stalin and german reunification: archival evidence on soviet foreign policy in spring 1952

Stalin and German Reunification: Archival Evidence on Soviet Foreign Policy in Spring 1952Author(s): Gerhard WettigSource: The Historical Journal, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 411-419Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2640210 .

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The Historical journal, 37, 2 ( I 994), pp. 4 I I-4 I 9

Copyright C I994 Cambridge University Press

STALIN AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION: ARCHIVAL EVIDENCE ON SOVIET FOREIGN

POLICY IN SPRING 1952

GERHARD WETTIG Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien

I

Was Stalin serious when, on io March I952, he proposed to the three Western powers restoration of Germany as a united state ?1 Over decades, this question has stimulated debate and aroused passion. Three schools of thought have tried to provide a convincing answer. The advocates of a traditionalist view feel that Stalin was committed to expanding or, at minimum, to maintaining Soviet power and communist rule, particularly in central Europe. The revisionists, on the other hand, tend to blame the Western side rather than the U.S.S.R. for East-West confrontation and hence are willing to believe that Moscow was seeking agreement on a number of issues including German reunification. In Germany, the controversy between the traditionalists and the revisionists is usually linked to the political issue of whether Adenauer's policy of integrating the Federal Republic into the Western alliance was sound or whether there was an alternative line of action which, as has been claimed, would have conformed better to the national interest. According to a third perception which prevailed among Western policy-makers at the time, Stalin did not really want agreement on Germany but was confronted with an increasingly successful 'policy of strength' which forced him to seek compromise. On the basis of this assessment, the leaders in the Western capitals including Bonn were not quite sure whether the note was already a positive result of their effort or whether they would have to continue for a while for their policies to bear fruit.2

The diverging Western assessments are based on one commonly accepted premise: if Stalin wanted change in Germany, he could not but come forward with a substantial offer which would induce the three Western powers and/or West Germany to seek agreement with him. Otherwise, everything he could possibly hope for was 'mere propaganda', which would basically leave things in Germany as they were. In concrete terms, Stalin had to decide whether he wanted to allow West Germany to be politically and militarily integrated into the West or whether he wanted to prevent this by giving up Soviet control and communist rule in East Germany.

The views differ exclusively on the perception of the choice with which Stalin saw himself confronted. Was it in his best interests to keep what he had and to allow West Germany to be included in the Western alliance? Or was there an overriding need to neutralize West Germany, even if this implied the G.D.R.'s abandonment? The first view has been taken most notably by Hermann Graml.3 The opposing argument has

1 Text: Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik de Sowjetunion, i ([East-] Berlin, I957), 289-93. 2 Cf. H. Graml, 'Die Legende von der verpassten Gelegenheit', Vierteljahreshefte fur

Zeitgeschichte, xxix (I98I), 330-I.

3 Ibid. pp. 3I0-I I; H. Graml, 'Nationalstaat oder westdeutscher Teilstaat', Vierteljahresheftefur Zeitgeschichte, xxv (I977), 838-42.

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been made particularly by Rolf Steininger.' Either side interprets the evidence which is available from both general context and Western sources in the light of what is seen as Stalin's 'real' interest. Those who feel that the Soviet dictator was unwilling to put East Germany at risk point to the militancy of Soviet rhetoric and to existing evidence for Moscow's political immobility. Their opponents respond by dismissing all this as propaganda routine and/or political mimicry, which was to allow for ambivalence as part of an intended bargaining process.

As a rule, the argument about the Soviet note of io March I952 is developed at three levels. First of all, the issue is put into the context of factional politics within the Soviet leadership. It is then argued that Beria, and later Beria and Malenkov, pursued a course directed at creating a democratic and neutral united Germany against Molotov, Khrushchev and possibly others as well.5 To support this hypothesis, there is no evidence other than subsequent accusations against Beria by his opponents that he wanted to abandon communism in the G.D.R. The blame, however, relates only to the period after Stalin's death in spring I953.6 The second point, which is elaborated in order to elucidate the Soviet policy underlying the note of io March I952, concerns what kind of Western response was aimed at by the Kremlin. The controversy is on whether the Soviet initiative was designed for acceptance or refusal.7

A third field of argument relates to the objectives and intentions 'behind' the Soviet note. On the one hand, the note's wording is analysed. While the traditionalists argue that the terminology used to describe the prospective united Germany's political order had an unequivocal anti-Western meaning in the Soviet context, the revisionists respond by saying that the note's authors must have allowed for its being interpreted along Western lines of thought as well. What the Kremlin's objectives and intentions may have been is also discussed, by ascribing pro- or anti-German attitudes to Stalin and other members of the Politburo and by speculating on the implications of the Soviet dictator's strategies to play off the Germans against the Western countries. A fourth set of indicators, which may allow us to infer whether Stalin was indeed putting the G.D.R. at risk, is hardly ever discussed: how Ulbricht and his peers reacted to the Soviet initiative, which was bound to 'sacrifice' them if this proposal was meant to be 'serious'.

4 R. Steininger, Eine Chance zur Wiedervereinigung? Die Stalin-Note vonm io. AMdrz 1952. Darstellulng und Dokumentation auf der Grundlage unverJffentlichter britischer uind amerikanischer Akten, Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte, Supplement I2 (Bonn, I985).

5 For this line of argument see, inter alia, B. Meissner, 'Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage, I949-I955', D. Geyer (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuich. Band Sowjetunion, Teil Auissenpolitik I (Cologne-Vienna, I972), pp. 482-3.

6 'Das Schlusswort von Walter Ulbricht auf dem I5. Plenum des ZK der SED, 24-26. Juli I 953' [ = text of a secret document], Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, I 2June I 957, pp. 364-70; speech by Walter Ulbricht, Neues Deutschland, 28 Nov. I96I; speech by Nikita S. Khruschev, Izvestiia, io March I963. In the meantime, also the original texts of Malenkov's, Khruschev's Molotov's and Bulganin's accusations against Beria at the CPSU Central Committee meetings of 2-3 July I953

have been disclosed ('Delo Berria. Plenum TsK KPSS, iiul' I 953 goda. Stenografischeskii otchet', Izvestiia TsK KPSS, I991 : I, I39-7 7).

7 While the revisionist school of thought largely takes it for granted that a positive Western response was expected in Moscow, the traditionalists point to evidence which indicates the opposite (see e.g. H. Graml, 'Die Legende', op. cit. pp. 3I6, 326-8, 340; H. Graml, 'Nationalstaat', op. cit. pp. 832-4, 838-9).



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II

In the files of the foreign policy archive of the Russian Federation, the prehistory of the Io March I952 note can be traced back to 24 February I95I. At that date the head of the third European department of the Soviet foreign ministry, M. Gribanov, suggested to deputy foreign minister A. Gromyko that principles for a peace treaty with Germany be prepared, which would allow the Soviet delegation at the prospective session of the foreign ministers' council to argue more forcefully.8 Remarkably enough, the S.E.D. leaders were accorded a role in the scheme. They were to come out with an initiative on Germany. Contrary to what would have to be expected if there had been a risk involved regarding their power, they were not in the least reluctant. On 2I February I 95 I Pieck, Ulbricht and Grotewohl volunteered to come up with the proposal which would allow the Soviet side to present its proposal as a response to an appeal which would originate from Germany.9

Soviet stalling tactics during the 5 March-22 June I95 I preparatory talks made the session of the four foreign ministers illusory. Hence no preparation was needed for it. Thus it was only in the following summer that the idea of an initiative on the German problem received further attention. On 3 August I 95 I Gribanov proposed to Gromyko that a commission be formed to write a draft of principles for a peace treaty with Germany. After the text had been prepared and subsequently approved by foreign minister Vyshinksy, it might then be sent to Stalin for approval. As Gribanov added, action was required to counter the 'wrong impression' which the Germans might get from the three Western powers' declaration terminating the state of war with Germany.10 Once again, the S.E.D. leadership was willing to be helpful. A plan of action was envisaged according to which the East German government was to take the first step. It would propose to Bonn a joint consultation to draft an appeal to the governments of the four powers urging them to conclude a peace treaty with Germany soon. It was, however, expected that Adenauer's government would reject the proposal. Therefore, the G.D.R. government would subsequently make the envisaged plea for an early peace treaty alone. In response to that, the Soviet government would then come out with its intended initiative and send a note to the three Western governments to which principles for the prospective peace treaty with Germany would be added.'1 On the basis of this plan of action, the preparations started.

At the end of August or at the beginning of September I95I, a commission in the foreign ministry was formed to submit a draft of the principles for a peace treaty with Germany. The candidate for chairman who had been envisaged by Gribanov was not accepted by Vyshinsky. So it was A. Bogomolov rather than S. Golunsky who chaired the drafting commission."2 The first version, however, was not provided by the commission but by Gribanov's third European department. The commission was simply to look at it and to make corrections to the extent that it deemed them

8 M. Gribanov to A. A. Gromyko, 24 Feb. 195 I, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (henceforth: AVPRF), o82, 38, II2, 250:387/Zeo.

9 Reported by S. Kudriavtsev to [deputy foreign minister] V. A. Zorin, 6 March I95I, AVPRF, o82, 38, II2, 250: 446/Zeo.

0 M. Gribanov to A. A. Gromyko, 3 Aug. I95I, AVPRF, o82, 38, I 12, 250: 1475/Zeo. " M. Gribanov to A. Ia. Vyshinskii, I5 Aug. I95I, AVPRF, o82, 38, 112, 250: I558/Zeo. 12 M. Gribanov to A. Ia. Vyshinskii, 27 Aug. I95I, AVPRF, o82, 38, I I2, 250: I642/Zeo. This

document is annotated in the addressee's handwriting.

1 4-2



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necessary.'3 It was only for a few weeks that the drafting commission operated. Even during this limited period of time, it was the third European department that provided the essential input. As it appears, the commission was merely a body which looked at what was prepared by Gribanov and his staff. It was evidently Gribanov who informed foreign minister Vyshinsky about the progress of the work."4 As early as in mid- September, the intended plan of action was transmitted to Stalin and approved by him. The decision was left open on when the right time would have come to implement the plan."5 In mid-January I952 the S.E.D. leadership, supported by the Soviet control commission in Germany, felt that the plan of action should be modified. Soviet deputy foreign minister Gromyko, however, strongly advised Stalin against this,16 and the proposal was rejected.

The final phase was reached when Gromyko suggested to Stalin in the second half of January I952 that the right time had come to implement the decision of mid- September I 95 I. As he explained, it was expedient to maintain the momentum and the initiative which had been gained by the East German proposal for elections in all of Germany. For this reason, the G.D.R. government was to direct the envisaged appeal to the four powers that a peace treaty be urgently concluded with Germany. When Stalin subsequently agreed, the deputy foreign minister sent him all the relevant documents including the plea which the G.D.R. government was to send to the four capitals, and the Soviet dictator formally took his decision.17 Five days later, the East German government sent and published the respective note. 18 From then on, everything went according to the fixed schedule. Within a week, Moscow answered that it agreed with the East German government and supported its initiative. Less than three weeks later, on Io March I952, the Soviet note and the enclosed principles for a peace treaty with Germany were both sent to the Western governments and made public.

The files of the foreign ministry in Moscow do not contain the slightest hint that factional strife among the C.P.S.U. top functionaries influenced the German unification initiative in any way. What emerges is the picture of bureaucratic procedures which are carefully observed. The key role is played by Gromyko as the deputy foreign minister responsible for German affairs. It was he to whom the head of the third European department directed his suggestions and proposals. And it was he who cleared the initiative with foreign minister Vyshinsky and supreme leader Stalin. As far as the details of the wording are concerned, the head of the third European department was

13 M. Gribanov to A. E. Bogomolov, 8 Sept. I95I, AVPRF, o82, 38, II2, 250: I76o/Zeo. 14 M. Gribanov to A. E. Bogomolov, I5 Sept. I95i, AVPRF, o82, 38, I I2, 250: i8io/Zeo; M.

Gribanov to A. Ia. Vyshinskii, 20 Sept. I95i, AVPRF, o82, 38, I I2, 250: i842/Zeo. 15 This document has not been found but its contents can be deduced from reference in a

number of other documents: A. Gromyko to V. M. Molotov, 2I Jan. I952, enclosure: A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin, AVPRF, 07, 25, 100, I3: I24/ag; A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin, 25 Jan. I952, AVPRF, o82, 40, I I, 255: ioia-Ge; A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin, 28Jan. I952, AVPRF, 07,

25, 100, I3: I73/r. 16 A. Gromyko to V. M. Molotov, 2I Jan. I952, enclosure: A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin,

AVPRF, 07, 25, 100, I3: I24/ag.

17 A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin, 25 Jan. I952, AVPRF, o82, 40, I I, 255: ioia-Ge; A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin, 28 Jan. I952, AVPRF, 07, 25, IOO, I3: I73/r; Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b): 0 meropriiatiiakh po uskorniiu zakliucheniia mirnogo dogovora s Germaniei i sozdaniia edinogo, demokraticheskogo, miroliubivogo germanskogo gosudarstva, 8 Feb. I952, AVPRF, 07, 25, IOO,

I3: I633ss/6.

18 Text: Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, I

([East-]Berlin, I954), 73-6.



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the principal operator. It was he who suggested to the foreign minister that a drafting commission be created. And it was he who, on the basis of drafts which he provided, prepared the texts to be submitted to the commission during the short period of its existence and subsequently to both his superiors in the foreign ministry and to Molotov as the politburo member responsible for foreign policy.

Molotov saw the draft only when the basic pattern had already been set. After that, however, he was involved very intensively: he had seen the text at least ten times at the various stages before the principles for a peace treaty with Germany were issued at the end. As it appears, Molotov was not overly burdened with responsibility and thus was the right man with whom the matter could be cleared in detail. As far as one can tell from the foreign ministry documents, Stalin had the text only twice. The politburo members other than Molotov were not asked for their opinion, and apparently received the relevant texts only once. On the basis of this evidence, it is inconceivable that there was any controversy among politburo members over policies to be pursued towards Germany. This can be assumed for still another reason. In the late forties and early fifties, Stalin made the foreign policy choices by himself, if in the name of the politburo, which met only rarely and then decided largely matters such as personnel questions.19

The bureaucratic pattern of Soviet foreign policy-making in I95 I/52 should not be misread as meaning that Western-type bureaucratic politics were practised. The basic prerequisites for such a pattern of interaction were missing. While the executive apparatuses, including their lower echelons, had leeway to suggest the kind of implementation measures they saw fit, there was no freedom to propose differing directions of foreign policy and to initiate controversies over them.

IIII

The documents of the foreign ministry in Moscow clearly reveal that the Soviet foreign policy-makers had little intent to elicit positive response among Western governments. On one occasion, it is true, the possibility was taken into account that the unlikely might happen and the Western side would accept the Soviet proposal to negotiate on Germany. Then the context makes clear that the Soviet foreign policy- makers perceived this to be a result of mounting pressures from the 'masses' in Germany who were expected to be mobilized by the perspective of a peace treaty with a reunified German state.20 If the contingency of Western willingness to accept negotiations was taken into account at all, it was never seen to be likely. What is more, the Soviet foreign policy-makers at all levels never felt that such acceptance was desirable. A positive response by Western governments was never discussed as an objective to the attainment of which efforts had to be made. It was the general public, particularly in Germany, to whom the message was directed.

There is detailed evidence on how the Soviet foreign policy-makers assessed the correlation of political forces in Germany as the crucial area of East-West conflict. Both the three Western powers and the West German government were generally viewed as enemies who had to be fought with any political means available. In conformity with Stalin's idea that the 'forces of imperialism' could, and should, be played off against

19 Iu. S. Aksenov, 'Apogei Stalinizma: Poslevoennaia piramida vlasti', Voprosy istorii KPSS, I99O: II, IOO-I.

20 A. Gromyko to V. I. Stalin [not later than 2I Jan. I952], AVPRF, 07, 25, 100, I3: I24/ag.



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each other, political differences within the Western camp were perceived as levers to disunite its various parts. The principal antagonist was, of course, the United States, which was accused of opposing German unification. Nonetheless, the U.S. was seen as persuading the 'German imperialist bourgeoisie' that 'unification would be put into practice, but only militarily and in alliance with the U.S.A.'. It was felt that this could be countered by hinting at the Morgenthau plan and the argument that Germany would never be reunified and become an independent state if it relied on American support. In Moscow's perspective, there was still another rift which could be exploited against the Western side: a widening conflict between the United States on the one hand and Britain and France on the other. The U.S.S.R.'s divisive strategy, however, was felt to be impeded both by British and French 'enforced' subservience to Washington and the West German imperialists' willingness to pursue the unification goal on the basis of an alliance with the United States.

Therefore, the Soviet foreign policy-makers invested their hopes not in negotiating with Western governments but in promoting political changes within Germany. It was crucial to eliminate the 'dictatorship' exercised by the 'German imperialist bourgeoisie' and to cope with official West German propaganda which sought 'to intimidate the masses and to prevent them from action against remilitarization'. An appropriate instrument to do away with 'imperialism' in West Germany was to invoke the I 945 'principles of Potsdam', to advocate 'unification of Germany on a democratic basis and in a peaceful way' and to promote 'conclusion of a peace treaty with a united Germany' to this end. It was also seen as essential to unmask the parties of both the ruling coalition in Bonn and the social democratic opposition as opponents of the national German interest and thereby to undermine the influence with the West German masses. Not even the bourgeois forces of Heinemann and Wessel, who opposed Adenauer on fundamentalist national grounds, had a positive response in Moscow, since their perceived potential to mobilize the German masses was felt to impair the political chances of the pro-Soviet forces. Only the West German communists were sympathetically looked at, given the fact that they were clearly subservient to East Berlin and Moscow.2'

IV

Compared to the principles for a peace treaty with Germany which were added to the note of Io March I952, the wording of the first draft of 8 September I95I was much more outspoken. This applies particularly to the clauses that pertain to the prospective united Germany's political and social order. Free activities were to be allowed only to those 'democratic parties and organizations the programme of which promotes the country's peaceful and democratic development and aims at the strengthening of peace and the establishment of friendship between the peoples'. Any activity of organizations and individuals 'which is directed at depriving the people of its democratic right, at restoring German militarism and fascism, and at cultivating revanchist ideas', was to

21 This assessment has been summarized from a document which the U.S.S.R's diplomatic mission in the G.D.R. sent to the third European department of the foreign ministry on I 5 March 1952 and which was then transmitted with the department's full approval to, inter alia, Gromyko, Vyshinsky and Stalin (Ekonomicheskii i politicheskii obzor polozheniia Zapadnoi Germanii v I95I godu, I5 March I952, o82, 40, 042-Ge/2, 254: I248 resp. 675/3).



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be banned. Soviet interpretation of the Potsdam agreement since I946 had made amply clear that this was to be interpreted in the Soviet mould. Blunter still were the economic postulates. Not only acceptance and development of the G.D.R.'s 'democratic transformations in industry, agriculture and other branches of the economy' in a future united Germany were deemed mandatory. These transformations had also to be imposed on Western Germany. At the same time, the West Germans would have to leave the European Community on Coal and Steel and to cut all other economic ties with the West. The united Germany's envisaged obligation to abstain from 'political or military alliances' was identical with the one contained in the final version of io March I952. In the draft of 8 September I95I there was also a clear tendency to stress restrictive conditions for Germany and to frustrate any claims the Western countries had against the Germans, whereas Soviet claims, particularly in the realm of reparations, were vigorously upheld. On the whole, the first draft shows tendencies identical with the ones contained in the final version, but in a language which was more difficult to digest for the Germans.22

Evaluation of the Soviet March I952 initiative must equally take into account its authors' underlying intentions. The basic objective was seen as the provision of support for the German communists in their 'struggle for the unity of Germany and the acceleration of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany '.23 In this context, the Soviet note to the three Western powers was believed to have 'great political importance for strengthening the struggle for peace and against remilitarization of West Germanv', since it 'would help the advocates of Germany's unity and of peace to unmask the three Western powers' aggressive intentions that are linked to the "General Treaty "'. The purpose was to develop a " campaign of struggle for the unity of Germany and the peace treaty '.24

Gromyko, who formulated this strategy in a number of memoranda to Stalin, felt it was crucial that the correct focus was chosen. The fundamental issue on which the struggle of the pro-Soviet forces in Germany had to be centred was not polemics against the vices of Bonn's treaties with the Western powers but the 'issue of concluding a peace treaty ', which would provide for 'withdrawal of the occupation troops' plus the 'issue of all-German elections aiming at a united, democratic and peace-loving Germany .'25

The S.E.D. leadership was instructed to start a 'campaign in the press and among the population' according to Gromyko's recommendations. The Soviet foreign policy- makers expected that this would strengthen the 'movement for restoring the unity of Germany' and bring about a 'new stage in the struggle of the German people for the liquidation of the existing split of Germany and for the creation of a united Germany '.26

It is instructive how the Soviet foreign ministry explained the note to Germany's communist neighbours. In a draft for a letter to be directed to the governments in Warsaw and Prague, the third European department stressed that mass mobilization for the creation of a united German state was resisted by the three Western powers which sought to 'substitute the peace treaty by their General Treaty and by accelerated West German integration into the war plans of the Atlantic bloc'. For this

22 M. Gribanov to A. E. Bogomolov, 8 Sept. I 95 I, AVPRF, o82, 38, I I 2, 250: I 760/Zeo. 23 A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin, 28 Jan. 1952, AVPRF, 07, 25, IOO, I3: I73/r. 24 A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin, 25 Jan. I952, AVPRF, o82, 40, II, 225: ioia/Ge. Largely

identical: A. Gromyko to I. V. Stalin, 2I Jan. 1952, AVPRF, 07, 25, 100, I3: I24/ag. 25 Ibid. 26 Gribanov to Chuikov and Semenov [no date], AVPRF, o82, 40, II, 225: IoIa/Ge.



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reason, it was necessary 'to develop the movement of the German people for peace and against war on an even broader basis and to confront the aggressive plans of the three powers concerning West Germany with a positive programme of a peace settlement with Germany and of concluding the peace treaty'. The envisaged action was to provide the 'political circles of the G.D.R. and of West Germany' with the possibility 'to develop a respective campaign in the press and among the German population against the aggressive policy of the three powers concerning West Germany'.27

That Stalin was indeed unwilling to negotiate seriously about German reunification and to allow the G.D.R. to be put at risk can be clearly seen from three facts. When the io March I952 note had hardly begun to make an impact, Stalin was already talking with the S.E.D. leaders about forced communization, accelerated militar- ization, and intensified border controls in the G.D.R.28 This is in stark contrast to what would have been expected if the Kremlin had really sought East-West understanding on Germany, as was pretended. At the same time, the assumption that Stalin was seeking agreement with the West is falsified by Soviet avoidance of any diplomatic dialogue. On the only occasion when a Western representative in Moscow talked to Vyshinsky during the crucial period, i.e. when U.S. Charge d'Affaires Cumming handed the three Western powers' negative reply to the U.S.S.R.'s plea for peace treaty negotiations, the Soviet foreign minister showed himself quite pleased with the response.29 Last but not least, there is not the slightest indication that the S.E.D. hierarchs were worried by the Soviet initiative, as they would inevitably have been if they had sensed that their position in East Germany might be endangered. Instead, they invariably applauded Soviet action fully. President Pieck expressed this feeling upon arrival in Moscow on 3I March I952, saying that the Soviet note 'had made a deep impression not only in the G.D.R. but in West Germany'. He added that the campaign promised 'further successful development'.30

V

The Soviet documents make abundantly clear that the three Western governments to which the note was sent were not the real addressees. The initiative was meant to mobilize the German 'masses', particularly in the Federal Republic, behind communist cadres under Soviet control in an intense effort to oust Adenauer's government and to force the Western powers out of Germany. Thus the basic premise of Western judgement - that Stalin was confronted with the choice of having either to seek agreement with Western governments or to accept his action's irrelevance - was absent from the Soviet foreign policy-makers' minds. The initiators of the io March I 952 note rather felt that they could effect political change in Germany by instrumentalizing the note for the purpose of mobilizing the German population against the Western powers and the West German government. To be sure, one can convincingly argue that this

27 Proekt pis'ma pol'skomu pravitel'stvu [no date], AVPRF, o82, 40, II, 225: ioia/Ge (enclosure).

28 A. Gromyko to A. Ia. Vyshinskii, i8 April 1952, AVPRF, 07, 27, i62, 42: 3347/r; Wilfriede Otto (ed.), 'Sowjetische Deutschlandnote 1952. Stalin und die DDR. Bisher unveroffentlichte handschriftliche Notizen Wilhelm Piecks', Beitrdge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 1991: 3, 374-89 (introduction and notes by Pieck relating to the S.E.D. leaders' conversations with Stalin on I and 7 April 1952).

29 H. Graml, 'Die Legende', op. cit. pp. 329-30 (on the basis of U.S. diplomatic documents). 30 Iz dnevnika A. Ia. Vyshinskogo, I April 1952, AVPRF, 07, 27, i6o, 42.



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was a gross overestimation of Soviet possibilities and that the premise underlying sceptical Western assessment of Moscow's effort was sound by objective standards. But if one looks at what the Soviet foreign policy-makers felt and thought, one cannot but conclude that they saw their effective activity elsewhere, and certainly not as doing business with Western governments.



stalin and german reunification: archival evidence on soviet foreign policy in spring 1952

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