S etN1E 11180/90-81

15 June 1982

Director ofCentralIntelligence

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMRELEASE ASSANMZED

Soviet Policies and Activitiesin Latin America andthe Caribbean

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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SNIE 11/80/90-82

SOVIET POLICIES AND ACTIVITIESIN LATIN AMERICA AND

THE CARIBBEAN•

Information available as of 15 June 1982 wasused in the preparation of this Estimate.

:? :11ti=ant has beenapproved tor release through

the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ofthe Central Intelligence Agency.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRALINTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of theEstimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National SecurityAgency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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CONTENTS

Page

KEY JUDGMENTS 1

DISCUSSION 5

Soviet Objectives 5

Strategic Background 6

Role of Cuba 6

Soviet Policies and Tactics 8

Consolidation of Revolutionary Regimes 8

Support for Insurgencies and Revolution 11

Bilateral State-to-State Relations 13

Constraints 18

Prospects and Implications for the United States 19

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Soviet activity and interest in Latin America have increasedsignificantly in the past few years, and in the aftermath of the battle forthe Falklands the Soviets and their Cuban allies will be probing for newopportunities. Since 1979, Moscow has moved more aggressively toexploit opportunities presented by pressures for revolutionary change inCentral America and the Caribbean and by the willingness of LatinAmerican states to deal with the USSR and its allies. The Soviet Unionhas helped to consolidate revolutionary regimes in Nicaragua andGrenada, has provided considerable aid—mainly through proxies andother third parties—to revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America, andhas intensified its efforts to develop favorable political and economicties with such countries as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Despite thisintensified interest, geographic remoteness has tended to relegate LatinAmerica—except for Cuba—to the periphery of Soviet securityconcerns.

Cuba plays a central role in Soviet relations with Latin America notonly as a dependent client serving Moscow's interests but also as anindependent actor influencing Soviet policies and tactics. Fidel Castro'svigorous support of Nicaraguan revolutionaries, for example, wasoriginally a Cuban initiative and had a marked impact on Sovietattitudes and policy toward the region. Soviet leaders came to shareCastro's assessment that the prospects for the success of revolutionaryforces in Central America were brighter than they had earlier calcu-lated. The Soviets have been working closely with the Cubans toconsolidate the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, which both view ascentral to promoting leftist gains in the region.

The Soviets have by and large successfully implemented a policy ofencouraging unrest in various Central American states, gaining afoothold in Nicaragua, and improving their relations with the govern-ments of the more important South American countries. From theSoviet perspective, such a policy has potential for distracting Americanattention from other regions; is relatively cheap in economic terms; hasnot required major commitments to local allies; and has not raisedconfrontation with the United States to an unmanageable level. TheSoviets are thus likely to persist with this strategy.

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Soviet su pport and guidance for Latin American revolutionarymovements now focus on:

— Encouragement of broad revolutionary coalitions, uniting pro-Soviet Communist parties with their traditional leftwing rivals.

— Creation of loyal military components.

— Use of hemispheric and extrahemispheric intermediaries.

— Training of revolutionaries.

In El Salvador the Soviets have facilitated the flow of arms andmilitary equipment to the Salvadoran insurgents from Cuba and otherthird parties. Although Moscow does not appear sanguine about theinsurgents' short-term military prospects, it probably still believes thatthey can seize power through a prolonged armed struggle.

In Guatemala and Honduras, the USSR and its allies have beenpressuring the local Communists to join broad revolutionary fronts andparticipate in armed struggle. The Soviets and Cubans have provided fi-nancial assistance and training.

Moscow undoubtedly sees potential opportunities for the left inColombia, the Dominican Republic, and Chile.

In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, Moscow's policy has aimedlargely at cultivating positive state-to-state relations. This approach hasemphasized trade expansion and—in some cases—readiness to sellmilitary hardware. Although these efforts have not usually beentranslated into increased Soviet influence, they have given some LatinAmerican countries additional opportunities to assert their independ-ence of the United States. By building on bilateral ties, the USSR alsoseeks to achieve specific economic objectives and hopes to gain broaderpolitical support for its policy initiatives in the hemisphere andelsewhere in the world.

Since 1980, Soviet economic interest and activity in Latin Americahave intensified. The USSR has become Argentina's largest grain buyer,incurring large trade deficits. Despite the Falklands crisis, this year'sPurchases are still expected to be 11-12 million tons, or about one-fourthof the USSR's total grain imports.

In purstiit of major arms clients over the last decade, the USSR hassecured only Peru—where it is now the primary supplier of air andground equipment. Moscow's military relationship with Lima, however,has given the Soviets little leverage over Peruvian policies.

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Despite Soviet success in Peru, most of the Latin American militaryestablishments have preferred Western-made arms and have beensuspicious of the Soviets. Moscow surely hopes, however, that its supportfor Argentina in the Falklands dis pute and interruptions in the supplyof arms from some Western sources will make at least the Argentinemilitary more receptive to Soviet offers.

Even in countries where the USSR's policy is keyed to developingbilateral state-to-state ties, as in Mexico, Moscow continues to conduct avariety of covert activities and other "active measures" to improve itsposition and play upon doinestic vulnerabilities over the longer term.These activities include:

— Funding local Communist parties and front organizations.

— Disseminating disinformation and forgeries aimed at theUnited States.

— Drumming up support for hemispheric revolutionaries.

— Infiltrating military and security services as well as otherimportant sectors of Latin American bureaucracies.

— Manipulating the media and mass organizations.

— Developing and using agents of influence, mainly through theCubans.

The Soviets are also educating numerous Latin American and Carib-bean students in the USSR, cultivating organized labor, and profitingfrom the growth of pro-Marxist sentiments among religious activists.

Despite increased Soviet optimism about trends in Latin America,Moscow recognizes that there are major constraints on its abilit y toinfluence developments there. Foremost is US political, economic, andmilitary strength; but pervasive Latin American antipathy to SovietCommunism and a Soviet desire not to alarm regional governmentsthrough too blatant backing of leftist insurgencies also inhibit Moscow'sactions. Moscow has therefore moved in wa ys designed to avoid directlyprovoking the United States. In contrast to the USSR's overt and directbilateral dealings with the larger states, its support for revolutionarymovements has been low-key and indirect, often employing interme-diaries and surrogates.

Moscow's long-term objectives of eroding and supplanting USinfluence in Latin America are unlikely to be affected, however, by itsrecognition of these obstacles to its ambitions. Over the next few years,Soviet efforts to gain influence are likely to increase. Washington's

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response to this challenge will be complicated by the fact that its owndeep concern about Soviet troublemaking in the area is not shared bymany regional governments. Sympathy with revolutionary causes willpersist in countries such as Mexico and Panama. Even countries lesssympathetic to leftist causes, such as Brazil and Venezuela, would beopposed to US military intervention to check revolutionary gains inCentral America and the Caribbean.

The persistent strain of anti-US sentiment in the region, which hasbeen accentuated by the Falklands crisis, offers the Soviets some newopportunities to expand their influence. However, Soviet initiatives areof less intrinsic significance than US policies and actions. US efforts tobuild hemispheric solidarity with the current Salvadoran Governmentand to gain Latin American support for countering Soviet-supportedleftist insurgency elsewhere in Central America have been damaged.The Soviets are certain to attempt to exploit what they perceive as a USsetback.

The large and growing quantity of military hardware in the handsof Soviet clients has major implia,thons for the region. In addition to de-fending both Cuba and Nicaragua against attack, such military power—especially in Nicaragua—facilitates support to the Salvadoran insur-gents and provides shelter for the guerrilla infrastructure. Within theterm of this Estimate, other objectives behind arms supply from theUSSR and various intermediaries probably include:

Intimidating Nicaragua's neighbors, thus disposing them to-ward acquiescence in the Soviet-Cuban foothold in CentralAmerica.

— Supporting insurgents in Guatemala.

— Laying the groundwork for support of possible future insurgen-cies in Honduras, Costa Rica, and elsewhere in the hemisphere.

The recent US warning of the consequences of delivering Soviet-supplied MIG aircraft to Nicaragua may have prompted the deferral ofsuch deliveries. Nevertheless, preparations for their arrival arecontinuing.

Over the longer term, there is also a possibility that the Soviets mayseek access to naval and air facilities in Nicaragua and Grenada. Suchaccess would have a significant impact on US security interests,especiall y with regard to the Panama Canal and other lines ofcommunication.

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DISCUSSION

Soviet Objectives

1. Soviet activity and interest in Latin America'have increased significantly in the past few years.Moscow has moved to exploit new opportunities pre-sented by pressures for revolutionary change in Cen-tral America and the Caribbean and by the willingnessof Latin American states to deal with the USSR and its'allies. Since 1979 the Soviet Union has helped toconsolidate the revolutionary regime in Nicaragua, hasprovided considerable aid—mainl y through proxiesand other third parties—to revolutionaries elsewherein Latin America, and has intensified its efforts todevelop favorable political and economic ties withsuch countries as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

2. Despite this intensified interest, Latin America'sgeographical remoteness from the USSR has tended torelegate it to the periphery of Soviet security concerns,except when Soviet involvement with Cuba or Cubanactivities have threatened to provoke a serious crisis inSoviet-US relations.' Over the years Latin America hasbeen less im portant in the USSR's rivalry with theUnited States than other Third World areas such asAsia and the Middle East, where Soviet stakes aregreater and Soviet power less constrained.

3. Soviet interest in Latin America is to a substantialdegree motivated by the USSR's global competitionwith the United States and its ideological and prag-matic commitment to support revolutionary causesworldwide. Moscow's basic aim in the region is toundermine US influence, which it seeks to achieve

' For purposes of this Estimate. Latin America is defined as allmainland countries/territories/dependencies from Mexico south toArgentina. Central America refers to Belize, Guatemala, El Salva-dor. Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. The Caribbeanincludes those island states/territories/dependencies with a coast on

the Caribbean Sea.The Estimate considers Soviet prospects in Latin America and the

Caribbean over approximatel y the next two years.e This Estimate examines the Moscow-Havana connection as it

bears upon the formulation and implementation of Soviet policytoward Latin America and the Caribbean. Anal ysis of the overallbilateral Soviet-Cuban relationship does not fall within the scope ofthe paper.

boils by strengthening Soviet diplomatic, economic,and military ties with governments of the region andby promoting radical change. This a pproach is in linewith Moscow's forward strategy in the Third World,which has the long-term aim of changing the interna-tional correlation of forces in favor of the USSR.

4. The Soviet leadership understands that growinginstability in Central America creates serious policydilemmas for Washington. In Moscow's view, if theUnited States does not respond effectively in CentralAmerica during the next few years, revolutionarymomentum will accelerate there and elsewhere inLatin America. If Washington intervenes directly,however, Moscow perceives that it will be able tostimulate international criticism of US action. In eithercase, Moscow anticipates that revolutionary ferment inAmerica's own backyard will divert US attention andresources from more distant problems, sow divisionsbetween the United States and its allies, and undercutWashington's credibility in the Third World,

5. Moscow's current su pport for revolutionarycauses should not obscure its other important prioritiesand interests in the area, which it promotes simulta-neously and sometimes in contradiction to its backingfor revolution. The level of Soviet economic, military,and political activity with the larger countries indi-cates that they are major targets in Soviet strategytoward Latin America. A substantial share of theUSSR's agricultural imports comes from Argentina andBrazil, and Moscow has a major arms supply relation-ship with Peru. Such state-to-state relations give theSoviet Union an opportunity to expand its presenceand influence in specific countries. The Soviets, ofcourse, also seek to encourage those states—such asMexico—to adopt policies independent of the UnitedStates.

6. Moscow regards the Falklands situation as asignificant opportunity to intensify Latin Americanalienation from the United States and expand its owninfluence in the region. It is trying to stiffen LatinAmerican resentment of US support for Britain and tostimulate distrust of the US commitment to regional

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interests. It almost . certainly sees the crisis as openingthe possibility of Argentina's turning to the USSR toreequip its armed forces. Moreover, it probably alsoviews the crisis as weakening the US ability to mobilizeLatin American nations against Soviet, Cuban, andother leftist advances in the area.

Strategic Background

7. The Soviets have had ties with some LatinAmerican Communist parties since the 1920s, butuntil the 1960s they expended little effort to expandtheir influence in the hemisphere. Soviet involvementwas limited largely to providing some financial assist-ance to the local Communist parties, which in re-turn—by and large—were expected mainly to supportMoscow's position at Communist international gather-ings, while seeking to broaden their influence overevents in their own countries. Moscow's expectationsin the area remained modest until the advent of FidelCastro.

8. Castro's alignment of Cuba with the USSR by1961 marked the turning point in Soviet involvementin Latin America. Castro's move handed Moscow anopportunity to establish an ideological, political, andmilitary foothold in the hemisphere, and a potential togain in the strategic competition with the UnitedStates. The outcome of the Cuban missile crisis and thecontainment of Castroism to Cuba in the early 1960snevertheless punctured Moscow's hopes of quicklyaltering the strategic balance and forcing the pace ofchange in the region.

9. In the 1960s in Latin America and the Caribbeanthe USSR did not—with the exception of Cuba—frontally challenge US dominance. The Soviets didvigorously undertake "active measures" intended toundercut US influence.' But Moscow provided no

' The Soviets use the term "active measures" to refer to a broadrange of overt and covert operations intended to provoke policyeffects. These measures, which represent an unconventional adjunctto traditional diplomacy, are designed to influence the decisions offoreign governments, disrupt relations between other nations, under-mine confidence in foreign leaders and institutions, and discreditopponents. They include such actions as manipulation of the media,disinformation and forgery, use of foreign Communist parties andfronts, sub rosa economic activities, and various political influenceoperations. Operational Intelligence Memorandum C1A-319/01000-82, Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures (April1982), assesses Soviet "active measures" more broadly and in greaterdetail.

military or any significant economic assistance to anynon-Communist Central American or Caribbeancountry. It emphasized in its policy the more prag-matic concerns of building diplomatic, commercial,and even military relations with the existing govern-ments, as in Peru. Moscow apparently hoped thatstronger bilateral ties would place it in a betterposition to profit from growing nationalism and itsaccompanying anti-Americanism. Correspondingly,the Soviets also discouraged the small orthodox Com-munist parties from engaging in violence and werereluctant to support leftist groups advocating revolu-tion. Although the Soviets did try from time to time tpcultivate some local leftist leaders—such as Jamaica'sMichael Manley, who was quite eager to curry favorwith them—their efforts were limited and they werecontent to let the Cubani take the lead. In fact, theyencouraged Manley to ntiintain correct relations withthe United States in order to qualify for economicassistance which they were unwilling to extend.

10. In the case of Chile's Salvador Allende, Mos-cow's reluctance wholly to embrace his regime re-flected a wide range of considerations beyond itsconcern with the US reaction: his political opportun-ism, conflict with members of his own Socialist partyas well as the Communist Party, inability to co-optgroups of the extreme left, and lack of a loyal militaryforce to defend his regime. In their reflections on theChilean experience, Soviet leaders have noted thepossibility of a "peaceful road to socialism," whilewarning revolutionaries of the need for a broad lef t-wing coalition and their own military formation.

11. This measured approach by the Soviets yieldedboth political and economic benefits. The number ofregional states with which Moscow established rela-tions expanded (see map), and the USSR's 1970simports were 10 times those of the previous decade,largely because of grain purchases from Argentina.

Role of Cuba

12. Cuba plays a central role in Soviet relationswith Latin America both as a dependent client servingMoscow's interests and as an independent actor influ-encing Soviet policies and tactics. Cuba's dependenceon the USSR for economic and military assistance hasbeen a tender point for Castro, who vehemently deniesany linkage between Soviet largess and Cuban actionsin support of the USSR's foreign policy objectives.

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Soviet Diplomatic Relations in Latin America and the Caribbean

11311114 742

Diplomatic relations11111 Established since January 1969

Established before 1969OINI Never established• &dal/ens maintained 1945-47; no missionsexchanged since.b Relations established April 1945; Legationopened M Moscow but closed July 1946; nomissions have been exchanged since.

ReMtions established 1944; broken oft 1947;reestablished 1964; broken off again 1973after ouster of Allende.

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And, in fact, he has enjoyed greater freedom in hispolicies in Latin America than he has elsewhere in theThird World. Nevertheless, Castro pays close heed toSoviet interests and to the limits of Moscow's toleranceon tactical matters.

13. Soviet and Cuban approaches to the region havenot always been harmonious. Initially Moscow wasconvinced that a "march toward socialism" in LatinAmerica would be slow and disapproved of Castro'sindiscriminate aid to hemispheric revolutionaries as"adventurist." By 1968, however, Soviet political pi-es-sure and economic incentives, combined with Cubanforeign polic y reverses, began to bring the two coun-tries' goals and interests back into convergence andculminated in their joint intervention in Angola andEthiopia in the mid-1970s. By 1979 the two hadexpanded their collaboration to include support ofviolent revolutionary parties and groups, particularlyin Central America.

14. Castro's vigorous support of Nicaraguan revolu.:tionaries beginning in 1978 was essentially a Cubaninitiative, and it has had a marked impact on Sovietattitudes and policy toward the region. Moscow wasimpressed by Havana's success in exploiting the revo-lutionary situation in Nicaragua. Not only did theCubans supplant US influence there, but, in a countryin which Moscow had previously had no officialrepresentation, it soon enjoyed diplomatic, military,economic, and even formal party links with theSandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Sovietleaders apparently came to share Castro's revisedassessment that the prospects for the success of revolu-tionary forces in Central America were brighter thanthey had earlier calculated, and felt that the UnitedStates was irresolute in countering leftist gains.

15. The Soviets have been working closely with theCubans to consolidate the Sandinista regime; bothshare the view that Nicaragua is central to promotingleftist gains elsewhere in Central America. The Cu-bans have also served as intermediaries with insurgentgroups elsewhere in Central America and with theradical Bishop regime in Grenada. Moscow prefersthat Havana take the lead in advancing regionalrevolutionary causes—in deference to Castro's under-standing of local political dynamics and longstandinginvolvement with revolution in Latin America; be-cause Cuba is a hemispheric, S panish-speaking power;and to shield the USSR against any backlash from the

United States and from the lar ger Latin Americancountries where it has a bilateral stake.

16. Despite the efficacy of Havana's role so far,Moscow is no doubt alert to the potential for damageto its broader interests arising from its Cuban con-nection. Potential for friction between Moscow andHavana exists in their conflicting preferences fordifferent factions within some Latin American revolu-tionary movements. Partly to monitor Cuba's activitiesand check those they judge too provocative to theUnited States, the Soviets will continue their efforts toexpand their own influence and levera ge—particu-larly in Nicaragua.

Soviet Policies and Tactics

17. Moscow employs diverse means to exploit dif-fering local conditions and to serve multiple Sovietinterests. It is helping to consolidate the revolutionaryregime in Nicaragua and is supporting the regime inGrenada. In some Latin American countries—particu-larly El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—it isadvocating and supporting violent revolution. Inothers, it is employing a mix of diplomacy and "activemeasures." This pattern is likely to persist for at leastthe two- year period of the Estimate.

Consolidation of Revolutionary Regimes

18. Moscow places a high value on consolidatingand ensuring the survival of revolutionary regimes inthe hemisphere. The new radical regime in Nicaraguaand, to a lesser extent, that in Grenada are politicallyand symbolically significant for the USSR, especiallyafter its experience with Allende's Chile. The Sovietshope that the leftist, pro-Soviet, anti-American govern-ments in Managua and Saint Georges will contribute tothe emergence of other similarly oriented regimes inCentral America and the Caribbean and serve as aconduit for revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere.

19. Nicaragua. Moscow, whose involvement inCentral America was low before the Sandinista vic-tory, is assiduously cultivating the new revolutionaryregime in Nicaragua. It has subordinated its ties to theminuscule local Communist party and establishedformal party links with the Sandinistas. A Sovietdiplomatic mission was established in January 1980,and the total number of Soviets now in Nicaragua,

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including military advisers and technicians, is prob-ably between 150 and 175.

20. The trend toward closer relations has acceler-ated over the last year or so. Recent high-level Nicara-guan visitors to Moscow have included Defense Minis-ter Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Political CommissionChairman Arce, and Foreign Minister D'Escoto. Juntaleader Daniel Ortega's visit to Moscow and meetingwith President Brezhnev in May 1982 have put Sovietties with Nicaragua on the same level as those withmany important Soviet clients elsewhere in the ThirdWorld.

21. Even at a time in which the Soviets are beingtightfisted with economic assistance, Moscow and itsallies are meeting some of Nicaragua's economicneeds. Moscow's economic assistance program is gov-erned by a 1980 "framework - agreement—a formusually reserved for major aid recipients such asAfghanistan and Cuba—that calls for assistance to allmajor economic sectors. To date, Moscow, its EastEuropean allies, and Cuba claim to have committedabout $480 million in nonconvertible currency creditsto finance agricultural, roadbuilding, and communica-tions eq uipment and other machinery. The claimsmay involve some double counting and could there-fore be inflated; nevertheless, some of the equipmentfinanced by these credits has already been delivered.In addition, Libya has provided a $100 million cashloan, and may have promised considerably more thanthat (although the Libyans are notorious for not honor-ing such commitments).

22. Moscow has also tried to blunt US economicpressure on Managua. The countries of the SovietBloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance(CEMA) gave Nicaragua 80,000 metric tons of grain tooffset the cancellation of the 1981 US grain deliveries.Nevertheless, the Soviets appear reluctant to committhe substantial hard currency assistance most neededby Managua and have privately advised the regime tobe cautious in disrupting economic ties with Nicara-gua's most important Western economic partners.

23. In the area of military relations, Moscow contin-ues to work largely through Cuba and other thirdparties to help build up the Sandinista military estab-lishment, but its own direct role is increasing as itgauges the Latin American and US reaction. As evi-

denced by the visits of Defense Minister Ortega toMoscow in the last year or so, military consultationsare becoming more frequent and direct. Moscow nodoubt hopes that its military assistance will forestallefforts to topple the regime and strengthen pro-Sovietelements in the Sandinista establishment.

24. The bulk of Nicaragua's military equipmentand assistance has come from the USSR and itsCommunist allies, with other third parties providingmodest levels of assistance (see table I). Soviet militaryagreements are estimated to be worth at least $100million through 1981. Some equipment has been sentfrom the USSR to Cuba and Algeria and transshippedto the Sandinistas. Crowing East European militarycooperation with Nicaragua is almost certainly under-taken at Soviet behest. The Soviets also appear to beencouraging such parties as Libya and the PalestineLiberation Organization (PLO) to provide militaryassistance and training to the Nicaraguans. The PLOapparently views its role in Nicaragua and its aid torevolutionaries elsewhere in the region at least partlyas a guarantee of continued Soviet military and politi-cal support.

Table I

Military Equipment and Assistance Suppliedby Communist Countries to Nicaragua

USSR Tanks, heavy amphibious ferries, ar-mored personnel carriers, artillery,multiple rocket launchers, trucks,transport aircraft, helicopters. Patrolcraft, and training

Bulgaria Pilot training

Czechoslovakia Small arms

East German yTrucks and military equipment

Poland Pilot training

Cuba Machirseguns, artillery, mortars, small

arms, ammunition, and training

Vietnam Small armsAmong maksr items in this inventory are about 25 T-55 tanks,

about 800 trucks, 12 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, six CSPheavy amphibious feniea two M1-8 Hip helicopters, six AN-2aircraft, one Zhuk-class patrol craft, 12 D-20 152-mm gun-howit-zers, 48 Z1S-2 57-mm antitank guns, 12 BM-21 multiple rocketlaunchers, and more than 100 antiaircraft guns.

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25. In contrast to at least 2,000 Cuban military andsecurit y personnel, the number of Soviet militarypersonnel in Nicaragua is relatively modest—between50 and 75. The Soviet contingent thus a ppears to beroughly equal in size to that from Eastern Europe(mainly East Germany), the Middle East (the PLO andLibya), or Asia (Vietnam and North Korea). However,many of the Soviets, along with their Cuban counter-parts, seem to be acting as advisers to key members ofthe armed forces. Soviet military advisers are attachedto the Nicaraguan General Staff, are assisting in thepreparation of defensive contingency plans, and areprobably providing intelligence support. Soviet mili-tary aides are also closely involved in plans to reorga-nize and improve various Nicaraguan military serv-ices, particularly the Air Force—where they havelargely displaced the Cubans. Moreover, Soviet pilotsand technicians who accompanied deliveries of severalAN-2 air transport planes and two MI-8 helicopterslast summer apparently are still there and have usedthis equipment to transport Nicaraguan militarypersonnel.

26. The Soviets also plan to provide several AN-26transport aircraft soon, and a group of Nicaraguanpilots reportedly are scheduled to go to the USSR forappropriate training. In addition, efforts to expandand upgrade some Nicaraguan airfields, coupled withreported training of Nicaraguan Air Force personnelin Cuba. Bulgaria, and probably elsewhere in EasternEurope to fly MIGs, suggest that Moscow may havebeen planning future deliveries of fighter aircraft,including some already in Cuba. The recent USwarning of the conseq uences of such a move, however,may have prompted deferral of such deliveries.Nevertheless, preparations for their arrival arecontinuing.

27. Moscow's apparent interest in avoiding high-visibility involvement in Nicaragua is derived partlyfrom its desire not to provoke US countermeasuresagainst either Nicaragua or the USSR. In workingthrough intermediaries, especially in military matters,Moscow has sought to ensure that its prestige is not tieddirectl y to the fate of the current regime in Managua.A more conspicuous Soviet role would also risk alienat-ing Mexico, Panama, and other regional countries thatare showing some signs of unease over the Nicaraguanmilitary buildup. For these reasons, the Soviets prob-

ably will be content to continue to rel y on allies andnonregional intermediaries to provide the bulk ofmilitary assistance to Nicaragua. However, Moscowwill continue to build more direct channels of influ-ence and make occasional direct deliveries of militaryequipment to test US reactions to ex panding Sovietinvolvement.

28. Grenada. Moscow has appeared less certainabout the long-term prospects of the leftist govern-ment in the small island state of Grenada and has beensomewhat more circumspect in supporting it. Al-though the Soviets welcomed the leftist coup and havecome to regard it as an authentic "anti-imperialistrevolution," they have been reluctant thus far to openan embassy on the island. Their economic assistance tothe Bishop government so far has also been modest,amounting to a little more than $1 million in agricul-tural and construction aid and some limited technicalassistance for the island's new television facility andtwo new radio transmitters far more powerful than theisland requires for local broadcast needs.

29. In the area of military assistance, the Sovietshave provided about three dozen military trucks andreportedly have offered military training in the USSRto about a dozen Grenadians. Moscow presumably alsoplays an indirect role through Cuban military assist-ance efforts, and has encouraged its East Europeanallies to provide aid. Of particular importance is the3,000-meter runway being built, principally by theCubans, that will be capable of accommodating allknown types of Cuban and Soviet aircraft.

30. There are signs that the USSR and Grenadamay be moving to upgrade their relations. The Bishopgovernment has established a diplomatic mission inMoscow—the first Grenadian embassy in the USSR—which could prompt a reciprocal move by Moscow. Inrecent months, key Grenadian military and politicalaides have also visited Moscow, presumably to seekadditional Soviet economic and military aid.

31. Suriname. Recent developments in Surinamehave given Moscow a new o pportunity to developrelations with another regime with revolutionary/socialist pretensions in the Caribbean. The abortiveMarch coup attempt against the government domi-nated by army commander Bouterse has been a majorfactor in the regime's decision to look for support from

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Cuba. Havana has responded with a small shipment ofarms, and promises of full military and economicsupport. Although the Soviets will probably let Cubatake the lead, they have already signaled their interestin exploiting the new situation by announcing thatthey will open a resident embassy in the near future.

32. Guyana. Soviet efforts to cultivate the leftist-leaning government of Forbes Burnham and his Peo-ple's National Congress (PNC) in Guyana have beenconstrained by Moscow's longstanding relationship.with the pro-Soviet People's Progressive Party (PPP)led by Cheddi Jagan. Although in the last year or twoMoscow has moved somewhat away from the PPP,relations between Moscow and Burnham continue tobe characterized by mistrust. Although the Sovietsseem reluctant to extend economic aid to the finan-cially hard-oressed government, they have sought totake advantage of the regime's economic problems bycontinuing to encourage a PPP-PNC coalition.

tionary Directorate, the umbrella organization con-ducting the insurgency, and has endorsed armed strug-gle as the left's best alternative. Moscow has facilitatedthe flow of arms and military equipment to theSalvadoran insurgents from Cuba and other thirdparties and has contributed logistic support to theoperation. While generally supporting the entire revo-lutionary front, Moscow has strengthened the positionof the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) withinit by funneling some of its assistance to the insurgentsthrough the PCES. This has endowed the SalvadoranCommunists with a degree of influence much greaterthan their numerical strength would warrant. In bol-stering the position of the PCES, Moscow hopes toensure that the party—and through it the USSR—willbe well positioned to exert influence on events in ElSalvador, especially if the leftist insurgency shouldsucceed.

Support for Insurgencies and Revolution

33. Much of Moscow's support for insurgent andrevolutionary movements in the hemisphere is covert,opportunistic, and flexible. Accordingly, the Sovietsare expanding their links with leftists—particularly inEl Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—where grow-ing revolutionary activity promises opportunities toinstall anti-US and potentially pro-Soviet regimes.Elsewhere, they have encouraged the several smallorthodox Communist parties in the Caribbean toprepare for violent revolution and have called on theChilean left to initiate armed struggle against thePinochet regime.

34. Soviet support and guidance for Latin Ameri-can revolutionary movements now focus upon:

— Encouragement of broad revolutionary coali-tions, uniting pro-Soviet Communist parties withtheir traditional leftwing rivals.

Creation of military components loyal to therevolutionary coalitions.

— Use of hemispheric and extrahemispheric inter-mediaries.

— Training of revolutionary cadres.

35. In El Salvador, Moscow has continued to sup-port Communist participation in the Unified Revolu-

36. Despite this involvement, Moscow has tried tosoft-pedal its role in El Salvador, partly to avoidprovoking strong US countermeasures there that couldspill over into Nicaragua and lead to further deteriora-tion in relations with Washington. Moscow seemed tohave been impressed by the Reagan administration'sreaction to the situation in El Salvador and appearsconcerned that the outcome of the election in March1982 may have significantly lessened the immediateprospects of the revolutionary left. However, theSoviets have taken comfort in the West European- -reluctance to endorse the elections. The Soviets alsohope that actions by the political right in El Salvadorwill further complicate the US administration's effortsto mobilize Congressional support for additional mili-tary and economic su pport for that country, and, overthe long term, assist the left. Although the Sovietsappear less sanguine about the insurgents' short-termmilitary prospects, they probably still believe that theinsurgents can seize power through a prolonged armedstruggle.

37. In Guatemala and Honduras, Moscow and itsallies have also been pressuring the local Communiststo join broad revolutionary fronts and participate inarmed struggle. Cuba, probably su pported by Moscow,has promised arms to Communists and other radicalleftists if they unify. The Soviets have provided finan-cial assistance and training and have encouragedvarious third parties to do the same. In the last few

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years, for the first time since the mid-1960s, theSoviets have even resumed giving paramilitarytraining in the USSR to Honduran Communists.Moreover, in the last year or so, Soviet personnel inCuba reportedly have participated in political train-ing of Guatemalan Communists and have beenmore directly involved in giving tactical advice tothe Guatemalan insurgents.

38. The Soviets and the Cubans have also pres-sured the Dominican Communist Party into' agrudging agreement to prepare for eventual armedstruggle in the Dominican Republic. Recently, how-ever, they urged the party to join a united frontwith the leftist Dominican Liberation Party for theMay 1982 national elections—a coalition that thelocal Communists nevertheless avoided. Moscow isalso using the Dominican Communists to channelfunds to the United Part y of Haitian Communists,which reportedly is trying to organize a movementof Haitian exiles for the eventual ouster of PresidentDuvalier. In addition, the USSR sponsors propa-ganda activities to enlist support for hemisphericrevolutionaries through Soviet front organizationssuch as the World Federation of Democratic Youthand the World Peace Council.

39. In the case of Chile, the Soviets have ado ptedan openly militant line aimed at promoting a unitedarmed struggle against the Pinochet regime. Mos-cow provided the chief of the Chilean CommunistParty with a forum at the 26th CPSU Congress tocall for armed revolution, and subsequently hasbroadcast similar messages to Chile by other Chil-ean and even Salvadoran Communists. Despite in-creasing calls to overthrow Pinochet, Moscow doesnot believe his demise is imminent and has notcommitted significant material resources to assistthe Chilean Communists.

40. Moscow undoubtedly sees potential opportuni-ties for the left in the political and social flux inColombia, but has also been seeking good relationswith the government in power. Its involvement withColombian revolutionary groups, therefore, is moreambivalent. The Soviets have longstanding close tieswith the Colombian Communist Party (FCC) but

the extent of their dealings with, and influence on,the party's paramilitary arm, the RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia (PARC), which is oneof the country's most effective guerrilla groups, isuncertain. Since the mid-1970s, FARC has as-sumed a more inde pendent and radical line thanthe FCC, which has publicly renounced violenceas a means to gain power. Some top FARC leadersreportedly have received training in the USSR,and Moscow maintains some contact with thegroup through the FCC.

41. Nevertheless, the Soviets are not known tohave opposed active Cuban support for insurgencyin Colombia. Following the seizure of the Domini-can Embassy in Bogota in 1980 by the M - 19guerrillas, the Cubans assumed responsibility fortheir training and subsequent infiltration into Co-lombia. These Cuban-directed efforts have causedsome diplomatic embarrassment to the Soviets—for example, the cancellation of a visit by thePresident of Colombia that had long been soughtby Moscow.

42. One of Moscow's newest and most effectivetactics for the support of Latin American revolu-tionary movements involves the use of proxies andother third parties. Within the region, Cuba hasrecently been joined by Nicaragua in playing thisinstrumental role. Nicaragua maintains trainingcamps for Latin American insurgents and acts as afunnel for transporting externally supplied armsinto El Salvador, Guatemala, and—to a lesserextent—Honduras. Some Nicaraguan personnelreportedly have been functioning as advisers to theSalvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas, and Nica-ragua serves as a base for the Salvadoran guerrillacommand structure. Extrahemispheric actors in-clude most prominently the PLO, but Libya,Vietnam, and several East Euro pean countrieshave also participated. Latin Americans are sentfor paramilitary and political training to sites inCuba, Eastern Europe, Libya, and elsewhere.' inthe Middle East, as well as the USSR itself. Armsand other support are shipped from or through anumber of countries as a means of distancing theUSSR from what would be seen as especiallyprovocative acts.

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Soviet Trade With Latin Americaand the Caribbean (Excluding Cuba)

SovietImports

Soviet Hard— Currency Deficit

Million US S

5,000

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

SovietExports

77 78 79 80 81

SOO

1960-75' 76

'Annual average.

I

Unclassified

Bilateral State-to-State Relations

43. In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, Mos-cow's policy has aimed largely at cultivating positivestate-to-state relations. This approach has emphasizedtrade expansion and—in some cases—readiness to sellmilitary hardware. Although these Soviet efforts havenot usually been translated into increased Soviet influ-ence, they have given some Latin American countriesadditional opportunities to assert their independenceof the United States. By building on bilateral ties, theUSSR also seeks to achieve specific economic objec-tives and hopes to gain broader political support for Itspolicy initiatives in the hemisphere and elsewhere inthe world.

44. Economic. The US-sponsored partial grain em-bargo following the invasion of Afghanistan, combinedwith Soviet agricultural problems, has intensified So-viet economic interest and activity in Latin America.It has led to a significant growth in grain purchasesfrom Argentina as well as Brazil. Since 1980 the USSRhas become Argentina's largest grain buyer, account-ing for about 80 percent of that country's 1981 grainexports. Despite the Falklands crisis, this year's salesare still expected to be 11-12 million metric tons, orabout one-fourth of the USSR's total grain imports—although the ultimate volume will depend upon theresults of the Soviet grain harvest. The USSR andArgentina also have concluded a five-year agreementwhich calls for annual Soviet purchase of 60,000 to100,000 metric tons of Argentine beef; 1981 purchasestotaled 87,000 metric tons.

45. Such economic dealings with the USSR so farhave paid handsome dividends for Latin Americancountries. Moscow has imported on a cash basis andhas run massive trade deficits. (See chart.) Accordingto the latest Soviet figures, Moscow's trade deficit withArgentina reached $3.3 billion in 1981. Brazilianexports to the USSR have also boomedincreasingfrom 1980 by more than 100 percent to $744 millionin 1981—while imports totaled only some $23 million.Such highly favorable trade arrangements are of greatbenefit to Argentina, and of more modest benefit toBrazil, in helping to offset their balance-of-paymentsdeficits with other regions. Before the outbreak of theFalklands conflict, the Soviets—in response to theirown hard currency stringencies—sought short-termcredits from Argentina to cover grain purchases, butthey did not appear to use the conflict to press this

$(16717 645

demand. Argentina, badly in need of hard currencyfrom grain sales to finance its military activities, hasbeen unwilling and unable to offer any short-termcredits and, in fact, has requested advance hardcurrency payments from the USSR for impendinggrain deliveries. In the absence of an a greement on the -issue, the USSR has obtained West European financingfor its purchases.

46. Despite these deficits, the Soviets have derivedcertain benefits of their own from this trade. Inaddition to meeting urgent economic needs, the USSRwas able to undercut the 1980 US grain embargo andblunt its potential for future use. The Soviets arepressing to develop the bigger Latin American coun-tries—particularly Argentina and Brazil—into impor-tant markets for Soviet finished goods, especiallyequipment for hydropower projects. There are nowalmost 1,000 Soviet and East European civilian techni-cians in the region. (See table 2.)

47. The nuclear field is another important area inthe growing relationship between the USSR and Ar-gentina. In an attempt to diversify its sources ofsupply, Buenos Aires has turned to Moscow for zirca-loy production equipment. Earlier this year, the two

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Table 2

Soviet Bloc Civilian Technicians inLatin America and the Caribbean, 1981

EasternTotal USSR Europe Cuba

Total 5,570 350 580 4,640Argentina 60 40 20Bolivia 75 25 50Brazil 105 30 75Colombia 70 60 10Ecuador 10 — 10El Salvador 5 — 5Grenada 575 25 50 SOOGuyana 75 10 40 23Jamaica 115 — — 115Mexico 125 25 100Nicaragua 4,200 75 125 4,000Panama 5 5 —Peru [IS 30 asUruguay 25 20 5Venezuela 10 5 5

sozawidindi

countries signed a nuclear supply contract that callsfor the Soviets to provide enrichment services and 1ton of heavy water. Consistent with Moscow's opposi-tion to nuclear weapons proliferation, this contractrequires safeguard measures. By expanding a relation-ship with the most advanced nuclear developmentprogram in Latin America, Moscow probably hopes tobecome a welcomed supplier of highly lucrative nu-clear materials to other regional states, such as Brazil.

48. The Soviets are also making an.economic pushin Brazil. Moscow's decision last year to sell oil therewhen it was reducing deliveries to its allies and otherThird World countries reflected a desire to court theBrazilian Government as well as a pressing need forhard currency. Soviet oil exports to Brazil through1982 will be 20,000 to 24,000 barrels per day, or about3 percent of Brazil's oil requirements. Long-term tradeagreements initiated by the two countries last yearenvision a trade turnover of $5 billion over the nextfive years. According to the terms of the agreements,Brazil will supply agricultural products under long-term contracts while the Soviets will continue sales ofcrude and also provide turbines for Brazilian hydro-electric projects.

49. Moscow has also expanded technical exchangeswith Brazil. Attracted by Moscow's willingness to

provide advanced technology on attractive financialterms, Brasilia has signed a technical service andfinancing agreement for the installation of Sovietethanol manufacturing plants. The protocol calls forthe construction of 15 facilities, with the USSR su ppl y

-ing equipment and nonconvertible commercial creditsof up to 2,5 percent of total costs. Additionally, a SaoPaulo oil exploration company has agreed to Sovietassistance in evaluating the oil potential of the Paranabasin. Moreover, Brasilia has also agreed to expandedSoviet participation in hydroelectric development, andhas contracted for assistance in evaluating coal de-posits and assessing the feasibility of advanced coalgasification techniques.

50. The Soviets are also increasing their economicand commercial activity in Mexico, albeit not rapidly.For the last seven years, Mexico has had observerstatus with CEMA. Despite a gradual expansion duringthis period, Mexican trade with the USSR still accountsfor less than 1 percent of Mexico's foreign commerce.Discussions with the USSR on a quadrilateral oil swapunderscore Mexico's openness to dealings with theSoviet Union, but Mexico's insistence on commerciallyviable arrangements may continue to restrict tradeexpansion. Moscow wants Mexico to ship oil to Cuba.In turn, the USSR would su ppl y Mexican customers

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in Europe. In addition to gaining substantial transpor-tation savings. Moscow may think that the UnitedStates would be less likely to interrupt Mexican thanSoviet shipments of oil if Washington resorted to an oilblockade of Cuba. The Soviets may also seek to obtainadvanced US technology in Mexico, but Mexicanefforts to avoid violating US export controls could limitSoviet opportunities.

51. Military Sales and Training. The Soviets' ef-forts to enter into military sales relationships have notkept pace with the growth of their economic relation-ships. Over the last decade, the USSR has secured onlyPeru—where it is now the primary supplier of air andground equipment—as a major arms client. In thewake of the US refusal since the early 1960s to sellPeru sophisticated aircraft, a newly installed leftistmilitary regime turned to the USSR in 1968 formilitary equipment. To date, Soviet military sales toPeru have amounted to more than $1 billion. Whilesome of this equipment is dated, it more than meetsPeruvian requirements and has included sophisticatedjet aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air and air-to-sur-face missile systems, and tanks. The Soviets have alsobeen able to introduce their own military advisers forthe first time into South America, and there arecurrently 125 to 150 Soviet military advisers andtechnicians in Peru. In addition, 2,000 to 3,000 Peruvi-ans, including military and intelligence personnel,have been trained in the USSR, and Peruvian intelli-gence has a liaison relationship with the KGB.

52. Peru has sometimes taken pro-Soviet or at leastanti-US positions, but Lima's military relationship hasgiven the Soviets little leverage over Peruvian policies.While the Peruvian Army and Air Force continue toseek new and more advanced military equipmentfrom the USSR, key civilian members of the currentBelaunde government—including the President him-self—are expressing a desire to reduce the degree ofPeru's military dependence on Moscow, although thelikelihood of this is low. Not only do the PeruvianArmy and Air Force appear to value the Soviet tie, butthe Falklands crisis has made the USSR more attrac-tive as an arms supplier. The local Communist partyremains an insignificant political force and Moscowhas shied away from supporting more radical ele-ments. The Soviets are conscious that promotion ofviolent struggle could cause the military to sever the

arms relationship and thereby severely set back Sovietinterests. Moscow seems satisfied, at least for now, thatthe arms relationship represents its best entree, andhopes that over the longer term leftist and pro-Sovietelements will become stronger.

53. Despite Soviet arms sales to Peru, most of theLatin American military establishments, includingthose in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, have preferredWestern-made arms, been suspicious of the Soviets,and repeatedly declined Moscow's offer of militaryequipment and joint training programs. These coun-tries' officers corps are by and large staunchly anti-Communist, and their increasing concern over leftistgains in Central America will complicate Soviet effortsto make inroads in the military sales area.

54. Undoubtedly, Moscow hopes that its politicalsu pport for Argentina in the Falklands dispute andinterruptions in the supply of arms from some West-ern sources will make at least the Argentine militarymore receptive to Soviet offers. Such a move would bea difficult one for the Western- and US-trained Argen-tine military leadership, which has been particularlyoutspoken in its anti-Communism. Nevertheless, ifWestern restrictions on arms continue, Buenos Airesmay seriously consider purchasing selected militaryequipment from the USSR to replace its losses anddemonstrate disenchantment with the West. It isPossible that Argentina might be more open to the ---acquisition of Soviet arms if they were suppliedthrough an intermediary such as Peru. Moscow maybelieve that its chances of establishing arms supplyrelationships with some other governments in theregion will be enhanced.

55. Political. On the political front, the Sovietshave consistently sought to discredit US policy. Theyare prepared at every turn to capitalize on the Latinperception of decades of US political and economicpressure. Moscow has applauded demonstrations ofindependence from the United States, such as therefusal of Argentina, Brazil, and Peru to join in theUS-sponsored trade sanctions against the USSR follow-ing the Afghanistan invasion. The Soviets have soughtto exploit Mexico's opposition to US initiatives in ElSalvador and to play on the differences betweenMexico and the United States over how best to restorestability in Central America. Moscow is especiallypleased to see differences between the United States

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— Disseminating disinformation and forgeriesaimed at the United States.

and Latin American countries regarding policy towardthe USSR, and probably views such disagreements assigns of a further weakening of US influence andincrease in its own.

— Drumming up support for hemis pheric revolu-tionaries.

56. The Soviets have tried to use the FalklandIslands dispute between Argentina and Great Britainto further ingratiate themselves with the governmentin Buenos Aires and elsewhere in the region. Afterinitial hesitation, Moscow publicly supported Argenti-na and apparently passed limited intelligence informa-tion to Buenos Aires. Nevertheless, Moscow did notapprove the invasion, nor has it formally endorsedArgentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falklands,although it has depicted Argentine policy in positiveterms as a continuation of the process ofdecolonization.

57. Moscow has intensified its diplomatic and po-litical efforts to improve its capabilities and demon-strate the importance it attaches to bilateral ties Withthe states in the area. In the last year or so, the LatinAmerican section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry hasbeen expanded and a new department created toemphasize more narrow regional expertise in handlingthe growing volume of contacts. During this period,the Soviets also have begun to send higher level visitorsto Latin America. In the spring of 1981, for example,Politburo candidate member Rashidov visited Brazil.More recently, in April 1982, Politburo candidatemember Aliyev, accompanied by Brezhnev's personalsenior foreign policy aide, paid a visit to Mexico City.Moscow, for its part, has played host to visits byMexican President Lopez Portillo in 1978 and subse-quently his foreign and defense ministers. While thesevisits have not resulted in any significant agreementsbetween Mexico and the USSR, the publicity accordedto them by the two countries reflects the symbolicimportance that both attach to their bilateral ties.

58. Even in countries where the USSR's policy iskeyed to developing bilateral state-to-state ties, Mos-cow continues to conduct a variety of covert activitiesand other "active measures" to improve its positionand play upon domestic vulnerabilities over the longerterm. These activities include:

— Funding local Communist parties and 'frontorganizations.

— Infiltrating military and security services as wellas other important sectors of governmentalbureaucracies.

— Manipulating the media and mass organizations.

— Cultivating pro-Soviet sentiments among aca-demics and students.

— Developing and using agents of influence, mainlythrough the Cubans.

59. To Moscow, the local orthodox Communistparties are essentially instruments%of Soviet policy (forsizes of parties, see table 3). The USSR provides fundsto most Latin American Communist parties and isencouraging them to become more active, particularlyin organizing broad coalitions of the left. In Mexico,for example, in keeping with Moscow's longstandingdesire to forge greater unity among the local leftists,top-level Soviet part y officials took part in negotiationspreceding last year's fusion of the Mexican CommunistParty with four smaller leftist parties. The Soviets alsotried to pressure other Mexican leftist groups—includ-ing two parties that have been co-opted by thegovernment—into joining the new leftist coalition. --Their subsequent decision to ease such pressure pre-sumably reflects their awareness of the limits of Sovietinfluence with some local leftists and a desire not toantagonize the Mexican Government. Nevertheless,the Soviets probably calculate that such low-key in-volvement in strengthening Communist parties in theexisting political systems poses little immediate risk totheir state-to-state relations. The Soviets and Cubansemploy their state-to-state and covert leftist contacts inMexico to undermine US influence within the region.They are using Mexico as a base from which toconduct "active measures" against other countries.

60. The Soviets have also stepped up their propa-ganda activities in the area over the last several years.These efforts aim both to discredit US policy in thehemisphere and to strengthen leftist elements. Mos-cow, for example, has directed its representatives inLatin America to spread false accusations about the

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Table 3

Pro-Soviet Communist Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean

Country

Estimated

Population.Mid-1981

Communist PartyEstimated

Membership Status

Argentina 28,130,000 45,003 ProscribedBolivia 5,490,000 500 ProscribedBrazil 124,800.000 6,000 ProscribedChile 11,162,000 20,000 ProscribedColombia 25,217,000 12,000 LegalCosta Rica 2,332,000 3,200 (PVP) LegalDominican Republic " 5,855,000 6,000 LegalEcuador 8,275.000 1,000 LegalEl Salvador 4.610,000 800 ProscribedGuadelou pe 304,000 3,000 LegalGuatemala 7,310,003 750 (PCT) ProscribedGu yana 857,000 Unknown (PPP) LegalHaiti 5.923,000 350 (PUCH) ProscribedHonduras 3,940,000 1,500 ProscribedJamaica .t ,268,000 Unknown (WP1) LegalMartiniq ue 302,000 1,000 LegalMexico 69,100,000 112,000 1 LegalNicaragua 2,559,000 250 (PSN) LegalPanama 1,928,000 550 (PPP) Legal

Paragua y 3,268,000 3,500 ProscribedPeru 18,119,000 3,000 LegalUruguay 2,944,000 7,000 ProscribedVenezuela 17,913,000 4,500 Legal

• This figure is the total membership claimed for a Communist-dominated coalition called the UnifiedParty of Mexico (PSUM), which is somewhat more independent in orientation than the other parties listed inthe table.

Unclassified

reasons for Washington's tilt toward Britain on theFalklands dispute. The Soviets have also used frontorganizations such as the World Peace Council, theWorld Federation of Democratic Youth, and theWorld Federation of Trade Unions to mobilize sup-port for Central American and Caribbean revolution-ary groups. Moreover, through its greatly expandedEnglish-language, medium-wave coverage (relayedfrom Cuba), Rad io Moscow now blankets theCaribbean.

61. In keeping with the pattern elsewhere in theThird World, the Soviets try to infiltrate the bureauc-racy of the host government. In the case of Jamaicaunder Michael Manley, for example, the KGB devel-oped contacts with a wide range of Jamaican politicalfigures—including Manley and government minis-ters—and helped Manley to organize a special intelli-

gence unit to monitor his political op ponents and US

activities. The KGB was also in close contact withsome of Manley's radical supporters who employedviolence against the opposition. Yet, at the same time,the Soviets regarded the regime as unstable andproved unwilling to provide significant economicassistance, which might have helped to ensure itssurvival. Moscow is now apparently seeking to pursuecorrect and businesslike relations with the currentgovernment of Edward Seaga, if only to retain a Sovietpresence in Jamaica, while continuing to maintaincontacts with local leftist groups.

62. The Soviets are also educating numerous LatinAmerican and Caribbean students in the USSR toimprove Moscow's image, establish a cadre of localsympathizers, and spot and evaluate potential agentsfor the Soviet intelligence services. Moscow reportedlyoffers hundreds of scholarships per year to studentsfrom countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,

ET

Table 4

Academic Students From Latin America and the Caribbean in the USSR andEastern Europe, • 195641 b

Departures to the USSR and Eastern Europe Being Trained as ofDecember 19811956-81 1981

Total USSREasternEurope Total USSR

EasternEurope Total USSR

EasternEurope

Total 13,955 8,785 5,170 1,390 945 445 8,800 4,360 2,440Argentina 450 235 215 10 5 5 35 25 10Belize 20 zo 5 5 — 20 20 —Bolivia 910 520 390 20 10 10 105 65 40Brazil 560 290 270 20 5 15 45 30 15Chile 730 530 200 10 5 5 70 40 30Colombia 1,565 975 590 110 100 10 1,015 555 460Costa Rica 910 560 350 100 50 50 670 385 285Dominica 10 5 5 10 5 5 10 5 5Dominican Republic 925 700 225 150 125 25 800 700 100Ecuador 1,805 1,070 735 190 140 50 835 355 480El Salvador 305 160 145 10 5 5 as 30 55French West Indies 155 100 55 15 10 5 75 45 30Crenada 40 40 20 20 — 40 40 —Guatemala 145 120 25 20 15 5 80 55 25Guyana 350 140 210 20 5 15 95 20 75Haiti 170 8.5 85 10 5 5 40 25 15Honduras 470 295 175 SO 25 25 230 125 105Jamaica as zs 30 10 5 5 ss 25 30Mexico 735 460 275 35 25 10 140 80 60Nicaragua 725 450 275 250 150 100 ' 425 260 165Panama 1,000 650 350 175 100 75 1,000 650 350Paraguay 20 10 10 — — — — — —Peru 1,315 1,005 310 145 125 20 795 770 25Uruguay 65 as 30 — — — — — —Venezuela 510 295 215 5 5 — 135 55 80

'Excludes Yugoslavia.b Cuba ma y have received more Latin American students than all other Communist countries combined. Students from virtually every

country in the region have been noted at various schools in Cuba since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959. and man y of them have receivedparamilitary training.

Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Jamai-ca, Mexico, and Venezuela to study in the USSR atLumumba Universit y (see table 4). The Soviet interestin cultivating organized labor in the area has alsoincreased. For example, the USSR now has formal tieswith the Nicaraguan trade union organization andmaintains an educational exchange program withtrade unionists from Colombia.

63. The Soviets have profited from the growth ofpro-Marxist sentiments amonereligious activists. Theyhave been especiall y impressed with the direct supportsuch activists have provided the Sandinista regime andother revolutionar y causes elsewhere in Central Amer.

ica. Crowing resistance among church leaders to thisde facto partnership between religion and revolutionnotwithstanding. Moscow and Havana probably willseek to benefit from the s ympathies of many churchactivists for leftist revolution in the region.

Constraints

64. Despite its increased optimism about trends inLatin America, Moscow recognizes that there aremajor constraints on its ability to influence develo p

-ments there. Foremost is the attitude and role of theUnited States. Moscow believes that US political,economic, and military strength still gives Washingtonpotential for considerable leverage in the hemisphere.

1 eT

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65. Moscow has therefore moved in ways designedto avoid directly provoking the United States. Incontrast to the USSR's overt and direct bilateraldealings with the larger states, its support for revolu-tionary movements has been low-key, often employingintermediaries and surrogates. This pattern of indirectsupport also reflects Soviet uncertainty about the long-term prospects of revolutionary movements and un-willingness to commit the USSR irretrievably to re-spond to possible US actions against them. Further-more, Moscow has been careful to play down its directcommitment to the Sandinista regime and has appar-

entl y not sought a -friendship- treaty with Nicaraguaas it has with some Third World clients outside theWestern Hemisphere.

66. More important, the Soviets have displayedconcern about the application of US political andmilitary leverage in response to the crisis in CentralAmerica. The Reagan administration's frank warningshave emphasized that Washington is indeed sensitiveto Moscow's efforts to exploit political instability in itsown backyard and that such activities there might welltrigger a strong US reaction. The level of arms deliv-eries to Cuba in 1981—the second-highest annual totalon record—and the Soviet efforts to build up Nicara-gua's military forces are to a degree indicative of thisanxiety. At the same time these measures provideCuban and Nicaraguan armed forces with increasedoffensive capabilities and with further means to in-timidate neighbors and provide safehaven for leftistinsurgents.

67. Antipathy to the Soviets is another constraint onMoscow. Even those governments that have developedimportant bilateral ties with the USSR, such as Argen-tina and Brazil, remain strongly anti-Communist anddistrustful of Soviet motives with respect to theirdomestic politics. Brazil, for example, out of fear ofSoviet intelligence penetration, has even refused to

accept Soviet military attaches. The Brazilians havealso kept the USSR out of areas that they consider ofstrategic importance, such as the nuclear program anduranium exploration efforts. In addition, the BrazilianCommunist Party remains outlawed and is closelymonitored by the security 'authorities. Thus, in thenear term Moscow recognizes that more extensive andopen backing for leftist insurgencies in Central Amer-ica would risk a backlash against the USSR by regional

governments and reinforce their suspicions of Soviet-inspired interference in their internal politics. Suchbacking would also stimulate anti-Communist ele-ments among important social groups, especially thevarious churches.

68. Moreover, economic considerations also imposesome constraints on Soviet activism in the region.Foremost are the poor quality, technological back-wardness, and narrow range of Soviet industrial goods,which are compounded by the area's historical prefer-ence for Western goods. Taken together, these factorsseverely limit Soviet export prospects. In cases whereMoscow might hope to make political inroads throughimports from Latin American or Caribbean countries,its severe shortage of hard currency is a major con-straint. Finally, the USSR's record of tightfistednesswith regard to economic assistance deprives it offurther opportunities to assist pro-Soviet regimes orotherwise gain influence in the region.

69. Another constraint on Moscow is the unstablenature of new leftist regimes and its recognition thatits influence is dependent on local political trends thatit may be unable to control. The electoral ouster ofManley in Jamaica was a key case in point, and theBishop regime in Grenada faces economic problemsthat could generate political discontent. The Sovietsprobably are still uncertain whether the new revolu-tionary regimes in Nicaragua and Grenada can sup_vive. The Soviets see Nicaragua's Sandinistas underconsiderable pressure from the United States andformerly sympathetic European socialists. They alsosee Nicaragua increasingly beset by a wide variety ofpolitical opponents, armed counterrevolutionaries, andmounting economic problems.

Prospects and Implications for the United States

70. Moscow's long-term objectives of eroding andsupplanting US influence in Latin America are unlike-ly to be affected by its recognition of the obstacles toits ambitions under present power realities and thepolitical climate in the hemisphere. In fact, over thenext few years, Soviet efforts to gain influence in theregion are likely to increase and will probably presentmore serious problems for the United States. Washing-ton's response to this growing Soviet challenge will becomplicated b y the fact that its own deep concernabout Soviet troublemaking in the area is not shared

54

SIRET

by many regional governments. S y mpathy with revo-lutionary causes will persist in countries such as Mexi-co and Panama. Even countries less sympathetic toleftist causes such as Brazil and Venezuela would beopposed to US military intervention to check revolu-tionary gains in Central America and the Caribbean.

71. The Soviets will continue to use both state-to-state and revolutionary approaches, depending on thesituation. Moscow probably will continue to judge thatin the long term it has a great deal to gain bycontinuing to develop positions of influence iii themore politically significant countries such as Argen-tina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. It will couple thisinterest with its exploitation of ferment in countriesembroiled in insurgencies or ruled by unstableregimes.

72. Uncertainty about US intentions is the domi-nant consideration in Soviet thinking about risks andgains in exploiting regional opportunities. Withoutabandoning its support for revolution, Moscow is likelyat present to minimize risk by recommending tacticalprudence to its regional clients Cuba and Nicaragua.Moscow's recent endorsement of calls for talks be-tween Nicaragua and the United States, for example,probably reflects its interest in easing US pressure andbuying time for the beleaguered Sandinista regime, aswell as in cutting its own costs.

73. So far, the Soviets have been reluctant to pro-vide Nicaragua with massive economic aid. Nonethe-less, if the Sandinista regime falters for economicreasons. Moscow and its allies probably would besomewhat more forthcoming with economic support.Because Nicaragua's population is much smaller thanCuba's, and because Managua seems at this time toenjoy broader international economic backing thandid Havana in the 1960s, in the near term at least theSoviets would almost certainly not have to assume thekind of economic burden that the y have been carryingin Cuba for two decades.

74. Intensified pressure on Managua by Nicaraguandissident armed elements may be seen by Moscow asposing a potential long-term threat to the Sandinistaregime, yet as also offering an opportunity to drawNicaragua still closer to the Soviet Bloc. Moscow willprobably counsel Managua to avoid countermeasuresprovocative to the United States—such as armed

forays deep into Honduras—but may assume a moreactive role in planning Nicaragua's counterinsurgencymeasures, and might expand its military assistance.

75. In the event Nicaragua were subject to directconventional attack, it would have to rely primarily onHavana rather than Moscow for immediate assistance.The Cubans concluded a secret defense agreementwith Managua in late 1979 and almost certainly wouldcommit their personnel stationed in Nicaragua, as wellas additional Cuban forces, to resist any such attackshort of a direct invasion by US forces. The Sovietshave not, so far as we know, promised direct Sovietsupport in this eventuality, but presumably theywould step up military aid to the Cubans. Moscow'sother allies and clients could not be ex pected toprovide much more than political support.

76. The large and growing levels of military hard-ware in the hands of Soviet clients have major implica-tions for the region. In addition to defending bothCuba and Nicaragua against attack, such militarypower—especially in Nicaragua—facilitates su pport tothe Salvadoran insurgents and provides shelter for theguerrilla infrastructure. Within the term of this Esti-mate, other objectives behind arms supply from theUSSR and various intermediaries probably include.

— Intimidating Nicaragua's neighbors, thus dispos-ing them toward acquiescence in the Soviet-Cuban foothold in Central America.

—Supporting insurgents in Guatemala.

— Laying the groundwork for support of possiblefuture insurgencies in Honduras, Costa Rica, andelsewhere in the hemisphere.

77. Over the longer term, there is also a possibilitythat the Soviets may seek access to naval and airfacilities in Nicaragua and Grenada. Such accesswould have a significant im pact on US security inter-ests, especially with regard to the Panama Canal andother lines of communication. The principal constrainton the Soviets in expanding their military presence inCentral America and the Caribbean is their uncer-tainty as to the US res ponse. Nevertheless, the y arevery likely to continue to probe US resolve during thisdecade.

78. The persistent strain of anti-US sentiment in theregion, which has been accentuated by the Falklands

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crisis, offers the Soviets some new opportunities toexpand their influence. However, Soviet initiatives areof less intrinsic significance than US policies andactions. The Soviets probably have no firm expectationof any dramatic new political payoffs in the near term,although they probably do hope that their support willmoderate local suspicions of Moscow and enable themto project an image of the USSR as a distant butpowerful supporter of Latin American and anti-colonial interests. They may also calculate that theoutcome of the crisis could usher in a period ofpolitical instability and open prospects for those inBuenos Aires who might be more inclined towardcloser relations with the USSR. The Soviets are alreadyseeking to profit from any general deterioration in USinfluence in the hemisphere arising out of the Falk-lands crisis, but they realize that Washington's lossescannot be immediately chalked up as Moscow's gains.

79. US efforts to build hemispheric solidarity withthe current Salvadoran Government and to gain LatinAmerican support for countering Soviet-supportedleftist insurgency elsewhere in Central America havebeen damaged. The Soviets are certain to attempt toexploit what they perceive as a US setback. They will

continue to conduct many of their activities in theregion either covertly or through intermediaries. Al-though generally successful to date, this tactic isvulnerable to public exposure of Soviet support forsubversion and revolutionary violence. Furthermore,some Soviet intermediaries (such as Cuba, Algeria, orthe PLO) might possibly be led to moderate theirpolicies through a combination of external pressureand internal problems.

80. The Soviets have by and large successfullyimplemented a policy of encouraging unrest in variousCentral American states, gaining a foothold in Nicara-gua, and improving their relations with the govern-ments of the more important South American coun-tries. They probably expect their general progress tocontinue, especially if the United States appears to beinconsistent, or discredits itself through its reactions toevents in the region. From the Soviet perspective, sucha policy has potential for distracting American atten-tion from other regions; is relatively cheap in eco-nomic terms; has not required major commitments tolocal allies; and has not raised confrontation with theUnited States to an unmanageable level. The Sovietsare thus likely to persist with this strategy.

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