states counterplan opening packet

8/2/2019 States Counterplan Opening Packet

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STATES COUNTERPLANSAMFORD DEBATE INSTITUTE ‘09 OPENING PACKET

States Counterplan IndexThesis: The thesis of this counterplan is that the states are better able to solve for socialservices for poverty than the federal government, and federal programs to increase socialservices in the United States will disrupt the delicate balance of power between the state

and federal governments. The Affirmative team’s use of the federal government to increasesocial services will pre-empt these state solutions, undermining the most effective means of alleviating poverty. In addition, the system of federalism is one of the best bulwarksagainst tyranny and the promotion of individual liberty. In its zeal to save the poor, theAffirmative plan merely risks undermining the foundations of the American system of government.

States Counterplan Index ........................................................................................................1States Counterplan Shell (1/2) .................................................................................................3

States Counterplan Shell (2/2) .................................................................................................4***Theory*** ...........................................................................................................................5States Counterplan Theory: Fifty State FIAT is OK ...............................................................5States Counterplan: Permutation Answers ..............................................................................6***Solvency*** .......................................................................................................................7States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Poverty Best ....................................7States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best ........8States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: State Solutions Solve Best ...................................9States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best ......10States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Better for Health Care ...................11States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Lopez Precedent ................................................12

States Counterplan Solvency: State Action Leads to Federal Action ...................................13States Counterplan Solvency: No race to the bottom ..........................................................14States Counterplan Solvency: States Aren’t Racist ..............................................................15***Uniqueness*** .................................................................................................................16Uniqueness Extensions: Federalism is Strong Now .............................................................16Uniqueness Extensions: Power over poverty being devolved now ......................................17Uniqueness: The Supreme Court is protecting federalism now ...........................................18***Links*** ...........................................................................................................................19Link Extensions: Social Services Are a State Responsibility ...............................................19Link Extension Wall ...............................................................................................................20Link Extensions: Health Care ...............................................................................................21

Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism .....................................................22Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism .....................................................23***Internal Links*** .............................................................................................................24Internal Links: Other nations model US Federalism ............................................................24***Impacts*** .......................................................................................................................26Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops War ..........................................................................26Federalism Impacts: Liberty .................................................................................................27Federalism Impacts: Ethnic Conflicts Impact Module ........................................................28

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Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops Ethnic Conflicts ......................................................29Federalism Good: Africa Impact Module .............................................................................30Federalism Impacts: India Impact Module ..........................................................................31Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions ......................................................................32Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions .....................................................................33

Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impact Module ............................................................................34Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impacts .........................................................................................35Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Module ......................................................................36Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions ..................................................................37Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions .................................................................38Federalism Impacts: Russia Impact Module ........................................................................39Federalism Impacts: Russia Authoritarianism Module .......................................................40***States Counterplan Affirmative Answers*** ...................................................................41States Counterplan 2ac Answers ............................................................................................41States Counterplan 2ac Answers ............................................................................................42States Counterplan 2ac Answers ............................................................................................43

States Counterplan 2ac Answers ............................................................................................44States Counterplan Answers--Extensions ..............................................................................45States Counterplan Affirmative Answers: States counterplan won’t lead to federal action 46Interstate Compact Answers ...................................................................................................47Interstate Compact Answers ...................................................................................................48

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States Counterplan Shell (1/2)

TEXT: The fifty states, relevant territories and the District of Columbia will {insertrelevant affirmative plan mandates}. Any necessary authority will be devolved to the states

via extension of the Lopez precedent. Enforcement guaranteed, we reserve intent.

Observation 1: The counterplan is not topical: It uses thestates, not the federal government.

Observation 2: Solvency

The states offer the best anti-poverty solutions:

D. Russell Crane, 2008 (Prof., Family Therapy, Brigham Young U.), HANDBOOK OF

FAMILIES AND POVERTY, 2008, 3.

*Because considerable variety exists in how states seek to promote work, their experience can suggest what policy innovations seem most promising as states continue to experiment with welfare policies. The devolution of welfare policy to states has important lessons for health care,education, food and hunger, immigration, and other policies where there is a similar belief that these difficult problems could be best addressed by states.

Observation 3: The net benefit: global federalism

(--) The state governments constitutionally have control over public welfare policies.

David Marion, 2009 (Professor of Government at Hampden-Sydney College, Washington Times,

January 2, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).

No similar constitutional argument can be made for federal assumption of obligations that historically

have fallen under the states' police powers: law enforcement, public health/welfare , recreation,

and education. Not only does the Constitution provide little support for much of the aid now sought by

governors and local officials from New England to California, but such assistance threatens to

weaken a fundamental structural feature of Madison's "partly national, partly federal" system. His "compound republic" was carefully designed to nurture and protect fundamental liberties whilesupporting competent government.

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States Counterplan Shell (2/2)

Federal action on poverty risks pre-emption or squeezing out state action in the poverty arena:

James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law andPolicy, May–June 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf ) In all of these areas the federal government has the predominant role. In some areas it has anexclusive role according to the Constitution. In others its exclusive authority is not constitutionallymandated, but, when it acts, it preempts state action. In yet other areas it may not be preemptive, but it still became a dominant or important presence in the twentieth century as the national idealevolved and the economy changed. Many of these areas of federal action, of course, are seen as being “about” the economy, not “about” opportunity or economic security or poverty. But oftenthey also have a more profound impact, for good or ill, on poverty and opportunity and securitythan most spending decisions.

(--) Other nations model U.S. federalism decisions:

Donald L. Horowitz, 2007 (Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University, Drake LawReview, Summer, 55 Drake L. Rev. 953. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008).

Federalism is among those institutions. Indeed, the adoption of a federal regime in this country in 1787 was followed very closely in Europe and Latin America. In both, federal institutions were seen to provide a

democratic solution to the problem of uniting diverse territories in a single regime. Switzerland, Germany, Argentina,Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil were among the states that adopted federalism for this purpose, andtheir decisions were explicitly based on the American example . Issues of constitutional design, at long

last revived in the United States by Professor Levinson's book, thrive outside the United States. Since the Third Wave of Democratization began in Portugal in 1974, dozens and dozens of constitutions have been written andrewritten. Some have taken their inspiration from the United States and adopted fixed-term presidencies,

bicameral legislatures, and upper houses with equal numbers of representatives from each federal unit; others have been more

eclectic in their design. Whatever the design, outside of the United States, the configuration of institutionsis not regarded as an unchangeable feature of the landscape but an arena of purposive activity in which the aim is to engineer institutions that can cope in a democratic way with the problems particular societies present.

(--) A strict system of federalism is necessary to preservefreedom and solve warfare around the globe.

Patrick M. Garry, 2007 (Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law, BrandeisLaw Journal, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008).

In creating a system of dual sovereignty between the state and federal government, "the Framers split the atom of sovereignty" by

designating two different political entities (federal and state), "each protected from incursion by the other." This federalismscheme not only lets the two different levels of government specialize in their respective functions, it provides a structure in which a multitude of heterogeneous communities can co-exist under a singlenational government. For instance, one of the benefits of federalism is that people of different views can gather in different

states with different policies and priorities. Hence, federalism supports and accommodates the wide diversity of American society.

As Professor Steven Calabresi explains, federalism has served as a vital ingredient of America'sconstitutional democracy: It prevents religious warfare , it prevents secessionist warfare , and it

prevents racial warfare . It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years , unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There isnothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace , prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document .

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***Theory***

States Counterplan Theory: Fifty State FIAT is OK

THEY USE MULTIPLE ACTORS TOO—THEY HAVE THE PRESIDENT ACT AND THE 535 MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.

NECESSARY TO TEST FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE RESOLUTION: ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS DEFEND THAT

ACTION.

LITERATURE CHECKS ABUSE: WE HAVE EVIDENCE SAYING STATES SOLVE BETTER—THEY SHOULD HAVE EVIDENCE

DEFENDING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS BETTER.

IMPOSSIBLE BRIGHT LINE: CAN’T PROVE 4 CUPS OF FIAT IS WORSE THAN 2 CUPS OF FIAT.

TURN: THEIR FIAT IS UTOPIAN—NO EVIDENCE CONGRESS WILL EVER PASS THEIR PLAN—VOTE NEGATIVE ON PRESUMPTION.

CREDIBLE NET BENEFIT CHECKS ABUSE: THEY CAN

ANSWER AND/OR TURN OUR NET BENEFITS.

HARDER TO BE NEGATIVE:

AFF SPEAKS 1ST AND LAST INHERENT PERSUASIVE ADVANTAGE

AFF WIN PERCENTAGES WERE VERY HIGH BEFORE THE NEW WAVE OF COUNTERPLANS AND KRITIKS—PROVES NEGATIVES NEED MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY

8) TOPIC IS HUGE: AFF. HAS WIDE RANGE OF AFFIRMATIVES TO CHOOSE FROM—NEGATIVE NEEDS CREDIBLE GENERIC STRATEGIES TO KEEP UP.

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States Counterplan: Permutation Answers

1) STILL LINKS TO THE NET BENEFITS: THEY STILL USE FEDERAL ACTION

2) TURN: MIXED SIGNALS

A) PAST DECISIONS PROVE--Overlapping federal and statelaws send mixed federalism signals:

Hayford, 2002 Prof. of Business Law, 2002 (Florida Law Review; April, 2002; Lexis)

The Supreme Court's stated understanding of the FAA has sent mixed signals about a state law-making rolein commercial arbitration. On the one hand, the Court has interpreted the FAA to preempt state laws thatnegate or undermine the enforceability of commercial arbitration [*177] clauses-leaving no latitude for state regulation. On the other hand, the Court has understood the FAA to treat the question of contractrevocation, on generally applicable grounds such as fraud, duress, and uncon-scionability, as one of state law-leaving no federal role. Additionally, on a variety of other matters affecting arbitration, the Courtseems to recognize that the FAA speaks either ambiguously or not at all, such as post-award judicial review,arbitrators' standards of conduct and arbitral procedures-leaving potential gaps in the Act's pro-arbitration policy.

B) Conflicting signals undermine federalism:Werhan, 2000 professor of Constitutional Law @ Tulane, 2000 (Washington & Lee Law Review, Fall,

2000; 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1213)In the Supreme Court's recent, and potentially transformative, decision in United States v. Lopez, 13 whichit recently solidified in United States v. Morrison, 14 a bare majority of the justices suggested an intriguingredefinition of the congressional commerce power. 15 The Lopez/Morrison innovation promises tointegrate formal and functional approaches to federalism limits and to align contemporary doctrine with theoriginal federalist understanding and the foundational jurisprudence of the Marshall Court. 16 The justices,

however, have given mixed signals of their direction. Following on the heels of Lopez, the same narrowmajority of justices in Printz v. United States 17 adopted a strongly formalistic approach to limitingcongressional regulatory power. 18 The Printz [*1217] retrenchment reinforces the considerable doubts

over whether the Court will be able to maintain a balanced federalism jurisprudence.

3) If the federal government and states act in “lockstep” it undermines meaningful federalism:

Marie Garibaldi, 1998 Justice for the Supreme Court of New Jersey, TULSA LAW JOURNAL, Fall1998, p. 67.It is clear today that the assertion that a state constitution provides greater protection than the FederalConstitution is no longer novel. In my Court, when we base our decision on the New Jersey Constitution,we state clearly the "adequate and independent" state grounds that form the basis for that opinion.

Nonetheless, there will continue to be cases where state courts will be faced with having to determinewhether its constitution provides greater protection of individual rights than afforded under the FederalConstitution. In making that determination, state courts will still be presented with the vexing problem of how to prevent state constitutions from becoming "a mere row of shadows" of the Federal Constitution

and from gleaning such little guidance from federal law as to make state law "incoherent."

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***Solvency***

States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States SolvePoverty Best

(--) Each dollar spent by the states is better than federal money for anti-poverty programs:

Edgar Browning, 2008 (Prof., Economics, Texas A&M U.), STEALING FROM EACH OTHER:HOW THE WELFARE STATE ROBS AMERICANS OF MONEY AND SPIRIT, 2008, 196-197.*Welfare programs operated by state, local, and nongovernmental entities can also be expected to be more effective per dollar spent than welfare administered at the federal level. Not only are theformer entities closer to and more familiar with the problems faced by the poor but they also havegreater flexibility in designing and carrying out programs of assistance. One of the virtues of adecentralized approach, as in a federal system, is that different states and organizations will utilizedifferent approaches and can learn from both the successes and failures realized. It should not be

forgotten that the welfare reform of 1996, widely regarded as one of the few successes among welfare policy reforms, was builtupon the experiences of several states experimenting with different approaches. These states had to receive waivers from the

federal government just to try alternative approaches, but with the federal government out of the picture there would be a great

deal more experimentation, which would lead over time to more effective policies.

(--) State initiatives are solving poverty now:

Thomas Billitteri, 2009 (Staff, Congressional Quarterly), URBAN ISSUES, 4TH Ed., 2009, 18.

*As federal policymakers wrestle with the poverty issue, states and localities are making inroads of their own. Mayor Bloomberg has been promoting a plan to pay poor families in New York up to$5,000 a year to meet such goals as attending parent-teacher meetings, getting med ical checkupsand holding full-time jobs. Patterned after a Mexican initiative, the plan aims to help poor familiesmake better long-range decisions and break cycles of poverty and dependence that can last

generations.

(--) State experimentation is critical at providing anti-poverty solutions:

D. Russell Crane, 2008 (Prof., Family Therapy, Brigham Young U.), HANDBOOK OFFAMILIES AND POVERTY, 2008, 8.

*To encourage work, states have experimented with eligibility rules, self-sufficiency programs, andthe structure of benefits, time limits, sanctions, provision of support services, and participationrequirements. States have transformed their welfare systems from providers of cash assistance toemployment offices. States have restructured state welfare and employment offices intoemployment-oriented departments and brought a number of social services under one roof. They

have simplified the rules and streamlined the application forms for cash assistance, child care,Medicaid, and food stamps.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: LaboratoryEffect Means States Solve Best

(--) The laboratory effect allows states to provide the best

solutions:JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online.

Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009).

Many liberal thinkers skeptical of states' rights and state actions since the days of segregation have begun to see that the states, to use Justice Louis Brandeis's words from the 1930s, can ''serve as alaboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.''Professor Issacharoff said states were often quicker than Washington to spot a problem when itemerged, and so ''it may be the states that have the best initial take on it, and try different regulatorymethods until we fasten on a single national solution.''

(--) The laboratory effect allows states to provide the best

solutions:

Alan Well, 2008 (Dir., National Academy for State Health Policy), HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June2008, 738.

Yet one of the most compelling federalism metaphors is dynamic. When people argue that statesshould function as the "laboratories of democracy," state action is not viewed as an end in itself but,rather, as a mechanism for determining effective policy, which can then be adopted or rejected byother states or the nation as a whole.

(--) The states are experimenting with poverty solutions now:


*Policy devolution to states is part of the New Federalism presidents have championed during the past three decades or so, but policy devolution became a particularly prominent part of welfare policy as frustration grew with expanding welfare rolls in the 1980s and early 1990s. Because itwas unclear how welfare policy could produce self-supporting families, particularly if these families had a

history of welfare dependency and numerous barriers to work, policymakers were willing to turn the problemover to states to experiment with alternative ways of solving these problems.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: StateSolutions Solve Best

(--) State solutions are best at providing for low-income families:


*For decades, states have been experimenting with ways to encourage work among low-incomefamilies, particularly those who have been receiving cash assistance. States were the first to createwelfare programs aimed at ensuring mothers could be at home with their young children.

(--) States provide the best solutions to social problems:

David Marion, 2009 (Professor of Government at Hampden-Sydney College, Washington Times,January 2, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).

The Founders understood that the real home of democracy or self-government is in the localitiesand the states where people have a genuine shot at managing their own affairs. Local self-government is the nation's principal nursery when it comes to cultivating good habits and soundopinions. If people believe they have little or no control over programs and services that touchthem most directly, or if they believe they can pass along the ill effects (including the costs) of their decisions, they either will withdraw from the public arena or adopt a dangerous "free rider"mentality.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: LaboratoryEffect Means States Solve Best

The “laboratory effect” allows states to provide superior

solutions to national problems.Tonja Jacobi, 2006 (Assistant professor, Northwestern University School of Law, North CarolinaLaw Review, May, 2006, 84 N.C.L. Rev. 1089. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008).The states were intended to be independent from one another's policy preferences, to allow themto act as policymaking laboratories for the nation.

The laboratory effect allows states to find the best solutions:Patrick M. Garry, 2007 (Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law, BrandeisLaw Journal, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008).Another value of federalism relates to the close relationship between state governments and their constituencies. It is generally thought that the smaller the governing unit the more likely it is to beresponsive to the needs of the [*474] community. 20 Smaller political units are able to foster a

deeper sense of community and increased opportunities for political participation. 21 As Professor Wechsler has observed, "the states are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest andopinion, the special centers of political activity, [and] the separate geographical determinants of national as well as local politics." 22 Moreover, as Justice O'Connor has observed, "the 50 stateshave served as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas." 23

Continued state experimentation allows other states to “cherry- pick” the best solutions for their state.

Laura Thomas Gebert, 2007 (J.D. candidate, Barry University School of Law, Barry Law Review,Spring 2007, 8 Barry L. Rev. 149. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008).Many government projects of the past few decades have successfully addressed this country's

environmental concerns. 239 Some of the energy policies currently being implemented by stateand foreign governments will also prove successful. [*174] Florida should carefully monitor thesuccesses and failures of such programs as California's Solar Initiative, Colorado's Amendment 37,and the solar programs in foreign countries such as Israel, Greece, and Japan. 240 By carefullyanalyzing the progress of these programs, Florida can "cherry pick" the most cost-effective andsuccessful plans appropriate for our local conditions, while avoiding the pitfalls that are certain tooccur in any untested government program.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: LopezPrecedent

(--) Extension of the Lopez precedent is critical to the worldwide

federalism signal of the United States:Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor of Law at Northwestern University, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW,1995, p. LexisWe have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own

American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positivedevelopment that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on thewillingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. TheU.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorouslyour own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and thelegal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

(--) A strong U.S. federalism model solves wars across theglobe:

Steven Calabresi, Law Professor, Northwestern, 1995 (MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, p. 774) (PDBF469)Some of the best arguments for centripetal international federalism, then, resemble some of the bestarguments for centrifugal devolutionary federalism: in both cases - and for differing reasons - federalismhelps prevent bloodshed and war. It is no wonder, then, that we live in an age of federalism at both theinternational and subnational level. Under the right circumstances, federalism can help to promote peace, prosperity, and happiness. It can alleviate the threat of majority tyranny - which is the central flaw of democracy. In some situations, it can reduce the visibility of dangerous social fault lines, thereby preventing bloodshed and violence. This necessarily brief comparative, historical, and empirical survey of the world's experience with federalism amply demonstrates the benefits at least of American-style small-state federalism. In light of this evidence, the United States would be foolish indeed to abandon its federalsystem.

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States Counterplan Solvency: State Action Leads to FederalAction

The ratchet up effect means state action will cause federal

action:

Peter Jacobson, 2007 (Prof., Health Law and Policy, U. Michigan School of Public Health),UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAW REVIEW, June 2007, 1201.

*Federalism matters. For better or worse (to return to the marriage metaphor), we are stuck withstate-level options in the absence of national health insurance. If government is responsible for ensuring some level of access to health care for uninsured populations, federal uniformity may bedesirable, but states should also experiment with various approaches and policy alternatives untilCongress acts. The federalism question is paramount for discussing access to health care. If health care is considered to

have fundamental moral importance, it should arguably be available to all, regardless of where they live. For theforeseeable future, however, health care will not be available to all. As such, the burden falls onthose states that are willing to accept the responsibility of caring for their own citizens. The number of states now willing to address the needs of their uninsured populations is encouraging and may put pressure on other states and the federal government to finally acceptresponsibility.

State action eventually leads to federal action—the Counterplan will solve all of the case:

J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis,accessed June 20, 2008)

We argue here that states can be important catalysts of a federal policy response by stimulating both pro-regulatory and anti-regulatory forces to appeal to the federal government for relief sooner rather than later. To explain this phenomenon we piece together and build on insights from twoliteratures: the environmental federalism scholarship, which predicts when environmentalists andstate and local governments will appeal for federal regulatory floors to prevent a race to the bottom, and when states will do so to overcome interstate externalities (ISEs); and what we have labeled

"defensive preemption theory" (DPT), which predicts when industry will seek federal regulatory ceilings. We show how,

consistent with DPT, state regulation addressing climate change has prompted industry to seek uniformand preemptive federal regulation. In addition, we show that although the traditional assumptions of race-to-the-

bottom theory (RBT) and ISE theory do not apply to climate change (and thus do not generate demand for federal regulation),

state regulatory measures nevertheless leave pro-regulation forces unsatisfied and drive them to Congress for relief. Thus,state regulation aimed at climate change has produced a convergence of interest group support for federal intervention - what we call "hitting the regulatory sweet spot."

State regulation creates federal policy responses:J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis,accessed June 20, 2008)

The automobile industry signaled its preference for preemption by attacking California's tailpipe regulations inthe courts. 134 And by mid-2006 it was clear that industry groups in other sectors, including [*1536]electricity generation, would seek relief from Congress sooner rather than later. 135 In sum, our point is not

that industry demand is solely responsible for federal regulation, but that state regulation can prompt industry players to support a federal policy response sooner than they otherwise might have, increasing the likelihood of its passage.

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States Counterplan Solvency: No race to the bottom

(--) We FIAT uniform enforcement in the counterplan text: stops race to the bottom.

(--) RACE TO THE BOTTOM THEORY EMPIRICALLY AND PRACTICALLY FALSE—

MULTIPLE REASONS

Frank B. Cross, 2002 Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, McCombs

School of Business, University of Texas at Austin; Professor of Law, University of Texas Schoolof Law, 2002 (CORDOZO LAW REVIEW, November, THE FOLLY OF FEDERALISM, p. 1)The race to the bottom theory suffers serious theoretical flaws. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, onwhich it is based, the prisoners cannot even communicate much less collaborate. However, statesare perfectly capable of joining together to prevent the industrial blackmail . A second theoretical problem relates to industry's ability to make its threats credible. For an industry tomove to a more lenient jurisdiction may have considerable costs, and many factors other thanenvironmental regulation affect an industry's preferred location. Indeed, a clean environmentmight be highly desirable to some companies and their workforces. Empirical evidence generallysuggests that environmental costs are not major factors in industrial locational decisions.Moreover, there is evidence that industry gains value from environmental protection and may bemotivated to voluntarily adopt protections rather than bargaining for their elimination. The theorythat industry universally minimizes its pollution control efforts, regardless of other variables, is plainly wrong. The strict race to the bottom theory is largely empirically unsupportable. The equilibrium

solution for the race to the bottom would have every state adopting the same policy at the absolute bottom - no environmental regulation whatsoever. The theorysuggests that companies will negotiate for lower and lower environmental compliance costs. If any state adopted any more stringent policy than any other state, itwould supposedly be undercut by the other states and be driven to weaken its standards to the bottom to save jobs or tax revenues. This obviously does not describereality. States and localities have adopted a variety of independent environmental rules that disconfirm the race to the bottom fears. The theory cannot explain whystates would ever create their own independent environmental protection actions, much less maintain and strengthen those actions. While the absolute race to the bottom hypothesis is plainly wrong, some may argue that the hypothesis has some marginal effect, after other factors are considered, reducing environmentalcontrols below the level that is socially optimal and that would be chosen absent pressure to relocate. At the margin, though, it seems as if a democratic citizenryshould be able to take a stand behind its preference for greater environmental regulation, even at the expense of some marginal level of economic growth.

Ultimately, the validity of the fear should be empirically tested, and empirical evidence has not provided strong support for race to the bottom fears. Beforethere were any federal environmental laws, states and local governments adopted numerous regulations, though "race to the bottom believers would suggest that such programs should never have developed." During this period, standards got progressively stricter and air pollution wassubstantially controlled. In the more recent period, individual states have adopted standards more

stringent than those of the federal government. Revesz has recently chronicled state environmentalinitiatives ranging from auto emission standards (where federal action restrained more vigorousstate regulation), hazardous waste regulation, municipal solid waste regulation (where the federalgovernment has left the field to the states), and other areas of environmental protection. Thisrecord blatantly contradicts the race to the bottom theory.

(--) State solutions will not create a “race to the bottom.”

Michael Cannon, 2007 (Dir., Health Policy Studies, Cato Institute), CATO BRIEFING PAPERS,Sept. 13, 2007, 9.

States would be unlikely to engage in a "race to the bottom" by eliminating important consumer protections: the first people to be injured by such unwise regulatory policies would be the voters in

that very state, who would then punish the responsible officials.

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States Counterplan Solvency: States Aren’t Racist

No link: no reason why state anti-poverty actions cause racism

FEDERAL ACTION DID NOT ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION Donald M. Linhorst, PhD, ACSW, is assistant professor, School of Social Service, Saint Louis University,Social Work, July 2002 v47 i3 p201(8) Federalism and social justice: implications for social work)Although the examples provide support for the ability of the federal government to promote individual justice when it is not granted by individual states, a weakness of federal actions is their time frames.Slavery existed for almost 75 years after the signing of the U. S. Constitution. In addition, discrimination in both private and public settings was not prohibited until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

STATES NO LONGER RACIST Melvyn R. Durchslag, Law professor, Case Western, LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW, June2000, p. 1375-6.Upon reflection, I suppose that no one should be surprised by the renewed interest in states' rights, or

federalism if you will. African Americans are no longer enslaved, nor do states subject them to theindignities of Jim Crow laws as they did thirty years ago. Consequently, the worst of states' rights history is just that - history.

Federalism does not conflict with fighting racismBalko ’03 [http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,100922,00.html, October 22, Radley]However, one can passionately support states’ right and federalism and also think the 13th Amendment (search) andBrown v. Board of Education (search) were important and necessary. Federalism has nothing to do with segregation or,for that matter, anything related to race issues. Government works most efficiently when it’s most accountable to the

people. If we must have government interference in our lives, it’s best to do it first at the local level, then at the state, andthen -- only in limited circumstances -- at the federal level. Provincial government allows us the freedom to move away from

jurisdictions we find oppressive or unfair.

Post Civil War Amendments to the Constitution takeout the racism turn:McConkie, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1996 (1996 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 389, BrighamYoung University Law Review; Lexis)Indeed, during the two periods in our history when federalism was most vehemently advanced, theoverriding purpose was the oppression of African Americans: at first for the preservation of slavery, and then for the

preservation of de jure segregation and discrimination. Race provides a strong undercurrent or at least plays a part in today's debate as

well. But regardless of the underlying motives behind the current debate over federalism, it remains clear that traditional arguments that federalism could prevent federal civil rights enforcement have been severely weakened by the Civil War Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

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***Uniqueness***

Uniqueness Extensions: Federalism is Strong Now

(--) President Obama is restoring federalism in the present

system:

JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis.

Accessed May 1, 2009).A recent decision by President Obama that could open the way for California and other states to settheir own limits on greenhouse gases from cars and trucks represents a shift in the delicate and oftenacrimonious relationship between the federal government and the states, legal experts say, possibly

signaling a new view of federalism . ''I think it's quite significant,'' said Samuel Issacharoff, a professor of

constitutional law at New York University law school. ''It shows the Obama administration's more benign view of

government intervention,'' Professor Issacharoff said, and ''may indicate a spirit of cooperative

federalism '' in which Washington will look to the states for new ideas and even a measure of guidance.

(--) Obama has embraced progressive forms of federalism.JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online.


The Obama administration seems to be open to a movement known as ''progressive

federalism ,'' in which governors and activist state attorneys general have been trying to lead the way on environmental initiatives, consumer protection and other issues, several constitutionalexperts say.

(--) Obama is strengthening the role of the states now:

New York Times, 2009 (January 30, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).

Signs of a Stronger State Role A recent decision by President Obama points to his possible supportof an increase in ''progressive federalism,'' possibly easing delicate relations between federal andstate government. Before, the general theme was that the best law comes from Washington.

(--) Obama is ushering in a new era in federal-state relations:

JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online.


Tom Miller, the attorney general of Iowa, who met with the transition team in December to discuss federalism and

other issues, said he believed the Obama administration would ''usher in a new era in federal-staterelations.'' Members of the new administration, Mr. Miller said, ''are open to what we're talking about,what we're thinking.'' They also appreciate, he said, the fact that state attorneys general oftenachieve a level of bipartisan cooperation when they band together to pursue lawsuits.

16




Uniqueness Extensions: Power over poverty beingdevolved now

(--)Power over poverty policy is being devolved to the states

now:

Scott Allard, 2009 (Prof., School of Social Service Administration, U. Chicago), OUT OFREACH: PLACE, POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE, 2009, 150.*The pressures of rising federal budget deficits also created incentives to reduce federalcommitments to antipoverty programs. As a result, there began a gradual but steady downwardtransfer of safety net policymaking authority from the federal government to state governments, a process commonly referred to as the devolution of policymaking authority. Three decades of devolutionary activity have given state and local governments greater administrative and fiscalcontrol over a host of safety net programs, including Medicaid, welfare cash assistance, and anarray of social service programs.

(--)Multiple avenues of power over poverty policy are being devolved to the states now:

Scott Allard, 2009 (Prof., School of Social Service Administration, U. Chicago), OUT OFREACH: PLACE, POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE, 2009, 150.*For instance, building on experimental state welfare program waivers in the late 1980s and early1990s, welfare reform in 1996 shifted substantial responsibility for welfare cash assistance programs to state and local governments for the first time since before the War on Poverty. Theconsolidation of many different federal categorical grant programs into block grants has alsoresulted in the devolution of program responsibility to state and local governments .

17




Uniqueness: The Supreme Court is protecting federalismnow

(--) The Supreme Court grants the states considerable control

over anti-poverty policy now.

Bridgette Baldwin, 2008 (Assistant Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).In upholding this budgetary scheme, the Supreme Court confirmed, "there is no question thatstates have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each state is free to setits own standards of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotesto the [*33] program." n257 This case demonstrated a clear ideological shift that veered towards complete deference to"states' rights" in ways that had direct and dire implications for specifically working-class Black women navigating welfare.

Federalism continues to be a central lens through which current welfare cases are decided by theSupreme Court. n258 However, the emerging new federalist approach to welfare demonstrates thegrowing significance of fiscal concern as a legitimate claim and the rise of fiscal conservatism as aviable framework for endorsing a state's rights argument in welfare law and policy decisions.

(--) Multiple Supreme Court decisions prove: the Court is protecting federalism now:

William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,

Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009).

Notwithstanding Ms. Greenhouse's writing of an obituary, the reports of the death of federalism, to paraphrase Mark Twain, n3 are [*586] greatly exaggerated. The decisions of the Supreme Courtlast term in Medellin v. Texas n4 and Riley v. Kennedy n5 establish that controversies aboutfederalism have not disappeared from the docket, and in both cases, the states successfullychallenged exercises of federal power. A wealth of recent scholarship also suggests that federalism

remains a hot topic. n6 Federalism is still alive and well.

18




***Links***

Link Extensions: Social Services Are a StateResponsibility

(--) Social services are the responsibility of state and local governments:

Daniel Lips, 2007 (Education Analyst, The Heritage Foundation), DISCONNECTED ANDDISADVANTAGED YOUTH, Hrg., House Comm. on Ways & Means, June 19, 2007, 47.

Providing social services and education is primarily the responsibility of State and local governments,not the Federal Government.

(--) The states are responsible for the administration of social

services:Scott Allard, 2009 (Prof., School of Social Service Administration, U. Chicago), OUT OFREACH: PLACE, POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE, 2009, 151.*Social service provision itself is a highly devolved activity. Even though many social service programs are funded in full or in part by the federal government, they are designed to beadministered by state and local government agencies. State and local governments, in turn, work with local service organizations to formulate programs that then deliver assistance to poor persons.Whether through block grants or other means, increases in federal social service expendituresnecessarily increase the responsibility of lower levels of government for program administration.

(--) The federal government has no power to impose economic policy on the states.

Julie Nice, 2008 (Professor of Law @ the University of Denver, Fordham Urban Law Journal,April 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).

Finally, the Court also invoked both federalism and separation of powers concerns, notingrepeatedly that the federal courts have no power to impose their views of wise economic or social policy on the states.

19




Link Extension Wall

First link is pre-emption: federal law will pre-empt state laws in agiven field Julie Lurman, 2007 (Assistant Professor of Natural Resources Law and Policy, University of Alaska, Alaska Law Review, December, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008).Preemption has been clearly recognized by the United States Supreme Court: If Congress evidences intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is pre-empted . If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacleto the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Thus, a state statute may be preempted either because congressional legislation completely occupies a given field so that thereis no room for state action, or because, although Congress left room for the state to legislate, thestate's legislation directly conflicts with the federal statute.

Second link is “sticky strings:” federal funding brings

conditions that destroy federalism:Bridgette Baldwin, 2008 (Assistant Professor of Law at Western New England College School of

Law. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).The King case demonstrates a conceptual shift in Supreme Court welfare ideology toward

cooperative federalism, where the federal government conditioned funding according to

how state governments regulated and legislated their AFDC programs in accordance with federal (constitutional) concerns. Moreover, under this theory, the Supreme Court concluded that stateshad an obligation (if they accept federal funding) to furnish aid to all eligible poor. n192 King

signaled expanded control of the federal government over state policies and

practices .

Third link is “crowd-out:” federal interventions undermineaccess to state benefits--

Mila Kofman, 2007 (Prof., Health Policy Institute, Georgetown U.), HEALTH CARE REFORM:RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATEINITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 23.

*I encourage you to look for measures that will encourage and support meaningful state initiatives.It is also important to remember that many self-funded large employer plans provide generous benefits to workers and dependents, covering expensive medical conditions and covering peoplewith significant medical needs. Federal interventions must be carefully crafted as to not undermine comprehensive benefits that many have.

(--) Federal legislation will pre-empt state legislation.Julie Lurman, 2007 (Assistant Professor of Natural Resources Law and Policy, University of Alaska,Alaska Law Review, December, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008).

"When Congress exercises a granted power, concurrent conflicting state legislation may be challengedvia the Preemption Doctrine." In other words, state law must yield where it conflicts with federal law.The concept of preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which requiresthat state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to," federal law be invalidated.

20




Link Extensions: Health Care

(--) Health care is constitutionally a state function:

Eleanor Kinney, 2008 (Prof., Law, Indiana U. School of Law), RUTGERS LAW REVIEW,Winter 2008, 353.

*In the federal system of the United States, the states, through the police power, have primaryresponsibility for the regulation and promotion of the public's health. The Federal Constitution issilent on the matters of health and health care.

(--) Federal inaction in the health care arena encourages stateinnovation.

John Tierney, 2007 (U.S. Representative, Massachusetts), HEALTH CARE REFORM:RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATEINITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 13.

*Absent federal action on the issue, many states have taken, or are beginning to take, action of their own accord to address their uninsured populations and expand access to care. Indeed, my own stateof Massachusetts has been a pioneer in this regard, having enacted legislation last year to achievenear-universal coverage of the Bay State's residents through a combination of approaches.

(--) The plan pre-empts state public health agencies:

Eleanor Kinney, 2008 (Prof., Law, Indiana U. School of Law), RUTGERS LAW REVIEW,Winter 2008, 362. *All states have a public health agency that is responsible for the promotion and protection of the public health within state borders. Public health statutes grant governments certain powers within the state.

21




Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism

(--) Now is the key time for federalism in the United States—new policies undermining federalism threaten to undermine the

entire federal system:

David Marion, 2009 (Professor of Government at Hampden-Sydney College, Washington Times,

January 2, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).

The American federal system has weathered severe challenges in the past. The fact it has done so,

however, does not diminish the severity of the threat that federalism faces at this moment .

This would not be a good time for the friends of liberty and competent government to let down their guard. All the resources of Madison's republic will be needed to preserve the health of the federalsystem as the consequence of the financial crisis reverberate from Wall Street to Main Street. Madison's political

writings are all about harnessing private interest in the service of the general good. He believed self-government, properly construedand thoughtfully arranged, is defensible on the dual grounds of satisfying human ambitions and enriching human existence. Hisdefense of the federal system cannot be separated from his defense of self-government. The American federal system was not

valued by Madison as an end in itself, but as a means for "securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" and for promoting "justice" and the "general welfare." Policies that weaken the federal system inevitably threaten thenoble objectives of the Founders' experiment in democratic republicanism.

(--) Even small decisions threaten federalism:

Inter-State Council Secretariat 2008 (Online. Internet. Accessed May 1, 2009.

http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/CHAPTERXII.pdf, Sec 12.5.01, September 3An eminent American expert, while dealing with Federal legislative power in the United States of America, has observed: “Of

course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at last in one fell swoop. If there is any danger,

it lies in the tyranny of small decisions —in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at State sovereignty, bit by bit, until essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell”.

(--) There must be limits to federal power in order to preservefederalism:

Elizabeth Weeks, 2007 (Assoc. Professor at Kansas Law, Journal of Health Law &

Policy, Vol. 1, p. 79, 2007. Online. Internet. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012053](“The national government has unique needs in maintaining the supremacy of federal law and an

orderly federal system, yet there must be a limit to federal power and a corresponding reservoir of state power if federalism is to have any meaning at all.”); Rich & White, supra note 115, at 862

(noting historical tension between national and state governments and the “basic principle . . . of division of powers betweendistinct and coordinate governments”).

22




Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism

POWER IS ZERO-SUM: FEDERAL ACTION UNDERMINES THE STATES

John Yoo, 1997 law professor, (SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, v. 70, p. 1352)It is important to note that Justice Kennedy did not differentiate between laws that regulated statesqua states and those that regulated private parties in areas that might be thought to lie within state power. Following Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrencetreated the exercise of any federal power as a diminution of the power of the states and hence a reduction of state sovereignty.

EVEN SMALL DECISIONS THREATEN FEDERALISM.Gillian Bradford, 2006 (reporter, ABC Transcripts, SHOW: The World Today, July 21, 2006.Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008).MIKE RANN: I think all of us have seen, over decades, bit by bit the powers of the states beingstripped away. We've sat by either legislative action by the Federal Government, by court

decisions, High Court decisions, or by just the simple financial power of the Federal Government.So what we're trying to do is to actually improve federalism by enhancing, rejuvenating,reinvigorating the states.

EVEN SMALL DECISIONS CAN GREATLY AFFECT FEDERALBALANCE

Tracy Kaye, 1998 Associate Professor of Law at Seton Hall, HARVARD JOURNAL ONLEGISLATION, Winter 1998, p. LexisIndividually, the fiscal impact of each of these bills may seem small, but as Professor LaurenceTribe has noted, "if there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions -- in the prospectthat Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing isleft but a gutted shell".

Each step is important—federalism is eroded bit by bit Nivola ’01 [http://www.brook.edu/Views/Articles/Nivola/2001PI.htm]

In contrast to the overloaded central administrations of unitary regimes, a federal systemattains efficiencies through a division of labor and the decentralization of routine tasks.This advantage of federalism will erode if Congress persists in preempting one statefunction after another.

23

http://www.brook.edu/Views/Articles/Nivola/2001PI.htm

http://www.brook.edu/Views/Articles/Nivola/2001PI.htm




***Internal Links***

Internal Links: Other nations model US Federalism

(--) Other nations look to U.S. federalism as a model.

William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009).

For more than two centuries, the structure of our Constitution has made America the beacon for thefree world. It has prevented our Bill of Rights from becoming a parchment guarantee. Thestructure of our Constitution, which divides sovereignty to empower states to address local problems, the federal government to address national problems, and both levels to check each other, remains

an enduring gift that, true to its promise, secures the blessings of our liberty. In our post-9/11 world, wherefreedom is our hope, we need federalism, which secures freedom, now more than ever. Bothfederalism and the separation of powers must endure as structural limits of government.

(--) MANY COUNTRIES HAVE MODELED AMERICAN FEDERALISM

Steven Calabresi, 1995 Law professor, Northwestern, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, December

1995, p. 759-60.At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in anextraordinarily large number of very important countries, some of which once might have beenthought of as pure nation-states. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria,the Russian Federation, Spain, India, and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adoptingconstitutions that are significantly more federalist than the ones they replaced. Many other nationsthat had been influenced long ago by American federalism have chosen to retain and formalizetheir federal structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Canada, Brazil, Argentina,and Mexico, for example, all are basically alive and well today.

(--) UNITED STATES' FEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE MODELED

Norman Ornstein and A. Coursen, Fellows at the American Enterprise Institute, AMERICANENTERPRISE, January/February, 1992, p. 24The United States may be able to at least point the way. Our innovations in decentralized federalarrangements as well as our experience in sorting out powers and rights between Washington and the statescould well be adapted to many troubled situations elsewhere today.

(--) US FEDERALISM MODEL EFFECTIVE WAY TO MEET ETHNIC CHALLENGES AROUND THEWORLD

Will Kymlicka, Law professor-Queens University, The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, July,2000, 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 207, p. 213The history of ethnic relations in Western democracies contains many examples of injustice, oppression,coercion, discrimination and prejudice. Yet over the past thirty years, Western democracies have developeda number of interesting, and I believe effective, models for accommodating ethnocultural diversity. One of these models involves the use of federal or quasi-federal forms of territorial autonomy to enable self-government for national minorities and indigenous peoples. I believe that these forms of territorialautonomy are in general a success, and contain potential lessons for other countries around the worldstruggling with issues of minority nationalism.

24




25




***Impacts***

Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops War

Federalism stops conflicts abroad.Donald L. Horowitz, 2007 (Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University, Drake LawReview, Summer, 55 Drake L. Rev. 953. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008).Eighth, federalism can provide a stimulus for interethnic alignments and coalitions. Once theHausa-Fulani could no longer govern essentially alone, their political party was driven to seek genuine coalitions with other groups. 31 If, then, federalism helps to proliferate groups andsubgroups, or if it helps to confine the power of groups to a more or less proportional share, it will,all else equal, make it impossible for one group to aspire to control the whole government throughthe democratic process. If that is so, and if parties remain ethnically based, as they are likely to be,then it follows that incentives to form interethnic coalitions will be enhanced. Interethniccoalitions are much more likely to attend to the interests of multiple groups, thereby reducingconflict, especially if the coalitions are formed before elections.

26




Federalism Impacts: Liberty

A) Federalism preserves liberty and prevents tyranny:

William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009).

Six years ago, in the aftermath of the victory by my former office in Board of Trustees of theUniversity of Alabama v. Garrett, n12 I published an essay about the judicial enforcement of federalism as one part of the "double security" of freedom predicted by James Madison in TheFederalist No. 51. n13 Madison described the structure of the Constitution this way: In a singlerepublic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a singlegovernment; and the usurpations are guarded against, by a division of the Government into distinctand separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to eachsubdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of

the people. The different governments will control each other; at the same time that each will becontrolled by itself. n14

B) MUST REJECT EVERY INVASION OF LIBERTY Sylvester Petro, 1974 Professor of Law, Wake Forest University, TOLEDO LAW REVIEW,

1974, p. 480It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of oneaspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leadsto chaos, tyranny, despotism and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhensyn. Ask Milovan Dijilas. In sum,if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming tomaximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified andresisted with an undying spirit.

(--) Federalism provides a double protection of liberty:William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,

Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009).

Madison viewed the structural restraints of federalism and the separation of powers as the doublesecurity of liberty. Horizontally, each level of government, state and federal, checks its abuses of power. Vertically, each government checks the other.

Federalism prevents foreign dictatorships: Nicole Herther-Spiro, 2007 (Emory International Law Review, Spring, 2007. Online.Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).

The balance of power in any federal system is a delicate thing. n4 Every state that implements federalism mustdetermine how to balance the autonomy granted to the states or regions against the authority of thecentral government. n5 Many of the countries that adopt federal systems do so in the hope that thefederal system will provide for both a unified central government and real control at the locallevel. One theory of federalism argues that the system prevents abusive government bydecentralizing power. n6 By vesting some power in regional governments, federalism renderscentral governments less [*322] able to establish authoritarian dictatorships. n7 The trend towardsfederalism among states that have previously experienced strong and oppressive central regimescan be understood in the context of this theory - a federal system might help to prevent oppressivedictators from once again monopolizing the power of the state to the detriment of its people. n8

27




Federalism Impacts: Ethnic Conflicts Impact Module

A) CONSENSUS OF STUDIES CONCLUDES FEDERALISM PROMOTES ETHNIC ACCOMMODATION

Nancy Bermeo, professor of politics at Princeton University, writes on regime change, 2002 (JOURNALOF DEMOCRACY, 13.2, pp. 96-110 A New Look at Federalism)Since the evidence for and against federalism is clearly mixed, we must weigh it as carefully as possible.Toward this end, Ugo Amoretti and I organized an international research team in 2000 to study the relativemerits of federalism versus unitarism in divided societies. With the horrors of the Yugoslav breakup paramount in my mind, I expected our project to conclude that federalism exacerbated ethnic conflict.Instead, despite considering a great diversity of cases, our authors were nearly unanimous in concludingthat federal institutions promote successful accommodation.

B) ETHNIC CONFLICTS KILL MILLIONS OF CIVILIANS Nancy Bermeo, professor of politics at Princeton University, writes on regime change, 2002 (JOURNALOF DEMOCRACY, 13.2, pp. 96-110 A New Look at Federalism) At a time when globalization is

supposedly producing homogeneity, differences derived from ethnicity have become especially lethal.Ethnic violence within states is now much more common than interstate violence and also tends to beharder to stop. Since 1945, ethnic violence has played a major role in half of all wars, turned more than 12million people into refugees, and caused at least 11 million deaths. Precisely because today's wars are sooften between peoples rather than states, civilian casualties have risen dramatically. Fewer than half of thecasualties in World War II were noncombatants, while today some three-quarters of all war casualties arecivilian.

FEDERALISM ACCOMMODATES ETHNO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW & JURISPRUDENCE, 2000 (July, p. 207)The history of ethnic relations in Western democracies contains many examples of injustice, oppression,coercion, discrimination and prejudice. Yet over the past thirty years, Western democracies have developeda number of interesting, and I believe effective, models for accommodating ethnocultural diversity. One of

these models involves the use of federal or quasi federal forms of territorial autonomy to enable self-government for national minorities and indigenous peoples. I believe that these forms of territorialautonomy are in general a success, and contain potential lessons for other countries around the worldstruggling with issues of minority nationalism.

28




Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops Ethnic Conflicts

Federalism can prevent ethnic conflicts in other countries: Nicole Herther-Spiro, 2007 (Emory International Law Review, Spring, 2007. Online.

Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).A theory of federalism's potential to prevent ethnic conflict has also developed in recent years. n9Ethnic-or identity-based federalism, as an idea, holds a certain appeal in the post-colonial context.As a system of government, it attempts to resolve one of the problems that imperialist, colonialhistory created by granting autonomy to groups whose culture and identity have long beensuppressed in the "unity" of modern nation-states. n10 A nation-state adopting an ethnic-basedfederal system gives the "nations" within its borders some degree of self-governance as regions or states in a federal system. n11 Ethnic federalism is one method by which a country may attempt tomanage the interests of multiple ethnic groups within its borders and prevent violent ethnicconflict or attempts at secession.

Federalism resolves ethnic tensions and prevents

secessionism: Nicole Herther-Spiro, 2007 (Emory International Law Review, Spring, 2007. Online.Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).Ethnic federalism is an attempt to create a territorial solution to ethnic conflict by acknowledgingthe need to grant some degree of autonomy to ethnic groups within a state but attempts to do sowithout complete secession. As Professor Tully explains: The most familiar form of the politics of cultural

recognition is the claims of nationalist movements to be constitutionally recognised as either independent nation states or as

autonomous political associations within various forms of multinational federations and confederations. n68 Federalism based on ethnic divisions provides a solution to demands for recognition without dissolving theunity of the nation-state. Ethnic-based federalism is an institutional arrangement thatacknowledges and uses ethnic units "as a basis for local governments," in the hopes that doing sowill harmonize inter-group conflicts. n69

Federalism can prevent ethnic conflicts in other countries.Donald L. Horowitz, 2007 (Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University, Drake LawReview, Summer, 55 Drake L. Rev. 953. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008).There are at least eight ways in which federal institutions - and here I mean specifically theexistence of substate territorial units holding some governmental power that the centralgovernment does not hold - can have benign effects on ethnic conflict. Some of these effectsinvolve providing satisfactions at one level of government that are unavailable at others. Othersentail restructuring of cleavages, interests, relations, and alliances. First, units placed below thecentral government, whether those are called provinces, regions, or states, can allow a group thatis a minority in the country as a whole but a majority in a substate unit to exercise governmental power in ways that would be foreclosed if the whole country were one undifferentiated territory.For example, in Malaysia, where Chinese are about one-quarter of the total population and nolonger exercise great power at the center, they nevertheless are a majority in the state of Penang.

17 The Chief Minister of that state has always been Chinese, and despite the rough edges of ethnicrelations there, there is [*959] some sense of a government responsive to Chinese interests inPenang. 18 Where groups are territorially differentiated, this is a very common function of federalism, and it can certainly mitigate, but not vitiate, a sense of minority exclusion at the centralgovernment level. The important point is that such provincial power, while not completelysatisfying, may be sufficient to avert attempts to secede, particularly because most such attemptsfail anyway.

29




Federalism Good: Africa Impact Module

A) AFRICAN FEDERALISM KEY TO STOPPING AFRICAN CONFLICTS:

Shaheen Mozaffar, Associate Professor of Political Science at Bridgewater, and James R. Scarrit, Professor of Political Science at University of Colorado- Boulder, IDENTITY AND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMYIN PLURAL SOCIETIES, ed. Safran and Maiz, 2000, p. 243Ethnopolitical conflicts in contemporary Africa thus reflect the interplay of historically configured

social structures and the strategic choices of political actors involved in traditional struggles for power andresources. For the most part, these conflicts have involved the activation of ethnicity to define groupinterests and articulate political demands concerning equity and proportionality in the allocation of cabinet positions, administrative appointments,

public sector jobs, and development funds. These instrumental demands are generally negotiable and readily accommodated within the existing institutional framework of the statethrough 'ethnic arithmetic' in forming multiethnic government coalitions and formulating affirmative action policies. More problematic are ethnopolitical conflicts that involve the

activation of ethnicity to define group identity and articulate expressive demands dealing with the very survival of the g roup against real or perceived threats to it. Thesedemands are difficult to deal with because they usually require a fundamental restructuring of the state, for example, the transformation of a unitary to a federal system, the creation of additional units in an existing federal system, or outright secession.

B) AFRICAN CONFLICTS PUT MILLIONS AT RISK:Edmond J. Keller, Professor of Political Science at University of California, THE INTERNATIONALSPREAD OF CONFLICT, ed. Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 275Since 1960, Africa has witnessed more than a score of civil wars, and in just the past decade between twoand four million people have died in such wars. In 1993 alone, there were 5.2 million refugees and 1.3million displaced persons in Africa. Domestic insecurity in Africa, then, has had an increasingly high propensity to spill over borders, resulting in new regional security dilemmas. For example, in a matter of weeks the 1994 civil war in Rwanda resulted in five hundred thousand deaths, and in more than threemillion refugees fleeing to Zaire and Tanzania. It is clear that what were once thought to be mere domesticconflicts are now increasingly seen as potential sources for regional insecurity. Domestic ethnic conflicts in places such as the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Rwanda, have led to intense and bloody internal wars,massive refugee flows, and threats to the continuity of multi-ethnic nation states.

C) African conflict escalates to global nuclear war

Jeffrey Deutsch, Rabid Tiger Project founder, professor of political science at New

World University, November 18, 2002, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9,

http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.htmlThe Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in theCongo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domesticinstability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars(thanks in part to “national” borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We’ve gotall too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking,Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is

a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus,outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since

been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don’t need any “help,” thank

you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone maynot induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

30




Federalism Impacts: India Impact Module

A) India models US federalism

IYER 5/15/01 [THE HINDU, V. R. KRISHNA]The United States, the most powerful state in the world, despite considerable autonomy to the 50 states is proof that nationalism and devolution of power to states are not self-contradictory. The founding fathers of the Indian Union did recognise the federal destination of India but their vision was blurred by the bleedingPartition and massive migrations, as well as religious and ghastly massacres. Thus these transient traumasmade the leaders feel a case for over-centralised polity. What is more, the Constitution made the statesweak, holding on to the Raj creed of centrifugalism. Federalism for India is fundamental but a few key provisions strike a different note.

B) INDIAN FEDERALISM STOPS BLOODSHED OVER KASHMIR:Shastri , Obtained Bachelors of Arts at Santa Clara University, HASTINGS INTERNATIONAL LAWREVIEW, 1994, p. 133The Indian federal system is undergoing a period that is likely to result in a gradual controlled

decentralization of power to the states and, eventually, to local levels. In the past thirty to forty years, the Indian

government has created new institutions, thereby responding to the demands and needs of various groups for self-recognition. Despitemeeting such demands, the central government has not compromised the central unity and democracy of the overall system. In the future,as part of this ongoing process, new states and hill councils may be formed, particularly in response to tribal, linguistic, and other localconcerns. Furthermore, the increasing liberalization of the economic system will also allow states to create their own economic policies

and work with the private sector on their own terms. While threats from separatist terrorism will continue to exist, particularly in Kashmir, the past experience in Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and the Northeastern states has shownthat after prolonged conflicts in which the center holds its ground, separatists will eventually realize, under popular pressure, that the federal system provides an opportunity for them to gain a share of power,while the alternative is violence and bloodshed.

C) VIOLENCE OVER KASHMIR THREATENS NUCLEAR WAR AND THE END OF LIFE ON THE PLANET

FAI, STAFF, Islamic Horizons January, 2004 - February, 2004; LEXISThe Kashmir dispute involves not only the lives and futures of the Kashmiris, but it also significantlyimpacts India-Pakistan relations and the peace and stability of the South-Asian subcontinent-home to one-fifth of the

world's population. The dispute appears to be irresolvable peacefully because international apathy encourages the obduracy of one of the parties. To distract from its occupation of Kashmir in defiance of UN resolutions, India has mastered the art of propagating myths about the genesis and nature of the dispute. The UN Security Council unanimously agreedwith the common position taken by the three parties in the dispute--the Kashmiris, Pakistan, and India--that the status of Jammu and Kashmir can be settled only in accordancewith the will of the Kashmiris, ascertained through the democratic method, i.e. a free and impartial plebiscite. The U.S. and other democracies, also, endorsed this agreement. Theterms stipulated by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), in close and continuous consultation with both countries, were crystallized in two resolutions adopted onAug. 13th, 1948 and Jan. 5th, 1949. Both governments formally accepted the terms in a binding international agreement similar to a treaty. A ceasefire was immediately enforced,and UNCIP started negotiations on a plan for the w ithdrawal of Indian and Pakistani armies from Kashmir, a plan that would not disadvantage either side or imperil impartiality of the plebiscite. The U.S., Britain and France sponsored all of the Security Council resolutions that called for a plebiscite. Their commitment was indicated in a personal appealmade by President Harry Truman and British Prime Minister Clement Atlee that differences over demilitarization be submitted to arbitration by the plebiscite administrator, adistinguished American war hero: Admiral Chester Nimitz. Unfortunately, India rejected this appeal and, later, objected to an American acting as the plebiscite administrator. No permanent obstacles bar the establishment of a UN-run plebiscite administration in Kashmir. The world organization has proved its ability, even in the most forbiddingcircumstances, to institute an electoral process under its supervision and control, with the help of a neutral peacekeeping force. One such striking example is Namibia, which was peacefully brought to independence after seven decades of occupation and control by South Africa. More recently, the UN peacefully settled the East Timor issue. Four decadesago, UN Representative Sir Owen Dixon envisaged that the Kashmiri plebiscite could be so regionalized that none of the state's different zones would be forced to accept anoutcome contrary to its wishes. The idea of a referendum or plebiscite can be seamlessly translated into the idea of elections to one or more constituent assemblies that willdetermine the future status of the state or of its different zones. However, any such election must be completely free, transparent, and conducted under UN control and supervision.

Kashmir, it might be said, is the Alsace-Lorraine of South Asia, substituting India and Pakistan for France and Germany. It hassparked two conventional wars and a nuclear arms race between the South Asian rivals, making it the world's most dangerous territory. Any new war may have nuclear implications that could endanger

every nation and every human. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers that have developedsophisticated missile delivery vehicles, and both are adamant against signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both feature domestic constituencies that universally celebrate their muscular, nuclear postures; no political party or serious private association champions nuclear controls or disarmament.

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Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions

INDIA USES FEDERALISM TO DECREASE TENSIONS NEAR KASHMIR

PTI NEWS AGENCY, July 25, 2001, p. Lexis

New Delhi, 25 July: Indian Home Minister L K Advani on Wednesday as dateline said that the federalgovernment, as part of devolution of power to states, was willing to give special powers to Jammu andKashmir if the demand so arose. Replying to supplementaries during question hour in Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament), Advani reiterated Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India and there would be no compromise on it. Stating the government was moving towards devolution of more powers to states,Advani said, "in this process if Jammu and Kashmir needs special powers, we are willing to give it".

FEDERAL STRUCTURE ESSENTIAL TO INDIA'S FUTURE THE HINDU, May 15, 2001, p. LexisTo be unitary at the whim of the Union and federal at the pleasure of the Centre makes our Republic aquasi-federal chameleon. Indian pluralism, rich in diversity and deep-rooted in group identity, is not a mere

coat of paint. In constitutional politics and justice there is no room for hide-and-seek jurisprudence. Lawand life shall shape their modus vivendi in the integral yoga of federal justice.

FEDERAL FRAMEWORK IN INDIA IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT CONFLICT

GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, January 22, 2002, p. Lexis The home minister said the federal government wouldwelcome the J and K government to identify areas for the exercise. In his speech on 'My India: The Visionfor the Future', Advani said "I think that it is not out of place to mention my hope and desire to see thecoming together of India and Pakistan in some type of confederal framework in the years to come. This isnot an impossible dream." Advani recalled how the two Germanys reunited by pulling down the BerlinWall and referred to signs of reconciliation even between the two Koreas and Europe becoming a singlemonetary union with a common currency.

DENIAL OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOMENTS KASHMIR CRISIS Michael Kelly, Director of Research at University of Detroit College of Law, DRAKE LAW REVIEW,1999, p. LexisAs history has shown, this was a tactical, political mistake, the repercussions of which carry over to the present: "The refusal to recognize self-determination movements can also produce severe internationalramifications. The current conflict in Kashmir demonstrates how a previous denial of a people's right toself-determination can foment the conflicts of the present and ensure the uncertainty of the future."

Federalism is crucial to India’s cohesionIYER 5/15/01 [THE HINDU, V. R. KRISHNA]

In India, when linguistic states were demanded, there was no contra-national passion. On the other hand, itwas a great nationalist who urged that linguistic states be formed. Central resistance to this desideratumwas, at root, "Delhi Mughaldom". A people's right cannot be suppressed and this was demonstrated by PotiSriramalu going on a fast unto death and actually his martyrdom accelerated the driving force of linguisticautonomy. Today, when we look back on the various states, is there one single patriot who regrets or rejectsthe formation of Kerala and Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Maharashtra? Likewise,the other states were formed in due recognition of the power and passion which supported the just claim of limited self- determination. Let me repeat that autonomy, only within the Indian sovereignty, is not anti-national but strengthens the country's fraternity.

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Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions

Failure of Indian federalism causes nuclear war in Kashmir

Kelly, Director of Legal Research, Writing & Advocacy at Michigan State University's Detroit Collegeof Law, 99 [47 Drake L. Rev. 209, Michael J.]

Fraying FederationsThere are several federations around the world that continue to hobble along in their present form but showsigns of strain, and are subjected to demands from internal groups both for more autonomy and, in somecases, outright secession and independence. India, Russia, Canada, and Mexico are representative of suchinstances.1. India: The Kashmir Dilemma Despite the many ethnic and religious separatist movementsfrom all over the country that threaten the central government in India, the most vexing problem, and theone that has drawn the most international attention, has been with that region in the north known asKashmir. n249 The formerly independent state of Kashmir has been the object of a political and militarytug-of-war between the nation-states of India and Pakistan since the independence of these two large statesfrom Britain in 1947. n250 The "Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir" was constituted under the Treaty of Amristar in 1846 n251 and was one of 565 "princely states" that were considered nominally independent

when India and Pakistan were both part of the single British colony on the Asian sub-continent knowncollectively as "India," but who, upon the British exodus from the region, were given the free choice toaccede to either of the two successor dominions: Pakistan or India. n252 [*253] Kashmir's Hindu ruler chose India, even though the majority of Kashmiris were Muslim, in exchange for troops to repel tribalraiders. Lord Mountbatten, Governor- General of India, provisionally accepted the accession but noted thatthe final question would be settled by a plebiscite. n253 That plebiscite has never been held. n254 Ashistory has shown, this was a tactical, political mistake, the repercussions of which carry over to the present: "The refusal to recognize self-determination movements can also produce severe internationalramifications. The current conflict in Kashmir demonstrates how a previous denial of a people's right toself-determination can foment the conflicts of the present and ensure the uncertainty of the future." n255Moreover, the international community has never recognized India's claim to Kashmir. n256[SEE MAP IN ORIGINAL] Kashmir is now occupied by three sovereign nation-states: India, whichcontrols the lion's share; Pakistan, which occupies a small western portion; and China, which controlsLadakh. n257 Various mediations of the situation have been attempted (the United Nations from 1948-58,the U.S.S.R. from 1965-66, and the United States in 1990), but to no avail. n258 Predictably, the situationin Kashmir has degenerated. There are both secessionist groups and unionist groups taking militant actionagainst each other and the Indian army that has occupied the state to enforce military rule for most of the1990s. n259 Violence has become the daily norm for this region. In 1990 alone, there were 3000 deathsrelated to the unrest in [*254] Kashmir. n260 Complicating matters, and of concern to the worldcommunity and the United Nations, is the recent development of nuclear capabilities on the part of bothIndia and Pakistan. n261 Indeed, as the realistic and potential flashpoint amongst the three occupyingnuclear powers, Kashmir has been referred to as a "nuclear tinderbox" waiting to be ignited. n262One formula recently put forward, and significantly based on principles of self- determination, calls for thecreation of a "Kashmiri Autonomous Region" under nominal Indian control that would exist until areferendum can be held, at which point the various parts of Kashmir can freely choose with whichsovereign they wish to associate without the entire region going as a single entity. n263

33




Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impact Module

A. Federalism is crucial to prevent multiple civil wars and thedestruction of Democracy in Iraq

Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton, 04 [TheWashington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2; Pg. 7, Dawn]

Establishing a governmental system that can accommodate Iraq's different ethnic and religious groups, previously kept in check by the political and military repression of the Saddam Hussein regime, is paramount to securing that peace. In the absence of a system uniquely designed toward this end, violentconflicts and demands for independence are likely to engulf the country. If not planned precisely to meetthe specific ethnic and religious divisions at play, any democratic government to emerge in Iraq is bound to prove less capable of maintaining order than the brutal dictatorship that preceded it.By dividing power between two levels of government -- giving groups greater control over their own political, social, and economic affairs while making them feel less exploited as well as more secure --federalism offers the only viable possibility for preventing ethnic conflict and secessionism as well asestablishing a stable democracy in Iraq.

B. War in the Middle East will escalate into global nuclear war Steinbach, DC Iraq Coalition, 02

[John, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html ]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms

control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the

Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once

unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current

President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42)

Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the

principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data

relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.)

Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, theunilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual

use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass

destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger

a world conflagration." (44)

34

http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html

http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html




Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impacts

Federalism would solve in Iraq

White 2004(Roger, assc prof, poly sci, Loyola U, New Orleans; The Guardian; February 13. l/n))

If there were ever a case for federalism, Iraq is it. The United States was the first federal government,thanks in great measure to the genius of James Madison. In the years since our Constitution was ratified in1789, many countries -- Canada, Australia and lately Mexico, to name a few -- have developed federalinstitutions. The essence of federalism is divided sovereignty. Federal rule applies in situationscharacterized by different, distinct communities, each wanting to rule over themselves but also having goodreasons to stick together. The Yankees of Massachusetts and the Planters of South Carolina were, after all,not terribly fond of each other in 1787, but most knew that unless they surrendered a portion of their sovereignty they would lose all of it to one or another European power.

Liberal democracy solves Iraqi instability White 2004

(Roger, assc prof, poly sci, Loyola U, New Orleans; The Guardian; February 13. l/n))

One of our main jobs today in Iraq is to stop the Kurds, Shias and Sunnis from engaging in adestructive civil war of their own. This said, we can still retain a healthy sense of our own politicallimits. Liberal democracy, as we have come to know it, is predicated upon the defense of inalienable rights, as Thomas Jefferson famously announced in 1776. The idea that rights belongto individuals and not to groups is not yet readily accepted in Iraq and probably will not be for some time. While some basic level of individual freedom will have to be built into the new IraqiConstitution if anything like a democracy is to arise, the demand for individual freedom will haveto be advanced prudently. The recognition of inalienable rights will have to be balanced againstlocal traditions and conventions.

Failure to establish power-sharing will cause a civil war Robberson 12/10/03 [The Dallas Morning News, Tod, L/N]

The creation of democratic governance, after 35 years of brutal dictatorship, is a key aspect of Washington's reconstruction and stabilization plan for Iraq. Without a stable democracy that balances power between Iraq's disparate religious and ethnic groups, U.S. officials warn, thenation threatens to slide into further chaos and potential civil war. Finding a formula that satisfieseveryone is an enormous challenge.

The Failure of federalism in Iraq causes civil war that escalatesthrough the region and destroys global federalism

Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton, 04 [The

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2; Pg. 7, Dawn]The potential consequences of failing to design federalism properly and to establish a stable democracy inIraq extend far beyond Iraqi borders. Civil war in Iraq may draw in neighboring countries such as Turkeyand Iran, further destabilizing the Middle East in the process. It may also discourage foreign investment inthe region, bolster Islamic extremists, and exacerbate tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. A civil war in Iraq may even undermine support for the concept of federalism more generally, which is significantgiven the number of countries also considering federalism, such as Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, to name justtwo. Finally, the failure to design and implement the kind of federalism that can establish a stabledemocracy in Iraq might undermine international support for other U.S. initiatives in the region, includingnegotiations for Arab-Israeli peace.

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Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Module

A) FEDERALISM IS CRITICAL TO STABILIZE NIGERIA

AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, 2002 (Sept 11, p. 1008254u6672)Governor James Ibori of Delta State has said that for democracy to be strengthened, there was the need for the re-affirmation of the structure of the nation and for all Nigerians to support the constitution thatemphasized true federalism. The governor said most of the problems facing the country could be resolved by keeping to the true practices of federalism. Fielding questions from newsmen during the monthly presschat at Government House, Asaba, Ibori said, "if you take from the local government elections to the issueof revenue allocation, and in fact, also to the issue of the threat of impeachment of Mr. President, to mymind, the core issue at play: as true federalism." He reiterated that until unless Nigerians were committed tothe practice of true federalism, the nation's polity would continue to witness various hiccups. The federalgovernment has appointed prosecutors to enforce gun laws and has initiated tort reform to stop state suitsagainst gun manufacturers. Both initiatives are unconstitutional. They intrude on rights reserved for thestates and are not justified under the commerce power of Congress.

B) NIGERIAN STABILITY KEY TO STOPPING VIOLENT INSTABILITY THROUGHOUT WEST AFRICA

Akwei 03 (Adotei, Africa Director @ Amnesty International, NPR, 4/7)Ms. AKWEI: Well, Nigeria is absolutely critical to West Africa. You have conflicts in Liberia. You have conflict now in Cote d'Ivoire, which was one of the most stable countries in Africa. You have a very fragilesituation Sierre Leone and you have fighting on the border of Guinea. So that whole Manu River region of West Africa is just on the precipice. You have very weak democracies in Benin and in Ghana. The sayingis 'That if Nigeria, you know, sneezes, the rest of West Africa catches a cold.' It also impacts all of Africa because it has this population that's massive. It has economic potential to really pull the region up--the WestAfrica region. You know, we're all kind of waiting and hoping for Nigeria to assume and lead the way itwas meant to because of its size and its resources. And we're still waiting.

C) African conflict escalates to global nuclear war Jeffrey Deutsch, Rabid Tiger Project founder, professor of political science atNew World University, November 18, 2002, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9,

http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.htmlThe Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in theCongo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domesticinstability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars(thanks in part to “national” borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We’ve gotall too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking,Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa isa major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus,

outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines havelong since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers untothemselves and don’t need any “help,” thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvementvery quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But anAfrican nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in afight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial,scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

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Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions

Federalism is crucial to preventing ethnic conflict in Nigeria

Innocent Anaba ‘04 [Africa News Service, August 24, 2004 pNA, Abuja, Aug 24, 2004 (Vanguard/AllAfrica Global Media via COMTEX)]EMINENT Lawyer, Professor Itse Sagay, SAN, yesterday warned that unless Nigeria returns to the path of true federalism, she may never record real growth, progress, development and harmony amongst the ethnicnationalities that make up the country, even as he blamed the country's woes on bad leadership.He also justified the restiveness of the people of Niger Delta region, saying "the people of the Niger Delta,whose land produce all this stolen wealth have every reason to be restive in the midst of their misery,squalor, wretchedness and extreme poverty and neglect."

Sharia threatens Nigerian federalism, resulting in conflict

J. Isawa Elaigwu, Institute of Governance and Social Research & Habu Galadima, University of

Jos, 03 [Publius, Summer 2003 v33 i3 p123(22)]

The transition from military to civilian government on 29 May 1999 had raised hopes for a new democratic Nigeria. However, no sooner had civilian politicians taken over the reins of power than an emotionalreligious issue--Sharia--burst upon the political scene, casting a dark shadow over Nigerian federalism.Political leaders in the North began implementing Islamic law over criminal matters in Nigeria's 12 mostlyMuslim northern states. Communal violence emanating from conflict over Sharia soon consumed morethan 3,000 lives, often under brutal and barbaric circumstances.

Nigerian federalism is crucial to prevent conflict

Vanguard ’04 [Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, July 14, 2004 pNA

[Byline: Mcphilips Nwachukwu, Ikechukwu Eze, Charles Ozoemena & Nduka Uzuakpundu]ON the occasion of the 70th birthday celebration of Nobel Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka, one-timemilitary governor of Imo and Lagos States, Rear Admiral Ndubuisi Kanu, declared yesterday in Lagos thatthe therapy for Nigeria to attain true development, prosperity and political stability laid in its capacity toembrace true federalism.Prof. Soyinka himself reviewing the polity on BBC, accused the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) of trying to manipulateelections to transform the nation's political landscape into a "one-party democracy."President Olusegun Obasanjo, who has been locked in a running battle with the Nobel Laureate since his (Obasanjo's) return to power in1999, surprised on lookers at the birthday lecture by congratulating an author widely seen as his most eloquent critic.Only two months ago, the acclaimed playwright and activist was tear-gassed and briefly arrested during an anti-government rally in

Lagos. Admiral Kanu, guest speaker at the lecture organised by the Pyrates Confraternity co-founded by Prof. Soyinka, said theinability of Nigerian leaders to toe the path of true federalism and their failure to appreciate the implicationof the heterogeneous nature of the country had only resulted in the various political uprisings,marginalisation, and social injustices in the country.

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Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions

Failure of federalism in Nigeria causes civil war

Jide Ajani, Political Editor & Olasunkami Akoni ’04 [Africa News Service, May 4, 2004

pNA, Lagos, May 04, 2004 (Vanguard/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX)]On his own part, Governor Tinubu declared that any policy of government which neglects the spirit of truefederalism or which makes it difficult or impossible for a state to cater for the needs of its citizen wouldamount to riding the tiger. Speaking extempore, the governor made it clear that if the leadership refuses to provide the basic needs of the people, like health, education and security, the same citizens would somedayturn the heat on the leadership.

Federalism is crucial to the future of Nigeria

Comtex 8/20/04 [Africa News Service, Olapade Agoro, NAC Presidential Candidate, (Vanguard/All

Africa Global Media via COMTEX)]He made some assertions, just as he also made some claims regarding what transpired at the polls. For instance, he asserted that without true federalism, Nigeria as a nation would not work. He is right. And

many others before him had said that much.

Federalism is crucial for the progress of Nigeria

Innocent Anaba ‘04 [Africa News Service, August 24, 2004 pNA, Abuja, Aug 24, 2004 (Vanguard/All

Africa Global Media via COMTEX)]"It has thus become clear that unless Nigeria returns to true federalism, there can be no real growth, progress, development and harmony amongst the ethnic nationalities that make up the country," He notedthat democracy is yet to arrive in Nigeria, saying "part of the grave problem facing us today is our stubbornand consistent refusal to accept the practice and culture of democracy. And so, we have civilian governmentand no democracy."

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Federalism Impacts: Russia Impact Module

A) FEDERALISM IS KEEPING RUSSIA TOGETHER Michael Kelly, Director of Research at University of Detroit College of Law, DRAKE LAW REVIEW,

1999, p. LexisWith the notable exception of Chechnya, Russia has managed to hold itself together in a cohesivefederation through a combination of offering a significant degree of autonomy to its constituent parts andthe gradual empowerment of its regional governments. There are twenty-one ethnically homogenousrepublics under the new federal constitution, and these are more worrisome for Russia's central governmentin Moscow than the provinces, autonomous provinces, districts, autonomous districts, or territories.

B) RUSSIAN COLLAPSE INCREASES RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Henry E. Hale, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rein Taagepera, Professor of Political Science,University of California, 2002 (EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, November, p. 18)A fragmenting Russia could pose extreme security concerns for the West, of which the nuclear danger is the

most obvious. While the former Soviet republics were willing to cede their arms to Russia, a collapsedRussia would be likely to have no clear single 'successor' to which the weapons would best be transferred.This could make it nearly impossible to consolidate Russia's nuclear arsenal, which would in turn seriouslycomplicate international diplomacy. Indeed, given the tendency of some Russian regional leaders to spoutanti-Semitic slogans or otherwise thumb their noses at norms of human rights, their hold on nuclear weapons could radically increase the likelihood that these weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists or other groups that would like to use them for more than just defensive deterrence. Even if this likelihood issmall, the possible outcome is sufficiently grave to merit significant effort to prevent it from occurring.

C) THE IMPACT IS EXTINCTION BERES, 1984 (TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY; PG. 50-51) Nuclear terrorism could even spark full scale nuclear war between states. Such war could involve theentire spectrum of nuclear conflict possibilities, ranging from a nuclear attack upon a nonnuclear state to

systemwide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likelyway would involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists “hosted” in another state. For example, consider the followingscenario: Early in the 1980’s Israel and her Arab state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peacesettlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already several years old, only the interests of the Palestinians—as defined

by the PLO—seem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousand dead and maimed ismatched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes againstterrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon the Lebanese government and it allies retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire regionis ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries in the area have suffered unprecedented destruction. Of course, such ascenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react to the situation in the Middle East?What would be the Soviet response? It is entirely conceivable that a chain reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could ensue, one thatwould involve the superpowers or even every nuclear weapon state on the planet. What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigmwould allow us a proper framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the outer limits of human destructiveness.

Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible consequences. Whatever the actualextent of injuries and fatalities, it would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a planetary casket strewn

with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations.

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Federalism Impacts: Russia Authoritarianism Module

A) FEDERALISM IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVATION OF

DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIAGLOBAL NEWS WIRE, April 23, 2002, p. LexisSt Petersburg, 23 April, RIA-Novosti correspondent Svetlana Chikirova: Federalism in Russia is aguarantee of the authorities' accountability to citizens, deputy head of the Russian president's administrationDmitriy Kozak believes. RIA-Novosti news agency reports that Kozak said this today when addressing aninternational conference on the division of powers among the various levels of public authorities in Russia.According to Kozak, the generally-recognized principles of federalism have over the past decade "in Russia been implemented extremely haphazardly or not implemented thoroughly". This has led to the start of a process of abolition of local self-government, there are "more and more discussions about replacing it",Kozak said. However, Russia made its historic choice in favour of federalism at the start of the 1990s, hesaid. This choice was enshrined in the new Russian Federation Constitution of 1993. Kozak said thatfederalism and local self-government are for Russia primarily a means of increasing citizens' participationin running the state, bringing the authorities closer to the public and guaranteeing the stability of public

institutions. The issues to be discussed at today's conference are therefore of "immense, vital importance"for Russia, Kozak stressed.

B) Failure of Russian democracy risks the use of 1000s of nuclear warheads

Shelton 01Shelton, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1-15-2001 (Henry) Vital Speeches No. 7, Vol. 67; Pg. 194 ; ISSN: 0042-742XForce, Forces, and Forecasting; Henry H. Shelton speech; TranscriptIn much the same way while the Balkans remain a serious concern in Europe, but the situation there palesin comparison with events in Russia. The future of Europe will not swing on the status of Kosovo or the

establishment of a new Serbia. No, the future of Europe swings on the path that Russian nationalism takesand whether Russia can continue its peaceful evolution into a fully democratic nation with a stableeconomy that abides by the rule of law. As I discussed with my counterpart, Russian Chief of Staff Kvashnin, this past Tuesday, one of the most potentially destabilizing factors in the region is the thousandsof nuclear and chemical weapons, stored in facilities throughout Russia. And as we all know, there are stillthousands of nuclear warheads in the Russian arsenal. They present a very profound danger to our securityshould they fall into the wrong hands and there are many "wrong hands" out there trying to get them.

40




***States Counterplan Affirmative Answers***

States Counterplan 2ac Answers

(--) Fifty state FIAT is illegitimate and a voting issue:

A) It’s utopian: All 50 states have never taken an action at the sametime

B) No literature base: No literature assumes all 50 states take auniform action—can’t research answers

C) Voting issue for fairness & ground

(--) Counterplan doesn’t solve the case: it doesn’t mobilize resources or collective action as well as federal action: Weill evidence in the 1ac.

(--) No proof other nations will model state religious doctrine—our 1ac evidence says the federal government’s policy is modeled: meaning they don’t solve our 2 nd advantage.

(--) The federal government is the best actor to address poverty: it has amountain of empirical successes:

James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law andPolicy, May–June 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf ) When Attacking Poverty, the Federal Government Often Is Very Effective That the businesssector, state and local governments, and charity are inadequate to the task of redressing povertyand ensuring opportunity would not mean that the federal government should play an importantrole if the federal government also were unsuccessful or institutionally incapable. But the federal

government possesses the resources and has proven itself as an actor— the most successful

actor—in these arenas, especially when (as discussed earlier) it moves both economic and spending policy in the

same positive direction. When it did that in the 1960s and the late 1990s, progress was substantial. Separately in this issuePeter Edelman addresses the canard (from Ronald Reagan among others) that “we fought a war on poverty and poverty

won.”49 The fact is that many federal initiatives from the last seventy years have beenextraordinarily successful. Their impact has been incomplete but still formidable: ■ The federalgovernment has transformed old age from a frequent sentence of poverty to, typically, albeit notuniversally, a state of economic and health security. In 2003 public benefit programs reduced bymore than 80 percent the number of seniors who otherwise would be living in poverty (14 million

fewer seniors).50 ■ Public benefit programs (overwhelmingly federal or federal-state programs), such as TANF,social security, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, and others, lifted nearly one in threeotherwise poor children out of poverty in 2003.51 ■ Public benefits substantially reduce the

severity of poverty even for those they do not lift out of poverty. In 2003 for those who remained poor the

programs increased their average income from 29 percent to 57 percent of the poverty line.52 ■ In the 1960s studiesfound deep hunger and malnutrition in many poor areas of the country. While hunger and foodinsecurity are still widespread problems, food stamps, school meals, WIC, and related programshave made severe hunger much less common. ■ In the first fifteen years after Medicaid began, black infant

mortality dropped by 49 percent, more than nine times the rate of improvement of the preceding fifteen years.53 Indisputablythese results are not good enough. The work of ensuring that the federal government lives up to its responsibilities andappropriately takes on poverty, insecurity, and unequal opportunity through its economic and spending policies is hardly

finished. And that work is not easy, short-term, or assured of success. But there is no alternative. The federalgovernment is the indispensable player in redressing poverty.

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Permute: do both—this solves best: allows for national organization and support while still maximizing statesolutions:

James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and

Policy, May–June 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf ) Second, the federal government already has played a successful and central role, especially duringthe last seventy years, in moving the country toward more nearly equal opportunity, greater economic and health security, and reduced poverty.21 There is no substitute for a robust positivefederal role. That the federal role is absolutely necessary does not mean that the federal government always will do the

right thing. Nor, when it does the right thing, will the federal government always do so decisively enough, completelyenough, or in a timely way. Bitter experience shows us otherwise. The federal role, moreover, does not mean that individualself-reliance, a strong and effective charitable sector, a more supportive workplace, and engaged state and local governmentsare unimportant. The federal government does not substitute for the role of other sectors that themselves are criticalcomponents of a broad social strategy to build economic security, develop opportunity, and reduce poverty. American history,economic and government structure, politics, and culture all mean that a robust economy, a civil society, and vibrant state and

local government are fundamental to economic security. But having real national leadership in the mix

is essential . As Pres. Lyndon Johnson said early in the war on poverty: Unfortunately, many

Americans live on the outskirts of hope—some because of their poverty,and some because of their color, and all too many because of both. Our task is to help replace

their despair with opportunity.… Poverty is a national problem, requiring improved

national organization and support. But this attack, to be effective, must also be organized at the State and the local level and must be supported and directed by State and local efforts.…The program I shall propose will emphasize this cooperative approach….22

Turn: Federal spending on anti-poverty solves racism:James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and

Policy, May–June 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf ) The two periods of greatest leaps in empowering and creating opportunity for African Americansin our nation—the Reconstruction period after the Civil War and the period of the civil rights

movement in the 1960s and 1970s—were periods of political and economic progresscomplemented by federal spending policy. In both instances the economic change created throughaccess to property, to jobs, to political power, to the courts, and to education dwarfed that created by new federal spending initiatives. But, in both periods, spending initiatives were an importantsecondary source of change.32 And both produced a fierce reaction stemming from the defense of the economic and

political power of whites and of economic elites. Both times the challenge to poverty, economic injustice,and racial discrimination slowed or reversed. In other words, political cycles tend to drive federaleconomic management and federal spending policy to move in tandem: both are likely to be inadequate

for the poor when political weakness means that the national government can ignore their needs. For example, in the last fewyears Congress passed damaging bank-ruptcy law changes and the Bush administration sought damaging changes in overtime

and civil rights policy, while Congress cut Medicaid, child support, child care, and other spending for the poor. But whenspending and economic policy are positive and complement each other, great strides can be madein increasing opportunity and reducing poverty.

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REJECT RACISM AT EVERY TURN:BARDNT 1991 (JOESEPH, MINISTER, DISMANTLING RACISM)

To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations,ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. Itshackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human

potential that God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are

cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marksof our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the visionand the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual,institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the effortsof those who know it is time to tear down once and for all, the walls of racism.

States will race to the bottom in the poverty area:

James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law andPolicy, May–June 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf ) Many in state governments believe that grants to and tax benefits for businesses are necessary toretain jobs or win the interstate (and increasingly international) competition to lure businesses thatcreate local jobs and economic growth. Businesses already in the state, or thinking of migrating in, look for public

investments in roads, other infrastructure, and education. These take a large share of state revenues. At the same time, manystate officials believe that laws supporting higher compensation (e.g., a state minimum wage or laws

mandating health benefits or paid leave) and laws granting more generous public assistance ,

potentially accompanied by higher taxes, will repel business and wealthy individuals . As one

expert observer of this phenomenon explained, [t]he ability of jurisdictions to break the link between taxes and expenditures

is limited by the threat of relocation by highly mobile, relatively wealthy individuals. In an effort to attract theserelocators, jurisdictions offer selective tax breaks or lower the overall burden or progressivity of broad-based taxes. This, then, cripples the ability of the jurisdictions to fund public goods and

services through a tax system based on ability to pay.46 Although the extent to which businesses actually makelocation decisions based on state incentives and taxes is in doubt, that these considerations weigh heavily on state officials

making budget decisions is not. The result is an interstate competition to create the best “businessclimate.” At the same time, states fear that if their public benefits are more generous than those of other states, they will become magnets for the poor—that low-income people will move into thestate to obtain the benefits.47 Again, many doubt how valid this fear is, but it is common. It is a contributingfactor to what has been called “the race to the bottom”—the perceived need of states to keep their benefits as low as or lower than those in other states, and particularly neighboring states. Through

this mechanism the interstate competition squeezes down antipoverty efforts.

(--) The net benefit is empirically denied—the federal government has massive involvement in anti-poverty

initiatives:James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy,May–June 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf )

Today the shape of hunger and poverty in America is very different from during the Depression.So is the shape of the federal government. And the Red Cross. And the town of England, where500 children every day receive federally funded free or reduced-priced school lunches.6 SocialSecurity, child support payments, food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),and Medicaid also are part of the town fabric.

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(--) No link: Federalism will adapt to the plan

Ann O'M. Bowman, James F. and Maude B. Byrnes Professor of Government at the University of

South Carolina, 02 [Publius, Spring 2002 v32 i2 p3(21)]

Richard H. Leach once commented that the adaptability of federalism was perhaps its most prominentfeature. (7) Adaptability suggests that the American federal system can adjust and evolve to handlechallenges and changes effectively. If the next decade or so takes the trajectory of trend lines (a), (c), or (d)-the paths with the highest probability of realization-American federalism will easily accommodate it. Shiftsin authority have characterized the U.S. federal system since its founding and are likely to continue.

(--)NO THRESHOLD: NO REASON ONE PLAN KEY TO FEDERALISM.

(--)NO INTERNAL LINK: OTHER NATIONS MODEL THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM; NOT INDIVIDUALDECISIONS.

(--) Federalism is cyclical—the plan is insignificant in the overall move of federalism

Ann O'M. Bowman, James F. and Maude B. Byrnes Professor of Government at the University of

South Carolina, 02 [Publius, Spring 2002 v32 i2 p3(21)]

The federalism scenarios make no assumptions about the length of time represented by the dotted lines. It isquite possible, even likely, that the next decade or two will see several of these trends unfold at different periods. Increases may be followed by decreases, periods of no change could be interspersed among

upward or downward trends.

(--) FEDERALISM DOESN’T SOLVE IN OTHER COUNTRIES:

Michael A. Pagano, Professor of Public Administration and Director of the Graduate Program in Public Administration

at the University of Illinois at Chicago, 02 [Publius, Spring 2002 v32 i2 p1(2)]

This, the first issue of the Global Review of Federalism, reaches toward the future, rather than the past, andsketches out the important factors and features of established federal systems in the future. Although thenotable successes of ethnic, religious, racial, and other minorities in securing a voice in emergingdemocratic societies are laudatory, many attempts at enhancing the autonomy of groups and of integratingthem into a larger society have been less than satisfactory. Alongside the South African and Belgian stories

stand the Palestinian and Kashmir debacles; then there are the swings of the federalism pendulum thatcharacterize places such as Nigeria and Russia.

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States Counterplan Answers--Extensions

Federal government solves poverty better: Social Security,Medicare, Medicaid all prove this is true:

James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law andPolicy, May–June 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf )

By contrast, when the federal government provides both funds and direction , the outcome usually is better. Some of these programs are so successful that we no longer remember how deep (how “intractable”—to use a phrase often applied to the problems of the poor) the problems that they tried to solve supposedly were. Social security, Supplemental Security Income,Job Corps, Medicare, Medicaid, Head Start, school lunch and school breakfast, food stamps, childsupport enforcement, immunizations, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (commonly known as the WIC program) are among the many programs that fit this model.

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States Counterplan Affirmative Answers: Statescounterplan won’t lead to federal action

Industry will water down the federal standard created from state

action:J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis,accessed June 20, 2008)

Elliott and his coauthors made this point in the context of a larger argument that sought to debunk prevailing myths about theorigins of federal statutes, namely that they are either the product of a well-intentioned Congress seeking to solve policy

problems, or the result of conventional interest group politics in which environmentalists successfully pressure the nationalgovernment for legislation. 10 To properly understand federal statutes, the authors argued, one must recognize that they are

the product of organizational and political exigencies 11 (a position that we, of course, embrace). Under this"evolutionary" model of federal statutes, state-level legislative successes by environmental groupstend to be countered by federal legislative successes by industry groups. 12 This insight was the genesis

of DPT. Since then, others have identified additional examples of this phenomenon, although no one has elaborated on it inany depth. 13 The Elliott et al. account of industry demand for federal legislation provides an important piece of the puzzleof how federal statutes take shape. First, it disabuses us of the notion that industry will always resist regulation. Indeed,industry groups sometimes provide the impetus for regulation, in both domestic and international settings. 14 Although

[*1506] industry may lead the charge for federal legislation only infrequently, industry support for federal regulationundoubtedly has a powerful effect on the prospect of its passage. 15 Yet what will industry demand fromCongress? It will demand a federal standard that preempts inconsistent state regulation and eliminates

regulatory uncertainty. Uniformity is not enough, however. Industry will also try to undercut the mostaggressive state standards by seeking a lower federal ceiling. 16 States thus establish the boundaries within

which the federal negotiation over standards takes place - the more stringently states regulate at the outset, the more leverage

they create for a compromise in the end. If the federal standard turns out to be weaker than the mostaggressive state standard, and if preemption prevents any deviation, then industry achieves adouble win. 17

The unified FIAT of the Counterplan will prevent industry fromappealing to Congress for a federal standard:

J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis,accessed June 20, 2008)

States can increase regulatory uncertainty in this way either by taking action alone or by joining together with other states in

regional compacts. Moreover, because states will be responding to somewhat different interest groupconfigurations within their own jurisdictions, there is a high likelihood that different states willadopt different regulatory approaches. This practically ensures inconsistency and helps driveindustry to Congress. At the same time, some states are likely to be more important than others in provoking this

reaction. Historically, California seems to have been especially influential in prompting industry demand for federaluniformity, perhaps because of the state's disproportionate market power 27 and history of engaging in product regulationtargeting automobiles. 28

States only have a limited effect to create federal policy change:J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis,accessed June 20, 2008)

Based on the climate change example, we argue that although states [*1539] can have asignificant catalytic effect on the demand for federal legislation (by stimulating pro-regulatorydemand, defensive preemption, or both simultaneously), they have less to do with its content. Theclimate change example shows that state regulation can have some effect - for example, by helpingto create path dependence for certain policy tools - but that far more influential are three other factors: the goals of key interest groups, the physical and technical properties of the regulatory problem they face, and the compatibility of the potential points of regulation (what we call"regulatory nodes") with available regulatory tools.

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Interstate Compact Answers(READ REGULAR STATES ANSWERS AND THEN…)

TURN: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION:

A) Interstate compacts destroy democracy Hasday, Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit., 97

[49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, Jill]Yet while the benefits of compacting for devolutionists are clear, the compacting form raises serious democratic concerns. Perhaps the core meaning of democracy is that it allows the majority in a polity tolargely determine the shape of their government and the course of its pursuits. No matter the benefits of permanency, there is still a tension between this principle and long-term contracts by governments. Even if compacts are the product of deliberative, collective self-determination, [*8] which often is doubtful, theyseverely hamper the people's ability to continue to guide their own fate by strictly limiting a party state's power to respond to changing preferences and circumstances. At the heart of the meaning of compacts, thistension has gone essentially unexplored by compact writers, who instead expound on the advantages of finality and hail compacts as augmenting the voice of the citizenry as they empower the states. n34

B) Democracy promotion key to preventing inevitable extinction

Diamond, senior research fellow at Hoover Institution, 95(Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives, A Report to theCarnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1995, p. 6)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. Inthe former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. Theflow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that havemade common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous,democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life

on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventionalthreats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

TURN: ROLLBACK:Hasday, Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit., 97

[49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, Jill]Congress' role is the first issue that should be reexamined in light of the democratic tension within compacting. Every interstateagreement must win the approval of the party state legislatures, but only some [*12] interstate agreements are compacts, directly boundto the compact jurisprudence on permanency and constitutionally required to garner congressional as well as state assent. n50 Only thoseagreements that may " 'encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States' " n51 must take the compact form and

receive Congress' consent. Yet Congress, unlike the states, is not bound by the compacts it approves. It cancondition its consent or simply supersede its approval legislation with subsequent law. n52

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Interstate Compact Answers

Compacts don’t strengthen federalismHasday, Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit., 97

[49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, Jill]From the states' perspective or that of people who support compacts as a way to increase state power, thisasymmetry is yet another reason to be reluctant to compact. Not only are the states bound almostirrevocably, n53 but the omnipresent threat that Congress will change its mind deprives them of the full benefit of reliance.

Congress must approve interstate compacts—proves they link to all their net benefits:

Richman, Old Dominion University, 03 [Publius, Spring 2003 v33 i2 p79(4)]

In his discussion of formal interstate compacts, Zimmerman explains the requirement for congressionalapproval, originally included in the Articles of Confederation and imported into the Constitution as a basic protection against regional or sectional state alignments against other states, or against the federal

government. In the nineteenth century, most compacts addressed particular interstate boundary conflicts,and thus did not involve general policy concerns; increasingly in the twentieth century, compacts addressedmore substantive interstate subjects. In 1921 Congress approved creation of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the first bistate compact creating a quasi-independent permanent entity with a commissionas board of directors and an executive staff to build and manage revenue-producing transportation and portfacilities in the New York and New Jersey Hudson River port region.

Congress must approve all interstate compacts—and it is not aslam dunk

Richman, Old Dominion University, 03 [Publius, Spring 2003 v33 i2 p79(4)]

Although congressional approval has been forthcoming in many interstate compacts, it is not to be assumedthat Congress plays an insignificant role (i.e., by routinely endorsing compacts agreed upon by two or morestates). Zimmerman's discussion of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, approved by Congress in 1996for a period of three years, offers a recent instance where the congressional approval requirement was a keyfactor in avoiding inter-regional conflict. The dairy compact's aim was to help (i.e., to offer economic protection to) the northeastern states' declining family dairy farms by stabilizing milk prices in the thosestates. The measure involved stabilization of the price of milk by New England's state regulatory agencies by setting common minimum prices at the farm. The compact was opposed by the national milk-processingindustry, and significantly by a group of midwestern states that perceived the compact as a restraint on their ability to freely market their dairy products in New England. Due to the regional controversy, Congressrefused to extend its approval of the compact more than the original three years granted. Consequently,lacking congressional approval, the compact expired in 2001.

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states counterplan opening packet

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