specific design consideration of smart for application … · specific design consideration of...

1

Specific Design Consideration of SMART for Application in the Middle East and

North Africa Region

2017. 10. 3.

Hyun-Sik Park

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

IAEA Technical Meeting on Technology Assessment of Small Modular Reactors for Near Term

Deployment, 2 – 5 October 2017, Tunis, Tunisia

2

Contents

1 Introduction

2 Design & Safety Features of SMART

5 Summary

4 Deployment Roadmap of SMART

3 Specific Design Consideration for MENA

3

SMART: Integral Type Reactor with Multiple Application

Introduction (1/2)

Electricity and Fresh Water Supply to a City of 100,000 Population

Suitable for Small Grid Size or Distributed Power System

365 MWth

Integral PWR

Electricity Generation, Desalination and/or District Heating

Plant Data

Thermal Power : 365 MWt

Electricity: 90 MWe

Water : 40,000 ton/day

Seawater Potable

water

Electricity

Desalination Plant

Intake

Facilities

Steam

SMART

Steam

Transformer

SMART:System-

integrated

Modular

Advanced

ReacTor

../../../../SMART/발표자료/SMART-대외발표/동해안에너지포럼/최종발표자료/20091113.wmv

../../../../SMART/발표자료/SMART-대외발표/동해안에너지포럼/최종발표자료/20091113.wmv

4

Harmonizing Innovative Concept and Proven Technology for Regulatory License and Market/Public Acceptance

Introduction (2/2)

• All Primary Components in

Reactor Vessel

• Passive Safety Systems

• Modularization for Field

Installation and Maintenance

• Fully Digitalized Control System

Proven Technologies

• 17x17 UO2 Proven Fuel Technology

• Large Dry Containment Building

• Control Rod Drive Mechanism

• Reactivity Control Concepts using

Burnable Poison and Soluble Boron

Innovative Concept

5

Generals: Integral type PWR for generation of electrical power

Plant design life : 60 years

Ultimate heat sink : seawater for seashore construction (or cooling tower for inland construction)

Plant availability : more than 90%

Reload cycle : more than 30 months

Spent fuel storage capacity : 30 years

Safety Criteria: Fully passive system for accident mitigation

CDF(Core Damage Frequency) : less than 1.0 * 10-6/RY

Containment failure frequency : less than 1.0 * 10-7/RY

Operator response time (grace time) : more than 72 hours

Seismic Design : 0.3g (~7.0 (Richter scale))

Design & Safety Features of SMART (1/8)

6

RPV - NSSS

All Primary Components in a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)

8 Helical Once-through SG’s

4 Canned Motor Pumps

Internal Steam Pressurizer

25 CRDM’s

RPV Internals

Upper Guide Structure &

Core Support Barrel, …

RPV

6.5 m (D) X 18.5 m (H)

Design Condition: 17 MPa, 360oC

RPV Life > 60 years


Control Rod Drive

Mechanism

Pressurizer

Reactor Coolant

Pump

Upper Guide

Structure

Core Support

Barrel

Flow Mixing

Header Ass’y

Core

ICI Nozzles

Steam

Nozzle

Feedwater

Nozzle

Steam

Generator

Lower Core

Support Plate

Flow Skirt

7

RPV - Internals


PSV Nozzle

CRDM Nozzle

ICI Nozzle

ICI Support Structure

PSV Nozzle

CRDM Nozzle

ICI Nozzle

PSV Nozzle

CRDM Nozzle

ICI Nozzle

ICI Support Structure

Flow Skirt

Core Support Barrel

Upper Guide Structure

Flow Mixing Header Assembly

Helical Steam Generator

Impeller Flywheel

Diffuser

Component Cooling

Sealing Can

Shaft

Cooler Rotor

Stator

Impeller Flywheel

Diffuser

Component Cooling

Sealing Can

Shaft

Cooler Rotor

Stator

Canned Motor Pump

8

RPV – Fuel & Core

Fuel

Proven 17 x 17 LEU Fuel with Reduced Height (2 m)

Peak Rod Burn-up > 60 GWD/MTU

Core

57 Fuel Assemblies

Fuel Cycle Length > 3 years

Availability Factor > 95%

Proven Reactivity Control

25 External Magnetic-Jack CRDM (4-Channel)

Soluble Boron & Burnable Poison

60 years of On-site Spent Fuel Storage


12 8 12 8 12

8 12 8 12 8

12 8 12 8 12

12 8 12

12 8 12

A B C D E F G H J

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

90°

270°

0°180°

2.82 w/o U-235 21 FA

4.88 w/o U-235 36 FA

N indicates No. of UO2+Gd2O3 fuel rods.

N

N

84 4

84 4

4

4

8

4

4

8

8

8 8

8

8

88

8

24

24

24

24

20

20

20

20

20

20 20

20

20

20

20

20

S2 S1 S1 S2

R1 R3 R1 R3 R1

S2 S1 S1 S2

R2 R3 R2

S2 S2

R1

R1

S2 S2

R2 R3 R2

A B C D E F G H J

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

90°

270°

0°180°

Regulating Bank

Shutdown Bank

R

S

9

RPV – Thermal-hydraulics

Major Flow Path through Upper Guide Structure (UGS) Holes at Upper Part to minimize Cross Flow

Flow Mixing Header Assembly (FMHA) provides Thermal/Flow Mixing in case of TH Asymmetry

Major TH Parameters


Parameter Value

Core Thermal Power, MWth

Pressure, MPa

Core Average Mass Flux, kg/m2s

Maximum Core Bypass, %

Average Rod Heat Flux, kW/m2

Core Inlet Temperature, oC

SG Inlet, oC

Steam Superheating, oC

Fuel Thermal Margin, %

365

15

2,507

4.0

360

295.7

323

30

> 15

10

Fluid Systems

Secondary Systems (Steam, Feedwater)

Charging, Letdown, CVCS

Safety Systems (PRHRS, PSIS, CPRSS)


SMART Safety System

PRHRS

CPRSSPSIS

11

Safety Systems

Inherent Safety Features

No Large Break: Vessel Penetration < 2” (NONE from RPV Bottom)

Large Primary Coolant Inventory

SG Secondary as Pressure Boundary and No Excessive Cooling

Low Vessel Fluence

Engineered Safety Features

Passive Residual Heat Removal System (4 Train)

Natural Circulation Cooling of SG from Secondary Side

Entry to Shutdown Cooling Condition in 36 hrs using 2 Trains

Passive Safety Injection System (4 Train)

4 trains of CMT (Core Makeup Tank) and SIT (Safety Injection Tank)

2 stages of ADS (Automatic Depressurization System)

Containment Pressure and Radioactivity Suppression System (CPRSS) functions as a Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS)


12

Digital MMIS

Fully Digitalized I&C System

4 Channel Safety/Protection System and Communication

2 Channel Non-Safety System

Advanced Human-Interface Control Room

Ecological Interface Design

Alarm Reduction

Elastic Tile Alarm


Safety A channel

Safety B channel

Safety C channel

Safety D channel

Non-Safety X channel

Non-Safety Y channel

Safety Interface network

Non-Safety Interface network

Non-Safety Backbone network

Hard-wired connection

Logical data flow connection

RSR RCR TSC ERF

ISO

PIS D

PIS C

PIS B

PIS A

NIS D

NIS C

NIS B

NIS A

PPS D

PPS C

PPS B

PPS A

RTSG D

RTSG C

RTSG B

RTSG A

AIS

(PAM B)AIS

(PAM A)

SGCS D

SGCS C

SGCS B

SGCS A

SMS B

(ICCMS)SMS A

(ICCMS)

SafetyInterface Network

SMS

(NIMS)

NIS Y

NIS X

PIS Y

PIS X POCS

PRCS Y

PRCS X

SDCS Y

SDCS X

AIS IPS

Non-safetyInterface Network

PAM-D

SGSC

NSGSC

NSGSC SGSCNSGSC NSGSC

Display such as Information (IPS), Indication (AIS) and Alarm (AIS)

LDP

Field Sensors Field Sensors Ex-Core Detectors MCC NIMS Sensors Ex-Core Detector Field SensorsCEDM

MCPMCC MCC

Non-SafetyBackbone Network

SafetyShutdownControlPanel

Main Control Panel

Auxiliary Control Panel

AISCEDM ERFICCMSIPSMCCMCPMCRNISNSGSCPAM -DPIS POCS PPSPRCSRCRRSRSCOPS SDCSSGCSSGSCSMSSSTSC

: Alarm and Indication System: Control Element Drive Mechanism: Emergency Response Facility: Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System: Information Processing System: Motor Control Center: Main Coolant Pump: Main Control Room: Nuclear Instrumentation System: Non -Safety Grade Soft Controller: PAM Display: Process Instrumentation System: POwer Control System: Plant Protection System: PRocess Control System: Rad waste Control Room: Remote Shutdown Room: SMART COre Protection System : SeconDary Control System: Safety Grade Control System: Safety Grade Soft Controller: Specific Monitoring System: Sub -network Switch: Technical Support Center

Safety A channel

Safety B channel

Safety C channel

Safety D channel

Non-Safety X channel

Non-Safety Y channel

Safety Interface network

Non-Safety Interface network

Non-Safety Backbone network

Hard-wired connection

Logical data flow connection

RSR RCR TSC ERF

ISO

PIS D

PIS C

PIS B

PIS A

NIS D

NIS C

NIS B

NIS A

PPS D

PPS C

PPS B

PPS A

RTSG D

RTSG C

RTSG B

RTSG A

AIS

(PAM B)AIS

(PAM A)

SGCS D

SGCS C

SGCS B

SGCS A

SMS B

(ICCMS)SMS A

(ICCMS)

SafetyInterface Network

SMS

(NIMS)

NIS Y

NIS X

PIS Y

PIS X POCS

PRCS Y

PRCS X

SDCS Y

SDCS X

AIS IPS

Non-safetyInterface Network

PAM-D

SGSC

NSGSC

NSGSC SGSCNSGSC NSGSC

Display such as Information (IPS), Indication (AIS) and Alarm (AIS)

LDP

Field Sensors Field Sensors Ex-Core Detectors MCC NIMS Sensors Ex-Core Detector Field SensorsCEDM

MCPMCC MCC

Non-SafetyBackbone Network

SafetyShutdownControlPanel

Main Control Panel

Auxiliary Control Panel

AISCEDM ERFICCMSIPSMCCMCPMCRNISNSGSCPAM -DPIS POCS PPSPRCSRCRRSRSCOPS SDCSSGCSSGSCSMSSSTSC

: Alarm and Indication System: Control Element Drive Mechanism: Emergency Response Facility: Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System: Information Processing System: Motor Control Center: Main Coolant Pump: Main Control Room: Nuclear Instrumentation System: Non -Safety Grade Soft Controller: PAM Display: Process Instrumentation System: POwer Control System: Plant Protection System: PRocess Control System: Rad waste Control Room: Remote Shutdown Room: SMART COre Protection System : SeconDary Control System: Safety Grade Control System: Safety Grade Soft Controller: Specific Monitoring System: Sub -network Switch: Technical Support Center

13

MENA & Korean Nuclear Energy

Specific Design Consideration for MENA (1/17)

JRTR (Jordan)

APR1400 (UAE)SMART (KSA)

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

14

Nuclear cooperation between MENA and Korea

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan)

Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR) by KAERI & JAEC

Construction finished (2010.8~2017.6)

5 MWt thermal power, in Irbid area (@JUST)

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Construction of APR1400 by KEPCO & ENEC

Being constructed (2012.7~2018.)

4 units of 1400 MWe NPP (in Barakah area, Abu Dhabi)

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)

Korea-KSA SMART Partnership (2015.9~)

Share SMART Technology Ownership through Pre-Project Engineering and FOAK Plant Construction in KSA

Joint Marketing of SMART in MENA region

K.A.CARE Human Capability Buildup for SMART NSSS design

Feasibility study on SMART for Jordan together with KSA, Jordan


15

Site Information: Annual Temperatures and Humidity


Temperatures in KSA

Humidity in KSA

Temperatures in Tunisia

16

Specific Design Consideration of SMART for KSA

Following Regulatory Requirements

Evaluation criteria

Reduced LPZ for emergency planning

Enhance safety and economic competitiveness

Based on general data on specific site location

Ambient temperature, humidity

Seawater temperature

Electrical grid, city water supply

Precipitation, wind velocity

Fire protection, soil properties, …

Consideration for inland construction

Cooling Tower

Consideration for seashore construction

Desalination System


Desalination

Cooling Tower

17

SMART Passive Safety Systems

Passive Residual Heat Removal System (PRHRS)

Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS)

Containment Pressure and Radioactivity Suppression System (CPRSS)


18

Containment Pressure and Radioactivity Suppression System (CPRSS)

Design to reduce LPZ

Lesser radioactivity release

Under design


IRWST

ECT(4EA)

G. L.

RX

CMT(4EA)

SIT(4EA)

PrimaryContainment

Area (PCA)

Secondary Containment Area (SCA)

ECTHX

SIT(4EA)

ECTHS (4EA)

SpargerPressure

Relief Line

IRWSTVent Line

HVAC

IodineFilter

TSP Tank

Reactor Containment and Auxiliary Building

(RCAB)

19

General Arrangement

Twin units construction

~20% more economical than single unit


20

Required site information for site-specific design


Required Data Contents

Sea water level (Max., Min) Hydrologic data

Geotechnical engineering data

Soil & Rock Parameter

Environmental Data in region of site

Location & Chemical spills

Seismology data Seismic design

Projected population, Individual data

Public dose rate

Sea water temp. & Air temp. HVAC, CCW, Service water

Chlorination Demand Chlorination system

21

System List to consider Site Specific Data from KSA

Ambient temperature

Control Room HVAC System

Standby Diesel Generator Building HVAC System

Electrical and I&C Equipment Areas HVAC System

Aux. Building Controlled Area HVAC System

Aux. Building Clean Area HVAC System

Control Room Emergency Habitability System

Reactor Containment Building HVAC System

Reactor Containment Building Purge System

Turbine Generator Building HVAC System

Compound Building HVAC System

CW Intake Structure HVAC System

Chlorination BLDG HVAC System

Plant Chilled Water System


22

System List to consider Site Specific Data from KSA

Seawater temperature

Circulating Water System

Turbine Building Open Cooling Water System

Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System

Component Cooling Water System

Service Water System


23

SMART Deployment: Seashore or Inland


Candidate locations for inland deployment

Candidate locations for seashore deployment

24

Nuclear Desalination using SMART (conceptual)

The SMART reactor is coupled to four MED units, each with thermal-vapor compressor (MED-TVC) and producing total 40,000 m3/day, with 90 MWe.

Multiple Effect Distillation (MED) Plant was considered.

Vapor produced by an external heating steam source

Vapor multiplied by placing several evaporators (effects) in series under successively lower pressures,

Vapor produced in each effect is used as a heat source for the next one.


Seawater / BrineDistilled / CondensateSteamChemical / etc.

Effect# 1 Effect#2

Chemical

Pre-

HeaterSeawater

Holding

Tank

Condensate

Pump

FinalCondenser

Seawater

Return

Pump

Seawater

Cooler

Thermo

Compressor

38℃

Steam

Transformer

25

Types of Cooling System

Once-through cooling

Closed-cycle wet cooling

Cooling pond

Dry cooling

Hybrid cooling

Cooling System of NPPs

Once through dominates (Sea-45%; Lake-15%; River-14%)

Closed cycle with cooling tower: 26%

At present, about 43% of U.S. thermoelectric generating capacity is served by once-through systems, 42% by closed-cycle systems, 1% by dry cooling systems, and the remainder by cooling ponds.


26

Cooling system options


for 3000 MWt

27

Once-Through Cooling vs Closed Cycle Wet Cooling


28

Dry Cooling & Hybrid Concepts


Air

High enthalpy

Low enthalpy

Air

High enthalpy

Low enthalpy

Fin tubes

Air Cool Condenser

Turbine

Steam

Cold spray

Boiler Condensate

Heller System - Yangchen TPP(Coal Fired Power Plant, 2×600 MW, China)

Turbine

Steam

Boiler

Condensate

In-Direct Air Cooling - Trino(Combined Cycle Power Plant, 2×350 MW, Italy)

Hybrid (Parallel Condensation)

29

Nuclear Dry Cooling Options (conceptual)


Direct dry cooling system Heller system Indirect dry cooling system

Major Parameters

Direct dry

cooling

system

Heller

system

Indirect dry

cooling system

Improved indirect

dry cooling system

with aux. HX

Required heat transfer area Low Medium High Medium

ΔT between fin tubes and air High High Low Medium

U, overall heat transfer

coefficientHigh Low Low High

probability of radiation leakage High High Low Low

Leakage rate at rupture in fin

tubesHigh Low Low High

Improved indirect dry cooling system

with aux. HX

* Now a seashore site is considered in KSA for constructing SMART FOAK plants.

30

SMART Development (1997~2015)

Deployment Roadmap of SMART (1/6)

Standard Design Approval @ 2012. 7. 4.

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Conceptual Design

Basic Design

SMART-P (65MWt)Design and Licensing

Pre-

Project

Service

SMART Standard Design Approval

DesignOptimization

Safety Enhancement Research for SMART

Construction

Total 1,500 MY and ~300 M$ are invested.

Business for SMART

Construction

자체과제

SMART-ITL Construction

Passive Safety System Validation Tests

VISTA-ITL Tests

VISTA Tests

- Foreign Cooperation: Saudi Arabia, UK, Moldova, Malaysia, etc.

- SPC : Business for SMART Export

Thermal-Hydraulic Validation Tests - IETs

SMART

-660VISTA-ITL

SMART-ITL

Standard Design

Certificate for SMARTSMART PPE Project Starts @ 2015. 12. 1.

SMART-330

31

Korea-KSA SMART Partnership: Milestone


2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2020-2025

MOU(‘13.12)

K.A.CARE and KAERI

Start(‘14.2)

JFS(Joint

Feasibility Study)

End(‘15.1)

JFS(Joint

Feasibility Study)

MOU(‘15.3)

K.A.CARE and MSIP

SMART development

and partnership & HCB

PPE Contraction (‘15.9)

K.A.CARE and MSIP PPE phase

will be

completed

(‘18.11.30)

Construction phase

started in ‘2019 (Plan)

SMART 1,2 UNITS Site

Finalization

KSA : Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia

32

Korea-KSA SMART Partnership: Plan


SMART Development Pre-Project Engineering

1997 ~ 2015 2016 ~ 2018 2019~2024 (Expected)

SMART Standard DesignTechnology ValidationLicensingSafety Enhancement forPost Fukushima Action Plan

Korea & KSA

FOAK Plant Construction

2 FOAK PlantsConstructionLicensing (CP, OL)

KSAKorea

FOAK Engineering DesignK.A.CARE HCBPSAR

Commercialization

HCB: Human Capability Buildup

PSAR: Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

CP: Construction Permit

OL: Operation License

CommercializationDevelopment

33

SMART-PPE: Design Concept


• Passive Safety System

• No Emergency Diesel

• Simple Operation

• Smaller Exclusion Area

Boundary

Better Safety

Cost Reduction

• Power Increment

• Smaller Building

• Less Components

34

SMART-PPE: Engineering Features


Parameter SMART-SDA SMART-PPE

Site General Site Specific Site for KSA

Safety Systems Active & Passive Passive

Plant Power 330 MWt (~100 MWe) 365 MWt (~100 MWe)

Regulation & Standard Korean Norm Korean Norm

Design Level DL2 DL2

Licensing Document Standard SAR Preliminary SAR

SDA : Standard

Design Approval

PPE : Pre-Project

Engineering

SAR : Safety

Analysis Report

35

SMART-PPE: Scope of Engineering


NSSS Design Fuel DesignComponent

DesignBOP/AE Design

Core Design

Fuel Design

Reactor Vessel and Main Component Design

Main Feedwater and Main Steam

Mechanical Design

General Arrangement

Fuel Assembly Design

System Design

Reactor Coolant Pump Validation

MMIS Design Containment Building

MMIS Design and ValidationSafety Analysis Aux. system Design

180O

A

8

8

8

B

8

20

12

20

8

C

8

20

12

8

12

20

8

D

8

20

12

24

16

24

12

20

8

E

90O

8

12

8

16

8

16

8

12

8

270O

F

8

20

12

24

16

24

12

20

8

G

8

20

12

8

12

20

8

H

8

20

12

20

8

J

8

8

8

0O

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

N

N

2.60 w/o U-235 21 FA

4.80 w/o U-235 36 FA

N indicates No. of Gd rod

Containment

RV

MS

FW

피동잔열제거계통

PRHRSHX

SCP

정지냉각계통SCHX

SIPM

M

안전주입계통

LHX

RHX

F

PRM

BRM

VCT

CCP

PHIX GS

HUT

HUP

BAST RMWT

RMWP

BAMP

BAC BACIX

M

CHARGINGCONTROL

VLAVE

MM

LETDOWNCONTROL

VALVEBABT

EDUCTOR

M

EDT

RDT

RDP

OUTSIDE(YARD)

화학및체적제어계통

ChemicalAdditionSystem

PIX

IRWST

ECT

2차측

기기

복수펌프

복수

기

터빈발전기

복수펌프순환수조

냉 각 탑

우회증기냉각

기

기동우회냉

각기

C

P

P

CP

P

증기구역격리밸브

주증기격리밸브

증기구역격리

밸브

증

기발

생기

급수구역격리

밸브

급수격리밸브

급수격리밸브

급수구역격리

밸브

터빈발전기

순환수펌프

2차측냉각수펌프

급수펌프

복수

기

주증기격리

밸브

급수펌프

비상보충수

탱크

비상보충수

탱크

기동우회냉

각기

우회증기냉각

기

SBLOCA

0 6000 12000 180000

2

4

6

8

10

450

490

530

570

610

650

Top of Core

RV Collapsed Water level

Wat

er L

evel

, m

Time, sec

Hot Spot Cad Surface Temperature

Tem

pera

ture

, K

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1601.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

SLB Feed Flow Increase STEAM Flow Increase FLB CEA Withdrawal CLOF Locker Rotor SGTR

Limit DNBR = 1.41

DNBR

Time, sec

0 10 20 30 40 508

10

12

14

16

18

20

Pressure Limit = 18.7 MPa

Pres

sure

, MPa

Time, sec

FLB CLOF CEA Withdrawal Locked Rotor SLB SGTR

36

SMART Technology Development & Its Validation

A variety of Technology Validation Tests have been conducted from 2009 to 2011 for the verification of the SMART Design.

Domestic Standard Design Approval (SDA) on July 4, 2012

Development of Passive Safety System, Severe Accident Countermeasures & Simulator after Fukushima (2012~2015)

Specific Design Considerations for Application in MENA

Site-specific design is being considered.

Desalination system & Dry cooling options are discussed.

SMART Deployment Roadmap (SMART Partnership)

SMART-KSA Joint Feasibility Study (2014.2~2015.1)

SMART Pre-Project Engineering (2015.12~2018.11)

FOAK Plant Construction (2019~) after successful PPE project

Summary

37

Thank you for your attention!

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