sosa - judgment and agency (part iii)

7/24/2019 Sosa - Judgment and Agency (Part III)

1/41

T

Knowledge andAction

hat

foilows

r,vili draw

inspiration

fronl

Aristotie's

virtue

theory

for

an accrount of

how

human

knowledge

and action are

related.

A. Aristotle

r.

We

begin

r.vith

a

passage

that

illurninates Aristotle's

ethics,

frorn Book

ll,

Clrapter

4,

of the

lrlicomachean

[:thics;

It is possible

to

do sonrething that is

in

accorciance witir the

laws ofgrarnnrar,

cither

by

chance or at the

suggestion of another. A uran will

be a

gramnur*

ian,

then,

only

when

he has

both done

something

grammatical

and donc it

grammaticaliy;

and

this

means

doin;

it in accordance with the

gramuratical

krrowiedge in hirnself.

(ENII

a,

no5azz-(>)

'l'his

provides a key

to

Aristotle's view of hurnan flourishing as the fun-

tlrrnrental

ethical

value. Please

note that

the second

o'in

accordance with"

(.ilnnot

mean

simply

"coinciding

with the

content of."

After

all, what

orrc

cloes nright coincide with the content of

one's

knowledge entirely

by

,'llance.

But Aristotle

means

to

rule

out

such accidental coincidence,

as is

t lcar

in the

first

sentencre

of the passage.

There nlust be

a tighter

connection

tlrln

jr-rst

coinciclence letween one's knowledge that a certain

sentence is

rtlrulrnratic:al

ancl thc

bcing granrnlatical clf

one's utterance,

in

order

for the

uttcr;Il)c:c

to trc

"in

ccorcianc:cr with" the knowledge. The

sentence

may

lrc knowll to bc

gnrnrnltic'a1,

firr

onc thinil,

blrt

its

grarunratical

utterance

rrr;ry bc

clrrc

orrly to

tlrc

ussrrr:rrrt'c

of

rr

liar

(to

tlrc

"suggestion

ofanother"),

u,llilc tllc

klrowlctlu('rr.'nlrtins

irrrplicit

rlrrl

ill,rt

tivc.


2/41

r34

KN()WLEDGIT

AND

ACl

l()N

The

view

is

fi,rrther

specified

in the

capsulc

statelllellt

foupd

in

Book

I,

Chapter

7,

accordillg

to

which

. . .

hura

good turns

out

to

be

activity

of

soul

in

accordance

r.vith

virtue,

antl

if there

are

more

than

one

virtue,

in

accordnce

lvith

the

best

and

most

cornplete.

(ENI

7,

ro98ar-r7)

Chapter

8

adds:

Yet evidetly,

as we

said,

it

leeds

the

cxternal

goods as

well;

for it

is ipos-

sible,

or

not

easy,

to

do

noble acts

without

the

proper

ecluipment.

Irr many

actions

lve

usc

friends

and

riches

and

political

power as

itrstruurcnts

.

.

'

(EN

I 8,

ro99a3r-bti)'

And

Chapter

9

explains

furtirer:

[Happiness]

. .

. has been

said

to

be a

virtuous

activity

of soul,

of

a

certain

kincl.

Of the

reraining

goojs,

sonte

ll1tlst

necessarily

pre-exist

as

condi-

tions

ofhappiness,

and

others

are

naturally

co-operative

and

useful

as

instru-

ments.

(ENI

9,

ro99bz-8)

One

last

important conlponent

appears

in Book IV, Chapter

r:

Now

virtuous

actions

are

noble and

done

for the

sake

of the

noble.

Therefore

the

liberal

ruan,

iike

other

virtuous

men,

will

give

for the sake

of the

noble,

and

rightly;

fbr he

r.vill

givc

to the

right

people,

the

riglrt anloullts'

ancl

at

the

right iinre,

with all

the other

quaiifications

that

accompany

right

giving; and

that

too

with

plcasurc or

without

pain;

for that

which

is

virtuous

is pleasant

orfree

frorn

pairr-least

of

all will

it

be

painful.

(ENIV r, rI20^4-7)

z.

Beyond

his

own

nlain

statenrents,

Aristotle's

vierv

stands

otlt

lnorc

clearly

by

contrast

with

the

Stoic

alternative,

which

seenls

diametrically

opposed.

Aristotelian

flourishing

involves

the

exercisc

of

one's

virtuc's'

ntoral

and

intellectual. However,

sonle

virtues require

external

aids

ftrr

their

exercise, as

when

liberality

reqrlires

itlollcy.

Ily

contfast,

all

that thc

Stoics

require

for

a

full

nteasure

ofhappiness

(f;rring wcll)

and

virtue

is that

one

properly

order

one's

preferenc:es

and

clhoose

raticltrally

()n

th:rt

basis.

r.

It

riht

be tgrrght

tht cxtcrnrl

qoorls

firrtlrcr

hrppirrcss

tltc_rv:ry

:t gootl

stotclr

tirrthcls

'r

pl..riirrblc

i,rt".ii.l

strc,

irs

r,rr"r.i,'',".,,,

to

rcrl hlprirrcss,

rvhith

is

irrtcrrrrlly

(-()lrstittltc(l'

ilrrt this clrrtr.rt

frc

riglrt,

givcn

tllrt

Iir Alistotlc

lrl'irrrr

rvcll is

r'rrrs/lllrlr'rl

by

tttllrlc

t

titlll.

sttt l

rs

thc

libcllrl

h;rn,lirrg

ovt'l

,r{'.1

lili.

.rrrrl

rrot

.irrst

tltc

situttl.tt

tllll

ilt

.t M.rtrix

sr't'rlritl.

Nol

ir

it plrLrsiIlc

t

lr,rt lr;rpprrrcss

,,rrsist.

ol vrr t rrorrr

t I

ivil

\'

tllrr

p,rsst'ssiott

of cx

tt'lll gotltls'

sillt

r'

Itttttt.ttt11,,,,,11(\'lll1l()ll\.l(tiVll\'..lltlcrltltt'tltl0tlt

ll(',llilIvllIll{rtl\'l(Il\lt\"l)lllll)\tltl

rrt'rtls

rsr',1 irl

solttt

rtlr lt .tr I tvtt

1'.

l.t5

True virtue resides tn

the

perfection

of

one's

rational nature, and it is tllc

exercse of such virtue and

only

this that makes

a

life

good.'

Thrs paints

a

stark

contrast.

'Who

is right?r

B.

Aristotle

and

the

Stoics

r.

Take

a culture

where

sheep

are sacred

and wolves evil. Shccp urc t() [)('

protected,

wolves to

be

killed. Suppose you shoot and kill

a

shccp in woll

's

clothing. Your

action

is

"in

accordance" with virtue. Nevertllclcss,

it

l,rlls

short.

We are focused on

your

doing

in killing

that shcep-that

vcry tloiui.

not

things done whereby

you

do that doing. This doing is clistint t

fiorrr

any action

ofyours, strictly

speaking.

An

action of

oing

nrust

illlplcurcr)l

,ur

irrtention

to o, as

such, and

you

do not

intend to kill a.s/lccp,

as

sur'lr. Yor

rl,'

intend

to kiil that animal

(clothed

as a wo10,

and that

aninral

i.r :r .r/rcr7r, lrrrt

you

do

not

intend to ki1l it under rlris description.

Suppose

next you

shoot

and

kill

a

wolf

in

wolf's clothing.

Nolv

you tlo

intend

to kill this arrinal, and this

alrinlal

is

a wolf, and

you tlo intcnrl

ro

kill

it

under

this

dcscription. Now your full endeavor

is in

act:ortlrurt

t' rvit

lr

your

virtue, as

is

its

succcss.

You do

intend to kill that anintal bcfirrc

v()u,

,rs

it

happens a wolf, and you do

intend

to

kill

it

as

a rvolf.

In

a

wrry

tlris srrt

t't'ss

i-s

"in

accordance with"

your

relevant conlpetences,

practical

rultl t ounitivr'.

You

endeavor

to

kill

that

rvoif

by shooting

it,

when you spot

it,

r

ntl

bclit'r,t'

it

correctly

to be

a

wolf.

You thr.rs

bring

to bcar

a colllplcx

c:ornlrint'tl r'onr

pe tencre. This

includes

your

ability to tell the look of a wolf

,

:rncl

it irrclrrtlt's

;rlso your shooting cornpetence.

So,

your lethal

shot at

tht

wolf-n,rrrilt'sls

rclevant

virtues

and

conlpetences

seated

in

you.

Ncvcrthclcss, y()ur

killrrri

r.

'I'hc

atticle

on Stoicisnr, by Dirk Blltzll', in the

.\r,lrlirrrl

I:ucytloptlit

rtl l'ltlosoplty

(

onl.un\

.r

llrief'accottnt.AlsorelevantistheostensiblecontrrstrviththcsrrlposcdlySotr.rtir

lrcu'rlr.r(

wisdorn is

sullicient

for happiness

(for

flourishing). llrrt scc l{trsscll.l,rrrcs olr

"Wstlorrr

.rrrtl

Hrtrpirressirtllutltl,duutts:7tl-:ll:,"Pltil()soplt(rs'lrryrrtt,rj(tq)("tol):

r:r,lir.(()nrl)('llrrf'

cr-itiqtrr: of':tddutirr

tllll(

pssiluc

in

suppor-t

ot'thc thcsis tl)rt

So.r'.rtcs

(rr

l'l.rt,,''

Sot

r.rttr)

rc1ly

hcld tlrc

vicrv tlrirt rt,istlonr rs

rr1/ir'i'lt,

urrtl

rrot-jtrst

l(l('rr,//)/, lirr lr.rprrrt'ss

.

Iltrvctticdtotitcortlvs,rnt(('nlr.rll).rs\;r{csinlp()ttiurt

lirrlllt'ttounl ol Aislrrttlr.trcllrrrs

tlrtisslrlrl;trtl,.tllc.tsltttlltrtsicler

thcn hcr.jtrclnrent

that

it

is

sunny outside

at

a

nroment

when

tlrc scrccrr

r/o's ltntpcttto

r'pcrfe'c:tly

tratrsparent, errabling her

to see that

it

rs inclcccl

sur)uv:rt tll:rt

v('r'y n)()nrcnt.

Tllc nlcrc qlJinnatior in

the endeavor

II.

Wt'(,ul

.r\slrtttt' lll.rt,

.rt lll,

nr()ru( nl

rltt'

tn.rtlr'ltt't

tt,lgtnt'nt.

llt't sitt,rtiott

totrltl sw,itt'lr

nl\l.illl,ll('()tt\l\'.trl

rr,l/l//rr,/)'lt,'ntlr.rn\l),u('nl

\(t('('nl()\(t('('lt

rr.tllt lnovrr'.

KNOWT-EDGE

AND ACTION


10/41

r50

KN()W

LIlD(;E AND A(lTI()N

KN()W Ltlt)(;li AND ACTI()N

I5I

to aflirm

correctly

is then

plausibly

colllpetent

on the

first

order.

It

is

basecl

inrnrediately

on the apt visual

experience

and the

apt

visuai

seerning

that

p.

In aflirming accordingly, she thereby

functions appropriately. The aflir-

nratioll then cloes get

it

right, and in

so doing

manifests

a

first-order

conr-

petence

to

nrake

such

correct

visual

affirmations.

So, the

afftrmation

is

not

only conlpeterlt

but

also apt.

Flowever,

the aflirnration might

too

easily

have been

inapt,

since

the

screen

nright

so

casily havc bcen opaque

(whilc

seanrlessly segueing

into

sonlething

now quite

clivergent

fronr

the

reality

yonder).

Something is

thus

seriously

amiss

in the

relevantjudgnrent, which

falls

short

in

the

fbllowing

respect.

To

judge

is to

affirm

in

the

encleavor

to affirm aptly.

But when

she takes

it

tlrat

in aflirming

as

she

does she

would

then

affirm

aptly,

our

subject

is

incorrect.

Given the

randonr

behavior of the

screen,

given

that it is

just

as

likely

that it would be

transparent as

opaque, she is wrong to think

that shc:

utctuld

then af{irnr

aptly,

if

she

affirnred at

all

on the

nlatter

at

hand.

Only by

luck

can she at that nroment

get

it

right

with

her relevant

first-order

percep-

tual

affirmations

airned

at truth. True,

her

alJtrnrafttn

tltat

p

is

correct

at that

ttronrent, when

the screen happens

to

Lre

transparellt

(at

least

for

a

llronlent).

Her aflirmation

is

correct,

and even apt, as

rpt

rs

would

be

her

aflirmations

based on her

perceptions

through an

open window sorne sunny

morning.

Why

are

they apt that

way? Iiecause

she

happens

to

satisfy

the interest-

ing

Shape and Situation requirenrents whosc conrbination with her visual

sorting skill

gives her

the

conrpetence to

sort

the

things she

sees

clearly dis-

piayed

under

the

sun before

her.

Nevertheless,

Sinrone's

perceptual

judgments

through

the randomly

transparent screen

are not

apt, since her

affirmations are

not guided

to

apt-

ness

through

an

apt

appreciation

of

the

conditions. Therefore,

when

shc

happens

to view

the

scene hefore her through the trensparent

screen,

ancl

affirms about that

scene

in

the endeavor

to aflirnr

aptly,

she will

affirnr

aptly.

but

her

attainment of

this ainr will

not be

apt. This is

becatrse

the ranclonr-

ness

of

the screen precludes

her

believing

aptly that

her afftrnlatic>ns about

the

scene

beyoncl

l,trltl

thcn bc apt,

that

if shc thcn affinlrccl ebout thrt

scene,

her affirnlation u,ottltlbc

apt.

T'his

is nrclc fhlsc

by tlrc

firct

thrt tlrt'

screen rnight:rs

casily

bc trattspurcnt lls

n()t


11/41

r52

KNOWLEDGE AND AC]'ION

with the perceptual conlpetences made possible

by the transparency of

the

screen.

But

she

lacks

the second-order

com.pctence required

forjudg-

nrental

knowledge. She

lacks the

required conrpetence

to

judge,

not

just

to

afiirm,

aptly. This required competence

rvould

enable her

to

succeed

aptly

in

the endeavor notjust

to

get

it right,

but to get

t right

aptly.

4.

That

is

then what

we nray be

tracking

commonsensically when we deny

that she

really

knows even

when the

screen is

perfectly transparent so

that

on the first

order

she fcrrrns

apt perceptual aflirmations

(ancl

representa-

tions). Those afiirrnations

(representations)

fail to be guided

to

aptness by

the subject's

awareness

that

they uottld

be apt.

Even

though they

are

apt

when the screen

happens

to be

trarlsparent,

their attainment

of

ayttness is not

itself

apt; it is spoiled by credit-iimiting luck.

J.

There

is

however a difference between our

two

Simone

cases.

Simone:

in her plane

up aloft does have

credal anirnal

knowledge of the scene before

her

on the ground,

despite

how

easily

she nright

have

been in

the simula-

tion

cockpit instead.

By contrasto when she faces

the transparent screen,

Simone lacks any credal

knowledge

of the scene before her.

That

contrast

between

our

two

Sinrones

derives

from

the follow-

ing

corresponding contrast.

When

up

aloft, Sirnone's

perceptual

afiir-

rnations

are unsafe in one

way:

as she makes

her

perceptual

afhrmations,

she

might

easly hat,e

been ili

piaced

to

make

thenr,

since she might so

eas*

ily have been

in the simuiation cockpit.

Clall

this

backwards-unsafcry,

l)espitc

the backwards-r.rsafety of

her

perceptual

affirnrations as she

nrakes

thenr,

Simone's affirnrations r,vhen

aloft

still seem

safe

in

another

wayr

if

she

werc

to

ask herself whether her

affirmation

u,ould

thtnbe apt, as

she

contemplatcs

a perceptual

affirmation,

she

can lnswer correctly in

the

afiirrnative.

So,

hcr

afti

rmation

then

is

-forutard

s -

safe.

If

Simone aloft lacks creclal anirnal knowledge, then,

it

is

not for the

rcr-

son

that the screen-dependent Sinrone

lacks

it.

It is

not

because

it

is-llsc th:rt

she would afiirm aptly on the scenc before her.

If

Sinrone ak>ft

lacks

crccl:rl

animal knowledge

it is rather because, cvcn if it happcns t()

bc

true:

thlt

il'

she affirrrr.ed

perceptually, shc r,,rrulr/ afflnlt

aptly, rhis is

n()t sonlc)thing

sllc

is

in

a

position

to

know,

4ivcn

hr>w

casily

shc tt,qltt

tltut

ltaw ''l rurclcr sinlrr-

lation,

itrdisc:cnt

ibly so.

(lonsiclcr'


12/41

INTENTIONAT.

AC

rr()N AND

^IUDGMENT

2. Evetr that

rnuch

is made

cloubtful by

actions still

to

sonle extent

apt

and creditable without

anything

properly called knowiedge to

serve as the

nleans-end

connection. Not even

subcredal

knowledge

seenrs

required.

Take

a

case

in which

we

need

to choose

arbitrarily by

just

supposing

that

a

certain nleans-end proposition

is

true.

'We

may need to act

on

that

assunrption

just

as an

arbitrary choice among

3o

equal options, one

of

which

nrust

be

chosen.

We might

just

barely

guess

by opting for

straight

swimrning

in

one of

3o

clirec:tions, and we

nright

reach

land that way,

and

our cloing

so

nlay be

apt to

some

extent. Our

guess is

rnininrally

competent.

At least we

do not swinr in

circles

So

that seenls a

way to

get

it right

on

the

direction

of reac:hable

land, in

a way

that

manifests

some

degree ofaptness.l

C)n

the

other

hand,

we need not

even

positively guess.

We

need not

posi-

tively think that the choice we have made is right,

and that

our

choic e

will

be

a successful

means

to our

end.

'We

can insteacl

lust

supprrse and hope that

the

chosen

option

will

yield success, while acting on that

assurnption. Here

one's

action nright be succ:essful and even

apt to some

extent,

despite the

element of luck owed to the arbitrariness

of our supposition. Here again,

what

may

enable

the action

to

attain

sonre

degree

of

aptness

is

that

it

suc-

ceed

(one

reaches land) in

a

way

that

nlanifests

(suflicient)

competence,

so

as

to

be a

success

sonrewhat creditable to

the agellt.

3,

That

conclucles

our

inquiry into r,vhether

apt action requires

knowledge

of

at least

the

anirnal

level. Arbitrary

suppositiorl carlnot

constitute

knowl-

ecige of

any sort.'

Apt

action connects with epistemology

rnore tenuously

than

by

requiring

knowledge

of the

nreans

to one's

end. Nothing nrore

is

necessarily

required than

arbitrary

supposition

on

which one

is

willing

to

risk

action.

Such

supposition will sonretinres enable

apt

attainnrent of one's

end by

connecting

it

to soille

nleans,

helping

thus

to constitute

a

much

fuller

c:onlpetence nranifest

in

suc-cessful

attrinnrent

of that

end.

A

value

ofaninral

krrowledge

hence

resides not in

its being

neccssary

for apt

intentional

action,

but rather in its

often being

a constitutive

part

ofwhat is

r.

Oourpare

the

pitcher

who ltrckily

hits

a

honre

nrn withont

nranifbsting

competence

(period)

as

a

hotuc rtrn

hirter

(trnhkc

the

uniclrre

llabe

l{uth). It

still seenls possible

to

say that

his

suc-

cess nrirnifbsts

s()lrc

(sliglrt)

tlcqrcc

of'corrrpctcnce

,

rntl instrrntiatcs

sourc

(corresponclinely

sliulrt) tlcqrcc of-lptrrcss.

:. Hct'c wc

slrorltl irrtclrlct

tllc

";r'bitrrincss"

of'tllc supl)()siti()ll

til prct'lutlc tllc

solt

of'sub-

lintin:rl rcli,rlrllitVtll.rt t'n.llrl('\()urcyc

t'x:rrrrsrrlrjt't't'suucsst'st()(.()llstitutc.rsortof'sulrt'rcrl:rl

k rror','lctlHr..

r55

-#**ir

'{'

"d

,$

Intentional

Action

andJtdgment

A.

Taking Stock

r.

We have explored

a connectiou

between

knowledge

and

apt .tctiot.t,

action

whose success

ntanifests

pertinent

colllpeteltce.

'We

have

focusecl

on

action that

takes a

nleans-end fornr,

a

forrn

huttratt

action

so

often

does

take.

Clonsider

the complete

conrpetence recluired

fbr

slrch

actiou

to

bc:

conlpetent

and fur

its

sLlccess

(in

attaining

its

airn) to

nranifest

conlpetellce.

Such conrpetence seerned

initially

to require

the agent to

beleve

knou,ledgt''

ably

the

relevant nreans-end

proposrtion.

On

further

rcllection,

that

rlow

appears

too

rcstric:tivc

a

view of

apt

action,

which ntay

after all

require

rlothini

nlore

tharl a

good guess,

especially

if

one

rtrust act

whetr nothing

epistenrically

better

is

avail-

able.

In

response we nray

recluce the

level of

klowleclc

requirecl ttr

that of

sinryly thnkng

that the

nreans-end

proposition

is

trueo

so

long

as

this thought

is colnpetently

enough

sustairred,

c:ven

with

coltrpetellcc

'nvhose

reliability

lies

well

below

Jo

perc:t:nt.

We

rteec{

not

evett

insist

that this

is

literally

knowleclge.

We

can

allow

that

we

speak

rtretaphori-

cally

in calling such

guess-like

thoughts

"ktrowled4e." This

neecl

tror

concern

us

if

our

interest

is

not so

tnttch senlantic

as

rttctatrllrysic:al analy-

sis.

But

we

have seen how

proper it

see

ttrs

to

rcc'optrizc

in Errglisll

r

killtl

of

subcredal

aninlal

knowle

clge,

as

in the c:ase of

thc, fllwle ss cyc-cxaltl

subject.

If crcdll

lnilnl krrowlcrlgc

is not rcrlttirctl

for u t'oltlpctctl('c

t() stt('('cctl,

pcrlrirps

subr'rctlul

:llliltr;rl kllowlcclsc

(';ut

sufllr'c?

Arrtl

pcrlrlrs

kllowlctluc'

trf';rt

lc';rst

tlris

low lcvcl

is

n'rttin'l?


13/41

r5

TNTENTIONAL ACl'ION

AND

.IUDGMENT

sufficient.

This

status it

often attains

by

constituting

the subject's

grasp

of rel-

evarlt means-end

infornration,

however tenuous

that

grasp nray

be,

whether

through

a

reliable*enough

though

subcredal

thought

that

the

means

will

yielcl

the

desired

end,

or

through

a rnore substantiai

judgment

to that

effect.

Moreover,

such

"knowledgeable"

success

ts

more

fully

creditable

to the agent

than

is

the

success due to

suppositional

luck. And

the

relevant

crednl

anirnal

knowledge

would bring

creclit

beyond that

ofits

subcredal

correlate.

4.

Cornpatibly with that,

we can

nevertheless

uphold the Aristotelian

view

of

human

flourishing as a life

of acconrplishnlent, while activity of soul

rel-

evantly avoids

luck to

the

extent

that it is in accordance

with

virtue, and

at

the

limit in

accordance

".

. . with

the

best ancl

nrost

conrplete."

B.

What

Is an

Intentional Action?

A

Preliminary Account

I.

Have

we now

stumbled

on

a

problem

for

our

analysis

of

intentional

action in Chapter

r? An

h.entional

actittn was said to be

constituted by

the

apt

success

of an

intenticln of

the doer's, one that manifests

the

doer's

com-

petence

to succeed with such intcntions.

What now

shall

we say about

the swimnreruvho nlanages

to

reach shore?

Does he reach shore

intentionally?

It

would

seerl

so.

At

least, he

does

aim

to

do

so. And

he

does attain

that ainr. But

does

he

do

so

aptly? Does the

attain-

ment

ofthe aim nranifest a colllpetence to do so

reliably

enough?

Very

plausibly

it does

not.

At

first the

swinrrnerjust

guesses

at

randonl

one

of

3o

directions in

which he

uright

swirn,

and

the

guess,

as we

saw, need

not

even

rise

to the level

of

a thinking, however tentative, that land

lies

in

that

direction. It

nray

be

nothing

nlore

than

an

arbitrary

supposition for the

sake

of trying sonrething

as

likely

to succeed as any

of the

other

directions.

Shail we conclude that the swinrnrer reaches shore intentionally

without

nraniftsting

any conlpetence to do

so?

The success

does seeul

a

nrrtter

of

pure

luck,

which

ostensibly

refutes the

account

of intentional action as apt

intention.

Br-rt

it is ftr

fronl

cle r that

the

swinlrucr's sLlcccss cloe s nrrf nlanifbst

a

spc-

ciflc:

cclrupc)tcncc to rcrc'lr sllorc.

()orrrpctcnr:cs

ncccl

nt

trc

infhlliblc,

aftcr

:rll.'l'lrcy t';ur

bc.jtrst

rcli:tblc'to s()nrc'tlcgrcc,'uvllir'll t':ur bc

cxtrcntcly

krw.

A

lron('r'un

lrittt'r rrrirr,lrt,rnr

firt'tlrc

r.fit'r's,

t'xt'r-t'sing;t

t:ifi

ttrun:rtt'llctl

itt

INT'ENTIONAL

ACTION

AND

^IUDC;MHNT

r57

the

history

of

the

sport.

Here

reliability

is

still

quite

low,

while

artainmer

is nonetheless

intentional

and

creditable

to

say the

least.l

If

our

switnmer's

shore

is

distant

and

the

crossing

clifticult,

success

may

manifest

conlpetence

that

is

outstanding.

And

he

does

certainly

aim

to

reach

safe shore.

This

is

the

airn

that

keeps

him

swimming

for

hours.

Outstanding

cornpetence

is

then

rnaniGst,

yes.

Competence

to

reach

shore

given the swimmer's

capabiliti

es

and

knout-how?

This

is

not

so

clear.

According

to

our

accotlrlt,

however,

it

is this

sort

ofqper

fic con-ryetence

that

a

success

must

manifest

in

order

to

be intentional.

But

why

deny

to

our

swim-

mer

the

specific

competence

to

succeed

upon

trying

in those

conditions?

Conrpare

the

tennis

novice

who swings

wilclly

as he receives

a thunder-

bolt

serve.

There

are

matry

ways

he

might

have

swung,

rnany

arcs

that

his

racket

might

have

traced

at rnany

different

angles.

Ancl

there

is

of course

one such

way

of swingine

vigorously

that

will

vield

a

winning

rerurn.

Suppose

he happens

to

swing

that

way,

and

does

score

a

rvinning

return.

Is

he

then

competent

to

hit

a winning

return?

V/hy

not

say

that he

does have

a

competence

to

do

so,

though not

a

very

high

conlpetence?

After

all,

he

does

ainr to

hit

a

winning

return,

alcJ

he

does

secure

various

elenrents

of conrpetence

in

his

performance.

His

eyes

are

open.

He

is

alert

and

focused.

He

faces

and

swings

in

the right

direc-

tion'

Et

cetera'

His

overall

competence

to return

that serve

is

of course

extremely

low;

nonetheless

he

has

sorue

degree

of

it.

And

this

degree

is

then

exercised

in pursuit

of his

firm

and

present

aim

to

nrake

the

return.

He

does

succeed

in

doing

so,

nloreover,

and

his

effort

with

that degree

of

aptness

is

crucial

to the

success

of his

attempt.

Here

again

it

seenrs

rather

plausible

that

the

aim is

attained

intentionally,

as was

the

aim

of the swimmer.

2.

Competence

cloes conle

in

degrees,

within

a

dinrension

reflecting

ole's

probability of

success,

itr

reievatrt

conditions

of

shape

and

situation.

One

has

a

degree of

such "cotttpetence"

proportionally

to how likely

one

would

be

to

succeed

if

one

tried

when

so shaped

and

situated.

Conrpare

the

"length"

of

a

piece

of writing.

A novel

can

attain

sonle

clegree

of length

without

counting

as

a longnovel.

Similarly,

an

aIenr

can

attairl

sollle

deree

of

(relevant)

conrpetence

without

counting

as

a

(rele-

varrtly)

comltcfcttf

agent.

So,

we

lrlust

clistinguish

(a)

attainrlret

of success

.

llrrt

rlt'rrsc

r't',,rll

tlr.rr

rrrl

"rrt('llli'rr,rl"

is t.nlr;ulr()unr

t.

"lr\,,lcsrrgrr,".ul,l

is tlrrrs

stiPlrl,1i1,1.1"

l'('\lt

t(

l('(l

li.tln

ttr

ryl,lr.l.rlrlrrrlt'r,,litr.

).\lr(.(.(

ll


14/41

r58 INTEN'II()NAL

ACTt()N AND

.TUDGMENT

that

nranifests

sonle degree of

(relevant)

cornpetence

in a

given

dotnain,

frorn

(b)

attainnrent of success that nranifests cttmpetuzcc

(period)

in that

domain. Attainrnents

of

sort

(a)

rnay qualify as

intentional actiorts, and

for this

they

need

only attain sollre degree

of aptness,

corresponding to

the degree of pertinent cornpetence

then exercised by the

agent.

Only

with

attainrnents of sort

(b)

do we reach

success

that

is

apt

(period)

in

that

dornain.

In

this

sense

a

donrain

will

nornrally

allow

a

distinction

between

(c)

attainnlents to sonre

clegree apt, rnaniftsting sonre degree

of

relevant

conlpetence,

ancl

(d)

attainments that

are

apt

(period),

ancl

nranifest

conlpetence

(period),

in that

clonrain.

3.

The

foregoing

account acconlrlrodates

orlr

swimrrter

who

reaches

safe

shore,

the golfer who

scores

a hole-itr-one,

ancl also

the

fbllowing

conrpelling

case.

A prisoner

is

told

by

hisjailer

that

throughout the conring

night hisjaii

cell r,r,'ill

be

unlocked, but the

jailer's

testimony

is

only

a

cruel

joke.

The prisoner does

form

the belief,

though,

and by acting

on it that

night,

he escapes,

since

c:onl-

pletely by

accident

the

door

ras

unlocked.

Is

his

escape

intentional?

Is

it

apt?

It is hard to deny

that the

prisorrer esc:apes

intentionally

(by

design).

Moreover,

his

escape

does

seern

plausibly

enough to manifbst a

degree of

conlpetence

alreacly

seatecl in

hinr as he lay irr

bed

preparecl

to

nrake his

n1ove.

And that degree of conrpetence

seellls

also to lre

r-nanifest

in his

successful escape,

even

despite the

irrrportant

elenrent of luck involved.

A conrpetence need not be

infallible, after

all.

Note in

any case

the

sharp

contrast

lretween

the prisoner

and

l)avidson's

waiter.

The

waiter does

intend

to Llpset

his boss, to

c1o so

by

knocking

over

a

stack ofdishes.

So

he arranges the

tall

stack

in the kitchen in preparation for

the

execution of

his plan.

Br-rt before he

can

exc'cute, his nervy

interntiotr

nrakes

hinr

nervous,

which rnakes hinr sturttblc onto

the

stack,

thus

knocking it over

and upsetting

the

boss.

Here

there

is

a clear

and

powcrfirl

intuition that thcr

waiter

upsets

the

boss rruintentionally,

even

though

he

cloes

so

bcc:ause

of his

intention

to

do

so.

'What

then rnakcs the

cliflcrrcncc bctwecn

this casc artcl otrr

earlier

cases?

Is it

not true

in

all

ofthcrn thlt

thc

ascnt

suc:ccccls

in tkrin what hc

intends,

and succeecis accorcling to

plarr? It is by

krrockirrg ovcr

tllc

clisllcs

thar

thc waite-r upscts tllc: boss. Anrl

it is

by

s'uvirruirrg irr

ccrtuin

wirys

thr

tllc tcnnis

rtovit'c

ntl

tlrc

g()lfi'r-ltt;rin

su('('r'ss,;rrrtl

by

slvinlrrrirrg

in :r t'crt;rin clircr'ri


15/41

IO

INTENTIONAL

ACTION AND

JUDC;MENT

is a basketball

player's shot

reliable

enough

to count as apt? What

about a

baseball hitter's

swing?

A chess

rrtaster's

gambit? A cornedian's

risky

joke?

A

detective's

following

of a

lead? A

scientist's

line

of

inquiry?

In each

case

sonle

judgment

of

appropriate

risk

must be nrade,

one

that

takes

into

account the

relevant skills,

shape,

and

situation of

the perfornrer.

C.

Two

Further Problems

r.

Take

again a

golfer's

hole-in-one. Cornpetence to

hit a

hole-in-one

spe-

cifically

(or

at least reliability

at

cloing

so),

in

his

conditions

nllrst

of

course be

very low. But that ostensible

problenr

we

have aiready surpassed. The

golfer

nonetheless does hit the hole-in-one

intentionally. Ifin so

doing

he does not

manifest competence,

nroreover, it is not necessarily because

the competence

manifest

is too low.

We

have already seen low reliability

to

be

no insuperable

obstacle to intentional success.

More

problematically, however,

golfers

nornrally do

not

airn at

hittng

a

hole-in-orue specifically.

It need

not

be through

so

ainring that the

golfer

attains

his

success, though

the success

is

attained

intentionally

nonetheless.

'We

must

hence relax

the condition

that in order

to

attain

X

intentionally

one nrust

have

aimed to attain

X specificaily. One

nlust

have

ainred to attain

Y, for

sonle

Y

related

appropriately

to X. In the golfer's case,

here

is a likely

Y com.ing as

close

as

possible

to the

hole

(with

sinking the

shot

being

the

limiting case).

Of

course,

that does

not provide

a

general solution to how Y

rnust

be

related to X

in

general.

One

suggestion is

this:

X

rnust

be a

deterrni-

nate

ofY.

Better

yet,

X

nrust

be a deterrninate ofY

such that

the

alent

favors

Y&X over

Y&-X

in such a

way

that

he aims

to

attain

rnore specifically the

following

[Y, preferably

4.In

this

way,

an

airn

can

be

a

conrplex,

hierarchi-

cally

orclered aim.a

+.

Recall

in any case the shot

in the clark whereby Strperstitious

Huntcr harpens

to

kill

a

ratr-

bit. I now see

no good way

to cleny

that

htrnter s nltrch crerlit as

is

cltrc: orrr

ittcky golfcr anti

orrr lucky

swimnrer.

lt

seenrs [rest to grrrnt

thrrt Hrultcr tlocs

"intcntiorr.rlly"

kill tht rabbit.

as

cloes our

swinlllrcr rerrch

slr


16/41

r6z

INTENTIONAL

ACTION

AND

JUDGMENT

the

relevant

phenonlena

is now in

plain

view,

and

it retnains

oniy

to

apply

labels. True

enough,

that

is not

to say

that

labels

catrnot be

nrisapplied,

by

the

standard of

the natural

language.

But nor is

it

given

a

priori

that

the

language

will

always

stancl

ready to

deliver

already

dedicated

labels that

appropriately

distinguish

what is

there

to be

distinguished.

C)urs,

I

sense,

is

a

case

ofthe

lat-

ter sort.

Is it

really a deterlrrinate

issue

whether

I win

"intentionally"

when

my

rnaster

intention

was

to

lose,

rny

intention

to

win

only

clerivative?

In the

appendix

to this

chapter,

we

take up

what

it is

to intend,

which

deserves

our attention

through

its central

involvenrent

in our

account

of

intentional

action.

Ilut

fbr

now we

continue

to

develop

that account.

D.

Intentional

Action:

A

Further

Development

r. Let

us

next

explore

firore

fully the

metaphysics

ofintcntional

actiotr,

via

a nretaphysical

"by"

relation.

When

sonteone

has

ten

cents

in

their

pocket this

coulcl be

by having ten

pennies,

or by

having

two

nickels,

or by haviug

a

dinre.

These

are all

ways

of having

that amount

of

nroney

in

one's

pocket.

When

sonreone

makes

the

light

go on, this

could

be by

ac'"ivating

a

sensor'

or

by

flipping

a

switch.

These

are alternative

ways

of nraking

the light

go

ot1. [f

one

activates

the

sensor, this

could

be

as

passive a

doing

as

when,

pushed ofl a

cliff,

cne does

fall

to

the

ground

below.

Alternatively,

it could

be a deecl,

a doing

of

one's

own,

and

perhaps

even

something

one

does

intentionally.

This

could

in

turn

be dorre by

the

raising

of one's

right lcg.

Of

collrse,

one

nright

raise

one's

leg as a

ntere

cloing,

under

the

doctor's

nrallet.

One's

raising of

that

leg

is

not

just

the

rising

of

the

leg,

rn'hic:h

could

be

forced

up by

sonreone

who

seizes

it,

or

could

rise

in

a

sLlrgeott's

hands once

anlputated.

There

seenls

a diflerence

between

those

ways

in which

oneos

leg

nright

have risen,

and

one's

raising

that

leg.

The

latter

ts

tcrhap,s

sonle-

thing

that

one

r/oes,

even though

one

crallnot

help

cloing

it

otlc:c

the ntallet

strikes.

If a

purse

is in

the

way, olle

does

kick that

nurse; that

is sorlrething

one

surely

cloes.

If

ollc:

r/ocs

roll clowrthill

whctl

ptrshccl

frttrtl

tltc: top,

thett

in a

sinlilar

way

onc

riocs

raisc'

onc's lcg

whc,rl tllc

rlrllct

strikcs.

T'llcsc are:

tlritrgs

tlr:rt

onc

tlocs cvcn

if'rlonc

is

llropcrly

tlwttccl

s

"()l)c's

tlwll tloiltg'"

lly t'ontt';tst,

tltr'l'ising

of'tlrc

lcg

tllrrt

is rtllll)tlt:ttctl,

or firrc'ctl trp

plrysi-

,,rllv lry

st,nt(.()lt('t'ls.',.rr

l,y,r

tlu\t

ol'rvilttl,

r't)l'l't'slr(tlltls

l() l)()tlrirrg

tll:tt

tlllc

INTENTI()NAL

ACTION

AND

JUDGM

tjN"r

r63

r/oes,

not

even

to anything

that one does

passively.

Still,

one does

perhaps

raise

one's leg passively

under

the

rrrallet,

and

uery plausibly

otte

nright raise

it thus

passively

in one's

sleep, In

this

last

case

a

doing

is

one's

own

doing-

is

thus

a

"deed,"

let's

cail it

that-even

though

it

is not

ntcntionally

done.

There are thus

things done

by one's

bod

or its

parts-as

when the

leg

is forced

to

move

up-without

being

things done

by oneself. The

Ieg

does

lllovc

up,

even

if it

is made

to

do

so

by

the force

appliect.

And

there

are

things one does

passively,

deeds

done

without

being

done intentionally,

as

when

one nloves

one's leg

whiie

asieep.

2.

Cornpetence

aligns

with none

of that,

since it recluires

intention,

which is

absent in

those cases.

A

competence

is

a

disposition

to suc-

ceed

in

attaining

certain

aims

that

one might

have in

a

certain

dornain.

A cornpetence

is a

disposition

to attain

those

ains if

one tried

to

attain

thern.

Trivially, I

would

say, it is

a

disposition

to

attain thenr

ilrtention-

aliy,

everr if

this

does not entail

that the

attainnlent

nlust

be consciously

intentional.

'We

are

proceeding

on

the

assumption

that

in

order

to

do

sonrething

intentionally

one

nlust clo

it

in

accordance

with one's

nrost

deternrinate

relevant

plan,

one that

begins

with

a set

of

basic

actions

and

eventuates

in

the

aimed-for

outcome.

Holv

the

outconre

conles

about

nrust not

clash

with that plan,

as it

does

when

a golf

ball

ricochets

offa rree

for

a hole-in-

one.

Moreover,

the

execution

of the plan

must

consist

in the performance

of

a spatiotemporal

array

of basic

actions

whereby

one

nreans

to

attain the

objective

via the

plan.

The plan

might

gain

specificity

as

the

time for

action

approaches,

if one

thinks that

one

can still

affect

the

outconre.

That

is why

tlre

basic

actions can

be spatiotemporally

arrayed.

3.

-We

are

thus relyini

on

the

notion of

an action

that

is basc.

This

I

under-

starrd

as

sirnply a deed

D

that

one does

intentionally,

there

being no

other

cleed

f)'

Ity tloing

which

one intentionally

ainrs

to do D

(alternatively:

there

bcing

no

such D'

that

one

does

intention

ally in

the

endcaurrr

to

do D).

One inrportant

uotion

to

be used

below

is that

of

an aim

A's

being

.rttairrccl

pnrtly-by

onc's

cloirtsciecd

I)'. The

ainr nright

be a

deed

of

one's

owrr,

clcccl l),

as

abovc.

lltrt

othcr

ainrs

nright

also be attainecl

portly-lty

clcccls tlf-onc's

()w

n.

Wllcn

()r)c

rinrs

to tkr l),

tlrcrc

is;r

clcccl l)'lt,

wlliclr olrc

intcrrtionally

.tillts

to

tlo l),

wlrt'l-t' l)

l)'

in

tltt. lillitilrrr

t';rsc.

Wllt.n

ollt.

is

t.ornpctcrrt

t


17/41

164

tNl'riN'tloNAt

ACl'lON

AND

IUDGMENT

by doing

I)',

for sonle

D';

rvhich

is cornpatible

with

the

possibility

that

one

do

D by

doing

D",

fbr soflle

I)"

distinct

from

l)''

Oue

may

be

competent

to

do

D

by

doing

l)', rnoreover,

bttt

nof

competent

to

do

D by

doing

D"'

In

that case,

if one

always

tried to

do

D

by

doing

D",

one

would

not

really

be

competent

to

succeed

when

one tried

to

do D,

In order

to

be

conlpeterlt

to

successfully

do

I)

when

one

tried,

there

ntust

rather

be

a

I)' such

that

one

would

succeed

reliably enough when

one triecl

to

clo

D

by

cloing D',

and

such

that

one

would try

reliabiy

enough

to

do

D

by

doing

D'.

(Or,

rather,

there

must

be

sonre set

of

actiolls

like

D'

such that,

in

trying

to

do

D,

the

agent

would

reliably

enotrgh

pick

one or

another

of

the

mernbers

of

that set

as

the

deed

by

doing

which

they

would

try

to

clo

D.)

For a

particular

exanrple

of

the

above,

let

D

=

putting

sonle

water

in a

certain

basin,

D'

=

twisting

open

the

right

faucet

with

one's

right

hancl,

and

D"

-

twisting

opell

the left

faucet

rvith

one's

left

hand'

Normally,

however,

one

tnust coordinate

one's

own

basic deeds

so

as

to

bring

about

one's objective.

One's

basic deeds

nrust forrtr

a

spatiotemporal

array

such that

olle

attailts

oue's aim

only

through

the

courbination

of

the

mebers

of

te

array,

where

the array

sufilces

for the

attainnre

nt

of the airn.

Here

the ainr

is

attained

suffrciently-by

the

combined

doing

of the

basic

deeds

in the

relevant

array.

So

we

have:

Attainment

A is

attained

sufficiently-by

set

(array)

X

iffX is

a

rnaximal

set

of

deeds

D

partly-by

each

ofwhich

is

A attained'i

Attainment

A

is

an

inditidual

attaintnent

by

indiuidual

I iff

A is

attained

sufiiciently-by

a

set X,

all deeds

in

which

are

deeds

of

I'

Thus,

one

rnay

filI

the

basin

quickly

by

first

opening

the

right

faucet

with

one's

right

hand, and

then

openine

the left

fattt-et

with

one's

left

hand.

If

no

other

basic

cleecl

is

requirecl

for

the actional

sufliciellcy of

that

set,

then

the

quick

filling

of that

basin

is an

individual

attaillnrertt

of

onc's own.

-5.

A is

a collcctittt,lttailuellt

ift X

is

ir

set

srch

that

A

is

attillecl

strfllciently-lty

sc't

X. ncl

therc

are at least

tw.

cleeils

in X clone

by clisparate

agents.

Attlinnlcnt

A

is

thcn

rt i'


18/41

lN

I llN

I l()NAt

A(,t

l()N

ANI).f

Ul)(jNil:N

I

Wc lrr:ry

tllus

t.ollc:lutlc

tlllt;r-jtrclgrrrcrrt

is

rn

illterllti


19/41

So ctalRoots

ofFluman

Knowledge

Q

ocial

factors

affect epistemology in

at least two ways. They bear

on

an

l)irnportant

sort

of belief,

ancl

also

on a

corresponding sort

of

epistemic

competence. This concerrls

a kind

of value

possessed

by

knowledge,

and

concerns

also how

the

pragmatic can properly encroach on epistemology.

We begin

with

this

latter issue.

A.

Pragmatic

Encroachment

The Risk of Pragmatic Encroachment

What

sorts

of factors bear orl the huntins-relative evaluation of an

archer-hunter's shot? This involves

how

well that shot contributes to the

overall hunting-relevant objective:

say,

a

good

afternootr's hunt.

One way it

can

contribute is

by being successful, by aptly

hitting

a

target of

high

(hunt-

ing) value,

and

killing that

prey.

Such

aptness does

not require that the shot

be

also

meta-apt. A

shot

can

aptly

kill

its

pre , manifesting

the archer's

skill,

even

though

it

was

too risky

a shot, and betrayecl

poorjudgment.

An apt

shot can thus

fail

to

be nleta-apt.

On

a

nreta*level

we

ask whether the

risk

under4one is

appropriate.

What

might

this involve?

How

(:arl

we under-

stand

a way of

manaing and

assessing

risk while brac:kcting

suc:h

prac:tic:al

objectives as

how

rlruch

it

nratters

to that huntcr or

t()

his

tribc

that

hc not

rnisuse his

energy, titttc, ancl

rcsr>ttrcc:s?

Strppose

rt srrrccss/irl

ltttttt t


20/41

T7I

knowiedge

i.s a norm

of assertion, that

one

falls

short

ifone afflrnrs,

whether

publicly

or privately,

what

one

does not

know.

Such

affirmation

can be

an

act either

of thought or

of speech.

Judgment

in particular

is

an aflirnra-

tive

act

of

thought.3 Knowledge

then is

a

nornl

ofjudgnrent.

And

this is

of

course conrpatible with knowledge being apt

belief,

or

belief

whose

cor-

rectness

nranifests

(sufficient)

conrpetence and not

(too

rnuch) luck. The

conclusion

to

draw

is

then that

aptncss is

a

norln

of

belief. And

this fits

our

picture

platitudinously.

A belief

cloes

surely

fall

short

ifit fails

to

get

it right

through conlpetence.

It falls

short

in the way

any

perfornrance

with

an airn

falls

short if it

faiis

to

secure its

ainr

through

conlpetence.

That

knowledge

is

a

nornr

of belief

is

then

a

special c:ase

of the fact tbat

aptnes.r,

success that

rrranifests

cttrnpctcncc,

is a

norln

of perJormancc.a

What,

however, does

such

conrpetence

require?

Core epistemic colnpe-

tence

is

a dispositional

ability

to

discern the

true fronr

the

false

in a certain

donr.ain. Infallibly

so?

Surely

not:

that

is

askine

too

rnuch.

Reliably? Well,

yes,

reiiably enougll,

What then

is the standard?

How

rnuch

reliability

is

required

for it to

be,

episternicaliy,

reliability enough?

Is

it

really appropriate,

hor,'ever,

to

reqriire

a

precise

specification

of

a

threshold? Is

this

not

as inappropriate as it

would

be

to insist

on

an exact

threshold for

justification

enough to

constitute

justification,

or an

exact

threshold fbr confidence enough to constitute

belief?

We are content to

assunre

that

tlrcre are such

thresholds

(or

twilight zones) for

justificatiorl

and

for

belief. Why

can't

we extend that

tolerant

attitucle to the supposecl

threshold

of

reliability for

epistenric

competence?

Can't

we

just

assunre that

there

is such

a

threshold, even if

we

callnot specify it

rrrore precisely?

Fair

enorigh.

But we nright

still

wonder

about the dimension

of epis-

ternic

justification

and

that

of

episternic

conlpetence

(whether

these are

clifTerent

or at

bottorn the

sarne),

and even

about the

dinrension

of con-

fidence.

All

three

are

nragnitudes,

each

plausibly

involving

a

threshold.

.t.

This is

a

tenrporary expedient for expository purposes; in

due course

rve

will

find reason to

clistinsuish

rrorc cl;rbot'atcly trctr'vceu

thc

state

ofbelieving

anri

the assertive act

ofjnclenrent.

.1.

Tlris

provirlcs rlrt urtlcrstlnrling

of'thc'kuorvlctlce

trornr

olassertion difibrent fi-om

that

firtnrcl in Tirrrotlry

Willirrrlrson's

Kr,rr,/r'r{qc

tutd Its Linits

(()xfirrd:

()xforcl

university Press,

:ooo). Scc cspcr'irrlly

ch. r t,

"Asscrtion,"

rvltcrc thc kllowlcdcc

rtrle

is unclerstoocl

as

qovern-

ing

rr.r'rr'r/irrr corrstitutivclv,

[r1'.rrr,rlt>ry lvitlr tllc w:rys irr rvlricll

tlrc

ltrlcs of'chcss

cr>trstitutivcly

a()vcrn

tlrc

Itic.t'..

()ru';rtt'orrlt

is irr tt'r'rrs


21/41

172

SOCIAL

ROOTS

OF

HUMAN KNOWLE.I_JGE

We

might still wonder

how

such

a threshold

is set.

'What

sorls

of

consiclera-

tions deternr.ine

it? In particular,

is

the

epistenric threshold

invariant across

the practical

situations

ofboth

subject and attributor?

How

reliable

is reliable

enough?

Will this vary

clepending

on

how

much

is

practically

at stake

for the subject?

For

the

attributor?

Take a fact that

p.

Earlier

we

distinguished

(a)

the

degree of

reiiability

required

for

arl

appro-

priate

public

assertion

of

that

fact

(or

for

the

clam

to know it) from

(b)

the

degree

required

for the subject

to

just

know

it, regardless

of

whether

he

claims to do

so, and

also

from

(c)

the

degree

required

even

just

to

believe

competently thatp,

to

tnanifest

in so believing

a

reliable

enough

conr.petence.

These

degrees nray well

coincide,

determined

as they

all

are

by

what

we

can appropriately

store

for

later

retrieval

even

when the

original

basis is

lone

from. memory.

If we

put aside pragmatic

concerns such

as whether

a check

will bourlce,

or

whether

one

will

be late

for a tneeting

in another

city,

what

then determines

whether

a conlpetence

is episten:tically

reliable

enough?

How

can we

assess

risk of

failure

(false

belief) once

practical concerns

are

set

aside?

The

concerns that remain

would

be

cognitive or theoretical.

Using

a catchall

label,

let's

call

thern

"(purely)

episternic."s

'What

is distinc-

tive of

these?

They

presunrably

involve

truth,

and

its reliable acquisition.

A

competence

is epistemic only

if it

is

an

ability,

a disposition,

to discern

the true

trom

the

false

in a certain

domain.

But infallibility

is

too rnuch

to

require, which

triggers

once

again our

persistent question:

How

reiiable

is reliable

"enough," and

is

this

som.ething

that

varies

from subject to sub-

ject,

or

from attributor to

attributor,

or

both?

When

we bring

in extra-epistenric

concerns

about

physical safety,

or

bouncing

checks,

or

irnportance

of

tinrely

arrival,

in

the epistemc

assessnlent

of

a

belief,

are

we

proceeding

as inappropriately

as

when

we

assess

the

ten-

nis appropriateness

of

a serve

by

how well it

inrpresses

a

friend entering

the

stancls?

There appear

to

be

domain-intertral

stanclards

that

deternrine

proper

risk in tennis.

And

the sanle seenrs

true

of huntitrg,

and

ofindefinitely nlany

other

domains

of

hunran

perforrnanc:e.

These

adrnittcclly

resist

precise for-

nr.uiation. They

presurnably

concern

ltow sucrct:

ss

is asscssccl

intcrnally

to thc

dornain.

f)onrain-internal

stattclarcls

of suc:h

suc(:erss

wotrlcl lrclp clctcrtltillc

5.

ltrlrfirllt.t';rtt'oultwcnriry,

lrt'r'rl

l.,rult'outo(ltt'l'tontct-ttsllc'srtlcstltcpl'tttlt'ttti;rl:rlrtl

ltlot:tl.

su, lr.slrcrlr.rlrslllt';t.sllrctr,.Ilt',rvt'lll.tt

()l)('nlot

rto\t'..1n,1 ,ssltllt'lirl'srrrrrlrritVtlt.tl

.ttlVtltllct

rrrrlrr,)n((.t

n\l.rllrlrtrtltllr.,r. l.rrrr,,,rtlr('rnrlltttlt'tllt'trtlt'ol

tlrt"'rt,trllt.rl()ll)t.tl'ltl,lli(-."

173

dornain-internal

standards

for

"reliability

enough." For

a

hunt

we

have

the

successful

hunt,

for

tennis the winning

match.

Whether

a particular perfor-

lance

is appropriate

within

either

dornain

depends

on how appropriately

that

perfornlance

is meant to

contribute-and

how

appropriately

it

does

contribute-to

a

pattern

of activities with enough

probability

of

attaining

domain-internal success,

such

as

that of the hunt or of the rnatch.t'

As hunians and

as

fellow

mernbers

of our

conrmunities

and

of our

spe-

cies,

we depend cnrcially and variously on

the

acquisition and sharing of

information.

The epistemically successful

liG

is a difiicult

thing to

define

in

general ternr"s,

as

is

the

epistemically successful history

of

a comnlunity

or

species.

It

seems a

rnatter

of collectively attaining and sustaining a picture

of the surrounding world

that

enables

a

level of prediction, control, and

understanding

within an acceptable

range,

liven

the possibilities and

trade-

offs

proper

to

the

constitution

and situation of

the subject

and/or

his group.T

Here non-epistemic

factors do

plausibly

bear.

What

determines the

accept-

able range

depends

on the

needs

of that

life and corrlrnunrty, and

on the

range ofpossible

success allowed by

participants'

constitution

and situation.

Epistemic

competences

are

analogous

to

tennis

and hunting

compe-

tences.

The

latter

abilities or dispositions attain their status as

conlpetences

by how they bear on the

proper

objectives of tennis and hunting

respec-

tively. Whether

a

tennis

or hunting ability is reliable enough depends on

whether its

exercise can

suffciently further the relevant

objectives over

the

span

of a rnatch

or

of a hunt. This is compatible with the failure

of

many

instances

of

that exercise.

And

assessment

of proper perforrnance must

also

take

into

account

h


22/41

SOCIAL ROOIS

OtI

HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE

175

174

SOCIAL ROO'I'S

OF

HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE

such

an ability

can be

rnaniftst

in the

success

ofthe

hunter's kill

or the

chartr-

pion's winning ace, nraking

this an apt

perfornrance. But it seenrs

quite oth-

erwise in

the epistemic

donrain; or at

lelst so

it seems

initially.

A speculative

hypothesis that

a detective,

or

a lover,

or a

rneteoroloist

feels in his

bones to

be

correct,

can be

based on

a considerable.

ability

that

nevertheless

falls well short

of

being

io

percent

reliable. An aflirmation

on

such

a

basis

is thus analogous

to

the

long

shot

by

ther

hunter-archer or

the

biasting

serve

by

the tennis

charnpiotr.

These

latter seen

properly

ASSess-

able as apt,

so long as they

succeed

within the

hunt or

the

nratch. Sttppose

the long

shot does

kil1 the

prey

and the

blasting

low-percentage

serve does

win the

point,

and suppose

these

perfbrnrances

to

be part of a

pattern

reli-

ably

enough

predictive of succress

over

the course of

a hunt

or of

a

match.

That particular

hunting

shot,

and that

particular serve,

would then

each

be

assessed

as both

apt and

neta-apt,

as

one

rvhose sucrcess

manifests

a

domain-specific

conlpetence

of

the perfortner,

and one

that

runs

appropri-

ate risk

(perhaps

when viewed

as part

of

a

relevant

overall

pattern), even

if

the

risk of failure for

that

isolated

perfornrance

is

quite high.

It

seems

otherwise, however,

in

the

donrain

of

knowledge. Take

the

speculative

belief-in*one's-bones

based

on

an ability

to

discern

truth,

though with

low

reiiability. That

belief will not

be

considered

an

instance

of

knowledge, surelyi

nor will

it

be

rirought

to

hit

the ttrark

of

truth through

a reliable enough

cpistenric

cornpetence

exercised

by

the believer.

If that

ability

falls

very far short

of reliability,

if it falls

near the server's

t5 percent

rate of

slrccess, then it will

not

be

granted

the

status

of a

knorvledge-level

epistemic

competeltce. When

taken at

face value,

its

deliverarlces will

pro-

vide

neither

knowledge nor

reliably

enough

apt beliefl,

Why

is a batter's

15 percent

conrpetertce

deerned outstanding,

as is

a

basketball

player's

40

percerrt

three-point

percentage.,

u'hile an

epistenric

ability

at

those levels

is

disnrissed

as

subpar

and inadequate

to

provide

knorvledge?

True, those athletic

percentages top the

relevant clistributions

among

humans and

even anrong

players. Suppose

however that

the ability

to

speculate correctly

on the

part of thc

clctcctive or

the lovcr

or tltc

ttrete-

orologist

also

tops

its relevant

clistribution.

All thrcc

ofltltertt

arc as

goocl

at such

risky, speculativc

thought s

is

artyor)c,

ancl [rr

bcttcr

thatl

ltt


23/41

r76

SOCiAL ROOT'S OF

HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE

that would

have

had

greater

chance

of success, as

there was no time to pass

to

a

teamrate.

The

teanr-involving

social dirnension of lrasketball

hence

does

not preclude

that a

perft>rnrance

rrright

attain

an

inr.pressive degree

of

aptness while

manifesting very unreliable

conrpetence.

Why

not allow

similarly

that

aptness ofbelief might be based on unreliable

competence?

The foregoing suggests a

distinction between:

srtmeuthat

apt thought,

whose

correctness nranifests sonle degree

of conrpetence

on the

part ofthe

believer, and on

the

nratter at

hand,

and

in the

circunlstances,

and

reliably

enough

thought

that

is apt

(lteriod),

above a

threshold ofreliable conlpetence

set

by

the

needs ofhuman flourisiring in infornration-sharing

conrnrunities.

Given

this

distinction,

we might

rvell

allow

that a

thought

can

attain

sonle degree of aptness rvithout alrrounting to

knowledge.

Thus, the

well-infornred hypotheses

of

a

self-conficlent Sherlock Holnres or

Albert

Einstein

can

anlount to

sonrewhat

apt

thoughts

(affirnrative

thoughts),

while falling short of knowledge. In

a way they

are: sonrewhat apt affirma-

tions,

whose

correctness does

nranifest conlpetence

far

above

the

aver-

age

for

the

sort

of

question

and

the circunlstarlces

involved.

Nevertheless,

they are

not

reliably

enough apt aflirmations. They

neecl

to

be

confirmed-

in

some cases

through

nlore

peclestrian,

reliable ways-before they

can

attain

the

status

of

outright

knorvledge.

Only through

such confirmation

could

they

finally

attain

the status

of

reliable

enough

apt

belief.

And only

thus

can

they be

really

apt

(pcriod).

Note

further

how

this

nright

help

explain

the

sta

nding of

rorm-requiring

conlpetence

(or

epistenric

justification)

for

assertion.

There is a nornr

of

assertion

that derives

fronr

a default reliability

requirenrent inrposed

on

mernbers

of

human cornnlunities.

'We

are

accordingly required

to

assert

only what

manifests

reliable enough

competence. What

is properly

asserted

is only

what is underwritten

thus reliably. The standing ofthis

norm derives

in turn

front the requirements

for

altproltratc sharing

of

infornration,

con-

ducive

to

human

flourishing through rnutual

reliancc.

So,

the cxplarration

of

the noril)'s stancling

will clcrivc

fronr

tlrc

rccltrircnrcnt of rcliability if

sharing

is

to

c


24/41

r78

SOCIAL

ROOTS

OF

I-IUMAN

KNOWLI]DGE

an apt

intellectual

perfornlance,

a

perforrtrance

that

attains

its

aiur irl

a

way

that

manifests

the perforrner's

contpetence.

The kowledge

that

we

are

reluctant

to

attribute

here

requires full-fledged

jgdgntent,

notjust

a slless.

Compatibly

with

that,

we

can

allow

a

lower

grade

of

"knowledge,"

whether

metaphorically

or

literally,

olle that

requires only

apt

guessing,

and

not

apt

judging.

Aptjuclging,

nloreover,

requires

that

the

perforrner attain

his

airn,

and do

so

in

a

way that

rnanifests

"r'nough"

relevant

conlpetence.

Accordingly,

to

really know

fiuclgnrentally)

one

nlust aflirnr

in

the endeavor

to

get it

right

aptly

(and relial-rly enough),

ancl

or]e lnust

attain

that objective

in

a

wav

that

rnanifests

one's relevant

conlpetence.

Since

the

eye-exanr

glresser

cloes

not

evenjtrdge,

he cral)llot

knor.vjuclunrentally."

Encroachment

and

Invariantisnr:

.What

Is

Reliability

"Enough"?

Aptness

then

is success

through

conrpetence,

where

the cotnpetence

urust

be

reliable

enoup4h.

This enables

a

distinction

betweeu

the

things

we

knorn,

full

stop,

ancl

the

things

we

know well

enouh

to

act

on

thetn. One

might

knorv solnething,

after

all, even

though

in a

special

context,

e.l',

where

one's expert

opinion

is required,

otte

does

not

know

it well

enough

for action.

Just

think

of the

stakc'

involved

in the c:ontcxt

of

a

tluclear

reactor,

or a

law cottrt, or

a surgery

roonl.

How

nlore

specifically

do we

understand

this variation?

We

nrighr

try

saying

that

to

know

well

enough

in

a

high

stakes

situation

is

to

have a reliable

enough

apt belief.

If

we

applicd

our

earlier

fornlula,

then,

we

would

have

to say

that as

the stakes

rise, the

stttrject's

krtowledge

dwindies

or

even disappears,

providecl

his conrpetetrc:e

does

not

rise.

More

plausibly, however,

there

is

no sttch outright

loss

of

krlowledge;

what

chanses

is

only

whether the

subjc:ct

knows

weli

cnolrgh

irl

thc'

new

context,

with

its

higher stakes,

whether

he

knows

well

ettottgh

to ellable

proper

reliancc

on

that

belief as a

prenrise

in

practical

reas


25/41

SOCIAL ROOTS OF

HUMAN

KNOWI-EDGE rBr

r8o

SOC]IAL

ROOTS

OF

IIUMAN

KN0WLEDGE,

(.()ur-s(.

tlrt.

.lr/.,t'l'.rr't

of-

nililit.s,t,irtq

lltttt

vrclt

uti

tlrt.

.\(.,l,r

ll.ttl',tl

l,rrrr,,rr,rtr,.'.

l'lrr,ttltllr

stt,'ll

a

saying

we can endeavor

to

attain

one

or

another of

a

vast

nunlber of airns,

inclucling

pragmatic

airlrs

divorced frorn

disinterested intention to inforrn.

Fortunately, there

rs very often the intention sinrply to infbrnr-to infornr

and not to nrisinforn-as

a

donrinant

aim

in hunran

conlnlunication. Given

our

capacity

for strategic

self-deception,

a

sinrilar distinction

seems in

order

forjudgment

and

beliefas

for

public

assertion.

Despite

how

susceptible

we

can

be

to

epistenrically

irrelevant pragmatic

factors, there

is

such

a

thing

as

disin-

terestecl beliefinfluenced purely

by

the ainr to

get it

right,

to beiieve correctly.

Consider the

irnportarlce of proper assertion for an

inforrnation-sharing

social

species. A

newscaster

or a

teacher

might assert

with testimonial pro-

priety even

when

they

do

not

voice

their

own

beliefs.'3

If the speaker plays

no role in

any such

epistenric

institution,

however, no such

role as

that of

newscaster or that of teacher, then their assertion is

epistemically

proper

only

when it

voices

their

own lrelief.

Otherwise

it

would

be irnproperly

insincere.

But

what sort

ofbeliefis

at

issue here?

Is it

beliefas

confident

enough credence

or is

it

rather

judgtnent,

an act

ofafiirrnation or

a disposition

to affirnr with

the

aim ofafiirnring correctly, rvith truth, reliably enough,

and

indeed

aptly?

Suppose such

judgnrent

to

be

r,vhat

nrost

directiy

determines

proper,

sincere public

aflirmation. A

speaker's

afiirnlatiorl of

what

he does

not

n

this

sense

judge

to be true

wouid

then involve

an episternically

improper

clash:

what

he

is willing

to

say publicly

then clashes with

what

he

says to

hinrself

nJitro interno.In

orcler to

avoid

such inrpropriety, what the speaker

affirnrs

publicly

must

conlport

with

what

he rvould

aflirnr

to hinrself in

the

privac:y

of

his

own

rnincl. Otherwise

there would be either some

speech

flaw,

or

sorne failure

of sincerity.

Fully

epistenrically proper aflirmation

reqr-rires

the

avoidance of

any

such flaw

or failure. It

nrust

express

in

unf-

lawed

speech

what the speaker

thinks

(in

act

or disposition).

The speaker

speaks

with epistenric propriety only if

he

speaks

as

he

thinks, with sincer-

ity

and

without linguistic

flaw.'a

Is

there

an account in ternrs

of

credential threshold that rivals our

account

in

terms ofjudgment?

Acc:ording to

such a

rival

account

what assertion

r.j.

As-fcnnitcr

sosa - judgment and agency (part iii)

Documents