Strategic Conflict Assessment Report

Name: Philip Farrell

ID: 0436941

Conflict: Central African Republic conflict 2012-2013

Perspective: Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Level: International/Regional

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CONTENTS

Chapter Page

PART ONE: CONFLICT ANALYSIS

A) Background and history

B) Analysis of social structuresi. Securityii. Politicaliii. Socialiv. Economic

C) Conflict Actors

D) Dynamics

PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RESPONSES

1) Outside the Central African Republic

International Community

African Community (African Union, ECCAS)

2) Non-governmental humanitarian responses

3) Within the Central African Republic

The government of Michel Djotodia

Peripheral Groups

Civilian Responses

PART THREE: DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS

A) Strategies and options

B) Recommendations

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*Report based on events up to and including 11-October-2013

PART ONE: CONFLICT ANALYSIS

A) Background and history

Since gaining independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has seen more coup d’états than democratic elections.  After François Bozizé assumed power in a coup from Ange-Félix Patassé in 2003, a rebel coalition known as Séléka began a three year Bush War with Bozizé’s government. Despite an April 2007 peace agreement, violence continued in many parts of the country. In 2012, Séléka launched a new offensive, capturing numerous towns in central and eastern regions. Despite military intervention by ECCAS members (Cameroon, Chad, Angola, Republic of Congo, and Gabon) and South Africa, rebels eventually took the capital Bangui in March 2013. President Bozizé has since fled to Cameroon, while Séléka leader Michel Djotodia has installed himself as the country’s new President.

As of October 2013, the situation in CAR remains extremely volatile and unstable, with all sides accused of looting, raping, and committing summary executions across the country. Séléka backed Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye has described the situation as “catastrophic”, and says that the CAR is now “a non-state” (Nossiter A, August 2013).

B) Analysis of social structures

i. Security

Following Séléka’s takeover of the country, ECCAS (which had previously committed troops to stop the takeover) agreed to a de facto recognition of the new regime and a transitional framework under their supervision.

Security uncertainties remain critical. The economy of the capital Bangui has been spoiled by the presence of looting and rebel requisitions. Divisions within the movement and the proliferation of weaponry in Bangui are some issues that urgently need to be addressed. Elsewhere in the country, tensions between the Muslim and Christian populations have a potential to become inflamed and possibly draw in responses from neighbouring states.

Séléka have been disbanded, but control over pockets of the movement may have been tenuous as looting and raping continue to be a problem. The current situation for the National Army (FACA) is uncertain, however in March 2013 it was reported that the Chief of the Armed Forces had sworn loyalty to Djotodia (Reuters, March 28 2013), diminishing the worry of a protracted large-scale conflict or civil war. Small bands of resistance, loyal to Bozizé remain particularly in western regions (Financial Times, September 2013).

It is imperative that the Djotodia government implement a programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) which would go a long way to address the proliferation of weapons on the streets and the potential for prolonged conflict.

ii. Political

The International Crisis Group (ICG) provides a bleak picture for the political situation in CAR. Stressing that the new regime needs to secure“the country, organise elections, restorepublic services and implement judicial, economic and social reforms” (ICG Africa

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Report No.203, June 2013), the ICG states that failure to carry out these functions will further weaken both the Séléka movement, and its ability to govern.

An estimated 150,000 – 206,000 people remain internally displaced as a result of the conflict, and a solution needs to be found for these people if they are not to become part of a situation that may shatter the relative peace today.

iii. Economic

At the moment the ECCAS members surrounding CAR are waiting to see what impact the transition government may have on the economy of the struggling state. If this impact is negative, there is a potential to create a large economic black-hole in the heart of Africa, which could prove detrimental to the economies of South Sudan, Cameroon and Republic of the Congo. Spill-over of black economies and illicit trading into these countries could put an enormous strain on their already struggling economic situations.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) recently cited the CAR as one of the most underdeveloped nations in Africa. For this situation not to worsen, the new government will urgently have to address its serious economic concerns along with security issues to help prevent future conflict.

iv. Social

The ICG has cited the “deterioration of the social environment” as a factor that“could jeopardise the very fragile transition”(ICG Africa Report No.203, June 2013), of the CAR.In August UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos told the Security Council that “1.6 million people are in dire need of assistance, including food, protection, health care, water, sanitation and shelter” (Amos V, UN News Center, August 2013) . Ms. Amos also claimed that more than 206,000 people have been displaced.

The country faces a refugee crisis, with a reported 40000 CAR citizens fleeing to neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (Misser, F, September 2013), a country ill-equipped to host such vast amounts of asylum seekers.

“Faced with multiple problems, the new government will have to define security, humanitarian, budgetary and political priorities” (ICG Africa Report No.203, June 2013).

C) Conflict actors

Séléka : Emerging in 2012, Séléka were not a single force but a coalition of different actors. Two of the main groups were the CPJP and the CPSK, both of whom have many of the same aims and rationales for engaging in conflict. A2R, FDPC and UFDR are the groups other factions. The movement’s make-up was reflected in its name; Séléka means Alliance.

The RNW described the organisation as a ‘motley’ group made up of many mutineers and former militiamen (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, January 2013). Before the successful takeover of Bangui in March 2013, Séléka strength was estimated at 3000 fighters.

Its principal demands were the full implementation by the government of peace agreement details of 2007 and 2011. Following Bozizé’s failure in this regard, Séléka’s primary aim became state capture.

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Since doing so, Séléka vowed to hold Presidential elections in 2016, with new President Djotodia promising not to run. After the coup in March 2013, when the Army swore loyalty to Djotodia, the military and main body of Séléka began merging. In early October, the movement was officially disbanded, but many of its former members remain sprawled throughout the country, with their weapons intact.

National Army (FACA): the RNW estimated the Army’s strength in January 2013 at 3500 soldiers (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, January 2013). In March 2013 the Army Chief of Staff claimed the military were swearing allegiance to Djotodia. However, a not insignificant amount of armed resistance from former soldier remains.

This represents a major problem for the security of the state. The Financial Times reported on September 10 that 74 people had been killed in the western region of Bossangoa in clashed between Séléka forces and gunmen loyal to Bozizé.

While FACA itself has been supplanted by Séléka and expected to integrate with it, the emergence of Bozizé loyalists opens up the prospect of another actor in the arena. In August, Bozizé claimed that he intended to return to power (Reuters, August 10 2013; Hubert T, August 2013), a claim which may have spurred on those elements who remain loyal to him.

Bozizé was granted asylum in Cameroon but was last active in South Africa.

Chad: Situated on CAR’s north-western frontier, Chad has traditionally been a key supporter of the Bozizé regime. In 2003 President Idriss Déby helped bring Bozizé to power and in operations against Séléka in 2010. As well as mediating peace efforts by ECCAS, Chad sent an unconfirmed number of troops to CAR to protect Bangui.

Chad’s traditional role as a Bozizé ally may raise fears of Déby resistance efforts by Bozizé loyalists. Although the Chadian force in Bangui refused to engage in fighting Séléka as they entered the city, fuelling rumours that Déby may have given up his support of Bozizé (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, January 2013). This is corroborated by remarks made by the former President when he accused Déby of ordering his troops to let Séléka take the city (Hubert T, August 2013).

If Chad is willing to back the new regime, then this might be good news for the stability of CAR.

France: The CAR’s former colonial master was been involving itself in the country’s affairs since its independence. Often the arbiter of the survival of particular regimes (Berman, 1974; cited in Smith B.C. 2003: pp. 81); France was instrumental in helping Bozizé to power in 2003, and since 2007 have retained a light troop presence in the country. France still has 450 soldiers at the Bangui M’Poko Airport, a force which was not active during the recent conflict.

On September 23rd foreign minister Laurent Fabius called for an international response to escalating levels of violence in CAR and the arming of an African peacekeeping force (Irish J, September 2013).French President Francois Hollande has categorically ruled out sending French troops into the CAR (AFP, September 2013).

South Africa: South African President Jacob Zuma is another traditional ally of Bozizé. Zuma’s willingness to back Bozizé may have as much to do with countering French influence in the region as providing altruistic support to a traditional ally. An

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abounding theory is that Zuma’s party, the ANC, may also have mineral interests in CAR, as well as financial assets that required protection (Manthorpe J, April 2013).

South African National Defence Forces (SANDF) troops have been station in the country since 2007, with a further 200 being deployed to protect President Bozizé in January 2013 (IRIN, January 2013).The SANDF claims to have suffered 13 fatalities protecting Bangui, however Bozizé accused Zuma of failing to send adequate reinforcements to assist FACA in March and enabling Séléka’s taking of the capital (Hubert T, August 2013). Zuma has faced criticism for South Africa’s role in the country, and with an election coming up in South Africa next year; he is unlikely to risk further involvement in CAR.

All SANDF troops previously based in CAR were withdrawn in April (City Press, April 2013).

ECCAS & African Union: The CAR was suspended by the African Union (AU) in March after the coup (Dixon R, March 2013). The AU is planning a peacekeeping force of 3500 troops to be deployed in the country, but this may not take place until 2014 (Irish J, September 2013).

ECCAS, of which the CAR is a member, committed 2000 troops to bolster an existing force of 500 in the aftermath of the coup (BBC, April 2013). These included the troops from Chad but not those of South Africa, which is not a member. Known as MICOPAX, this force currently numbers about 1,100 troops still on the ground (AFP, September 2013) which are expected to form the core of the new African Union force in 2014.

D) Dynamics

Greed GrievanceMineral wealth Poverty, unemployment, exploitationPower struggle Coercion, attacks on civilians and minoritiesPolitical and/or tribal elitism Unequal development, exclusion

PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RESPONSES

1) Outside the Central African Republic

International Community

Since the 24 March coup d’état the international community has been criticised for inactivity in responding to the on-going instability in the country. It appears to be “low on the international radar” (The Africa Report, October 2013).

Prior to Séléka’s takeover France, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom among others, called on all sides ot cease hostilities, in particular the rebels. These calls from foreign secretaries were never backed up with threats of sanctions or military action and were mainly disregarded by both sides. They were mirrored by the International Criminal Court, the European Union, and the United Nations, to no avail.

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It seems now that the international community and the UN Security Council are keen to only pay lip service to the crisis. A growing number of organisations such as FIDH have called on the world’s governments to address the situation and assist the CAR before the situation there worsens (FIDH, September 2013). These calls mirror those of UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos who warned that unless action is undertaken in CAR soon, it risks becoming a failed state.

Since the coup France has been the most vocal in its support for a peaceful resolution to the on-going crisis, with President Hollande holding talks in Bamako in late September to urge a settlement (AFP, September 2013). France appears to assist by proxy, and is unwilling to commit its own forces. Hollande has called for a UN Security Council resolution on CAR (Fox News, September 2013). The United Nations held discussions about the CAR at its general assembly in September, but the issue was a peripheral cause compared to other concerns, mainly in Syria. However, discussions in New York did prompt Djotodia to dissolve the Séléka movement.

The major problem with regard to the international community since March has been its inaction, and a wait-and-see policy (Vircoulon T, September 2013). Meanwhile the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. ECCAS should focus on working with France for a lasting resolution.

African Community (African Union, ECCAS)

ECCAS members were supportive of Bozizé’s government and provided diplomatic and military aid to the ousted President during the recent Bush War and conflict that preceded his toppling. This failed to protect him against loosing his position and alienated members of the victorious regime from their neighbouring counterparts.

Following the successful coup in March the African Union suspended the CAR, threatening rebel leaders with prosecution (Dixon R, March 2013). However, this appears to create enormous problems for Djotodia’s government in its attempts to secure peace in the country and control its own fringe elements.

However the Union appeared to back the new government when it decided to deploy a new 3,500 strong peacekeeping force to the country in 2015. It may be that the Union is also playing a wait-and-see game with the CAR to see if the new President is capable of stemming the tide of violence gripping the state.

ECCAS has plans to deploy MICOPAX to other CAR cities, particularly in the west and north which have seen the worst of the on-going violence. The AU deployment will not take place until 2014, meaning that the MICOPAX force will be badly stretched if it is to try and maintain order. There is evidence to suggest that prominent supporters of Bozizé within ECCAS such as Chad have abandoned him and are prepared to support Djotodia. Currently their force in the country is working with his government trying to maintain peace. Whether this force is big or willing enough to confront ex-Séléka fighters or Bozizé loyalists remains to be seen.

2) Non-governmental humanitarian responses

Significant aid has been provided by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) who have been working primarily in Bangui districts most affected by recent floods. They

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have described the situation in the country as ‘volatile’ (ICRC, 2013). Also active in Bangui, Boguila and Paoua have been Médecins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) who noted that rates of malaria, diarrheal disease and malnutrition are higher than a year ago, 33% in the case of malaria (MSF, September 11 2013). The United Nations has also scaled-up its response to the crisis by opening mobile units in the north of the CAR to provide food for up to 500,000 people at risk of starvation (UN News Center, September 2013). Many humanitarian groups have pulled their staff out of the country as the violence continues (Reuters, July 2013).

While the work of humanitarian organisations, charities, and NGOs in the face of continuing instability is commendable, it fails to mask the seeming ignorance of the international community to the political and security concerns of the country. More focus appears to have been put on allaying a humanitarian crisis, than on creating a politically stable situation in the CAR.

3) Within the Central African Republic

The government of Michel Djotodia

Djotodia’s government has managed to convict some of its own followers of criminal activity. On September 11 the Criminal Court in Bangui sentenced 17 Séléka fighters to 8 years in prison for various crimes including theft and rape (Reuters, 12 September 2013). This was a promising response by the new government to the lawlessness of its troops, but cannot mask the problems with law and order rampant throughout the country.

The Séléka movement was officially disbanded in early October (The Africa Report, 2013) following increasing internationl pressure. Elements of the coalition that were loyal to Djotodia’s central leadership have been immersed into FACA, while the rest have been dibanded. However, many of these ex-troops appear to still carry their weapons, increasing the need for DDR processes in the country.

The new President has also discharged General Jean-Pierre Dollé-Waya, the Army Chief of Staff who swore alleigence to him in March. It appears that Dollé-Waya was releived of his position following clashes with Bozizé loyalists near Bangui in September (Sudan Tribune, 2013). This may have created discontent amongst army ranks. In addition, soldiers loyal to François Bozizé continue to hamper DDR efforts.

Peripheral groups

As well as Bozizé loyalists challenging state security, a new threat from former Séléka also has the potential to destabilize the contry. In March, Nelson Ndjadder, a rival of Djotodia’s within Séléka, claimed that he and many others did not recognise the new President’s rule and would consider challenging him in future (Dixon R, March 2013).

In early May, the FDPC faction of the alliance broke away from the coalition, citing criminal elements in the alliance as a factor for discontent and Djotodia’s unwillingness to crack down on abuses by some Séléka forces (NZ Week, September 2013). This group is accused of being behind some of the violence seen in northern CAR recently. If true, then FDPC has the potential to hinder the peace process. However, if they are genuine in their

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pursuit for justice and an end to criminal activity, then the FDPC may become a positive actor for social change.

As noted, Djotodia has officially disbanded Séléka, but what effects this will have on criminal activity is unknown. Many commentators have pointed out that the President had a tenuous authority over much of the movement anyway, and are skeptical that a move of this kind will have any effect on ex-rebel activities.

Civilian responses

Reports of responses by ordinary people in the country have trickled out through journalists stationed there. In the Bangui neighbourhood of Gobongo, residents were reported to have banged pots and pans for three nights in a row to show their displeasure with the continuing violence in the city. Youths in the same area also built a barricade to keep government troops and irregular rebels out (Nossiter A, August 2013).

Since the coup there has been little civilian mobilisation for or against the new government. Whether this is borne out of fear, apathy or support for either side is unclear. For now, civilian responses appear limited to localised acts of resistance or civic enterprise, but as yet has no national character.

PART THREE: DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS

A) Strategies and options

A military coup d'état is not an action that ECCAS should support in any sense, and the bloc were right to try and support Francois Bozizé while he was President. However, it seems clear now that the picture has changed. Many ECCAS leader may not be fond of Djotodia (BBC, 13 April 2013) however, now that he is President and pledged to hold elections, ECCAS must back him. This is to ensure that the CAR can recover in time for these planned elections. While Djotodia may not be seen as the ideal Head of State be neighbouring members, it would nonetheless be more detrimental for the CAR if another President were to be deposed in such a short space of time. It the finding of this assessment, that ECCAS must back Djotodia and his DDR process.

While mainly an economic bloc, ECCAS is very interested in peace and security. In order for central African markets to remain stable and capable of trade, peace and security must be maintained in the ten member states at all costs. Initially, ECCAS became involved in supporting Bozizé’s government militarily as means of securing trade and stability in the region. However, now that Djotodia is in power, ECCAS needs to reassess its options in the CAR.

The CAR is the most central member state of ECCAS and its position in the bloc makes its security and tradability of high importance. ECCAS should act to ensure that the CAR does not become a socio-economic black-hole in the heart of the bloc, or “a wound in the heart of Africa” as Idriss Déby recently declared (BBC, April 2013). It must also do so to ensure that spill-over violence and instability do not affect the member states surrounding it.

Currently Djotodia is having trouble pacifying his country, in spite of recent convictions against looter and rapists within his forces (Reuters, 12 September 2013). However, his position remains as unstable as the country’s. If the CAR is to stabilise and

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begin rebuilding, the ECCAS members should consider recognising Djotodia as a legitimate statesman and assist him in maintain law-and-order. The African Union must also be pressurised by the bloc to reinstate the CAR to full membership, as its current status of suspension will only serve to hamper Djotodia’s ability to rule, and therefore the CAR’s ability to rebuild.

As well as political support, the military support is also critical to the stabilization of the CAR. Currently, ECCAS members are maintaining a MICOPAX force of 1,100 troops in the country (AFP, September 2013). With FACA seemingly incapable of policing the country currently, and with divisions still endemic within Séléka, MICOPAX should be taking the lead in security and peacekeeping. It can also play a role in the DDR process.

In order to do this, MICOPAX may have to firmly engage with ex-Séléka irregular forces roaming streets and neighbourhoods (Nossiter A, August 2013) and demand their turnover their weapons. To do this, ECCAS should encourage Djotodia to heal relations with the FDPC faction who have committed themselves to the DDR process (NZ Week, September 2013).

The FDPC leader Abdoulaye Miskine remains under arrest in Cameroon (an ECCAS member). He should be released and allowed to return to the CAR to link up with Djotodia for negotiations. This is essential, as members of Djotodia’s cabinet have stated that Miskine’s participation in the transitional government is essential for peace (NZ Week, September 2013).

ECCAS members recently made plans to deploy some of the MICOPAX force to other cities, particularly in western regions racked with violence (Vircoulon T, September 2013). However, with a force of just 1,100 troops, this could stretch the force. Unless ECCAS and the African Union can persuade France to proactively use its force based in Bangui, then the MICOPAX force should be strengthened significantly before the wider African Union force is deployed in 2014.

Cameroon is specifically involved when it comes to the question of ousted President Francois Bozizé. In March, after he was deposed Bozizé was granted asylum in Cameroon (Polgreen L, March 2013). Since then he has been influential in supporting loyalist elements of FACA and is a focal point of resistance to the new government in Bangui. Furthermore, his presence in Cameroon could destabilize the Yaoundé government. In September it was reported that 1000 Bozizé loyalists had crossed the border and were setting up a base of operations from which to launch incursions into the CAR (Timchia Y, September 2013). This could be dangerous for Cameroon, especially if Djotodia or ex-Séléka elements attempt to cross the border to deal with these pro-Bozizé forces. Unless addressed, this could be the beginning of spill-over violence that ECCAS should try and prevent. For its own sake and that of the CAR, Cameroon should deport Bozizé as soon as possible.

However, Bozizé may not be in Cameroon, as some reports have traced him to South Africa (BBC, June 2013). If he is in South Africa, then ECCAS members should pressure Pretoria into extraditing him to Bangui to face genocide charges levelled against him there (SABC, June 2013).

Finally there is the crucial issue of displaced persons and refugees. As stated roughly 206000 people may be displaced both within and outside the CAR. Of the tens of thousands that are displaced within the country; violence and flooding has compounded their situation. ECCAS needs people on the ground to distribute aid and vital medical services. Many aid

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agencies have left the CAR due to instability and violence (Reuters, July 2013). FACA and MICOPAX urgently needs to pacify areas of the country that have experienced high levels of internal displacement and encourage these aid agencies back, in order to alleviate a huge displacement problem

There may be 40000 refugees in neighbouring countries, most of them ECCAS members. Although many member states are experiencing problems of their own, be there political, social, economic or security related; all urgently need to cooperate fully with available agencies on the ground to provide suitable camp accommodation for these refugees. Their presence in these states should help remind them of how important it will be to stabilise the CAR and allow these people to leave and return home.

B) Recommendations

The full recognition of Michel Djotodia’s government by all ECCAS members and a normalising of relations with the Central African Republic.

Cameroon to extradite Francois Bozizé to Bangui to face charges. If he is in South Africa, ECCAS must pressure that country to extradite him.

ECCAS to pressure the African Union to reinstate the Central African Republic’s membership.

MICOPAX force to be strengthened immediately with an emphasis on securing peace in the capital, Bangui.

Cameroon to release Abdoulaye Miskine as soon as possible. MICOPAX troops to participate in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

process, in cooperation with committed FACA, FDPC, and other ex-Séléka elements. MICOPAX troops to provide protection for aid agency workers and staff to ensure the

provision of assistance to internally displaced people in the country. ECCAS members to deal with the influx of refugees win their borders to prevent a

large humanitarian crisis in the region. ECCAS members to work closely with France, as their support for a resolution will be

crucial.

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