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Standards and Accountability

Cognitive Lesson Objective: • Comprehend the relationship of standards and accountability.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:• Explain the concept of accountability as it relates to standards.

• Explain the relationship between standards, accountability and the Air Force Core Values.

• Predict the impact of accountability on mission accomplishment.

• Given a scenario, justify the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an officer’s actions with regard to the concept of accountability.

Affective Lesson Objective: • Value the need for ethical and accountable behavior in the military.

Affective Samples of Behavior:• Actively participate in discussion on standards and accountability as

presented in classroom examples.

• Respond positively to the need for all Airmen to hold themselves and others to the highest standards.

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“Air Force leaders failed in their leadership responsibilities… failed to establish adequate procedures… [which] are central to revitalizing a culture of accountability and responsibility.”

- From the “Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management” (released September 2008)

INCIDENT SUMMARY -

BLACKHAWK ACCIDENTAL SHOOTDOWN

In April 1991, the President and Secretary of Defense directed US forces to conduct Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). Consequently, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) directed the creation of a Combined Task Force (CTF)

to conduct operations in northern Iraq. Coalition air forces from Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have continued to conduct air operations in a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) north of 36 degrees north latitude in Iraq. These operations, which have served as a symbol of coalition resolve and as a deterrent to Iraqi military encroachment into a United Nations-established security zone in northern Iraq, were conducted without a major accident until April 1994. As stated by General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “For over three years, the pilots and crews assigned to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT flew mission after mission, totaling well over 50,000 hours of flight operations, without a single major accident. Then, in one terrible moment on the 14th of April, a series of avoidable errors led to the tragic deaths of 26 men and women of the American Armed Forces, United States Foreign Service, and the Armed Forces of our coalition allies. Characterizing the accident as “a tragedy that should never have happened,” Defense Secretary William Perry promised the families of those killed in the accident that their deaths would not be in vain.

Background

Since Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began, coalition aircrews have flown daily missions over active Iraqi air defenses to guard the over 50,000 Kurdish refugees within the United Nations-designated security zone. Iraqi forces have tested coalition resolve by probing the no-fly zone with Iraqi aircraft, illuminating coalition aircraft with “fire control” radars, and firing on friendly forces. Coalition forces have responded by shooting down an Iraqi Mig-23 and by bombing Iraqi antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile sites. Even with these firm responses to Iraqi violations, Iraqi forces continue to harass Kurdish refugees within the security zone and to sabotage UN relief trucks. In December 1993, coalition personnel were fired upon as they left their support base in Zakhu. In March 1994, Saddam Hussein publicly stated that he would be “forced to take other means” in response to renewed United Nations sanctions. As recently as April 1994, a female

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civilian journalist employed by a French news agency was murdered in northern Iraq. These and other events have increased tensions in the area as coalition aircrews and ground personnel continually operate at a high state of readiness.

Synopsis of the Accident

At approximately 0730L time in Turkey, an E-3A AWACS aircraft departed Incirlik AB on its assigned mission: to provide airborne threat warning and air control for all Operation PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft operating inside the TAOR. As normal operations directed, the AWACS was the lead aircraft and would fly the first of the 52 sorties scheduled for that day’s operations. The AWACS proceeded to its assigned air surveillance orbit located on the northern border of Iraq. The crew included a mission crew commander (who supervises all controllers) and a senior director (who supervises all weapons controllers). The mission crew commander had limited experience and was not currently qualified because he had only flown one sortie in the past three months. The weapons controllers included an en route controller (responsible for clearing OPC aircraft in and out of the TAOR) and a TAOR controller (who controls OPC aircraft inside the TAOR). Also on board the AWACS was an airborne command element (ACE), a Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) representative who works directly with both the mission crew commander and the senior director. OPLAN 91-7 directed that the ACE “will be aboard [AWACS] to serve as the representative of the CFACC for time critical decisions.” However, according to CFACC testimony, the ACE had no decision-making authority.

The two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters took off from Diyarbakir at approximately 0820L. Their mission was to transport passengers and cargo from Diyarbakir to the MCC Headquarters at Zakhu. From Zakhu, their mission was to transport the co-commanders of the MCC and other staff officers to the Kurdish towns of Irbil and Salah ad Din, Iraq, and return. The Blackhawk pilots reported to the AWACS en route controller as they entered the no-fly zone of northern Iraq at approximately 0920L. Six minutes later, they landed at Zakhu.

The AWACS detected the Blackhawks shortly after its onboard systems reached operational status. The surveillance section assigned the flight a “friendly general” track symbol and a track designator. Both the senior director and the mission commander had the track symbol displayed. The en route controller acknowledged the helicopters’ entry into the TAOR. The senior director changed the Blackhawk helicopter “friendly general” symbol to a “friendly helicopter” symbol, but there is no evidence to indicate that the en route controller attempted to perform a Mode IV check on the Blackhawks as the ACO implies that the AWACS crew should. The en route controller monitored the helicopters until the IFF returns faded from AWACS coverage at approximately 0924L. The helicopters’ symbol was suspended, an action that maintained the symbol in the vicinity of Zakhu.

At approximately the same time the Blackhawks were landing at Zakhu, two F-15Cs took off from Diyabakir. The AWACS en route controller identified the F-15s and maintained radar contact with them as they proceeded to the TAOR. Their mission was to perform an initial fighter sweep of the no-fly zone and clear the area of any hostile aircraft prior to entry

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of coalition forces. Following the fighter sweep, the F-15s were to establish a combat air patrol (CAP) for their defensive counter air mission. All fighter aircraft operating from Incirlik AB conduct missions in the TAOR in accordance with the standing ACO and SPINS and the daily ATO. It is the responsibility of all aircrews flying OPC missions to understand all directives governing air operations. The CFAC DO is responsible for ensuring that arriving aircrews are briefed on all aspects of the OPC flying mission. The CFAC DO provided these rules of engagement (ROE) briefings for change-outs of complete flying units, but there was no arrangement to ensure that individual replacement pilots coming to OPC were centrally briefed. Briefing these personnel was an individual squadron responsibility. Both F-15 pilots had come to OPC on temporary duty assignment rotations. Both had read the Aircrew Read File, and both had received a squadron ROE briefing.

The rules of engagement provided were reduced, in briefings and in individual crewmembers’ understandings, to a simplified form. One result of this simplification was that some crewmembers were not aware of all specific considerations required prior to engagement. These considerations included identification difficulties, the need to give defectors safe conduct, and the possibility of an aircraft being in distress with its crew unaware of their position.

At 0954L, the Blackhawk flight reported to the AWACS en route controller that they were en route from “Whiskey to Lima” (codewords respectively for Zakhu and Irbil). The en route controller who received their call was not familiar with the location of “Lima” and did not look it up, although materials to do so were available. At that time, the en route controller reinitiated the helicopter track symbol. According to directives, the TAOR controller was responsible for controlling aircraft inside the TAOR. However, neither the en route controller nor the senior director instructed the Blackhawk helicopters to change from the en route radio frequency to the TAOR frequency, which was being monitored by the TAOR controller. To compound the situation, the Blackhawks were squawking the wrong Mode I code (no changeover from en route code to TAOR code); but there is no evidence that either the en route controller or the senior director told the helicopters that they were still “squawking” the Mode I for outside the TAOR. Even so, the “H” symbol assigned to the Blackhawk flight was regularly displayed on the senior director’s radarscope from 0904 until 1011L.

Interviews with helicopter pilots assigned to the Blackhawk unit revealed that they were not aware that the ATO specified separate transponder Mode I codes for operating inside versus outside the TAOR. In fact, they had routinely flown in the TAOR using the Mode I code designated for use outside the TAOR. “Normal ops” for the Blackhawks was to use the Mode I code, and AWACS had not pointed out the incorrect procedure on previous flights. There is nothing to indicate that the correct code and procedure were briefed on the morning of the accident.

At approximately 1011L, the Blackhawk flight entered mountainous terrain at low altitude and faded from AWACS radar and IFF coverage. At that point the controller suspended the helicopters’ track symbol, which caused the computer to move the symbol based on the last available heading and airspeed information. Unfortunately, the en route

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controller, who had not transferred control of the flight to the TAOR controller, did not note the heading and speed the flight was following to point “Lima”; nor did he identify the flight path the helicopters had reported they would follow. At approximately 1013L, the air surveillance officer designated the Blackhawks’ last known location on the senior director’s radarscope by placing a computer-generated “attention arrow” to point out the area of interest. Even though a blinking alert light accompanied the arrow, the senior director did not acknowledge. Sixty seconds later, the arrow, and light were automatically dropped from the scope.

The F-15 flight lead reported entering northern Iraq to the AWACS TAOR controller at approximately 1020L. Since the ATO did not contain any detailed information on the Blackhawk helicopters and the AWACS TAOR controller had not advised the fighters of friendly activity in the area, they had no knowledge of the helicopters. Although several independent sources aboard the AWACS had knowledge and visual display of the Blackhawks, no one informed the F-15 pilots of their presence. Unfortunately, the en route controller dropped the Blackhawk symbol--the only visual reminder to the AWACS crew that the Blackhawks were in the TAOR--from the radarscopes at 1021L.

At approximately 1022L, as the fighters began their TAOR “sweep,” flight lead reported a contact to the TAOR controller. The TAOR controller had no radar return or IF replies from that location. Moreover, neither the mission crew commander nor the senior director aboard the AWACS directed the weapons or surveillance sections to locate and identify the reported contact. Meanwhile, the F-15 pilots attempted to identify the contacts by electronic means but were unsuccessful. They initiated an intercept to investigate. At approximately 1023L, the AWACS received intermittent IF signals from the helicopters in the area where the F-15 pilot had called his contact. Simultaneously, the “H” character also reappeared on the senior director’s radarscope. Clearly, the Blackhawks were squawking the same IF Mode I and II codes that they were squawking before the AWACS lost radar contact at approximately 1012L. However, AWACS personnel made no radio calls regarding the IF returns to the fighters, even though the returns increased in frequency and remained on the display without interruption from 1026L to just before 1028L.

When the F-15s, now at approximately 20 NM from the helicopters, reported another contact, the TAOR controller responded with “Hits there,” which means corresponding contacts. However, a replay of the AWACS magnetic tape recordings clearly shows “IFF paints,” rather than “hits,” at the reported location (a “hit” describes a radar return; “paint” describes an IFF reply). At 1026L, the Blackhawk helicopters’ IFF returns were clearly visible, along with intermittent radar returns on the AWACS radarscopes. Nevertheless, at 1028L, the en route controller initiated an “Unknown, Pending, Unevaluated” track symbol in the area of the helicopters’ returns and attempted an IFF identification. By this time, the F-15 flight lead had closed to within 5NM of the helicopters and visually detected a single helicopter. As the fighters began to close for an identification pass, no one aboard the AWACS attempted to determine specific IFF aircraft identification or to do a Mode IV check on the helicopters. The “H” character previously attached to the helicopters’ IFF return was still present on the senior director’s radarscope.

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At approximately 1028L the F-15s made a visual identification pass (VID) at 450 knots indicated airspeed, approximately 1,000 feet left and 500 feet above the Blackhawks. The lead F-15 pilot visually misidentified the Blackhawks as Iraqi Hind helicopters. The F-15 wingman saw the two helicopters but did not positively identify them as Hinds. [NOTE: AFR 110-14, Aircraft Accident Investigation - Report of Investigation, further stated the accident pilots’ fighter squadron last conducted formal, visual recognition training in December 1993. The training in 1993 included viewing 35 mm slides of friendly and enemy helicopters. The accident pilots stated that the majority of the helicopter slides used in their training were from ground level looking up, and showed either the front or side of the helicopter. Differences between friendly and hostile helicopter camouflage and color schemes were not discussed during the squadron’s training. The accident pilots may not have been aware that Iraqi Hind helicopters had a different color scheme (light tan and brown camouflage) from that of the U.S. Blackhawk helicopters (dark green and black camouflage.) The lead pilot stated he had never seen a Blackhawk helicopter with the wings and auxiliary tanks attached. The wingman stated that he had never seen a photo of a Blackhawk with the wings and auxiliary tanks attached. One of the squadron’s visual training slides at home station depicts a Blackhawk helicopter with the wings and auxiliary tanks attached. It could not be determined if either of the accident pilots had ever viewed that slide]. At this time, the F-15s and the Blackhawks were too close together for the AWACS crew to identify separately. The F-15 flight lead again reported “two Hinds” and the TAOR controller responded, “Copy Hinds.” [NOTE: AFR 110-14, Aircraft Accident Investigation - Report of Investigation, further stated that the flight lead started a right-hand climbing turn to set up an oval racetrack pattern behind the helicopter, he saw a second helicopter in trail. As the flight lead passed above the helicopter in the climbing right turn, he referred to his in-flight visual recognition guide and determined that the helicopters were “Hinds” as he had first reported. He transmitted “VID Hind, Tally 2, lead-trail.” The flight lead then transmitted, “Tiger 2, confirm Hinds?” The F-15 wingman replied, “Standby.” The wingman conducted a VID pass (approximately 2,000 ft. right) of the trailing helicopter, but did not confirm the identification. In response to the flight lead’s radio call, the wingman responded “Tally 2.” The wingman testified that he intended this call to indicate he saw two helicopters. The F-15 flight lead understood his wingman’s transmission to mean that he confirmed the identification. The AWACS TAOR controller said, “Copy Hinds.”]

The F-15 lead flew to a position approximately 5-10 NM behind the helicopters and called “Engaged” to AWACS, indicating his intention to attack the helicopters. He also told his wingman to “Arm Hot” and proceeded to brief the engagement--he would shoot the trail helicopter and the wingman was to shoot lead. There is no indication that the AWACS senior director, the mission crew commander, or the ACE made any radio calls throughout the intercept or that they issued any guidance to either the AWACS or the F-15 pilots. At 1030L the F-15 flight lead reported they had “splashed” two Hind helicopters.

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Conclusion

Immediately following the engagement, the F-15 pilots flew two visual “recce” passes over the crash site. Nothing could be identified except burning debris. Following an air refueling with a KC-135 tanker, the fighters resumed their defensive counter air mission for another 1.5 hours, then returned to Incirlik AB at 1300L. Shortly after 1100L, the JSOTF operations officer at Incirlik received initial notification from CTF C2 of an accident allegedly involving Hind helicopters and that the location of the Blackhawk flight was unknown. The JSOTF directed their response force at the MCC (forward) to prepare to launch a search and rescue (SAR) team.

Following the intercept, the AWACS crew had continued their routine mission. At approximately 1130L the CFAC ground-based mission director called the ACE, onboard the AWACS, to report that the Blackhawks were unaccounted for. At around 1214L, the CFAC ground-based director instructed the ACE to find the Blackhawks and confirm good radar contact with them. Unable to locate the Blackhawks, the AWACS departed the TAOR and landed at Incirlik AB at 1915L. At 1315L, Kurdish civilians notified MCC (forward) of the crash site location of two U.S. helicopters that had been shot down. Immediately, the CTF gave the authorization to launch the SAR force. Almost simultaneously, a team of Special Forces personnel and civilian interpreters departed MCC (forward) at Zakhu, by ground transportation, en route to the crash site.

At 2015L, almost ten hours after the accident, the JSOTF on-scene commander confirmed to the CTF commander: U.S. Blackhawk wreckage--26 casualties, no survivors.

INCIDENT SUMMARY -

CZAR 52 CRASH AT FAIRCHILD AFB

Czar 52, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, WA, launched just before 1400 hours on the 24th of June, 1994. The mission was to practice maneuvers for an upcoming airshow. On board was

a crew of four: the pilot, Lt Col Arthur “Bud” Holland, co-pilot Lt Col Mark McGeehan, navigator Lt Col Ken Huston, and safety observer Col Robert Wolff.

These men were key figures in the operation of the 92d Bomb Wing. Lt Col McGeehan was the Commander of the 325th Bomb Squadron; Lt Col Huston was his Operations Officer. Lt Col Holland was an instructor pilot and the Standards and Evaluation Officer for the 92d Bomb Wing. Col Wolff was the Vice Wing Commander. Col Wolff was added at the last minute by Col Brooks, the Wing Commander. This was to be Col Wolff’s “fini-flight” - his last flight before he left the Air Force; his family and friends were waiting for him on the flightline with champagne for a toast.

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Maj Tony Kern’s study “Darker Shades of Blue: A Case Study of Failed Leadership” summarizes the events of Czar 52 as follows:

“The aircrew had planned and briefed a profile, through the Wing Commander level, that grossly exceeded aircraft and regulatory limitations. Upon preparing to land at the end fo the practice airshow profile, the crew was required to execute a “go-around” or missed approach because of another aircraft on the runway. At mid-field, Czar 52 began a tight 360 degree left turn around the control tower at only 250 feet altitude above ground level (AGL). Approximately three quarters of the way through the turn, the aircraft banked past 90 degrees, stalled, clipped a power line with the left wing, and crashed. Impact occurred at apprximately 1416 hours PDT. There were no survivors.”

Lt Col “Bud” Holland was flying the aircraft at the time of the incident. He was thought by many senior leaders to be one of the most experienced and best B-52 pilots in the fleet. However, significant animosity existed betweenBud Holland and his co-pilot, Lt Col McGeehan, over Lt Col McGeehan’s unsuccessful efforts to have Lt Col Holland grounded for numerous violations of air discipline spanning a period of three years. Evidence of this negative activity was found in complaints by other crewmembers, maintenance problems from over-stressing or exceeding aircraft limitations, and stories of Lt Col Holland’s accomplishments and plans that circulated throughout the wing. At the time of the accident, however, there was no record of disciplinary actions taken against Lt Col Holland for any of these air infractions. Some of this failed documentation was later attributed to numerous changes in leadership within the 92d Bomb Wing over that three year period. Lt Col McGeehan, concerned about Lt Col Holland’s flying and the leadership’s unwillingness to do anything about it, had ordered his subordinates not to fly with him and told them that “if anyone had to fly with him, he would.”

The crash of Czar 52 was merely the last incident in a chain of poor performance by Lt Col Holland. The lessons to be learned from the crash have nothing to do with Lt Col Holland’s performance, or the aircraft’s capabilities. Leadership failed Lt Col Holland by failing to hold him accountable; as a result, lives were lost in a needless accident. When any airman feels that the rules do not apply to them, and leadership does nothing to correct that assumption, we as leaders fail all of our airmen. The significance of this case study, according to Maj Kern’s “Darker Shades of Blue,” is that:

“It is a compliation of tendencies that are seen throughout the spectrum of our operations. Many aviators report that rules and regulations are “bent” on occasion, and some individuals seem to be “Teflon coated” because their mistakes are ignored or overlooked by their supervisors. Most honest flyers will readily admit to operating under different sets of rules depending on the nature of the mission they are about to fly...This often leads to a confusing mental state for young or inexperienced flyers, who see ever-increasing “shades of gray” creeping into their decision-making process.”

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INCIDENT SUMMARY -

NUCLEAR STEWARDSHIP IN THE AIR FORCE

“No breach of nuclear procedures of this magnitude has ever occurred previously.”

- Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee

12 February 2008

The official report on the “Bent Spear” incident of 29 August 2007, when a B-52 bomber inadvertently transferred cruise missiles with nuclear warheads from Minot AFB, ND to Barksdale AFB, LA, remains classified. However, what follows is

a brief unclassified summary from the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety report dated February 2008.

“The movement plan identified two pylons of nuclear-inert missiles to be transported by tactical ferry on 30 August 2007. Subsequently, personnel of the Minot Munitions Maintenance Squadron changed the plan to prepare and transport a pylon of missiles closer to expirations dates...in lieu of one of the planned pylons of missiles. That change was reflected on the movement plan but not on the documents produced from the internal work coordination process at Minot. The documents produced from this process are used in daily operation and they continued to list the originally scheduled two pylons of weapons. As a consequence, one of the originally scheduled pylons of cruise missiles had not been prepared for tactical ferry. When the breakout crew accessed the storage facility, they did not properly verify the status of the weapons in the facility as required by established procedure and they failed to note that the missiles on one of the pylons on their internal work document still contained nuclear warheads.

“Although procedure requires three subsequent verifications (by three different groups) of the payload installed in the cruise missiles, those procedures were not followed. The weapons were then flown to Barksdale and downloaded from the aircraft. The convoy crew at Barksdale, following the proper procedure, determined that the missiles on one of the pylons contained nuclear warheads.”

Report Findings

• Over time, nuclear weapons movement procedures were compromised for the sake of expediency, without review or approval above the wing level

• Confusion created by storing nuclear weapons with non-nuclear weapons and parts

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• Previous inspections failed to detect changes in processes and procedures

• Nuclear mission as a whole has declined in visibility and oversight

Resulting Disciplinary Actions

• 7 officers, including Wing Commander, Ops Group Commander and Maintenance Group Commander at Minot AFB, were removed from their positions

• Approximately 90 personnel were temporarily decertified from working with nuclear weapons

• 13 airmen were administered UCMJ action

• 15 airmen were administratively removed or affected by the incident

• Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General T. Michael Moseley were asked to resign

Headline News - What the World Saw

The following headlines relate to a series of events from August 2006 to the present day, regarding the well publicized shortfalls in the Air Force in its handling of nuclear weapons.

Sep 5, 2007: Reuters – “U.S. Bomber mistakenly flies with nuclear weapons”

Sep 5, 2007: Associated Press – “Air Force official fired after 6 nukes fly over U.S.”

Sep 5, 2007: USA Today – “Commander disciplined for nuclear mistake”

Sep 6, 2007: CNN – “Air Force investigates mistaken transport of nuclear warheads”

March 26, 2008: Washington Post – “Nuclear Parts Sent to Taiwan in Error”

March 26, 2008: New York Times – “U.S. Sent Missile Parts to Taiwan in Error”

May 31, 2008: Washington Post – “AF Nuclear Weapons Security is Unacceptable”

June 5, 2008: Air Force Times – “Moseley, Wynne to be asked to resign”

June 6, 2008: Los Angeles Times – “Defense Secretary Robert Gates fires Air Force’s top 2 officials”

June 6, 2008: USA Today – “Nuclear mishaps lead to Air Force resignations”

July 25, 2008: Air Force Times – “Minot’s latest alarm: napping with launch codes”

Dec 17, 2008: European Stars and Stripes – “Report: Wyo. Unit Fails Nuke Security Inspection”

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July 15, 2009: Associated Press – “AF Boots Sleeping Missile Crew”

October 30, 2009: Associated Press – “Minot Air Force base commander fired”

Adapted from “Air Force Relieves Commanders Involved in Nucle-ar Weapons Incident”

Armed Forces Press Service, 19 October 2007, by Fred W. Baker III

The series of procedural errors at Minot AFB began at the start of the morning that the pylon – six missiles packaged together for loading – was to be transported. First, crews did not inspect all of the pylons in the weapons storage area. Then, the crew hauling the pylon by trailer to the aircraft failed to inspect the missiles. The Minot mission control center failed to verify the status of the pylons in a database. And finally, the B-52 crew navigator did not check the missiles, which were loaded on the left wing ready for transport. The navigator did check the pylon loaded on the right wing, which was correctly disarmed. The pylon carrying the wrong weapons was never inspected. The B-52 landed that morning at Barksdale AFB, where munitions handlers followed correct procedures, discovered the error and notified officials.

Relieved from duty after a six-week investigation were Col Bruce C. Emig, 5th Bomb Wing commander at Minot Air Force Base, Col Cynthia M. Lundell, the 5th Bomb Wing’s maintenance group commander, and Col Todd C. Westhauser, 2nd Operations Group commander at Barksdale Air Force Base.

Adapted from “Nuclear Parts Sent to Taiwan in Error”

The Washington Post, 26 March 2008, by Josh White

The Defense Department mistakenly shipped secret nuclear missile fuses to Taiwan in 2006 and did not learn that the items were missing until March 2008, Pentagon officials acknowledged, deepening concerns about the security of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Officials with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) sent four nose-cone fuse assemblies to Taiwan in August 2006 instead of four replacement battery packs for use in Taiwan’s fleet of UH-1 Huey helicopters. The fuses help trigger nuclear warheads on Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles as they near their point of impact.

“In an organization as large as DOD, the largest and most complex in the world, there will be mistakes,” said Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, speaking at the Pentagon. “But they cannot be tolerated in the arena of strategic systems, whether they are nuclear or only associated equipment, as was in this case.” Gates found the incident “disconcerting,” he added.

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Senior defense officials said it was almost certainly human error that led to the nose cones being shipped, and Air Force officials were concerned the classified items were placed in an unclassified area of a DLA warehouse and not properly tracked. Quarterly inventory checks over the past 18 months did not show the nose cones were missing.

Adapted from “F. E. Warren Missile Wing Fails Nuke Inspection”

Air Force Times, 16 December 2008, by Michael Hoffman

The 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, WY, failed its Nuclear Surety Inspection in December 2008 because its maintenance group did not properly document tests on its missiles. The 90th was the second nuclear missile wing and at least the fifth nuclear unit known to fail its NSI in 2008.

Inspectors failed the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT, in November. The Air Force’s third and only other nuclear missile wing, the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., received failing grades on its NSI this year from Defense Threat Reduction Agency inspectors, but passed after the Space Command Inspector General overruled DTRA.

DTRA and Space Command inspectors failed the 90th Missile Wing after discovering the maintenance group had not properly documented tests done to its missiles, even leaving some tests completely undocumented. An unsatisfactory grade on any portion of the NSI fails the entire wing. The maintenance group received an unsatisfactory grade early in the inspection.

The 90th’s NSI failure comes less than a year after Defense Department officials discovered the wing was involved in the mistaken shipment of ballistic missile fuses to Taiwan in 2006. Airmen at F.E. Warren shipped the fuses in 2005 to Hill Air Force Base, Utah, where they were placed in unclassified storage after being misidentified as helicopter batteries because of wrong labels and classifications. A year later, Hill airmen shipped the fuses encased in ballistic missile nose cones to Taiwan.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired Wynne and former Chief of Staff Gen. Michael T. Moseley in June for the erosion of the Air Force’s nuclear mission.

Continued Accountability Issues at Minot AFB: Bent Spear Suc-cessor Wing Commander Fired

Associated Press, 30 October 2009, by James MacPherson

The military says the commander at the Minot Air Force Base has been relieved of his command.

The Air Force has lost confidence in Col. Joel Westa’s ability to command the base.

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The military says Westa was unable to “foster a culture of excellence,” and showed “a lack of focus on the strategic mission during his command.” The Air Force says he was not relieved for any alleged misconduct or wrongdoing.

Westa has been the base commander since October 2007. He also commanded the base’s 5th Bomb Wing.

Westa was ousted a little more than two weeks after the base’s missile wing commander, Col. Christopher Ayres, was released of his duties. That followed a series of mishaps including two crashes of vehicles carrying missile parts in a little more than a year.

GENERAL SCHWARTZ ON ACCOUNTABILITYFrom speech at the Air Force Association Convention, 16 September 2008

The subject of accountability is one the Air Force has struggled with in recent weeks. Recent disciplinary actions at the highest levels of leadership have captured national headlines. It gives me no pleasure to have to deal with accountability issues, but we will take action to ensure we do the right thing for our Air Force.

I want to take this opportunity to reiterate the need to police ourselves and sustain Air Force organizational standards. Our role isn’t similar to other professions like the law, clergy or medicine. If you don’t care for your doctor, you can find another. If you don’t care for your pastor, you can find another. If you don’t care for your attorney, lord knows you can find another. But what happens when America finds its AF lacking? What alternative does a nation have when it has only one AF?

That fundamental reality suggests a professional obligation to enforce accountability in matters large and small. I’m not suggesting confusing mistakes for misconduct…or forgetting that not every violation deserves a death sentence. But we must hold ourselves to the highest of standards without eroding the support our people provide each day through their valued service…and by doing what is right for combat readiness. This is how we take care of our Airmen, and create the conditions for Airmen to succeed in combat. Whether related to the matters outlined in the Donald Report or thousands of actions our people perform each day, healthy accountability is the foundation of our mission to fly, fight and win.

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EXCERPT FROM “SELF-EVALUATION:

A DISCONNECT IN OUR VALUES”

Col Jim Slife, USAF From Air and Space Power Journal, Winter 2008

The Little Blue Book identifies “rule following” as a critical component of service before self: “To serve is to do one’s duty, and our duties are most commonly expressed through rules. While it may be the case that professionals are expected to exercise judgment in the performance of their duties, good professionals understand that rules have a reason for being and the default position must be to follow those rules unless there is a clear, operational reason for refusing to do so.”

When we…write our own [performance] reports, we are telling our subordinates that service before self is a great concept for them but that our careers are too valuable to risk trying it out on our own reports. This highlights “faith in the system,” another component of service before self: “To lose faith in the system is to adopt the view that you know better than those above you in the chain of command what should or should not be done. In other words, to lose faith in the system is to place self before service…If the leader resists the temptation to doubt ‘the system’ then subordinates may follow suit. Finally, AFDD-1 highlights the concept of duty as another component of service before self: “Airmen have a duty to fulfill the unit’s mission. Service before self includes performing to the best of one’s abilities the assigned responsibilities and tasks without worrying how a career will be affected. Professionals exercise judgment while performing their duties; they understand rules exist for good reason. They follow rules unless there is a clear operational or legal reason to refuse or deviate.”

In short, if our values are to have any lasting significance to us as an institution, we must demonstrate them in our actions. Leaders…have a responsibility to do the right thing and insist that our actions are consistent with our values. We must do this to ensure that the Airmen following us will not have occasion to lose faith in the system.

______________________________Bibliography:1. Baker, Fred W., III. “Air Force Relieves Commanders Involved in Nuclear Weapons

Incident.” American Forces Press Service, 19 October 2007.2. Blackhawk Shoot-Down. Squadron Officer School (SOS) case study, Maxwell AFB,

AL: SOS, 1996.3. Hoffman, Michael. “F.E. Warren Missile Wing Fails Nuke Inspection.” AIr Force Times,

16 December 2008.4. Kern, Anthony T. Darker Shades of Blue: Case Study in Failed Leadership. 1995.

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5. MacPherson, James. “Minot Air Force Base Commander Fired.” Associated Press, 30 October 2009.

6. Schwartz, Gen Norton, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. Address. Air Force Association Convention, Washington, DC, 16 September 2008.

7. Slife, Col Jim. “Self-Evaluation: A Disconnect in Our Values.” Air and Space Power Journal, Winter 2008.

8. The Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety. “Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons” February 2008.

9. White, Josh. “Nuclear Parts Sent To Taiwan In Error.” The Washington Post, 26 March 2008.