1. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1 U.S. SECURITIESAND EXCHANGE 1 COMMISSION, 1 100 F. Street, NE 1 Washington, D.C. 20549 Plaintiff, Case: 1:08-cv-02167 Assigned To : Leon, Richard J. V. Assign. Date : 1211212008 Description: General Civil SIEMENSAKTIENGESELLSCHAFT J Wittelsbacherplatz 2 1 D-80333Munich 1 Federal Republic of Germany 1 1 Defendant. 1 1 COMPLAINT Plaintiff, U.S. Securitiesand Exchange Commission(the "Commission7'),alleges: SUMMARY 1. Between March 12,2001 and September30,2007 (the "Relevant Period"), SiemensAktiengesellschaft ("Siemens" or the "Company7')violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 115U.S.C. 5 78dd-11(the "FCPA") by engaging in a widespread and systematicpractice of paying bribes to foreign government oEcials to obtain business. Siemens created elaboratepayment schemesto conceal the nature of its corruptpayments, and the Company's inadequate internal controlsallowed the illicit conductto flourish. The misconduct involved employeesat all levels of the Company, including former seniormanagement, and reveals a corporate culture that had long been at odds with the FCPA.

2. 2. Duringthis period, Siemensmadethousands of separatepaymentsto third parties in ways that obscuredthe purpose for, and the ultimate recipients of,the money. At least4,283 ofthose payments, totaling approximately$1.4 billion, were used to bribe governmentofficialsin return for business to Siemensaroundthe world. Amongthe transactions on which Siemenspaid bribes were those to design and build metro transit linesin Venezuela;metro trains and signalingdevicesin China;power plants in Israel; high voltagetransmission lines in China; mobiletelephone networksin Bangladesh; telecommunicationsprojects inNigeria; national identitycardsin Argentina;medical devicesin Vietnam, China, and Russia;trafficcontrolsystemsin Russia; refineries in Mexico; and mobile communicationsnetworks in Vietnam. Siemensalsopaid kickbacks to Iraqi ministries in connectionwith salesof power stationsand equipmentto Iraq under the UnitedNations Oil forFood Program. Siemensearned over $1.1 billion inprofits on thesefourteencategoriesof transactionsthat comprised332 individualprojects or individual sales. 3. InNovember 2006, Siemens' current management began to implement reformsto the Company's internalcontrols. Thesereforms substantiallyreduced, but did' not entirelyeliminate, corruptpayments. All but $27.5 million ofthe corruptpayments occurredprior to November 15,2006. 4. Siemensviolated Section30A ofthe SecuritiesExchangeAct of 1934 ("Exchange Act7')[15U.S.C. 578dd-11by making illicitpaymentsto foreign government officialsin orderto obtainor retain business. Siemensviolated Section 13(b)(2)(B)of the Exchange Act by failing to have an adequate internal control system in place to detect andprevent the illicitpayments. Siemensviolated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of

3. the Exchange Act by improperlyrecording each of those payments in its accounting books and records. JURISDICTION 5. This Courthasjurisdiction overthis action under Sections21(d), 21(e), and 27 of the Exchange Act 115U.S.C. $9 78u(d), 78u(e) and 78aaI. Siemens, directlyor indirectly,made use of the means or instrumentalitiesof interstate commerce, of the mails, or ofthe facilitiesof a national securitiesexchangein connectionwith the transactions,acts, practices, and coursesof business alleged in this Complaint. 6. Venue is appropriateinthis Courtunder Section27 ofthe Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 5 78aaI or 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(d). DEFENDANT 7. Siemensis a German corporation with its executiveoffices in Munich, Federal Republicof Germany. Siemensis one of the world's largestmanufacturersof industrialand consumer products. Siemensbuilds locomotives, traffic control systems and electricalpower plants. The Companyalso manufacturesbuilding control systems, medical equipmentand electrical components,and formerlymanufactured communicationsnetworks. Siemensemploysapproximately428,200people and operatesin approximately 190countriesworldwide. Siemensreported net revenue of $116.5 billion and net incomeof $8.9 billion for its fiscal year ended September 30, 2008. 8. In accordancewith Germanlaw, Siemenshas a SupervisoryBoard and a ManagingBoard. The SupervisoryBoard is generally comparableto the board of directorsof a corporationin the United Statesin that it overseesmanagement but with

4. less oversightpower under G e m law. The Managing Board -or "Vorstand" - generallyperformsthe dutiesand responsibilities of seniormanagement of a corporation in the United Statesand includesthe Company's Chief ExecutiveOfficer ("CEO") and Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"). 9. Prior to a recent reorganization, Siemensoperated through a complex array of business groups and regional companies. Thebusiness groupsare divisions within Siemensand arenot separatelegal entities. Theregional companies arewholly- or partly-owned subsidiariesof Siemens. Thethirteenprincipalbusiness groupsduring the RelevantPeriod were: Communications("COM"), SiemensBusiness Services ("SBS"), Automationand Drives ("A&D9'), Industrial Solutionsand Services("I&S"), SiemensBuildingTechnologies("SBT"), Power Generation("PG"),PowerTransmission and Distribution("PTD), TransportationSystems("Tv, SiemensVDO Automotive ("SV"), Medical Solutions("MED"), Osram MiddleEast, SiemensFinancial Services ("SFS"), and SiemensReal Estate ("SRE"). In 2008, Siemensreorganizedthe groups into three Sectors-Energy, Healthcareand Industry. 10. SinceMarch 12,2001, Siemens' American Depository Shareshave been registeredwith the Commissionpursuantto Section 12(b)of the Exchange Act. [15 U.S.C. 5781(b)]. Siemens' American Depository Sharestrade ontheNew York Stock Exchange ('WSE") under the symbol"SI." FACTS A. Background 11. Siemenstracesits originsto 1847and for over 160years has been one of the most successfulconglomeratecompaniesin Germany. After World War 11, Siemens

5. had difficultycompetingfor business in many Western countries and responded by seekingbusiness opportunitiesin certain less developed countrieswhere corrupt business practices were common. 12. Duringthe pre-1999period, thefist period, bribery at Siemenswas largely unregulated. German law did not prohibit foreign bribery and allowed tax deductionsfor bribes paid in foreigncountries. Siemenswas not yet listed on theNYSE and thereforewas not subjectto U.S. regulation. Undeterredby foreign lawsthat prohibited bribery, Siemensput severalpaymentmechanismsin place, including the use of cash and off-booksaccounts,to make payments as necessaryto win business. 13. ThetermNiitzlicheAufwendungen ("NAY')or ''useful expenditures" was a commonlyused tax lawterm and was commonlylisted on Siemens' cost calculation sheetsto denotepaymentsto third parties, includingillicitpaymentsto foreignofficials. Though aslarule Siemensrequired two signatureson all major documentsin accordance with an i n t e d controlknownas the "four-eyes" principle,many exceptionsto the rule weremade to ensure quick accessto cashto make illicit payments. 14. Overtime, Siemensdevelopedanetwork of payment mechanisms designed to funnelmoney throughthird parties in a way that obscuredthe purpose and ultimate recipient of the funds. On at.least oneproject, bribesto high ranking governmentofficialswerearrangedpersonallyby a member ofthe Vorstand.. The successof Siemens' bribery systemwasmaintainedby lax internal controls over corruptionrelated activities and an acceptanceof suchactivitiesby membersof senior management and the compliance, internal audit, legal and financedepartments.

6. 1. NYSE Listing 15. From 1999to 2003, the secondperiod,theVorstand was ineffectivein implementingcontrolsto addressconstraints imposed by Germany's 1999adoptionof the OrganizationforEconomic Cooperationand Development ("OECD) anti-bribery conventionthat outlawedforeignbribery. OnFebruary 15,1999,the very daythat Germanyratified the OECD Convention,the then-CEO of Siemens"expressed his concern at the number of criminal and other investigationsinto members of the Company," furthernotingthat "[als the Board could possiblybe held responsiblefor various offenses, it was importantto takeprotective measures." However,bribery continuedfor years afterward. 16. The Vorstandwas also ineffectivein meeting the U.S. regulatory and anti- bribery requirementsthat Siemenswas subjectto followingitsMarch 12,2001,listing on theNYSE. 17. The changesin the legal landscapecaused by Germany's ratificationof the QECD Conventionand Siemens' listing on theNYSE should have put an endto bribery at Siemens. Unfortunately, they did not. Instead, a steady flowof improper payments continuedto emanatefiom the Company, in largepart because of certain actionsand inactionstaken by the Vorstand. 18. For instancein mid-2000, as Siemensprepared for itsNYSE listing, its legal departmentforwardeda memorandum to the SupervisoryBoard Chairmanand CFO identifying certainoff-books accounts. The memorandummade it clearthat Siemens' accountshad to be maintained "in harmony with the principlesof orderly accounting.

7. Otherwisesanctionsare likelyunder criminal law." The Vorstand failedto act, and the off-booksaccountscontinuedto exist even after Siemens"YSE listing: 19. In addition,the Vorstand failed to adoptmeaningll compliance measures, failed to adequatelystaff Siemens' compliancefunction and, attimes, failed to adopt reasonablerecommendationsdesignedto enhance complianceprocedures at the Company. As illustrated herein, many of the improperpaymentsmade by Siemens involved the use of business consultants and business consultingagreementsto funnel illicitpaymentsto third parties, includinggovernment officials. In April 2000, the Vorstand rejected a proposal by the Company's General Counselto create a Company- wide list of business consultants and a committeeto reviewthese relationships. Although Siemensissuedvariousprinciples and recommendationsregardingbusiness consultants, Siemenshad no mandatoryand comprehensiveCompany-widerules inplace governing the use of business consultants until Juneof 2005. 2. Red Flags (CommunicationsGrouv -Nigeria) 20. From 2003 to 2006, the thirdperiod, members of theVorstand failed to respond appropriatelyto indicationsthat bribery was widespreadat Siemens. Red flags that the Vorstand membersmissed or ignored included substantialcashpayments in Nigeria by seniorlevel employeeswithinthe COMbusinessgroup. In the fall of 2003, Siemens' outside auditor KPMG identified 4.12 million in cashthat was brought to Nigeria by COMemployeesand flaggedthe paymentsforreview. A compliance attorneyatthe Company conducteda one-day investigationofthe payments andwrotea report indicatingthat COM employeesadmittedthat it was not an isolated event and warned of numerous possibleviolations of law. Thoughthe compliancereport was

8. reviewed inNovember 2003 by Siemens' then-CFO, no disciplinaryaction was taken, no furtherinvestigativework was conducted,and the report was not provided to or discussed with the Vorstand as a whole or the Company's auditcommittee. COM employees identified in thereport, includinga former COM manager, continuedto pay bribes through a seriesof slush fundsuntil at least November 2006, when they were arrested followinga raid of Siemens' offices (the"Dawn Raid") by criminal authoritiesin Munich, Germany. Had seniormanagement responded differently,bribes paid by the COM group could have been reduced or eliminated. 3. , Red Flags mower GenerationGrour,-Italv) 21. During the thirdperiod, the Vorstand alsofailedto respond appropriately to multi-million dollar bribes paid in Italy by managersof the SiemensPG business group. In July2003, the news media reported that prosecutorsin Milanwere investigatingbribespaid to employeesof ENEL, an energy companypartly-ownedby the Italian government, in connectionwith two power plant projects. SiemensPGmanagers made approximately6 million in corrupt paymentsto two ENEL officials. The corrupt paymentswere routedthrough slushfunds in Liechtensteinusing a Dubai-based business consultant. 22. In April 2004, ajudge in Milan issued a written opinion concludingthat the evidence indicatedthat Siemensviewed bribery "at leastas a possible business strategy." In or aroundMay 2004, a legalmemorandumconcerningthe rulingwas sent to members of the Vorstand, includingthe then-CEO andthen-CFO ofthe Company. Anothermemorandum,sentto membersof the Vorstand, includingthe then-CEO and the then-CFO in April 2004, detailed severancepackagesthat had been givento the PG

9. managers and attacheda September2003 memorandumprepared by an American law firm.Thelegal memorandum suggestedthat Siemensshould immediately review and assureproper functioningof its FCPA complianceprogram, that the allegations and steps taken to addressthem shouldbe reportedto the board, and that the employeesinvolved should be disciplined. 23. Subsequently, Siemens,alongwith two of its PG managers, entered into a plea bargainwith criminal authoritiesin Italypursuant to which Siemenspaid a 0.5 million fine, gaveup 6.2 million inprofits and was barred fiom sellinggas turbinesin Italy for oneyear. Despitetheir criminalconduct,the two PG managers involvedinthe ENELmatter received earlyretirementwith fullretirement benefits. The PG CFO received a1.8 million severancepackage from Siemenswhen he leftthe Companyas a result of the ENELmatter. In a related criminalproceedingin Germany, the longtime CFO of PG confessedto authorizingthebribes. Siemens' corporateresponse to bribery assuredcertainemployeesthat they could expectto be taken careof if and when caught paying bribes on behalf of the Company. 24. There were additional significantred flags of corruptionincluding admissionsof bribery or so called"bonus payments" to governmentofficialsin March 2006 by a manager at SiemensGreeceof over37 million, as well as anApril 2006 KPMG audit identificationof over 250 suspiciouspaymentsmade through an intermediaryon behalf of Informationand Communication Mobile, a corporate predecessorof COM, and SiemensS.p.A in Italy.

10. 4. Tone at the Top 25. The Vorstand's responseto the situationsinNigeria and Italy demonstrated a tone at thetop of Siemensthat was inconsistentwith an effectiveFCPA complianceprogram and createda corporateculturein which bribery was tolerated and evenrewarded atthehighestlevelsof the company. 26. Siemensimplementedcertainimprovementsto its complianceprogram in responseto the situationin Italy. These included an anti-briberyspeechdeliveredby the then-CFOto high-levelbusiness managers in summer2004 and the establishmentof a Corporate ComplianceOffice in October2004. In addition, the Companyissuedpolicies overbank accounts,includingrequirementsrelatingto the initiation and use of Company accountsand authorizationsregarding cash. However, it was not until oneyear later, in June 2005, thatthe Companyissued mandatoryrules governingthe use of business consultants,e.g. prohibiting success fees and requiring complianceofficersto sign off on businessconsultingagreements. While thesemeasures appearto have been partially effective,improper payments continuedat leastuntil the DawnRaid inNovember 2006. 27. Despitethe Vorstand's knowledgeof bribery at two of its largest groups- COM and PG -the CorporateComplianceOffice continuedto have a conflictedmandate and lacked resources. Therewas aninherentconflict inthe Corporate Compliance Office mandate, which included both defendingthe Company, and preventingcompliance breaches. TheCorporateComplianceOfficewas significantlyunderstaffed, with a part- time ChiefCompliance Officer,and up to six fuil-time lawyersuntil 2007. Despite knowledge of numerousinstancesof corruption in multiple areasofthe business,the Company did not implementmandatory FCPA compliancetraining until 2007.

11. B. IllicitPaymentMechanismsUsed to Pay Bribes 28. Duringthe RelevantPeriod, Siemensmade thousands ofpaymentsto third parties in ways that obscuredthe purpose for, and ultimate recipient of, the money. The principalpaymentmechanismsused to facilitateillicit were business consultants,payment intermediaries,slushfunds, cash, and intercompanyaccounts. 29. Throughits use of business consultants and payment intermediaries, Siemensfunneledmore than $982.7 million to thirdparties, including government officials. All but $27.5 million ofthe paymentsweremadeprior to November 15,2006. Businessconsultantswere typicallyhired pursmt to business consultantagreements, contractsthat on their face obligated Siemensto pay for legitimate consultingservices. In reality, many business consultantagreementswere shamsin that the business consultantsperformedno servicesbeyond funnelingbribes. PG had specificinstructions on how to use a "confidential payment systemyyto conceal paymentsto business consultants. Payment intermediarieswere additionalentitiesand individualsthrough which Siemensfunneledbribes. Inmany cases, Siemenswould pay the intermediaryan amount and simultaneouslydirect that the money be transferredto a third-party bank account, less a smallportion asthe intermediary's fee. 30. Siemensalsofunneledmore than $211million through slush fundsfor use as bribes. All but $2.3 million of the piiymentswere made prior to September30,2004. Slushfundswere bank accountsheld inthe name of currentor formersenior Siemens employees,third parties, or affiliated entities. The most notable slush funds were maintained by a former COM manager recently convictedin Germanyfor his role in the

12. payment of bribesto foreign officials, which included several slushfunds held inthe name of U.S. shell companies. 31. . Siemensalsoused cash and cash equivalentsto h e 1more than $160.4 million to thirdparties. All but $9.2 million ofthe payments weremade prior to September30,2004. SiemensCOM employeesused cash desksmaintainedby the SiemensReal Estate Groupto obtain large amountsof cashto pay bribes. Often, employeeswould obtainhundredsofthousandsof dollarsand, at times, even $1million in various currenciesfiom the cash desks in Germany. Thecash was transported, sometimesin suitcases,acrossinternationalborders intovarious countries. At times, the cashwas then storedin safesmaintainedby Siemensemployeesto ensureready accessto cashto pay bribes. 32. Lastly, Siemensused various types of internalaccountsto funnel more than $16.2 millionto third parties. Approximately99% of thepayments were made prior to September 30,2005. An intercompany account is a type of Siemens7internal account that is used to makepaymentsontransactionsbetweentwo Siemensentities, i.e., for entity to entity business. Siemensused the intercompanyaccountsto make third party payments and in a number of instances, Siemensmaintainedthe accountsin thenames of unconsolidatedentities aroundthe globe, including Ecuador andNicaragua, in orderto avoid detection. Someofthe intercompany accountsmaintainedat unconsolidated entitieswere known to, andpossibly createdby, a formermember ofthe Vorstand, who had oversightresponsibilityfor LatinAmerica. 33. As earlyas 2004, a SiemensCorporateFinanceFinancial Audit employee raised concernsaboutthe use of intercompany accounts. He was phased out of hisjob

13. and assigned to work on "special projects" fkom his home until leavingthe Company in 2005. Siemensthereafter began closingsome of the accountsand eventuallyclosed all of them. 34. Another type of internal accountthat employeesabused was Siemens MED internal commissionaccounts. These balance-sheet accountswere intendedto be used to record commissionsMED earned on transactionswith other Siemensentities. Theseaccountswere used to make third party payments. Many of the intercompany accountpaymentsandthe MED internal commissionaccountpaymentswere done manually to bypass Siemens' automatedpayment system. Themanual payments, executedthrough SFS, did not require the submissionof documentationin supportof a payment. 35. Siemensuied a host ofother schemesto make more than $25.3 million in paymentsto third parties. In particular, Siemensused sham supplieragreements, receivablesand otherwrite-offsto generatepayments. C. Breakdown of Third Partv Pavments 36. Duringthe RelevantPeriod, Siemensmade 4,283 separatepayments totaling approximately$1-4billion to bribe governmentofficials in foreign countries throughoutthe world. An additionalapproximately 1,185separatepaymentsto third parties totaling approximately$39lmillionwere not properly controlledand were used, at least inpart, for illicitpurposes, includingcommercialbribery and embezzlement. The followingchartbreaksdownthe $1-4billion in illicit payments to foreign government officialsby business group. . .

14. D. Bribery of Government Officials 37. The followingparagraphsprovide examplesof bribery schemesinvolving projects and individual salescarried out by Siemensusing U.S. means duringthe Relevant Period with profits,of over $1.1 billion. 1. Metro TransitLines in Venezuela 38. Between 2001 and 2007, SiemensTS and SiemensS.A., a regional companyin Venezuela, paid an estimated$16.7 million in bribesto Venezuelan governmentofficials in connectionwiththe constructionof metro transit systemsin the 'citiesof Valencia and Maracaibo, Venezuela. Thetwo projects, Metro Valencia and Metro Maracaibo, generated approximately$642 million in revenue to Siemens. The Metro Valenciaproject was awarded to a TS entityin the United Statesand later transferred to Siemens, and the Metro Maracaibo project was awardedto Siemensand

15. part of the work was assignedto the U.S. TS entity. Each of the contractswas financed in part by the U.S. Export-Import Bank in Washington,D.C. The corrupt paymentswere made using fourseparate, overlappingpayment schemes. 39. Underthe first scheme, Siemensmaintaineda numbered, off-booksbank account in Panama and eithermaintained a similar accountin Miami or had contactsto a banker in Miami who had accessto suchaccounts. Theseaccountswere controlledby two CEOsandtwo CFOs of Siemens' regional subsidiaryin Venezuela. One ofthe regional CFOs estimatedthat between 2001 and 2003 hepaid $5 to $6millionper year out of the accounts, a portion of which went to governmentofficialsin supportof the Venezuelanprojects. Theregional CFOperiodically destroyedthe account statements. 40. Under the second scheme, Siemenspaid over $6.8millionto fourU.S.- based entitiescontrolledby a longtime Siemensbusiness consultant. Siemenscalled upon the consultant,known as a political "fixer" in Venezuelaand who had been an advisorto formerVenezuelanpresidents,to ensurepolitical supportfor the Maracaibo and Valenciaprojects and for Siemens' role in them. Siemensmade paymentsinto the U.S. bank accountsofthe fourcontrolledentitiespursuant to shamconsultingagreements in returnfor no legitimate work. Bank records reveal paymentsto Venezuelan govemmentofficialsandpolitically-connectedindividuals, includinga high-ranking member ofthe central government, two prominentVenezuelanattorneysactingon behalf of government officials, a formerVenezuelandefense minister and diplomat, and a relative of a local politician, all of whom had influence overthese and other Siemens contractsin Venezuela. Siemenstransferred an additional $4.9 millionto one of the

16. controlled entitiesbetween 2006 and 2007 by artificiallyinflatingthe terms of a contract with a U.S. engineering firm. 41. Under thethird scheme, Siemensused a Cyprus-based business consultant as an intermediaryto fundup to $2.5 million in bribe payments on the Valencia project. Shamagreementswere enteredinto with the business consultantthat purported to be for other Siemensprojects, but were actually designed to transfermoney to Valencia. This payment schemewas authorized by a former CFO of the Turnkey Division within the TS group at Siemens. 42. Under the fourth scheme, Siemensin 2002and 2003 entered into a sham agreementwith a Dubai-based business consultantto supplyMetro Maracaibo with approximately$2.6millionin workshop equipment. The equipmentwas actually suppliedby another supplier, andthe business consultantdid not supplyany goodsunder the contract. Afterthebusiness consultantcame under suspicionas a result of its involvementin the investigationof possiblebribespaid to ENEL managers in Italy, the CFO of Siemens' TurnkeyDivision's successorwas orderedto terminatethe contract. Instead, the new CFO arrangedthe assignment of the contractto anotherDubai-based business consultantthat continuedthe shamworkshop equipment arrangement. 2. MetroTrains and Simaling:Devicesin China 43. Between2002 and 2007, SiemensTSpaid approximately$22million to business consultantswho used someportion ofthose funds to bribe foreign officialsin connectionwith sevenprojects forthe constructionof metro trains and signalingdevices on behalf of governmentcustomersin China. The total value of the projectswas over $1 billion. After experiencingdifficultybreaking into the modern Chinesemarket, Siemens

17. began using a Hong-Kong based business consultant and related entitiesto pay bribes to influencethe award of contractsto Siemens. Siemenstypicallyhired the business consultantbased on an oral agreementto pay a successfee equalto a percentage of the project value and would enter into a written business consultingagreementafterthe governmentcontractwas awardedto Siemens. In connectionwith one Shanghaiproject, fourwholly-owned subsidiariesof the Hong Kong business consultantsubmittedinvoices totaling $11.7 million to Siemensand requestedpayment routed through a U.S. correspondentbank andthento various Swissaccounti The illicitarrangementwas enteredinto by a Sales& Marketingmanager, who later became a Vice President of SiemensTS in Chinawith the knowledgeand approvalof his supervisors. Therewere few, if any, legitimate servicesprovided by the business consultant;backdated agreementsand phony work product were used to supportat least some of thepayments. E-mails relating to a varietyof projects indicatethat the businessconsultantwas funnelingmoneyto governmentofficialsand "friends"with inside informationand influenceover governmentcontractingdecisions. 3. Power Plants in Israel 44. Between 2002 and 2005, SiemensPG paid approximately $20 million in bribesto aformer Director of the state-ownedIsraelElectricCompany ("IEC"). The bribeswere paid in connectionwith fourcontractsto build and servicepowerplants in Israel. The total value of the contracts was approximately$786 million: Siemensrouted the corruptpaymentsthrough a business consultant owned andmanaged by the brother in-law of the CEOofSiemensIsrael Limited, a regional subsidiary. Thebusiness consultantwas ostensiblypaid to "identify and defrne salesopportunities, providemarket

18. intelligence," and support contractnegotiations. In reality, the business consultant was a Hong Kong-based clothingcompany with no expertisein the power generationindustry. Thebusiness consultantneverprovided the services called for under its business consultant agreement. 45. Someofthe money paid to the business consultantwas traced to the formerIEC Director,who was in aposition to influencethe award of the contractswon by Siemens. A portion ofthe funds passed through U.S. bank accounts. 4. Hieh -VoltaeeTransmissionLines in China 46. Between 2002 and 2003, SiemensPTD paid approximately$25million in bribes to govenunentcustomersin connectionwithtwo forthe installationof high voltagetransmission lines in SouthChina.. Thetotal value ofthe projects was approximately$838million. The paymentswere funneledthroughmultiple intermediaries,includinga Dubai-based business consultingfirm controlled by,aformer SiemensPTD employeeand then paid to severalentities associatedwith a Chinese business consultantwho held a U.S passport and maintained a U.S. residence. Payments to the Dubai-based business consultantwere supported by phony distribution contracts. Seniormanagement of PTD in Germany approvedthe paymentswith the understanding thattheywould be sharedwith "partners" in China, includinggovernmentofficials. In 2002, Siemensused U.S. banks to funnel $1.2 million in bribesto anotherbusiness consultantwhose principal shareholdersheld U.S. passports. That business consultant also enteredinto a shambusiness consultantagreementwith Siemensunder which no legitimateserviceswereprovided.

19. 5. MobileTelephone Servicesin Bangladesh 47. Between 2004 and 2006, SiemensCOM paid approximately$5.3 million in bribesto government officials in Bangladeshin connectionwith a contractwith the Bangladesh Telegraph& Telephone Board ("BT'TB) to install mobiletelephone services. The.total value of the contractwas approximately$40.9 million. Thepayments 'weremade to three businessconsultantspursuant to sham agreementscallingfor services associatedwith the mobiletelephoneproject. The ultimate recipients of the payments includedthe son of the then-PrimeMinister in Bangladesh, the Minister of the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunicationsin Bangladesh, and the BTTB Director of Procurement. In addition, SiemensLimited Bangladesh, a regional company, hired relatives.of two otherBTTB and Ministryof Post and Telecomofficials. Most of the money paid to the business consultantswaS routed through correspondentaccountsin the United States, with at least onepayment originating&oma U.S. account. Since approximately September2004, a Siemensbusiness consultantwho served as a principal payment intermediaryon the Bangladesh bribe paymentshasbeen resident inthe United States. At least $1.7 million of the bribe paymentsmade throughthis intermediarywere paid into a Hong Kongbank accountwhilethe intermediarywas residing inthe United States. 48. Theinvolvementof seniorofficialsat Siemens' regional companyin Bangladesh, including a formerCEOand the directorofthe regional company's COM division, in the bribery schemeis revealedboth in statementsby the officialsand in internal emailmessages, severalof which includethe tagline, "kindly deletethis mail oncethe purpose is done."

20. 6. Four TelecommunicationsProiectsin Nigeria 49. SiemensCOMmade approximately$12.7 million in suspiciouspayments in connectionwith Nigerianprojects, with at least $4.5 millionpaid as bribes in connectionwith fourtelecommunicationsprojects with governmentcustomersin Nigeria, includingNigeria TelecommunicationsLimited and the Ministryof Communications. Thetotal value of the four contractswas approximately$130million. Thepractice of paying bribesby SiemensCOMinNigeria was long-standingand systematic. According to a highranking official within SiemensLimitedNigeria, a regional company, corrupt payments in 2000 and 2001 commonlyreached 15to 30% of the contracts' value. Bribe payments weretypically documentedusing fictitiousbusiness consultantagreements under which no actual serviceswereperformed. The CEO of SiemensLimitedNigeria forwardedrequests for "commission" paymentsto Siemensheadquartersin Germany. The illicitpayments were then made through a number of means, frequentlyincluding largecashwithdrawalsfrom cash desksthat were then hand-carried in suitcasesto Nigeria. 50. In the fourtelecommunicationsprojects, approximately$2.8 million ofthe bribepaymentswas routed through a bank account in Potomac, Maryland, in the,pameof the wife of a formerNigerian Vice President. TheVice President's wife, a dualU.S.- Nigeriancitizenlivingin the United States, served asthe representativeof a business consultantthat enteredinto fictitiousbusiness consultantagreementsto perform "supply, installation, and commissioning" servicesbut did no actual work for Siemens. The purpose ofthesepaymentswas to bribe government officials. Other compt payments includedthe purchase of approximately$172,000 in watchesforNigerian officials

21. designated in internal Siemensrecords as "P." and "V.P.," likely referringto the Presidentand Vice-PresidentofNigeria. 7. Identitv card Proiectin Argentina 51. Between 1998and 2004, Siemenspaid over $40million in bribes to senior officialsof the governmentof Argentinain an effortto securea $1billion project to produce national identity cards. Siemensofficialsbetween 1998and 1999,includingthe then-CEO of Siemensregional company in Argentina, SiemensS.A., caused $19million to be paid to business consultantsforbribes. At least $2.6 million was transferred from the business consultants' accountsdirectlyto the Presidentof Argentina,the Minister of the Interior, and the Head of ImmigrationControlto obtainthe contract. Duringthis period, Siemensofficialspromised to pay an additional $30million or moreto the Presidentand his Cabinetministers. In late 1999,the Argentine President ended his term whenhis party was voted out of office, and the new administrationthreatenedto terminatethe contract on the ground that it had beenprocured by fiaud. In an effortto head off that possibility, Siemenspaid $6 million in additionalbribesto officialsin the new Argentineadministration. Despitethese payments, the contractwas nonetheless canceled in May 2001. 52. Overthe followingfouryears, Siemensofficialsreceived a seriesof payment demandsand threats against its employeesin Argentina if it did not fulfill its past commitmentto pay additionalbribes. Between 2002 and 2004, Siemenspaid over $23million to settlethese demands. The Siemensofficials involved in authorizingthe payments included a member of the Vorstand,who in 2003personallyflewto the United Statesto meet with Siemens' principal intermediaryto negotiatethe payment terms, as

22. well asthe CEO and CFO of Siemens' regional company in Argentina. Approximately $9.5 million of thesepaymentswere routed through the books of an unrelated PTD transmissionproject in China in an effortto conceal the paymentsfiom Siemens' internal auditors. other were made through^.^. bank accountsbased on fictitious invoicesfor non-existent past servicesin connectionwith the identity cardproject and otherprojects inthe region, includingpaymentsto a former governmentMinister and member ofthe ArgentineCongress. 8. Medical Devices in Vietnam 53. SiemensMED paid $183,000 in early 2005 and $200,000 in early 2006 in connectionwiththe saleof approximately$6million of medical devicesontwo projects involvingthe VietnameseMinistryof Health. After learningthat bribe paymentswere required in Vietnam, SiemensMED soughtthe name of the business consultantentrusted by SiemensTS to conductbusinessin that market, includingmakingits bribepayments. SiemensMED then enteredinto an agreementwith an affiliate of the group of Hong- Kongbased business consultantsused by SiemensTS to act as SiemensMEDYspayment intermediary. Thepaymentswere routedthrough a U.S. correspondentbank and then to Singaporebank accountsof t h e ' ~ o n ~on^ business consultant. The amountswere then withdrawn iricash and transportedto Vietnam. Project calculation sheets connectedto the salesdesdribethe paymentsto the intermediaryas relatingto "room preparation." A number of Siemensseniormanagers, includingthe then-CFO of Siemens7business in Vietnam, admittedthat the purpose ofthe paymentswasto bribe governmentofficials. 54. With regard to the $183,000paymentthat wasmade in early 2005, the former CFO of SiemensLimited Vietnam ("SLV") describedhow he and the then CEO

23. of Siemens SLVpicked up an envelope with $183,000 cash at a hotel in Singapore "fi-om a Hong Kong business man" and flew to the Hanoi airport where the money was left with the then-head of Siemens MED in Vietnam, who had primary responsibility for contract negotiationswith officialsat the Vietnamese Ministry of Health. 9. Medical Devices in China 55. Between 2003 and 2007, SiemensMED paid approximately $14.4 million in bribes to the same intermediary described above in connectionwith $295 million in sales of medical equipment to five Chinese-ownedhospitals, as well as to fund lavish trips for Chinese doctors. The formercontroller of Siemensoversawthe business relationship between Siemens and the affiliateof the Hong-Kong-basedintermediarythat it used to pay the bribes. A majority of the sales on which the intermediary received a payment involved a bribe to a government official. The same intermediarywas used by SiemensTS to pay bribes in China and by Siemens MED to pay bribes in Vietnam. 56. For example, Siemenspaid $64,800 in May 2006 in connectionwith the sale of a $1.5 million MRI system to the SongyuanCity Central Hospital in China. The payment was sentto a U.S. bank account, and later routed to a Singaporebank account in the name of the intermediary. A project calculation sheet signed by the then-CFO of SiemensMED China describedthe payment as relating to "expenses (commission)"; however, no serviceswere provided by the intermediary aside from acting as a vehicle for the transfer of bribe payments. In or around March 2008, SongyuanHospital's deputy director and head of the radiology departmentwas convictedin China of corruptioncharges, including a charge for accepting a $60,000bribe from a

24. Siemenssalespersonin connectionwith the sale ofthe MRI system and sentencedto fourteenyears inprison. 57. Siemensalsoused the Hong Kong intermediaryto pay $9 million in travel costs for "study trips" Men by doctorswho worked at government-ownedhospitals in China. The studytrips, which included lavishtripsto Las Vegas, Miami, and other vacation spotsinthe United States,were connectedto at least 231separatesalesto hospitalsawardedto Siemenswith revenueof approximately$235million. Theformer CFO of SiemensMED in Chinausedthe intermediaryto pay for studytrips because of . concernsaboutthe lavishness and "non-scientific content" of thetrips, which were taken by doctorswho were in a positionto awardbusinessto Siemens. 58. Bribes were alsopaid to securesalesofmedical equipmentto hospitals in Chinaon behalf oftwo SiemensU.S.-based subsidiaries,Oncology Care Solutions ("OCS") in Californiaand MolecularImaging("MI") in Illinois. For OCS, Siemens developed a schemeto minimizethe risk of anti-briberyprosecution in the United States forthese transactions by routing the approvalof business consultingagreementsand the paymentof business consultantsthrough Siemens' headquartersin Germanyrather than intheUnited States. Between 1998and 2004, this schemewas usedto approveimproper paymentsof approximately$650,000 to Chinesebusiness consultantsin connectionwith the U.S.-related sales. A seniormanagerat SiemensMED in Germany and officialsof the U.S.-based subsidiaries, includingthe CFOsof OCS and MI were aware of the businessconsultantpayments and facilitatedthe schemeby verifyingthe amountsto be paid and thatthepayments were due and owing. At onepoint afterapprovingtwenty-six suchpayments, the seniormanager at SiemensMED refbsedto continuethepayment

25. scheme, citingconcern forthe welfare of his family if he were sentto prison. The CFO . of MED attemptedto pressurethe seniormanagerto keepthe payment scheme going, but without success. 59. In 2005, theseofficialsalso verified that "clean up" paymentstotaling over $500,000 were owedto Siemens' Hong Kong-based intermediaryin connection with salesby OCS and MI in China. The outstandingpayments were forbribes owedto third parties on behalf of Siemens. After receivingconfiation from OCS and MIthat the paymentswere outstanding, the formercontrollerof SiemensMed authorizedthree "clean up" payments in 2005for $377,400, $140,000 and $44,000. 10. TrafficControl Svstem in Russia 60. From 2004 to 2006, SiemensI&S and 000 Siemens, a regional company in Russia, paid approximately$741,419in bribesto governmentofficialsin connection with a WorldBank-funded project forthe designand installationof a $27milliontraffic control systemin Moscow cged the MoscowThird Ring Project. First, Siemenspaid money to its business consultantwho simultaneouslyworked as a technicalconsultantfor the MoscowProjectImplementationUnit (the "MPIU"), a quasi-governmentalunit that ran the MoscowThirdRingproject. The MPIU hired the technical consultantat Siemens' suggestion. From 2004 to 2006, Siemenspaid approximately $313,000to three entitiesassociatedwiththetechnicalconsultant, with at least $141,419 of the payment in exchangefor favorabletreatment in thetenderingprocess. Thetechnical consultantused his position at the MPIU to createtender specificationsfavorableto Siemens,to provide tender documentsto Siemensbefore their officialpublication, to evaluate projectbids in

26. a waythat ensured Siemenswould win the contract, and to assistduringthe implementation phase of the project. 61. Second, Siemenscolludedwith a competitorwho agreed to inflate its project bid to ensure Siemenswon the project. In return, Siemenshired the competitorat an inflatedrate of approximately$800,000. Siemensalso hired two of the competitor's former consortiummembers to become subcontractorsto Siemenson the project ("Subcontractor A and SubcontractorB ) . Siemenspaid SubcontractorA approximately $1.3 million for a shamtrafficstudy and approximately$1.4 millionto SubcontractorB for otheralleged services. In fact, both subcontractorswere used to funnel at least $600,000 of the $741,419 describedin paragraph 60 to seniorofficials of the MPN. 11. RefinervModernizationProiectin Mexico 62. In late2004, SiemensPG and SiemensS.A. de CV, a regional entity, madethree separate.illicitpayments totaling approximately$2.6 million to a politically- connectedbusiness consultantto assistin settlingcostoverrun claims in connectionwith three refmery modernizationprojects in Mexico. Someportion ofthese payments were routed through the business consultantto a senior official of the Mexican state-owned petroleum company,PetroleosMexicanos(Ternex"). The official was in a positionto influencetbe settlement. Thepaymentswere made withthe knowledge and approval of the then-CEO of Siemens' regional company in Mexico. Thepaymentsw& supported . by invoicesreflecting consultingservicesthat were not provided or only vaguely described. A portion of Siemens' work on the contractswas performed by aregional subsidiary in Atlanta, and someof the contractfinancing was providedby theU.S. Export-ImportBank in Washington, DC.

27. 12. Medical Devices in Russia 63. Between 2000 and 2007, SiemensMED made improperpayments of over $55millionto a Dubai-based business consultant in connectionwith sales ofmedical equipmentinRussia. Thebusiness consuItant was used as a payment intermediaryfor bribesto government-owned customersin Russia. The former CFO of SiemensMED knew of and approved the payments. Senior Siemensofficials estimatedthat up to 80% of Siemens' MED business in Russia involvedillicitpayments. On one suchtransaction in 2006, siemensmade payments of approximately$287,914, some of which was used forbribes, in connectionwith the $2.5million saleof a computertomograph systemto a public hospital in Ekaterinburg. On this contract,the bribes wereroutedthrough the Dubai-based business consultant, aswell as a secondbusiness consultantthat was registeredin Des Moines, Iowa. 13. GSMMobileNetwork Servicesin Vietnam 64. In 2002, SiemensCOMpaid approximately$140,000in bribes in connectionwith a tender worth approximately$35million forthe supplyof equipment and servicesrelated to a Global Systemsmobilenetwork for Vietel, a government owned telecommunications provider foundedby the VietnameseMinistryof Defense. Two separatepaymentstotaling $140,000 weremade tothe Singaporeaccountof a Siemens businessconsultant. Thepaymentswerethenrouted through a U.S. correspondent account and likelypaid to officialsat the VietnameseMinistryof Defense. Thepayments were part of a much largerbribery scheme concocted by high-levelmanagersat Siemens regional companyin Vietnam, SLV,to pay bribes to government officialsat Vietel and the VietnameseMinistry of Defensein orderto acquirePhaseI ofthe Vietel GSM tender.

28. In a June 2002, facsimilethat discussedthe bribery scheme, the formerhead of COM sales for the regional company described Siemens' explicitagreementto pay 8%of the value of the Vietel projectto officials at the Ministry of Defense and 14%ofthe project value to officials at Vietel. In August and September2002, Siemenssigned agreements with two business consultantswho were retained for the solepurpose of funnelingthe bribesto governmentofficialsconnected to Vietel. Ultimately, Siemenswas unsuccessfulin its pursuit of theVietel project and lostthe tender beforepaying additionalbribes. E. The Oil for Food Program 65. The Oil for Food Program was intendedto provide humanitarianrelief for the Iraqipopulation, which faced severehardship under the internationaltrade sanctions that followedIraq's 1990invasionof Kuwait. TheProgram permittedthe Iraqi governmentto sell its crude oil and usetheproceeds to purchase food, medicine, and critical idiastructure supplies. Theproceeds ofthe oil sales were transferred directly fiomthe buyers to an escrowaccount(the"U.N. EscrowAccount") maintained inNew York by the UnitedNations 661 Committee. Funds inthe U.N. EscrowAccountwere availableforthe purchase of humanitarian supplies, subjectto U.N. approvaland supervision. The intent ofthis structurewasto preventthe proceeds of Iraq's crude oil salesfiomunderminingthe sanctionsregimeby supplyingcashto SaddamHussein. 66. Corruptionwas rampantwithinthe Program. By mid-2000, Iraqi ministrieson the instructionoftop government officialsinstituted apolicy requiring suppliersof humanitariangoodsto pay a ten percent kickback on each contract. This kickback requirementwas euphemisticallyreferred to as an "after-sales service" fee

29. ("ASSF"); however, lio serviceswere provided. Supplierscompetingto obtain contracts underthe Program were encouragedto include a ten percent markup in their bids or purchase orders. The inflatedcontractprices were incorporated into the Oil for Food contractsas a way to permitthe suppliersto recover fiomthe U.N. Escrow Accountthe kickbackpaymentsthey had paid secretlyto Iraq. Following the 2004 release of a report by the U.S. General AccountingOfficeexposingsomeofthe abuses,the U.N. commissionedan independentinquiry committee, headed by former FederalReserve ChairmanPaul Volcker (the "Volcker Committee"), to investigatethe Program's performance. That committee's October 27,2005, final report estimatedthatthe Iraqi governmenthad diverted $1-7billion in illicit incomefiom the Program. 1. Siemens' Involvementin the Oil for Food Program 67. Siemensparticipated inthe Programthroughtwo of its regional companies, SiemensS.A.S. ("Siemens France") and Siemens Sanayive TicaretA.S. ("Siemens Turkey") andtwo subsidiaries,Osram Middle East FZE ("Osram ME") and GasTurbine Technologies SpA("GT). In total, 42 Oil for Food contractswere entered into, and secretkickback paymentsof approximately $1.7 millionwere madeto Iraqi controlled accountsin orderto avoid detectionby the U.N. Total revenueson the contractswere over $124millionwith profitsof approximately $38,226,537. The paymentswere characterized as after salesservicefees; however,no serviceswere actually rendered. The ASSFs were effectivelybribespaid to the Iraqi regime, which Siemensimproperlydisguised on its books andrecords by rnischaracterizingthe bribes as legitimate commissions.

30. 2. SiemensFrance 68. From approximatelySeptember2000to July 2001, SiemensFrance enteredintotwelvecontracts coveringpower stationrenovation, servicingand spareparts with the Iraqi Ministryof Electricity and paid illicitASSFs of approximately$321,745. The contractswere artificially inflated by 10%and then submittedto the U.N. for payment. The U.N. was not informedthat the contractshad been inflated orthat Siemens France intendedto pay illicit kickbacksto Iraq. 69. For instance, in July2000 Siemenssubmitteda bid forthe rehbishment of cranes at the DauraPower Stationin Iraq. The purchase order was subsequently signed inNovember 2000, and included a 10%increase in the contractvalue. Shortly thereafter, in January2001, Siemenssigned a Supplementto its business consultant agreementwith its local agent in Iraq providing for a 10%commissionto the agent for "after sales servicesand activities." Thedocumentwas unusual becauseit provided a . . higher agent compensationthanwas usually provided on such contracts; it was "inconsistent with Siemens' practice" which required specificationand pricing of any true after salesservices; and becausethere was only one Siemenssignatoryonthe contract. In various lettersand memoranda, oneformer Siemenssalesman documented discussionsthat he had with Iraqi officialsregardingthe requirementof ASSFs. In a memorandumwritten by another Siemensemployeediscussinghow to makethe ASSF payments, the employeestatedthat Siemens' agent in Iraq told himthat another Siemens subsidiary, SiemensTurkey, had chosento pay ASSFs in cash "so that no names appear onpaper."

31. 70. SiemensFranceused a local agent in Iraqto deposit the ASSF payments in cash into a Jordanianbank accountheld by two Iraqi officials, which were later transferredto an account controlled by the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity. The local agent confirmedthe bank depositswere made on behalf of Siemensand bank records reflect the payments. Whenmakingthe ASSF payments, the local agentused the name of an acquaintancewho did not work for Siemenssoasto concealhis true identity. 3. SiemensTurkev 71. From approximatelySeptember 2000to June 2002, SiemensTurkey enteredintotwenty contracts relatingto the building and rehabilitation ofpower stations, andpaid after salesservicefeestotaling approximately$1,243,119. Many aspects of SiemensTurkey's involvementinthe Oil for Food Program were similarto those of SiemensFrance. Both companiesused the samelocal agent in Iraq and both dealt principallywith the Ministry of Electricity intheirpaymentof illicitASSFs. As described above, a Siemensemployeestated'thatthe agent informedhim that Siemens Turkeywas payingASSFsin cash "so that no names appearonpaper." Siemens' local agent alsodeposited someASSFs into a Jordanianbank accountcontrolledby Iraqi officials. 4. OsramMiddleEast 72. From approximatelyMay 2000 to June2002, Osram MiddleEast ("Osram"), a Siemenssubsidiary, enteredinto six contractswithstatecompanieswithin the Ministryof Oil, and paid ASSFs of approximately $89,250 forthe sale of lighting equipment. Osram employeesadmittedthat Siemens' local agentrelayedthe Ministry of Oil's demand for ASSFs sometimein late2000. On three of the contracts, Osram entered

32. into secretsideagreementsagreeingto pay a 10%kickback to the Iraqi ministry. The local agent signed each of the sideletterson Osram's behalf. The contracts between Osram and the Ministry of Oil typically contained a 10%markup for ASSFs. The inflated contractswere submittedto the U.N. for approval,but the U.N. was not informed that the contractswere inflated andthe side letterswere not disclosed. Theagent admitted that he made the ASSF paymentsto Jordanian bank accountsheld forthe benefit ofthe IraqiMinistryof Oil on Osram's behalf. 5- -GTT 73. Beginning in 2001, GTT entered into four contractswith the Ministryof Electricityin which ASSFs of $81,962 were paid. For eachcontract, the value of the contractwas increased by approximately 10%betweenthe submissionof the initial bid and the signingofthe purchase order. GTT employeesadmitto the ASSF kickback scheme, and documentsreflectthat GTT's agent in Iraq informed GITthat ASSF payments were a conditionto obtainingcontracts. Though all of the contractswere signed before 2003, none were performed before the start ofthe Iraqi war. After the war began, the U.N asked GTTto amend each contractto decreaseits value by the 10% ASSF. P. SiemensEm~IovedU.S. Means to Engagein Bribery 74. Intotal, Siemensmade bribe payments directly or indirectlyto foreign govemmentofficialsin connectionwith at least290projects or individual salesinvolving business in Venezuela, China, Israel, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Argentina, Vietnam, Russia, and Mexico that employed the mails and othermeans and instnunentalitiesof U.S. interstate commerce. The corrupt paymentswere made to governmentofficialsortheir

33. designees for the purpose of obtaining or retainingbusiness in connectionto the above projects. The use of interstatecommercein connectionwith bribery includedinvolving U.S.-based Siemenssubsidiariesand their employees inthe bribery schemes; financingof three underlying projects by the World Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank; making illegalpaymentsthrough U.S. banks; usingU-S-based companiesas intermediaries, business consultants,and holders of slushfunds; conductingmeetings in the United Statesin furtheranceof a bribery scheme; and transmitting mail, electronicmail, and facsimilemessagesinto and out of the United States. G. SiemensFailed to Maintain Its Books and Records 75. During the RelevantPeriod, Siemensmade thousands ofpaymentsto third parties in ways that obscuredthe purpose for, and the ultimate recipientsof, the payments. Inparticular, Siemenspaid approximately $1.4 billion in bribesto foreign governmentofficials. Doing so involvedthe falsificationof Siemens' books and records by employeesthroughoutthe Company. Specifically, Siemensfailedto keep accurate books and recordsby: 1)establishingand funding secret, off-books accounts; 2) establishingand using a system of payment intermediariesto obscurethe sourceand destination'offunds;3) making paymentspursuant to business consultantagreementsthat inaccuratelydescribedtheservicesprovided; 4) generatingfalse invoicesand other false documentstojustify payments; 5)disbursingmillionsin cashfrom cashdeskswith inaccurate documentationauthorizingor supportingthe withdrawals;6) usingpost-it notes for thepurpose of concealingthe identity of persons authorizingillicitpayments; 7)recording illicit ASSFpaymentsas legitimate commissionsin Oilfor Food

34. transactions; 8) falsifymg U.N. documents in connectionwith the Oil forFood Program; and 9) recording bribes as payment for legitimate services. H. SiemensFailedto Maintain AdequateInternal Controls 76. Siemensfailedto implementadequateinternal controlsto complywith the Company's NYSE listing, includingthe detection and prevention of violations of the FCPA. First, Siemensengaged inthe knowing falsificationof books and records. Siemensestablishednumerousoff-booksaccountsand secretslushfundsfor thepurpose of obscuringthe purpose for, and ultimate recipientof, illicitpayments. Elaborate payment mechanismswere used to concealthe fact that bribe payments were made around the globeto obtainbusiness, includingthe PG confidentialpayment systemand extensiveuse of business consultants and intermediariesto h e 1bribes. False invoices and payment documentationwas created to make payments to business consultantsunder falsebusiness consultant agreementsthat identifiedservicesthat were never intendedto be rendered. Illicitpayments were falselyrecorded as expensesfor management fees, consultingfees, supply contracts, room preparation fees, and commissions. Documents related to its participation in the Oilfor Food Program were alsoinaccurate. Siemens inflatedU.N. contracts, signed sideagreementswi6 Iraqi ministriesthat were not disclosedto the U.N., andrecorded the ASSF payments aslegitimate commissions despiteU.N., US., and international sanctionsagainst suchpayments. 77. Second, Siemensemployeesroutinely circumventedthe internal controls the Companyhad in place. Slushfundswere opened inthe names of former and current employees and maintainedoff-books. At any givenpoint, Siemenshad no central record of the true number of bank accountsopenedon its'behalf,from which, millions in illicit

35. paymentswere made. Despite a "four-eyes" policy that required two signatureson Companydocumentsto authorizetransactions, a significantnumber of business consultantagreementswere enteredinto and a significantnumber of payments were authorizedin violation ofthe policy. In many instances, signatures authorizingthe withdrawalof hundreds ofthousands of dollars from cash deskswere placed onpost-it notes and later removed in orderto eradicateanypermanent record of the approvals. In numerousinstances, officialssigningdocumentsfailedto conductany review of the documents. For example, an official who authorizedpayments on behalf of Siemens' Russianregional subsidiaryauthorizedpaymentsdespitehis inability to read the languagein which the supportingdocumentationofthe paymentswere prepared. Siemensofficialsfiequentlymisused internal accountsby transferringmoney &omone Siemensentityto mother without any legitimate business purpose or proper documentationof the disposition of the funds. Siemensofficialsmodified the formatof agreementsto avoid internal controlsonthe use of business consultants by backdating agreements, misidentifjingcounterpartiesas"agents" rather than "business consultants," and obscuringthe amountspaid to business consultantsby splittingthe payments among separateagreements. 78. Finally, Siemensfailedto establishadequate internalcontrolsdespite its knowledgethat corruptionwas rampant. Siemensdid not issuemandatory and comprehensiveCompany-widecontrolsregarding the use of business consultants until June2005, well after senior officialswere awareof widespreadbribery in the Company's two largest divisions,COMand PG. Despitethose controls,due diligenceon business consultantsremained largely inadequate, and payments continuedto be made without

36. adequateproof of servicesrendered. Siemensfailed to establish controlsover numerous off-booksaccountsheld on its behalf aroundthe world. The Companymaintained no central list of corporateaccountsheld at unconsolidated entitiesor in the names of individual Siemensofficials. Siemensfailedto establish controlsover cash disbursements,allowed manualpayments withoutdocumentation,and failedto ensurethe proper use of intercompany accounts. Siemensfailedto establish an effectivecentral compliancefunction. The complianceoffice lacked independenceand was severely understaffed. Siemenstone atthe top was inadequatefor a law abidingentity, and employees engaged in bribery and othermisconduct on behalf of the Companywere not adequately disciplined. Siemensalso failedto conduct appropriate anti-bribery and corruptiontraining. CLAWISFOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM [Violationsof Section30A of the ExchangeAct] Paragraphs 1through 78 arerealleged and incorporatedby reference. 79. As describedabove, Siemens,through its officers, agents, and subsidiaries,corruptlyoffered,promised to pay, or authorizedpaymentsto oneor more persons, whileknowing that all or a portion ofthose payments would be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly,to foreignofficialsforthe purpose of influencingtheir acts or decisionsin their official capacity, inducingthem to do or omit to do actionsin violation of their official duties, securingan improper advantage, or inducingsuch foreign officialsto use their influencewith foreigngovernmentsor instrumentalities thereof to assist Siemensin obtaining or retaining business.

37. 80. By reason of the foregoing, Siemensviolated, and unless enjoinedwill continueto violate, Section 30A of the ExchangeAct. [15 U.S.C. S78dd-11 SECONDCLAIM [Violations of Section13@)(2)(A)of the ExchangeAct] Paragraphs 1through 80 arerealleged and incorporatedby reference. 81. As described above, Siemens, through its officers, agentsand subsidiaries, failedto keep books, records, and accounts,which, in reasonabledetail, accuratelyand fairlyreflected its transactionsand dispositionsof its assets. 82. By reason of the foregoing, Siemensviolated, and unless enjoinedwill continueto violate, Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the ExchangeAct. [15 U.S.C. 7 8 m ~ ( 2 ) ( ~ ) 1 THIRDCLAIM [Violations of Section 13@)(2)@)of the ExchangeAct] Paragraphs 1through 82 arerealleged and incorporatedby reference. 83. As described above, Siemensfailedto devise and maintaina system of internal accountingcontrolssufficientto provide reasonableassurancesthat: (i) transactionswere executedin accordancewith management's generalor specific authorization;and (ii) transactions were recorded as necessary (I)to permit preparation of financial statementsin conformitywith generally acceptedaccountingprinciples or any other criteria applicableto such statements,and (II) to maintainaccountabilityfor its assets.

38. 84. By reason ofthe foregoing, Siemensviolated, and unless enjoined will continueto violate, Section 13@)(2)@) of the Exchange Act. 115U.S.C. 9 78m(b)(2)(~)1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORJ3, the Commissionrespectfullyrequeststhatthis Court enter a final judgment: A. Permanentlyrestraining and enjoining Siemensfrom violating Sections 30A, 13@)(2)(~)and 13@)(2)@) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 8578dd-1, B. OrderingSiemensto disgorgeill-gottengainswrongfully obtainedasa result of its illegal conduct; and C.. Grantingsuchfurtherrelief asthe Cow may deemjust and appropriate. Dated: /z2008 Respecthlly submitted, d Cheryl J. carboro @.C. Bar No. 2175) ~ e i d ~ .Muoio Tracy L. Price Denise Hansberry Robert I. Dodge , AttorneysforPlaintiff, U.S; Securitiesagd Exchange.Commission 100F Street,NE Mail Stop6030 SPII Washington,.DC 20549-6030 (202) 551-4403(Scarboro)

39. 4 T0 000001 T1INHALT: 000002 T1------------ 000003 T1 000004 T1Teil 1: Allgemeine Beschreibung der Leistung 000005 T1 000006 T1Teil 2: Angaben zur Ausfhrung 000007 T1 000008 T1Teil 3: Leistungsverzeichnis mit Langtext 000009 T1 000010 T1 000011 T1 000012 T1Weitere Unterlagen zur Leistungsbeschreibung: 000013 T1 000014 T1Anlage 1: Mgliche Kommunikationsbeziehungen bei der OP- Steuerung 000015 T1 (schematische Darstellung) 000016 T1 000017 T1 000018 T1Anlage 2: Schnittstellenbeziehung zwischen dem TKSys, dem Identity- 000019 T1 Management (IDM) und dem OP- Managementsystem (OPM), 000020 T1 schematische Darstellung 000021 T1 000022 T1 000023 T1Anlage 3: Mgliche Szenarien fr die Verschlsselung und 000024 T1 Authentifikation auf verschiedenen Verbindungswegen 000025 T1 sowie daraus resultierende Anforderungen 000026 T1 000027 T1 000028 T1Anlage 4: Bieterangaben 000029 T1 000030 T0 000031 T1TEIL 1: ALLGEMEINE BESCHREIBUNG DER LEISTUNG 000032 T1============================================= 000033 T1 000034 T1 000035 T1 000036 T1INHALT 000037 T1----------- 000038 T1 000039 T101. Projektbeschreibung 000040 T1 000041 T11.1 Gegenstand und Ziel der Ausschreibung 000042 T11.2 Bestehende TK- Systeme 000043 T11.3 TKSys- Grundkonzeption 000044 T11.4 Spezielle Projektanforderungen 000045 T1 000046 T1 000047 T102. Organisatorische Besonderheiten 000048 T1 000049 T12.1 Projektorganisation 000050 T12.2 Terminplanung und Terminkontrolle 000051 T12.3 Vorbereitung der Ausfhrung, Antragstellung 000052 Seite 1

40. 4 T1 u.Genehmigungsverfahren 000053 T12.4 Personal 000054 T12.5 Auftragsabwicklung allgemein 000055 T12.6 Durchfhrungsplanung und Installation 000056 T12.7 Aufbau und Test des TKSys (Systemtest, 000057 T1 Typabnahme und Grundkonfiguration) 000058 T12.8 Technische und organoisatorische Angaben 000059 T1 000060 T1 000061 T103. Bauliche Angaben 000062 T1 000063 T13.1 Standorte 000064 T0 000065 T101. Projektbeschreibung 000066 T1 000067 T11.1 Gegenstand und Ziel der Ausschreibung 000068 T1 000069 T1.1 Gesamt- Kommunikationslsung (TKSys) fr den 000070 T1 Dienstbetrieb 000071 T1 000072 T1Das Klinikum der Universitt Mnchen - nachfolgend KUM 000073 T1genannt- beabsichtigt im Zuge einer gemeinsamen 000074 T1Manahme die bestehenden Telekommunikationssysteme fr 000075 T1den Dienstbetrieb am Campus Grohadern und am Campus 000076 T1Innenstadtkliniken in Form einer Gesamt- 000077 T1Kommunikationslsung einschl. aller zentralen und 000078 T1dezentralen Komponenten sowie Applikationen 000079 T1nachfolgend TKSys genannt - zu erneuern einschl. einer 000080 T1Erweiterung um die Teilnehmer fr das derzeit im Bau 000081 T1befindliche OPZ (OP- Zentrum) und das CSD (Centrum fr 000082 T1Schlaganfall und Demenz). 000083 T1 000084 T1Innerhalb der geplanten Gesamt- Kommunikationslsung 000085 T1ist eine bergreifende Sprachkommunikation einschl. 000086 T1aller Applikationen und zentraler Funktionen, netz- 000087 T1bergreifende Leistungsmerkmale, Synergieeffekte bei 000088 T1der Administration und im Betrieb, eine gleichlaufende 000089 T1Software- Wartung aller Anlagenteile nach neuestem 000090 T1technischen Stand sowie insbesondere eine optimale 000091 T1Untersttzung klinischer Prozesse zu realisieren. 000092 T1 000093 T1Fr die bestehenden Systeme in Grohadern bzw. der 000094 T1Innenstadtkliniken wird zuknftig aus Altersgrnden der 000095 T1Support durch den Hersteller eingestellt. Die 000096 T1bestehenden Anlagenteile in Grohadern bzw. der 000097 T1Innenstadtkliniken werden in ihrem jetzigen Zustand bis 000098 T1zur Realisierung der Gesamtmanahme belassen, d.h. 000099 T1nicht mehr hochgerstet. 000100 T1 000101 T1Gegenstand und Ziel dieser Ausschreibung ist somit die 000102 T1Schaffung eines bergreifenden TKSys ber alle 000103 T1Standorte, einschl. betriebsfertiger Montage, 000104 Seite 2

41. 4 T1Einrichtung und Gesamt- Konfiguration, Inbetriebnahme, 000105 T1Dokumentation und Einweisung. 000106 T1 000107 T1 000108 T1.2 TK- Systeme fr die Patiententelefonie 000109 T1 000110 T1Die derzeit zustzlich bestehenden TK- Systeme fr die 000111 T1Patiententelefonie in beiden Husern werden durch 000112 T1externe Firmen ber Gestattungsvertrge betrieben und 000113 T1sind nicht Gegenstand der Ausschreibung. 000114 T1 000115 T1 000116 T11.2 Bestehende TK- Systeme 000117 T1 000118 T1.1 TK- System Grohadern 000119 T1 000120 T1Die Sprachkommunikation des KUM Grohadern wird derzeit 000121 T1ber ein klassisches leitungsvermitteltendes TK- System 000122 T1realisiert. 000123 T1 000124 T1Eckdaten: 000125 T1 000126 T1Fabrikat/Typ: 000127 T1 Siemens, Hicom 300/350 H 000128 T1Baujahr: 000129 T1 1998 000130 T1Errichter u. Instandhalter: 000131 T1 Fa. MTG, Mnchen 000132 T1Kaufmnnischer Status: 000133 T1 Kaufanlage 000134 T1Leitungsnetz: 000135 T1 2- Aderverkabelung bis zum Endgert 000136 T1Stromversorgung: 000137 T1 Integrierte unterbrechungsfreie 000138 T1 Stromversorgung an der Zentrale 000139 T1Amtsanschaltungen: 000140 T1 10 x S2M 000141 T1 Rufnummer 089 / 7095-0. 9999 000142 T1Abgesetzte Anlagenteile: 000143 T1 Anlagenteil Forschungspavillion, 000144 T1 Anlagenteil Max-Lebsche-Platz 000145 T1Quer- und Festverbindungen: 000146 T1 KUM Innenstadtkliniken ber 1 x S2M 000147 T1 Patientenanlage ber 1 x S2M 000148 T1Vermittlungspltze: 000149 T1 8 Pltze, automatische Abfragestelle 000150 T1Applikationen: 000151 T1 Verbindungsdatenauswertung 000152 T1 VoiceMailsystem 000153 T1 Netzwerkmanagement 000154 T1 Verkehrsmessung 000155 T1 ACD- Lsung 000156 Seite 3

42. 4 T1 Alarmierungsserver 000157 T1 Sprachaufzeichnung an der Vermittlung 000158 T1 Diktier- Server 000159 T1 Dokusystem Leitungsnetz 000160 T1Sonderanschaltungen: 000161 T1 3 Personensuchanlagen (TMOM) 000162 T1 Nottelefone mit sog. Funkfinger 000163 T1Privatgesprchsabrechnung: 000164 T1 Inkassosystem ber 000165 T1 Kassenautomat 000166 T1Patientenabrechnung: 000167 T1 Extern, mit eigener Anlage und 000168 T1 eigenem Inkassosystem 000169 T1 000170 T1Teilnehmer 000171 T1 000172 T1TK- Zentrale Grohadern (Hauptsystem): 000173 T1 3.840 Teilnehmer 000174 T1Forschungspavillion (abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000175 T1 124 Teilnehmer 000176 T1Max-Lebsche-Platz (abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000177 T1 48 Teilnehmer 000178 T1 000179 T1Gesamt 4.012 Teilnehmer 000180 T1 000181 T1davon DECT: 000182 T1 127 Teilnehmer (124 Basisstationen) 000183 T1 000184 T1 000185 T1.2 TK- System Innenstadtkliniken 000186 T1 000187 T1Die Sprachkommunikation der Innenstadtkliniken wird 000188 T1derzeit ebenso ber ein klassisches 000189 T1leitungsvermitteltendes TK- System realisiert. 000190 T1 000191 T1Eckdaten: 000192 T1 000193 T1Fabrikat/Typ: 000194 T1 2 x Siemens, Hicom 350 H, V 3.0, 000195 T1 vernetzt ber 12 x S2M 000196 T1Baujahr: 000197 T1 2001 000198 T1Errichter u. Instandhalter: 000199 T1 Fa. Siemens 000200 T1Kaufmnnischer Status: 000201 T1 Kaufanlage 000202 T1Leitungsnetz: 000203 T1 2- Aderverkabelung bis zum Endgert 000204 T1Stromversorgung: 000205 T1 Integrierte unterbrechungsfreie 000206 T1 Stromversorgung an der Zentrale 000207 T1Amtsanschaltungen: 000208 Seite 4

43. 4 T1 8 x S2M (jeweils 4 pro Anlage), 000209 T1 Rufnummer 089 / 5160-0. 9999 000210 T1Abgesetzte Anlagenteile: 000211 T1 Hicom 3x3 V3.4, Schillerstr. 000212 T1 40 ber 2 x S2M (LWL), 000213 T1 HiPath 4300 V1.0 Schillerstr. 53 ber 2 x S2M, 000214 T1 HiPath 4300 V1.0 Bavariaring ber 2 x S2M, 000215 T1 Hicom 350E V1 Frauenlobstr. 9, Dermatologie (derzeit 000216 T1 gemeinsam mit Patientenanlage Stdt. KH Thalkirchen) 000217 T1 ber 4 x S2M, 000218 T1 Anlagenteil Pathologie (entfllt bis zur Erneuerung) 000219 T1 ber 2 x S2M, 000220 T1 Anlagenteil Pharmakologie (derzeit demontiert wegen 000221 T1 Baumanahmen) ber 2 x S2M 000222 T1Quer- und Festverbindungen: 000223 T1 Patientenanlage ber 1 x S2M 000224 T1 LMU Mnchen ber 1 x S2M 000225 T1 KUM Grohadern ber 1 x S2M 000226 T1Vermittlungspltze: 000227 T1 5 Pltze, Automatische Abfragestelle, 000228 T1Applikationen: 000229 T1 Verbindungsdatenauswertung 000230 T1 VoiceMailsystem 000231 T1 Netzwerkmanagement 000232 T1 Verkehrsmessung 000233 T1 ACD- Lsung 000234 T1 Alarmierungsserver 000235 T1Sonderanschaltungen: 000236 T1 2 Personensuchanlagen (TMOM) 000237 T1 Synchrone Ansagen VPL (TMOM) 000238 T1 Synchrone Ansagen SA (TMOM) 000239 T1 Nottelefone mit sog. Funkfinger 000240 T1Privatgesprchsabrechnung: 000241 T1 Manuell per Auswertung 000242 T1Patientenabrechnung: 000243 T1 Extern, mit eigener Anlage und 000244 T1 eigenem Inkassosystem 000245 T1 000246 T1 000247 T1Teilnehmer 000248 T1 000249 T1TK- Zentrale Innenstadtkliniken (Hauptsystem): 000250 T1 4.320 Teilnehmer 000251 T1Schillerstr. 40 (abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000252 T1 75 Teilnehmer 000253 T1Schillerstr. 53 (M845, abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000254 T1 127 Teilnehmer 000255 T1Bavariaring (M 846, abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000256 T1 25 Teilnehmer 000257 T1Dermatologie (abgesetztes Anlagenteil): 000258 T1 203 Teilnehmer 000259 T1 000260 Seite 5

44. 4 T1Gesamt 4.750 Teilnehmer 000261 T1 000262 T1Nach vollstndiger Umstellung auf die neue Gesamt- 000263 T1Kommunikationslsung sind die bestehenden TK- Systeme 000264 T1einschl.aller Anlagenkomponenten, der 000265 T1Stromversorgungseinrichtungen und der Endgerte in 000266 T1Abstimmung mit dem Auftraggeber zu demontieren und 000267 T1fachgerecht zu entsorgen. 000268 T1 000269 T1 000270 T1 000271 T11.3 TKSys- Grundkonzeption 000272 T1 000273 T1 .1 Hauptfunktionen, Applikationen und Schnittstellen 000274 T1 000275 T1Das neue TKSys ist fr einen mglichen Endausbau fr 000276 T1bis zu 000277 T1 000278 T1 16.000 Teilnehmern, 000279 T1 000280 T1mit folgenden Hauptmerkmalen, Funktionen und 000281 T1Applikationen 000282 T1 000283 T1- Paketvermittelnde Voice- over- IP (VoIP) Technik 000284 T1- SIP und ggf. dezidierter Einsatz proprietrer 000285 T1 (herstellerspezifischer) Session-/Kommunikationsprotokolle 000286 T1- VoWLAN (Voice over WLAN) 000287 T1- Zentrales, mandantenfhiges Managementsystem 000288 T1- ZBDB (Zentrale Basisdatenbank) 000289 T1- Zentrale, mandantenfhige Abfragestelle (Vermittlung) 000290 T1- ACD (automatische Anrufverteilung) 000291 T1- VDE/VDA (Verbindungsdatenerfassung und Auswertung) 000292 T1- ETB (Elektronisches Telefonbuch) 000293 T1- UMS (Unified Messaging, Voice- und Faxmail) 000294 T1- CTI (Computer- Telephony- Integration) 000295 T1- FMC (Fixed Mobile Convergenz / One- Number- Konzept) 000296 T1- Nachrichten- Managementsystem (Alarmierungs- u. 000297 T1 Konferenz- Managementsystem) 000298 T1 000299 T1sowie mit folgenden Schnittstellen auszustatten: 000300 T1 000301 T1- Anbindung an ein IDM (Identity- Managementsystem, 000302 T1 Verzeichnisdienst) 000303 T1- Anbindung an ein OPM (OP- Managementsystem) 000304 T1- Identifizierung, Lokalisierung und Ortung von 000305 T1 Endgerten 000306 T1- Anschaltung externer PSA (Personensuchanlagen) 000307 T1- Anschaltung externer Lichtrufanlagen 000308 T1- Anschaltung externer, SIP- basierter Sprechstellen und 000309 T1 bertragungseinrichtungen 000310 T1- Native Anbindung eines externen Videokonferenzsystems. 000311 T1 000312 Seite 6

45. 4 T1Alle Telefonendgerte des Bestandes werden durch neue 000313 T1VoIP- Endgerte ersetzt. 000314 T1 000315 T1Weitere detaillierte technische Anforderungen, 000316 T1Systembedingungen, Spezifikationen, Leistungsmerkmale 000317 T1und Applikationen sowie Schnittstellen zu Fremdsystemen 000318 T1oder externen Anwendungen sind nachstehenden 000319 T1Ausfhrungen sowie den detaillierten technischen 000320 T1Festlegungen im Teil 2 (Angaben zur Ausfhrung) bzw. im 000321 T1Teil 3 der Ausschreibung (Leistungsverzeichnis mit 000322 T1Langtext- Beschreibung) zu entnehmen. 000323 T1 000324 T1Vernetzung mit den TK-Systemen fr die 000325 T1Patiententelefonie 000326 T1 000327 T1Das zuknftige TKSys ist weiterhin mit den bestehenden 000328 T1TK-Systemen fr die Patiententelefonie an beiden 000329 T1Hauptstandorten ber S2M-Querverbindungen (Qsig) zu 000330 T1vernetzen. 000331 T1 000332 T1Die Vermittlung von Anrufen zu den Patiententelefonen 000333 T1erfolgt weiterhin ber die Vermittlungspltze des neuen 000334 T1TKSys. 000335 T1 000336 T1 000337 T1.2 Zentrale Anlagenteile 000338 T1 000339 T1Die Ausfhrung der Gesamt- Kommunikationslsung in Form 000340 T1eines neu zu errichtenden TKSys erfolgt in Voice- over- 000341 T1IP (VoIP) Technik, fr alle Teilnehmer des Klinikums 000342 T1der Universitt, mit ISDN- Amtsanschaltung an das 000343 T1ffentliche Telefonnetz und SIP- Trunks an 000344 T1entsprechende Netzbetreiber. 000345 T1 000346 T1Als Session-/ Kommunikationsprotokolle ist als 000347 T1Grundstandard SIP einzusetzen, wobei zur Realisierung 000348 T1bestimmter Leistungsmerkmale auch zustzlich 000349 T1herstellerspezifische, proprietre Protokolle fr 000350 T1dezidierten Einsatz zugelassen werden. 000351 T1 000352 T1Die Vernetzung der zentralen Anlagenteile des TKSys 000353 T1untereinander sowie die Anbindung der VoIP- Endgerte 000354 T1erfolgt ber das gebude- und campus- bergreifende 000355 T1IT- Netz des Klinikums der Universitt. 000356 T1 000357 T1Die Hauptstandorte fr die Installation zentraler 000358 T1Komponenten sind: 000359 T1 000360 T1 000361 T1Klinikum Grohadern 000362 T1 000363 T1- TK- Zentrale Grohadern (Hauptstandort 1) 000364 Seite 7

46. 4 T1- Forschungspavillion 000365 T1- Max-Lebsche-Platz 000366 T1 000367 T1 000368 T1Innenstadtkliniken 000369 T1 000370 T1- TK- Zentrale Innenstadtkliniken (Hauptstandort 2) 000371 T1- Schillerstr. 40 000372 T1- Bavariaring 000373 T1- Dermatologie 000374 T1 000375 T1Alle integrierten oder adaptierten zentralen 000376 T1Anlagenteile und Funktionen sind auf Basis einer 000377 T1einheitlichen Kommunikationsstruktur (einheitliche 000378 T1digitale bertragung ber IP) fr Sprach- und 000379 T1Datenkommunikation vorzusehen, so dass die Vernetzung 000380 T1der zentralen Anlagenteile untereinander ber das IT- 000381 T1Netz der Universitt erfolgen kann. 000382 T1 000383 T1Neben der Anschaltung von Endgerten ber IP muss auch 000384 T1der Betrieb von leitungsvermittelten analogen 000385 T1Endgerten sowie standardisierten S0-Schnittstellen 000386 T1ber entsprechende Gateways realisiert werden knnen. 000387 T1 000388 T1 000389 T1.3 Redundanz und Ausfallsicherheit 000390 T1 000391 T1Verfgbarkeit allgemein 000392 T1 000393 T1Es ist ein hochverfgbarer und blockadefreier Betrieb 000394 T1fr alle zentralen Komponenten einschl. der 000395 T1vorgesehenen Applikationen im Umfang des geforderten 000396 T1Endausbaus und bei voller Auslastung zu gewhrleisten. 000397 T1 000398 T1Hierbei mu durch den Einsatz entsprechender 000399 T1redundanter Komponenten sowie durch weitere Manahmen 000400 T1zur Ausfallsicherheit eine Verfgbarkeit von 99,99% 000401 T1gewhrleistet werden knnen. 000402 T1 000403 T1 000404 T1Technische Redundanz von Komponenten der zentralen 000405 T1Vermittlungseinrichtung 000406 T1 000407 T1Die folgenden Anforderungen gelten fr das TKSys im 000408 T1weitesten Sinne, also auch fr die mit dem TKSys 000409 T1anzubietenden Applikationen sowie alle fr die Funktion 000410 T1erforderlichen zustzlichen Komponenten (z.B. DNS-, 000411 T1DHCP- und Radius-Server sowie Session Border- Controler 000412 T1etc.). 000413 T1 000414 T1Zur Erhhung der Ausfallsicherheit der zentralen 000415 T1Steuerung des TKSys ist ein redundanter, d.h. 000416 Seite 8

47. 4 T1dezentraler und rtlich getrennter Aufbau zentraler 000417 T1Anlagenkomponenten vorgesehen. 000418 T1 000419 T1Es sind jeweils Callserver an den beiden 000420 T1Hauptstandorten Grohadern und Innenstadt (jeweils ein 000421 T1Callserver) vorzusehen, die in einem Clusterverbund 000422 T1eine gegenseitige Vollredundanz bilden. Die Callserver 000423 T1sind an unterschiedliche Core-Switches anzubinden. 000424 T1 000425 T1Die Redundanz ist so zu konfigurieren, dass eine 000426 T1standortbergreifende Redundanz 000427 T1der zentralen Komponenten des TKSys gegeben ist. 000428 T1 000429 T1Im Normalbetrieb bernehmen die lokalen Callserver die 000430 T1Steuerungsfunktionen fr den jeweiligen Standort. 000431 T1 000432 T1Im Strungsfall mssen die jeweils in Funktion 000433 T1befindlichen Komponenten die kompletten Funktionen und 000434 T1Leistungsmerkmale fr das gesamte TKSys zur Verfgung 000435 T1stellen. 000436 T1 000437 T1ber die hauptstandortbergreifende Redundanz mssen 000438 T1fr die vollstndige Funktionalitt des TKSys und der 000439 T1zentralen Applikationen mindestens folgende 000440 T1Notfallszenarien gewhrleistet werden knnen: 000441 T1 000442 T11. Bei Ausfall der zentralen Komponenten des TKSys an 000443 T1 einem Standort bernehmen die zentralen Komponenten des 000444 T1 TKSys am anderen Standort die vollstndige Steuerung 000445 T1 der Endstellen des ausgefallenen Standortes. 000446 T1 000447 T12. Bei Ausfall der WAN-Verbindung zwischen den Standorten 000448 T1 bernehmen die zentralen Komponenten des TKSys an den 000449 T1 jeweiligen Standorten die Steuerung der lokalen 000450 T1 Endstellen, Verbindungen zwischen den Standorten sind 000451 T1 ber das ffentliche Netz zu routen. 000452 T1 000453 T1Auer den vorgenannten Redundanzmanahmen der Zentralen 000454 T1Komponenten an den Hauptstandorten 000455 T1 000456 T1* TK- Zentrale Grohadern (Hauptstandort 1) 000457 T1* TK- Zentrale Innenstadtkliniken (Hauptstandort 2) 000458 T1 000459 T1sind an den weiteren Standorten, wie 000460 T1 000461 T1- Forschungspavillion (Grohadern) 000462 T1- Max-Lebsche-Platz (Grohadern) 000463 T1- Schillerstr. 40 (Innenstadtkliniken) 000464 T1- Bavariaring (Innenstadtkliniken) 000465 T1- Dermatologie (Innenstadtkliniken), 000466 T1 000467 T1an denen Gateways (z.B. fr a/b-/ S0- Teilnehmer oder 000468 Seite 9

48. 4 T1Amtsgateways) eingesetzt werden, jeweils Komponenten 000469 T1mit autarker Steuerfunktion fr den Weiterbetrieb von 000470 T1internen, standortbezogenen Telefonie- Funktionen bei 000471 T1Ausfall der betreffenden WAN-Verbindung vorzusehen. 000472 T1 000473 T1Weitere detaillierte technische Anforderungen sind dem 000474 T1Teil 2 (Angaben zur Ausfhrung, Titel 04 und 05) sowie 000475 T1dem Teil 3 der Ausschreibung (Leistungsverzeichnis mit 000476 T1Langtext- Beschreibung, Titel 01) zu entnehmen. 000477 T1 000478 T1Durch den Bieter sind die herstellerspezifische Lsung 000479 T1der Redundanz, der Ausfallsicherheit und die mgliche 000480 T1Konfiguration darzustellen. 000481 T1 000482 T1 000483 T1.4 Amtszugnge 000484 T1 000485 T1Allgemein 000486 T1 000487 T1Im Gegensatz zur bisherigen Amtsanschaltung mit 000488 T1verschiedenen Rufnummern fr die beiden Hauptstandorte 000489 T1wird zuknftig eine gemeinsame Kopfnummer mit 000490 T15-stelligem Rufnummernblock 000491 T1(089 / 4400-xxxxx) fr die beiden Hauptstandorte 000492 T1Grohadern und Innenstadt im Benehmen mit dem 000493 T1Netzbetreiber realisiert. 000494 T1 000495 T1 000496 T1Dimensionierung 000497 T1 000498 T1Die Anbindung des neuen TKSys an das ffentliche 000499 T1Telekommunikationsnetz erfolgt im Erstausbau ber 18 000500 T1ISDN-Primrmultiplex-Anschlsse (S2M). Diese werden auf 000501 T1die beiden Hauptstandorte wie folgt verteilt: 000502 T1 000503 T1- Grohadern: 10 x S2M 000504 T1- Innenstadtkliniken: 8 x S2M 000505 T1 000506 T1Die Anbindung des TKSys an das ffentliche 000507 T1Telekommunikationsnetz muss grundstzlich auch ber 000508 T1SIP-Trunks mglich sein. 000509 T1 000510 T1Im Erstausbau erfolgt kein anlagenseitiges Routing fr 000511 T1berlufe an weitere Netzbetreiber fr den 000512 T1Strungsfall, was jedoch grundstzlich anlagentechnisch 000513 T1je S2M-Amtsgateway oder SIP- Trunk mglich sein muss. 000514 T1 000515 T1 000516 T1Redundanz und Lastteilung 000517 T1 000518 T1Das Routing von Verbindungen in das ffentliche 000519 T1Telekommunikationsnetz muss so erfolgen, dass eine 000520 Seite 10

49. 4 T1optimale Auslastung der Amtsanschlsse an beiden 000521 T1Hauptstandorten bei mglichst geringer Auslastung der 000522 T1internen Strecken zwischen den Standorten erreicht 000523 T1wird. 000524 T1 000525 T1Bei Strung von Amtsanschlssen muss ein Routing zu den 000526 T1verbleibenden, nicht gestrten Amtsanschlssen 000527 T1erfolgen. 000528 T1 000529 T1Eine Optimierung bzw. nderung der Dimensionierung der 000530 T1Amtszugnge hinsichtlich der bentigten Kanle unter 000531 T1Bercksichtigung eines verbundbergreifenden 000532 T1Redundanzkonzeptes erfolgt ggf. nach kompletter 000533 T1Inbetriebnahme des TKSys und einer entsprechenden 000534 T1Verkehrsmessung zur Ermittlung der tatschlichen 000535 T1Medienstrme fr den internen bzw. externen Verkehr. 000536 T1 000537 T1 000538 T1.5 Rufnummern- Organisation 000539 T1 000540 T1Bedingt durch die neue gemeinsame Rufnummer mit 000541 T15-stelligem Rufnummernblock ist eine bernahme der 000542 T1bisherigen getrennten Rufnummern mit jeweils 000543 T14-stelligem Rufnummernblock nicht mglich. 000544 T1 000545 T1Anforderungen an die Migration auf neue Rufnummer mit 000546 T15-stelligen Rufnummernblock: 000547 T1 000548 T1Externe Erreichbarkeit: 000549 T1 000550 T1Fr die Migration auf die neue Rufnummer bestehen zwei 000551 T1Hauptanforderungen an die externe Erreichbarkeit: 000552 T1 000553 T11. Sofortige Erreichbarkeit aller Nebenstellen des KUM 000554 T1 ber die neue zentrale Einwahl 089 / 4400-xxxxx. 000555 T1 000556 T12. Temporre Erreichbarkeit unter den bisherigen 000557 T1 Rufnummern 089 / 5160 - xxxx (Innenstadt) und 089 / 000558 T1 7095 - xxxx (Grohadern), Umwertung der alten 000559 T1 Rufnummern in neue Rufnummern beim Carrier whrend 000560 T1 eines definierten bergangszeitraumes. 000561 T1 000562 T1Interne Erreichbarkeit: 000563 T1 000564 T1Um sowohl aus technischer als auch aus 000565 T1organisatorischer Sicht eine reibungslose Umstellung 000566 T1auf die