The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 4 | Number 2 | Article ID 3022 | Jan 12, 2009

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Somali Pirates and Political Winds Drive Japan to the Gate ofTears [Updated]

Michael Penn

Somali Pirates and Political Winds DriveJapan to the Gate of Tears [Updated]

Michael Penn

In late October 2007 an odd story appeared inthe press. A Japanese-owned chemical tankercalled the Golden Nori was hijacked off thecoast of Somalia. There were no Japanesenationals on board, but the East Asian nationhad become entangled, quite unusually, in anEast African affair. Unforeseen at that time wasthat this curious incident would eventuallybecome one of the top foreign policy issues inTokyo: Somali piracy has emerged as apotential turning point for Article Nine of theJapanese Constitution, and is significant forother reasons as well. The following essayreviews the record of Japanese encounters withSomali pirates and explores the motives andpolitical pressures driving the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) toward a proactive rolein suppressing East African piracy.

The Golden Nori

Attacks on Japanese Shipping

At this writing, a total of seven ships ofJapanese affiliation have run afoul of Somalipirates. The Golden Nori affair was the onlycase that occurred in 2007. After a period ofnegotiations and, apparently, the payment of asubstantial ransom, the ship was released inDecember of that year. That appeared to be theend of the story.

However, in April 2008 an apparently-unrelatednews story appeared about a rocket attack on aJapanese oil tanker named the Takayama offthe coast of Yemen. The captain and a portionof the crew were Japanese nationals. Therocket blast created a small hole in the sternthat caused fuel to leak, but did not harm anyof the crew or seriously cripple the tanker. Theship was able to continue its journey withoutfurther event.

It was the second half of 2008 that witnessedthe acceleration of the crisis. No less than fiveships with some affiliation to Japan werecaptured by Somali pirates. The Japanese-owned Stella Maris and MT Stolt Valor, as wellas the Japanese-operated Irene and AfricanSanderling were seized, ransoms paid, andlater released. The Japanese-owned ChemstarVenus and its crew remain in pirate hands as ofthis writing. None of these ships had anyJapanese crew members—most of the crews areFilipino—but the epidemic of East Africanpiracy has unnerved Japanese shippingcompanies.

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Somali pirates

The Asahi Shinbun has reported that Japaneseshipping companies began in the autumn of2008 to reroute some vessels around the Capeof Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa andavoid the more direct route through the SuezCanal. This longer route adds six to ten days tothe journey, and may cost Japanese shippingcompanies, collectively, an annual US$100million in additional expenses. [1] Ordinarily,Japanese companies send about two thousandships through the Suez Canal on an annualbasis, which would mean that about five or sixJapan-affiliated ships pass through the Bab al-Mandab—the “Gate of Tears,” the straitsseparating East Africa from Yemen—on anygiven day.

The Origins of Contemporary Somali Piracy

One question that few in Tokyo seem to beasking is why this piracy has suddenly reachedepidemic proportions along the Somali coast.Like most governments and observers,Japanese government leaders have denouncedthe pirates as representing a grave threat tointernational order without stopping toconsider the reasons why this problememerged in the first place. Perhaps this lack ofcuriosity ref lects a s imple def ic i t ofimagination; or perhaps it may be that theanswers to be found do not reflect very well onthe developed world.

Since the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu whichresulted in the deaths of nineteen US soldiers(the famous Black Hawk Down incident), theWest has more-or-less washed its hands of theanarchy and suffering of the Somali people. Solong as they confined themselves to killing eachother in their remote East African nation, noone in major capitals really gave much thoughtto Somali interests.

Smaller-scale piracy has always been knownalong the Somali coast, but in 2006 the practice

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was nearly eliminated by the rise of the IslamicCourts Union (ICU). The ICU cracked down onthe pirates and came close to reunifying andbringing peace to the war-torn nation. The ICUfailed in this endeavor because of the combinedinterventions of Ethiopia, which invadedSomalia with its land forces, and the UnitedStates, which began funneling support to theold Somali warlords, now calling themselvesthe “Alliance for the Restoration of Peace andCounter-Terrorism.” Both Addis Ababa andWashington intervened because they sharedthe fear that the establishment of the ICUwould be a key victory for “Islamic radicalism”and might serve as a potential base for Al-Qaida. Ethiopian leaders also faced theadditional problem of Somali separatist forcesoperating within the Ogaden region along theborder with Somalia.

Militia from the Islamic Courts Union

Aside from plunging the Somali people backinto their long war, the Ethiopian and Americaninterventions also allowed the piracy problemto reach its current proportions. Some of thesame warlords that have received US supportfor their anti-ICU credentials also seem to beplaying a low-key role in letting the piratescarry out their activities. The government ofEritrea, which supports the ICU, has explicitlyblamed Washington for the piracy problem. In aNovember 2008 statement, Asmara charged:

The main cause of this problem isthe vacuum that has been createdfor the last seventeen years inSomalia. Sadly, an enduringsolution is not conceivable until thereckless acts of the US and itssurrogates aimed at balkanizingSomalia, dividing its people alongethnic and clan lines… cease. Thesolution lies, accordingly, in theliberation and reconstitution of aunited and sovereign Somalia.Unless and until the entire Somalipeople—whether they are in theso-called ‘Somaliland,’ ‘Puntland,’‘ J u b a l a n d , ’ o r‘ B e n a d i r l a n d ’ — e x t r i c a t ethemselves from the malaise offragmentation to bring about theirown endur ing so lu t i on bythemselves, piracy and otherdeplorable activities will notindeed cease. [2]

Aside from the larger issue of a comprehensivepolitical settlement for the Somali people, thereare deeper issues related to the appearance ofthe pirates themselves. The ‘muscle’ of thepirates is believed to be provided by formermilitiamen who have taken their land-fightingout to the seas. On the other hand, the nauticalexpertise is being provided by formerfishermen who are now out of regular work.

And why are Somali fishermen out of work?The Somali pirates themselves have allegedthat international businesses have depleted thefish stocks in Somali territorial waters;moreover, toxic wastes have been dumpedalong the Somali coasts by foreign agents whounderstand well that there is no centralgovernment in Somalia to protect the nation’slegal rights. [3] Januna Ali Jama, a spokesmanfor the Somali pirates, justified their actions inSeptember 2008 in the following terms: “I do

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not think we are in the wrong. Our country isdestroyed by foreigners who dump toxic wasteat our shores.” [4]

It is difficult to fully evaluate these claims fromlong distance, but it does seem problematicthat most analyses of the problem of Somalipiracy conceive of the issue only in narrowmilitary terms and securing sea lanes ratherthan examining more comprehensively how theproblem came about, and what Somaliperspectives on the issue might be. In thecontext of Japanese policy in particular, itshould be kept firmly in mind that we aretalking about a long-distance conflict between aSomali people with an estimated per capitaannual income of US$600 and a Japanesepeople with an estimated per capita annualincome of US$33,500. [5]

Political Winds Driving Tokyo Forward

Reports emerged in the last week of 2008 thatTokyo was preparing to send MSDF destroyersto protect shipping along the Somali coast. Thebill which is being prepared by the governmentis likely to allow the most permissive rules ofengagement that the MSDF has ever had,which means that they may be authorized toshoot and kill for the very first time in theirorganizational history which dates to 1954. Thebill may state that Japanese sailors can employdeadly force even if they are not under directattack from the pirates. The bill may alsoprovide for close cooperation between theMSDF and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) sincethe Japanese military is not authorized to makearrests. Theoretically, the new frameworkcould provide for MSDF destroyers to battlewith pirates along the coast of East Africa, killsome of them in the fighting, and bringcaptives back to Japan for prosecution. [6] Theexact terms of the bill, however, are still undernegotiation. The government is, moreover, alsomulling the possibility of sending the MSDFeven in the absence o f a new law by“reinterpreting” older laws. [7]

Clearly, if events transpire in a manner similarto the picture being painted above, this willmark a major departure from past Japaneseinternational behavior. What factors are drivingthese changes? We will suggest six:

1. Justifying the Extension of the Indian OceanMission

2. Demonstrating Japan’s International SecurityContribution

3. Utilizing the Japanese Navy

4. Keeping Up with the Chinese

5. Connecting with Yemen

6. Dividing the Political Opposition

Each of these motives will now be explained.

1. Justifying the Extension of the IndianOcean Mission

For the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)and its coalition ally New Komeito theemergence of the piracy problem came at apolitically convenient time. Since theresounding victory of the opposit ionDemocratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the July2007 House of Councillors election, thegovernment has been under a witheringpolitical assault from the opposition partiesdemanding that several SDF missions abroadbe ended. None of these struggles was fiercerthan the MSDF Indian Ocean mission battle oflate 2007. In order to achieve the results theydesired, the ruling parties resorted to thehighly questionable tactic of employing theirKoizumi-era supermajority in the House ofRepresentatives to override a decision of theupper house. This was the first time such athing had been done in about half a century,and it was done in defiance of public opinion.

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By the summer of 2008, a new battle on thisvery same question was shaping up. Thegovernment wanted to authorize yet anotheryear-long extension of the MSDF mission. Forthe ruling parties, the intensification of Somalipiracy at just that time was fortuitous. As earlyas August, then-LDP Secretary-General AsoTaro was among those darkly hinting thatJapan’s vital sea lanes would be in danger if theMSDF were absent from the Indian Ocean: “Iwant the public to realize we cannot close oureyes and expect others to do Japan’s workwhen 90% of the oil is brought into Japanthrough the Indian Ocean.” Aso quickly linkedthis concern to the issue of Somali piracy, andthe editors of the Yomiuri Shinbun inparticular, starting in August and continuing upto the current day, agitated relentlessly for theMSDF to be re-tasked to take on Somalipirates.

In fact, the MSDF Indian Ocean missionappears to have nothing to do with anti-piracyefforts (it would be a violation of the existinglaw if they did have a role), but this argumentwas probably marginally useful in reducingopposition to the extension of the mission. Thefact that the Horn of Africa lies rather distantfrom the main oil route between the PersianGulf and Japan did not, as far as we know, leadJapanese opponents to challenge LDPSecretary-General Aso’s suggestions.

Curious logic and fuzzy geography aside, afresh one-year extension of the MSDF IndianOcean mission was indeed forced through theDiet in mid-December 2008, and this particularrationale lost most of its saliency. It did,however, put the issue of Somali piracy closerto the center of the Japanese foreign policydebate than would have otherwise been thecase.

2. Demonstrating Japan’s InternationalSecurity Contribution

One of the arguments repeatedly advanced by

the editors of the Yomiuri Shinbun editorialpage—and many leading conservativepoliticians as well—is that Japan must enhancei t s e f f o r t s t o m a k e “ i n t e r n a t i o n a lcontributions.” Since the Persian Gulf War of1991 there have been mounting pressures tomake these international contributions in amilitary form. As a Yomiuri editorial put it onDecember 27, 2008: “To fulfill its internationalresponsibilities, Japan must consider variouspossible measures.”

This Japanese view, of course, has beenstrongly encouraged, and to a significantdegree orchestrated, by US officials. Mostrecently, US Ambassador Thomas Schieffercommented: “I hope Japan will make acontribution and will do more to help rid theworld of this scourge of piracy that we’reexperiencing now.” [8]

Japanese conservatives are vulnerable to suchappeals for reasons of vanity as well as forpractical reasons. The desire for enhancedprestige has been a consistent theme inmodern Japanese foreign policy. OkamotoYukio once wrote that, “In its relationship withthe United States, Japan has craved respect.”[9] Kenneth Pyle has identified this quality as“honorific nationalism.” [10] My own preferredterm is “prestige diplomacy.” But whatever theprecise designation, it signifies that Japanesepolicymakers spend an inordinate amount oftheir time trying to ensure that Japan looksgood internationally even at the expense ofachieving concrete policy results.

One of the “practical” applications of prestigediplomacy is that it accords with Tokyo’s desireto attain a permanent seat on the UN SecurityCouncil. Washington policymakers seem tohave largely succeeded in convincing theJapanese elite that they will never be acceptedas a serious candidate for a permanent seatunless they meet their “responsibility” to sendJapanese troops on international peacekeepingmissions that include combat activities.

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Whether or not Japanese military missionswould actually bring them any closer to apermanent seat on the UN Security Council isanother matter, but important in this context isthe belief of many Japanese policymakers thatit is a necessary step on that road.

Japanese see themselves as the most advancedp o w e r i n A s i a . F o r s o m e J a p a n e s econservatives, an anti-piracy mission along theSomal i coast would be an importantreaffirmation that they still belong to the eliteclub of world leaders.

3. Utilizing the Japanese Navy

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991,the MSDF quietly emerged as the world’ssecond most-powerful navy. This was a sort ofembarrassment of riches in light of the fact thatthe Japanese Constitution forbids “land, sea,and air forces, as well as other war potential.”This dilemma was inherent in the very creationof the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954, butby 1991 the notion that Japan did not possess“war potential” had become laughable. Indeed,it was in reality one of the most advanced andpowerful military powers in the world, thoughit was still hesitant to use that power in light ofthe continued skepticism of the use of force bythe Japanese public.

Two major reasons account for the dramaticgrowth of Japanese naval power in particular.One was consistent pressure from Washingtonfor the MSDF to play a larger role in containingSoviet sea power in East Asia. The other was aproduct of Japan’s dramatic economic growthafter 1960: Although military spending wasgenerally kept below one percent of thenational budget, that still represented far moremoney for military equipment than most othercountries had available for such purposes.

One implication was that as the actualcapabilities of the MSDF expanded, so too didinternal and external expectations that Tokyo

would be willing to employ its impressivecapabilities. In 1981, Japan agreed to takeresponsibility for defending its own sea lanesout to a thousand mile radius from the homeislands. This gave the MSDF theoreticalresponsibilities ranging as far as Taiwan andperhaps the Philippines. The collapse of theSoviet Union in 1991 left the MSDF with theonly major naval force in East Asia other thanthe US Navy.

So what did the MSDF do at this time? Theycontinued their ship-building program, andbegan to shift increasingly toward the creationof an of fensive—rather than str ict lydefensive—military capability. This offensivecapability was best symbolized by the 2007launching of the JDS Hyuga, a helicopteraircraft carrier that is officially described as a“helicopter-carrying destroyer” in order toalleviate legal questions and politicalsensitivities.

JDS Hyuga

Not surprisingly, there seem to be many MSDFofficers who do not want to train endlessly forcontingencies that would never be authorizedto act upon, or to let their high-tech vessels sitidle in port gathering rust. Also, there arecivilian politicians who have concerns akin tothe one once famously expressed by Secretaryof State Madeleine Albright when speaking toJoint Chief of Staff Colin Powell: “What’s thepoint of you saving this superb military for,Colin, if we can’t use it?” [11]

One of the key factors driving Tokyo towarddeployment of the MSDF against Somali piratesis the need for the Japanese navy to justify the

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substantial budget that it has been given by thegovernment, as well as to provide practicalexperience for Japan’s military forces.

4. Keeping Up the with Chinese

Practical experience for Japanese militaryforces appears to be an urgent matter for manyJapanese conservatives because they fear—andsome even expect—that Japan will have toresist Chinese military pressure in the future.

Indeed, much of what has been said aboveabout the MSDF seems to apply with equalforce to the Chinese Navy. The Chinese toohave been gradually increasing the capabilitiesof their sea forces. This includes the purchaseof more sophisticated destroyers from Russiaand the recent announcement that Beijing isconsidering the possibility of building its ownfirst aircraft carrier. [12] Of course, it could bethat the Chinese military is only responding tothe strength of Japan’s navy and the launchingof the JDS Hyuga.

In late December 2008, Beijing announced thatit would participate in anti-piracy operationsnear Somalia. The motives for this decisionseem to be a combination of the desire to givemore operational experience to the ChineseNavy and to demonstrate China’s newfoundstatus as a “responsible stakeholder” in theinternational community.

Chinese Aegis Destroyer

Beijing’s announcement lit a fire underJapanese conservatives like few otherdevelopments could have. Several Japanesefears had unexpectedly coalesced. Beijing wasdoing in practice what Tokyo had been piningto do for some time. Moreover, the implicationwas that the Chinese Navy would soon beworking side-by-side as partners with the USNavy while MSDF officers sat sullenly in theirquiet offices. In this context, Waseda UniversityProfessor Shigemura Toshimitsu told TheTelegraph: “The government, diplomats, andthe policymakers in the Ministry of ForeignAffairs are very afraid. Before, China did notfeel able to cooperate in global militaryoperations with the US or other nations, butthat has clearly changed. I foresee Beijingincreasingly projecting its power overseas inthe future.” [13]

In short, Beijing’s decision to participate inanti-piracy operations along the Somali coastinstantly elevated the issue to an urgentpr ior i ty for conservat ive Japanesepolicymakers. What may have seemed to thempreviously as a way to burnish theirinternational credentials was now, in theirestimation, a serious issue of long-termnational security.

5. Connecting with Yemen

One little-noticed side effect of the anti-piracycampaign is that it is likely to strengthenJapanese relations with Yemen. In fact,Japanese and Yemeni diplomats have clearlyrecognized this possibility since at leastSeptember 2008. At that time, JapaneseAmbassador in Sanaa Toshikage Masakazu toldYemeni Minister of Transport Khalid Ibrahimal-Wazeer that Japan was considering theprovision of additional support to Yemen inorder to train its coast guard and to establish aregional center for combating maritime piracy.[14]

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Yemen followed up by hosting a regionalmeeting on combating piracy in late October2008 and deploying about one thousandsoldiers and sixteen military boats to ward offpiracy in its regional waters. The YemeniTransportation Ministry announced that theywould set up three centers for monitoring theinternational waters in the Gulf of Aden. [15]

In late December, Tokyo declared that Japanwould provide patrol boats and other vessels toYemen for use in anti-piracy operations. Thesepatrol vessels are equipped with bulletproofglass and other devices that qualify them as“weapons” under Japanese law and thereforeinfringe on Japan’s ban on arms exports.However, Tokyo planned to waive the usuallegal restrictions in this case. [16] In fact, manyof the same measures had been taken by Tokyoa few years earlier with respect to piracy nearthe Straits of Malacca.

The combined effect of these new anti-piracymeasures is to tighten Japan-Yemen relations ina way that had not been the case in the past.Not long ago, the main bilateral link betweenJapan and Yemen was Overseas DevelopmentAssistance. These anti-piracy efforts add animportant new layer to this connection, and itcomes, perhaps not coincidentally, at a timewhen Yemen is initiating a modest oil and gasdevelopment program with involvement byJapanese companies.

It is not yet clear if a MSDF mission would playa substantial role in furthering the build-up ofthis particular bilateral connection, but it isapparent that Sanaa is seizing the opportunityprovided by Somali piracy to enhance their owninternational role. The measures that Tokyo isnow taking in regard to Yemen might just aseasily have been an alternative to direct MSDFmilitary action rather than a supplement to it.

6. Dividing the Political Opposition

One final fringe benefit for the LDP that would

come out of an MSDF deployment to the Somalicoast is that it puts pressure on the motleycoalition of forces nipping at the heels of theruling party. The plain fact is that the LDP’smany opponents do not share a unifiedideological perspective, and security policy isone of the main fissures running through theopposition forces.

Even before the government began seriousconsideration of sending the MSDF to EastAfrica, some of the more hawkish elements ofthe DPJ began utilizing the issue as a way todistinguish their party’s policies from LDPpolicies. The various wings of the DPJ hadunited in opposition to SDF deployments inboth Iraq and in the Indian Ocean, but that didnot mean that the hawkish wing was opposedto military deployments in principle; theywanted only to argue for different deploymentsthan those embraced by the government.

In mid-October 2008, DPJ lawmaker NagashimaAkihisa invited Prime Minister Aso Taro tocomment on a proposal that the Japanesegovernment might send MSDF escort ships tothe Somali coast. He asserted, “Escorts by SDFships would be very effective. The dispatchwould not be for the purpose of the use ofarms.” [17] DPJ lawmaker Asao Keiichiroadded: “A crackdown on pirates would be moreeffective to promote Japan’s contribution to theinternational community than the [IndianOcean] refueling mission.” The Prime Ministerresponded: “That kind of proposal is very good.Let us study it.” [18]

Of course, when the government actually beganto advocate an MSDF Somalia mission itself,the DPJ backed off its previous support for thenotion and started raising various objections.On one level, this reflected DPJ leader OzawaIchiro’s cynical political tactics. At anotherlevel, it reflected the fact that lawmakers suchas Nagashima Akihisa and Asao Keiichiro wereleading DPJ hawks, and that most of theremainder of the party was never that

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enthusiastic about their proactive militaryproposals.

The foreign policy divisions within the Japanesepolitical opposition more generally, and the DPJspecifically, have existed for many years, andthe anti-piracy issue is unlikely to create anyserious splits before the next Japanese generalelections. Nevertheless, for LDP lawmakersthere must be a sense of pleasure in being ableto force the opposition to confront its internalcontroversies about politically sensitive issuesof security policy.

Japan in the Deep Waters of NationalInterest

As can be perceived from the precedingdiscussion, there are a number of plausiblereasons for, as well as practical benefits to,Tokyo’s desire to send the MSDF to the Somalicoast: Tokyo would gain enhanced politicalprestige; the military alliance with the UnitedStates would be strengthened; the capabilitiesof Japan’s navy would be put to use; Beijingwould be put on notice that Japanese won’t bepushed around; and the opposition partieswould face political strain. Given this host ofbenefits for the ruling party, the MSDF willprobably be sent to East Africa within a fewmonths.

These benefits, however, should not obscuresome of the broader ethical and political issues.In the first place, the military suppression ofSomali pirates, should it come to pass, will notdo anything to resolve the fundamentalproblems of that region unless they areaccompanied by political and economic effortsthat so far have been lacking. As can beperceived, the emergence of large-scale piracyin Somalia is itself a symptom of a deeperpolitical problem; namely, that Somalis havebeen abandoned by the major powers, andwhen they have come close to solving their ownmost pressing problem by themselves—theestablishment of a more stable political

order—they have been prevented from doing soby interventions from powers posing as theguardians of international political stability.

In this context, the rush to deploy warshipsagainst Somalia by Japan and other leadingpowers does not seem to be motivated byanything resembling the best interests of theSomali people, but simply by annoyance that adisenfranchised group with guns have gotten intheir way and have cost them some money.Certainly, piracy is a violation of internationallaw, puts human lives at risk, and has thepotential to cause serious environmentaldamage if a tanker dumps its oil cargo into thesea. The Somali pirates must inevitably be putout of business. However, the self-servingposture of Japan and other nations suggeststhat this conflict is in a very real sense thewarfare of the world’s rich against the poor.After all, why have the arguments about Somalipiracy been so conspicuously bereft of anydebates about the general welfare of Somalia?

With this point in mind, it becomes clearer thatthe motives and benefits listed above amount tolittle more than a power game. Put anotherway, it is about a narrow conception of nationalinterests that in the long run will likely bedetrimental, not supportive, of internationalpeace and security. The pirates may besuppressed by lethal force employed by amultilateral coalition, but the underlyinginequities of the international order will only beexacerbated. The predictable long-term resultof this action and others like it will be a loss ofconfidence in potential ly stabi l iz inginternational organizations, increased mutualdistrust, and ultimately the rise of shrillerforms of nationalism among many of the greatpowers. The global experience of the late 19thcentury ought to serve as fair warning as towhere this all leads.

Indeed, in Japan there is a potent seventhmotive that hasn’t yet been mentioned. Theanti-piracy mission is an ideal opportunity to

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further the hollowing out of Article Nine of theJapanese Constitution and the spirit behind itwhich counsels “trusting in the justice and faithof the peace-loving peoples of the world.” If theMSDF starts shooting and killing Somalipirates, then the most serious restrictionimposed by Article Nine will be rendered moot.

Of course, only a fool would trust fully in othernations’ justice and peace-loving nature. But onthe other hand, to abandon completely thenotion that other peoples can even understandjustice and peace, or that they can act fromthose motives, simply opens the door to aHobbesian nightmare in which everyonebecomes the loser. Fear of disappointment or ofbeing called naïve ought not prevent awarenessthat the creation of some degree of mutualtrust is a sine qua non of creating a stableinternational order. Violent suppression alonewon’t do it. There needs to be a positive goalthat accompanies each military objective. In thecase of Somalia, we’ve yet to see any suchthing.

The Japanese Constitution was once envisionedas being a key step along the road to a betterand more stable international order, but inrecent years Japanese leaders seem determinedto embrace a lowest-common denominator formof normality. Ultimately, this will prove to be abetrayal of Japan’s genuine national interests,and may lead to the threshold of an entirelydifferent Gate of Tears.

Notes

[1] Asahi Shinbun, “Ships Detouring to AvoidPirates,” December 2, 2008.

[2] Afrol News, “Eritrea Blames US for SomaliPiracy,” November 21, 2008.

[3] Connie Levett, “Fishing Fleets are Pirates,Too,” Sydney Morning Herald, November 24,2008.

[4] Alastair Dalton, “Ocean of Opportunity forModern Pirates,” Scotsman.com News,November 19, 2008.

[5] GDP per capita income figures from the CIAWorld Factbook.

[6] Yomiuri Shinbun, “Govt to Bring AntipiracyBill Before Diet,” January 7, 2009.

[7] Yomiuri Shinbun, “MSDF May Be in SomaliWaters by March,” January 16, 2009.

[8] AFP, “US Envoy Urges Japan to JoinSomalia Anti-Piracy Mission,” January 9. 2009.

[9] Yukio Okamoto, “Japan and the UnitedStates: The Essential Al l iance,” TheWashington Quarterly, Spring 2002, p. 64.

[10] Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: TheResurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose,PublicAffairs, 2007.

[11] Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: AMemoir, Miramax, 2003, p. 182.

[12] Edward Wong, “China Signals MoreInterest in Building Aircraft Carrier,” New YorkTimes, December 23, 2008.

[13] Julian Ryall, “Japan Concerned Over USRelations with China,” The Telegraph,December 23, 2008.

[14] Saba News Agency, “Yemen SeeksJapanese Support for Establishing RegionalFighting Piracy Center,” September 7, 2008.

[15] Saba News Agency, “Yemen to HostRegional Meeting on Combating Piracy,”September 16, 2008.

[16] Kyodo News, “Yemen to Get Patrol Boatsto Fight Piracy,” December 24, 2008.

[17] Michael Penn, “DPJ Hawks Call for a

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Military Anti-Piracy Role in Somalia,”Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1170, October 19,2008.

[18] Ibid.

Michael Penn is Executive Director of theShingetsu Institute for the Study of Japanese-Islamic Relations and a Japan Focus associate.He wrote this article for The Asia-PacificJournal. Posted at Japan Focus on January 20,2009.

Recommended citation: Michael Penn, "SomaliPirates and Political Winds Drive Japan to theGate of Tears," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol.4-2-09, January 20, 2009.

Michael Penn's articles at The Asia-PacificJournal include:

Is There a Japan-Iraq Strategic Partnership?

Oil and Power: The Rise and Fall of the Japan-Iran Partnership in Azadegan

Michael Penn contributed the followingupdated to as Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1265on January 29, 2009.

MSDF SOMALIA ANTI-PIRACY MISSION TOBE LAUNCHED SOON

Yesterday the Japanese government announcedthat it had decided to deploy the MSDF on ananti-piracy mission to the Somali coast on thebasis of the current SDF law. YasukazuHamada, the minister of defense, said he hadordered the force to prepare for deployment,which may take place as early as March. He didnot offer details about the possible size of thenaval mission. Hamada said, "The pirates in theGulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia posethreats to Japan and the international

community and are an issue that should bedealt with swiftly."

The International Maritime Bureau hasreported that 111 ships were attacked in 2008off the eastern coast of Somalia and in the gulf.Forty-two of these vessels were hijacked, and adozen are still being held, including theJapanese-owned Chemstar Venus.

The Defense Ministry is not entirely happy withthis mission. Since the legal basis of themission is shaky, the rules of engagement arelikely to be somewhat impractical. Article 82 ofthe SDF law, on which the MSDF anti-piracydispatch will be based (at least initially),stipulates that ships the MSDF can protect arelimited to:

-- Japan-registered ships.-- Foreign-registered ships operated andcontrolled by Japanese shipping companies.-- Foreign-registered ships carrying cargobeing transported to Japan.

Sounds good, but how are MSDF vessels reallygoing to know the exact identity of each andevery ship passing through the Bab al-Mandab?How are they going to know whether or not aship carries "cargo being transported toJapan!"? How much cargo is cargo? Onecigarette? The MSDF is not allowed to protectships that are not Japanese or Japan-related. Ifsuch ships are attacked by pirates within therange of the MSDF, the MSDF plans to just callsome other nations' navy for help.

The Defense Ministry is well aware of theselegal problems, and this is precisely why theyhave been asking the government to give themclear guidelines. "There's a limit on what wecan do under the current laws," said a seniorMSDF officer to the Yomiuri Shinbun, "I wantthe government to properly explain to thepublic what the MSDF can and can't do."Defense Minister Hamada has repeatedly calledfor a new law: "This is only a stopgap

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measure… I believe the MSDF should engagein anti-piracy activities under a new law."

The SDF has many friends in the Diet andelsewhere who are eager to draw up just such alaw. Among them is Masahisa Sato, the soldier-politician we introduced in ShingetsuNewsletter No. 1104 (August 2008). Sato backsboth a new law as well as the current mission:"The participating countries [are] occupied byactions to protect their own countries' orrelated vessels. For now, Japan will not becriticized even if the MSDF flotilla escort onlyJapanese and Japan-related ships." Anothervoice in support of the mission has come fromformer Defense Agency Vice-Minister MasahiroAkiyama, who asserted, "Japan has the secondlargest naval power in the Asia-Pacific regionafter the United States. It's not an option forJapan to decline to dispatch the navy."

However, the key political backer all along hasbeen Prime Minister Taro Aso himself. As theYomiuri notes: "A big factor behind the turningof the tide in favor of the dispatch was Asosucceeding Fukuda as prime minister inSeptember. Hamada had persistently expressedreluctance about the plan, but Aso reportedlywon over Hamada by asserting that Japanshould do as much as it could."

Also strongly lobbying for the anti-piracymission is the Japanese Shipowners'Association, who are losing significant sums ofmoney due to the pirate activities. Thepresident of this organization, HiroyukiMaekawa, has been deeply involved with talkswith the Defense Ministry about how the MSDFmission will work in practice. According to theYomiuri Shinbun (which is following this storymuch more closely than the other papers) theoutlined plan features a convoy system in whichJapanese commerc ia l sh ips w i l l beaccompanied by two MSDF vessels -- one in

front and one behind. One convoy escortmission will take about three days. The MSDFfleet will continue activities while procuringsupplies at nearby ports. Theoretically, theDefense Ministry will receive a notice issued bythe Japanese Shipowners' Association andconveyed by the Construction and TransportMinistry about each ship to be escorted by theMSDF prior to its departure for pirate-infestedwaters. A senior MSDF official commented,"We aren't going to get rid of all the pirates,but we'll deter pirate attacks and ensure thesecurity of Japan-related ships."

It should also be noted that the DefenseMinistry's plan calls for destroyer-bornehelicopters to play a significant role insurveillance activities for the convoys. Thehelicopters will be equipped with 7.62-millimeter machine guns, and members of theMSDF's Special Boarding Unit will be aboard.When an MSDF destroyer spots a suspectedpirate ship, it will warn the pirate ship via radionot to approach the convoy. If the ship doesn'trespond, the MSDF will be authorized to firewarning shots. What happens after that? Well,it sounds like it's in the Hands of God.

Some senior MSDF officers seem to be seeingthis mission as a long-awaited chance forredemption of the military honor: "DuringWorld War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy couldnot protect the nation's transport convoys. Wehave to regain the trust of the shippingindustry, which was lost during the war."According to the Yomiuri, such an outcomewould "clean this historical taint."

Let me get this straight: Japan's "historicaltaint" from World War II is all about the factthat the military wasn't strong enough to carryout its missions? This is the central issue?

World! You have been warned!