VITUG vs CA Case Digest

VITUG vs CA

188 SCRA 755

FACTS: This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the

two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A. naming private

respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In said decision, the court upheld the appointment

of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug’s estate with her (Mrs. Vitug’s) widower,

petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.

Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of

stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate, plus

interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the CA the alleged advances were

spent for the payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and “increment thereto.”

Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn were

conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for

reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory

and for “concealment of funds belonging to the estate.”

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a

survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.

The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement.

On the other hand, the CA held that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis

causa which “did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the

Civil Code,” and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation

under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement between the spouses Vitug constitutes a donation?

HELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be

embodied in a will. A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which

a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take

effect after his death.” In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case,

the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the

case relied on, Rivera v. People’s Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship

agreement purports to deliver one party’s separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their

joint holdings.

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be

presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to

take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because

it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other.

It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership,

as held by the Court of Appeals, by “mere stipulation” and that it is no “cloak” to circumvent the law

on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal

property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking

parlance as an “and/or” account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings

account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making

venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been

sanctionable as a prohibited donation.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the

latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No.

35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the

inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate

property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.

VITUG vs. CA

183 SCRA 755

FACTS:

Dolores Vitug, deceased, during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico

Vitug, executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. It provides that after the death of

either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor.

ISSUES:

WON the survivorship agreement is a will.

WON it is valid.

RULING:

Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were

married, so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property. The

cash is owned in-common by them. When the spouses opened savings account, they merely

put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in

favor of the other. Since the wife predeceased her husband, the latter acquired

upon her death a vested right over the amount under the savings account.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997]

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TORRES, JR., J.:

Unless legally flawed, a testators intention in his last will and testament is its life and soul which deserves reverential observance.

The controversy before us deals with such a case.

Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this petition for review the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] dated November 29, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from allowing or admitting the will of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing the issuance of Letter Testamentary in favor of petitioner Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond is AFFIRMED but modified in that the declaration that paragraph II of the Torcuato Reyes' last will and testament, including subparagraphs (a) and (b) are null and void

for being contrary to law is hereby SET ASIDE, said paragraphs (a) and (b) are declared VALID. Except as above modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."[2]

The antecedent facts:

On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring therein in part, to wit:

xxx

II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the following properties to wit:

a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;

b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in

common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental. [3]

The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.

Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petitioner was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks.Notices were likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition.

On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and

the deceaseds natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.

On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an ordering declaring that it had acquired jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, allowed the presentation of evidence. After the presentation of evidence and submission of the respective memoranda, the trial court issued its decision on April 23, 1993.

The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. Thus:

The admission in the will by the testator to the illicit relationship between him and ASUNCION REYES EBARLE who is somebody elses, wife, is further bolstered, strengthened, and confirmed by the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and his

two attesting witnesses during the trial.

In both cases, the common denominator is the immoral meretrecious, adulterous and adulterous and illicit relationship existing between the testator and the devisee prior to the death of the testator, which constituted the sole and primary consideration for the devise or legacy, thus making the will intrinsically invalid. [4]

The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.

On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed the trial courts decision admitting the will for probate but the modification that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid. The appellee court stated:

Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent, documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being contrary to law and

morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[5]

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the oppositors filed this petition for review.

Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals was contrary to law, public policy and evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion Oning Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree.Witness Gloria Borromeo testified that Oning Reyes was her cousin as her mother and the latters father were sister and brother. They were also nieces of the late Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the purported marriage of the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab initio as it was against public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family Code.Petitioners further alleged that Oning Reyes was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the time she was cohabiting with the testator hence, she could never contact any valid marriage with the latter. Petitioners argued that the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the personal declaration of the testator, himself, were sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. To further support their contention, petitioners attached a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle.[6]

The petition is devoid of merit.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. [7] Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions.[8] The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.[9] The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because practical considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality.[10] Where the parties

agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so.[11] Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.[12]

The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes.Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.

The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator himself, acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee, to wit:

Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love an [sic] affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J.

Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comfort and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.

Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.[13] To remand the case would only be a waste of time and money since the illegality or defect was already patent. This case is different from the Nepomuceno case.Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was never an open admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that he was already previously married and that he had an adulterous relationship with the devisee.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to

another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of Asuncion. Thus:

The foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban (supra) the Supreme Court stated that the declaration of the husband is competent

evidence to show the fact of marriage.

Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[14]

In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said-

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testators having meant just what he said. (Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).

Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their failure to present the said certificate before the probate court to support their position that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much less in this petition for review. This Court would no try the case a new or settle factual issues since its jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by the lower courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record, which petitioners have not shown in this case. [15]

Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain the findings of the appellate court it appearing that it did not commit a reversible error in issuing the challenged decision.

ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995, is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

RABADILLA vs. CA

June 29, 2000

FACTS:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.

Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was

instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have

the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic)

piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina

Coscolluela y Belleza dies.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the

provisions of subject Codicil.

ISSUE:

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.

HELD:

Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and

obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.

Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the

time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of

the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the

deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his

death

Uriarte v. CFI, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 VICENTE URIARTE vs. CFI, et. al. G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

Facts: Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the

late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite, a non-resident alien, in CFI Negros Oriental, alleging

that he is an acknowledged natural son of the decedent and his sole heir. Petitioner

had previously initiated an action before the same court for compulsory

acknowledgment as natural son but there was no final judgment yet. Private

respondents, nephews of the decedent, filed an opposition alleging that the decedent

had left a will in Spain. Later, the same respondents filed a petition for probate in CFI

Manila using the alleged last will of the decedent, and then filed a motion to dismiss

the special proceedings in CFI Negros Oriental. The CFI Manila allowed the petition

for probate, and the CFI Negros dismissed the intestate proceeding. Petitioner then

filed a motion for reconsideration in CFI Negros which was denied. He also filed an

omnibus motion in CFI Manila asking for the dismissal of the probate proceeding on

the ground that it was the CFI Negros that took first cognizance of the case. Said

motion was denied by CFI Manila. Hence this petition for certiorari on the ground of

grave abuse of discretion of the two courts – CFI Manila and Negros Oriental.

Issues: Whether or not the dismissal of the special proceedings in CFI Negros was

proper; and whether or not CFI Manila has jurisdiction to probate the alleged will.

Held: On the first issue, it was proper that the intestate proceeding in Negros CFI be

discontinued because of the fact that the decedent had left a will. It is well-settled that

testacy is favored over intestacy, and that any intestate proceeding may be terminated

at any time when it is discovered that the deceased had left a will. However, the

proper thing the private respondents should have done was to file the petition for

probate in CFI Negros which was already hearing the intestate proceeding. The issue

now is improper venue, not jurisdiction. Unfortunately for petitioner, he is now guilty

of laches for failing to timely object to the filing of the petition for probate in CFI

Manila. It is settled that questions of venue may be waived when not timely objected

to. Hence, the CFI Manila may continue with the probate case, without prejudice to

petitioner's successful action for his compulsory recognition as heir.

Petition for certiorari was denied.

URIARTE V. CFI

Short summary: alleged natural child of the deceased filed petition for settlement of INTESTATE estate of Don Juan Uriarte y

Goite in Negros Occidental Court. PNB was even appointed as special administrator, but PNB failed to qualified. MTD filed by

nephew of Don Juan, alleging that while he was in Spain, the deceased made a will AND that petitioner had doubtful interest

(proceeding for his recognition as a natural child not yet done). Pending this, the nephews instituted a petition for probate of the will

of Don Juan in Manila. Alleged natural son opposed, contending that Negros courts already had exclusive jurisdiction of the case.But

Negros court dismissed the special proceeding, and the Manila court proceeded to probate the will. Petitioner contested it. Court

held that since the decedent was a non-resident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper venues for the proceedings. But since

probate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even if the venue was improper,

petitioner considered to have waived the defect by laches. Lastly, the court held that if ever recognized as the natural child of the

decedent, he could opt to intervene in the probate proceedings, or to have it opened if already finished.

Facts:

-Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila and Negros

-The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed petition for settlement of INTESTATE ESTATE of Don Juan before

the Negros Occidental court. Note that during that time, the proceedings for compulsory acknowledgment as the natural son of Don

Juan was still pending

-PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate, but PNB failed to qualify

-OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of Don Juan):

Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated - submitted before Negros court

ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable

-JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related) commenced SPECPRO for PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF DON JUAN

before Manila courts + MTD in Negros Courts

Since there's a will, no need for intestate proceedings before Negros Courts

Vicente had no legal personality to sue

>>>OPPOSED by VICENTE: Negros Courts first took cognizance, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same

NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it

-VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to intervene + dismissal of petition for probate + annulment of

proceedings - DENIED

-Manila court admitted to probate the last will

WON NEGROS COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT? NO.

Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the time of his death, so the courts in the province s where he left

property may take cognizance of settlement of his estate

-here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros

Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to give way to Manila court

special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on

intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.

BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate

proceedings for the same purpose.

So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the

probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already

been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the

executor subsequently appointed.

If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as intestacy

VICENTE already waived procedural defect of VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID

-He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros court, so he should have filed a MTD in Manila court earlier: Manila

court already

*appointed an administrator

*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier

-court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net

result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction

As to interest of Vicente in the case

-two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent:

(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and

(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Salas and Kalaw for appellants.

Jose Santiago for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan, admitting to

probate a document which was offered as the last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on the 19th day

of April, 1908. The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five months following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter.

The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary

to execute a valid will.

The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of

certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.

At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since died, and consequently their testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The other three testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which the will was executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the following manner:

Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the

disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative

movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.

These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we are in perfect accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.

This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second assignment of error, viz, the testator's alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the will. Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he

indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He

was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.

Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will was executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or

five years prior to his death and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question was propounded to Doctor Basa:

Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you think he was in his right mind?

A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder, because when I spoke to him he did not answer me.

Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.

Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at

some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.

We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by will.

The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary capacity was discussed by this court. The numerous citations there given from the decisions of the United States courts are especially applicable to the case at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of

testamentary capacity. (In the matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep., 463; in the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)

The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator

in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of

mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.

The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which a

person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that —

Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this statement.)

The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and quoted with approval inCampbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:

To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.

In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:

The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he was about to bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged at the time when he executed his will. (See authorities there cited.)

In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case: The

testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory were mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became

filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant of the properties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:

Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his immediate family or property. . . .

x x x x x x x x x

Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their

strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful or recent events, especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he was

remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational expression.

In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as was

pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all

indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several

hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.

For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909

CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,

vs. FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.

Rodriguez and Del Rosario for appellants. Fernando Salas for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, admitting to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was

contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased, and who would be

entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.

Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the

alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.

The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the making of wills.

Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mariño, testified in support of the will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it was executed; and their testimony was corroborated in all important details by the testimony of the proponent herself, who was present when the will was made. It does not appear from the record why the third subscribing witness was not called; but since counsel for the contestants makes no comment upon his absence, we think it may safely be inferred that there was some good and sufficient reason therefore. In passing, however, it may be well to observe that, when because of death, sickness, absence, or for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness stand all the subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason for the absence of any of these witnesses should be made to appear of record, and this especially in cases such as the one at bar, wherein there is a contests.

The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore that

the testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind and memory, and in their presence attached his signature thereto as his last will and testament, and that in his presence and in the presence of each other, they as well as the third subscribing witness. Despite the searching and exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel for appellants could point to no

flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single incident which occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a contradiction, however, which we think is more apparent than real. One of the witnesses stated that the deceased sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and that after its execution food was given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and was given something to eat before he signed his

name. We think the evidence discloses that his wife aided the sick man to sit up in bed at the time when he signed his name to the instrument, and that he was given nourishment while he was in that position, but it is not quite clear whether this was immediately before or after, or both before and after he attached his signature to the will. To say that the sick man sat up or raised himself up in bed

is not necessarily in conflict with the fact that he received assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or impossible that nourishment might have been given to him both before and after signing the will, and that one witness might remember the former occasion and the other witness might recall the latter, although neither witness could recall both. But, however this may have been,

we do not think that a slight lapse of memory on the part of one or the other witness, as to the precise details of an unimportant incident, to which his attention may not have been particularly directed, is sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses, or as to the truth and accuracy of their recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument. Of course, a number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or even a single contradiction as to a particular incident, where the incident was of such a nature that the intention of any person who was present must have been directed to it, and where the contradictory statements in regard to it are so clear and explicit as to negative the possibility or probability of mistake, might well be sufficient to justify the conclusion that

the witnesses could not possibly have been present, together, at the time when it is alleged the will was executed; but the apparent contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses in the case at bar

fall far short of raising a doubt a to their veracity, and on the other hand their testimony as a whole gives such clear, explicit, and detailed account of all that occurred, and is so convincing and altogether satisfactory that we have no doubt that the trial judge who heard them testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy of entire confidence and belief.

The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at the time and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was executed, these witnesses were not in the house with the testator, and that the alleged testator was at that time in such physical

and mental condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. Two of these witnesses, upon cross-examination, admitted that they were not in the house at or between the hours of four and six in the afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have been made, this being the time at which the witnesses in support of the will testified that it was executed. Of the other witnesses, one is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These witnesses swore that they were in the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill, at or about the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, and that at that time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the house, and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to make himself understood, and

that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the testimony of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence. In addition to his manifest interest in the result of the investigation, it clearly discloses a fixed and settled purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to that end an utter disregard of the truth, and readiness to swear to any fact which he imagined would aid in

securing his object. An admittedly genuine and authentic signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the will, but this witness in his anxiety to deny the genuineness of the signature of his brother to the will, promptly and positively swore that the admittedly genuine signature was not his brother's signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in response to a somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently gave him to understand that his former answer was likely to prejudice his own cause. On cross-examination, he was forced to admit that because his brother and his brother's wife (in those favor the will was made) were Aglipayanos, he and his other brothers and sisters had not visited them for many months prior to the one particular occasion as to which testified; and he admitted further, that,

although he lived near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any of the other members of his family visit their dying brother, and that they did not even attend the funeral. If the testimony of this witness could be accepted as true, it would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the subscribing witnesses to the alleged will should have falsely pretended to have joined in its execution on the very

day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness happened to pay his only visit to his brother during his last illness, so that the testimony of this witness would furnish conclusive evidence in support of the allegations of the contestants that the alleged will was not executed at the time and place or in the manner and form alleged by the subscribing witnesses. We do not think that the

testimony of this witness nor any of the other witnesses for the contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the will, or as to the manner and from in which it was executed.

In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence, and upon a comparison of this signature with the signature attached to the instrument in question, we are wholly of the opinion of the trial judge, who held in this connection as follows:

No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures, and the presiding judge of this court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in the matter of signatures; nevertheless, the court has compared these two signatures, and does not find that any material differences exists between the same. It is true that the signature which appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that at the time of writing the

subscriber was more deliberate in his movements, but two facts must be acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and the other fact, that for some reason which is not stated

the testator was unable to see, and was a person who was not in the habit of signing his name every day.

These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two

signatures, but the court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are identical.

That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was

of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental

incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions

as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.

Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But when it is considered that

the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the

vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never was executed.

It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine the degree of mental capacity of a particular person has been everywhere recognized, and grows out of the inherent impossibility of measuring mental capacity, or its impairment by disease or other causes" (Greene vs. Greene, 145 III., 264, 276); and that "it is probable that no court has ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect to the exact amount of mental capacity requisite for the making of a valid will, without appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking" (Trish vs. Newell, 62 III., 196, 203).

Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has

been held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his property" (Lodge vs.Lodge, 2 Houst. (Del.), 418); that, "To

constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise" (Sloan vs. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that "it has

not been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . . Few indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity, would, according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man" (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L.,680);

and, that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree" (Boughton vs. Knight, L. R.,3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been

held that "testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from disease,

or great bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in" (Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).

But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the testator was, at the time of making the

instrument under consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be no question that, in the

absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.

Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.

(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 23, p. 71, second edition.)

In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased; that it was made in strict

conformity with the requisites prescribed by law; and that, at the time of its execution, the deceased was of sound mind and memory, and executed the instrument of his own free will and accord.

The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed, with the cost of this instance against the appellants.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989

MOISES JOCSON, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents.

Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Officers for petitioner.

Gabriel G. Mascardo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. No. 63474, promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled "MOISES JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, versus AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ,

defendant-appellants," upholding the validity of three (3) documents questioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, which declared them as null and void; and of its resolution, dated September 30, 1980, denying therein appellee's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.

As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3)

share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

The documents, which were presented as evidence not by Moises Jocson, as the party assailing its validity, but rather by herein respondents, are the following:

1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," marked as Exhibit 3 (pp. 12-13, Records) for the

defendant in the court a quo, dated July 27, 1968. By this document Emilio Jocson sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez six (6) parcels of land, all located at Naic, Cavite, for the sum of ten thousand P10,000.00 pesos. On the same document Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price, thus:

Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000) salaping Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob at ang pagkakatanggap ay

aking hayagang inaamin sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, sa aking anak na si Agustina Jocson, na may sapat na gulang, mamamayang Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto

Vasquez, at naninirahan sa Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay aking ipinagbile ng lubusan at kagyat at walang ano mang pasubali ang nabanggit na anim na pirasong lupa na nasa unang dahon ng dokumentong ito, sa nabanggit na Agustina Jocson, at sa kaniyang tagapagmana o makakahalili at gayon din nais kong banggitin na kahit na

may kamurahan ang ginawa kong pagbibile ay dahilan sa ang nakabile ay aking anak na sa akin at mapaglingkod, madamayin at ma-alalahanin, na tulad din ng isa

ko pang anak na lalaki. Ang kuartang tinanggap ko na P10,000.00, ay gagamitin ko

sa aking katandaan at mga huling araw at sa aking mga ibang mahahalagang pangangailangan. [Emphasis supplied]

Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa kong ito ay hindi labag sa ano mang batas o kautusan, sapagkat ang aking pinagbile ay akin at nasa aking pangalan. Ang mga lupang nasa pangalan ng aking nasirang asawa ay hindi ko ginagalaw ni pinakikialaman at iyon ay dapat na hatiin ng dalawa kong anak alinsunod sa umiiral na batas (p. 13, Records.)

2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated July 27,1968, marked as Exhibit 4 (p. 14, Records). On the face of this document, Emilio Jocson purportedly sold to Agustina

Jocson-Vasquez, for the sum of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, two rice mills and a camarin (camalig) located at Naic, Cavite. As in the first document,

Moises Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:

'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P5,000.00) salaping Pilipino

na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob sa aking anak na Agustina Jocson .... Na ang halagang ibinayad sa akin ay may kamurahan ng kaunti ngunit dahil sa malaking pagtingin ko sa kaniya ... kaya at pinagbile ko sa kaniya ang mga nabanggit na pagaari kahit na hindi malaking halaga ... (p. 14, Records).

3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale, "dated March 9, 1969, marked as Exhibit 2 (p. 10-11, Records), whereby Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, without the participation and intervention of Moises Jocson, extrajudicially partitioned the unsettled estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the same into three parts, one-third (1/3) each for the heirs of Alejandra Poblete, namely: Emilio Jocson, Agustina Jocson-Vasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same instrument, Emilio sold his one- third (1/3) share to Agustin for the sum of EIGHT

THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS. As in the preceding documents, Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:

Now for and in consideration of the sum of only eight thousand (P8,000.00) pesos,

which I, the herein Emilio Jocson had received from my daughter Agustina Jocson, do hereby sell, cede, convey and transfer, unto the said Agustina Jocson, her heirs and assigns, administrators and successors in interests, in the nature of absolute and irrevocable sale, all my rights, interest, shares and participation, which is equivalent to one third (1/3) share in the properties herein mentioned and described

the one third being adjudicated unto Agustina Jocson and the other third (1/3) portion being the share of Moises Jocson. (p. 11, Records).

These documents were executed before a notary public. Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite on July 29, 1968 and the transfer certificates of title covering the properties therein in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in the name of Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds.

Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then Court of First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was twice amended. In his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein

petitioner assailed the above documents, as aforementioned, for being null and void.

It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in his complaint for the reason that the nature of his causes of action is at issue, thus:

8. [With regard the first document, that] the defendants, through fraud, deceit, undue pressure and influence and other illegal machinations, were able to induce, led, and procured their father ... to sign [the] contract of sale ..., for the simulated price of

P10,000.00, which is a consideration that is shocking to the conscience of ordinary man and despite the fact that said defendants have no work or livelihood of their own ...; that the sale is null and void, also, because it is fictitious, simulated and fabricated contract x x x (pp. 52-53, Record on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]

xxx xxx xxx

12. [With regards the second and third document, that they] are null and void because the consent of the father, Emilio Jocson, was obtained with fraud, deceit, undue pressure, misrepresentation and unlawful machinations and trickeries committed by the defendant on him; and that the said contracts are simulated, fabricated and fictitious, having been made deliberately to exclude the plaintiff from

participating and with the dishonest and selfish motive on the part of the defendants to defraud him of his legitimate share on said properties [subject matter thereof]; and

that without any other business or employment or any other source of income, defendants who were just employed in the management and administration of the

business of their parents, would not have the sufficient and ample means to purchase the said properties except by getting the earnings of the business or by

simulated consideration ... (pp. 54-55, Record on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]

Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a father and daughter who are living under the same roof, especially so when the father has no need of money as the properties

supposedly sold were all income-producing. Further, petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record on Appeal). As far as Exhibit 2 is concerned, petitioner questions not the extrajudicial partition but only the sale by

his father to Agustina of the former's 1/3 share (p. 13, Rollo).

The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner (pp. 59-81, Record on Appeal). It declared that the considerations mentioned in the documents were merely simulated and fictitious because: 1) there was no showing that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2) the

prices were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to lack of consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of the sale between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining between the parties; and that the real intention of the parties were donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from participating in the estate of his

parents. It further declared the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" and ordered that the properties subject matter of all the documents be registered in the name of herein petitioners and private respondents.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's and ruled that:

1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are concerned the appellee's complaint for annulment, which is indisputably based on fraud, and undue influence, is now barred by prescription, pursuant to the settled rule that an action for annulment of a contract based on fraud must be filed within four (4) years, from the discovery of the fraud, ... which in legal contemplation is deemed to be the date of the registration of said document with the Register of Deeds ... and the records admittedly show that both

Exhibits 3 and 4, were all registered on July 29, 1968, while on the other hand, the appellee's complaint was filed on June 20, 1973, clearly beyond the aforesaid four-year prescriptive period provided by law;

2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are decisively not simulated or fictitious contracts, since Emilio Jocson actually and really intended them to be effective and binding against him, as to divest him of the full dominion and ownership over the properties subject of said assailed contracts, as in fact all his titles over the

same were all cancelled and new ones issued to appellant Agustina Jocson-Vasquez ...;

3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and subsisting, and the partition with sale therein made by and between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez,

affecting the 2/3 portion of the subject properties described therein have all been made in accordance with Article 996 of the New Civil Code on intestate succession, and the appellee's (herein petitioner) remaining 1/3 has not been prejudiced (pp. 41-42, Rollo).

In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following assignments of errors:

1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING

THAT THE SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD" AND NOT ON ITS INEXISTENCE AND NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND GOOD

CUSTOMS?

II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION?

III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INEXISTENT AND NULL AND VOID THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION AND IN

REVERSING THE DECLARING DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT? (p. 2, Rollo)

I.

The first and second assignments of errors are related and shall be jointly discussed.

According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of action were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a contract tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent was obtained through fraud, is voidable; and the action for annulment must be brought within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil Code), otherwise the contract may no longer be contested. Under present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time the convenant was registered with the Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered on July 29, 1968 but

Moises Jocson filed his complaint only on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as these documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had prescribed.

If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in assailing the questioned documents, We would have sustained the above pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by petitioner, he

further assailed the deeds of conveyance on the ground that they were without consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as paid were in fact merely simulated.

According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause produce no effect whatsoever. A

contract of sale with a simulated price is void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]), and an action for the declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code; See also, Castillo v. Galvan, No. L-27841, October 20, l978, 85 SCRA 526). Moises Jocsons saction, therefore, being for the judicial declaration of nullity of Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of simulated price, is imprescriptible.

II.

For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely academic. The burden of proof in

showing that contracts lack consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree of proof becomes more stringent where the documents themselves show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and more so where the documents were notarized, as in the case at bar. Upon consideration of the records of this case, We are of the opinion that petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents are without consideration.

Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no other source of income other than what she derives from helping in the management of the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and which was insufficient to pay for the purchase price, was contradicted by his own

witness, Isaac Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and her husband were engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p. 10, t.s.n., January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his wife testified that they did not know whether or not Agustina was involved in some other business (p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p. 36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).

On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the business of buying and selling palay and rice even before her marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948 and continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15, 1976). Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a contract is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it is clear that petitioner miserably failed to prove his allegation.

Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of alleged inadequacy of price. To

begin with, there was no showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase price paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above the total assessed value of the properties alleged by petitioner. In his Second Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that the total assessed value of the properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase price paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the 1/3 share

of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his wife, Alejandra Poblete. And any difference between the market value and the purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight, may not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-

46430-31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).

Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract (Article 1470, Civil Code) and there is nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in Emilio Jocson's consent.

Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a father and his daughter is purely

speculative which has no relevance to a contract where all the essential requisites of consent, object and cause are clearly present.

There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3 and 4, that the properties subject matter therein are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that since the properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were enough proof to show that the properties covered therein were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637, 644, We held that:

Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal assets, the spouses Perez

adduced not a modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which provides that ... . As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639],

it was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the Property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property." In the recent case of Maramba vs. Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 474], this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that "the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the marriage," and then concluded that since "there is no showing as to when the

property in question was acquired...the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar, since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the husband alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to said spouse.'

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, No. L-24571, December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs. Torela, No. 1,27843, October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 391.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to

Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor

but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v.

Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December 16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.

We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal (See Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248). But this ruling is not inconsistent with the

above pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs- Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124 SCRA 154).

In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient proof to show that the disputed properties were acquired during his parents' coverture. We would have ruled that the properties, though registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in view of the presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.

There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.