22 MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016

By Ty Bomba

Central Committee of 15 (from an over-all civilian population of about 1,000).

At the same time, the People’s Liberation Army has created a division-level “garrison headquarters” on Sansha, and it fi elds an estimated 6,000 military personnel across the two island groups. Airfi elds large enough to accommodate fourth-generation Su-27 and Su-30 fi ghter aircraft have been built, along with hardened revetments to protect the planes on the ground. On the naval front, Sansha now has docks large enough to service the fl otilla of seven frigates and destroyers (total) that home-port from there. Lastly, signals intelligence communica-tions intercept stations have been set up all across the Chinese-claimed area.

Aside from China, four other nations are also taking part in the

freedom of navigation across the area––have done little more than engage in diplomatic handwringing over the issue. During that time the mainland Chinese have fortifi ed seven of the Spratlys (named after the British whaling ship captain who, in 1843, was the fi rst Western navigator to chart the island) and an equal number of the Paracels (the modernized form of the old Portuguese word “pracel,” meaning shallow seas or banks).

The idea diplomacy is going to move the Chinese to roll back their claims to the islands, or disassemble their military engineering within them, is a non-starter. Beijing has declared Sansha Island (previously “Woody Reef”) a “prefecture city,” which will henceforth maintain a provincial People’s Congress of 60 members and a

E ighty percent of the world’s total sea-transported oil goes through the South China Sea

and, of course, that means the area inescapably has international signifi -cance. At the same time, within that transshipment total, about 60 percent of China’s oil imports move across the area. From the Chinese perspective, especially given the fact their energy importation needs are expected to double by mid-century, all that comes together to mean their interests in the area trump those of all others.

During the past few years, the other regional nations with claims to por-tions of the sea––Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, the Philippines, as well as the US, which has no territorial claims but maintains an offi cially declared interest in maintaining the

above — A Malayasian CB90 - CB stands for Combat Boat

right — Chinese Marines in their distinctive uniforms. It would be troops such as these that would be used in any operation to seize all the Spratly Islands

SOUTH CHINA SEATHE NEW DRAGON’S LAIR

MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016 23

militarization of the islands, which altogether comprise some 30,000 islands, shoals, and reefs.

On Taiping Island, the Republic of China (Taiwan) has a military airfi eld large enough to land C-130 transport aircraft, and sorties of that type now average one per month, but with no reliable word on what’s being fl own in. The nation’s Coast Guard also maintains a squadron of three M8 patrol craft there.

Ironically, if there’s any issue that could potentially bring together the two Chinas, it’s the Spratly Islands. That’s because both Chinese govern-ments make identical claims for them. Further, the Taiwanese state-run oil company offi cially identifi es “Vietnamese aggression” in the area as the greatest threat to regional peace. In that same regard, the Beijing regime has offered the Taiwanese a share of the oil and gas to be found in the region if it will offi cially meld the two claims into one. For its part, the US State Department and Navy never mention Taiwan whenever they offer press releases on the topic.

On Shallow Reef, the Royal Malaysian Navy maintains a squadron of CB90 assault craft and a Starburst air defense battery.

On Thitu Island, the Philippine army maintains a 60-man infantry pla-toon, which mans a position centered around a complex of concrete bunkers. Manila’s air force runs Rancudo Airfi eld, which, like the Taiwanese facility on Taiping Island, is large enough for military transport planes, and which is being further expanded. At present, though, only reconnais-sance fl ights sortie from there. There is also a civilian settlement on Thitu with a population of some 300.

Ominously since 2014, the Chinese have specifi cally cited Thitu as one of the islands they intend to “reclaim.” Further, in 1999, on Second Thomas Shoal, the Philippine Navy purposely grounded a World War II-era “LST” (landing ship tank), which they’ve kept in place there, armed and crewed by Marines, ever since.

The Philippine claim is undercut by the Moro National Liberation Front, which wages an on-again-off-again independence struggle

within that nation’s Sulu region. The front has recently come out in full support of the Chinese claims. In their press release about it, the Muslim Moros said both China and the Moro people were equal victims of US and Philippine “colonialism.”

Last, on Spratly Island––the namesake locale for the entire archipelago, and which is also claimed by Taiwan––the Vietnamese military maintains a helicopter pad and meteorological station.

In sum, all the involved nations have some military personnel stationed on their respectively claimed islands. Any forceful Chinese move to take over some or all of the Spratlys, will have to involve at least a small ground force to land on the islands, capture or kill the enemy troops they fi nd there, and then occupy those places in order to maintain the basis for Beijing’s territorial claims and pre-vent other militaries from returning.

Exact numbers remain uncertain, but the ground force contingents from the different claimant countries

Chinese Navy destroyers on patrol in the South China Sea

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26 MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016

seem presently to be on about 45 of the islands: 6,000 Chinese, 90 Malaysians, 100 Filipinos, 100 Taiwanese, and 1,500 Vietnamese.

A fi nal player has recently entered the scene: Japan. Though Tokyo makes no territorial claims in the South China Sea, it’s involved with its own similar dispute with China in the East China Sea. Accordingly, early in 2015, Tokyo and Manila signed an agreement whereby their two navies have begun regular joint exercises, and their vice ministers of defense

have been formed into a standing liaison team for those two services.

At the same time, Japanese personnel have been sent to “advise” Vietnamese submariners on various aspects of those operations. Further, Vietnam and the Philippines have signed the preliminary agreement to form a “strategic partnership” aimed specifi cally at sharing naval intelligence, technology, and training. Since Manila already has such an agreement in place with Tokyo and Washington, it’s easy to see a spider web of interlocking alliances––similar to the one that came to cover Europe

prior to the start of the First World War––is spreading across the region.

In addition to all the above, the overlapping sovereignty claims are fur-ther heightened by the fact each new geologic survey of the region raises the estimates of the oil and gas to be found in it. The South China Sea has proven oil reserves of around 11 billion barrels, with an estimate of 28 billion barrels likely there in total, along with natural gas reserves of about 266 trillion cubic feet. In comparison, the US has a proven oil reserve of 36.5 billion barrels and a natural gas reserve of 31 trillion cubic feet.

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MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016 27

• China Needs Armed Strength to Secure Disputed Territories.China must amass the military wherewithal necessary to abort or defeat other nations’ efforts to make the status quo the per-manent reality. Beijing therefore ultimately needs suffi cient military capacity to secure all the disputed territories, whole and intact, while warding off all adversaries intent on reversing those gains.

• China Will Impose a New RegionalOrder. To facilitate the above two principles, while also consolidat-ing national unity, China must establish a new regional order. It will establish that new order by consensus, diplomacy or coercion, depending on case-by-case circumstances. As a fi rst step to hedge against threats to that new Chinese-led regional order, constructing a locally dominant navy is the fi rst essential.

Operational ApproachesEven within the strident context

created by the three strategic principles

above, Beijing has no interest in starting an all-out war over the South China Sea. It would

only benefi t if the move resulted in a

short, relatively bloodless conquest after which relations were quickly re-normalized. The Chinese would, therefore, be likely to avoid attacking targets within the opposing nations’ homelands, even if those assets might be deployed from there

new Chinese-led regional order, constructing a locally dominant navy is the fi rst essential.

Operational ApproachesEven within the strident context

created by the three strategic principles

above, Beijing has no interest in starting an all-out war over the South China Sea. It would

only benefi t if the move resulted in a

short, relatively bloodless conquest after which relations were quickly re-normalized. The Chinese would, therefore, be likely to avoid attacking targets within the opposing nations’ homelands, even if those assets might be deployed from there

navy is the fi rst essential.

Operational ApproachesEven within the strident context

created by the three strategic principles

above, Beijing has no interest in starting an all-out war over the South China Sea. It would

only benefi t if the move resulted in a

short, relatively bloodless conquest after which relations were quickly re-normalized. The Chinese would, therefore, be likely to avoid attacking targets within the opposing nations’ homelands, even if those assets might be deployed from there

for use against them in the Spratlys and Paracels (much as the British avoided attacking the Argentine homeland during the Falklands War).

Attacks against enemy homelands would inescapably raise the stakes. In one way or another, that would cause China to have to pay a higher price for its seizures, both immedi-ately in the possible form of enemy counterattacks on China proper, and in long-term damage to regional or even global economic relations.

China would therefore likely only expand the war to enemy homelands if its forces turned out to be unexpected-ly thwarted by some particularly deter-mined opponent. Even then, China's approach would have to be careful, for example, in attempting to wrest con-trol of islands claimed by Taiwan or the Philippines, since both have mutual defense agreements with the US. While those agreements wouldn’t necessarily be applied to a war kept isolated within the islands, there’s no ambiguity in them in regard to direct attacks on the two countries’ home territories.

A Chinese invasion of the islands in the South China Sea is more likely to occur if they’re fi rst engaged in some larger military confl ict. In such a context, China's seizure of them could be painted as a justifi able military necessity rather than one of naked aggression.

Whatever the offered rationale for it, such a confl ict would likely start with China moving its submarine and surface fl eets into the area to destroy enemy warships. Long-range aircraft, basing from Hainan and the mainland, would also be committed in that way. Military assets would also have to be deployed along the China-Vietnam border to guard against the latter’s possible

Chinese StrategyThe Beijing government has

identifi ed the South China Sea as an area of “core interest” since March 2010. That means they apply the following three strategic principles–– simultaneously and with equal weight––in relation to it.

• Territorial & Maritime Sovereignty are Indivisible.Neither territorial nor maritime disputes can be allowed to remain unresolved indefi nitely. Though temporarily shelving claims, for the sake of effi cient joint international extraction of natural resources is allowable, each claim remains sacrosanct. No claim, or part of any claim, will be traded away to secure another claim. China must eventually be internationally recognized as hav-ing gotten its way on all claims.

below — The Philippine LST run aground at Second Thomas Shoal

left — A Malayasian soldier with a Starburst man-portable air defense missile