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STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AN EVOLVING ALLIANCE AGENDAMARCH 2021

The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney is dedicated to the rigorous analysis of American foreign policy, economics, politics and culture. The Centre is a national resource, that builds Australia’s awareness of the dynamics shaping America — and critically — their implications for Australia.

The United States Studies Centre is a joint venture of the University of Sydney and the American Australian Association.

The Centre’s Foreign Policy and Defence Program receives funding support from the following partners:

Research conclusions are derived independently and authors represent their own view, not those of the United States Studies Centre or the Perth USAsia Centre.

The Perth USAsia Centre located at The University of Western Australia is a non-partisan, not-for-profit institution strengthening relationships and strategic thinking between Australia, the Indo-Pacific and the USA. The Centre is a lead-ing think tank focusing on geopolitical issues, policy development and building a strategic affairs community across government, business and academia.

The Centre was established as a collaboration of the American Australian Associa-tion, the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and The University of Western Australia.

The Perth USAsia Centre receives its core operating funding from:

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Corporate partnerships provide funding that underpins the Centre’s activities. We are proudly supported by:

INTRODUCTION by Simon Jackman 2

SECTION 1. How does the US domestic political landscape enable or constrain increased US presence and attentiveness to the Indo-Pacific?

6

US domestic politics and policy by Simon Jackman 8

The Biden agenda, Congress and Australian interests by Bruce Wolpe

18

SECTION 2. How should the United States and Australia advance prosperity and resilience?

26

Strengthen the global and regional trade architectures by Jeffrey Wilson

28

Enhance health cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific by Matilda Steward

32

Re-engage the United States in global health security by Adam Kamradt-Scott

36

Activate the Australia-US-Japan trilateral infrastructure partnership by Hayley Channer

40

Collaborate to combat misinformation and the threat of domestic extremism by Elliott Brennan

44

Strengthen Indo-Pacific vaccine partnerships by Adam Kamradt-Scott

48

Find common areas of cooperation in bolstering resilience to climate change by Simon Jackman and Jared Mondschein

52

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 3. How should the United States and Australia bolster collective deterrence and defence?

56

Organise the alliance for collective defence by Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone

58

Expand allied force posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific by Brendan Thomas-Noone

62

Strengthen coordination on countering maritime coercion by Ashley Townshend and Toby Warden

66

Advance defence industrial base integration by Brendan Thomas-Noone

70

SECTION 4. How should the United States and Australia strengthen the economic and technological foundations of the allied and partner network?

74

Leverage advanced manufacturing, critical technology coordination and allied supply chain networks by John Lee

76

Develop deterrence against Chinese economic coercion by Jeffrey Wilson

80

Avoid protectionism to maximise joint economic opportunities by Stephen Kirchner

84

Build cyber capability and cooperation for an evolving threat landscape by Jennifer S. Hunt

88

Endnotes and images 92

About the authors 105

INTRODUCTION Australia’s long-standing strategic relationship with the United States is transforming in response to the geostrategic change in the Indo-Pacific and a fractious debate in the United States about its role in the world. At the same time, technological change and economic interdependence have reshaped the nature of interstate competition, creating many new vectors of state power. For Australian policymakers and their American partners, creativity and dexterity are in great demand, with the US-Australia alliance growing in scope and deepening in strategic importance.

With a new administration in Washington committed to both the Indo-Pacific and the value of alliances — and 2021 marking the 70th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty — this volume advances an agenda for the alliance in this critical phase.

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Infrastructure, energy, frontier technologies and higher education are just some of the domains where a rapid shift in mindset is underway, with national security and strategic considerations now much more salient or even paramount. As the COVID-19 pandemic vividly high-lights, points of national vulnerability and risk — and conversely, resilience and strength — are being discov-ered or created at a brisk pace. This re-emergence of economic tools of statecraft, or geoeconomics, is demanding creativity and dexterity from policymakers and moments of reckoning for democratic societies and their leaders.

These developments are of profound significance for Australia and its alliance with the United States. Australia occupies the middle longitudes of the globe’s most important geographic strategic arena, the Indo-Pacific. The Australia-US alliance has rapidly taken a regional focus and emphasis unseen since the Vietnam War. Australia is one of many countries that counts China as its largest trading partner, but, and unusually for an econ-omy of its size, it has also maintained a highly concen-trated mix of exports and destination markets. Accord-ingly, Australia has been, is, and will be, on the frontlines of geoeconomic competition. Unsurprisingly, this too is broadening and deepening the alliance agenda.

Three key developments are driving swift evolution in Australia’s alliance with the United States — far and away Australia’s most important strategic relationship.

First, strategic competition with an increasingly capa-ble, assertive and authoritarian China is now widely accepted as the single most pressing challenge for the United States and its allies. This change in the US strate-gic mindset finds no meaningful partisan opposition in Washington and certainly not among relevant officials in the Biden administration.

Second, rapid technological change and deepening economic interdependence have reshaped the nature of interstate competition since the Cold War, the last era of great power rivalry dominating international affairs. Since then, long-standing, conventional vectors of state power have been transformed; examples include the develop-ment of stealth, autonomous systems and hypersonics in the domain of conventional military capabilities or the way that technology has transformed intelligence collection and analysis.

International trade and cross-border investment flows have always been vehicles for projecting and acquir-ing national power and influence but now have a level of strategic significance not seen in living memory.

Third, understanding the domestic US political and policy environment must factor into any assessment of the alliance agenda, of how to advance Australian national interests through the alliance. Despite deep and bitter partisan acrimony in the United States, there is much for Australians to welcome. The unified stance on China’s coercive manoeuvres across party lines and between countries is a critical alignment to tackle this high stakes and pervasive issue.

STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH AN INCREASINGLY CAPABLE, ASSERTIVE AND AUTHORITARIAN CHINA IS NOW

WIDELY ACCEPTED AS THE SINGLE MOST PRESSING CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. THIS CHANGE IN THE US STRATEGIC MINDSET FINDS NO MEANINGFUL PARTISAN OPPOSITION

IN WASHINGTON AND CERTAINLY NOT AMONG RELEVANT OFFICIALS IN THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION.

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Across the US strategic affairs community, Australia’s credentials as an ally of substance are impeccable. Australia is rightly seen as on the “frontlines” with respect to the China challenge and being willing and able to respond credibly. Across nominees and appointees — their speeches and Senate testimony — and announcements about the tasking and resourcing of agencies, it is clear the Biden administration is prioritising the Indo-Pacific and the role and interests of allies and partners. We survey these developments in the chapters of this volume.

But we also identify a number of challenges to Australian national interests in the US domestic political and policy environment.

› The magnitude of the China challenge is accepted across party lines, but this must be backed by spending commitments and focus to translate aspiration and intent into policy, programs and facts-on-the-ground. (See Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone on page 58)

US Vice President Joe Biden delivering a speech to the United States Studies Centre and the Lowy Institute in Sydney on 20 July 2016. Photo: United States Studies Centre

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› The US and Australian governments are chiefly focused on the immediate health challenges of COVID-19, particularly getting vaccines to their citizens, but there remain opportunities for building more resilient public health systems in the Indo-Pacific. (See Matilda Steward on page 32 and Adam Kamradt-Scott on page 36)

› Democratic resilience is no longer a concept solely associated with the developing world. From cyber networks to domestic extremism, the internal focus all democratic governments are undergoing is an opportunity for collaboration. (See Elliott Brennan on page 44 and Jennifer S. Hunt on page 88)

› The Biden administration has promised to put climate change considerations at the heart of its thinking about foreign policy and national security. This has prompted considerable speculation about the implications for Australia, with its high carbon emissions per capita and reliance on fossil fuel exports. (See Simon Jackman and Jared Mondschein on page 52)

› Protectionism, isolationism and scepticism about multilateral arrangements are also important legacies of the Trump presidency, supercharged by the COVID-19 pandemic’s damage to the US domestic economy, to the United States’ sense of its priorities and its place in the world. (See Jeffrey Wilson on page 28 and Stephen Kirchner on page 84)

› US defence budgets were under enormous strain and scrutiny before COVID-19, opening up a gap between operational capabilities and strategic aspirations in the Indo-Pacific. Countries that felt “out in the cold” in Trump’s Washington are vying for presence and influence with the Biden administration (e.g., NATO partners). Internal competition for resources inside the US Government will also risk distraction from the Indo-Pacific. (See Brendan Thomas-Noone on pages 62 and 70 and Ashley Townshend and Toby Warden on page 66)

› Geoeconomic threats to American primacy are prompting the Biden administration to explicitly connect domestic recovery to external strength, with reviews of supply chains and strategic, government-led investments to secure US technological supremacy. But any opportunities — and risks — for allies remain unclear. (See Hayley Channer on page 40, John Lee on page 76 and Jeffrey Wilson on page 80)

Accordingly, a clear-eyed understanding of Australian national interests — advancing them and advocating for them in these early months of the Biden administration — is vital, central to the mission of the United States Studies Centre, the Perth USAsia Centre and the purpose of the chapters that follow.

Professor Simon Jackman Chief Executive Officer March 2021

STATE OF THE UNITED STATES

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SECTION 1. HOW DOES THE US DOMESTIC POLITICAL LANDSCAPE ENABLE OR CONSTRAIN INCREASED US PRESENCE AND ATTENTIVENESS TO THE INDO-PACIFIC?

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US DOMESTIC POLITICS AND POLICYPROFESSOR SIMON JACKMAN

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For Australian national interests, one issue dominates assessments about US domestic politics. What is the appetite of the United States for a return to global lead-ership? A range of subsidiary questions follow:

› How quickly, and to what extent, will the Biden administration operationalise the strategic aspirations laid out over the 2020 campaign, for a return to multilateralism, for assembling and leading a coalition of allies and partners in countering China’s assertiveness, for increased presence and power in the Indo-Pacific and for the dollars and focus that this will entail?

› What other policy priorities are competing with these issues and how much salience do they enjoy?

› How robust is the bipartisan consensus around the scale and urgency of the China challenge? Will deep partisan acrimony in the United States impede the Biden administration’s ambitious plans for wide-sweeping competition with China?

To rigorously address these questions the United States Studies Centre (USSC) commissioned surveys of the adult, citizen population of the United States, fielded in October 2020 before the November elections and reinterviewing 1,186 respondents in late January 2021, after Biden’s inauguration. These surveys build on USSC

surveys in 2019 and earlier years, utilising much of the same question wording so as to permit valid inferences about trends and change in American public opinion on issues of relevance to Australian national interests.

Trump and the pandemic have hardened American views on China

In Figure 1 we summarise responses on five propositions about China and its relationship with the United States, comparing results from USSC surveys administered in July 2019, October 2020 and January 2021. American opinions on China were not especially favourable in 2019 and have generally become more negative since. Trump voters, in particular, have moved even more decisively towards negative views of China after the November 2020 election, no doubt driven by Trump’s insistence about the Chinese origins of COVID-19 and its contri-bution to Trump losing the election.

› As recently as July 2019, less than a majority of Americans held negative views about China’s relationship with the United States, with little partisan variation. By October 2020 and especially by January 2021, 69 per cent of Americans described China’s influence on America as negative, a view shared by 64 per cent of Biden voters in January and by nine out of 10 Trump voters.

› Seventy-two per cent of Americans describe China as unfriendly towards the United States or an enemy of the United States, up from 56 per cent in 2019 (this item was not asked in October 2020). Trump voters moved 22 points on this measure, from 70 per cent to 92 per cent, and Clinton/Biden voters moved 18 points, from a bare majority (53 per cent) in 2019 to 71 per cent in 2021.

› Forty-three per cent of Americans believe the United States is in a Cold War with China, up from 28 per cent from mid-2019, driven not by change among supporters of Democratic candidates, but largely by a doubling of the rate at which Trump voters report this belief (from one-third in 2019 to two-thirds in 2021).

› In 2019 a slim majority (51 per cent) thought the United States was too economically dependent on China, rising to 65 per cent in our January 2021 survey. The change is almost exclusively driven by a hardening of opinion among Trump voters (54 per cent to 84 per cent), with little movement among Clinton/Biden voters.

› A similar story holds for the proposition “China has overtaken the United States as the world’s technological leader.” There is little movement on this item aside from Trump voters, moving from 28 per cent agreement in 2019 to 42 per cent in January 2021.

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Figure 1. American opinions about China have hardened, especially among Trump voters Percentage of respondents agreeing, by president vote. 2019, 2020 and 2021 surveys.

Trump voters

Other/non-voters

Democratic candidate voters

All

Overall, China’s influence on America is negativeJuly 2019 October 2020 January 2021

Trump voters

Other/non-voters


All

America is too economically dependent on ChinaJuly 2019 October 2020 January 2021

Trump voters

Other/non-voters


All

China is unfriendly or an enemy of the United StatesJuly 2019 January 2021

Trump voters

Other/non-voters


All

July 2019 October 2020 January 2021

Trump voters

Other/non-voters


All

The United States and China are in a Cold WarJuly 2019 October 2020 January 2021

46

36

45

43

82

44

52

61

89

52

64

69

33

17

30

28

49

26

34

37

66

27

34

43

54

43

54

51

75

49

62

63

84

54

56

65

28

33

51

38

29

33

49

38

42

31

45

41

70

40

53

56

92

44

71

72

China has overtaken the United States as the world’s technological leader

Clinton voters

Biden voters

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The elite, Washington consensus on China is largely mirrored in mass opinion, save for the recent and pronounced hardening of views among Trump support-ers. Only slim or near-majorities of Biden voters agree that “America is too economically dependent on China” or that “China has overtaken the United States as the world’s technological leader.” But these proportions are sufficiently large — and the issues sufficiently serious — to serve as a reservoir of political capital for the Biden administration’s policy of competition with China.

The risks of isolationism

For decades researchers have measured isolationism in US public opinion with the proposition “America would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.” Across our three surveys we see an increase in isolation-ist views in US public opinion, but again with a distinctly partisan character.

In mid-2019 we observed that one-third of Trump voters expressed isolationist views, comfortably ahead of the 22 per cent rate among Clinton voters. By October 2020, all groups reported an increase in isolationism: 29 per cent among Biden voters and 37 per cent among Trump voters.

Figure 2. Isolationism has increased dramatically among Trump voters Percentage of respondents agreeing, by president vote. 2019, 2020 and 2021 surveys.

Trump voters

Other/non-voters


All

America would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world

July 2019 October 2020 January 2021

33

31

22

28

37

34

29

33

59

41

28

41

The outcome of the November 2020 election appears to have prompted a massive uptick in isolationism among Trump voters to 59 per cent, no doubt a reaction to Biden’s early actions in reversing some key Trump poli-cies, rejoining the Paris Climate Accord (Paris Agree-ment) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and promising to restore more conventional relations with American allies and partners. Non-voters and support-ers of minor parties and independents also moved towards isolationism between October 2020 and January 2021. Biden voters’ levels of isolationism are unmoved through the election period, further suggestive of the political character of the reaction among Trump voters and non-voters.

One of the defining characteristics of “Make American Great Again,” “America First” and, more broadly, “Trump-ism,” is hostility to American engagement in multilateral-ism, catalysing a resentment to globalisation and inter-nationalism evident since the 1990s, ending the elite-led, bipartisan consensus around the virtues of US global leadership. This hostility clearly endures among Trump voters, and indeed, at levels seldom seen in decades of measuring isolationism. This will be a fault line both between the Biden administration and its Republican opponents, but also, critically, within the Republican Party.

Clinton voters

Biden voters

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It is widely accepted that Trump-led hostility towards multilateralism, and other isolationist elements of the Trumpian worldview, impeded the effectiveness of the Trump administration’s China policy. Accordingly, a key issue for Australia is whether deeper US engagement and presence in the Indo-Pacific can steer clear of opposi-tion founded in isolationism and instead, more helpfully, be motivated by widely-shared, negative assessments of China’s ambitions and assertiveness.

Competing American foreign policy priorities

Survey respondents were asked to rate the importance of three foreign policy priorities, “working with allies to stand up to China,” “dealing with global climate change” and “promoting democracy in other nations.”

There is little partisan disagreement about the impor-tance of “working with allies to stand up to China.” Over-all, 85 per cent of respondents saw this as a “very” or “fairly” important priority, with 93 per cent of Trump voters and 88 per cent of Biden voters making this assessment.

Figure 3. China is rated as important by majorities of Democrats and Republicans, but climate change is even more important for Democrats Percentage of respondents rating foreign policy priority as “very” or “fairly” important, by 2020 presidential vote. January 2021 survey.

Trump voters

Other/non-voters

Biden voters

All

Working with allies to stand up to China is very or fairly important

93

68

88

85

Trump voters

Other/non-voters

Biden voters

All

30

64

97

68

Dealing with global climate change is very or fairly important

Promoting democracy in other nations is very or fairly important

Trump voters

Other/non-voters

Biden voters

All

61

53

78

67

13

But a stark partisan difference emerges on climate change. Almost all (97 per cent) of Biden voters rating this as very or fairly important, compared with just 30 per cent of Trump voters. Biden voters are also more likely than Trump voters to endorse democracy promo-tion as a very or fairly important foreign policy goal, 78 per cent to 61 per cent.

A closer analysis finds that while many Biden voters rate “working with allies to stand up to China” as important, it is almost always subordinate or equal to climate change as a priority. Ninety-three per cent of Biden voters have climate change as their top or equal top foreign policy priority, one-third rate climate change as their single, top foreign policy priority and 28 per cent rate all three priorities as equally important. Only three per cent of Biden voters state that “working with allies to stand up to China” is unambiguously their top foreign policy prior-ity and 13 per cent rank this priority last, behind climate change and democracy promotion.

For Trump voters, the situation is starkly different, with 57 per cent stating that “working with allies to stand up to China” is unambiguously their top foreign policy priority and just two per cent identifying climate change as their single most important foreign policy priority. Fifty-one per cent of Trump voters rank climate change unambig-uously as their least important priority out of the three.

Table 1. Rank orderings of foreign policy priorities, by 2020 presidential vote

The rank in importance of working with allies to stand up to China, dealing with global climate change and promoting democracy in other nations

Importance ranking All Biden voters

Trump voters

Other/non-

voters

All equally important issues 22.8 27.7 11.2 29.5

Climate most or equal most important issue 40.9 65.0 8.0 39.6

China most or equal most important issue 46.9 26.2 82.6 37.6

Democracy most or equal most important issue 18.2 13.3 23.7 19.6

Climate change least important issue 20.2 2.3 50.5 12.7

China least important issue 8.8 12.9 0.5 12.1

Democracy least important issue 20.9 29.6 11.2 17.1

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Survey respondents were also asked if the United States ought to “reward countries who do more to stop climate change with more favourable trade deals and impose costs on those that do not” (see Figure 8 on page 54). Seventy-two per cent of Biden voters agree with this proposition (32 per cent expressing strong agreement) and another 24 per cent are indifferent. Further analysis of the implications of this particular finding appears on pages 52-55.

The message for Australian policymakers from this data is clear. The Biden administration’s supporters want the campaign promise of a centrality of climate change considerations to be realised, for climate change consid-erations to not just be central, but arguably the single most important driver of US foreign policy, and prefer-ably, linked to decisions about trade deals. For Biden’s supporters, “working with allies to stand up to China” is, at most, part of an ensemble of foreign policy chal-lenges.

The Biden administration and Congressional Democrats will find it difficult to ignore this level of political demand from their supporters for climate change to infuse US foreign policy.

Bearing the costs of decoupling from China?

A majority of Americans report that the United States is too economically dependent on China. But are Amer-icans willing to bear the costs that might accompany economic and technological decoupling from China?

We asked respondents if they would prefer to purchase a cell (mobile) phone made in China or a cell (mobile) phone not made in China, while randomly varying the (hypothetical) extra cost of the phone not made in China “in order to reduce our reliance on Chinese made prod-ucts” (each respondent was randomly assigned to one of the five price points shown in Figure 4.

In the baseline condition of no price premium for buying “not made in China,” overwhelming majorities report a preference for buying not made in China: 88 per cent overall, every Trump voter and 84 per cent of Biden voters. Unsurprisingly, increasing costs diminishes preference for the not made in China phone, but even with a premium of $250 or more, at least two-thirds of Americans report a preference for the phone not made in China. Trump voters remain most adamant about preferring the phone not made in China across rising cost differences, with around 90 per cent preferring the phone not made in China despite a $250 or even $500 price premium. Biden voters are the most responsive to the increasing price premiums, but even at the $250 and $500 levels, a majority of Biden voters continue to prefer the phone not made in China.

We concede the “cheap talk” nature of assessing willing-ness-to-pay in surveys. Even so, we note: (1) preferences for the phone not made in China are high, under any circumstances; (2) a partisan gap is nonetheless apparent but grows larger as the price premium of the phone not made in China increases, suggesting that Biden support-ers are most exposed to the costs of technological and economic decoupling from China.

THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL DEMOCRATS WILL

FIND IT DIFFICULT TO IGNORE THIS LEVEL OF POLITICAL DEMAND FROM THEIR SUPPORTERS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE

TO INFUSE US FOREIGN POLICY.

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These results do suggest partisan fault lines and limits to US domestic political support for decoupling. This said, while it is a Democratic administration pursuing decoupling, rank and file Democrats are likely to follow the cues of their party’s leaders, tolerating any economic burdens stemming from decoupling, especially if these are offset by other elements of the Biden administration’s “build back better” program. Moreover, Republicans are unlikely to use the economic costs of decoupling from China as a credible line of political attack against Demo-crats, with Republican members of Congress among the most insistent advocates of decoupling.

Accordingly, we assess high levels of economic and political tolerance for decoupling from China in Amer-ican public opinion and see little incentive for political leaders in either party to mount opposing arguments.

Figure 4. Americans say they are willing to accept the higher costs of buying “not made in China” Bars indicate percentage saying they would prefer to purchase a cell (mobile) phone not made in China (versus a phone made in China), given different levels of increased cost. January 2021 survey.

All Biden voters

Other/non-voters Trump voters

84

100

75

50

0

25

100

75

50

0

25

Zero cost difference

$50 $100 $250 $500 $50 $100 $250 $500

Experimental variable: higher cost of phone not made in China

78 78

5359

88 8581

6673

10095 95

88 89

73

83

6762

82

Zero cost difference

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Disunity and American democracy

We conclude this introductory survey of the state of US public opinion and politics, and its implications for the alliance agenda, with an assessment of the depth of partisan animus in the United States. Being positively disposed to one’s fellow partisans is to be expected, almost a defining characteristic of identifying as a Democrat or a Republican. But a relatively novel devel-

Table 2. Negative partisanship in the United States is far more pronounced than in Australia

Median thermometer ratings of parties, by vote. January 2021 surveys.

US data Australian data

2020 vote

Median rating of Republican

Party

Median rating of Democratic

Party

Party difference

2019 Vote

Median rating of Coalition

parties

Median rating of Labor

party

Party difference

Biden 13 80 57 Labor 38 76 38

Trump 63 5 58 Coalition 80 46 34

Other/non-voter

44 49 5 Greens 22 66 44

Other/non-voter

60 56 4

opment in American public opinion is “negative parti-sanship,” reporting negative evaluations of supporters of the party one does not identify with.

We assess two measures of negative partisanship in the United States, using comparable Australian data to put the results in some perspective for an Australian audience.

First, we ask respondents if they would be “happy, unhappy, or if it wouldn’t matter” if an immediate family member said they intended to marry someone who is: (a) a Democrat; (b) a Republican; (c) transgendered; (d) a “born again” Christian.

Forty-four per cent of Trump voters would be unhappy if a family member married a Democrat. In contrast, 52 per cent of Biden voters would be unhappy if their family

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member married a Republican. For Biden voters, this rate of unhappiness at the prospect of a family member marrying a Republican (52 per cent) exceeds the unhap-piness rate reported if family members were to marry a transgendered person (19 per cent) or a “born again” Christian (39 per cent).

Corresponding Australian data help put these results in context. Just 17 per cent of Coalition voters say they would be unhappy if an immediate family member intended to marry a Labor supporter; conversely, 28 per cent of Labor supporters and 32 per cent of Greens supporters say they would be unhappy if an immediate family member intended to marry a Coalition supporter. These Australian rates of unhappiness at the prospect of partisan inter-marriage are at most half of the corre-sponding rates we observe in the US data.

Second, survey respondents are asked to provide “thermometer ratings” of partisan groups, on a zero-to-100-point scale.0.1 Median ratings of major parties are reported in Table 2, broken down by who the respondent voted for in the most recent national election.

In-party ratings are essentially the same in both coun-tries, around the 80 mark on the zero to 100 cold-to-hot thermometer scale. An exception is the 63 median rating given by Trump voters to the Republican Party, a reaction no doubt to criticism of Trump from Republican leaders after the Capitol Hill insurrection on 6 January 2021, Trump’s subsequent impeachment and Trump’s hostility towards Republican election officials in Georgia inter alia during the post-election period.

The key difference between the United States and Australia are the ratings of out-parties. The median rating of the Democratic Party from Trump voters is just five; the Republican Party gets a median rating of 13 from Biden voters. In Australia, the median out-party ratings are markedly higher: Labor voters give a median rating of 38 to the Coalition parties, while Coalition voters give a median rating of 46 to the Labor Party (barely below the neutral rating of 50). This constitutes more compelling evidence of the depth of partisan animus in the United States and the contribution of negative partisanship to political polarisation in the United States.

The United States transitions from the Trump to Biden presidencies with partisan polarisation at extraordinarily high levels; Australian audiences can only marvel at this critical feature. Through this chapter, and throughout this volume, we identify instances where this partisan-ship constrains or impedes policymaking — and equally, note those rare instances of bipartisanship — and their implications for Australian national interests.

THROUGH THIS CHAPTER, AND THROUGHOUT THIS VOLUME, WE IDENTIFY

INSTANCES WHERE THIS PARTISANSHIP CONSTRAINS OR IMPEDES POLICYMAKING

— AND EQUALLY, NOTE THOSE RARE INSTANCES OF BIPARTISANSHIP — AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIAN

NATIONAL INTERESTS.

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THE BIDEN AGENDA, CONGRESS AND AUSTRALIAN INTERESTSBRUCE WOLPE

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Joe Biden proposed an expansive legislative agenda throughout the 2020 presidential campaign, span-ning racial justice and voting rights, green energy jobs programs, buttressing Obamacare and infrastruc-ture. But sitting above all these issues is control of the pandemic and rebuilding the US economy.

President Biden simply must get his US$1.9 trillion COVID recovery package through Congress (and may well have by the time this volume is published). There is a deep understanding — which Republicans recognise as much as Democrats — that if Biden fails on this first hurdle, his presidency will be permanently damaged. In fact, failure to win congressional approval on the American Recovery Plan will mean that Biden will be unable to win congressional approval of virtually all the other priority measures listed above that he took to the election.

The key to understanding what Biden can accomplish in Congress requires an appreciation of the politi-cal dynamics that affected and ultimately overcame, Obama’s presidency. Indeed, the lessons from the 111th Congress — the first two years of President Obama’s first term — are the guideposts for Biden’s strategy and approach in this 117th Congress.1.1

Like Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, Biden comes to office as a Democratic president with his party in the majority in both houses of Congress. Biden also

has an agenda with marked similarities to Obama’s: rebuilding an economy struck down by crisis, addressing an urgent health care reform agenda, securing progress in the epic battle to combat global warming and a host of other compelling social priorities.

But unlike Clinton and Obama, Democratic control of Congress is tenuous — just six seats in the House of Representatives and Vice President Harris the tiebreak-ing vote in the Senate — and at great risk in the 2022 midterms (see Figure 5). Midterm elections typically see the party of the president lose seats. As shown in Figure 6, the midterms of 1994 and 2010 resulted in huge gains for Republicans in House elections, ending unified Democrat control of the federal government and stalling the agendas of both Clinton and Obama. With dogged opposition to the last two Democratic presi-dents successful in those midterm elections, Congres-sional Republicans have little incentive to support Biden’s policy proposals. The Capitol Hill insurrection on 6 January 2021 further dampened the already remote prospects of bipartisanship.

Biden’s calculus is that if he fails to secure passage of the American Recovery Plan or meet his ambitious vaccination targets (100 million shots in the first 100 days) his presidency is lost too, along with any chance of legislative success on racial justice, climate change and immigration.

As Vice-President, Biden was central to the Obama administration’s protracted and ultimately self-defeat-ing negotiations with Congressional Republicans in 2009 and 2010. Democrats were unsatisfied with the policy compromises that resulted (on recession recovery, on health care, on climate) and lost the House of Repre-sentatives: policy pain and no political gain. Biden has no intention of being guilty of repeating that mistake.

This is why Biden is determined to go big and go early, to get the vaccine and economic stimulus in place as soon as possible, and without Republican votes, if needs be.

BIDEN’S CALCULUS IS THAT IF HE FAILS TO SECURE PASSAGE OF THE AMERICAN

RECOVERY PLAN OR MEET HIS AMBITIOUS VACCINATION TARGETS (100 MILLION SHOTS IN THE FIRST 100 DAYS) HIS PRESIDENCY IS LOST TOO, ALONG WITH ANY CHANCE OF

LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS ON RACIAL JUSTICE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND IMMIGRATION.

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The House of Representatives

In the 117th Congress that convened in January 2021, the House is comprised of 221 Democrats and 211 Republi-cans. While margins are immensely tighter than Obama and Speaker Nancy Pelosi faced in 2009, the political dynamics are the same: to be successful, Democrats will have to find the balance on complex legislation within the caucus to ensure that defections do not kill President Biden’s agenda — severely undercutting his presidency. Speaker Pelosi and her leadership team have nearly no cushion for error as the threshold between winning or losing comes down to just a couple of Democrats.

This is all the more important given that the House will be the driver of the Biden legislative program. The key lessons of successful legislative management by the Democrats in the 111th Congress are no less applicable to President Biden and Speaker Pelosi today. In particu-lar, look for:

› Clear and consistent leadership from the President on his agenda and legislation. President Biden’s voice must be forceful, consistent and steady in laying out and explaining what he wants Congress to do, giving assurance to members in swing districts.

Figure 5. Democrats control Congress, but with razor-thin margins

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› Intensely effective working partnerships between the president, the speaker and her committee chairs. Key to Speaker Pelosi’s success throughout her tenure is her exceptional ability to read the moods and dispositions of the members of the Democratic Caucus and to have those assessments guide chairs of the committees in crafting legislation.

› A vigorous schedule of hearings to underscore the urgency of the legislative agenda. In both Obamacare and the energy and climate legislation in 2009, carefully constructed hearings showed the high degree of consensus of key interests and constituencies behind these major legislative reforms. The health insurance and pharmaceutical industries strongly supported the Affordable Care Act. Energy, chemical and manufacturing companies supported the cap-and-trade bill. These very visible shows of consensus paved the way to advance these landmark proposals.

Figure 6. Midterm elections typically see the party of the president lose House seats

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The Senate

The 50-50 tie in the Senate plus the tie-breaking vote of Kamala Harris gives the Democrats control of the Senate’s agenda, its calendar, committees and critically, which bills come up for votes on the Senate floor.

The biggest initial dividend of control of the Senate for President Biden is that the Democratic majority will generally approve his Cabinet nominees. The withdrawal of Nerra Tanden’s nomination as director of the Office of Management and Budget is the first real hiccough, highlighting the immense power of “red state” Demo-cratic Senators looking to distinguish themselves from their Democratic colleagues (e.g., Manchin from West Virginia).

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EVEN IF THE HOUSE LEADERSHIP CAN FIND AGREEMENT AMONG ALL HOUSE DEMOCRATS ON THESE CONTENTIOUS

ISSUES AMONG ALL THE FACTIONS IN THE PARTY, THE LION’S SHARE OF THE BIDEN LEGISLATIVE AGENDA IS DEAD ON ARRIVAL IN THE SENATE.

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Key elements of Biden’s agenda will be subject to the Senate’s supermajority requirement: 60 Senators are necessary to call debate to a close (to end a “filibuster”) and move legislation to a majority vote on final passage. Budget legislation is exempted from the filibuster’s supermajority requirement. Both political parties have at times relied on packaging major policy programs into the reconciliation process like the 2001 Bush Tax Cuts, Obama’s 2010 Affordable Care Act and, most recently, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Biden’s COVID recovery legislation will be considered this way, circumventing compromises with any Republican senators, but under-scoring the importance of holding Democratic sena-tors together. This will test Majority Leader Schumer’s political and parliamentary skill, in particular, (a) dealing with the extraordinary negotiating power of “red state” Democratic Senators (who can credibly threaten to vote against the legislation and hence can extract concessions and amendments) and (b) using parliamentary proce-dures that keep the comprehensive COVID recovery package more or less intact, bringing an up-or-down vote that is much more costly for rebel Democrats to vote against.

Any realistic assessment of the current configuration of Congress must recognise: (a) that there are not 10 Republican votes in the Senate willing to support virtu-ally any element of the Biden agenda; (b) there are limits to what can be legislated via the budget reconciliation process that circumvents the filibuster; (c) there is dwin-dling appetite for attacking the filibuster itself by enact-ing changes to Senate rules or for overruling the Senate parliamentarian’s determinations about what can be legislated via reconciliation; and (d) even for majority votes on the Senate floor, all 50 Democrats must vote together, or have defections offset by Republicans cross-ing the aisle.

Accordingly, even if the House leadership can find agree-ment among all House Democrats on these contentious issues among all the factions in the party — from the progressives on the left led by Representative Alexan-dria Ocasio-Cortez to the moderates who won Trump districts in the suburbs in 2018 and held them in 2020 — the lion’s share of the Biden legislative agenda is dead on arrival in the Senate.

Exceptions that prove the rule

There will, however, be several key exceptions of great relevance for Australia:

Defence spending. In early January 2021, in the closing days of the 116th Congress, both the House and Senate overrode President Trump’s veto of the National Defense Authorization Act, which sets military spending levels and locks in US strategic priorities for the country’s defence posture.1.2 This was the first time Congress had overridden a Trump veto. This spirit of bipartisan coop-eration on defence will carry through the Biden presi-dency, with most Democrats joining most Republicans to ensure steady commitment to overall US defence policy, spending levels and weapons programs. Defence spending will be a major ongoing target of Democrats on the left in both the House and Senate, but on these issues, the centre will prevail.

Foreign Policy. President Biden has entered office with-out the United States engaged in major wars overseas. Biden’s much firmer stance on Russia and President Putin, the aim of restoring effective working relationships with America’s allies in Europe and Asia, and Biden’s tougher position on human rights, from Saudi Arabia to Burma to China, will be strongly welcomed. The House and Senate foreign relations committees will be active on legislation that will provide incentives and punish-ment on human rights issues.

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Appropriations and government funding. An enduring trend, even under the Trump presidency, was the ability of the House and Senate to work through the govern-ment spending (supply) bills for all the government agen-cies and their operations. The Appropriations Commit-tees have been able in recent years to reach agreements to keep the government operating. The longest govern-ment shutdown in American history, however, occurred under President Trump, who insisted, as a condition of signing legislation to maintain orderly funding of the government, that Congress approve funding for the border wall with Mexico.1.3 Trump ultimately backed down on his demand and normal operations resumed. This was such a searing political experience that, with a president such as Biden — a creature of Congress — a repeat of that confrontation is highly unlikely.

Congress and Australian interests

There are several major issues directly affecting Austral-ian interests:

China. Leaders in Congress on China policy are highly aware of Australia’s frontline status with respect to China and Australia’s alliance credentials. As in the Trump administration, this bipartisan coalition will serve a valu-able role in helping ensure executive branch policy and actions are mindful of Australia’s interests.

Trade. Leaders in Congress on trade will be sympathetic to Australia’s long-standing fidelity to free trade norms and policies and will pay special attention to China’s economic coercion of Australia. There is little evidence of Congressional support of the United States joining the CP-TPP, at least not until the US economy has meaning-fully recovered from COVID.

Military posture. As discussed above on the defence spending issues, Congress will welcome continued further deepening and coordination on the military alli-ance and overall posture in the Asia Pacific, especially with respect to China and its projection of sovereignty and force.

Big Tech. Australia’s strong stance against the market abuses of big tech companies, especially Facebook and Google, has captured the attention of both members of Congress who follow these issues closely and the administration officials and agencies who oversee anti-trust and consumer protection issues.1.4 Conversely, there is little love for Big Tech in Congress nor any chance of Congress being sympathetic to any claims that social media giants have been treated unfairly by Australia.

Climate change — a special case. Climate change and global warming have already proven to be an issue that is directly affecting Australian politics. Biden’s commit-ment to move aggressively on climate is a pillar of his overall agenda. His stance on climate was crucial to winning the support of Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren for the Democratic nomination. In office, Biden has affirmed reaching stringent carbon-re-ducing targets by 2050, and has moved aggressively1.5 through executive orders to reverse Trump policies that rolled back environmental regulations, ended carbon-in-tensive projects such as the Keystone XL pipeline and permit approvals that would have opened public lands and off-shore tracts to oil and gas drilling.

These measures, especially the support for firm 2050 targets, have provoked political debate here on Austral-ia’s climate policy. Carbon pricing — a critical lever in real-ising emissions targets — is an obvious threshold issue. It is unclear whether the Biden administration would welcome or propose legislation on carbon-pricing, but a sustained debate in the US Congress on carbon-pric-ing, even if the legislative passage were to fail, would spill over into Australian domestic politics.

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In the interim, there is nothing the Australian Government can say or do that will slow down, delay or stop any action Biden and his climate advisors — led by former Secretary of State John Kerry, who is fully seized of the climate issue — take to address climate change.

On pages 52-55 we revisit this issue, assessing that while any material divergence in climate policy between the two countries will be an irritant, such differences will not in any way threaten the deep fundamental relationship between the two countries.

We further assess that if Biden were to propose carbon-pricing legislation, Congressional enactment is unlikely. In 2009, the Waxman-Markey “cap-and-trade” program passed the House despite the defection of dozens of Democrats from energy-producing states because of the support of a crucial handful of Repub-licans. The Waxman-Markey Bill was never brought to a vote in the Senate and died. We doubt that in the current Congress carbon-pricing would even make it out of the House of Representatives, let alone make it to the Senate floor.

This suggests that political spillovers into Australia on climate and emissions will intensify only in so far as a Democratic-controlled Congress actively engages on the issue. US policy proposals will also powerfully shape the terms of debate here on what Australian policy should be.1.6 Conversely, should Biden climate and emissions policy hit a political wall in Washington — with Congress the key actor — the intensity of Australian debate may not necessarily diminish, but the scope of climate policy options will likely be limited along similar lines.

Australian national interests dovetail with Biden being successful in overseeing America’s recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. A prosperous, capable and self-confident United States is more likely to take on the burdens of global leadership and projecting power and presence into the Indo-Pacific, of bearing the costs of competition with China.

But there are second-order effects at work too, tying Australian national interests to Biden’s domestic politi-cal fortunes. American power and prestige abroad are in no small measure functions of the domestic standing of the incumbent president. Early successes for Biden will earn him political capital for pushing back against the voices of protectionism, isolationism and unilateralism in the Congress. An engaged America — led by a President not only supportive of the rules-based, international order but with the political capital to drive the support-ing policy and action from Congress — is a stronger and more effective alliance partner of Australia.

AN ENGAGED AMERICA — LED BY A PRESIDENT NOT ONLY SUPPORTIVE OF

THE RULES-BASED, INTERNATIONAL ORDER BUT WITH THE POLITICAL

CAPITAL TO DRIVE THE SUPPORTING POLICY AND ACTION FROM CONGRESS — IS A STRONGER AND MORE EFFECTIVE

ALLIANCE PARTNER OF AUSTRALIA.


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SECTION 2. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA ADVANCE PROSPERITY AND RESILIENCE?

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STRENGTHEN THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL TRADE ARCHITECTURESDR JEFFREY WILSON

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Context and background

Australia needs to facilitate US re-engagement with the rapidly evolving global and regional trade archi-tectures.

During the Trump administration, the United States with-drew from several important trade institutions, while launching a series of costly — and ultimately ineffec-tive — trade wars. These policies have compromised the integrity of global trade institutions and weakened the benefits of regional trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While the Biden admin-istration has signalled a change in approach to trade issues, countervailing domestic and international imper-atives mean the direction of its trade policy remains unclear. Australia now has an opportunity to shape the trade policy outlook of the Biden administration in a way that favours rule making, multilateralism, and greater collaboration with allies and like-minded partners.

The Biden administration

The Biden administration inherits a ruinous set of trade policies from its predecessor. Trump’s first presidential act was to withdraw from the TPP, greatly weakening an institution that locked in a US-preferred model for trade liberalisation. The Trump administration vetoed new

appointments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, rendering its dispute settlement and rule-enforcement functions ineffective. It aggravated allies and friends by imposing trade balancing agree-ments under thinly-veiled threats of diplomatic coer-cion. Most significantly, it prosecuted a self-harming bilateral trade war with China, which has demonstrably failed to either change the US-China trade balance or lever reform to China’s trade practices.

While the Biden administration has signalled an intent to change trade policy, mixed signals mean its new direc-tion remains unclear. On the positive side, it has flagged a more multilateral approach to managing trade tensions with China, recognising that Trump’s bilateral trade war has failed.2.1 The selection of Katherine Tai — a veteran trade lawyer with deep China expertise — as the next US Trade Representative telegraphs that substantive issues (such as intellectual property) will now dominate the agenda.2.2 The United States has begun to re-engage with the WTO by supporting the appointment of its next Director-General and may remove the veto on Appellate Body appointments, restoring the global trade dispute settlement mechanism to normal function.2.3

However, countervailing imperatives mean the Biden administration is also unlikely to fully recommit to trade liberalisation or rule making. Trump’s China tariffs will

be politically costly to wind back at home (particularly in the steel sector) and also function as bargaining chips for future negotiations with China. It is unlikely they will be unilaterally reduced in the near term.2.4 Biden’s “Buy American” pledge2.5 is not strictly a trade policy but indicates that protectionism will remain a feature of US economic policy. Several selections to the Council of Economic Advisers have a record of trade scepticism, suggesting liberalisation is unlikely to be on the imme-diate agenda.2.6 Rejoining the TPP will also be a longer-term proposition, due to opposition within Congress at home and complex negotiations with partners abroad.

Beyond the costs to the US economy itself, trade policy under the Trump administration has been harmful to the global and regional trade architectures. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism has been compromised due to Appellate Body appointment vetoes and cannot enforce trade rules in a timely and effective manner.2.7

The United States has disengaged from regional trade diplomacy, depriving these efforts of the political and economic heft that US leadership offers. Bilateral pres-sure on China has failed to achieve Trump’s objective of increasing US exports,2.8 and even then, a focus on trade balancing ignores the real trade policy challenges currently posed by China, such as intellectual property protection and subsidies to state-owned enterprises.

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Table 3. US trade diplomacy under the Trump administration

Target Year Action

Trans-Pacific Partnership partners

January 2017 Withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership, rendering entry-into-force numerically impossible

WTO members January 2017 — ongoing Systematic veto of Appellate Body nominations to force US-requested governance reforms; Appellate Body became inquorate on 10 December 2019

Canada and Mexico August 2017 — September 2018 Renegotiation of North American Free Trade Agreement under threat of termination

Korea January — September 2018 Renegotiation of Korea-US Free Trade Agreement under threat of termination

World March 2018 — ongoing Tariffs applied to solar panels, washing machines, steel and aluminium imports on national security grounds; Canada, China, the EU, India, Mexico, Turkey and Russia all impose retaliatory tariffs

China July 2018 — ongoing Escalating the application of tariffs to demand a bilateral trade agreement, rising to cover $550 billion of imports from China; China repeatedly retaliates, with tariffs imposed on $185 billion of exports from the United States

Turkey August 2018 — ongoing Removal of Turkey from US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme; imposition of additional 25 per cent tariff on Turkish steel (enacted August 2018, withdrawn May 2019, reimposed October 2019)

Japan April — December 2019 Negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement favouring US agricultural exporters under threat of tariff imposition

European Union May 2019 — ongoing Imposition of retaliatory tariffs on $7.5 billion of EU exports in Airbus dispute; threatened imposition of 25 per cent tariff on automobiles to force a trade-balancing bilateral agreement

India June 2019 — ongoing Removal of India from the US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme

Brazil and Argentina December 2019 Removal of exceptions from steel tariffs in retaliation for alleged currency manipulation

Source: Jeffrey Wilson, “Adapting Australia to an era of geoeconomic competition,” Perth USAsia Centre, January 2021, available at: https://perthusasia.edu.au/our-work/geoeconomics-report

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Australian interests

The absence of US trade leadership is a major chal-lenge for Australia. As a highly open economy, Australia depends on a reliable and rules-based trade system. Its medium size means Australia lacks either the economic or political heft to defend its trade interests bilaterally, so multilateral institutions, such as the WTO globally and the TPP regionally, are of critical importance. US disengagement — and at times, non-constructive inter-ventions — threaten the reliability of these institutions. It also deprives Australia of a powerful and like-minded partner to work within new trade negotiations.

US re-engagement with global and regional trade architectures is critical for Australia’s national interests. However, the extent of current US disengagement, and competing domestic and international imperatives, means the direction and pace of trade policy recali-bration under the Biden administration cannot be taken for granted. Australia should engage the United States to encourage and shape patterns of re-engagement in 2021 and beyond.

Policy recommendations

› Communicate the importance of a functioning WTO system and collaborate on WTO reform efforts. Australia should clearly reiterate to its alliance partner the value of a rules-based and functional global trading system. It should also work with the United States to support constructive WTO reform efforts, particularly in terms of the smooth functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism.

› Begin preparatory work enabling the United States accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Domestic economic priorities in the United States mean its accession to the TPP will be a long-term process. However, preparatory efforts should begin now to address key obstacles. Within the TPP group, Australia should lead discussions on how the (presently untested) accession mechanism will operate. With other major TPP economies — such as Japan, Canada and Singapore — it should start engaging the United States on key reform issues that need to be negotiated. Of key importance are issues to do with the implementation of intellectual property provisions suspended as a result of the United States’ departure from the regional agreement in 2017.

› Support confidence-building through US-Australian leadership in emerging trade platforms. Constructive US engagement in new multilateral trade platforms will help restore global confidence in the United States as a trade policy leader. Australia and the United States could work together in areas of shared priority. A useful starting point is the recently-launched e-commerce negotiations within the WTO, which Australia co-convenes with Japan and Singapore.2.9 Establishing global e-commerce rules will be essential in protecting the 21st-century industries of these economies and would also signal to the world a more engaged and leadership-oriented US trade outlook.

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ENHANCE HEALTH COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFICMATILDA STEWARD

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Australia and the United States should build on exist-ing commitments to strengthen health security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. These efforts must focus on addressing the secondary impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, which threaten to reverse fragile gains made across broader health and development indicators over recent decades. Despite early contain-ment measures resulting in lower caseloads through-out Southeast Asia and the Pacific compared to other regions, progress in controlling the spread of the virus and the ongoing capacity of national governments to respond to outbreaks remains deeply uneven.3.1 Diver-sion of material and human resources to address COVID-19 has placed further strain on already weak health systems, causing significant disruption to essen-tial services and stalling momentum towards univer-sal health coverage.3.2 An estimated 34.8 million infants throughout Southeast Asia have missed routine vaccina-tions as a result of the pandemic,3.3 with health experts warning that efforts to control and eradicate malaria in the Pacific are also at risk.3.4

The 2020 AUSMIN Global Health Security Statement established a foundation for bilateral cooperation in tackling COVID-19 throughout the region with its pledge to strengthen and accelerate health security capacity building.3.5 Australia and the Biden administration should recommit to this joint plan of activities with an expanded

remit to confront a broader suite of health and devel-opment challenges emerging from the pandemic. This approach will be crucial for ensuring collective action strengthens health systems holistically, rather than creating parallel infrastructure that operates solely in response to COVID-19 and generates limited long-term impact.3.6


Engagement with multilateral institutions and stronger coordination with allies in meeting global health chal-lenges is a key priority for the new administration. President Biden has stressed the need to “restore US global leadership to fight [the COVID-19] pandemic” and reversed former President Trump’s withdrawal from the World Health Organization on his first day in office.3.7

The White House roadmap for combating coronavirus includes ambitions for sustained domestic and inter-national funding for global health security that extends beyond emergency funds for health and humanitar-ian assistance. The administration also intends to enact institutional change, creating an office of Global Health Security and Diplomacy at the State Department and re-establishing the Obama-era Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense within the National Security Council.3.8 This heightened focus on America’s contribution to health security has been underpinned by personnel appointments with experience navigating

pandemics, including Biden’s chief of staff Ron Klain who oversaw the Obama administration’s response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Other picks for key positions — including the Secretary of Homeland Security and Ambassador to the United Nations — also played active roles during the Ebola and Zika outbreaks.3.9

But translating this momentum into sustained attention and resources for the Indo-Pacific will be a considera-ble challenge. Securing funding for an expanded inter-national response will require ongoing congressional support in the face of significant challenges facing Amer-ica’s own COVID-19 response and domestic economy more broadly.3.10 These efforts will also require a recon-ceptualisation of American global health financing, which has developed under a model of shared responsibility that encourages recipient countries to increase their own investments in health systems strengthening along-side donor contributions.3.11 Equally, achieving an explicit regional focus will require the introduction of specific directives or initiatives led by senior figures within the US government. For instance, USAID’s Over the Horizon Strategic Review — conducted to provide goals for the agency’s medium- to long-term response to COVID-19 — identified 14 focus countries that combined develop-ment need, opportunity for impact, and US national security interests, none of which are in Southeast Asia or the Pacific.3.12

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Table 4. The Australian Government’s COVID-19 development response: Partnerships for Recovery (published in May 2020)

AUSTRALIA’S NEW PARTNERSHIPS FOR RECOVERY POLICY INCLUDES HEALTH SECURITY AS A CORE ACTION AREA,

WHICH, COUPLED WITH AUSTRALIA’S RECENT COMMITMENT OF $500 MILLION TOWARDS THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF VACCINES THROUGHOUT THE REGION, FURTHERS THESE

ONGOING HUMANITARIAN AND REPUTATIONAL EFFORTS.

Focus

› Pacific and Timor-Leste

› Southeast Asia

› Global response

2019-20: The swift initial response

› Our development investments have pivoted to COVID-19 priorities. All continuing investments are addressing development challenges exacerbated by COVID-19.

› Immediate distribution of PPE and other critical medical supplies.

› $280 million for the Indo-Pacific Response and Recovery Package.

› Kept critical transport links open in our region amid global supply chain disruptions.

2020-21: Investing in regional recovery

FY2020-21 budget:

› A$4 billion in Overseas Development Assistance aligned with Part-nerships for Recovery

› Including $80m commitment to Gavi-COVAX Advance Market Commitment

Additional targeted measures:

› $304.7m COVID-19 Response Package Pacific and Timor-Leste

› $23.2m Vaccine Access and Health Security Pacific, Timor-Leste and Southeast Asia

› Response detailed in 27 tailored COVID-19 Development Response Plans

Priority action areas

› Health security

› Stability

› Economic recovery

with a cross-cutting focus on protecting the most vulnerable

Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Infographic: Partnerships for Recovery.” Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/development/infographic-partnerships-recovery

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Enhanced health cooperation with the United States in Southeast Asia and the Pacific would help to ensure a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific, a key Australian national interest. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia had taken significant steps towards raising its profile and commitment to strengthening regional health systems and resilience, namely through the 2017 Indo-Pacific Health Security Initiative and associated Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security.3.13 Australia’s new Partnerships for Recovery policy includes health secu-rity as a core action area, which, coupled with Australia’s recent commitment of $500 million towards the equi-table distribution of vaccines throughout the region, furthers these ongoing humanitarian and reputational efforts.3.14 Such projects also align with broader regional priorities, including ASEAN’s COVID-19 Comprehen-sive Recovery Framework which focuses on enhancing health systems and accelerating inclusive digital trans-formation.3.15


Australia and the United States should:

› Partner to protect and restore essential health services in priority countries. These efforts could focus on the delivery of routine immunisations that have been disrupted during the pandemic, or on a specific infectious disease at risk of re-emergence.

› Commit to joint investments in digital health technologies. These would offer opportunities to support better care and disease surveillance and can act as an important tool for public communication during health emergencies. Financing should address the digital divide and ensure equitable access for rural communities and women. Such investments would align with the goals of the WHO 2020-2025 Global Strategy on Digital Health and present an avenue to operationalise the MOU between the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade from July 2020 supporting high-quality and sustainable development outcomes in partner countries through digital connectivity.3.19

› Deepen regional and bilateral engagement in the Pacific. Australia should express its support for bipartisan legislation currently before Congress that provides an expanded framework for US foreign policy in the Pacific islands. The Boosting Long-Term US Engagement (BLUE) Pacific Act proposes increased diplomatic and development presence, supports public health programs, and proposes funding of more than triple current levels of assistance. Importantly, the framework would integrate the US approach with other partners including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Taiwan.3.20

Pooling resources in pursuit of joint objectives will also enable Australia to step up its engagement throughout the region. Despite recent statements by Prime Minis-ter Morrison that “ASEAN’s centrality is at the core of Australia’s vision for the Indo-Pacific,”3.16 Canberra’s pivoted aid program focuses primarily on the Pacific,

Timor-Leste and Indonesia due to the presence of pre-existing partnerships.3.17 As the largest source of bilateral COVID-19 aid to Southeast Asia — with major contributions to the Philippines, Cambodia and Myan-mar — further collaboration with the United States can help Australia bridge this gap.3.18

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RE-ENGAGE THE UNITED STATES IN GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITYASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ADAM KAMRADT-SCOTT

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The recent change in presidential leadership provides a key opportunity for Australia to engage the United States in strengthening global and regional health security. Within weeks of President Biden taking office, several Trump administration policies relating to global health were retracted or overturned. This notable change in direction has been described as the United States returning to its former global leadership role, but the reputational damage will take longer to repair. World leaders and global health experts have pointed to the vacillation between Republican and Democratic admin-istrations on multiple policy issues like the global gag rule,4.1 and more recently the former president’s attack on the World Health Organization,4.2 which have contrib-uted to a perception the United States is unreliable. This presents an opportunity for Australia to work closely with the United States to repair the country’s standing in the global health community while simultaneously strengthening regional and global health security.


On assuming office, President Biden moved to revoke several decisions of the former administration pertain-ing to global health. As pledged during the election campaign, on his first day in office, President Biden

retracted the Trump administration’s effort to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organiza-tion.4.3 The day after the inauguration, the administration released its National Strategy for COVID-19 Response and Pandemic Preparedness in which restoring US leadership and advancing health security to be better prepared for future health threats was identified as one of seven priority goals.4.4 Coinciding with the strategy document’s release, Dr Anthony Fauci confirmed to the World Health Organization’s Executive Board that the United States would join the COVAX initiative that seeks to provide two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines to low and middle-income countries, increase techni-cal cooperation, and re-engage in multilateral efforts to defeat COVID-19 and ensure enhanced preparedness.4.5 To assist in coordinating these efforts, the Biden admin-istration has re-instituted the National Security Council Directorate on Global Health Security and Biodefense and pledged to reinvigorate the Global Health Security Agenda,4.6 both of which were initiatives of the former Obama administration but which had languished under President Trump.4.7 Further measures, such as creating a National Center for Epidemic Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics, advocating for the creation of a new United Nations facilitator for biological threats, and working with multilateral partners including the G7, G20, ASEAN, and African Union to strengthen preparedness are also outlined in the National Strategy.4.8

WORLD LEADERS AND GLOBAL HEALTH EXPERTS HAVE POINTED TO THE

VACILLATION BETWEEN REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIONS ON MULTIPLE POLICY ISSUES LIKE THE

GLOBAL GAG RULE, AND MORE RECENTLY THE FORMER PRESIDENT’S ATTACK ON THE

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A PERCEPTION

THE UNITED STATES IS UNRELIABLE.


Australia’s interests are best served by seeing the United States re-engage with the global health community, but it is unlikely the United States will return to the leader-ship role it once assumed. There are two key reasons for this. First, for at least the initial 12-24 months of the Biden administration, the government will be appropriately focused on containing the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (commonly known as the coronavirus) throughout the United States. This is likely to focus resources and attention on the United States’ domestic situation in the near term. Second, several other countries sought to fill the leadership vacuum created in global health govern-

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Table 5. Status of the Biden administration’s proposed actions on global health and pandemic response (as of 4 February 2021)

Action Requires Administrative or Congressional Action?

Status

Restore the National Security Council’s Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense Administrative 4

Rescind the Mexico City Policy Administrative 4

Restore funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Administrative 4

Release a National COVID-19 Response Strategy, including a strategy for international engagement Administrative 4

Restore funding to WHO and reverse Trump administration decision to withdraw from WHO membership Administrative 4

Support the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator and join COVAX Administrative/Congressional* 4

Create position of Coordinator of the COVID-19 Response and Counselor, reporting to the President Administrative 4

Develop a diplomatic outreach plan led by the State Department to enhance the US response to COVID-19, including through the provision of support to the most vulnerable communities

Administrative** 4

Provide US$11 billion to support “international health and humanitarian response,” including efforts to distribute countermeasures for COVID-19, build capacity required to fight COVID-19 and emerging biological threats

Congressional Proposed

Ensure adequate, sustained US funding for global health security Congressional Proposed

Expand US diplomacy on global health and pandemic response, including elevating US support for the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)

Administrative Proposed

Call for the creation of permanent international catalytic financing mechanism for global health security and work with international financial institutions, including multilateral development banks, to promote support for combating COVID-19 and strengthening global health security


Call for creation of a permanent facilitator within the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General for response to high consequence biological events


Source: Jennifer Kates and Josh Michaud, “What Will Be the Contours of the Biden Administration’s Global Health Agenda?“ 9 February 2021. Available at: https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/issue-brief/what-will-be-the-contours-of-the-biden-administrations-global-health-agenda/*Depending on the details of the administration’s proposal to support the ACT-Accelerator and join COVAX, Congressional approval may be required.**The National Security Memorandum requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Representative of the United States to the United Nations, the Administrator of USAID, and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to develop this plan within 14 days or as soon as possible.

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ance by the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ poli-cies, and now appear unwilling to cede that influence, viewing the United States as an “unreliable ally.”4.9

Australia can play an important diplomatic role in supporting the United States — including the endorse-ment of its reliability as a trusted partner — where shared interests exist. It can also actively seek out a number of new opportunities to enhance US-Australia cooperation. Global health security is one such area. The Austral-ian Government’s regional health security initiative that witnessed the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)’s Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security,4.10 the recently announced A$500 million regional vaccine initiative,4.11 and efforts between the US military and Australian Defence Force to strengthen civil-military health cooperation across the Indo-Pa-cific have provided a solid basis for further US-Australia cooperation.4.12 Strengthening and building on these existing initiatives, aligning development assistance to prioritise strengthening health systems and workforces, re-invigorating some of the health-related multilateral initiatives, and working constructively together to reform the World Health Organization offer a number of oppor-tunities to not only counter moves by other countries to increase their influence throughout the region but also demonstrate a re-engaged and responsive United States.


› Initiate ministerial discussions for a joint regional health security initiative involving the United States, Australia, Japan and India. Renewed interest in ‘The Quad’ multilateral arrangement provides a key opportunity to now strengthen regional health security, which reflects long-standing shared interests by all four governments. Intra-regional vaccine production and distribution could provide an immediate area for collaboration while intergovernmental talks commence to identify new synergies and areas for cooperation in strengthening regional disease surveillance and response capacities.4.13

› Further strengthen civil-military cooperation in health security in the Indo-Pacific region. As documented in the 2019 AUSMIN statement on global health security,4.14 the US military Indo-Pacific Command and the Australian Defence Force have made good initial progress in strengthening civilian and military cooperation for health security. These efforts are only at a nascent stage though and can be further expanded via providing technical assistance and training to other militaries in the region engaged in health assistance. These measures would create new opportunities for military-military cooperation while also serving to strengthen civil-military norms and enhance regional stability and security.

› Strengthen and re-invigorate the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). The GHSA initiative was launched in 2014 under the Obama administration and offers a viable intergovernmental platform for supporting countries in the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen their capacities in disease detection, surveillance and response.4.15 The GHSA, which languished under the former Trump administration, could be relaunched and repurposed to collaborate with other multilateral institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and World Bank to provide targeted development assistance for regional health system strengthening and workforce capacity building. The GHSA could also be used constructively to develop consensus on key issues, such as reform of the World Health Organization and proposals to strengthen multilateral cooperation in global health security.

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ACTIVATE THE AUSTRALIA-US-JAPAN TRILATERAL INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERSHIPHAYLEY CHANNER

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Australia, the United States and Japan should acti-vate trilateral mechanisms to support the private sector to take up infrastructure funding initiatives in the Indo-Pacific. Amidst the many upheavals of 2020, the value of infrastructure partnerships in the Indo-Pa-cific to Australian foreign and security objectives has fallen by the wayside. This issue matters because one of the most permanent ways in which China’s claims to regional leadership is being asserted is via the provi-sion of the Indo-Pacific’s underpinning infrastructure. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is providing essen-tial transport and information connectivity to the region, however, BRI projects are not always transparent, nor do they meet global quality standards.

Australia, the United States and Japan all agree that to provide regional partners with fair, open and ethical financing alternatives — and to compete effectively with the BRI, they must leverage the resources of the private sector. Leveraging private sector capital and expertise in our development agencies’ infrastructure program-ming is critical to increasing our impact and strategic success. With the small and medium economies of the region looking to build critical infrastructure to meet the demands of their populations and growth, there is a small and fast-closing window of opportunity for Australia, the United States and Japan to capitalise on this moment.

Launched partly in response to China’s BRI, in November 2018 Australia, the United States and Japan announced the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific.5.1 The Trilateral Partnership aims to provide regional governments with an alternative, trans-parent source of infrastructure funding and emphasises working with the private sector to improve outcomes relative to purely state-financed programs like the BRI. In November 2019, the Trilateral Partnership announced the Blue Dot Network (BDN) — an initiative to reduce the risk for private investors by providing certification for government, private sector, and civil society infrastruc-ture projects that met international quality standards.5.2 While primarily a certification body, it can also provide access to US$60 billion in capital in loans or equity through the US International Development Finance Corporation (US-IDFC). However, specific mechanisms remain to be determined.

Despite efforts by the Trilateral Partnership, no public-pri-vate infrastructure projects have been cemented. The first and only project under this trilateral framework — an undersea fibre optic cable connecting Palau with the Indo-Pacific — is being done in partnership with the Palau Government rather than industry.5.3 The only other project on the horizon is an undersea cable connecting Santiago with Sydney5.4 but again, progress is slow — discussions between Canberra, Washington and Tokyo for a project focused predominantly on Australia and

Chile will likely be continuing. Furthermore, other than BDN’s inaugural trilateral Steering Committee in Janu-ary 2020 — which discussed a possible vision statement, membership criteria, and responsibilities5.5 — the BDN has yet to issue certification standards businesses can benchmark against more than a year later.


As evidenced by the last two years, Australia’s, the United States’ and Japan’s development agencies’ infrastruc-ture programming is not adequately structured to facil-itate private sector take-up. In the case of the United States, not even a major restructure of its development agencies in 2018, whereby the Overseas Private Invest-ment Corporation was transformed into the US-IDFC,5.6 has addressed this issue.

WITH THE SMALL AND MEDIUM ECONOMIES OF THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION LOOKING TO BUILD CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO MEET

THE DEMANDS OF THEIR POPULATIONS AND GROWTH, THERE IS A SMALL AND

FAST-CLOSING WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN TO CAPITALISE ON THIS MOMENT.

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PAKISTAN$46.1

INDIA$18.0

BANGLADESH$23.2

SRI LANKA$6.5

KOREA$8.7

JAPAN$8.5

VIETNAM$7.9

CAMBODIA$10.0

THAILAND$9.5

MALAYSIA$28.9 SINGAPORE

$34.5

INDONESIA$32.7

PACIFIC ISLANDS$4.2

OTHER ASEAN$35.4

Figure 7. Chinese investment and contracts in the Indo-Pacific, 2014-19 (US$ billions)

Source: https://perthusasia.edu.au/our-work/geoeconomics-report

Although the US-IDFC possesses new development finance tools specifically designed to support private-sector-led projects such as small grants, loan guaran-tees, and equity investments, several factors including lacking communication and an inaccessible online inter-face are keeping business away.5.7 Following a meeting of the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership with Vietnam in October 2020,5.8 the US-IDFC has yet to make any further public announcements regarding the progress or future direction of this initiative.5.9

PART OF THE DIFFICULTLY IS THAT AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES

AND JAPAN HAVE SEPARATE, NOT ALWAYS EQUAL, INFRASTRUCTURE

PRIORITIES, AND THE WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS

CAN SCATTER FOCUS, PREVENTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROJECT PIPELINE.

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Supporting strategic infrastructure projects remains one of the most tangible ways to promote growth, demon-strate regional leadership, and further Australia’s national interests. Australia can maximise its impact in this space by working with like-minded partners and leveraging private-sector investment. However, clearly, there have been challenges to working trilaterally and getting the private sector on board.

Part of the difficultly is that Australia, the United States and Japan have separate, not always equal, infrastruc-ture priorities, and the wide range of regional infrastruc-ture needs can scatter focus, preventing the establish-ment of a project pipeline. In addition, to lift the BDN out of obscurity, some basic benchmarks must be set and the commercial benefits to certification proactively pushed out to business. Further, a review of the US-IDFC to understand the positive and negative effects of the restructure on attracting private investment could assist the United States to make adjustments as necessary, as well as help Australia and Japan decide if and how they should implement similar changes within their own development agencies.


Australia, the United States and Japan collectively should:

› Discuss the potential for a trilateral infrastructure hub established in Southeast Asia, initially dedicated to one aspect of infrastructure provision to the region. A central hub that focused on one major project, for instance, internet connectivity, would help narrow focus. The three countries could then reach out to industry partners in the field and cultivate and leverage business expertise to deliver similar projects to multiple countries over several years. A hub and single-area focus would help catalyse the Trilateral Partnership reputation in the region as a credible alternative to the BRI.

› Engage business via a regular Indo-Pacific infrastructure investment symposium to understand industry needs and promote interest in public-private partnerships.5.10 When feasible, Australia could propose an infrastructure symposium hosted in Southeast Asia bringing together Australian, US and Japanese governments and businesses. A symposium with latitude for private discussions could help government quickly understand where the roadblocks are for industry, including on regulatory concerns, as well as share information regarding government priorities on a country and sectoral basis.

› Clearly outline the BDN’s certification standards and procedures to access partner government funding. In addition, the rewards of certification to business should be explicit — for instance, allowing business to trumpet their prioritisation of environmental protection and sustainability as a responsible global citizen. The BDN could also be expanded to include base-level grants (non-repayable financial contribution provided under strict guidelines).

› Evaluate and reform development programming in the infrastructure space, based on the priority of maximising private-sector engagement. Recalibrating the orientation of relevant agencies to the specific needs of the private sector will greatly augment their capacity to leverage involvement. An assessment of infrastructure programming in all three countries should be conducted to identify how to make these programs more business-friendly.

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COLLABORATE TO COMBAT MISINFORMATION AND THE THREAT OF DOMESTIC EXTREMISMELLIOTT BRENNAN

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Australia and the United States should support the establishment of a regular track 1.5 dialogue between government, business, and civil society leaders on the spread of violent extremism and its drivers.

The links between flawed information ecosystems and domestic extremism are now explicit and well-ac-knowledged following the failed Capitol insurrection on 6 January 2021. American security and intelligence agencies will be dealing with an emboldened extreme right-wing domestic terror threat for years to come as a result of the belief among many that the presidential election was rigged.6.1 But both the explosion of violence and erosion of fact were a long time in the making and long foretold.6.2 Australia is in a position to avoid the full fate of the United States in this regard. Working with American counterparts will be essential given that many of the solutions strike through American jurisdictions, like Silicon Valley.6.3

The COVID-19 pandemic was an accelerant — but not the root cause — for the linked information and extremism crisis facing the world today. Traditional news sources have been financially squeezed for years while the internet giants applying the bulk of the pressure have shirked any real responsibility for the content they host and promote, even in many cases when it was clearly extremist or outright conspiracy theorist content.6.4

The Trump administration quickened truth decay. The leader of the world’s oldest and most renowned democ-racy was disinterested in upholding the institutions that underpinned it. The COVID-19 pandemic then caused immense, health and financial hardship and contributed severe damage to social cohesion. Meanwhile, internet use soared in concert with prolonged lockdowns.6.5

With the above factors in place, the world was primed for the rapid scaling of misinformation within individu-als’ information ecosystems and far-right groups and conspiratorial grifters were ready to exploit it.6.6


The scale of this challenge does not pale in comparison to those like economic recovery, climate change or the rise of an authoritarian China. In fact, solving the United States’ domestic security and information crises is crit-ical to each.

But like the other problems facing the Biden adminis-tration, these are intractable. The Republican Party is deeply divided. So long as conspiracy theories are flour-ishing within its ranks and giving those views legitimacy, the Biden administration will struggle to truly amend the problem.6.7

Australia and the United States are in the process of rewriting the online regulatory landscape. While Australia is at the vanguard of some issues like media bargaining, the US Congress now has the resolve to regu-late the tech giants headquartered in its jurisdictions. The Biden administration is likely to increase the scope of anti-trust suits already filed against Google and Face-book, embark on data privacy and algorithmic transpar-ency pushes and look closely at Amazon’s market posi-tion, including through the lens of its labour practices.

THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC WAS AN ACCELERANT — BUT NOT THE ROOT CAUSE

— FOR THE LINKED INFORMATION AND EXTREMISM CRISIS FACING THE WORLD TODAY. TRADITIONAL NEWS SOURCES

HAVE BEEN FINANCIALLY SQUEEZED FOR YEARS WHILE THE INTERNET GIANTS

APPLYING THE BULK OF THE PRESSURE HAVE SHIRKED ANY REAL RESPONSIBILITY

FOR THE CONTENT THEY HOST AND PROMOTE, EVEN IN MANY CASES WHEN

IT WAS CLEARLY EXTREMIST OR OUTRIGHT CONSPIRACY THEORIST CONTENT.

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There is bipartisan consensus that Section 230 of the US Communications Decency Act (1996)6.8 — which does not consider internet platforms like Twitter and Facebook to be publishers — needs to be made fit for purpose. Democrats broadly seek to impose more responsibil-ity on the bigger platforms, while Republicans accuse them of excessive censorship.6.9 This bipolarity will belie efforts to truly reform the media landscape in a way that reflects the realities of the 21st century.6.10

While any regulatory measures will take time, the threat of violence partly born of broken information ecosys-tems remains pressing. The Biden administration is taking steps to seriously address the threat of far-right extremism from a national security perspective, includ-ing a comprehensive threat assessment of domestic extremism being undertaken by the Director of National Intelligence in cooperation with the FBI and the Depart-ment of Homeland Security.6.11 This marks a definitive step into the post-9/11 paradigm of domestic security. Australia is also in the process of exploring the scope of these problems in the form of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s Inquiry into extremist movements and radicalism in Australia.6.12

RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM NOW ACCOUNTS FOR AS MUCH AS 40 PER CENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION’S CASELOAD IN AUSTRALIA, A DRAMATIC INCREASE FROM 2016 WHERE IT WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 10-15 PER CENT. EXTREME RIGHT GROUPS, INCLUDING NEO-NAZIS, ARE INCREASINGLY EMBRACING ENCRYPTED MESSAGING PLATFORMS TO ORGANISE IN SECRECY BUT HAVE ALSO

HELD VERY PUBLIC GATHERINGS INDICATING THAT THEY ARE EMBOLDENED.

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› Australia should support the establishment of a regular track 1.5 dialogue with the United States on countering violent extremism and its drivers. Australia and the United States have sound and long-standing intelligence-sharing arrangements through the Five Eyes collective and have also participated in sustained multilateral initiatives since 2001 through the United Nations and bodies like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the matter of counterterrorism.6.18 There is also a strong history of official agreements between their respective counter-intelligence coordination centres.6.19 But following multiple intelligence failures in the United States,6.20 and a rising threat in Australia,6.21 new foundations are needed. Both governments recognise this and are undertaking independent internal reviews into the changing domestic security landscape. These efforts would be complemented by convening government leaders in coordination with business leaders at the coalface, and civil society leaders and researchers who built an intimate knowledge of this emerging landscape before it presented itself fully as a threat to national security.

› Such a forum would help to sharpen both Australia and the United States’ existing participation in multilateral fora and would give necessary context allowing collegial and pragmatic discussions given Australia and the United States’ many shared values.

› Australia already participates in a similar dialogue on counterterrorism with the European Union6.22 and has previously participated in track 1.5 dialogues with the United States on critical issues like defence and cybersecurity.

› The dialogue’s scope should include the role of big tech. Both the United States and Australia are beginning a once-in-a-generation regulatory effort in this area and the new foundation must address the conditions that have let misinformation and conspiracy theories fester to the advantage of extremist recruiters.


Damaged information systems and right-wing extrem-ism represent clear and present dangers for Australia. Right-wing extremism now accounts for as much as 40 per cent of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)’s caseload in Australia, a dramatic increase from 2016 where it was estimated to be 10-15 per cent.6.13 Extreme right groups, including neo-Nazis, are increasingly embracing encrypted messaging plat-forms to organise in secrecy but have also held very public gatherings indicating that they are emboldened.6.14 In statements to parliamentary joint committees, both the Australian Federal Police and the New South Wales Crime Commission have testified that COVID-19 has driven a rise in right-wing extremism online.6.15 And, of course, it was an Australian man in Christchurch who conducted the deadliest explicitly extreme right-wing terrorist attack in recent decades.6.16

With a high-profile vaccine roll out, the threat of social unrest, violence and terrorism at associated crowded places is real and demands vigilance. Attacks on 5G towers rolled out in the United Kingdom and even New Zealand demonstrate the short leap from conspira-cy-fuelled extremism to violence and terrorism.6.17

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STRENGTHEN INDO-PACIFIC VACCINE PARTNERSHIPSASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ADAM KAMRADT-SCOTT

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Australia should actively engage the United States to partner in making COVID-19 vaccines available across the Indo-Pacific region, including via multi-lateral initiatives.

Several countries in the Indo-Pacific region are expe-riencing high levels of SARS-CoV-2 (commonly known as the coronavirus) transmission, which has contrib-uted to significant demand for COVID-19 vaccines. In response, China and Russia have actively engaged in “vaccine diplomacy” to expand their influence and pres-ence in countries of strategic significance to Australia, including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.7.1 A well-co-ordinated, whole-of-region approach to the distribution and administration of COVID-19 vaccines will be critical to halting the ongoing transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, avoid duplication of effort, and ensure cost-ef-fectiveness of development assistance. A comprehen-sive Indo-Pacific vaccination strategy will also aid global economic recovery.

As part of its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, Australia in November 2020 announced a Regional Vaccine Access and Health Security Initiative, which is designed to provide “safe, effective and affordable COVID-19 vaccines for the Pacific and Southeast Asia.”7.2 The initiative entails a A$500 million commitment over

three years and will capitalise on the efforts undertaken by the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)’s Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security (CHS) prior to the pandemic — to fast-track regulatory approval and distribution of medical products. This framework will accelerate the availability of COVID-19 vaccines across the region once they have received TGA approval.7.3

In contrast, the United States has provided little detailed information to date on how it will directly support coun-tries throughout the Indo-Pacific region, nor how it will work with key regional stakeholders and allies to contain and eliminate the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including fair, rapid and equitable distribution of currently available COVID-19 vaccines.


The primary focus of the Biden administration through-out 2021 is on containing and eliminating the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus throughout the United States.7.4

On 14 January 2021, then President-Elect Biden released the “American Rescue Plan” which aims to secure an additional US$1.9 trillion from Congress to launch a federal vaccination program, offer direct financial relief to Americans, and provide community support for struggling businesses and communities.7.5 In terms of

THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION’S JOINT DECISIONS TO JOIN COVAX

AND REVERSE THE PLANNED UNITED STATES’ WITHDRAWAL FROM THE

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION HAS ALREADY BEEN WELCOMED BY THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A SIGN OF THE UNITED STATES’ WILLINGNESS

TO RE-ENGAGE IN MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO DEFEAT COVID-19.

international commitments, President Biden announced at the G7 meeting in February 2021 the United States will contribute US$4 billion towards the COVAX initiative,7.6 a multinational arrangement aiming to provide COVID-19 vaccines to low and middle-income countries that might otherwise lack timely access.7.7 Given the Trump admin-istration had declined to join COVAX, pledging instead an ‘America First’ vaccine policy,7.8 the Biden admin-istration’s joint decisions to join COVAX and reverse the planned United States’ withdrawal from the World Health Organization has already been welcomed by the international community as a sign of the United States’ willingness to re-engage in multilateral approaches to defeat COVID-19.

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What is the COVAX initiative?

COVAX is a joint initiative between the World Health Organization, the Coalition for Epidemic Prepared-ness Innovation (CEPI) and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (a global public-private global health partnership). The initiative aims to help facilitate the rapid development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines and ensure their equitable and fair distribution to all countries.7.9 COVAX has guaranteed it will purchase two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines and distribute them to countries so that they can vaccinate at least 20 per cent of their population. The initiative is particularly important for low-income countries that would otherwise struggle to gain access to COVID-19 vaccines due to cost barriers, ‘vaccine nationalism,’ and supply issues due to limited production capacity. At least five vaccine manufacturers have currently signed supply agreements with COVAX, and it is expected COVAX will commence distributing vaccines in the first quarter of 2021.7.10

Yet while the Biden campaign released a series of foreign policy statements on restoring American leadership and working to improve relations with Central Amer-ica and Africa,7.11 no equivalent policy positions were outlined on the Biden team’s future engagement with the Indo-Pacific region or China specifically. This has led to widespread speculation on how President Biden will approach wider US engagement in the Indo-Pacific.7.12


Australia has a number of intersecting interests regarding COVID-19 vaccines that will be best served by a more regionally engaged United States. Given the combined population size of Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, Australia’s regional vaccine initiative will be insufficient to meet the region’s needs. New Zealand has pledged its excess COVID-19 vaccines to Pacific island countries for free,7.13 which will help prioritise Australia’s support for Southeast Asian countries; but additional international contributions will be critical to containing the SARS-CoV-2 virus throughout the region and reopening tour-ism and trade. Joint US-Australia-New Zealand vaccine arrangements, in addition to support provided via the COVAX initiative, will also potentially help counter some of the efforts by China and Russia to use their vaccines to increase their regional influence.

JOINT US-AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND VACCINE ARRANGEMENTS, IN ADDITION TO SUPPORT PROVIDED VIA THE COVAX

INITIATIVE, WILL ALSO POTENTIALLY HELP COUNTER SOME OF THE EFFORTS

BY CHINA AND RUSSIA TO USE THEIR VACCINES TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

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Specifically, China’s pledge to make its COVID-19 vaccines a ‘global public good’ has been accompanied by high-level diplomatic missions to promote its vaccines to countries across the region and further abroad.7.14 These vaccine diplomacy/soft power efforts have been recognised as an attempt to make “strategic inroads” into the region,7.15 with some characterising China’s efforts as building a “Health Silk Road” commensurate with the Belt and Road Initiative.7.16 Yet concerns remain about the efficacy of some of China’s COVID vaccines,7.17 and infor-mation is beginning to emerge of significant price vari-ation in advance purchase agreements between coun-tries,7.18 raising the prospect that Indo-Pacific countries might face having to vaccinate their populations twice at considerable expense if current vaccines provide insufficient protection. It is therefore in Australia’s short, medium and long-term interests that proven safe and effective vaccines are made available, distributed and administered as soon as possible. The United States’ support for an Indo-Pacific vaccine drive will be critical to ensuring that outcome.


› Establish a joint US-Australia-New Zealand COVID-19 vaccine taskforce to pool procurement and work with partners to coordinate vaccine distribution and administration across Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Vaccine manufacturers have already been identified as elevating prices for individual countries, which is best countered by multinational purchasing platforms. A US-Australia-New Zealand taskforce can work with countries in the region and international platforms like the COVAX initiative, and the World Health Organization’s South-East Asia and Western Pacific regional offices, to coordinate the purchase, delivery and administration of COVID vaccines. A joint taskforce will also help prevent duplication of effort, ensure cost-effectiveness of development assistance, prevent wastage, and facilitate a more rapid distribution and administration across the region.

› Enable additional financing options through multilateral institutions to increase manufacturing and vaccine availability. The COVAX initiative provides one of the most important platforms for distributing an initial supply of COVID vaccines to countries eligible to receive official development assistance, but the initiative remains significantly underfunded. In addition, COVAX will not meet countries’ full needs, necessitating additional measures. Enabling financing arrangements via the Asian Development Bank to support the construction of new manufacturing facilities, and the World Bank to support direct procurement from existing manufacturers will supplement the COVAX initiative. Helping countries gain access to proven safe and effective vaccines directly from manufacturers via loans and financing arrangements will also circumvent indemnity problems associated with donated vaccines and place decision-making back in the hands of national governments.

› The United States and Australia lead an initiative in the World Trade Organization to waive intellectual property rights to rapidly upscale regionally-based manufacturing of approved, efficacious vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics. Intellectual property (IP) barriers on COVID vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics via the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) framework continue to impede rapid upscaling of critical medical products to contain the SARS-CoV-2 virus.7.19 This is despite the fact the TRIPS agreement permits countries to waive IP considerations in national emergencies.7.20 Australia, the United States, and other like-minded countries like Canada and the United Kingdom could work constructively to waive or partially waive existing IP protections, allowing for vaccine producers in India, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea amongst others, to commence manufacturing. This will be particularly important in advance of second-generation COVID vaccines to counter currently circulating and future variants.

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FIND COMMON AREAS OF COOPERATION IN BOLSTERING RESILIENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGEPROFESSOR SIMON JACKMAN AND JARED MONDSCHEIN

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Australia and the United States should co-invest in the development of clean energy solutions.

The Biden administration is pursuing an ambitious climate agenda, its elements signalled well in advance during the 2020 presidential election campaign. Austral-ian interest in this policy domain runs high, with several commentators speculating that climate change policy will become a pressure point between the Biden admin-istration and the Morrison government8.1 and hence, a rare but vivid instance of public disagreement in the US-Australia relations.

Within a month of taking office, the Biden administra-tion rejoined the Paris Climate Accord, cancelled the Keystone pipeline and restored environmental regulation and rule-making processes rolled back by the Trump administration.8.2 Biden also announced the intention for the United States to have a “carbon pollution-free electricity sector no later than 2035” and be “on a path” to achieve net-zero emissions, economy-wide, by 2050.8.3 These policy changes and aspirations give voice to the Biden campaign’s plan to spend around US$2 trillion on “a clean energy revolution and environmental justice.”

But of special note is the way that the Biden admin-istration intends for climate change considerations to feature heavily in US foreign and trade policy, particu-larly whether or not it will implement a campaign pledge of “carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-in-tensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations.”8.4 Among Biden’s first announcements after winning the election was the appointment of John Kerry as Special Presi-dential Envoy for Climate and designating this position as a member of the National Security Council. Kerry’s seniority and status further underscore the importance of the Biden aspiration for the United States to lead inter-national efforts on climate change.

Two features of Biden’s proposals warrant elaboration.

First, Biden’s proposals enjoy deep support among the Democratic rank-and-file, while being carefully tailored to appeal to moderate and independent voters, or at least not alienate those segments of the electorate. During the presidential campaign, Biden insisted that his climate change policy was more moderate than the “Green New Deal” and that his administration would not oppose fracking though he simultaneously advo-cated massive investments to steer the US economy to a low-carbon future.8.5

Many of Biden’s climate and energy policy aspirations are not controversial and are widely endorsed (if tacitly) throughout American society. Well before Biden’s campaign, leading multinational firms, many US states, and institutions in civil society had already committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 — or earlier.8.6 From this perspective, the surprise is not so much the apparent boldness of Biden’s policies, but the trench-ant opposition of the Trump administration to climate change policy.

Second, there is broad support for injecting climate change considerations into foreign policy, trade and national security policy. As reported on page 12 ,survey research by the United States Studies Centre finds that 68 per cent of Americans rate dealing with global climate change as a very or somewhat important goal of US foreign policy.

More specifically, as shown in Figure 8, the same survey finds 46 per cent of Americans agree that the US Govern-ment should “reward countries who do more to stop climate change with more favourable trade deals, and impose costs on those that do not.” Only 20 per cent of Americans are opposed to an explicit link of preferen-tial trading arrangements with climate change action. Nearly three-quarters of Biden voters agree with this proposition, highlighting the depth of political demand on climate change action in the Democratic base.

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Climate Envoy John Kerry is still building his office and the details of the international-facing elements of Biden’s climate policy remain a work in progress, as are any first-order implications for Australia.

In the first week of the Biden administration, a phone call between Kerry and Australia’s Minister for Energy and Emissions Reduction Angus Taylor appeared to show agreement around the importance of driving techno-logical solutions to climate change, flagging enhanced US-Australia coordination on research and development into low-carbon energy technologies.8.9 Yet in late Febru-ary 2021, Kerry noted to a public audience that “Australia has had some differences with us, we’ve not been able to get on the same page completely”8.10 — the closest the Biden administration has come to criticism of Australian climate change policies.8.11

Carbon-based, border adjustment taxes remain an unsettled subject of debate within the administration, albeit one getting increasingly more attention.8.12 At the moment, Australia may need to be more concerned about the implementation of such a tax by the European Union, where the debate is more developed, and the likelihood of implementation may be as early as 2023.8.13

Figure 8. Biden supporters overwhelmingly want US trade policy linked to climate change Percentages of respondents giving each indicated response, by 2020 presidential vote, January 2021 survey

Question asked: Should the United States reward countries who do more to stop climate change with more favourable trade deals and impose costs on those that do not?

Trump voters

Others

Biden voters

All

31 14 36 13 5

6 6 46 33 8

2 24 40 32

13 7 34 28 18

Strongly disagreeDisagreeNeither agree or disagreeAgreeStrongly Agree

Biden campaign promises about imposing costs on international climate laggards have thus far not trans-lated into policy. Instead, the Biden administration has focused on positive measures, stressing that a “zero emissions future offers remarkable opportunity for busi-ness, for clean, green jobs, for economic growth”8.8 in an effort to “build back better” — linking climate change policy with popular initiatives such as investing in US infrastructure and economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.


Domestic US politics will limit broader congressional legislation on climate change (see page 24 for further details). But actions already undertaken by the US exec-utive branch span the “whole of government,” with prac-tically every US federal department and agency — from Energy and Transportation to Treasury, Commerce and the US Trade Representative — directed to commit to climate initiatives via executive orders issued by Presi-dent Biden.8.7

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› Continue monitoring the development of internationally-oriented elements of US climate change policy and their connection to US security and strategic policy. Facing little room to move on climate change in the Congress — but pent-up political demands from its supporters for action — the Biden administration will be attracted to the international policy arenas as venues for notching “wins” on climate. Australia has multiple strategic and commercial interests at stake, especially should energy and emissions be part of any “grand bargain” between the United States and China.

› Establish a clean energy partnership focused on innovating new low and no-carbon solutions. The United States and Australia have overlapping interests in maximising investments into clean energy technology. They also have committed, or are seeking to commit, significant investments in clean energy. The challenge for the two countries is to calibrate the R&D portfolio and the potential sharing of intellectual property to minimise inefficiencies, taking advantage of the plethora of US capital and expertise in the area and the simultaneous abundance of Australian energy resources. Clean energy innovations could be considered as a part of a “skinny deal” Digital Trade Agreement that would act as an addition to the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement.

Biden administration policies in the “technology-not-tax” arena align with the Coalition’s preferred approach to climate, emissions and energy policy8.16 and lie more soundly in the small set of politically-viable climate change policies likely to pass the US Congress.8.17

Beyond the ever-increasing international and domes-tic political pressure to do more on climate change, Australia faces the long-term challenge that three of its top destinations of Australian fossil fuels exports — Japan, Korea and China — have committed to net-zero carbon emissions in the coming decades.

Australia will likely escape overt, first-order pressure from the United States on climate change, for a number of reasons.

› Americans well understand that Australia is on the “front lines” with respect to China and Beijing’s economic coercion — that China is subjecting Australia to economic coercion — and that Australia’s US alliance credentials are impeccable. Biden administration officials have already pledged to “stand shoulder to shoulder” with Australia on Chinese economic coercion.8.14

› The Australian alliance enjoys broad and deep support in the US Congress, with several of Australia’s strongest backers in the US Congress themselves hostile to Biden’s climate change agenda.8.15

› Until the United States makes credible commitments to lower emissions itself — such as a binding national policy like a carbon tax and not merely aspirations or the uneven and uncoordinated mix of state and local initiatives — Australia has a strong moral case.

The very same fossil fuel linkages to Asia may well be repurposed to provide low- or no-carbon energy to Asian markets. Australia is uniquely situated to become a clean energy superpower if it implements the right poli-cies and can be at the technological frontier in low-car-bon energy production, transmission and storage.8.18 Solidifying energy R&D ties with the United States would better facilitate such efforts.


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SECTION 2. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA BOLSTER COLLECTIVE DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE?

SECTION 3. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA BOLSTER COLLECTIVE DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE?

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ORGANISE THE ALLIANCE FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENCEASHLEY TOWNSHEND AND BRENDAN THOMAS-NOONE

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59


Australia and the United States should advance oper-ational-level coordination within and beyond the alliance to facilitate a collective approach to deter-rence and defence in the Indo-Pacific. It is now well accepted in Washington and Canberra that the United States cannot uphold a favourable balance of power in the region alone.9.1 China’s increasingly large and sophis-ticated military is eroding the foundations of American power in the Western Pacific.9.2 While the Pentagon is working to find technological and operational offsets to the problems China presents, it faces rising budgetary pressures, daunting modernisation challenges and a host of unrelated domestic and global commitments.9.3 Australia is heavily implicated by these trends. Canberra has core interests in the preservation of a stable stra-tegic order in the Indo-Pacific and a key role to play in upholding this order alongside the United States and other allies and partners.

Yet the US-Australia alliance lacks the tools to implement a strategy of collective defence. Despite a very high level of military interoperability, Canberra and Washington have not developed processes for coordinating mili-tary strategy, undertaking combined contingency plan-ning or assigning roles and responsibilities for regional operations.9.4 Such measures are required to transform the alliance into a credible vehicle for deterrence and

defence. Some regional precedents exist. In 1951, the US and Australian navies signed the Radford-Collins Agree-ment to coordinate maritime security responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific — the only mechanism of its type in the alliance which, while still in force, needs substan-tial updating.9.5 Later in the Cold War, the United States and Japan pursued similar, if more comprehensive, approaches to dividing operational responsibilities for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime blockades in the Western Pacific.9.6 These are useful constructs for the United States and Australia to consider when thinking about collective defence operations today.


The Biden administration appears open to exploring new approaches to collective defence in the region with militarily capable allies like Australia. Whether this trans-lates into action on sensitive issues — such as reading key allies into US military planning at early stages of devel-opment — is yet to be seen.9.7 President Biden’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks, has, for instance, written about the need for a “federated” approach to Indo-Pacific defence policy.9.8 This would see the United States and key regional allies integrate military capa-bilities into comprehensive security architectures to achieve common approaches to a range of strategic policy issues: from expanding defence value chains to

developing joint operational concepts. Hicks has also proposed co-developing and co-producing an auxiliary supply ship to offset the costs and expand the capacity of the United States and its allies to sustain and resupply forward-deployed forces during high-end conflict.9.9

Pursuing new forms of defence networking with regional militaries is also high on the Biden team’s agenda.9.10 This is likely to build on common operating platforms like the P-8 maritime surveillance and ASW aircraft that is operated by the United States, Australia and India. As some incoming administration officials have under-scored, common capabilities allow easier integration and data sharing, providing ripe opportunities for coor-dinated maritime patrols in the Indo-Pacific.9.11 Others highlight the need to find “complementarities” between US and allied forces, which could facilitate more effective combined presence deployments and have potential to develop into standing maritime task forces.9.12 However, as these proposals will require major changes to the way the US military has cooperated with partners for the past three decades, they will encounter significant bureaucratic and political hurdles in both Canberra and Washington.

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Figure 9. Major anti-submarine warfare exercises involving Australia and the United States

Surface ship participation

Submarine participation

Aircraft participation

AUSTRALIA

JAPAN

CHINA

INDIA

SINGAPORE

MALAYSIA

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

TAIWAN

PHILIPPINES

INDIAN OCEAN

PACIFIC OCEAN

Bay of Bengal South ChinaSea

Darwin RAAF Base Darwin

PerthRAAF Base Pearce

Okinawa

Yokosuka

RAAF Base Tindal

RAAF Base Townsville

RAAF Base Edinburgh

Cocos (Keeling) Islands (Australia)

Guam (USA)Andaman and Nicobar Islands (India)

Exercise MALABARLast iteration: 2020Participants: Australia, India, Japan, United States

Exercise OCEAN EXPLORELast iteration: 2019Participants: Australia, New Zealand, United States

Exercise LUNGFISHLast iteration: 2019Participants: Australia, United States

Exercise LA PEROUSELast iteration: 2019Participants: Australia, France, Japan, United States

Exercise SEA DRAGONLast iteration: 2021Participants: Australia, Canada, India, Japan, United States

Exercise PACIFIC VANGUARDLast iteration: 2020Participants: Australia, Japan, South Korea, United States

Legend

Access points for potential US and Australian combined ASW patrols

Access points for potential wider allied and partner combined ASW patrols

Misawa

60 Sources: Department of Defence; Royal Australian Navy; Commander, US 7th Fleet; Commander, US Pacific Fleet9.13

INDONESIA TIMOR-LESTE

NEW ZEALAND

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Australia has a strategic interest in minimising these hurdles, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As the United States’ unilateral ability to uphold the regional order declines, contributing to a coalition defence arrangement that preserves stability and halts Chinese military expansion is Canberra’s next best strategic policy option.9.14 This idea lies behind Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the government’s emphasis on advancing both independent and allied capabilities to deter major powers and shape the regional strategic environment.9.15 Building mechanisms for US-Australia military coordination on key region-wide tasks, such as ASW operations and theatre missile defence, are the building blocks of such a strategy — even if allied integration is not desirable or possible across all capa-bilities and mission sets. This approach may also assist Canberra to realise its long-standing goal of tethering Washington more firmly to its immediate region. The reason for this is clear: As China’s capacity to project power into Australia’s northern approaches intensi-fies, and as the United States’ interest in Australia as a strategic location and regional military partner grows, Canberra and Washington’s security needs in Austral-ia’s Indo-Pacific neighbourhood are becoming more closely aligned than at any time in the 70-year history of the alliance.


Australia and the United States should organise the alliance for collective defence in an active but cautious way, focusing on two immediate lines of effort:

› Explore options for combined strategic and military planning centred around high-value scenarios and maritime operations. For collective defence to function at an operational level, the US military must read-in, involve and collaborate with Australia — and other close allies — at the earliest possible stage of the planning process.9.16 This is an unrealised objective of the 2018 US National Defense Strategy.9.17 Canberra and Washington should pursue this goal in a stepwise way, beginning with contingency planning for Pacific and Southeast Asian scenarios that could involve a limited use of force by China. Both allies should also explore combined command structures for peacetime surveillance and ASW patrols between Cocos Islands, Northern Australia and Guam; broadening these to include India and Japan, with access to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Japanese archipelago.

› Update and expand the 1951 Radford-Collins Agreement. Although this non-binding navy-to-navy arrangement worked to coordinate allied maritime responsibilities in the Cold War, it is too limited for today’s security environment.9.18 New operations and geographic settings should be explored to include the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and South Pacific, with a revised agreement accounting for recent force posture initiatives and offering a basis for new ones. A service-level agreement to coordinate — rather than integrate — national responsibilities on key maritime tasks may be a less politically sensitive way to progress towards combined operations. Ideally, any revised agreement should be expanded beyond the maritime domain to include air, land, space and cyber forces, either jointly or in separate service-level arrangements.

AS CHINA’S CAPACITY TO PROJECT POWER INTO AUSTRALIA’S NORTHERN APPROACHES INTENSIFIES, AND AS THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST IN AUSTRALIA

AS A STRATEGIC LOCATION AND REGIONAL MILITARY PARTNER GROWS, CANBERRA AND WASHINGTON WILL FIND THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS MORE CLOSELY ALIGNED THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE 70-YEAR HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE.

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EXPAND ALLIED FORCE POSTURE INITIATIVES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC BRENDAN THOMAS-NOONE

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Australia and the United States should launch a new generation of Indo-Pacific posture initiatives. Draw-ing on the 2020 Force Posture Working Group, the establishment of new facilities, operating locations and sustainment hubs will enable a more forward Austral-ian Defence Force (ADF) posture. This would provide options for a range of regional deterrence and defence activities, and help sustain US military presence in the Indo-Pacific. New US or allied posture initiatives in Australia and the region should focus on maintaining and expanding operational access to Southeast Asia, enabling enhanced capacity building and support for vulnerable regional states, and underwriting deterrence missions.

Realigning each country’s regional force posture has been a major focus for Australia and the United States over the past decade. Canberra has upgraded military infrastructure and presence across northern Australia in an attempt to grow the capacity and capability of the ADF to surge forward in a conflict.10.1 Results have been mixed. While upgrades to military facilities above the 26° South parallel have proceeded in the intervening years, the overall number of ADF personnel has declined.10.2 Similarly, the Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia,” launched in 2011, has proceeded with a highly questionable level of progress. Its aim was to achieve a

military footprint that was “geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable.”10.3 Some significant realignments commenced and are still underway, but overall progress has been stilted, with US forces in the region operating from large concentrated bases much as they were in 2011.10.4


There is broad bipartisan recognition in the United States that its Indo-Pacific force posture is ill-equipped to meet China’s military challenge. This includes members of Biden’s national security and defence teams, many of whom have supported ongoing efforts to redistribute US forces, reinvigorate existing initiatives and forge new ones. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin supports the continued redistribution of US forces across the Indo-Pacific, including the major realignments initi-ated under Obama’s rebalance.10.5 But American think-ing about allied force posture initiatives — and how US infrastructure and access in the region can be lever-aged to bolster allied reach and capacity — has been more limited. Some ideas have included Australia rotat-ing naval assets to a standing maritime task force or progressing the networking of exercise and test ranges to enable integration.10.6 The Biden administration has inherited a long-running Joint Force effort to develop new operational concepts for the Indo-Pacific, which

will require new partners, access locations and regional infrastructure, likely leading to a degree of bureaucratic momentum as new initiatives are considered by US military services.10.7

There is general support for further resources in Congress for a new slate of force posture changes in the region. This is critical for any substantial realignment of US military forces considering the significant infrastruc-ture and logistic spending that may be required.10.8 The passage of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act by Congress — which established the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) — in late 2020 is a positive step in this direc-tion. The PDI, a US$2.2 billion account that is intended to directly fund and upgrade the United States’ military footprint in the Indo-Pacific, will be a central tool for the Biden administration and an opportunity for allies.10.9

NEW AMERICAN OR ALLIED POSTURE INITIATIVES IN AUSTRALIA AND THE REGION

SHOULD FOCUS ON MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING OPERATIONAL ACCESS TO

SOUTHEAST ASIA, ENABLING ENHANCED CAPACITY BUILDING AND SUPPORT FOR VULNERABLE REGIONAL STATES, AND

UNDERWRITING DETERRENCE MISSIONS.

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21

45

4

3

6

35

7

Figure 10. Current and potential allied force posture in the Indo-Pacific

Legend

Existing force posture initiatives and enhanced air cooperation sites

US and Australian co-development of regional defence infrastructure

Possible locations for maritime force posture initiatives

Possible locations for expanded Australian access arrangements

AUSTRALIA

SINGAPORE

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

PHILIPPINES

INDIAN OCEAN

PACIFIC OCEAN

Darwin Harbour

INDONESIA

Manila

Cocos (Keeling) Islands (Australia)

South ChinaSea

MALAYSIA

INDIA

Manus IslandLombrum Naval Base

21 US Force Posture Initiative and Enhanced Air Cooperation sites 1. RAAF Base Darwin2. Robertson Barracks Close Training Area3. Mount Bundey Training Area4. Defence Establishment Berrimah5. Kangaroo Flats Training Area6. RAAF Base Tindal7. Bradshaw Field Training Area

Fleet Base West

HMAS Coonawarra

Guam (USA)

US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites

1. Fort Magsaysay2. Basa Air Base3. Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base4. Antonio Bautista Air Base5. Lumbia Air Base

Sources: Department of Defence, US Department of State, The Australian10.10

RAAF Base Amberley

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Australia has a significant interest in shaping and deliv-ering new force posture initiatives that will both enable the objectives of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and improve the sustainability of US military presence in the region. Canberra’s new strategic policy blueprint has underscored the need for Australia to develop the ADF’s ability to deliver deterrent effects, contribute to coalition operations and respond to grey zone activities in Austral-ia’s immediate region.10.11 This will require an expanded list of potential operating locations, bases and sustain-ment hubs in Southeast Asia, the Pacific and the north-east Indian Ocean. Canberra will need to strengthen existing relationships with nations in those areas as well as leverage US access arrangements where mutually beneficial. While Australia is already reorientating its domestic force posture, upgrading airfields, developing new port facilities and expanding training ranges across the northern part of the country and in territories like the Cocos Keeling Islands and Christmas Island, much more will be required to support Australia’s more active strategic policy agenda.10.12


Using the recently established bilateral Force Posture Working Group, Australia and the United States should:

› Establish a US maritime or naval force posture initiative in Australia. With US Air Force and Marine initiatives well underway, a naval or maritime element would provide innumerable benefits and help sustain US military presence in the region. The US Navy faces a series of structural challenges, including growing demands on an overworked fleet, budgetary pressure and an increasingly active and capable China.10.13 Options to alleviate some of these pressures could include developing a maintenance or rotational deployment capability in Western Australia or providing a logistics hub for forward deployed lift assets and US Navy transports to enable more effective supply of dispersed forces.10.14

› Explore combined force posture initiatives in Australia’s immediate region. As both allies realign their respective force postures, there may be advantages to combining resources by establishing select combined facilities. This is already being trialled through the redevelopment of a naval facility on Manus Island.10.15 While the United States and Australia have substantially different requirements and interests in how they structure forces in the region, there are key overlaps — such as developing new operating locations that would facilitate greater Indian Ocean access or bolstering efforts aimed at easing logistics challenges.

› Facilitate greater Australian use of US operating locations across the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s Defence Strategic Update calls for an ADF that is capable of executing independent deterrent effects in Australia’s immediate region, countering grey zone coercion and joining wider coalition operations when required. This demands a more agile operational posture. In the future, elements of the ADF may need to move rapidly throughout the region, leading operations, contributing to coalition high-end deterrence missions and conducting independent manoeuvres in the same deployment.10.16 Greater access to US operating locations in Guam, the Philippines, Singapore and elsewhere would support the ADF in these tasks and help to augment Australia’s contribution to upholding the regional order.

RAAF Base Amberley

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STRENGTHEN COORDINATION ON COUNTERING MARITIME COERCIONASHLEY TOWNSHEND AND TOBY WARDEN

66

67


Australia and the United States should strengthen coordinated efforts to counter Chinese grey zone activities in maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Over the past decade, China’s use of maritime coer-cion has undermined security, sovereignty and stability within Australia’s immediate region, and contributed to the expansion of its strategic influence. These activities have intensified during COVID-19. Chinese naval and coastguard vessels are intimidating their Southeast Asian equivalents, disrupting fishing ships and hydrocarbon exploration platforms, and supporting maritime militias in disputed waters.11.1 China’s geopolitical presence is also growing, enabled by unilateral administrative arrange-ments and the construction of dual-use infrastructure by state-owned firms.11.2 These activities are eroding the regional strategic status quo without resorting to conflict and, underwritten by China’s expanding military reach, threaten to bring about a Chinese sphere of influence.

Washington and Canberra agree that a more forward-leaning approach is required to counter China’s maritime grey zone activities.11.3 Both have worked inde-pendently, together and with like-minded partners to help Southeast Asian and Pacific nations defend their maritime rights and interests. This has included diplo-matic solidarity, presence operations in support of state and non-state actors facing Chinese intimidation, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assis-

tance and information-sharing initiatives to illuminate China’s coercive activities.11.4 Such efforts should be expanded and improved through closer strategic coor-dination within the alliance.


Biden’s national security team appears highly supportive of this agenda. The National Security Council’s (NSC) Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, has advocated strengthening multinational thresholds and penalties for low-level coercion.11.5 Similarly, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks, has emphasised the need to reform coordination mechanisms and deci-sion-making processes to address grey zone maritime activities in concert with allies and partners; and has called for “strengthening collaborative planning” more broadly.11.6

Two main lines of effort have been proposed to opera-tionalise this collective approach — most of which align with the Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) which seeks to build partner capacity, enhance information-sharing and boost multinational cooperation.11.7 The first focuses on military and mari-time capacity building. This includes bolstering partner capabilities in anti-access/area denial systems, ISR plat-forms, maritime law enforcement, and maritime patrol and interdiction, as a means of empowering regional

countries to push back more effectively on grey zone activities.11.8 This could extend to widening the role of the US Coast Guard to train and exercise with Indo-Pacific counterparts.11.9

The second line of effort involves the provision of direct operational and intelligence support to partners on the frontline of Chinese coercion. Such measures are intended to increase the stakes for Beijing should it seek to disrupt lawful maritime activities and help regional states defend their maritime rights more effectively. This could include an expansion of coordinated patrols and presence activities by allied navies and coast-guards in order to prevent coercion, assure partners and respond to maritime intimidation in real time;11.10 and would involve improved efforts to foster shared maritime domain awareness across the region.11.11

OVER THE PAST DECADE, CHINA’S USE OF MARITIME COERCION HAS

UNDERMINED SECURITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND STABILITY WITHIN AUSTRALIA’S

IMMEDIATE REGION, AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE EXPANSION OF ITS STRATEGIC INFLUENCE. THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE

INTENSIFIED DURING COVID-19.

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Table 6. Recent examples of Chinese maritime coercion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific

Date Description

December 2019 — January 2020 China deployed maritime militia ships, supported by the Chinese Coast Guard, to waters off the Natuna Islands, prompting Indonesia to dispatch fighter jets, warships and coast guard vessels to patrol the region

February 2020 People’s Liberation Army Navy ship aimed its weapon control system at a Philippine Navy ship in the Spratly Islands

February 2020 A Chinese state-owned company made significant progress expanding and upgrading Momote Airport, near Lombrum Naval Base

March 2020 China deployed a fleet of maritime militia ships to the Union Banks in the Spratly Islands

March 2020 China opened two new research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, which include defence silos and military-grade runways

April 2020 Chinese Coast Guard ship rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat near Woody Island

April 2020 A Chinese research ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8, accompanied by Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels, sought to intimidate the Malaysian-chartered drillship, West Capella, operating in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone

April 2020 China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the establishment of two administrative districts within Sansha City

November 2020 A Chinese company signed a memorandum of understanding with the Papua New Guinean Government to develop a comprehensive multi-functional fishery industrial park on Daru Island

January 2021 National People’s Congress adopted the Coast Guard Law allowing the Chinese Coast Guard to fire on foreign vessels

Sources: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, The New York Times, Radio Free Asia, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reuters, The Interpreter, The Guardian11.12

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Australia has a stake in all these initiatives. As the 2020 Defence Strategic Update points out, grey zone activ-ities are targeting Australian interests in an open and stable region and must be addressed through active efforts to shape the strategic environment and deter coercive actions.11.13 Yet, while Canberra and Washington have a shared understanding of the grey zone challenge, their interests and threat perceptions are not entirely symmetrical.11.14

This has led to coordination problems. Above all, the alli-ance has not identified common red lines with regard to Chinese grey zone tactics such as island-building, mari-time intimidation or the use of paramilitary forces. This stems from divergent appetites for military, strategic and political risk. While hard to achieve, shared thresholds for action are crucial for increasing Beijing’s risk calcu-lus and assuring regional partners of allied support.11.15 Moreover, Australia and the United States do not prior-itise the policy tools for countering grey zone coercion in exactly the same way. For instance, in the Pacific, where Australia has important interests in regional lead-


Australia and the United States should broaden and deepen their combined approach to countering maritime grey zone activities in the following ways:

› Establish formal channels for coordinating counter grey zone activities in maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Given the number of agencies involved in addressing this challenge, strong central leadership is needed from Canberra and Washington. Indeed, as the recent Pacific Fusion Centre issue has highlighted, even considered actions can create unhelpful duplication.11.18 A coordinating mechanism could identify strategic lines of effort, functional roles and responsibilities and, ideally, undertake planning for specific initiatives and operations bilaterally. It could be nested within the new Indo-Pacific Coordination Mechanism or established between appropriate national leads, such as the NSC and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. A bilateral, or trilateral including Japan, working group within the Maritime Security Initiative could help to streamline regional capacity building, intelligence sharing and maritime domain awareness efforts.

› Expand and improve the coordination of current efforts to support third parties through maritime presence operations. Enhanced multilateral maritime presence in close proximity to actual or potential Chinese intimidation of regional vessels is likely to have a deterrent effect. While the so-called West Capella standoff in April 2020 signalled US and Australian resolve to deliver this effect in an opportunistic way, future activities would benefit from pre-planning on red lines, protocols for action and greater information sharing.11.19 Given the asymmetry between Chinese maritime forces and smaller US and Australian fleets, coastguard and border force agencies have a role to play.11.20 This could be enabled by rotating or deploying or a US Coast Guard detachment to Australia to establish patterns for allied patrol operations.11.21

ership, Canberra has advanced a whole-of-government approach to bolstering resilience; whereas US initiatives have often been led by the Pentagon and not always dovetailed with Australian efforts.11.16 Finally, the alliance has yet to deliver a genuinely combined approach to

maritime domain awareness and counter-coercion operations — a task that requires deeper ISR integration, unmanned vehicles for persistent situational awareness and, potentially, the inclusion of information, electronic warfare and special operations forces.11.17

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ADVANCE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE INTEGRATIONBRENDAN THOMAS-NOONE

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Australia should pursue more innovative ways to advance defence industry integration with the United States, including by coordinating with Canada and the United Kingdom. A collective approach to defence industrial base integration between the United States and its close allies is essential to maintaining a conventional military edge in the Indo-Pacific. China is on a path to match — if not surpass — the combined R&D spending of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand by the mid-2020s.12.1 Harnessing new technologies, integrating them into allied defence forces and ensuring their affordability for middle powers like Australia are critical steps to achieving a favourable balance of power in the region.12.2

The US Congress recognised these challenges in 2017 when it expanded America’s National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) to include Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada. Its aim was to deepen connec-tions between allied defence and national security industries, eventually creating a defence free trade zone.12.3 However, meaningful progress on implementing this framework has stalled. This is because Washington has failed to address core hurdles to further integra-tion, such as its treatment of US allies under extraterri-torial export controls like the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).


The prospects for substantial defence industrial inte-gration under the Biden administration are dim. Biden’s campaign platform was clear: the Trump administration had let too many foreign companies bid on US Govern-ment contracts, including those issued by the Pentagon, undercutting American manufacturing and industrial jobs. Biden has already moved to fulfil his campaign promise, issuing an executive order strengthening “Buy American” regulations during the first week of his administration.12.4 The new order centralises much of the decision-making power over waivers for the regulations within the White House, expands the list of products covered and closes some well-known loopholes.12.5

These domestic priorities are clearly at odds with the spirit of further industrial integration with close allies. Nevertheless, some senior Biden administration offi-cials have voiced support for the strategic logic of deeper integration. In her written response to ques-tions from Senators during her nomination process for Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kathleen Hicks stated that the NTIB should be “leveraged wherever possible” to strengthen defence relationships with allies. The NTIB would be part of the answer in encouraging competi-tion within the US industrial base, she added, as well as fostering “collaboration, competition and innovation to ensure a healthy supply chain.”12.6

HARNESSING NEW TECHNOLOGIES, INTEGRATING THEM INTO ALLIED DEFENCE FORCES AND ENSURING

THEIR AFFORDABILITY FOR MIDDLE POWERS LIKE AUSTRALIA ARE CRITICAL

STEPS TO ACHIEVING A FAVOURABLE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE REGION.

How this conflict between Biden’s domestic agenda and the requirements of allied strategic policy coordination will be resolved is uncertain. The president may be the decisive factor. Importantly, it was during Biden’s chair-manship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Australia-US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty passed in 2008. Biden — and his staff director at the time, now Secretary of State Antony Blinken — raised concerns about the integrity of the treaty, questioning the reliability of Australia’s export control regime and the risks of establishing a precedent that weakens America’s ITAR rules.12.7 Today, further defence industrial integration may hinge on whether the president’s views and those of his closest advisors have changed over the past decade or can be influenced in office.

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Slow progress on the National Technology and Industrial Base

Australia has had recent success in pushing for further recognition of the importance of defence industrial integration at the highest levels of US political and national security leadership. The joint statement from AUSMIN 2020 noted the ongoing work of the AUS-US Defense Trade Working Group and promised to “help resolve defense trade issues of mutual concern, including on export controls.”12.8 But progress in this area is increasingly measured by the success of individual specialised or pilot projects, rather than the wholesale change orig-inally envisioned by the NTIB framework. For instance, a recent Australia-US bilateral agree-ment to work towards a prototype of a hypersonic weapon based on 15 years of joint research was concluded through a specialised allied capability program in the Pentagon.12.9 While positive, the growing number of these specific, tailored, projects are a sign that overall progress has stalled.

200,000

400,000

800,000

1,200,000

0

2030

1,000,000

600,000

Nat

iona

l R&

D in

PP

P

Five Eyes* China

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

2021

2023

2025

2027

2028

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

2024

2026

2029

Actual Projected

Figure 11. Trends in national research and development

* The Five Eyes countries are the United States, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New ZealandSource: R&D figures up to and including 2017 reflect total gross domestic expenditure on R&D. Figures are shown in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars at current prices (as of 16 October 2019). Data retrieved from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Gross domestic expenditure on R&D by sector of performance and source of funds,” 16 October 2019, available at: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GERD_SOF#. R&D figures from 2018 to 2030 reflect a forecast using a version of the Exponential Smoothing (ETS) algorithm. The forecast is adjusted for seasonal variation. Included in this forecast are confidence intervals at a level of 95 per cent confidence.

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Australia has several overlapping interests in greater defence industrial integration with the United States. Canberra’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update prioritises the development of a robust domestic defence industry as a key pillar in ensuring the delivery and sustainment of Australia’s military modernisation efforts. Breaking down export barriers, facilitating better access to the US defence market and ensuring more equitable rules for intellectual property and collaboration are critical to this agenda.12.10 If progress is not made, Australian companies will be increasingly deterred from collaborating with the United States owing to fears that their products and intellectual property will be captured by its far-reaching export controls. Allies will instead network with each other to avoid the US system, as evident in the recent agreement between Boeing Australia, the Australian Department of Defence and the United Kingdom on sharing design materials for the unmanned Air Power Teaming System.12.11 Such activity deprives the United States of valuable innovation and niche technological capability.

Australia also has an interest in managing the affordabil-ity of modern military systems. As new generations of military equipment tend to rise in cost above inflation, it is burdensome for middle power allies to maintain


Australia has driven some bilateral wins in forging the NTIB framework into a workable mechanism for individual projects. Moving forward, additional specialised projects and a reformulated collective approach may be the most effective path towards further progress. Australia should:

› Caucus with NTIB members Canada and the United Kingdom in lobbying Congress and State Department officials. A joint strategy and diplomatic effort will leverage the combined weight of all three allies in Washington. Although Canberra, London and Ottawa do not share perfectly aligned defence industrial interests — and in some cases are direct competitors — their common interest in a more equitable defence industrial relationship with the United States could be used to drive political-level changes.

› Establish a combined Australia-US munitions manufacturing project in Australia. Munitions present a significant opportunity, in terms of strategic need and industrial capacity, to quickly stand up a demonstrable capability. Such an initiative would help bolster critical supply chains, build strategic resilience and fill gaps in America’s defence industrial base.12.14

› Utilise the NTIB to expand the range and depth of defence innovation challenges among its members. In 2017, Australia co-hosted an urban environment defence technology challenge alongside Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.12.15 Expanding such challenges to maritime, air and cyber environments, and linking them more directly to industry, would be a useful step towards building the case for further defence industrial integration.

a credible level of interoperability with US forces.12.12 This has become an even greater issue as systems like the F-35 fighter have failed to deliver on projected cost savings.12.13 A competitive defence market will assist cost-control and maximise defence investment. Finally,

a collective approach to defence innovation will help Australia maintain a regional military technological edge — a pillar of Australia’s defence strategy — by leveraging US and other trusted allied investments in R&D, talent and intellectual property.


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SECTION 3. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ALLIED AND PARTNER NETWORK?

SECTION 4. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ALLIED AND PARTNER NETWORK?

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LEVERAGE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY COORDINATION AND ALLIED SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKSDR JOHN LEE

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Australia must ensure that the Biden administration’s policies about domestic renewal are not inward-looking but based on an allied-centric approach to strengthen secure supply chains in strategic and critical sectors, and with respect to economic cooperation more generally.

President Biden and his key Cabinet officials have promised to focus on reinvesting in America, especially putting resources towards upgrading national infrastruc-ture and innovating capacity. Although rejecting Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ rhetoric, there are fundamental areas of continuity from the previous president when it comes to mindset.

For example, there is no longer blind faith in unfettered globalisation, that US-based multinationals should be left unimpeded to conduct commercial affairs in markets such as China as they see fit, or that the unregulated activities of these firms in external markets are axiomat-ically good for the American national interest.

In short, US economic and industrial policy will increas-ingly be guided by the political and strategic objectives of the US administration. In terms of strategic objectives, Biden and key officials, such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, have

all identified the competition and rivalry with China as the most urgent and important external priority facing the administration and the country. This means the US administration will want to ensure domestic economic and industrial policy are aligned with the objective of the United States being able to compete with China from a position of strength.


In these early days, President Biden is undertaking a review of all of Trump’s executive orders. So far, Biden has not lowered or removed the tariffs his predecessor placed on Chinese goods and services and has left alone most of the Trump-era executive orders and regulatory changes that restricted Chinese inbound investment and export of certain key technologies to China.

This is a clear signal Biden seeks to maintain any inher-ited leverage he has vis-à-vis Beijing. More than this, it is also evidence that the Biden administration accepts it is engaged in a long-term competitive dynamic with China and that Chinese economic and technological gain is often at the expense of the United States, and vice versa. In other words, the dynamic has shifted from one where economic interaction was perceived to be largely complementary prior to Trump to the current one where it is increasingly perceived to be zero-sum.

IN TERMS OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, BIDEN AND KEY OFFICIALS, SUCH AS

SECRETARY OF STATE ANTONY BLINKEN AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER JAKE

SULLIVAN, HAVE ALL IDENTIFIED THE COMPETITION AND RIVALRY WITH CHINA AS THE MOST URGENT AND IMPORTANT

EXTERNAL PRIORITY FACING THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE COUNTRY.

Policy is very much determined by personnel. In terms of key appointees at the top four levels, Biden has filled the administration with experts who not only accept the reality of strategic rivalry with China but recognise that military, economic, financial, commercial and tech-nological tools must be integrated and harnessed to compete successfully with China.13.1

There are currently advanced discussions inside the Biden administration as to what a more integrated approach to China ought to be like. This includes poli-cies associated with the reorganisation of supply chains, and more broadly, resetting the economic relationship with China.

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The Biden administration’s thinking on China Australian interests

Australia is having its own internal policy discussion about reorganising, securing or diversifying supply chains and markets regarding certain technologies or critical and strategic sectors. Given the diplomatic and economic tensions with China, there is a maturing conversation about decreasing Australia’s reliance on China and making sure the sources of Australian pros-perity and security are more resilient. In some instances, it will involve developing a sovereign capability when it was previously left to external entities to offer those capabilities to Australia.

All of this will involve a greater role for government in economic, commercial, and industrial affairs, with impli-cations on project financing, public-private partnerships, investment rules, safeguard standards, export licensing, and a plethora of other legal and regulatory frameworks.

Regarding national resilience, there is a need in Australia to:

› Identify genuinely strategic and critical sectors and products;

› Assess Australia’s vulnerability with respect to these sectors and materials; and

“Washington now faces its most dynamic and formidable competitor in modern history. Getting this challenge right will require doing away with the hopeful thinking that has long characterized the United States’ approach to China. The Trump administration’s first National Security Strategy took a step in the right direc-tion by interrogating past assumptions in US strategy.”

Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the US National Security Council Kurt Campbell and Special Assistant to the US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in “How American foreign policy got China wrong,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2018

“US policymakers and analysts have mostly, and rightly, discarded some of the more optimistic assumptions that underpinned the four-decade-long strategy of diplomatic and economic engagement with China...The basic mistake of engagement was to assume that it could bring about fundamental changes to China’s political system, economy, and foreign policy...”

Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the US National Security Council Kurt Campbell and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, “How America can both challenge and coexist with China,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019

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› Decide on strategies based on a combination of diversification, access to safe and secure supply chains or tech ecosystems contained within friendly economies, joint ventures with allies and partners, and even self-sufficiency.

We have seen elements of these in the emerging 5G ecosystem, which locks out Chinese partners such as Huawei and the concerted effort to develop rare earth supplies outside China. We are also seeing these prin-ciples being applied to information and communica-tions technology infrastructure (such as fibre-optic submarine cables) and in newer domains such as outer space, which is becoming increasingly important and contested.

In this context, the United States remains indispen-sable. Diversification, creating commercially viable supply chains in certain sectors, and even self-suffi-ciency or indigenous capacity depend enormously on US economic presence, involvement, markets, innova-tion, expertise and finance. Setting industry and ethical standards, such as in the use and protection of data, is generally the prerogative of those with a dominant commercial presence. For this reason, Australia needs well-regulated firms from advanced democracies such as the United States to expand their presence in regional markets.


› Replicate the government-to-government process leading up to 2020 AUSMIN to jointly identify genuinely strategic and/or critical sectors and materials. Build on this policy conversation through the Quad mechanism.

› Encourage the United States to apply the same methodology with Europe, including through a more proactive G7 agenda. Efforts must also be made to encourage buy-in from economies such as South Korea and Israel.

› Adopt a ‘systems’-based approach based on creating secure and commercially viable economic, technological and normative ecosystems relevant to these strategic/critical sectors based around allied and friendly economies. This ‘systems’-based approach is already apparent in the long-standing military cooperation between Australia and the United States in which the capabilities, interoperability and geography of one country enhance the capabilities and security of the other allied partner — where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

› Apply this mindset to thinking about reorganising supply chains for critical/strategic sectors. This would include harmonising relevant legal/regulatory trade and investment rules and establishing joint investment platforms and rules for public-private partnerships covering entities from both countries.

Enhancing Australia’s military capabilities and changing posture to reflect the primacy of regional challenges and threats requires military, commercial, and technological collaboration with the US government, and partnerships with private firms from both countries.

The United States has similar aims to Australia when it comes to building sovereign capability and national

resilience. But as the world’s largest economy with unri-valled innovative capacity and unmatched public and private resources, there is often an instinctive tendency for the United States to look mainly inward to advance its own interests, capabilities and resilience. Doing that will only advance Chinese strategic, economic, political and normative pre-eminence in the Indo-Pacific.

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DEVELOP DETERRENCE AGAINST CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCIONDR JEFFREY WILSON

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Australia and the United States need to coordinate their efforts — bilaterally, and with like-minded part-ners — in responding to Chinese economic coercion.

In recent years, China has used trade sanctions to economically punish governments that contest its foreign policy manoeuvres. Several US allies, including Australia, have been subject to China’s punitive trade measures. Despite engaging in its own trade dispute with China, the Trump administration failed to respond in support of affected allies and friends. As Australia mounts a World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge to Chinese trade sanctions in 2021, coordination with and support from the Biden administration will be crit-ical in ensuring Australia’s success, and reassuring third parties the United States will stand against Chinese trade coercion.

In recent years, China has deployed the use of trade sanctions to coerce governments that contest its foreign policy. This began in 2010 when it suspended rare earth minerals trade with Japan during a dispute over the Senkaku Islands. In subsequent years, seven more countries have been subject to similar trade sanctions (see Table 7). This tactic has been exclusively applied to small and medium economies, where size asym-

metries mean the target lacks the capability to retali-ate effectively. They also routinely target US allies and friends, clearly selected as a proxy for sanctions against the United States itself.

These Chinese trade sanctions serve dual purposes: domestic pressure and international deterrence. Domestically in the target country, they cause pain to important business sectors, in the expectation that affected companies will pressure their government to soften its stance toward China. Internationally to third parties, they telegraph that criticising certain Chinese policies will result in trade punishment, deterring further opposition.14.1


Despite frequently targeting US allies and friends, the Trump administration failed to substantively act on Chinese trade coercion. This partially reflects its ‘Amer-ica First’ stance and a general failure to support allies during diplomatic crises. It also reflects the fact that the Trump administration itself used coercive trade threats — in several cases, against the very same allies.14.2 Whatever the cause, US inaction during the Trump administration left allies to fend for themselves in the face of Chinese economic coercion. It also sent a message to non-alli-ance partners in the Indo-Pacific that the United States would not intervene if they are affected in future, thereby amplifying China’s deterrence effect.

Table 7. Targets of Chinese trade coercion, 2010-2020

Target Year Affected sectors

Japan 2010 Rare earth minerals

Norway 2011 Salmon

Philippines 2012 Bananas

Mongolia 2016 Minerals

Taiwan 2016 Tourism and education

Korea 2017 Tourism, autos, retail

Canada 2019 Canola, soy, pork, beef

Australia 2020 Barley, beef, coal, education, tourism, wine, cotton, timber, seafood, wool, wheat, copper, sugar

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The Biden administration has emphasised the impor-tance of working with allies in response to Beijing but has so far said they are reviewing the Trump administration’s policies before engaging in a new policy direction.


In 2020, Australia became China’s newest target. Follow-ing the Australian Government’s call for an independ-ent international inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 in April, China applied an 80 per cent anti-dumping duty to barley exports, effectively ending the trade. In subse-quent months more trade bans were applied, utilis-ing both formal (anti-dumping) and informal (customs procedures) methods. By year-end, China had restricted the import of 13 different products and services from Australia.14.3 The affected industries exported $54 billion to China in 2019,14.4 a serious economic blow coming atop the dislocations of COVID.

However, Australia stands out for its defiance of Chinese trade sanctions. The Australian Government has refused to offer any mea culpa, and in December 2020 referred Chinese tariffs on barley to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The dispute will be heard as case “DS598” in 2021.14.5 Flagging a departure from the Trump era, incoming US National Security Advisor-designate, Jake

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Sullivan, indicated the Biden administration will “stand shoulder to shoulder” with Australia in the dispute.14.6 DS598 will prove a landmark test of China’s ability to use trade sanctions as a means of diplomatic coercion, as an Australian victory will enable retaliation through the WTO. Importantly, it also multilateralises a matter previously handled bilaterally, allowing Australia to pool resources with like-minded countries.

Coordination between Australia and the United States would greatly aid efforts to deter, and defend against, Chinese economic coercion. Due to size differentials, middle powers such as Australia, Canada and Korea cannot effectively respond to Chinese trade sanctions alone. Collective responses provide the best defence against economic coercion. US involvement will be crit-ical to collective defence strategies. Its economic size — and thus scope for retaliation — is a powerful deterrent to further Chinese action. US support for such efforts will also provide reassurance to allies and partners when contesting Chinese foreign policy.


› The United States should coordinate with and provide third-party support to Australia’s WTO dispute with China. Australia is the first country to challenge Chinese trade coercion at the WTO. But as an infrequent WTO litigator,14.7 Australia’s case would benefit from US support. This could include preparatory discussions between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Office of the US Trade Representative as well as the United States directly participating in the DS598 process as a third party.

› The United States should review policies obstructing the normal functioning of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). Due to US appointment vetoes, the WTO Appellate Body is presently inquorate.14.8 China may strategically use an appeal to the Appellate Body to indefinitely delay a resolution to DS598. Restoring normal function to the DSM by removing US appointment vetoes, and then promptly clearing an existing case backlog, will be essential to ensure a timely and successful resolution.

› The United States and Australia should explore beyond-the-WTO “collective defence” mechanisms with like-minded partners. A collective defence mechanism that responds more promptly than the WTO is needed to deter Chinese economic coercion. Some type of “economic article five” mechanism involving the United States and its allies — similar but not identical to the collective defence provisions of NATO — will be the most effective means to do so. Australia and the United States should immediately consult with partners on the potential options with a view to establishing practical mechanisms in the medium term.

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AVOID PROTECTIONISM TO MAXIMISE JOINT ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIESDR STEPHEN KIRCHNER

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Australia needs to work with the United States to ensure that Australia’s domestic policy objectives in areas such as manufacturing capability, supply chain security and digital platform regulation maximise joint economic opportunities and promote tax and investment certainty on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Australia should work within the context of existing and prospective trade agreements and multi-lateral negotiations to secure non-discriminatory approaches to these issues that reinforce the joint interest in a rules-based multilateral trading system.

The US and Australian governments have both announced efforts to examine manufacturing capa-bility, the security of supply chains and critical goods. These efforts are potentially complementary and afford trading opportunities for Australia as a trusted ally and supplier. However, these efforts need to be harmonised to minimise the potential for unilateral and discrimi-natory approaches that could undermine the bilateral economic relationship and the international trading system.

Similarly, the Australian Government’s taxation and regulation of digital platforms should leverage multilat-

eral negotiations in this space that avoid discriminatory treatment of foreign commercial interests in pursuing domestic policy objectives. The content deals between Australian media and US tech companies defused a potential irritant in the bilateral relationship. The focus of digital platform regulation should be minimising interna-tional tax and investment uncertainty. This is more likely to be achieved by working through multilateral mecha-nisms and extending the digital commerce provisions of existing and prospective bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements.


Trade will not be an urgent priority for the administration relative to domestic issues. An early indication will be whether it seeks renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) from Congress when the current authority expires at the end of June 2021. If TPA is not sought or granted, trade negotiations will be downgraded in the adminis-tration’s first term.

There is growing public support for foreign trade in the United States and a partisan realignment around trade and tariffs as a result of Trump’s failed embrace of protectionism. However, the Democratic Congress is

still sceptical of free trade and trade agreements and is well disposed to industry policy with a view to furthering domestic employment and economic recovery objec-tives.

These protectionist instincts have received a boost from concerns about national security and supply-chain resil-ience in the wake of the pandemic. Biden’s pre-election trade policy consisted of a commitment to the onshoring of production of critical and strategic goods — currently the subject of a review. These concerns could become a fig-leaf for more traditional forms of protectionism.

THE FOCUS OF DIGITAL PLATFORM REGULATION SHOULD BE MINIMISING

INTERNATIONAL TAX AND INVESTMENT UNCERTAINTY. THIS IS MORE LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED BY WORKING THROUGH

MULTILATERAL MECHANISMS AND EXTENDING THE DIGITAL COMMERCE

PROVISIONS OF EXISTING AND PROSPECTIVE BILATERAL AND

PLURILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.

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The Biden administration is reviewing Trump’s tariffs, including the steel and aluminium tariffs from which Australia secured an exemption. The ‘phase one’ trade deal with China is also under review. The purchasing commitments made by China under the deal may have been a factor in the imposition of Chinese anti-dumping duties on Australian barley.15.1

Figure 12. American’s views of what foreign trade means for the United State

What do you think foreign trade means for America? Do you see foreign trade more as an opportunity for economic growth through increased US exports or a threat to the economy from foreign imports?

Source: Lydia Saad, “Americans’ Vanishing Fear of Foreign Trade” Gallup. 26 February 2020. Available at: https://news.gallup.com/poll/286730/americans-vanishing-fear-foreign-trade.aspx

% Opportunity for economic growth

% Threat to the economy

1992 20121997 20192002 2007

48

44

53

38

54

35

52

41

57

35

72

23

74

21

79

18

% Opportunity for economic growth

% Threat to the economy

THERE IS ALREADY COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO CRITICAL MINERALS AND

THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE. BUT AN INWARDLY FOCUSED AND PROTECTIONIST US TRADE AND INDUSTRY POLICY HAS THE

POTENTIAL TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST AUSTRALIAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS

DIRECTLY, AS WELL AS WEIGH ON GLOBAL TRADE. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO HIGHLIGHT THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN JOINT APPROACHES

THAT EXPAND RATHER THAN LIMIT TRADE.

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› Australia should work with the United States to ensure that they harmonise efforts to promote manufacturing capability and the security of supply chains and critical goods. This will maximise the joint economic opportunities available from these efforts and avoid unilateral measures that may undermine rather than reinforce the bilateral economic relationship.

› The Australian Government should seek to extend the digital commerce provisions of existing and prospective trade agreements and multilateral solutions to the regulation and taxation of digital platforms that promote international tax and investment certainty.

highlight the economic opportunity in joint approaches that expand rather than limit trade.

The US efforts to address climate change at an interna-tional level, alongside those of the European Union, are likely to weigh on carbon-intensive exports, including those from Australia, such as thermal coal.

The Australian Government’s proposed regulation and taxation of digital platforms attracted attention from the US Trade Representative under the Trump admin-

Katherine Tai, President Biden’s nominee for US Trade Representative, has indicated that climate change will be a centrepiece of the administration’s trade policies in support of the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050.

While the US Government has domestic anti-trust concerns about ‘big tech,’ the US Trade Representa-tive can still be expected to champion the interests of US multinational corporations abroad where foreign governments enact measures that discriminate against US commercial and national interests.


There may be opportunities for Australia to capitalise on national security and supply chain concerns as a trusted ally and supplier in expanding the bilateral trade and investment relationship. There is already coopera-tion between Australia and the United States in relation to critical minerals15.2 and the defence industrial base. But an inwardly focused and protectionist US trade and industry policy has the potential to discriminate against Australian commercial interests directly, as well as weigh on global trade. The Australian Government needs to

istration, who noted concerns about due process and investor protection under the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement,15.3 although competition policy is an explicit carve-out from the dispute resolution provisions of the agreement. The content deals between Australian media and US tech firms have provided a temporary fix. However, the issue underscores the importance of ensuring that domestic regulation is consistent with the principles of non-discrimination and serves to promote international tax and investment certainty.

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BUILD CYBER CAPABILITY AND COOPERATION FOR AN EVOLVING THREAT LANDSCAPEDR JENNIFER S. HUNT

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To deepen cooperation on cyber issues, Australia should restore critical bilateral and multilateral cyber efforts while also recognising that cyber-enabled disinformation is part of the expanding cyber threat landscape.

Australians and Americans consistently rank cyber attacks in the top five of global threats.16.1 It is easy to see why. Recent cyberattacks in the United States have targeted critical infrastructure including government agencies, hospitals and utilities. In February 2021, a water treatment plant in Florida was hacked through remote access and the sodium hydroxide mix remotely changed to dangerous levels before being caught and reversed in real-time by the plant operator.16.2 In 2020, at least two foreign governments breached the US Department of Homeland Security and Treasury and exposed Fortune 500 companies in what was described by some as the “Cyber Pearl Harbor” by inserting malicious code into a popular software product.16.3

Cyber is the connective tissue through critical state, economic, social and strategic systems. Increasingly the soft underbelly, however, is democratic infrastructure. As state conflicts expand to cyberspace, cyberattacks now target not just information systems, but electoral systems and even voters themselves through cyber-en-

abled disinformation campaigns.16.4 Cyber scholar Herb Lin notes the difficulties of defence — while traditional cybersecurity threats exploit the vulnerabilities of the system, these evolving attacks exploit its virtues, as cyber-enabled disinformation harnesses the openness and virality of social media to spread disinformation and conspiracy theories to poison democratic function.16.5 Whether for great power competition, private profit or pure entertainment, these tactics represent an evolving strategic challenge to democracies and Australia is not immune.16.6 The COVID-19 pandemic in particular has only heightened these challenges. In March 2020, the Australian Cyber Security Centre issued an alert warn-ing of malicious websites masquerading as trustwor-thy authorities on coronavirus information, disinforma-tion that could have undermined state responses to the pandemic.16.7

Australia invested significantly in cyber capacity and coordination under the Turnbull government including the introduction of a Special Advisor on Cyber Affairs (within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet), a Cyber Ambassador (within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) and the Australian Cyber Security Centre (within the Australian Signals Directorate). Under the Morrison government, cyber policymaking has shifted to Home Affairs, the cyber diplomatic portfo-lio has expanded to include critical technologies and Australian Cyber Security operations in the Australian

Signals Directorate have been given a significant boost in funding. Alongside the government’s 2020 Cyber Secu-rity Strategy, Canberra announced A$1.35 billion over 10 years, in part for training and recruiting more than 500 cyber specialists.16.8 These domestic efforts have been paired with significant engagement on the international front, but some bilateral efforts were abandoned under the Trump administration.


Individual US states have focused on bolstering their cyber defences but the federal government and the United States more broadly have lost valuable time in countering the newest evolution of attacks due to the Trump administration’s neglect of cyber issues. This neglect included: the dismissal of the Cybersecurity Coordinator position at the White House, the shrinking of the State Department’s cyber diplomacy wing, and repeatedly ignored calls for bolstering electoral security. President Trump publicly sided with Vladimir Putin over US intelligence agencies’ assessment of hostile foreign interference in cyber and electoral matters.16.9 In one of his last acts in office, President Trump dismissed the director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Secu-rity Agency at the Department of Homeland Security after the official confirmed Joe Biden’s win in the 2020 election.16.10

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The Biden cyber team

The Biden administration used its first month to signal the prioritisation of cyber issues on the national agenda through the appointment of officials with cyber experience across multiple departments.

› Biden’s National Security Council includes five experienced cybersecurity officials including:

› Anne Neuberger as Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology, a new position designed to elevate the subject internally

› Senior Director for Cyber, Michael Sulmeyer

› Homeland Security Advisor Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, her deputy, Russ Travers as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor and Caitlin Durkovich as Senior Director for Resilience and Response at the National Security Council.

› In the White House’s Office of Management and Administration, David Recordon will become Director of Technology.

› The Deputy Attorney General nominee, Lisa Monoca, also comes with cybersecurity portfolio experience.

The Biden administration must rebuild an atrophied state and fortify industrial capacity to counter diverse attacks. President Biden has signalled the prioritisation of cyber issues with a proposed US$10 billion funding package and the appointment of cybersecurity officials in key leadership positions across multiple departments. Cybersecurity officials occupy five positions on the pres-ident’s National Security Council, with others in senior posts across the Department of Justice, Treasury, State and Homeland Security. This allows for crossover and prioritisation of cyber in diverse portfolios. Overseeing coordination is the National Cyber Director, a position newly created by the 2021 Defense Authorization Act to improve US cyber defences through resilient networks, bolster offensive operations to impose costs on adver-saries and coordinate with industry, the academy and close allies.16.11

To reflect the evolving national security challenges in cyberspace, President Biden’s appointments also include disinformation and counterterrorism experts. Cyber increasingly sits at the nexus of growing domes-tic extremist activity, with online conspiracy theories about emails, servers and laptops leading to offline phys-ical violence. In 2019, the FBI warned against “conspir-acy-driven domestic terrorism” naming QAnon and conspiracies like Pizzagate.16.12 When Facebook16.13 finally shut down QAnon group pages in 2020, they found the

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fastest online conspiracy group comprised one million members across 15 countries including Australia.16.14 National security expert Peter Singer argues that the weaponisation of social media and the promulgation of extremist groups on Facebook has exacerbated chal-lenges in nearly every policy area, from aiding terrorist recruitment to being a state tool of great-power compe-tition to damaging the vitality of democracy.16.15


Australia’s interests in the cyber realm similarly lie at the intersection of technical and disinformation chal-lenges. ASIO has warned that far-right extremists are exploiting COVID-19 disinformation to recruit and radi-calise Australians online.16.16 While cyberattacks are generally measured in dollars, disinformation is meas-ured in lives.16.17 In 2020, separate reports by the Euro-pean Commission16.18 and the US State Department16.19 found that foreign actors, led by Beijing, Moscow and Tehran had carried out targeted online disinformation campaigns aimed at stoking confusion about the COVID-19 pandemic. Australia’s distance does not provide immunity to either a global pandemic or cyber-enabled disinformation as evidenced by Australian lockdown protestors shouting “Arrest Bill Gates” and attacking 5G infrastructure.16.20


Beyond recognising cyber-enabled disinformation as a part of the cyber threat landscape to build both defensive capacity and social cybersecurity resilience, Australia and the United States should also:

› Resume the Cyber Security Track 1.5 Dialogue16.21 in the 2021 Australia-US Ministerial Consultation16.22 inclusive of Australia’s inaugural Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical Technologies. These talks should be inclusive of Australia’s Ambassador for Cyber and Critical Technologies, Dr Tobias Feakin. Australia’s cyber ambassador has been in close contact with America’s allies during Washington’s relative hiatus from multilateral cooperation and can provide insight from extensive engagement on cyber issues with partner nations and the United Nations.16.23

› Coordinate with NATO’s efforts on collective defences to emerging cyber threats16.24 including cyber disinformation operations and electoral interference. The cyber realm is included in President Biden’s emphasis on building resilience in democracies. While working to deepen cyber cooperation between Five Eyes partners, Australia should also continue to engage closely with multilateral efforts alongside the United States at the United Nations and NATO to strengthen cyber norms and build collective responses to diverse cyberattacks that threaten state institutions, industry and democratic function. This includes recognising cyber-enabled disinformation as a threat alongside breaches and hacks and building defensive social cybersecurity accordingly.16.25 As countries like Finland16.26 have demonstrated, resilience against cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns does not merely require a technical or engineering solution. Often, the best solutions can be found in the social sciences16.27 and humanities.16.28 Research and educational links such as international visiting fellowships,16.29 scholarships and targeted grants can be used to efficiently explore the adaptation of allied efforts to counter disinformation to the Australian context.

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0.1 Respondents are instructed as follows “Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favourable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favourable toward the group and that you don’t care too much for them. You would rate the group at 50 degrees if you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward them.”

1.1 Further details appear in my account of that historic Congress and Obama’s legislative agenda on Capitol Hill: Bryan W. Marshall and Bruce C. Wolpe, The Committee: A Study of Policy, Power, Politics and Obama’s Historic Legislative Agenda on Capitol Hill. University of Michigan Press. 2018 Edition

1.2 Connor O’Brien, “Senate hands Trump his first veto override” POLITICO, 1 January 2021. Available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/01/senate-hands-trump-his-first-veto-override-453290

1.3 Andrew Restuccia, Burgess Everett, Heather Caygle, “Longest shutdown in history ends after Trump relents on wall” POLITICO, 25 January 2019. Available at: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/25/trump-shutdown-announcement-1125529

1.4 Bruce Wolpe, “Washington can wield a big stick and has Facebook’s authoritarian antics under the microscope” The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 2021. Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/washington-can-wield-a-big-stick-and-has-facebook-s-authoritarian-antics-under-the-microscope-20210222-p574lw.html

1.5 New York Times Editorial Board, “The Task Ahead for Biden on Climate” The New York Times, 6 February 2021. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/06/opinion/biden-climate-change-environment.html

1.6 For a full discussion of the Waxman-Markey legislation, see The Committee (University of Michigan Press, 2018), op. cit. note 1, at chapter 2. A year after Waxman-Markey was killed in the Senate,

the Gillard Government’s carbon pricing legislation, the Clean Energy Act, was enacted in 2011. At that moment, therefore, Australia under Gillard was far ahead of the United States under Obama. In 2013, the Abbott government won election and formed government and, consistent with its campaign platform, repealed the carbon tax legislation in 2014. It is the author’s view that if Waxman-Markey had become law in the United States, and if that legislation had worked to reduce carbon pollution without raising energy prices, the proposed repeal of the carbon tax in Australia could have been defeated.

2.1 Greenberg Traurig, “Biden Trade Policy,” The National Law Review, 17 November 2020, Available at: https://www.natlawreview.com/article/biden-trade-policy

2.2 Edward Alden, “Can Katherine Tai Deliver on Biden’s ‘Middle-Class’ Trade Agenda?” World Politics Review, 15 December 2020, available at: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29289/can-katherine-tai-deliver-on-biden-s-middle-class-trade-agenda

2.3 Aime Williams, “Joe Biden to remain tough on trade while re-embracing partners,” Financial Times, 16 November 2020, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c4e1c0e3-ba5b-46f8-87c7-9a56ca7a0a1a

2.4 Bryan Mercurio, “Biden on trade: same policy, different tone?” East Asia Forum, 25 December 2020, available at: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/12/25/biden-on-trade-same-policy-different-tone/

2.5 Joe Biden campaign website, “Joe’s vision” available at: https://joebiden.com/joes-vision/

2.6 Simon Lester and Alfredo Carrillo Obregon, “The Trade Policy Views of Biden’s CEA Picks” The Cato Institute Blog, 30 November 2020, available at: https://www.cato.org/blog/trade-policy-views-bidens-cea-picks

2.7 Jeffrey J. Schott and Euijin Jung, “The WTO’s

Existential Crisis: How to Salvage Its Ability to Settle Trade Disputes” Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief, December 2020, available at: https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/wtos-existential-crisis-how-salvage-its-ability-settle-trade-disputes

2.8 Chad P. Bown, “US-China phase one tracker: China’s purchases of US goods as of December 2020,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, “PIEE Charts,” 8 February 2021, available at: https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases-us-goods

2.9 World Trade Organization, “Negotiations on e-commerce continue, eyeing a consolidated text by the end of the year,” WTO News Item, 23 October 2020, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ecom_26oct20_e.htm

3.1 Cassey Lee, Siwage Dharma Negara and Maxensius Tri Sambodo, “Southeast Asia dodged the worst of Covid-19, but the economic devastation may last for years,” South China Morning Post, 30 September 2020, available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3103645/southeast-asia-escaped-worst-covid-19-its-economic-effects-could; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on South-East Asia,” United Nations, July 2020, available at: https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/2020-07/SG-Policy-brief-COVID-19-and-South-East-Asia-30-July-2020.pdf.

3.2 World Health Organization, “Maintain essential health services during COVID-19 response: WHO,” 6 August 2020, available at: https://www.who.int/southeastasia/news/detail/06-08-2020-maintain-essential-health-services-during-covid-19-response-who.

3.3 Tulip Mazumdar, “Stalled vaccine programmes ‘putting children’s lives at risk’,” BBC News, 4 June 2020, available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-52911972.

ENDNOTES

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3.4 Ben Doherty, “Covid could derail efforts to eradicate malaria in Pacific, health experts warn,” The Guardian, 3 December 2020, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/03/covid-could-derail-efforts-to-eradicate-malaria-in-pacific-health-experts-warn.

3.5 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “AUSMIN 2020 Global Health Security Statement,” Australian Government, 28 July 2020, available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/ausmin-2020-global-health-security-statement

3.6 Daniel F. Runde, Conor M. Savoy and Shannon McKeon, “Covid-19 Has Consequences for U.S. Foreign Aid and Global Leadership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 May 2020, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/covid-19-has-consequences-us-foreign-aid-and-global-leadership

3.7 Michael R. Gordon, “Biden’s First Foreign Policy Task Is a Global Covid-19 Response,” The Wall Street Journal, 9 November 2020, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-first-foreign-policy-task-is-a-global-covid-19-response-11604938968; The White House, “Letter to His Excellency António Guterres,” US Government Publishing Office, 20 January 2021, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/letter-his-excellency-antonio-guterres/

3.8 Joe Biden campaign site, “The Biden Plan to Combat Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Prepare for Future Global Health Threats,” available at: https://joebiden.com/covid-plan/

3.9 Alice Miranda Ollstein, “Biden’s chief of staff has battled pandemics before. Here’s how he plans to beat this one,” Politico, 30 November 2020, available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/30/ron-klain-plan-ebola-coronavirus-441330

3.10 Domenico Montanaro, “6 Numbers That Show President Biden’s Greatest Challenges,” NPR,

22 January 2021, available at: https://www.npr.org/2021/01/22/959312357/6-numbers-that-show-president-bidens-greatest-challenges

3.11 Michael Igoe, “Biden’s plan for global COVID-19 leadership to face early tests,” Devex, 7 December 2020, available at: https://www.devex.com/news/biden-s-plan-for-global-covid-19-leadership-to-face-early-tests-98693

3.12 USAID, “Over the Horizon Focus Countries,” US Government Publishing Office, 15 December 2020, available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/EXTERNAL_USAID_Over_the_Horizon_Focus_Countries.pdf

3.13 United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, “Red book/Blue book: An Australian guide to the next US administration,” October 2020, available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/red-book-blue-book-an-australian-guide-to-the-next-us-administration

3.14 Australian Associated Press, “Australia to spend $500 million on coronavirus vaccines for Southeast Asian and Pacific neighbours,” SBS News, 31 October 2020, available at: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australia-to-spend-500-million-on-coronavirus-vaccines-for-southeast-asian-and-pacific-neighbours

3.15 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework,” 12 November 2020, available at: https://asean.org/storage/2020/11/2-FINAL-ACRF_adopted-37th-ASEAN-Summit_12112020.pdf

3.16 The Hon Scott Morrison, “Opening Remarks — ASEAN Australia Virtual Summit,” Prime Minister of Australia, 12 November 2020, available at: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/opening-remarks-asean-australia-virtual-summit

3.17 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Partnerships for Recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response,” Australian Government,

available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/partnerships-for-recovery-australias-covid-19-development-response.pdf

3.18 Gregory B. Poling, “America First versus Wolf Warriors: Pandemic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 18 June 2020, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/america-first-versus-wolf-warriors-pandemic-diplomacy-southeast-asia

3.19 World Health Organization, “Global strategy on digital health 2020–2025,” 10 July 2020, available at: https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/documents/gs4dhdaa2a9f352b0445bafbc79ca799dce4d.pdf; USAID, “Signing of Memorandum of Understanding Between USAID and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia,” US Government Publishing Office, 28 July 2020, available at: https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-28-2020-signing-mou-usaid-and-department-foreign-affairs-australia

3.20 Representative Ed Case, “Introducing the BLUE Pacific Act,” Congressman Ed Case, 30 July 2020, available at: https://case.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=356

4.1 Sarah Boseley, “Trump takes war on abortion worldwide as policy cuts off funds,” The Guardian, 17 May 2019, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/17/trump-takes-war-on-abortion-worldwide-as-policy-cuts-off-funds

4.2 BBC News, “Coronavirus: What are President Trump’s charges against the WHO?” 8 July 2020, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52294623

4.3 Jamey Keaten, “Biden’s US revives support for WHO, reversing Trump retreat” The Associated Press, 22 January 2021, available at: https://apnews.com/article/us-who-support-006ed181e016afa55d4cea30af236227

94

4.4 President Biden, “National Strategy for the COVID-19 Response and Pandemic Preparedness” January 2021, The White House, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Strategy-for-the-COVID-19-Response-and-Pandemic-Preparedness.pdf

4.5 Emily Rauhala, “Biden to reengage with World Health Organization, will join global vaccine effort” The Washington Post, 21 January 2021, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/biden-administration-who-covax/2021/01/20/3ddc25ce-5a8c-11eb-aaad-93988621dd28_story.html


4.7 Laurie Garrett, “Trump Has Sabotaged America’s Coronavirus Response” Foreign Policy, 31, January 2020, available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/31/coronavirus-china-trump-united-states-public-health-emergency-response/


4.9 Maria Godoy, “Biden Said He’d Walk Back Trump’s WHO Walkout. Can All The Damage Be Undone?” NPR, 9 November 2020, available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/11/09/932065656/biden-said-hed-walk-back-trump-s-who-walkout-can-all-the-damage-be-undone

4.10 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Health Security Initiative for the Indo-Pacific region,” available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/investment-priorities/education-health/health/Pages/health-security-initiative-indo-pacific-region

4.11 The Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security, “Regional Vaccine Access and Health Security Initiative” The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at: https://indopacifichealthsecurity.dfat.gov.

au/vaccine-access 4.12 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and

Trade, “AUSMIN 2020 Global Health Security Statement,” available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/ausmin-2020-global-health-security-statement

4.13 Sudha Ramachandran, “India’s Vaccine Diplomacy: A Potent Card?” The Diplomat, 26 January 2021, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/indias-vaccine-diplomacy-a-potent-card/

4.14 The Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security, “Regional Vaccine Access and Health Security Initiative” The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at: https://indopacifichealthsecurity.dfat.gov.au/vaccine-access

4.15 In its first two years of operation, the GHSA helped see the Joint External Evaluation Alliance created, which has been instrumental in helping push for pandemic preparedness prior to COVID.

5.1 Prime Minister of Australia Media Release, “Joint statement of the governments of Australia, Japan and the United States Trilateral Partnership for infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific,” 17 November 2018, available at https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-governments-australia-japan-and-united-states

5.2 United States Department of State, “Blue Dot Network,” available at: https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/

5.3 Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, “Australia partnering with Japan and the United States to finance Palau undersea cable,” 28 October 2020. Available at: https://www.aiffp.gov.au/news/australia-partnering-japan-and-united-states-finance-palau-undersea-cable

5.4 Alex Vedovi, “From Santiago to Sydney, opening Latin America with fibre-optic cable” The Lowy Interpreter, 14 August 2020, available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/santiago-sydney-opening-Latin-America-fibre-optic-cable

5.5 The US International Development Finance Corporation media release “Blue Dot Network Steering Committee Holds First Meeting,” 31 January

2020, available at https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/blue-dot-network-steering-committee-holds-first-meeting

5.6 Dan Runde, Romina Bandura, and Janina Staguhn, “The DFC’s New Equity Authority” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 3 April 2020, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/dfcs-new-equity-authority

5.7 Daniel F. Runde, Romina Bandura, and Janina Staguhn, “How Can the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Effectively Source Deals?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 October 2020, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-can-us-international-development-finance-corporation-effectively-source-deals

5.8 Export Finance Australia, “Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership meets with Communist Party of Vietnam Central Economic Commission, State Bank of Vietnam, and Relevant Ministries,” Joint media release by Export Finance Australia, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the US International Development Finance Corporation, 12 November 2020, available at: https://www.exportfinance.gov.au/resources-news/news-events/media-releases/2020/november/trilateral-infrastructure-partnership-meets-with-communist-party-of-vietnam-central-economic-commission-state-bank-of-vietnam-and-relevant-ministries/

5.9 The US International Development Finance Corporation, “DFC Announces New Members of Biden-Harris Administration Leadership,” 2 February 2021, available at: https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-announces-new-members-biden-harris-administration-leadership

5.10 In 2018, the United States, Japan and India convened the inaugural Trilateral Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Forum. Since 2018 however, there has been no subsequent meeting and Australia has not been involved.

6.1 Department of Homeland Security, “National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin — January 27, 2021,” 27 January 2021. Available online: https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-

95

system-bulletin-january-27-2021 6.2 See for example: Jennifer Kavanaugh, Michael D.

Rich, “Truth Decay: An initial exploration of the diminishing role of facts and analysis in American public life,” RAND Corporation, February 2020. Available online: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2314.html ; Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “The Escalating Terrorism Problem in the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2020. Available online: https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-terrorism-problem-united-states

6.3 The difficulties Australia has faced in its news payment battle with Google is case in point. Trump-era trade officials lobbied the Australian government against the regulatory effort on the grounds that it unfairly targeted American companies — an inescapable reality given the pre-eminence of American firms in the social media sector. See: Calla Wahlquist, “US attacks Australia’s ‘extraordinary’ plan to make Google and Facebook pay for news,” The Guardian, 19 January 2021. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/jan/19/us-attacks-australias-extraordinary-plan-to-make-google-and-facebook-pay-for-news

6.4 Casey Newton, “How extremism came to thrive on YouTube,” The Verge, 3 April 2019. Available online: https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/4/3/18293293/youtube-extremism-criticism-bloomberg

6.5 NCTA, “COVID-19: How Cable’s Internet Networks Are Performing,” site dashboard last accessed 19 February 2021. Available online: https://www.ncta.com/COVIDdashboard

6.6 Elliott Brennan, “Coronavirus and protest: How COVID-19 has changed the face of American activism,” The United States Studies Centre, 26 May 2020. Available online: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/coronavirus-protest-how-covid-19-has-changed-the-face-of-american-activism

6.7 James Politi, “Mitch McConnell says conspiracy theories are a ‘cancer’ on Republican Party,” Financial Times, 2 February 2021. Available online: https://www.ft.com/content/d7a97f9f-4040-452a-

872d-2e9b265a7cf3 6.8 Full text available online: https://www.law.cornell.edu/

uscode/text/47/2306.9 Chris Griffith, “Capitol riot bumps up tech reform

priority,” The Australian, 22 January 2021. Available online: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/technology/capitol-riot-bumps-up-priority-of-tackling-technology-policy/news-story/abadd1a610aa3e0a297d625270bcafa1

6.10 It could also leave the United States behind as the European Commission progresses towards a Digital Services Act which will rewrite the rules of how American tech giants operate in one of their largest markets; Natasha Lomas, “Europe seizes on social media’s purging of Trump to bang the drum for regulation,” Tech Crunch, 11 January 2021. Available online: https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/11/europe-seizes-on-social-medias-purging-of-trump-to-bang-the-drum-for-regulation/

6.11 Reuters staff, “Biden orders assessment of domestic extremism risk, White House says,” Reuters, 23 January 2021. Available online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-security-idUSKBN29R2EH

6.12 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, “Inquiry into Extremist Movements and Radicalism in Australia; Mostafa Rachwani, “’A threat to Australia’: experts welcome inquiry’s focus on rise of rightwing extremism,” The Guardian, 10 December 2021. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/dec/10/a-threat-to-australia-experts-welcome-inquirys-focus-on-rise-of-rightwing-extremism

6.13 Paul Karp, “ASIO reveals up to 40% of its counter-terrorism cases involve far-right violent extremism,” The Guardian, 22 September 2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/22/asio-reveals-up-to-40-of-its-counter-terrorism-cases-involve-far-right-violent-extremism

6.14 Nick McKenzie, Joel Tozer, “Neo-Nazis go bush: Grampians gathering highlights rise of Australia’s far right,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 2021. Available online: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/neo-nazis-go-bush-grampians-gathering-highlights-rise-of-australia-s-far-right-20210127-

p56xbf.html 6.15 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement,

Inquiry into criminal activity and enforcement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Submissions available online: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Law_Enforcement/COVID-19/Submissions

6.16 Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019. Available online: https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/

6.17 James Pasley, “17 cell phone towers in New Zealand have been vandalised since lockdown, coinciding with a boom in 5G conspiracy theories,” Business Insider, 20 May 2020. Available online: https://www.businessinsider.com.au/17-cell-towers-have-been-vandalized-in-new-zealand-since-lockdown-began-2020-5?r=US&IR=T

6.18 For example, the APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force established in 2003: https://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-Terrorism

6.19 The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Defense in 2006 and have maintained cooperation and collaboration through the country’s respective counter terror coordination centres, intelligence sharing arrangements, and joint military operations apparatus.

6.20 Luke Broadwater, “Bipartisan Senate Inquiry on Capitol Riot Will Begin With Scrutiny of Security Failures,” The New York Times, 22 February 2021. Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/22/us/politics/senate-hearing-capitol-riot.html

6.21 Daniel Hurst, “Head of Australia’s extremism inquiry vows to take rising far-right threat seriously,” The Guardian, 5 February 2021. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/feb/05/head-of-australias-extremism-inquiry-vows-to-take-rising-far-right-threat-seriously

6.22 6th ASPI-KAS Australia-Europe Counter Terrorism

96

Dialogue 2020, available online: https://www.kas.de/en/web/australien/veranstaltungen/detail/-/content/6th-aspi-kas-australia-europe-counter-terrorism-dialogue-2020

7.1 Ian C Sayson and Claire Jiao, “Indonesia to Start Inoculations: Southeast Asia Vaccine Tracker” Bloomberg News, 8 January 2021, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-08/indonesia-to-start-inoculations-southeast-asia-vaccine-tracker

7.2 The Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security, “Regional Vaccine Access and Health Security Initiative,” The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at: https://indopacifichealthsecurity.dfat.gov.au/vaccine-access

7.3 The Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security, “Six countries partner on Regulatory Strengthening Program,” The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at: https://indopacifichealthsecurity.dfat.gov.au/six-countries-partner-regulatory-strengthening-program

7.4 Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar and Bill Barrow, “Biden unveils $1.9T plan to stem COVID-19 and steady economy” The Associated Press, 15 January 2021, available at: https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-coronavirus-action-plan-3d8d5841bb9098a81ad9452fb2619024

7.5 Erica Werner and Jeff Stein, “Biden unveils $1.9 trillion economic and health-care relief package” The Washington Post, 15 January 2021, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/01/14/biden-stimulus-covid-relief/

7.6 Emily Rauhala, “Biden to reengage with World Health Organization, will join global vaccine effort” The Washington Post, 21 January 2021, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/biden-administration-who-covax/2021/01/20/3ddc25ce-5a8c-11eb-aaad-93988621dd28_story.html

7.7 The World Health Organization, “COVAX Announces additional deals to access promising COVID-19 vaccine candidates; plans global rollout starting Q1 2021” WHO News release, 18 December 2020, available at: https://www.who.int/news/item/18-12-2020-covax-announces-additional-deals-to-access-

promising-covid-19-vaccine-candidates-plans-global-rollout-starting-q1-2021

7.8 Emily Rauhala and Yasmeen Abutaleb, “U.S. says it won’t join WHO-linked effort to develop, distribute coronavirus vaccine” The Washington Post, 2 September 2020, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/coronavirus-vaccine-trump/2020/09/01/b44b42be-e965-11ea-bf44-0d31c85838a5_story.html

7.9 Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance, “COVAX,” available at: https://www.gavi.org/covax-facility

7.10 Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, “COVAX announces new agreement, plans for first deliveries” Media Release, 22 January 2021, available at: https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/covax-announces-new-agreement-plans-first-deliveries

7.11 Joe Biden campaign website, “Joe’s vision” available at: https://joebiden.com/joes-vision/

7.12 C. Raja Mohan, “A New Pivot to Asia” Foreign Policy, 15 January 2021, available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/biden-china-asia-allies-strategy-pivot

7.13 The New Zealand Government, “NZ ready to provide $75m for Pacific and global COVID-19 vaccination support,” 17 December 2020, available at: https://covid19.govt.nz/updates-and-resources/latest-updates/nz-ready-to-provide-75m-for-pacific-and-global-covid-19-vaccination-support/

7.14 Liu Caiyu, “Making vaccines a global public good best response to nationalism: expert” Global Times, 5 December 2020, available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213083.shtml

7.15 Kim Beng Phar and Clementine Bizot, “The Jury Is Still Out on Beijing’s ‘Vaccine Diplomacy’” The Diplomat, 20 January 2021, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-jury-is-still-out-on-beijings-vaccine-diplomacy/

7.16 Jacob Mardell, “China’s vaccine diplomacy assumes geopolitical importance,” Mercator Institute For China Studies, 24 November 2020, available at: https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-assumes-geopolitical-importance

7.17 Nectar Gan and Tatiana Arias, “Chinese Covid-19 vaccine far less effective than initially claimed in

Brazil, sparking concerns” CNN, 14 January 2021, available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/13/asia/sinovac-covid-vaccine-efficacy-intl-hnk/index.html

7.18 Gabriel Pabico Lalu, “Duterte vouches for Galvez: Why focus on alleged corruption in vaccine pricing?” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 January 2021, available at: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1385309/duterte-vouches-for-galvez-says-he-doesnt-get-why-critics-are-occupied-with-corruption

7.19 Under the TRIPS agreement, there are provisions to permit IP protections to be waived for public health emergencies. Enactment of these provisions would permit other vaccine manufacturers to commence producing generic versions of COVID-19 vaccines, thereby increasing global supply.

7.20 World Trade Organization, “Uruguay Round Agreement — TRIPS,” available at: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm

8.1 Peter Hannam and Mike Foley, “‘Breathtaking’: what Joe Biden’s sweeping climate plan means for Scott Morrison,” The Guardian, 30 January 2021. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/30/breathtaking-what-joe-bidens-sweeping-climate-plan-means-for-scott-morrison; “US under Biden to test Morrison government’s do-little climate stance” The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 January 2021. Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/us-under-biden-to-test-morrison-government-s-do-little-climate-stance-20210122-p56w2a.html; Daniel Hurst, “Joe Biden if president will push allies like Australia to do more on climate, adviser says” The Guardian, 7 September 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/07/joe-biden-if-president-will-push-allies-like-australia-to-do-more-on-climate-adviser-says

8.2 Coral Davenport and Lisa Friedman, “The Battle Lines Are Forming in Biden’s Climate Push” New York Times, 2 February 2021. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2021/01/26/climate/biden-climate-change.html

8.3 “Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad,” The White House, January 27, 2021. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/27/

97

executive-order-on-tackling-the-climate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad/

8.4 “The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution & Environmental Justice,” Available at: https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/

8.5 Jim Orchard, “Can compromise candidate Biden compromise on climate change?” United States Studies Centre, 3 July 2020. Available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/can-compromise-candidate-biden-compromise-on-climate-change

8.6 “Commitments to Net Zero Double in Less Than a Year” UN Climate Press Release, 21 September 2020. Available at: https://unfccc.int/news/commitments-to-net-zero-double-in-less-than-a-year

8.7 “Executive Order on Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis” White House Executive Order, 20 January 2021. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-protecting-public-health-and-environment-and-restoring-science-to-tackle-climate-crisis/

8.8 “John Kerry Remarks at World Economic Forum, Davos,” January 27, 2021. Available at: https://www.state.gov/remarks-at-world-economic-forum-davos-2021/

8.9 Phillip Coorey, “Angus Taylor talks emissions with John Kerry,” Australian Financial Review, 25 January 2021. Available at https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/angus-taylor-talks-emissions-with-john-kerry-20210125-p56wp7

8.10 Jacob Greber, “Biden ramps up climate diplomacy amid ‘differences’ with Canberra,” Australian Financial Review, 24 February 2021. Available at: https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/biden-ramps-up-climate-diplomacy-amid-differences-with-canberra-20210224-p575hi

8.11 Presumably, Kerry was referring to Australia’s stance at the 2019 UN Climate Change conference, where it advocated for using emissions reductions beyond its Kyoto targets to count towards Australia’s Paris emissions targets. See “Australia is among a number of countries being blamed for blocking climate

agreement at COP25,” News.com.au. 17 December 2019. Available at: https://www.news.com.au/technology/environment/climate-change/australia-is-among-a-number-of-countries-being-blamed-for-blocking-climate-agreement-at-cop25/news-story/730cb3aa0db89c0ce495482e3cbf02fa

8.12 Theophilos Argitis, Kait Bolongaro and Derek Decloet, “Biden-Trudeau Climate Plan May Target Polluting Trade Rivals,” Bloomberg News, February 25, 2021. Available at: https://au.finance.yahoo.com/news/biden-trudeau-climate-plan-may-190215599.html

8.13 Rob Harris and Anthony Galloway, “‘New protectionism’: Australia to fight Boris Johnson’s green tariff bid” Sydney Morning Herald, 11 February 2021. Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/new-protectionism-australia-to-fight-boris-johnson-s-green-tariff-bid-20210210-p5714j.html

8.14 US National Security Advisor-designate Jake Sullivan on 3 December 2020. Available at: https://twitter.com/jakejsullivan/status/1334173397035741189?lang=en

8.15 e.g., “Cotton speaks about the Green New Deal on the Senate floor,” 28 March 2019. https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/speeches/cotton-speaks-about-the-green-new-deal-on-the-senate-floor

8.16 Jennifer Hewett, “Scott Morrison doubles down on climate change,” Australian Financial Review, 29 January 2020. Available at: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/scott-morrison-doubles-down-on-climate-change-20200129-p53vwc

8.17 It should be noted that “Government-to-government” is not the only channel through which Australia might experience pressure from the United States on climate change, energy and emissions. Australian civil society pays close attention to technological and policy developments in the United States; the attentiveness to likely Biden administration policy on climate change is itself testament to the fact that Australian public opinion is powerfully shaped by American and international public opinion on these issues. Australian policy settings are quite likely to be shaped not by any statements by Biden administration officials directed at the Australian government, but through the intense interest of Australians in the United States, but especially in

politics, culture, society and technology. 8.18 Adam Morton, “Ross Garnaut: three policies will

set Australia on a path to 100% renewable energy” The Guardian. November 6, 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/nov/06/ross-garnaut-three-policies-will-set-australia-on-a-path-to-100-renewable-energy

9.1 See: US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” June 2019, available at: https://media.defense. gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/ DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO- PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF; Elbridge A. Colby, “Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on the Role of Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations,” House Committee on Armed Services, 23 September 2020, available at: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20200923/110884/HHRG-116-AS00-Wstate-ColbyE-20200923.pdf; Frances Adamson, “ANU National Security College 10th Anniversary Lecture Series,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 25 November 2020, available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/speech/anu-national-security-college-10th-anniversary-lecture-series

9.2 Eric Edelman, Gary Roughead, Christine Fox, Kathleen Hicks, Jack Keane, Andrew Krepinevich, Jon Kyl, Thomas Mahnken, Michael McCord, Michael Morell, Anne Patterson and Robert Zakhein, “Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission,” United States Institute of Peace, November 2018, available at: https:// www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/ providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf, p. V.

9.3 Ashley Townshend, Brendan Thomas-Noone and Matilda Steward, “Averting Crisis: American Strategy, Military Spending and Collective Defence in the Indo-Pacific,” United States Studies Centre, August 2019, available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific, p. 8-26, 42-60; United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, “Red book/Blue book: An Australian

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guide to the next US administration,” October 2020, available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/red-book-blue-book-an-australian-guide-to-the-next-us-administration, p. 10-13.

9.4 Ashley Townshend, “Response to Michael Wesley’s ‘Beijing Calling’,” Australian Foreign Affairs, available at: https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/correspondence/2020/09/response-to-michael-wesleys-beijing-calling/ashley-townshend; Ashley Townshend and David Santoro, “Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” United States Studies Centre, April 2020, available at: https://united- states-studies-centre.s3.amazonaws.com/ uploads/7ee/92c/264/7ee92c264a982 a3add23fc544d82c8e8712ba346/ Operationalising-deterrence-in- the-Indo-Pacific.pdf, p. 21.

9.5 See: Stephan Frühling, “Is ANZUS Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia,” Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 60, No. 5 (September 2018), p. 199-218; Andrew Brown, “The History of the Radford-Collins Agreement,” Naval Historical Society of Australia, June 2008, available at: https://www.navyhistory.org.au/the-history-of-the-radford-collins-agreement/3/.

9.6 W. Bruce Weinrod, “Pooling and Sharing: The Effort to Enhance Allied Defense Capabilities,” in A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners, ed. Gary J. Schmitt (Carlisle: United States Army War College Press, 2015), p. 289; Narushige Michishita, Peter M. Swartz and David F. Winkler, “Lessons of the Cold War in the Pacific: U.S. Maritime Strategy, Crisis Prevention, and Japan’s Role,” The Wilson Center, May 2016, available at: https://www. wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/lessons_ of_the_cold_war_in_the_pacific_0.pdf, p. 7.

9.7 General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., “From the Chairman: Allies and Partners Are Our Strategic Center of Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 87 (October 2017), available at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1325218/from-the-chairman-allies-and-partners-are-our-strategic-center-of-gravity/, p. 4-5.

9.8 United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Hearing: China and the U.S. Rebalance to Asia,” US Government Publishing Office, 31 March

2016, available at: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/March%2031%202016_Hearing%20Transcript_0.pdf

9.9 Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Andrew Metrick and John Schaus, “Landing Together: Pacific Amphibious Development and Implications for the U.S. Fleet,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2016, available at: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160629_LandingTogether_Interim_Web.pdf

9.10 Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order,” Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2021, available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order

9.11 Cara Abercrombie, “Translating defence trade into cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” East Asia Forum, 20 May 2018, available at: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/05/20/translating-defence-trade-into-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/

9.12 Lindsey Ford, “Sustaining the Future of Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy,” Center for a New American Security, 28 September 2020, available at: https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sustaining-the-future-of-indo-pacific-defense-strategy

9.13 Department of Defence, “Australia joins Exercise MALABAR 2020,” Australian Government, 3 November 2020, available at: https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media-releases/australia-joins-exercise-malabar-2020; Department of Defence, “First Maritime Exercise conducted by Australian, French, Japanese and US ships in the Indian Ocean,” Australian Government, 17 May 2019, available at: https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/first-maritime-exercise-conducted-australian-french-japanese-and-us-ships; Des Paroz and Kieren Whiteley, “OCEAN EXPLORER 2019 showcases Anti-Submarine Warfare capability,” Navy Daily, 2 March 2019, available at: https://news.navy.gov.au/en/Mar2019/Fleet/5078/OCEAN-EXPLORER-2019-showcases-Anti-Submarine-Warfare-capability.htm#.YDwzlS0RpQK; Commander, US 7th Fleet, “USS Santa Fe Arrives in Stirling, Australia,” 25 February 2019, available at: https://www.c7f.navy.

mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1767117/uss-santa-fe-arrives-in-stirling-australia/; Glenn Slaughter, “Multinational exercise Sea Dragon concludes in Guam,” Commander, US Pacific Fleet, 28 January 2021, available at: https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130798; Department of Defence, “Royal Australian Navy joins regional partners for Exercise Pacific Vanguard,” Australian Government, 12 September 2020, available at: https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media-releases/royal-australian-navy-joins-regional-partners-exercise-pacific

9.14 Townshend et al., “Averting Crisis,” p. 61-72.9.15 Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic

Update,” Australian Government, 2020, available at: https://www.defence.gov.au/ StrategicUpdate-2020/docs/2020_Defence_ Strategic_Update.pdf; The Hon Linda Reynolds, “Keynote Address, Hudson Institute, Washington DC,” Department of Defence, 2 November 2019, available at: https://www.minister.defence. gov.au/minister/lreynolds/speeches/keynote-address-hudson-institute-washington-dc-0

9.16 Townshend and Santoro, “Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” p. 21.

9.17 Colby, “Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on the Role of Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations.”

9.18 Frühling, “Is ANZUS Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia,” p. 214.

10.1 Department of Defence, “Australian Defence Force Posture Review,” Australian Government, 30 March 2012, available at: https://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/Reviews/ADFPosture/Final.asp

10.2 John Coyne, “Strong and Free? The future security of Australia’s north,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 2019, available at: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-08/SR%20143%20Strong%20and%20free.pdf?NKaFaCyyQ96lB_Y6OG1QrXB_3vKlKXQ8

10.3 Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks and Mark Cancian, “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016, available at:

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https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs- public/legacy_files/files/publication/160119_ Green_ AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf, p. 3.

10.4 Mira Rapp-Hooper, Patrick M. Cronin, Harry Krejsa and Hannah Suh, “Counterbalance: Red Teaming the Rebalance in the Asia-Pacific,” Center for a New American Security, 14 November 2016, available at: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/counterbalance-red-teaming-the-rebalance-in-the-asia-pacific

10.5 Lloyd J. Austin III, “Nomination--Austin III,” United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 19 January 2021, available at: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/21-01-19-nomination

10.6 Ford, “Sustaining the Future of Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy”; Admiral Philip S. Davidson, “Statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Indo-Pacific Command Posture,” US Senate, 11 February 2019, available at: https://www.armed-services.senate. gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf.

10.7 For instance, the US Air Force has expanded its experiments in temporary basing in the region, including for the first time landing two F-22 Raptors supported by a supply aircraft in Palau in November last year. The US Marine Corps continues to run exercises in new logistics and operating methods with its recently established Littoral Combat Team based in Hawaii, with new locations in Japan, Guam and elsewhere being considered. Most importantly, the Navy is continuing to develop its Distributed Maritime Operations concept, which envisions a dissemination of offensive power throughout the fleet, as well as more realistic exercises and new operational locations, including potentially in the Indian Ocean. See: Kelley J. Stewart, “C-130J Super Hercules refuels F-22 Raptors Using Aerial Bulk Fuel Delivery System,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 25 November 2020, available at: https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2428065/c-130j-super-hercules-refuels-f-22-raptors-using-aerial-bulk-fuel-delivery-syst/; Shawn Snow, “New Marine Littoral Regiment, designed to

fight in contested maritime environment, coming to Hawaii,” Marine Corps Times, 14 May 2020, available at: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/05/14/new-marine-littoral-regiment-designed-to-fight-in-contested-maritime-environment-coming-to-hawaii/; Kevin Eyer and Steve McJessy, “Operationalizing Distributed Maritime Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security, 5 March 2019, available at: https://cimsec.org/operationalizing-distributed-maritime-operations/; Greg Jennett, “US plans to restore Navy’s 1st Fleet in rebuff to China in South China Sea,” ABC News, 3 December 2020, available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-12-03/us-plans-to-restore-navys-1st-fleet/12946076

10.8 Townshend et al., “Averting Crisis.”10.9 United States Studies Centre at the University of

Sydney, “Red book/Blue book: An Australian guide to the next US administration,” p. 11.

10.10 Department of Defence, “United States Force Posture Initiatives,” Australian Government, available at: https://www.defence.gov.au/Initiatives/USFPI/Infrastructure/Default.asp; Department of Defence, “USAF B-1B Lancers to train with Royal Australian Air Force,” Australian Government, 23 November 2017, available at: https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-releases/usaf-b-1b-lancers-train-royal-australian-air-force; Department of Defence, “Arrival of the 5th rotation of US Marines in Darwin,” Australian Government, 13 April 2016, available at: https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/arrival-5th-rotation-us-marines-darwin; US Department of State, “2016 Joint Statement of the United States-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue,” US Government Publishing Office, 12 July 2016, available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/01/251503.htm; Richard Ferguson and Amos Aikman, “US military to spend $300m on Darwin infrastructure upgrade,” The Australian, 31 July 2019, available at: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/us-military-to-spend-300m-on-darwin-infrastructure-upgrade/news-story/c61faf17bdb886ebf0a0e707a21404f7; Ben Packham and Cameron Stewart, “AUSMIN talks: Secret defence plan with US to counter China; Darwin to get strategic

fuel reserve,” The Australian, 30 July 2020, available at: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/ausmin-talks-darwin-key-to-countering-china-in-secret-defence-framework-with-us/news-story/585ef848e59603cdb1537393a6732a73

10.11 Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic Update.”

10.12 Ewen Levick, “Contract awarded for Cocos/Keeling runway upgrades,” Australian Defence Magazine, 4 February 2020, available at: https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/air/contract-awarded-for-cocos/keeling-runway-upgrades

10.13 Brendan Thomas-Noone, “The US Navy is Chasing the Impossible,” The Strategist, 27 August 2020, available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-navy-is-chasing-the-impossible/

10.14 Jonathan Earley, “Aiding our ally...some options for Australia,” Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2020), p. 47-63.

10.15 Stephen Dziedzic, “US to partner with Australia, Papua New Guinea on Manus Island naval base,” ABC News, 17 November 2018, available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-17/us-to-partner-with-australia-and-png-on-manus-island-naval-base/10507658

10.16 A good example of this future type of operation which would require more flexible access to US facilities is the RAAF and RAN deployments of joint task groups to Guam in July 2020. After drilling with US and Australian forces, the RAN task group also went on to conduct a patrol in the South China Sea. Adam Thorn, “Growlers and Hornets Join US Drills in Guam,” Australian Aviation, 24 July 2020, available at: https://australianaviation.com.au/2020/07/growlers-and-hornets-join-us-drills-in-guam/

11.1 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Implications of the Recent Philippines-China Naval Stand-off,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 May 2020, available at: https://amti.csis.org/implications-of-the-recent-philippines-china-naval-stand-off/; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Update: Chinese Survey Ship Escalates Three-Way Standoff,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30 April 2020, available at: https://amti.csis.org/chinese-survey-ship-

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escalates-three-way-standoff/; Drake Long, “Chinese Maritime Militia on the Move in Disputed Spratly Islands,” Radio Free Asia, 24 March 2020, available at: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/china-spratly-03242020164332.html

11.2 Xinhua, “China’s State Council approves establishing of two districts in Sansha city,” Xinhua News, 18 April 2020, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/18/c_138988256.htm; Thomas Shugart, “A Chinese-built airport next door to a key Australia-US naval base?” The Interpreter, 7 August 2020, available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-built-airport-next-door-australia-us-funded-navy-port

11.3 Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic Update”; US Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” January 2018, available at: https://dod.defense.gov/ Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National- Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

11.4 Ambassador Kelly Craft, Letter to His Excellency António Guterres, United States Representative to the United Nations, 1 June 2020, available at: https://usun.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/296/200602_KDC_ChinasUnlawful.pdf; Permanent Mission of the Commonwealth of Australia to the United Nations, N. 20/026, Australian Government, 23 July 2020, available at: https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mys_12_12_2019/2020_07_23_AUS_NV_UN_001_OLA-2020-00373.pdf; Nicholas Huynh, “U.S. Navy, Royal Australian Navy team up in the South China Sea,” Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 21 April 2020, available at: https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130600; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Update: Chinese Survey Ship Escalates Three-Way Standoff”; Department of Defence, “Operation Gateway,” Australian Government, available at: https://www.defence.gov.au/operations/southchinaseaindianocean/; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Pacific Fusion Centre to be established in Vanuatu,” Australian Government, 19 October 2020, available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/pacific-fusion-centre-be-established-

vanuatu; Andrew Tillett, “Australia lends backing to Jokowi in China stand-off,” Australian Financial Review, 10 February 2020, available at: https://www.afr.com/politics/ federal/australia-lends-backing-to-jokowi- in-china-stand-off-20200210-p53zdz.

11.5 Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order.”

11.6 Michael Green, John Schaus, Jake Douglas, Zack Cooper and Kathleen Hicks, “Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 May 2017, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-coercion-maritime-asia, p. 274-276; Kathleen Hicks, “Senate Armed Services Committee Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Kathleen Hicks Nominee for Appointment to be Deputy Secretary of Defense,” United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 February 2021, available at: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hicks_APQs_02-02-21.pdf, p. 23.

11.7 The White House, “Face Sheet: U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia,” US Government Publishing Office, 17 November 2015, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/fact-sheet-us-building-maritime-capacity-southeast-asia; US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” p. 49.

11.8 Richard Armitage and Kurt Campbell, “Strengthening Deterrence in Asia: Chairman’s Statement for the Atlantic Council Task Force on Extended Deterrence in Asia,” Atlantic Council, October 2014, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Ext_Det_Ch_Statement.pdf; Ely Ratner, “Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef,” The National Interest, 21 November 2013, available at: https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons-scarborough-reef-9442?page=0%2C1

11.9 Michael Sinclair and Lindsey Ford, “Stuck in the middle with you: Resourcing the Coast Guard for global competition,” Brookings Institute, 16 November 2020, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/10/16/stuck-in-the-middle-

with-you-resourcing-the-coast-guard-for-global-competition/

11.10 Lindsey Ford, “Sustaining the Future of Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy”; Michael Sinclair and Lindsey Ford, “Stuck in the middle with you: Resourcing the Coast Guard for global competition.”

11.11 Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee and Ainikki Riikonen, “Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific,” Center for a New American Security, 28 January 2020, available at: https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rising-to-the-china-challenge, p. 19-20.

11.12 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Gone Fishing: Tracking China’s Flotilla from Brunei to Indonesia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30 January 2020, available at: https://amti.csis.org/gone-fishing-tracking-chinas-flotilla-from-brunei-to-indonesia/; Renato Cruz De Castro, “Implications of the Recent Philippines-China Naval Standoff,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 7 May 2020, available at: https://amti.csis.org/implications-of-the-recent-philippines-china-naval-stand-off/; Drake Long, “Chinese Maritime Militia on the Move in Disputed Spratly Islands,” Radio Free Asia, 24 March 2020, available at: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/china-spratly-03242020164332.html; Hannah Beech, “U.S. Warships Enter Disputed Waters of South China Sea as Tensions With China Escalate,” The New York Times, 21 April 2020, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/world/asia/coronavirus-south-china-sea-warships.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Spokesperson’s Statement,” Government of Vietnam, 3 April 2020, available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns200404161321; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Update: Chinese Survey Ship Escalates Three-Way Standoff,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30 April 2020, available at: https://amti.csis.org/chinese-survey-ship-escalates-three-way-standoff/; Yew Lun Tian, “China authorises

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coast guard to fire on foreign vessels if needed,” Reuters, 22 January 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-coastguard-law-idUSKBN29R1ER; Thomas Shughart, “A Chinese-built airport next door to a key Australia-US naval base?” The Interpreter, 7 August 2020, available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-built-airport-next-door-australia-us-funded-navy-port; Aaron Smith, “Chinese fishing plant in Torres Strait raises alarm for Australian industry and islanders,” The Guardian, 27 November 2020, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/27/chinese-fishing-plant-in-torres-strait-raises-alarm-for-australian-industry-and-islanders

11.13 Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic Update,” p. 14, 15, 27-29.

11.14 Townshend and Santoro, “Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” p. 3, 5, 15.

11.15 Ashley Townshend, David Santoro and Brendan Thomas-Noone, “Revisiting Deterrence in an Era of Strategic Competition,” United States Studies Centre, 8 February 2019, available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/revisiting-deterrence-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition, p. 5.

11.16 Townshend and Santoro, “Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” p. 15.

11.17 Thomas Mahnken, Travis Sharp and Grace Kim, “Deterrence by Detection: A Key Role for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Great Power Competition,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 14 April 2020, available at: https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/deterrence-by-detection-a-key-role-for-unmanned-aircraft-systems-in-great-power-competition

11.18 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Executive Summary of the FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act,” US Senate, 23 May 2019, available at: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY%202020%20NDAA%20Executive%20Summary.pdf; United States Indo-Pacific Command, “Section 1253 Assessment — Executive Summary,” March 2020, available at: https:// int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6864- national-defense-strategy-summ/8851517f5e10106bc3b1/optimized/full.pdf;

Blake Herzinger, “US plans in the Pacific islands could undermine Australia’s efforts,” The Strategist, 12 June 2019, available at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-plans-in-the-pacific-islands-could-undermine-australias-efforts/; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia to support new Pacific Fusion Centre,” Australian Government, 5 September 2018, available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/australia-to-support-new-pacific-fusion-centre

11.19 Euan Graham, “U.S. Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies,” Foreign Policy, 4 May 2020, available at: https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/05/04/malaysia-south-china-sea- us-navy-drillship-standoff/; Blake Herzinger, “Learning in the South China Sea: The U.S. Response to the West Cappella Standoff,” War on the Rocks, 18 May 2020, available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/ learning-in-the-south-china-sea-the-u-s- response-to-the-west-capella-standoff/

11.20 Blake Herzinger, “Reorienting the Coast Guard: A Case for Patrol Forces Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, 5 November 2019, available at: https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/reorienting-the-coast-guard-a-case-for-patrol-forces-indo-pacific/

11.21 Michael Sinclair and Lindsey Ford, “Stuck in the middle with you: Resourcing the Coast Guard for global competition.”

12.1 William Greenwalt, “Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base to address great-power competition,” Atlantic Council, 23 April 2019, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/leveraging-the-national-technology-industrial-base-to-address-great-power-competition/

12.2 Brendan Thomas-Noone, “Mapping the Third Offset: Australia, the United States and Future War in the Indo-Pacific,” United States Studies Centre, 5 December 2017, available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/mapping-the-third-offset-australia-the-united-states-and-future-war-in-the-indo-pacific

12.3 William Greenwalt, “Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base to address great-power competition.”

12.4 The White House, “Executive Order on Ensuring the Future Is Made in All of America by All of America’s

Workers,” US Government Publishing Office, 25 January 2021, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/25/executive-order-on-ensuring-the-future-is-made-in-all-of-america-by-all-of-americas-workers/

12.5 Andrea Shalal, Alexandra Alper and Timothy Aeppel, “Biden signs ‘Buy American’ order, pledges to renew U.S. manufacturing,” Reuters, 25 January 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-idUSKBN29U0Z3; Richard A. Mojica, Alejandro L. Sarria, Dana Watts, Jason N. Workmaster, “Five Things You Must Know About Biden’s Buy American Act Executive Order,” Miller & Chevalier, 27 January 2021, available at: https://www.millerchevalier.com/publication/five-things-you-must-know-about-bidens-buy-american-act-executive-order

12.6 Kathleen Hicks, “Senate Armed Services Committee Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Kathleen Hicks Nominee for Appointment to be Deputy Secretary of Defense,” p. 37.

12.7 US Senate, “Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,” US Government Publishing Office, 21 May 2008, available at: https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/treaties.pdf

12.8 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Joint Statement Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2020,” 28 July 2020, available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/joint-statement-ausmin-2020

12.9 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Announces New Allied Prototyping Initiative Effort With Australia to Continue Partnership in Developing Air Breathing Hypersonic Vehicles,” 30 November 2020, available at: https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2429061/department-of-defense-announces-new-allied-prototyping-initiative-effort-with-a/

12.10 Brendan Thomas-Noone, “Ebbing opportunity: Australia and the US National Technology and Industrial Base,” United States Studies Centre, 25 November 2019, available at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-and-the-us-national-technology-and-industrial-base

12.11 Boeing Australia, Twitter, 9 June 2020, available

102

at: https://twitter.com/BoeingAustralia/status/1270158691120054274

12.12 Thomas-Noone, “Ebbing opportunity: Australia and the US National Technology and Industrial Base,” p. 10-13.

12.13 Anthony Capaccio, “F-35 Costs Drop for Building Jets But Rise for Operating Them,” Bloomberg, 29 May 2020, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-29/f-35-costs-drop-for-building-jets-but-rise-for-operating-them

12.14 Thomas-Noone, “Ebbing opportunity: Australia and the US National Technology and Industrial Base.”

12.15 Department of Defence, “The Technical Cooperation Program Contested Urban Environment Strategic Challenge — CUE Adelaide 2017,” Australian Government, 2017, available at: https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/cue17

13.1 See Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “How American Foreign Policy Got China Wrong,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning; Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “How American Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe

14.1 Jeffrey Wilson, “China’s trade sanctions on Australia. What’s the logic?” The Canberra Times, 24 December 2020 https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7063597/another-day-another-trade-sanction-but-whats-the-logic/

14.2 Under threat of trade sanctions, the Trump Administration coerced Japan, Korea and Canada into signing new ‘trade balancing’ type trade agreements. Jeffrey Wilson (2021), Adapting Australia to an era of geoconomic competition, p. 15.

14.3 Wilson, p. 1814.4 Jeffrey Wilson, “Adapting Australia to an era of

geoeconomic competition” Perth USAsia Centre, January 2021, available at: https://perthusasia.edu.au/our-work/geoeconomics-report

14.5 World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, “DS598: China — Anti-dumping and countervailing

duty measures on barley from Australia,” available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds598_e.htm

14.6 Matthew Knott, “Biden adviser says US stands ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with Australia” The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 December 2020, available at: https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/biden-adviser-says-us-stands-shoulder-to-shoulder-with-australia-20201203-p56k3p.html

14.7 In the last decade, Australia has only raised two WTO disputes. By contrast, the US has raised twenty-seven. See WTO, Dispute Settlement Statistics, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm

14.8 “It’s the end of the World Trade Organization as we know it” The Economist, 28 November 2019, available at: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/11/28/its-the-end-of-the-world-trade-organisation-as-we-know-it

15.1 Stephen Kirchner, The US is central to this China trade quarrel, Canberra Times, 25 May 2020.

15.2 David Uren, Rare earths: Is there a case for government intervention? United States Studies Centre, 25 May 2019.

15.3 United States Comments on Australia’s Draft Treasury Laws Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code) Bill 2009, 15 January 2021.

16.1 Jacob Poushter and Christine Huang, “Climate Change Still Seen as the Top Global Threat, but Cyberattacks a Rising Concern” Pew Research Center, 10 February 2019. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/10/climate-change-still-seen-as-the-top-global-threat-but-cyberattacks-a-rising-concern/. As noted by security researcher Brian Krebs, there are “few known incidents of malicious hackers” disrupting “complex systems” like this. Brian Krebs, “What’s most interesting about the Florida water system hack? That we heard about it at all.” Krebs on Security blog. 10 February 2021. Available at: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/02/whats-most-interesting-about-the-florida-water-system-hack-that-we-heard-about-it-at-all/

16.2 Pinellas Sheriff Dept, “Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference” Oldsmar, Florida, 8 February 2021. Accessed via YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M&ab_channel=PinellasSheriff. Carlie, Porterfield. “Hacker Tried to Raise Chemicals in Drinking Water to Dangerous Levels at Florida Treatment Plant” Forbes, 8 February 2021. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2021/02/08/hacker-tried-to-raise-chemicals-in-drinking-water-to-dangerous-levels-at-florida-treatment-plant/?sh=6db2df021f21

16.3 Isabellea Jibilian, “Here’s a simple explanation of how the massive SolarWinds hack happened and why it’s such a big deal” Business Insider, MSN, 24 December 2020. Available at: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/here-s-a-simple-explanation-of-how-the-massive-solarwinds-hack-happened-and-why-it-s-such-a-big-deal/ar-BB1cd5qB

16.4 In five volumes and thousands of pages released in 2019, the US Senate Intelligence Committee reported on Russia’s multi-prong cyberattacks including hacking officials’ emails, breaching state electoral rolls, and micro-targeting voters through social media campaigns to bolster conspiracy theories and disrupt fact-based democratic debate. Senate Intelligence Report on Russian Interference in the 2016 Election Vol 1-5, available at: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures

16.5 Herb Lin, “Cyber Operations v. Information Operations” 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (Cycon), Tallinn, Estonia. May 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyCDvEzq25s

16.6 See for example, the national security implications of public health conspiracy theories spread from online networks to traditional media in Jennifer Hunt, “The COVID-19 Pandemic v Post Truth” Global Health Security Network, 1 September 2020. https://www.ghsn.org/Policy-Reports

16.7 Brandon Kirk Williams, “An Opportunity for Strengthening US-Australia Cyber Cooperation” Lawfare, 16 September 2020. https://www.lawfareblog.com/opportunity-strengthening-us-

103

australian-cyber-cooperation16.8 Australia Cyber Security Strategy 2020. Available:

https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/news/australias-cyber-security-strategy-2020

16.9 Scott Horsley and Miles Parks, “Trump’s Refusal to Back US Intel over Russia at Putin Summit Sparks Bipartisan Ire” NPR, 15 July 2018. https://www.npr.org/2018/07/16/628973563/trump-putin-to-meet-after-new-charges-over-russias-2016-election-interference

16.10 Kaitlan Collins and Paul LeBlanc, “Trump fires director of Homeland Security agency who had rejected President’s election conspiracy theories” CNN, 18 November 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/17/politics/chris-krebs-fired-by-trump/index.html

16.11 Joshua Rovner, “A Lower bar for the cyber czar” War on the Rocks, 26 January 2021. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/a-lower-bar-for-the-cyber-czar/

16.12 Jana Winter, “Exclusive: FBI document warns conspiracy theories are a new domestic terrorism threat” Yahoo News, 2 August 2019. Available at: https://news.yahoo.com/fbi-documents-conspiracy-theories-terrorism-160000507.html

16.13 According to Facebook’s own reports, there were more than 1000 QAnon group pages, with more than 1 million members, 64% of whom arrived there after Facebook’s recommendation to join. See, Ari Sen and Brandy Zadrozny, “QAnon groups have millions of members on Facebook, documents show” CNBC, 10 August 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/10/qanon-groups-have-millions-of-members-on-facebook-documents-show.html

16.14 Julia Carrie Wong, “Revealed QAnon Facebook Groups are growing at a rapid pace around the world,” The Guardian, 11 August 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/11/qanon-facebook-groups-growing-conspiracy-theory.

16.15 Peter W. Singer and Emerson T Brooking, Like War: The weaponization of social media. Boston: Mariner Books, 2018.

16.16 Mario Christodoulou, ‘ASIO briefing warns that the far right is exploiting coronavirus to recruit new members’ ABC, 12 June 2020. Available at: https://

www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-12/asio-briefing-warns-far-right-is-exploiting-coronavirus/12344472

16.17 Jennifer Hunt, “The COVID-19 Pandemic v Post Truth” Global Health Security Network, 1 September 2020. Available at: https://www.ghsn.org/Policy-Reports

16.18 European Commission, “Coronavirus: EU Strengthens action to tackle disinformation” Press Release, 10 June 2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1006

16.19 US State Department, GEC Special Report: Russia’s Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda. Washington DC, August 2020. Available at: https://www.state.gov/russias-pillars-of-disinformation-and-propaganda-report/

16.20 Cameron Wilson, “Why are Australian Chanting ‘Arrest Bill Gates’ at Protests?” Buzzfeed News, 11 May 2020. https://www.buzzfeed.com/cameronwilson/lockdown-protest-australia-bill-gates-conspiracy-theories

16.21 Track 1.5 U.S.-Australia Cyber Security Dialogue, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2016. Available at: https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/cybersecurity-and-governance/other-projects-cybersecurity-2

16.22 The Cyber 1.5 track was held in 2016 and 2018, but the 2020 Ministerial notes appear not to focus on (or mention) cyber, though it does discuss disinformation. Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) Joint Transcript, 29 July 2020. Available at: https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/transcripts/australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-ausmin

16.23 In 2018, the UN established two working groups on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, Australia is a member of both. International Security and Cyberspace at the UN, DFAT 2021. Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/cyber-affairs/international-security-and-cyberspace

16.24 The most recent example is the Tallin Manual 2.0 (2017) which analyses how existing international law applies to cyberspace. Available at: https://ccdcoe.

org/research/tallinn-manual/ 16.25 In Jan 2017, the Obama administration declared

electoral systems as critical national infrastructure, a move that freed up federal expertise and funds for states. The announcement was made the same day that the declassified US Intelligence report was released which concluded that President Putin “ordered” an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US Presidential election, including “obtaining access to multiple US state or local electoral boards.” Tami Abdollah, “US Designates Election Infrastructure as Critical” AP News, 7 January 2017. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/64a7228c974d43009cdfc2b98766320b

16.26 Finland topped, by a significant margin, the annual Media Literacy index measuring resistance to fake news and disinformation amongst 35 countries. Media Literacy Index 2019 available at https://osis.bg/?p=3356&lang=en

16.27 Social sciences research in psychology, political science and communication studies can also help support the design of counter-messaging strategies to fight disinformation in cyberspace. See, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. “A Decadal Survey of the Social and Behavioral Sciences: A Research Agenda for Advancing Intelligence Analysis” (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2019). Available at: https://doi.org/10.17226/25335.

16.28 Jon Henley, “How Finland starts its fight against fake news in primary schools” The Guardian, 29 January 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/28/fact-from-fiction-finlands-new-lessons-in-combating-fake-news

16.29 For example, the Fulbright Cyber Security Scholar Award is available for US Scholars to conduct research at UK institution, but not yet Australia or vice versa. Available at: https://awards.cies.org/content/fulbright-cyber-security-scholar-award

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Page 4. US Vice President Joe Biden delivered a speech on the US-Australia alliance with an introduction by USSC Chief Executive Officer Professor Simon Jackman (seated), Sydney, July 2016. Photo: United States Studies CentrePage 8. Capitol Building, Washington DC. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 18. The United States Capitol in Washington, DC is the home of the US Congress. Getty ImagesPage 22. Inside the Capitol building dome, Washington, DC. Getty ImagesPage 28. A payload of rolled-up steel. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 32. A Royal Australian Air Force C-17A Globemaster III at RAAF Base Amberley delivered humanitarian aid to Port Villa in support of the disaster relief efforts of the Government of Vanuatu, April 2020. Photo: Department of DefencePage 36. US President Joe Biden speaks on COVID-19 response at the White House, January 2021. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 40. An Australia-Japan-United States trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Brisbane, November 2014. Photo: Getty Images

Page 44. Pro-Trump protesters gather in front of the US Capitol Building on 6 January 2021. Trump supporters gathered to protest the confirmation of President-elect Joe Biden’s Electoral College victory over President Trump in the 2020 election. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 46. An armed police officer patrols the area outside the Al Noor mosque following the death of 49 worshippers who were shot by an Australian right-wing extremist in Christchurch, New Zealand, March 2019. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 48. A health worker prepares a syringe dose of the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 52. Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden speaks about climate change in Wilmington, Delaware, September 2020. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 58. Members of the Royal Australian Air Force, US Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Indian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force pose for a photo at the conclusion of Exercise Sea Dragon, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, January 2021. Photo: US NavyPage 62. MV-22 Ospreys and KC-130J Hercules are parked during Marine Rotational Force — Darwin trans-Pacific flight, Cassidy International Airport, Kiribati, September 2019. Photo: US Marine Corps

Page 66. A Royal Australian Air Force C-27J Spartan aircraft provided aerial surveillance as part of the ongoing Australian Operation Solania, in support of the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency’s coordinated regional maritime surveillance and patrol operations. Photo: Department of DefencePage 70. Boeing Australia completed the engine run on its first Loyal Wingman unmanned aircraft as part of ground testing and preparations for first flight, September 2020. Photo: BoeingPage 76. Huawei flagship store in Shanghai, February 2021. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 80. A Chinese worker looks on as a cargo ship is loaded at a port in Qingdao, China, July 2017. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 82. Farmhand Hugh Stocks releasing barley into a auger to transfer to storage in a grain hopper after being harvested on a farm near Inverleigh, some 100kms west of Melbourne, December 2020. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 84. The Bremen Express cargo ship prepares to dock at Port Miami. Photo: Getty ImagesPage 88. Cybersecurity. Photo: Getty Images

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Elliott Brennan is a Research Associate at the United States Studies Centre (USSC). His work spans the breadth of the Centre but has focused on progressive politics in the United States and youth mobilisation.

Hayley Channer is a Senior Policy Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre. She previously worked for the Department of Defence producing strategic policy guidance on defence capabilities and international engagement with the United States and Japan.

Dr Jennifer S. Hunt is a Non-resident Fellow at the USSC as well as a Lecturer in Security Studies at Macquarie University. She has published on comparative national security policy of cyber and energy issues in the United States, Australia and the Arab Gulf.

Professor Simon Jackman commenced as USSC CEO in April 2016. Between 1996 and 2016, he was a Professor of Political Science and Statistics at Stanford University. His teaching and research centres on public opinion, election campaigns, political participation and electoral systems with special emphasis on American and Australian politics.

Associate Professor Adam Kamradt-Scott is a Non-resident Fellow at the USSC and an Associate Professor in Global Health Security and International Relations at the University of Sydney. His research explores how governments and multilateral organisations cooperate when adverse health events such as disease outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics occur.

Dr Stephen Kirchner is the USSC’s Director of Trade and Investment. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Fraser Institute in Canada, where he has contributed to research projects comparing public policies in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

Dr John Lee is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the USSC. He is also a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC. From 2016-2018, he was senior adviser to Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop.

Jared Mondschein is a Senior Research Fellow at the USSC. His research focuses on the US-Australian trade and investment relationship as well as innovation and entrepreneurship.

Matilda Steward is an Honorary Associate at the USSC. She was previously a Research Associate in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program and tutor in US and Australian politics.

Brendan Thomas-Noone is a Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program at the USSC where he works on national security and technology issues, US defence and foreign policy, and Indo-Pacific security.

Ashley Townshend is the USSC’s Director of Foreign Policy and Defence. He works on international security and strategic affairs with a focus on the Indo-Pacific, including regional alliances and partnerships, maritime security, defence policy, and US, Chinese, and Australian strategy.

Toby Warden is a Research Associate in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program at the USSC. He was previously a Research Assistant in the University of Sydney’s Centre for International Security Studies.

Dr Jeffrey Wilson is the Research Director at the Perth USAsia Centre. He has particular expertise in the politics of trade agreements, regional economic institutions and Australia’s economic ties with Asia.

Bruce Wolpe is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the USSC. He worked with the Democrats in Congress during President Barack Obama’s first term, and on the staff of Prime Minister Julia Gillard. He has also served as the former PM’s chief of staff.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTREInstitute Building (H03) City RdThe University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia+61 2 9351 [email protected] USSC.EDU.AU

PERTH USASIA CENTREThe University of Western Australia 35 Stirling Highway Crawley WA 6009 Australia+61 8 6488 [email protected] PERTHUSASIA.EDU.AU