structural integrity management for aging offshore infrastructures 1055 stress engineering...

Structural Integrity Management for Aging Offshore Infrastructures

2016 US-China Oil and Gas Industry Forum

2 an employee-owned company

Structural Integrity Management for Aging Offshore Infrastructures

• Types of infrastructure considered Fixed platforms Floating production systems

– Semi – FPSO – TLP – SPAR

Subsea Equipment Pipelines (both rigid and flexible) Flowlines (both rigid and flexible)


API Floating Systems Standards

• API RP 2FPS, Planning, Design, and Constructing Floating Production Systems • API 2A-WSD, Planning, Designing and Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms-Working

Stress Design • API Spec 2C, Specification for Offshore Cranes • API RP 2D, Recommended Practice for Operation and Maintenance of Offshore Cranes • API Bull 2INT-MET, Interim Guidance on Hurricane Conditions in the Gulf of Mexico • API RP 2MOP, Marine Operations • API RP 2RD, Recommended Practice for Design of Risers for Floating Production

Systems (FPSs) and Tension-Leg Platforms (TLPs) • API 2SIM, Structural Integrity Management of Fixed Offshore Structures • API RP 2SK, Design and Analysis of Station Keeping Systems for Floating Structures • API RP 2T, Recommended Practice for Planning, Design and Constructing Tension Leg

Platforms • API Bull 2U, Stability Design of Cylindrical Shells • API Bull 2V, Design of Flat Plate Structures • API RP 14J, Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore

Production Facilities • API RP 75, Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental

Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities • AISC 360-05, Specification for Structural Steel Buildings • AWS D1.1, Structural Welding Code - Steel


Organizational Elements of API RP 75 • Safety and Environmental Information • Hazards Analysis • Management of Change • Operating Procedures • Safe Work Practices • Training • Pre-Startup Review • Emergency Response and Review • Investigation of Incidents • Audit of Safety and Environmental Management Program

Elements • Records and Documentation


API RP 75 • Recommended Practice for Development of a

Safety and Environmental Management • Program for Offshore Operations and • Facilities • Contains 12 building blocks or “elements”

1 Equipment-based

11 Organizational

• Not labeled as IM, but content is similar to major oil company IM programs


Primary Damage Mechanisms

• Age

• Construction flaws

• Corrosion

• Fatigue

• Storms

• Lack of maintenance and upkeep


Structural Integrity - Examples


Hurricane Damage


Why is Integrity Management (IM) important?

• Emotional and economical cost to families from the loss of loved ones.

• Impact to the environment

• Impact to a company’s reputation

• Financial impact

• Loss of production


IM Cycle

Plan Implement

Measure

Document

ImproveIM Cycle

Plan Implement

Measure

Document

ImproveIM Cycle

Develop Plans (Risk-based, if applicable) and Procedures:

Monitoring

Inspection

Testing

Maintenance

Implement Plans

Measure Results – KPIs

Document Results

Identify Improvements/Changes

Periodic “Health Check” Assessments

“Sur

veill

ance

”


Components of FSIM • Overall weight management

and stability considerations

• Deck and Deck structure

Strength and fatigue

• Station keeping Systems – mooring lines, tendons, foundations/anchors, hull-mounted equipment

• Riser Systems – riser pipe, buoyancy, tensioners, porches

• Global performance – analytical versus measured

• Marine or Performance Monitoring

• Marine Systems – ballast, bilge, seawater


Full Life Cycle Approach

Moorings/Foundations

Risers

SubseaEquipment

Wells

Drilling

Topsides Equipment

DeckStructure

HullStructure

Decommission& Remove

Commission/Test

Fabricate/Manufacture

Design Install/Assemble

Operate

Project Life Cycle

Functions


Risers

SubseaEquipment

Wells

Drilling

Topsides Equipment

DeckStructure

HullStructure


Commission/Test



Operate


Risers

SubseaEquipment

Wells

Drilling

Topsides Equipment

DeckStructure

HullStructure


Commission/Test



Operate


Risers

SubseaEquipment

Wells

Drilling

Topsides Equipment

DeckStructure

HullStructure



RisersRisers

SubseaEquipment

SubseaEquipment

WellsWells

Drilling Drilling

Topsides EquipmentTopsides Equipment

DeckStructure

DeckStructure

HullStructure

HullStructure


Commission/Test



Operate Decommission& Remove


Commission/Test

Commission/Test

Fabricate/ManufactureFabricate/Manufacture

Design Design Install/Assemble

Install/Assemble

OperateOperate

Project Life Cycle

Functions


• Requires strong management direction and support

• Includes involvement from: Design to Decommissioning and Removal

Deficiencies or defects may occur at any stage of a project

Not just an “Operations” issue




• System Definition Functional requirements System Architecture

• Risk Assessment System or Component FMECA or FTA

• Design • Verification and Validation • Manufacture • Installation • Operations and Maintenance


Full Life Cycle Approach (Risk)

Hazard

Incident or Accident

Hazard

Incident or Accident

Decommission & Remove

Commission/ Test

Fabricate/ Manufacture

Design Install/ Assemble

Operate

Project Life Cycle

Swiss Cheese Failure Model

Barriers against failure


Full Life Cycle Approach – Examples of Unintended Failures (Risk)

• Design Barrier: Industry-accepted design codes are presumed to

provide adequate safety.

Unintended Weakness: Codes are applied outside of their originally intended scope.

• Fabricate/Manufacture Barrier: High quality material specifications are provided for

the project.

Unintended Weakness: Counterfeit material is used because of poor Quality Assurance processes.


Sleipner – North Sea - 1991

• Concrete gravity based structure • As it was deballasted onto the seafloor, rumbling noises

heard, followed by the sound of seawater pouring into the unit

• Began sinking and the buoyancy chambers imploded

Courtesy: Statoil


Sleipner Root Cause

• Inaccurate finite element approximation during calculations in the design of the structure.

• Stresses on the ballast chambers were under estimated by 47% and some concrete walls were designed too thin.


Ocean Ranger

February 15, 1982 The world’s largest semi-submersible capsized and sank on the Grand Banks with the loss of 84 crew members.


Ocean Ranger Canadian Royal Commission Findings

• Crews were not trained in emergency response.

• Safety equipment was inadequate.

• There were design and construction flaws, particularly in the ballast control room.

• Detailed instructions and personnel trained in the use of the ballast control panel were not available


Alexander Kielland – North Sea 1980

• The flotel lost one of its five legs in severe gale force winds, but not an extreme storm.

• The accident started with one of the bracings failing due to fatigue, thereby causing a succession of failures of all bracings attached to this leg.

• 123 Fatalities


This was traced to a small 6mm fillet weld which joined a non-load-bearing flange plate to this D-6 bracing.

This flange plate held a sonar device used during drilling operations.

Alexander Kielland – North Sea 1980


P-36 - Brazil


North Sea and Gulf of Mexico Major Incidents




Risers

SubseaEquipment

Wells

Drilling

Topsides Equipment

DeckStructure

HullStructure


Commission/Test



Operate

Project Life Cycle

Functions


Risers

SubseaEquipment

Wells

Drilling

Topsides Equipment

DeckStructure

HullStructure


Commission/Test



Operate


Risers

SubseaEquipment

Wells

Drilling

Topsides Equipment

DeckStructure

HullStructure


Commission/Test



Operate


Risers

SubseaEquipment

Wells

Drilling

Topsides Equipment

DeckStructure

HullStructure



RisersRisers

SubseaEquipment

SubseaEquipment

WellsWells

Drilling Drilling

Topsides EquipmentTopsides Equipment

DeckStructure

DeckStructure

HullStructure

HullStructure


Commission/Test



Operate Decommission& Remove


Commission/Test

Commission/Test

Fabricate/ManufactureFabricate/Manufacture

Design Design Install/Assemble

Install/Assemble

OperateOperate

Project Life Cycle

Functions


Thank You!

structural integrity management for aging offshore infrastructures 1055 stress engineering...

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