shipping security: maritime aspects off africa

Shipping Security: Maritime Aspects off Africa

Proceedings of Colloquium 18 February 2021

Glen Segell

Shipping Security:Maritime Aspects off Africa

Proceedings of Colloquium18 February 2021

GLEN SEGELL

Copyright © Glen Segell, 2021 Copyright © Glen Segell 2021 (Cover Design)

All rights reserved.DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4547830

ISBN: 9798710511305 Imprint: Independently Published

ISBN 9781901414486 (EPUB) Imprint: Glen Segell

Kindle VersionASIN: B08WWMLS9R

University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

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British Library.

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An academic collaboration of the Ezri Center for Iran &Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israel, the

Department of Political Studies and Governance,University of the Free State, South Africa and the SecurityInstitute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA),

University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

The University ofHaifa

199 Abba HushiAve

Mount CarmelHaifa 3498838

Israel

The Departmentof PoliticalStudies andGovernanceUniversity of

the Free StateP.O. Box 339Bloemfontein

9300

South AfricaSecurity Institutefor Governance

and Leadership inAfrica (SIGLA)

Faculty ofMilitary Science

StellenboschUniversity

Private Bag X2Saldanha 7395South Africa

CONTENTS

Dr. Glen SegellPreface

1

Dr. Serge Tshibangu Opening remarks

3

1 Mr. Timothy WalkerA critical comparative analysis of the implementation ofthe EU and AU's maritime strategies

7

2 Dr. Glen SegellNATO’s maritime dimension vis-a-vis Africa

15

3 Mr. Hirotaka MoriThe Safety of shipping off Africa: A Japanese perspective

29

4 Emeritus Professor Francois VreyPromoting maritime security off Africa: Threats,cooperation and the use of data

35

5 Rear Admiral (Retired) Hanno Teuteberg SM MMMThe Forgotten Choke Point

43

6 Dr. Stephen BlackwellArabian Gulf states and maritime security in the Horn ofAfrica

49

7 Dr. Jude CocodiaMaritime policing and illegal fishing in West Africa:Implications for environmental and human security

55

About the academic partners and contributors 63

Author bio 67

Abstracts and program: 18 February 2021 75

Shipping Security: Maritime Aspects off Africa 1

PREFACE

The oceans connect nations globally through aninterdependent network of economic, financial,social and political relationships. The statisticsare compelling: 70% of the Earth is covered inwater; 80% of the world’s population lives within100 miles of the coast; 90% of the world’scommerce is seaborne and 75% of that tradepasses through a few, vulnerable, canals andinternational straits.

The maritime environment includes traderoutes, choke points, ports, and otherinfrastructure such as pipelines, oil and naturalgas platforms and trans-oceanictelecommunications cables.

At the same time the world’s oceans and seasare an increasingly accessible environment fortransnational criminal and terrorist activities,including the transport and deployment ofweapons of mass destruction and associatedmaterials. Criminal activity in the maritimeenvironment includes the growing range and rateof pirate attacks, which raise concerns about thesafety of vessel crews and private citizens.

Maritime security is a fairly new sector. Itentered on to regional and continental agendasaround the middle of the first decade of the2000s. The content of African maritime securityas a policy field is currently contested. It can belocated anywhere between traditional securitypolitics (such as related to piracy and unregulatedfishing), developmental and environmentalistconcerns, and efforts to regain economicsovereignty over African territorial and offshorewaters.

Of the 54 African states, 38 have a coastalborder while the others rely on them for their

2 Shipping Security: Maritime Aspects off Africa

imports and exports. Continental communicationroutes landward of the maritime, and stablesecurity both landward and maritime aretherefore a continental concern. Any maritimeissues are symptoms of landward causes!

Africa has 48 000 km of coastline and 13million km2 of maritime zones. There are morethan 100 ports in Africa, with 52 of them handlingcontainers and transnational trade. Thecontinent’s maritime economy is thought torepresent close to 90 percent of its totalcommerce but African countries do not fullybenefit from their marine resources, mainlybecause of insufficient investment capacities.Foreign-flagged vessels transport 95 % of Africa'scargo trade.

Around 2009 maritime security reached theagenda of the Africa Union. There was, however,a disconnect between international and Africanefforts on maritime security and geopolitics.

To examine the topic further, an internationalconference was convened “Shipping Security:Maritime Aspects off Africa,” that was held as anonline event, due to COVID-19, on 18 February2021. The event was open to a global publicaudience with a Q&A session, recorded andavailable for viewing.

This volume is a collection of the proceedingsof the conference. The Chapters start with thethose with the macro picture and move to thosewith individual regional case studies. I would liketo thank all those involved, first and foremost thepresenters, and the authors in this volume.

Glen SegellEditor & conference co-convenerAkko, Israel18 February 2021


OPENING REMARKSDr, Serge Tshibangu

Special Envoy of the President of the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo / Chairperson of the African Union

Ladies and Gentlemen,Thank you for joining us virtually today. We

gather to share our perspectives of andinvolvement in this year’s Shipping Securitywebinar. I appreciate each of you taking time tobe here on behalf of your institution. Looking atthe diversified profile of speakers, colleaguesand partners participating in today’s event, it isproof of our shared commitment to the Africamaritime security.

The host of this webinar offered me theprivilege to give this opening remarks,therefore, it is my responsibility to salute theconstructive spirit that will animate thedifferent presentations and discussions that willfollow. I would like to express my appreciationfor the various contributions that will enableour security horizon to be cleared, thus openingup the prospect of great control of our oceans.

As we all are aware of, the African Union’sblue strategy was designed to restore oceanhealth, reinstate security at sea and strengthenstrategic “blue growth” sectors. However, thisvital space for ourselves and for the rest of theworld tends to become a favorite place forcriminal activities of all kinds, in particular,piracy, armed robbery, trafficking in humanbeings, drugs, weapons, illegal fishing, as wellas toxic waste and oil spills.

Dear colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,A reality will regularly come back to us as

Africans: "the blue economy" or the economy of


the sea. Meaning that Africa must see thiswealth as an opportunity for sustainabledevelopment. Armed with the crucialinformation that Africa has 13 million squarekilometers of maritime economic zones and17% of the world's freshwater resources,enough to introduce a new deal in the maritimetransport, ports, industrial fishing ...,unfortunately, economic sectors have alwaysescaped the continent and, until now, havebeen largely dominated by internationalinterests. Considering that 90% of thecontinent's imports and exports pass by sea andthat a large number of the most strategicmaritime trade corridors are located in theAfrican maritime spaces, we understand all theinterest that Africa can derive from bettercontrolling its maritime areas.

In addition, with reference to the 2050Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, it isimportant for me to point out that developedcountries protect African coasts, in particular inthe Gulf of Aden or in the Gulf of Guinea, inorder to protect their interests. But this alsoshows that in this area, internationalcooperation is necessary, including in the formof aid from the richest countries. Africa is moreexposed than the other continents for thesimple reason that it has very few skills andresources to deal with this situation. In fact,African Heads of State and Government havegradually realized that maritime security alsosimply means security of their respectiveterritories.

I look forward to today’s discussion and wantto assure you all that all voices matter and willbe heard. Even though we aren’t meeting in


person, I want to stress the importance of eachmember of this amazing team participating inthe discussion. In addition, I pose a challenge toeveryone “here” virtually today: let’s each finda way to connect with one of our partners on aone-on-one basis, so we can exchange ideas andstrengthen individual relationships. By doingso, we will strengthen the foundation of the2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy aswe forge our collective path forward.

With that, I’ll turn it over to ProfessorHussein Solomon, who has a lot to share withus.

Thank you!


1 A CRITICAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OFTHE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU AND

AU'S MARITIME STRATEGIESMr. Timothy Walker

Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa

IntroductionContinued instability and insecurity at sea

will detract from the ability of littoralcommunities and states to safely and securelyconduct maritime trade, attain inclusiveeconomic growth and social development, aswell as fulfil their international obligations.Secure and sustainable development of theAfrican maritime domain is increasinglyexpected to greatly contribute to the AfricanRenaissance and the achievement of Africansecurity and development goals.

Since 2010 the AU and EU has facilitated theadoption of several pan-continental initiativesand instruments that provide a framework forestablishing collective security and governancemechanism and institutions through whichmember states can both address commonsecurity challenges and threats and pursueopportunities and benefits.

Both the EU MSS and AU’s 2050 Africa’sIntegrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMStrategy) were designed to be the core strategyguiding the organisation and its member statestowards improved protection of the seas andthe creation of novel development opportunities(which the AU and member states usually termas ‘wealth-creation’). The increasing number ofassociated instruments shows that bothEuropean and Africa countries are acting on the


realisation that greater cooperation is requiredbetween them and with other actors around theworld if they are to successfully combatincidents of transnational maritime insecuritythat hinders their collective ability to create theenvironment necessary for the sustainabledevelopment of their maritime resources. Themain observable divergence occurs when wesee how many signatory state parties have thengone on to ratify these instruments and bylooking at progress in strategy implementationand achievement of goals.

Impetus for strengthening collectivemaritime institutions

The impetus for strengthening collectivemaritime institutions can be primarilyattributed to the following factors.

Firstly, research is showing that countriesand coastal communities are acutely vulnerableto a wide range of maritime security threatsand transnational organised crimes. The failureto tackle maritime crimes, either throughenhanced law enforcement or collaborativecapacity-building severely impacts the ability ofvulnerable countries to create thepreconditions necessary for sustainabledevelopment.

Secondly, maritime crimes can becharacterised as ‘wicked problems’ as they defysimple, national solutions due to theirincreasing sophistication. For instance, crimessuch as illegal fishing, drug trafficking andpiracy are becoming complex andmultidimensional as they are often committedby well-organised criminal groups engaging inmultiple criminal activities in multiplejurisdictions. Wicked problems require


transnational solutions that are best assuredthrough regional mechanisms designed andoperated by regional states.

Thirdly, most African states lack the meansto undertake national or unilateral actions asthey possess great variations in their individualcapabilities for asserting their sovereignty andexercising their authority through robustmaritime law enforcement and developinginfrastructure to facilitate trade.

This enduring challenge leads onto the finalfactor discussed in this section of the paper –the growing interest in deriving substantialbenefit from the development of oceanicresources for African economic growth andprosperity. Decision-makers have become morereceptive to the idea of investing in maritime orblue economic industries such as fisheries,aquaculture and tourism and no longer regardmaritime investments as irrevocable or sunkcosts.

A Brief History of the African Union’smaritime initiatives

Both the EU and the AU are taken to be theideal venue in theory for establishing therequired inter-state mechanisms that facilitatethe creation of greater, collective maritimesecurity through well-designed and functioninginternational institutions. The institutionsestablished and consolidated at this level willbe challenged though by the extent to whichthey can realistically accommodate both thedivergent and convergent interests andperspectives advocated by member states toprovide appropriate responses. In regards tothe AU, the number of member states bringswith it an increased risk of stalemates between


actors unwilling to compromise on theirperspectives and interests in the absence of astrong arbitrator.

The result of this gap has been the weakincorporation and integration or mainstreamingof maritime into the overall work of the AU.This was most clearly evident in the lack ofreferences to the role of maritime security insome of the pillars informing its peace andsecurity architecture. As Len Le Roux observedin 2006, “reading these documents leaves theimpression of an Africa without a coastline ormaritime zone, let alone broader maritimeinterests such as trade and maritimeresources”. These include the Common AfricanDefence and Security Policy of the AfricanUnion and the Protocol that established the AUPeace and Security Council.

Finding a permanent anchorage withinthe Commission

The AUC’s main attempt at establishing apermanent and cross-cutting maritimeanchorage took place from November 2010,while the 2050 AIM strategy was being drafted,after the Chairperson issued a directive toestablish an appropriate AU taskforce. Itsubsequently steered through the drafting ofthe strategy in 2012 and its endorsement bymaritime ministers in 2012 - an arduous taskinvolving numerous expert meetings, a lack ofseconded experts from member states andcomplicated by an institutional movement awayfrom the PSD to the Office of the Legal Counsel.It was inadequately funded and, in practice,now adrift from many of the networks in whichit was previously embedded.

In the meantime, AU maritime momentum


was already starting to shift away from theOLC-STF-2050 AIM Strategy wave and wasinstead gathering behind a Togolose proposalto convene and host a regional piracyconference. Interest in the conference led to itbeing turned into an extraordinary summit, andthe Togolese set their sights on a charter as agoal. A major problem though was thesubsequent lack of transparency and inclusivityin drafting. The draft Charter was onlypresented to two of the AU’s SpecializedTechnical Committees prior to the Summit. As aresult, the Charter presented for considerationand signature concerned some attendees byappearing to prioritise its security and safetyaspects and procedural articles overdevelopment issues such as blue economy,fisheries and tourism.

Further progress only became apparent inMarch 2018 when the Legal Counsel convenedan informal meeting with AU Member Statesand invited them to designate maritime and lawof the sea experts to serve on a revivedStrategic Task Force for the Implementation ofthe 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM)Strategy. The most significant outcome wasthat the STF agreed that finalising the Annexesto the Lomé Charter should be considered partof its mandate to consider the AIM 2050Strategy’s technical details to produce a roadmap for its incremental implementation.

The result of the inertia on 2050 AIMStrategy and the slow finalisation of the LoméCharter has increased the risk of the LoméCharter replicating the AMTC and RAMTC -neither of which came into force. So far onlyTogo and Benin has ratified the Lomé Charter.


A subtle irony here is that the Lomé Charternow depends on the 2050 AIM Strategy, whichit had overshadowed, even marginalised from2016 onwards. This has been marked by agrowing acceptance of the need for both formaland informal actions, which does bode well. TheSTF would, for one, be in a position to finallyfocus on its initial mandated task of revising theimplementation plan of the 2050 AIM Strategy.This was underscored by the 2020 PSD/AUrequest to begin convening consultativemaritime forums on the way forward without itbeing necessary to have completed LoméCharter annexes.

ConclusionThe AU and its commission has struggled to

both establish and consolidate maritimeinstitutions that can benefit member states inthe pursuit of their enduring and emergentmaritime interests. This can be attributed to theweakness of its intergovernmental functionsand to a reluctance among member states toconsider policies and concepts that have anstrong or inherent supranational dimension.Each of its maritime instruments has beenmarked by a wave of enthusiasm andaccompanying high-level meetings/events, butthe capacity of the commission to implementthem was not enhanced (either by internaldecision or member state championing).Instead the slow finalisation or implementationof each successive instrument produced by theAU has resulted in its superseding andovertaking by another, often with duplication ordilution – leaving the core implementationactors bereft of institutional momentum andmemory. While each additional instrument has


been designed to complement or enhance thosethat came before, the fact that these wereunfinished meant they overlapped andduplicated each other significantly. This alsooccurred between RECs and the AU where, theprinciple of subsidiarity notwithstanding, theAU has yet to play the facilitative or catalystrole that was originally envisaged and seemedpossible when it was ahead of the EU.


2 NATO’S MARITIME DIMENSION VIS-A-VISAFRICA

Dr. Glen SegellUniversity of the Free State, South Africa /

Ezri Center, University of Haifa, Israel

IntroductionThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also

called the North Atlantic Alliance, is anintergovernmental military alliance between 30European and North American countries. Theorganization implements the North AtlanticTreaty that was signed on 4 April 1949. Article5 provides “that if a NATO Ally is the victim ofan armed attack, each and every other memberof the Alliance will consider this act of violenceas an armed attack against all members andwill take the actions it deems necessary toassist the Ally attacked.”

To be defended are the territory, citizens andinterests of the state. One of those interests isthe maritime that includes coasts, ports, searoutes and the shipping. The NATO AllianceMaritime Strategy of 2011 informs thatwhether in support of Alliance joint operations,or when leading in a predominately maritimemission, maritime forces have critical roles tofulfil, defending and promoting the collectiveinterests of the Alliance across a spectrum ofdefence and security challenges, as defined inthe Strategic Concept of 2011.

The maritime environment also lends itselfwell to strengthened engagement incooperative security. It identifies the four rolesof NATO's maritime forces: deterrence andcollective defence; crisis management;cooperative security – outreach through


partnerships, dialogue and cooperation; andmaritime security.

Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) is thecentral command of all NATO maritime forcesand the MARCOM Commander is the primarymaritime advisor to the Alliance. MARCOM wasofficially launched on 1 December 2012, toreflect the NATO Heads of State’s decision tocreate a leaner and more effective commandstructure. Like its land and air counterparts(LANDCOM & AIRCOM), MARCOM answersdirectly to NATO’s Allied Command Operations(ACO) which is located in Mons, Belgium.

NATO has Standing Naval Forces under thecontrol of NATO Allied Maritime Commandwhich responds to Allied Command Operations.They are comprised of the Standing NATOMaritime Groups 1 and 2 and Standing NATOMine Countermeasures Groups 1 and 2. Thismultinational, integrated force is continuouslyavailable to perform tasks ranging fromparticipating to exercises to conducting NATOmissions. These forces are part of the maritimecomponent of the NATO Response Force.

NATO’s maritime defense interestsNATO allies share Africa's three sea basins:

while eight of its European Member States arecoastal states on the Mediterranean, and fiveon the Atlantic. This makes the African coastand landward from a central focus of NATO.The Atlantic Ocean, north of the Tropic ofCancer, and the Mediterranean Sea are part ofits region (in-area) to be defended as these arethe location of its member states. Africa is thesouthern border of NATO in Europe. NATOmember states share the Mediterranean as amaritime border with North African states.


Seas, as direct or transit routes for illegalmigration from Africa to Europe, are animportant concern. European and Africaneconomies through trade depends on securesea routes and shipping security in theMediterranean and onward through theStraights of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal.

Where and when necessary NATO hasconducted military operations to protectshipping off Africa’s coasts and also landward.As these African states have or could hostelements that would endanger the security andindeed the shipping security both civil andmilitary of NATO member states. Since the endof the Cold War in 1990, looking at eachinstance of NATO assistance and militaryinvolvement vis-a-vis Africa shows the two mainfocuses of NATO and Africa. The first is in 1994when the North Atlantic Council initiated theMediterranean Dialogue (MD) It currentlyinvolves seven non-NATO countries of theMediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel,Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Thereare also specific operations for immediatesecurity needs for example to support UnitedNations Resolutions in 2011 on Libya.

The second is with the African Union (AU)and its request. It is NATO policy, and it has inpractice assisted, non-NATO African statesbecause it is in NATO interest to do so as theirsecurity and stability projects into NATOmember states security and stability. Landwardsecurity and stability is a prerequisite to that ofmaritime. As such, for example, shippingsecurity, both civil and military, sea routepatrols, and air-sea surveillance and rescue arepart and parcel of NATO’s maritime dimension


vis-a-vis Africa. These have included Non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO)can be described as “multifunctional operationsthat encompass those political, military, andcivil activities, initiated and executed inaccordance with international law, includinginternational humanitarian law, contributing toconflict prevention and resolution and crisismanagement, or serve humanitarian purposes,in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives.”

The Africa maritime security dimension The content of African maritime security

as a policy field is currently contested. In Africainitial continent-wide efforts to beef up searchand rescue capacities evolved within thecontext of the 2000 International Convention onMaritime Search and Rescue. At this stage, thedebate on maritime security in Africa wasadvanced by the United Nations and the IMO,which set the tone by introducing sectorstandards. In 2008 the UN Security Council(UNSC) adopted a series of resolutions that,among other things, led to the establishment on14 January 2009 of the Contact Group on Piracyoff the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), pursuant toResolution 1851 (2008). The IMO sponsored ameeting of sixteen African and Arab states inDjibouti on 26 January 2009 that adopted aCode of Conduct Concerning the Repression ofPiracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in theWestern Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden(IMO 2009).

The EU, NATO, and others responded to thesecurity implications of African piracy bylaunching a number of joint operations. NATOguided by its latest strategic concept “ActiveEngagement, Modern Defence” (NATO 2010),


launched a combined task force OperationAllied Protector (March – August 2009), AlliedProvider (October – December 2008) and thenOperation Ocean Shield. The last for exampleauthorized by United Nations Security CouncilResolution 2020, which calls on statescooperating with the Somali government to use“all necessary means” to combat piracy. Also atthe request of the UN Secretary General,NATO’s naval forces escorted ships of theWorld Food Program (WFP) transiting in theGulf of Aden.

This led to ‘African Union - Africa'sIntegrated Maritime Strategy – Adopted in2014 (AIM 2050). It has its origins a discussionsince around 2005 on the Africa MaritimeDimension (AMD) in the context of piracy in theGulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean (East Africa),and the Gulf of Guinea (West Africa), in order ofdegree. Various African actors - among them,member states of the African Union (AU), theRegional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention,Management, and Resolution (RMs), andRegional Economic Communities (RECs) andthe African Union Commission — haveresponded to dimensions of the ADM with a setof policies in an effort to integrate theirevolving practices into a coherent maritimesecurity and safety policy.

AIM 2050 addresses all major issues thatAfrica is confronted with, namely: i. Diverseillegal activities, which include toxic wastedumping and discharge of oil, dealing in illicitcrude oil, human, arms and drug trafficking,piracy and armed robbery at sea; ii. Energyexploitation, climate change, environmentalprotection, conservation and safety of life and


property at sea; Research, innovation anddevelopment; and iv. Maritime sectordevelopment, including competitiveness, jobcreation, international trade, maritimeinfrastructure, transport, information,communication, technology, and logistics.

NATO’s security interestsA number of concerns continue to be a

reality on the African stage that could haveimpact on Europe and hence NATO and theirpotential to become global in nature. Theseinclude social radicalization and terrorism,energy and environmental disasters, civil war,unstable / failed governance, illegal migrantsand refugees, and criminal activities inweapons, drugs, and humans, only to name afew. These landward issues pose both a securitythreat and threaten economic interests seawardfor example, the pursuit of lawful commerce atsea close to African shores.

There is also a clear and present threat inthe new “Scramble for Africa” by externalactors. The main players other than NATOmembers are China, Russia, the EuropeanUnion, India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, South Koreaand the Gulf State countries who are allinterested in increasing cooperation withAfrica. Part of their involvement is detrimentalto local interests. For example arms trade, andradicalization of the population.

Some have established foreign bases inAfrica that could lead to proxy conflicts. Navalexamples are China in Djibouti (port of Obock,cross the Gulf of Tadjoura ), India inMadagascar (listening post set up in 2007 tokeep an eye on ship movements in the IndianOcean and listen in on maritime


communications) and The Seychelles (allocatedland on Assumption Island to naval base forcounter-piracy and an eye on China) and UnitedArab Emirates in Eritrea: (developing themothballed deepwater port of Assab foroperations in Yemen, including the navalblockade of the Red Sea ports of Mokha andHodeida and has a 30-year lease on a naval andairbase at the port of Berbera.) And indeedRussia.

NATO Mediterranean Dialogue NATO has recognized that non-NATO

alliance partnerships are required becauseshipping security and indeed sea routes andtrade in the Mediterranean from the Suez toGibraltar and the Black Sea are closely linkedto security and stability within Africa states.

In 1994 the North Atlantic Council initiatedthe Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) It currentlyinvolves seven non-NATO countries of theMediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel,Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.NATO's MD is primarily bilateral in structure(NATO+1). That is a testimony to the unstablegovernance of some of the seven and thedisputes between and among them thatprevents them functioning in unity.

The MD is based upon the twin pillars ofpolitical dialogue and practical cooperation.Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania andTunisia have all agreed on tailored IndividualCooperation Programmes with NATO. Theseinclude maritime cooperation for exampleintelligence, surveillance, joint exercises andsea route patrols for civil and military shippingsecurity, air-sea rescue, and the use of port andlogistic facilities.


A specific military operation in theMediterranean region was the NATO-ledOperation Unified Protector in Libya 2011 thathad some distinct maritime components: 1) theenforcement of an arms embargo on the highseas of the Mediterranean to prevent thetransfer of arms, related material andmercenaries to Libya; and 2) air and navalstrikes against those military forces involved inattacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians andcivilian-populated areas.

An example of a current NATO maritimeactivity in the Mediterranean can be seen fromthe decision at the NATO Warsaw Summit inJuly 2016, of the transformation of the ActiveEndeavour counter-terrorism mission in theMediterranean to a broader maritime securityoperation. The new operation received thename Operation Sea Guardian. Operation SeaGuardian is a non-Article 5 maritime securityoperation aimed at working with Mediterraneanstakeholders to maintain maritime situationalawareness, deter and counter terrorism andenhance capacity building. Some of the tasksinclude supporting maritime situationalawareness, upholding freedom of navigation,conducting interdiction tasks, maritimecounter-terrorism, contributing to capacitybuilding, countering proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction and protecting critical searoutes and land and sea infrastructures.

NATO conducts maritime exercises in theMediterranean. For example NATO exerciseDynamic Manta (DYMA20) began on Monday,24 February 2020 off the coast of Sicily. Ships,submarines, aircraft and personnel from 9Allied nations are converging in the Central


Mediterranean Sea for anti-submarine warfare(ASW) and anti-surface warfare training. Theaim of Dynamic Manta was to enhanceinteroperability and proficiency in anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare skills toparticipating units, providing complex andchallenging training serials. Units from Canada,France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey withsubmarines from France, Greece, Italy andTurkey under NATO Submarine Command areparticipating in 2020 edition. Italy as the hostnation, is providing support at the Cataniaharbour, naval helicopter base in Catania,Sigonella naval air station and Augusta navalbase with logistic support including refuelingoperations, medical assistance and personnelaccommodation.

NATO and the African UnionMuch has been said about allowing for

African solutions to African problems. But whathappens when African solutions fail, or do notachieve anticipated results? What happenswhen the failure of African solutions threatensto destabilize regional or international security?The use of regional organizations to solveAfrican issues is not a new phenomenon. Oneissue is that the African regional organizationscannot sustain themselves for prolongedsecurity operations and logistical concernsplague them. Two of the significant Africanregional organizations currently operational invarious security missions across the continentare 1) The African Union (AU), currently all 55African states except Morocco and 2) ECOWAS,comprised of 15 West African states.

They need support for their missions andNATO is well placed to provide this. At the


beginning of the 1990s, after the Cold WarNATO began to assume an increasinglyproactive role within the internationalcommunity and gradually projected itselfbeyond the Euro-Atlantic space (out of areaoperations). With this NATO took on newresponsibilities within the internationalcommunity. NATO’s Prague Summit 2002finally laid to rest whether or not NATO wouldbe in the business of out-of-area operations,including Africa south of NATO’s southernborder with Mediterranean states.

Since 2005, NATO has been cooperating withthe AU. The NATO-AU relationship startedmodestly with AU requests for logistics andairlift support for its mission in Sudan. Thecooperation has evolved over time and,although primarily based on ad-hoc military-technical cooperation, NATO Allies arecommitted to expanding cooperation with theAU to make it an integral part of NATO’s effortsto work more closely with partners in tacklingsecurity challenges emanating from the south.Cooperation is being developed in three mainareas: operational support; training support;and structural assistance. Operational supportincludes strategic air- and sealift, as well asplanning support. NATO has also supported thebuild-up of the African Standby Force throughexercises and training. For day-to-day activities,the Alliance maintains a liaison office at theAU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia.NATO and the African Union signed a newcooperation agreement on Monday (4November 2019), laying the ground for closerpractical and political cooperation between thetwo organisations. The deal supersedes an


earlier NATO-AU cooperation agreement from2014.

NATO deployment in and off AfricaNATO’s deployment in Africa has been

driven by direct requests from the AU forsupport in very specific areas and with UnitedNations Security Council Resolutions. This wasto firstly improve the humanitarian situation inDarfur from 2005 to 2007 in support of theAfrican Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) byproviding logistical airlift to AU forces.

Following this NATO provided logisticalairlift to AU forces in Somalia and conductednaval operations in reaction to the increase inacts of piracy along the Somali coast. NATOnaval forces conducted surveillance tasks andprovided protection to deter and suppresspiracy and armed robbery, which werethreatening sea lines of communication,shipping security and so economic interests.Examples are Operation Allied Provider 2008and Operation Allied Protector 2009 off theHorn of Africa. Operation Ocean Shieldcontributed to the international efforts againstpiracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa from2009 to 2016.

In detail NATO’s role in Operation OceanShield was to provide naval escorts anddeterrence while increasing cooperation withother counter piracy operations in the area inorder to optimise efforts and tackle the evolvingpirate trends and tactics. NATO conductedcounter-piracy activities in full complementaritywith the relevant UN Security CouncilResolutions. All Allies contribute to the mission,either directly or indirectly, through NATO’scommand structures and common funding.


NATO Allies provided ships and maritime patrolaircraft to NATO Standing Maritime Groups,which in turn assigned a number of ships, on arotational basis, to Ocean Shield.

Also at the request of the UN SecretaryGeneral, NATO’s naval forces escorted ships ofthe World Food Program (WFP) transiting inthe Gulf of Aden. There have been no successfulpiracy attacks from May 2012 onward, eventhough Somalia-based piracy has not beeneliminated.

Looking forwardWhy NATO and not the EU or the UN to

support AU maritime? The answer is that NATObrings to the table more so than any other in itsinteroperability and American contribution.Also even though the UN and EU do have manymissions in Africa, they lack the navalcapabilities of NATO. Time will tell also onNATO support to the AU’s continent-wide“2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy”(2050 AIM Strategy).

NATO support to the AU may even be withpartners such as China. While NATO andChina’s operations are distinct, interactionthrough meetings of the Shared Awareness andDeconfliction (SHADE) initiative, for examplehelped to build mutual trust over the years.

Thanks to the SHADE process, ‘China, Indiaand Japan in early 2012 agreed to coordinatetheir merchant vessel escort convoys throughthe Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor(IRTC) off the Horn of Africa with one countrybeing ‘reference nation’ for a period of threemonths on a rotational basis.’

Also in the Mediterranean, the increasedpresence of Chinese naval assets alongside


long-standing NATO ships have led someanalysts to go as far as argue for joint MaritimeInterdiction Operations (MIO) patrols.

ConclusionIt would be fair to assume 1) that there is an

unstable situation landward in many parts ofAfrica and 2) this is projected maritime off itscoasts and hence 3) this juxtaposed with theessential security and economic interests androle of NATO and its member states would 4)tend to the conclusions that NATO is going tostrengthen the efforts in the MediterraneanDialogue and 5) further support for the AfricanUnion where 6) shipping security would be highon the list of priorities.

To examine this in detail with evidencefurther research would permeate through asingular line of questions: What does Africamean for NATO? Is NATO unified for action inAfrica? What do African states in the MD andAU want from NATO? and What wouldtranspire if NATO were not to be activeespecially in shipping security and the maritimedimension of Africa.


3 THE SAFETY OF SHIPPING OFF AFRICA: A JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Hirotaka MoriJapan Ship Centre, London /

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), LondonOffice

Japan mostly depends on the maritimetransportation to import energy/mineralresources, marine/agricultural products andother resources, accounting for 99.6 % of totaltrade volume(tons). Therefore, the navigationalsafety is the key for the daily life of Japanesepeople as well as for the economy. The Gulf ofAden is one of the vital shipping lanes forJapan, because it connects Asia with Europe viathe Suez Canal where 19,000 vessels, includingapproximately 1,700 Japanese-related vessels(vessels registered in Japan, and vesselsregistered in other countries but operated byforeign companies which are wholly owned byJapanese shipping companies), pass annually.Furthermore, since approximately 15% ofcontainer cargos over the world and 18% of thevehicles for export from Japan were transportedthrough the Gulf of Aden in 2019, the safety ofmerchant vessels is still one of the urgent andcritical issues for Japan.

Japan remains concerned about thecontinuing threat posed by piracy off the coastof Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Accordingto the annual report of ICC-MRB (InternationalChamber of Commerce, International MaritimeBureau), the number of piracy incident hasincreased sharply and there were over 200incidents per year around 2009 to 2011.Although a marked reduction has been seen inthe number of attacks and hijackings around off


the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden since2012, and no piracy incident was reported in2019 and 2020, Japan observes that theunderlying causes of piracy remain in place,and the number of piracy incidents would riseunless stakeholders continue their globalcooperation.

This decrease is achieved by theimplementation of counter-piracy measures byeach shipping company and the results ofinternational cooperation for the counter-piracyoperation by many countries including Japan.The below measures would be considered asexamples.

- Japan’s actions against Piracy off theCoast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

- Special measures to embark privatelycontracted armed security personnel

- Best practice to deter piracy byshipping companies(1) Japan’s actions against Piracy off the

Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of AdenIn March 2009, after receiving the approval

of the Prime Minister based on the Cabinetdecision, the Minister of Defense gave theorder for Maritime Security Operations in orderto protect Japan-related vessels from acts ofpiracy in the waters off the coast of Somaliaand in the Gulf of Aden. Following this order,two Japanese destroyers departed from Japanand began escorting Japan-related vessels inthe same month. Moreover, to conduct moreeffective counter-piracy operations over anextensive marine area, the other order wasgiven in May 2009 to dispatch two P-3C patrolaircraft, and these aircraft commenced warningand surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden in


June of the same year.In view of the United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enactedthe Act concerning the Punishment of Acts ofPiracy and Measures to Deal with Acts of Piracy(the Anti-Piracy Measures Act) in July 2009 inorder to deal appropriately and effectively withacts of piracy.

In July 2013, Japan decided to participate inthe CTF151(Combined Task Force 151) tocommerce so-called zone defense in addition toescort missions as before, while coordinatingclosely with the units of other countries thatare engaged in counter-piracy operations, forthe purpose of conducting more flexible andeffective operations each other. Following this,the surface force started zone defense inDecember 2013. In addition, the air force hasbeen participating in the CTF 151 sinceFebruary 2014.

The maritime patrol aircraft (P-3Cs) based inthe Republic of Djibouti make use the excellentcruising capability in conducting warning andsurveillance activities in the vast area of theGulf. The flight zone is managed by the CTF151headquarters. The flight activities total 2,428 inflight mission and 18,179 in flying hours on asof December 31th, 2019, counted from July2009, when the JSDF started the surveillanceactivities. Furthermore, aircraft have identifiedapproximately 201,600 vessels and providedinformation to vessels navigating the area andother countries engaging in counter-piracyoperations on around 14,420 occasions.

In addition, three JSDF officers have servedas the CTF151 commander so far. (May toAugust in 2015, March to July in 2017 and


March to June in 2018). These opportunitieshave boosted the JSDF reliability in theinternational community and represented theJSDF’s continuous contribution to maritimepeace-keeping.

As of December 31st 2020, 3,922 vesselshave been escorted under the protection of theJSDF’s destroyers. Not a single vessel has cometo any harm from pirates and these vesselshave all safely across the Gulf of Aden. TheMinistry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport andTourism(MLIT) of Japan provides a sole contactpoint for coordination with the JSDF’s escort.

(2) Special measures to embark privatelycontracted armed security personnel

The number of piracy incidents in the Gulf ofAden rapidly increased in 2008, and spread tothe Indian Ocean later. Under thesecircumstances, it became common amongmajor maritime countries that PrivatelyContracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)were on-board of their flag vessels. ThesePCASP contributed to decrease of attacks bySomali pirates. However, under Japanese laws,it was prohibited to employ PCASP on Japaneseflag vessels.

Therefore the Act of Special MeasuresConcerning the Guarding of Japanese Ship inPirate-Infested Waters was enforced onNovember 30, 2013 to endure the security ofJapanese flag vessels by PCASP.

Under this Act, PCASP that is confirmed bythe Minister of the MLIT of japan can guardJapanese flag vessels in the Pirate-InfestedWater based on the Designated Guarding Planauthorized by the Minister.

(3) Best practice to deter piracy by


shipping companiesA lot of practices to deter piracy and

enhance maritime security have beendeveloped by shipping companies. Thesepractices include below measures.- Citadel

A citadel is a designated area where, in theevent of imminent boarding, all crew may seekprotection. Communication with the outside issecured, by VHF, satellite portable telephone,etc.- Razor wire

Razor wire fixed along on the whole upper-edge circumstance of her body creates aneffective barrier if properly rigged and secured.- Water discharge facility

Water shall be discharged from a waterdischarge facility toward the sea surface alongthe side of the ship.- Control of access to accommodation and

machinery spacesIt is important to control access routes to the

accommodation and machinery spaces to deteror delay entry. Higher gate around the weatherdeck and security enhanced doors/hatches areeffective.

These practices are compiled in BestManagement Practices to Deter Piracy andEnhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulfof Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, BMP5,supported by some organizations includingInternational Chamber of Shipping. Eachshipping company takes necessary measureswith reference to the document.

Due to the efforts and cooperation of manystakeholders, the number of piracy incidentshas been at lower level in recent years.


However, the threat of piracy off the Coast ofSomalia and in the Gulf of Aden has notcompletely disappeared. Further continuousefforts would be expected to secure the safetyof shipping off Africa.


4 PROMOTING MARITIME SECURITY OFFAFRICA: THREATS, COOPERATION AND THE

USE OF DATAEmeritus Professor Francois Vrey

Security Institute for Governance and Leadership inAfrica (SIGLA), Stellenbosch University, South Africa

BackdropAny basic image or tracts of shipping on the

world’s oceans indicates that a significant partof shipping travelling between the largeeconomic powers in the Eastern and theWestern hemispheres pass through Africanwaters. Add to this the presence of lucrativeliving and non-living resources requiringdiverse shipping operations off Africa, an imageemerges of a continent standing central incurrent and particularly future global oceanactivities of various kinds.

Two important catalysts underpin the abovescenario. Shipping off Africa requires safe andstable seas to conduct their globally importanteconomic activities. Second, Africa is obliged toplay a role in ensuring that its ocean territoriesare secure to provide stable maritimeenvironments for economic activities and topursue the continent’s own commitment to avibrant blue economy as part the AIMS-2050strategy of the African Union (AU). Collectivelycooperation and good data make a usefulcontribution for decision-making on maritimesecurity.

DiscussionMaritime threats, cooperation, and the

use of dataMaritime security threats in African waters

largely stems from non-traditional threats with


terrorism and insurgency beginning to straddlethe divide between soft and hard securitythreats. In addition, irregular and regularthreats manifesting as hybrid threats at seaalso seem to be taking shape. While listingthreats is a popular way to depict maritimesecurity threats off Africa, the quest continuesto refine and become more prudent in framingthe threat landscape to better direct Africanresponses. However grouped, cooperation andgood information are bound to remainconstituent elements of any sets of counter-measures to address maritime insecurity.

Waters of the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn ofAfrica, the Red Sea as well as theMediterranean off the north African coast(Libya in particular) are maritime landscapesunder threat. Further south in theSouthwestern Indian Ocean, insurgency inNorthern Mozambique and its implied overlapwith an Islamic State faction show a lingeringthreat to offshore economic maritime activities.Here large offshore gas fields and vulnerablecoastal communities living off the ocean areunder threat. The aforementioned areas alsoreveal extensive responses to contain threatswith the Gulf of Guinea, the southernapproaches to the Red Sea and waters offSomalia perceivably harbouring the greatestdangers for shipping and offshore economicactivities.

Responses to maritime security threatsTwo pathways of actions assist governments

to ensure better maritime security off Africa.Cooperation and use of reliable data form partof the overall notion of information sharing todirect prevention and other responses as a


fundamental tenet for promoting maritimesecurity. As concepts that inform how coastalcountries and regional entities react, East andWest Africa offer architectures and inclusion indata sets to foster cooperation and gatherinformation on security aspects.

Regarding cooperation, West Africa’sarchitecture for cooperation is largelyconfigured by the regional economiccommunities of the Economic Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS) and theEconomic Community of Central African States(ECCAS). ECOWAS covers fifteen states, whileECCAS comprises ten states. In total bothentities include about 17 coastal states pendingdouble membership of some.1 Turning thisregional notion of cooperation offshore, the2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct) (YCC) spanscoastal states and two island states of ECCASand ECOWAS. The YCC builds upon theregions’ common interests to also work towardsmaritime security and deal with armed robbery,hijacking of vessels and hostage taking of crewsas well as capturing and illegal selling ofpetroleum products in the Gulf of Guinea.2 Inaddition, information sharing is a centralfunction of the YCC with its different zonescovering coastal states from Angola to Senegalincluding Sao Tome & Principe, as well as CapeVerde.

The waters off the Horn of Africa in the Gulf

1 Some coastal countries (Angola and DR Congo forexample) hold overlapping memberships with ECCAS andthe Southern African Development Community (SADC).

2 By early 2021 the Gulf of Guinea is labelled the‘piracy’ hotspot of Africa due to the increase in attacks onshipping passing through these waters.


of Aden and into the southern Red Sea hold itsown array of threats to shipping. In spite of itsdramatic decline, piracy and attacks onshipping remain the apex threat off Somaliaalongside interconnected criminal activitiessuch as smuggling of weapons, people, drugsand illegal fishing. Somalia also reflects theprimary focus of extensive capacity buildingprogrammes and international involvement thatcollectively helped to suppress armed attackson shipping and assisted the country to gainsome resemblance of governance over itslittoral waters. Somalia in fact became a testingground for anti-piracy measures and outreachesand projects supporting vulnerablegovernments with maritime security capacitybuilding.

In the northern waters of the Gulf of Adenand towards the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the warin Yemen still fosters dangerous threats toshipping in this part of the Northwestern IndianOcean. Primary being the sowing of sea minesoff the harbour of Hodeia by the Houthimovement close to the entrance to the Red Sea.A further danger stems from indiscriminateattacks on commercial and naval vessels offYemen by way of unmanned platforms. A thirdthreat lingers around the huge Safer oil storageplatform anchored outside the port of Hodeiathat holds the potential of causing a majorecological disaster if the UN is not allowed tomaintain this platform properly. A major spillcould shut down the shipping lane through theBab-el-Mandeb and leave vessels damaged orhaving to be rerouted around Africa’s southerntip. A secondary threat is the disruption ofshipping transporting food supplies to large


displaced populations in Yemen resulting fromthe ongoing war. Overall, the war in Yemen andits spill-over leans towards hybridization of thethreat with dangerous military systems beingtransferred to the Houthi movement includingthe capability to attack commercial and navalvessels.

Cooperation off the Horn of Africa is lessstructured along the region’s economic entitiesif compared with the Gulf of Guinea’sarchitecture. While the IntergovernmentalAuthority on Development (IGAD) (8 members),the East African Community (EAC) (6 members)and the AU represent potential actors toaddress maritime threats off the Horn region ina cooperative way, the most effective responseto date came from international cooperation onnaval deployments off Somalia and setting upthe Djibouti Code of Conduct (2008) and JeddaAmendment (2017) (DCoC/JA) including 10African coastal and island states. The DCoCprimarily aims to contain and prosecute piracy,and through the 2017 Jedda Amendment, dealwith other maritime threats that prosperalongside piracy and armed robbery at sea.Alongside an array of capacity buildingendeavours to address Somalia’s maritimesecurity deficit, the international responses incooperation with some littoral Africangovernments probably contributed most tomitigate serious threats in this important oceanregion and the strategic sea lane passingthrough the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Turning to information sharing and the useof dedicated data in particular, the Stable SeasIndex and the Mo Ibrahim Index on AfricanGovernance hold an Africa focus. Updated data


sets on security, governance, threats and ruleof law in coastal states and their littoral watersjointly offer decision-making information todirect or redirect resources to neglecteddomains. The Ibrahim Index is updatedannually offering room to compile littoralcountries’ standings on national security andsafety, rule of law and justice, accountabilityand transparency, and anti-corruption.Although landward, the concept of liminalityconnects landward security conditions to whattranspires in a country’s maritime domain aslandward vulnerabilities and threats also fuelinsecurity at sea by way of interconnectednessand interdependence.

The Stable Seas Index measures maritimesecurity off Africa by way of data sets linked toselected issue areas: Governance (Internationalcooperation, rule of law and maritimeenforcement), economic matters (coastalwelfare, blue economy, fisheries) and threats(piracy and armed robbery, maritime mixedmigration and illicit trades). Collectively, theissue areas offer decision-makers quantifiedindicators on where more attention, resources,capacity building and time are required. Ifemployed alongside the Ibrahim Index securityindicators, decision-makers and otherresponsible parties have an opportunity tocompile a security governance image of theirmaritime areas of responsibility. The artremains to merge available data to build anactionable information picture.

Both above mentioned indexes also allow forcompiling unique regional indicators of the Eastand West African regional economiccommunities discussed earlier. This makes


possible cooperation within regions and notonly to enhance their own capacities, but alsoassist member states to build capacity inneglected areas. Both the YCC as well as theDCoC/JA ultimately depend upon the qualityand functionality of their member countries tocontribute and not allow room for crime,insurgency and terrorism to gain a foothold orfoster hubs of criminality plundering the seas tothe detriment of those who use the oceansresponsibly. In this vein data indexes helpcoastal states as well as regional collections ofcoastal states to build information packages topursue maritime security.

SummaryShipping and related maritime industries

remain the backbone of the global economy andfor national economies. Part of this economicreality resides in and around Africa with its vastocean territories harbouring marine resourcesand shipping lanes. Maritime threats off Africahold stark elements of weak maritime securitygovernance in some regions and these regionshouse the very resources and sea routesdeemed important for economic progress.Subsequently, maritime security governancepromoting stable and safe ocean territories offAfrica remains paramount.

Responses to maritime security threats offAfrica are not always well-exposed, but growthis visible. Architectures for cooperationprobably shows improvement with the Gulf ofGuinea and countries bordering the WesternIndian Ocean reflecting how Africangovernments attempt to cooperate and maketheir oceans safer and more secure. The YCCand DCoC remain two flagship developments


that contribute to more secure ocean territoriesoff Africa.

While efficient information sharing is rightlynoted as a critical element of maritime securitygovernance, the neglected element is reliabledata from indexes. The Mo Ibrahim Indexcombined with the Stable Seas MaritimeSecurity Index offer useful indicators to Africangovernments to better understand theirmaritime security challenges and act where theneed for capacity and resources are foundwanting. If merged with cooperativearrangements the combination offer a viablemodel to help improve maritime security offAfrica.


5 THE FORGOTTEN CHOKE POINTRear Admiral (Retired) Hanno Teuteberg SM MMM

South African Navy

Allow me to start with 2 quotes. The first isfrom Vice Admiral (Retired) Lutz Feldt, in hisexcellent paper entitled Maritime Surveillanceas a Pre-Condition for Maritime Security, and Iquote; “The character of the sea has changed.From an open space where freedom was therule, it has become shared, a common good forhumanity, vast but fragile, needing worldwidemanagement and protection”.

The second comes from closer to home;former President Nelson Mandela at theInternational Fleet Review in Cape Town on 5April 1997, and I quote parts; “The sea is a vitalnational interest and that is why we maintain anavy. We accept our obligation to combinewith other maritime nations to uphold thefreedom of the seas and to protect our nationalinterests through naval power”. The firstquestion is thus; are we heeding these wisewords?

On the Southern tip of Africa lies CapeAgulhas and the Cape of Good Hope. Off theEast coast of Africa, the Cape Sea Route runsoff the dangerous coasts of Somalia and Yemenwhilst to the West, the Gulf of Guinea hasbecome a hotbed of maritime crime. To theSouth lies the unforgiving seas of the roaringforties which channels any shipping traffic closeto the Cape of Good Hope. This Cape dividesthe often strategically overlooked SouthernAtlantic and Indian Oceans and also provides ahandy gateway to Antarctica.

In the past, a choke point would refer to a


specific geographical position. During moderntimes, this may have to be adapted to chokepoint areas. The sea lane of communication(SLOC) is channelled along this area (much likein the Malacca Strait or the Gulf of Aden. TheCape Sea route is channelled along theMozambique channel, and then hugs the SADCcoastline until Saldanha off the West coast.

Depending on the author, there are between9 and 12 international maritime choke points,with the obvious ones being the Strait ofHormutz, Straits of Malacca and the Suez Canaland Sumed pipeline, linked to Bab el-Mandeb.Not mentioned but very much in the picturewith regards to volume, is the Cape Sea route.Current volume places the route in the topthree whilst also acting as a much-neededalternative to routes passing some of the mostvolatile and unpredictable areas in the world.This was well appreciated in 1955 with theSimon’s Town Agreement between the UK andthe then RSA. However, with time and relativesecurity, the route and its strategic importancemay have been forgotten. Vice Admiral Feldtstates that “maritime chokepoints may be localor regional but their importance is global”.Ignoring the importance of the Cape Sea Routeis a mistake; by both the neighbouring SADCcountries and the maritime world as a whole.

The factors affecting maritime security ofany SLOC is quite generic. However, the CapeSea Route has some unique factors that requireinvestigation.

Although the threat of piracy along theSomali coast has diminished, it has all thepotential for future escalation. Until thefailed state scenario ashore has been


rectified, the potential for piracy incidentswill continue to drive insurance costs andsea routing.Climate change is playing a role in

forcing shipping closer inshore along theSouthern coast. This was already takeninto account in drafting the IMO Circular198 of May 1995, entitled “RoutingMeasures other than Traffic SeparationSchemes”. The geo-political environment of the

SADC region has changed dramatically.The previous colonial alignment has beenreplaced by a non-aligned, independentclimate with super power friendshipsvarying greatly. This is furthercomplicated by a number of youngdemocracies with a potential for failedstate status. The current economicclimate, partly due to the Covid 19pandemic, will not assist in theestablishment of a secure environment.Linked to the above, is the new challenge

of the Al-Sunnah insurgency in CaboDelgado, Mozambique and the seeminginability of both Mozambique or SADC tocounter this evolving threat. Al-Sunnahhas the potential of disrupting a 60 BillionDollar gas field investment. In addition,their presence along the coast could alsodisrupt sea traffic making use of theMozambican Channel.Lastly, the void left by departing powers

is being filled by the emergence of Chinaas a super power with associated newresource requirements and ambitions.There are currently more than one million


Chinese nationals residing in Africa. Theyare there to action the wide variety ofChinese investments and projectscurrently underway. Investments andprojects that may require protection.Reports indicate that both India(Seychelles) and China continue in theirefforts to obtain African bases (also Southof Djibouti and even on the West coast ofAfrica). It is important not to place apurely negative perception on theseactions. These long-term strategies maywell be a win-win scenario for all involvedas long as it remains balanced and wellmanaged.

To ensure the maritime security of the searoute, one must first examine the scope of thisterm. The term is a widely used “buzz word”encompassing everything from marine pollutioncontrol to SAR and even full-scale war. This iswell illustrated by the Maritime Security Indexcompiled by Christiaan Bueger in his paperentitled “What is Maritime Security” and usessimilar principles to those proposed by GeoffreyTill in his famous work entitled “Good Order atSea”.

The Index leads us to tasks, missions androles (from which the required tools for the jobcan be deduced). Most relevant in this casewould be salvage, anti-piracy or anti searobbery operations, fishery protection andpollution control. Changes to our worldindicate that PSO and maritime counterterrorism tasks are on the horizon. The biggestchallenge is that these tasks require actionfrom a wide variety of role players. Roleplayers that do not always communicate with


each other and who guard their own territoryand designated budget with much zeal anddiligence.

In Africa, there is a new player on the field,namely private military companies (PMCs).Previously operating ashore, they areincreasingly visible at sea, protecting foreigninvestments left unguarded by neglectedgovernment maritime security assets.Operating in the void left by governmental “seablindness”, they are mostly proving to beeffective despite the misgivings of navalofficers. However, it is imperative that theroles and legality of PMCs be fully appreciatedand managed.

Within the navies themselves, the classic KenBooth trinity of naval missions remain validtoday with an emphasis on the Constabularytasks which could be handled by basic assets.However, maritime assets need to bedeployable. Internet force design comparisonsdo not look into the reality of neglected andinoperable maritime security assets. What isthe availability of the maritime security toolswithin SADC? Allow me to pose some questionsin this regard and we will leave the answers tothe owners of the various processes.

Is the SADC maritime security strategyoperationalised and are the relevantagreements in place to provide a regionalresponse on the operational and tacticallevels?Does SADC have an integrated MDA

picture with a JIIM Command post todirect assets?Do we have the sensors in place to

populate this Common Operating Picture


(COP)? This would include satellites,Shore radars, MSAs, VTS, port controlsand others.Are the processes in place for command

decisions to be taken (delegations) todirect available assets on a 24/7 basis?Do we have the operationally available

forces to deploy as directed? This wouldinclude MSAs, OPVs, IPVs and BoardingParties. In addition, are the forcesinteroperable between the variousdepartments, PMCs and countries?

If the above seems to be lofty ideals, beaware that this is the pure basics and otherregions in Africa are achieving much of thisalready. SADC may have fallen behind.

If the answer to any of the above may be inthe negative, then we within SADC have notsucceeded in providing a secure andsustainable environment to foster maritimesecurity within our region. The lofty ideals andvision of AIMS 2050 and the Djibouti Code willthen remain just that; a vision far removed fromreality. The challenge is twofold:

We need to keep our strategic visionrealistic, achievable and affordable, and

We need to action these strategies toprovide tangible effect to provide therequired maritime security to the CapeSea Route and our region.


6 ARABIAN GULF STATES AND MARITIMESECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Dr. Stephen BlackwellTRENDS Research and Advisory, UAE

In order to defend strategically vitalinternational shipping lanes, the Arabian Gulfcountries have expanded and deepened theircooperation with governments and sub-stateactors in the Horn of Africa in recent years.Threats to the waterways adjacent to the Hornpersist given persistent instability inneighboring countries. Although pirate activityoriginating from Somali territory has abated inrecent years, regional maritime security is alsoimpacted by the ongoing conflict in Yemen.

The main waterways adjacent to this region,the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, constituteone of the most strategically important searoutes in the world. This paper first outlines thenature of the threats to maritime activity fromlittoral states. It then examines the policiespursued by Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates (UAE) as the two most active ArabianGulf states in the area. The paper will concludewith a discussion of how interregionalcooperation between the Gulf and the Horn ofAfrica states might help to stabilize the Horn’sadjacent seas in the future.

Local threats to maritime securityProjecting the Horn’s adjacent seas is an

issue of growing importance, given thatshipping travelling through the Red Sea to theSuez Canal and beyond must transit the Gulf ofAden and the critical chokepoint of the Bab el-Mandab Strait. The strait consists a waterwaythat is only 18 miles wide at its narrowest point


between Yemen and Djibouti, with the routebeing further narrowed into two navigablechannels separated by the Perim Island. In2018, a total of 6.2 million b/d of crude oilshipments passed through the strait accordingto the US Energy Administration.

The security of the waters of the Horn ofAfrica is tied in with the broader global andstrategic importance of the wider Indian Ocean.Within the general regional security context,the political and economic instability that haveaffect the states on the African side of the Gulfof Aden littoral has been a persistent threat.

This is particularly the case with Somalia,which has lacked an effective centralgovernment since 1991. The fragmentation oflocal authority, absence of security governanceand economic deprivation have created thecircumstances whereby piracy has increasinglythreatened shipping The onset and persistenceof insurgency against the Transitional FederalGovernment (TFG) and subsequently theFederal Government of Somalia since 2006 ledto increased attacks on shipping, whichprovoked in turn the creation of the CombinedTask Force 150 anti-piracy coalition tasked withthe mission to protect commercial shipping inthe Gulf of Aden.

Although instances of piracy have declinedmarkedly in recent years, potential threatsremain from both opportunistic raiders andterrorist and insurgent groups. Piracy has beenlargely suppressed by international initiativessuch as the US-led Combined Task Forces, andthe EU’s Operation Atalanta. Nevertheless, theUnited States Maritime Administration(MARAD) continued to warn of the risk of pirate


activity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden inDecember 2020. In the first half of 2020, eightinstances of attempted or suspected piracyagainst shipping were recorded in theinternational recommended transit corridor(IRTC) in the region.

There remains concern that internationalshipping in the Gulf of Aden is at risk ofterrorist attacks stemming from the ongoingconflicts and instability in Yemen. On 3 March2020, it was reported that three skiffs, one ofwhich might have been an unmanned water-borne improvised explosive device (WBIED),attempted to attack a Saudi-flagged vesselsailing 90 nautical miles off the Yemeni port ofNishtun. On May 17, in a similar incident, twoskiffs fired on a British-flagged chemical tankeren route from Al Jubail to the Red Sea. Securityforces on the tanker responded by destroyingone of the skiffs, which was suspected to becarrying explosive substances.

The location of the attack ruled out activityby Houthi rebels, though the Houthis have alsopreviously used WBIEDs in the Bab-El-Mandebstrait to specifically target Saudi vessels.Nevertheless, there are doubts over theexistence of local terrorists with the capabilitiesto launch attacks such as those allegedlyrecorded in March and May 2020. Al Qaeda inthe Arab Peninsula (AQAP) was notorious for itsattack on the USS Cole in 2000 and two attacksnear the port of Mukalah on the SouthernYemen coast in 2016. However, AQAP waseffectively neutralized and broken up by UAE-and US-led counterterrorism operations afterMukalah was pacified in 2016.

Whether the skiff attacks in the Gulf of Aden


were launched by residual terrorist cells ororganized by an external power remains amatter of speculation at present.

Intervention by the Gulf States: SaudiArabia and the UAE

As well as protecting vital interests, Saudiand Emirati activity in the Horn indicates a newassertiveness spurred by intensified geopoliticalrivalries in the wider Middle East and NorthAfrica (MENA) region. In addition, theirgrowing involvement in the region is a reactiveresponse to Iranian support for the Houthirebels in Yemen. In this context, Riyadh andAbu Dhabi are seeking to balance theirtraditional security and military relationshipwith the US with growing commercial linkswith China.

In recent years, the expanding influence ofSaudi Arabia and the UAE in the Horn has beenmanifested through a range of politicalinitiatives, diplomacy, aid, and investment. Inits bilateral relations with regionalgovernments, the UAE in particular has soughtpolitical and security partnerships to build ontraditional commercial ties symbolized by theDubai-based DP World’s development of theDoraleh port in Djibouti after 2006. In addition,Emirati diplomats mediated in the 2018agreement that ended a twenty-year longconflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. BothRiyadh and Abu Dhabi have also intervened toease tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia.

However, relations between the Arabian Gulfstates and the Somali government have beenaffected by rivalries between Saudi Arabia andthe UAE on the one hand and Qatar on theother. The Somali government of President


Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (“Farmaajo”)has been seen as being too dependent on Qatariinvestment and influence, with the result thatthe Saudis and Emiratis have sought to buildtheir security and trading relations with localauthorities in Somalia’s federal states.Following contested election process in Somaliain December 2020, there is a risk that renewedtensions could lead to further fragmentation ofthe state.

Securing local maritime routesOne important development for regional

security has been moves to create a “Red SeaForum” that has the potential to mediatedisputes and address ongoing and emergingthreats. However, a key question is the extentto which external powers should be permittedto shape a regime at the expense of theinterests of the littoral states of Gulf of Adenand the Red Sea. While the EU and China havesuggested their support for a forum, there isskepticism over the extent to which the UnitedStates might become involved, a significantfactor that indicates Washington’s waninginterest in acting as security guarantor in sub-regions such as the Horn.

A multilateral framework could offer a meansof managing a range of issues includingsecurity, conflict management, trade flows andmigration. It could also provide a mechanism toenable African states to engage with ArabianGulf actors to their mutual advantage.However, the efforts made to date suggestdifferences between the potential main players.A joint Saudi-Egyptian initiative launched in2017 a series of high level meetings andongoing engagement, though differences soon


became apparent. By virtue of its geographiclocation, Egypt naturally sees itself as pivotalregion actor through its links to the Arab andAfrican worlds and custodianship of the SuezCanal. To this end, Egyptian diplomats havestressed that a Red Sea forum’s membersshould only include those bordering the seaitself.

ConclusionThe Arabian Gulf States’ engagement in the

Horn of Africa and its adjacent seas thereforederives from evident security, political andeconomic imperatives. While a ‘regime’ such asthe Saudi-Egyptian Red Sea Forum couldemerge, the precise shape of securitygovernance in the region is still in a state offlux. Through measures to build multilateralcooperation on local maritime issues, theArabian Gulf states could play an enhanced rolein underpinning the security of the maritimeroutes adjacent to the Horn of Africa. Thesuccessful Saudi and Emirati mediation effortswith Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea demonstratedthe potential of Gulf involvement in thisrespect.

As the partial rapprochement between SaudiArabia and Qatar is now in place, there ispotential for the Gulf states to adopt a morecoordinated approach to a range of regionalsecurity issues, including a resolution of theYemen conflict, maintenance of the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace, and strengthening the authorityof the Somali government, as essentialelements in securing the Gulf of Aden and RedSea routes.


7 MARITIME POLICY AND ILLEGAL FISHINGIN WEST AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN SECURITYDr. Jude Cocodia

Niger Delta University, Nigeria

IntroductionIllegal fishing has always existed, but the

sharp rise in this practise in recent time hasdrawn attention to it. While so much researchhas been undertaken and policies developed byaffected governments and InternationalGovernmental Organisations (IGOs) to curbpoaching of animals on land and their illegaltrade in order to preserve their species, adearth of research and too few policies havebeen enacted to address Illegal, Unregulatedand Unreported (IUU) fishing. Despite regionaland international efforts to stop IUU fishing thephenomenon is still a growing problem andWest Africa is one of the worst hit regions.

Lacking the resources and capabilities of thedeveloped countries, poorer countries in theglobal south have developed unique approachesto tackling the problem of IUU fishing and thehuman and environmental security risks thatcome with it. Though these have yieldeddifferent degrees of successes, experts andauthors agree that significant and sustainedprogress can only be made when concertedinternational effort is harnessed to deal withthe problem given the fact that thegovernments of the poorer countries do nothave the capability and capacity to combatillegal fishing practices in their territorialwaters. This is evident from the case studiestreated in this chapter. While the effort of


Sierra Leone at checking illegal fishing can becommended, the same cannot be said of Nigeriawhere too little is done. So while the discourseon Nigeria is used to show the impact of illegalfishing on a country’s security if unchecked,Sierra Leone is used to capture the challengesthat have to be braced in order to make littlesuccesses that go a long way preserving humansecurity.

The Problem and Impact on Security ofIllegal Fishing

The nature of IUU fishing makes it difficult toobserve and tackle, since it occurs on the highseas where monitoring or intervening is morestrenuous. The problem of overfishing confrontsmany coastal states and many seem unable tocheck the trend and safeguard marine life andrevert the impact on human and environmentalsecurity. Illegal fishing is connected to crimessuch as forgery, money laundering, labourabuses (slavery), tax evasion and various typesof trafficking. Declining fish stocks, which is theeffect of illegal overfishing is a majorcontributor to the rise in piracy. Denied ofregular healthy fish hauls and with survivalbleak, young fishermen take to piracy.

Decreasing fish stocks have forced fishingoperators to travel further distances to catchfish. More days at sea means higher crew costswhich is circumvented by employing cheapermigrant (or illegal) workers. These workers arevulnerable to human trafficking at sea.Decreasing fish stocks has caused anovercapacity of fishing vessels. These vesselsare well suited for migrant smuggling, illicittrafficking in drugs, piracy, and the operatorsbecome a danger to the coastal state because


they possess good navigational knowledge ofthese coastal waters. The impact of IUUF onmaritime, national and human security isfurther accentuated by the observation that thedeclining fish populations lead to increasedlevels of competition and conflict amongoperators and local fishermen over theremaining stocks, that leads to decreasedeconomic food security, reduced environmentalsustainability and threats to peace and order. Inaddition, IUUF is linked to issues such asinducing slave labour, supporting insurgency,terrorism, organised crime, piracy, kidnapping,illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans and smallarms. Maritime security threats are complexand interconnected, and although they mayoccur at sea they are known to have extensiveon-shore impact. In Africa where there isineffective governance at sea and insufficientcapacity for monitoring, control, andsurveillance (MCS), these threats canproliferate and lead to maritime insecurity. Thedebate therefore should not be about mitigatingthese threats, but addressing illegal fishingwhich gives rise to these threats.

Most authors agree that since illegal fishinghas become a trans-organisational crimeinvolving well connected crime syndicates, itwill take international collaboration to curb it.International political will to curb IUU fishing iscertainly the way forward.

Challenges in Addressing Ilegal Fishingand Improving Maritime Security: Casesfrom West Africa

The capacity of coastal states, especiallydeveloping ones, is a major issue in curbingIUU fishing. Considering their limited naval


capacities, it is difficult to conduct regularpatrols over large areas. This makes it rife forIUU fishing to thrive in these areas since inthese countries, the actual likelihood ofdetection while violating fisheries regulation isclose to zero, vessels involved in IUU fishingare empowered to carry on with their activities.Again, countries with poor governance recordsare more susceptible to IUUF activities. It is forthis reason that many coastal states in Africasuffer the presence of illegal vessels from as faroff as China, European Union, Korea, Russia,Taiwan and Yemen. The poor wages of workersin countries with poor governance, the weakstate of local institutions, and the high level ofpatron-client relationships in these countriesbecause it is a source of survival, occasionsrampant corruption that is exploited by illegalforeign fishing vessels. Maritime officials oftenturn a blind eye in granting licenses to vesselsirrespective of the reputation of these vessels.This symptom negatively affects deterrence,monitoring, enforcement and prosecution andsometimes restrains state officials fromimposing severe penalties, all of which canprevent illegal fishing from occurring.

Nigeria: The rich marine endowments ofNigeria have attracted genuine foreignoperators and investors. This has substantiallygiven rise to illegal coastal activities by foreignand local companies. The huge maritimepolicing deficiencies have aided the growth ofIUU fishing. The depletion of the country’smarine resources compels local and artisanalfishing operators to move farther out to seawith ill-equipped vessels. Such movements havefound them venturing (or straying) into foreign


waters which becomes a threat for potentialconflict between Nigeria and its neighbours.Adding to this problem is the lop-sidedness ofresearch that focuses mainly on improvingmaritime security in relation to militancy andpiracy for improved oil revenue. Similarly, theinland focus of Nigeria’s security has left itsmaritime sphere deprived of necessaryattention.

Sierra Leone: In the past decade, industrialforeign vessels have increased their presenceand illegal activities in Sierra Leonean waterseither on their own or by enticing small-scalefishers into illicit partnerships, such as actingas trans-shipment vessels in near shore areas.This increase in fishing activities that impact onthe operations of the local fishermen promptedthem to take matters up in protecting theirlivelihood. Consequently, local fishermen havechased and boarded illegal vessels and handedthem over to the navy for prosecution. Theselocal fishermen stood up to protect theirlivelihood and their environment.

The government of Sierra Leone made theeffort to install Satellite Technology andAutomated Information Systems (STAIS) toimprove Monitoring, Control and Surveillance(MCS) of its waters. This has led to an increasein the number of offenders caught and chargedwith the highest fines. While some experts feelthat the fines are not enough to deter illegalactivity since offenders often have more thanenough to pay, a study by Doumbouya et alconcludes that illegal fishing declines as thefines imposed become more severe.Complementing the use of technology thegovernment of Sierra Leone in April of 2019


imposed a one-month ban on all fishing byforeign vessels to protect its resources. Thispolicy was to combat IUU fishing in itsterritorial waters. The ban temporarily easedthe tension between international fishingvessels and the local fishermen and broughtrelief to the latter who are forced to travelmuch further into the sea to get good hauls.Some experts argue that exercising such bansabout three times in a year will surely help thesocio-economy of Sierra Leone as the country’sfishermen will have access to more fish,improve their economic standing and thusreduce the threat of piracy. The economies ofsome coastal towns rely solely on fishing, so,leaving three months of the year to the localfishermen, will not only check overfishing andenvironmental/marine devastation, it willempower locals economically and so curbpiracy, and encourage them to partner with thegovernment in checking illegal fishing and itsattendant negative impact on state and humansecurity.

ConclusionWhere illegal fishing is allowed to thrive,

poverty is more widespread among populationsof coastal towns and especially in areas wherethe majority population depend on artisanalfishing for survival. Illegal fishing has thus beenlinked to security threats such as sea piracyand human trafficking and smuggling whichexplains the emphasis on countries policingtheir coastal waters to curb illegal fishing. Insupporting this approach to curbing illegalfishing, the debate therefore should not beabout mitigating these threats, but addressingillegal fishing which gives rise to these threats.


The uneven approach to the problem atregional level hampers collective internationaleffort which is badly needed to check illegalfishing and its impact on a nation’s security. Inview of what it will cost in terms of equipmentand training to effectively police internationalwaters, most African countries cannot go italone. A lot also depends on the countries oforigin of the foreign vessels involved in illegalfishing to be sincere in their efforts to stop thistrade.


ABOUT THE ACADEMIC PARTNERSAND THE CONTRIBUTORS

The Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf StatesUniversity of Haifa, Israel

The main mission of the Ezri Center for Iran& Gulf States, University of Haifa, is to promoteresearch, achieve a better and deeperunderstanding, and provide crucial insights intothe society, economy, politics, religion andculture of Iran and other countries of the Gulf,through the expertise of a sterling team ofspecialists and the employment ofinterdisciplinary tools and methods, coveringthe region's past, present and future. The EzriCenter also aims at becoming a hub ofadvanced research on the relations betweenIsrael and Iran as well as one on the Jewishcommunities of the Gulf, and particularly Iran.Through its various activities - which includeinnovative research, policy analysis, local andinternational conferences, workshops,symposia, colloquia, occasional lectures, booklaunches, film presentations, exhibitions, andcultural activities - the Ezri Center wishes toprovide a better and deeper understanding ofthe complexity and the undercurrent processesof Iran and other countries of the Gulf as wellas the region as a whole. The Center also drawson the vibrant local Iranian and Arabcommunities, as well as the cooperation andcollaboration of other Institutes and Centers,for events aimed at the dissemination of andfamiliarity with the Iranian and Arab arts andculture.


The Department of Political Studies andGovernance, The University of the Free State,South Africa

The Department of Political Studies andGovernance consists of two components:Governance and Political Transformation andPolitical Science. These components or divisionshave their own distinct institutional roles andfunctions, but they find common ground in theirrelation to the study of the state, government,relevant non-governmental institutions, andpolitics in general. Much of the common scholarlyfocus, interest, and research relate to the scienceand art of government; the science dealing withthe form, policies, organization, andadministration of the state or a part of one; andwith the regulation of its relations with otherstates and non-governmental organizations.

The Department provides an ideal setting forstudents at all levels of undergraduate andpostgraduate study to engage with novel ideasthrough learning, practicing scholarship, andcreative research in various sub-fields of politicsand governance, as well as in an array ofinterdisciplinary areas of inquiry. Its aim is toencourage its students to think broadly, critically,and internationally about the core features ofdemocratic and global citizenship.

Its mission is to pursue excellence throughquality teaching, research, institutional andcommunity engagement. This it seeks to achievethrough offering innovative and relevantprograms on national, regional, African, andglobal issues and the creation of opportunities todevelop competent staff in teaching and research.It does this with a staff on all three campuses ofthe University of the Free State.


Security Institute for Governance andLeadership in Africa (SIGLA), The University ofStellenbosch, South Africa

SIGLA is a research institute of StellenboschUniversity located with the Faculty of MilitaryScience, Saldanha, South Africa. SIGLA envisagesto position itself as one of the leading Africanresearch institutions and strives to buildleadership capacity and generate knowledgeresources in the areas of security governance insupport of sustainable development. SIGLArecognises that without governance andleadership neither security, nor development maybe sustained.

SIGLA’s research activities relating toleadership and governance on the Africancontinent focus upon landward, maritime andcyber security governance. SIGLA buildspartnerships with likewise institutions such as theUNODC Maritime Crime Programme, the RoyalDanish Defence College, NMIOTC on maritimesecurity and anti-piracy, and the Institute forSecurity Studies (Pretoria) to execute its mission.Faculty members, an international grouping ofResearch Fellows and Extraordinary Professorswork with SIGLA in the respective focus areas.Knowledge products are offered by way ofseminars/webinars, offering a platform forcollaborative research, partnerships on researchprojects, a series of annual SIGLA Briefs andresearch articles and participating in bookpublications. More information is available at:About SIGLA (sun.ac.za)


AUTHOR BIO

Dr. Serge Tshibangu is Special Envoy of thePresident of the Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC). Since President Felix Tshisekedi wasofficially sworn in as President of the DRC, Dr.Serge Tshibangu became his Advisor and later,the head of Politics and Diplomacy commissionin the Presidential Task Force. He holds a PhDdegree in Petroleum Engineering and a Masterof Engineering degree in Electrical andInformation engineering from the University ofthe Witwatersrand (WITS) in South Africa. Also,he has a specialisation in International TradeLaw from the World Trade Institute/Universityof Bern, Switzerland and another Specialisationin Defense and Security Development Strategyfrom the College of Hautes Etudes de Stratégieet Defense (CHESD). For the past two years ofwork at the Presidency of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, Dr. Tshibangu was head ofthe Congolese Government team thatnegotiated with General Electric South AfricaLtd. the signing of a 1.8 billion worth of energyand health infrastructure projects. He was alsothe head of the Congolese Task team that led tothe revival of the Military Cooperation with theUSA which was suspended 9 years ago. Hefinally led the DRC Task Force Team on AGOAwhich led to the reintegration of the DRC in theAGOA program. Dr. Serge Tshibangu is fluentin English, French, Lingala and Swahili.

Rear Admiral (Retired) Hanno TeutebergSM MMM joined the South African Navy (SAN)in 1977. He qualified as a submariner and thencompleted his Officers training in 1979. He served


as a Combat Officer onboard several surface shipsuntil returning to his submarine roots in 1985.From 1985 to 1996, he served onboard all SANsubmarines in all Combat Officer posts,completing his stint there with command of aDaphne Class submarine. During this period hewas also involved in all submarine upgradeprogrammes and lastly as the user specialist forthe Type 209 acquisition project. After completingstudies in Business Management and Staffcourses, he returned to Simon’s Town as theSenior Officer Submarines over the period 1999to 2001. From 2001 to 2003, he served as theDirector Fleet Quality Assurance, responsible formaintaining the standards of the sea-going fleet.He had the honour of serving as the DefenceAttaché to Berlin (Germany) over the period 2003to 2006. This period coincided with the delivery of4 SAN Frigates and 2 Submarines (acquired fromthe German Defence Industry). From July 2006until Dec 2008, he served in the post of DirectorFleet Force Preparation. The post has functionalcontrol over the SAN ships and submarines incommission and is responsible for preparing allSAN operational forces for employment by JointHead Quarters. He served as the DirectorMaritime Warfare from June 2009 until December2010 in Pretoria where he was responsible forcurrent and future naval force employment,design and doctrine. From December 2010 untilNovember 2011 he was employed as the Chief ofFleet Staff at Fleet Command in Simon's Townafter which he assumed the position of DirectorJoint Force Preparations and Training with Chiefof Joint Operations in Pretoria. He was appointedas Chief Director Maritime Strategy at the NavyHeadquarters as from 01 February 2013 and asDeputy Chief of the Navy on 1 April 2014. He


retired from this post on 31 March 2017. Sinceretirement, he has remained current in matters ofmaritime security and had presented papers atnumerous institutions, including the annual SMMMaritime Conference in Hamburg, Germany. RAdm (Ret) Teuteberg has received training in thefollowing fields: Surface and sub-surface maritimeoperations, National and Military Strategy,Business Planning and processes, Joint andmilitary operations and the planning thereof andCombat and Mission Readiness Training for Joint(Army included) and Naval Forces. He has beenawarded several decorations, including theSouthern Cross, Military Merit Medal as well asthe Navy Cross Decorations from both Argentinaand Brazil. Hanno Teuteberg is a keen yachtsmanand has participated in ocean races on all oceans,including Admiral’s Cup and Fastnet Races. Hehas also won the Cape to Rio Yacht Race on-LineHonours as well as handicap (Class 2). He hasbeen presented with provincial and nationalcolours for yachting.

Mr. Hirotaka Mori is Head of Japan ShipCentre(JSC) in London and Director-Maritime,London office of Japan External TradeOrganization(JETRO). He studied Mechanical andAerospace Engineering at Tohoku university inJapan, and joined the Ministry of Land,Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism in 2001. Atthe ministry, he has been in charge of policymaking for all transportation mode includingmaritime, aviation and automobile. He also has aunique experience at Japanese shipping companywhere he was in charge of the procurement ofnew building vessels in 2018-2020. Following thevarious maritime experience, he joined the JSCand JETRO in July, 2020. He is in charge of


research and analysis of maritime market aroundEurope in addition to promoting Japanesemaritime industries including Shipbuilding andShip machinery industries.

JETRO is a government-related organizationthat works to promote mutual trade andinvestment between Japan and the rest of theworld. One of the main activities of JETRO Londonis to support British, Irish, Swedish and Finnishcompanies looking to invest in Japan.

JSC was established in London in 1965 as ajoint office of Japan Ship Exporters’ Association(JSEA) and Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO). Since its establishment, JSC has beenactive for research, public relation andinternational cooperation on maritime market, asa bridge between Japanese shipbuilding / marineequipment industry and European maritimeindustries.

Professor Francois Vreÿ is EmeritusProfessor in Military Sciences, StellenboschUniversity He lectured in the Faculty of MilitaryScience, Stellenbosch University for 22 years andnow serves as the Research Coordinator for theSecurity Institute for Governance and Leadershipin Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch University. He isa C1 Rated Researcher of the National ResearchFoundation of South Africa. His research fieldsinclude Africa’s emerging maritime securitysetting and maritime security governance offAfrica in particular. His current post involvesbuilding international research partnerships onleadership, landward and maritime securitygovernance, and cyber security.

Dr. Stephen Blackwell is an analyst,researcher, and writer with more than 20 years’


experience in roles across the think-tank,academic and media sectors. He is the author of abook entitled British Military Intervention and theStruggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser, andthe Middle East Crisis, 1955-1958, as well asnumerous journal articles and book chapters. Hehas also written for the opinion and news analysissections of The National, Abu Dhabi’s first Englishlanguage newspaper. Dr. Blackwell previouslyworked as a Researcher at the Emirates Center ofStrategic Studies and Research in Abu Dhabi.Before moving to the UAE, he was Head of theEuropean Security Program at the Royal UnitedServices Institute in London and Editor for Jane’sSentinel Security Assessments. He has alsolectured at University College London (UCL) andat the University of Aberystwyth, where he alsocompleted his doctoral thesis on ‘Anglo-AmericanDefense Policy in the Middle East, 1957-1962’.

Mr. Timothy Walker is the Maritime ProjectLeader and a Senior Researcher at the Institutefor Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa.Since 2011 he has worked to promote maritimesecurity as a policy priority with organisationssuch as the African Union, the EconomicCommunity of West African States, the SouthernAfrican Development Community and the IndianOcean Rim Association. He is currently leadingthe implementation of an ISS project tostrengthen African maritime security institutions.His areas of interest include maritime security,piracy, the blue economy, China-Africa relations,international relations theory and human security.He has a master’s degree in political andinternational studies from Rhodes University inSouth Africa.


Glen Segell (DPhil, FRGS) is Research Fellowat the University of the Free State, South Africaand Professor at the University of Cambridge,England. He was born in South Africa andeducated to a BA and MA at the HebrewUniversity Jerusalem and to a Doctor ofPhilosophy (DPhi)l at the University of Oxford. Hespecializes in intelligence studies, civil-militaryrelations, the nexus between air and sea powerand strategic communications where he alsoconsults as an expert for NATO. He has heldteaching and research positions in the UnitedKingdom, Israel and South Africa. These includethe Center for Defence Studies King’s CollegeLondon, The University of Reading, The Institutefor National Security Studies Tel Aviv and theEzri Center for Iran and Gulf States Research,University of Haifa. He holds the rank ofBrigadier-General (Reserves). He was involved inactive intelligence and offense operations in Iraq,Kuwait, Sudan and Libya. He has published asubstantial number of peer reviewed articles andbooks. ORCID 0000-0002-4186-2761

Dr. Jude Cocodia is an Assistant Professor(Senior Lecturer) and Acting Head of theDepartment of Political Science, Niger DeltaUniversity, Nigeria. He has a BA and MA inPhilosophy from the University of Ibadan andErasmus University Rotterdam respectively. Healso holds an MSc and PhD in InternationalRelations from the University of Benin, and theUniversity of Nottingham respectively. He is a2014 awardee of the International PeaceResearch Association and an Associate Fellow ofthe Higher Education Academy, UK (2016). Heauthored the book Peacekeeping in the AfricanUnion: Building Negative Peace (Routledge, 2017)


and has written several book chapters, journalarticles and working papers for research think-tanks on security and development in Africa.Some of his current research include: theconstructivist influences of Nigeria’s Heads State;Small and light weapons and Terrorism in Africa;and the relevance of the African Union to thecontinent’s development. Outside academics, Judeworked with Everyone Counts InternationalCharity, a London based NGO as the ProjectCoordinator in Yenagoa, Nigeria (2011-2012) andLondon, UK (2013-2016).


ABSTRACTS

Rear Admiral (Retired) Hanno TeutebergSM MMM

The Forgotten Choke PointOn the Southern tip of Africa lies Cape Agulhas

and the Cape of Good Hope, forming the naturalchoke point for the Cape Sea Route. This chokepoint ranks right up there with Hormutz, Malaccaand Suez. In terms of volume, it remains in thetop five choke points globally. So important thatthe Simon’s Town Agreement (1955) between thethen United Kingdom and Union of South Africawas specifically signed to help guarantee themaritime security of this Sea Lane ofCommunication. However, for some reasons, it isoften ignored, perhaps due to its remoteness andperceived stability along its borders. This is truefor even the SADC states, despite the fact thatmore than 90% of all imports and exports arrivingor departing southern African shores do so via thesea – truly an island economy. The factorsaffecting the security of the Cape Sea route aredynamic and requires investigation to betterunderstand the current situation and futurescenarios. The maritime security index, tasks andtoolbox are well known factors. Where does theSADC region stand in terms of these tools? Manystrategies and plans with not so much actualaction. Investigating the existing deltas in thismaritime toolbox in order to fill the gaps hasbecome a matter of priority.

Mr. Hirotaka MoriThe Safety of Shipping off Africa - A Japanese

PerspectiveJapan mostly depends on the maritime

transportation to import energy/mineral


resources, marine/agricultural products and otherresources, accounting for 99.6 % of total tradevolume(tons). Ensuring the safety of navigation ofocean-going vessels is much important forJapanese economy and their lives. The Gulf ofAden, which is on the important sea-transportation route connecting Asia and Europeand is about 12,000 km away from Japan, is one ofthe most important area because about 1,700Japan-related vessels (vessels registered in Japan,and vessels registered in other countries butoperated by foreign companies which are whollyowned by Japanese shipping companies) passthere. The piracy off the coast in the area hasremained a big threat for Japanese shippingcompanies, although the number of the piracy hasmarked a significant reduction. In this webinar,speaker introduces Japan’s effort andinternational contribution against piracy, andsome practice of Japanese shipping companies.

Emeritus Professor Francois VreyPromoting maritime security off Africa:

Threats, cooperation and the use of dataMaritime insecurity plagues swathes of ocean

landscapes off Africa. The said insecuritycomprises multiple interconnected threats andvulnerabilities that call for smart retorts.Cooperation and credible data sets are twoimportant factors to direct capacity building andcountermeasures in support of more profitableand predictable ocean environments for shippingand other economic uses of the ocean as atransport and resource medium. A securemaritime setting off Africa, furthers safershipping lanes and port visits for ocean goingvessels. Cooperation implies buildingpartnerships and using existing regional


cooperation arrangements as well as focused bi-and multilateral collaboration to address threats.Data access calls for using and refining existingdata sets on Africa and its surrounding oceans tohelp governments direct resources and skillswhere the need is greatest. Collectively,cooperation and data (including informationsharing) help authorities and other maritimeagencies to better protect ocean territories andrelated infrastructure for the safe use by industryand ensure productive ocean landscapes forfuture generations.

Dr. Stephen BlackwellArabian Gulf states and maritime security in

the Horn of AfricaIn order to defend the strategically vital

shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea,the Arabian Gulf countries have expanded anddeepened their cooperation with the Horn ofAfrica in recent years. This increased activity hasbeen spurred by a range of factors included theupsurge of piracy following Somalia’sfragmentation and the ongoing civil conflict inYemen. Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates (UAE) in particular become moreproactive in terms of security engagement withlocal actors. As well as protecting vital interests,this activity indicates a new assertiveness spurredby intensified geopolitical rivalries in the widerMiddle East and North Africa (MENA) region.Given the recent instability and economicdislocation in the Horn of Africa, there is agrowing imperative for improved multilateralcooperative and governance mechanisms tomanage the full spectrum of risks which persist inthe region.


Mr. Timothy WalkerA critical comparative analysis of the

implementation of the EU and AU's maritimestrategies

I outline the development and implementationof the maritime strategies of the European Unionand the African Union. The success of the EU isunderpinned by a stronger recognition of/lessreluctance to cooperate in spite of maritimesecurity’s supranational dimensions. The EU’sintergovernmental component is wellinstitutionalised, whereas the AU's is challengedby the fact that its strategy has to beoperationalised outside of a supranationalframework and its intergovernmental element iscomparatively weaker.

Dr. Glen SegellNATO’s maritime dimension vis-a-vis AfricaThe African coast and landward from it have

always been a central focus of NATO. NATO is aregional security alliance formed in 1949 wherethe Atlantic Ocean, north of the Tropic of Cancer,and the Mediterranean Sea are part of its region(in-area). Africa is the southern border of NATO inEurope. Some NATO member states share theMediterranean as a maritime border with NorthAfrican states. Their economies through tradedepends on secure sea routes and shippingsecurity in the Mediterranean and onwardthrough the Straights of Gibraltar and the SuezCanal. Where necessary NATO has also conductedmilitary operations out of area to protect shippingoff Africa’s coasts for example the Horn of Africaand also landward, for example in Sudan,Somalia, and Libya. NATO assistance and militaryinvolvement is in two focuses 1) the NATOMediterranean Dialogue and 2) support for the


African Union. There are also specific operationsfor immediate security needs for example tosupport United Nations Resolutions in 2011 onLibya.

Dr. Jude CocodiaMaritime Policing and Illegal Fishing in West

Africa: Implications for Environmental andHuman Security

Illegal fishing has long been in existence, butresearch on it and its ripple effects on theenvironment and man has been relatively new.Newer still is establishing the nexus betweenillegal fishing, maritime policing and humansecurity. This chapter addresses this issue andcontends that in contributing significantly tooverfishing, illegal fishing pushes local fishermenout of their livelihoods, runs down coastaleconomies and so encourages sea piracy andtrafficking among other social ills. The studies ofNigeria and Sierra Leone used in this chapterpresent two very different approaches to theproblem. Much of the effort of these countries hasbeen local or national, and as such, a lot remainunachieved. To address this problem effectively,countries ought to have a seaward focus onsecurity just as they do toward land, and seekinternational and regional cooperation in doingso.

Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of HaifaDepartment of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State

Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, University of StellenboschInternational e-Conference

Shipping Security: Maritime Aspects off AfricaFebruary 18, 2021

Time: 10:00-12:00 (South Africa Time)

Moderator

Professor Hussein SolomonDepartment of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa

Opening Remarks

Dr. Serge Tshibangu Special Envoy of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo / Chairperson of the African Union

Presenters

Mr. Timothy WalkerInstitute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South AfricaA critical comparative analysis of the implementation of the EU and AU's maritime strategies

Dr. Glen SegellUniversity of the Free State, South Africa / Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, IsraelNATO’s maritime dimension vis-a-vis Africa.

Mr. Hirotaka Mori Japan Ship Centre, London and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), London Office The Safety of Shipping off Africa: A Japanese Perspective

Emeritus Professor Francois VreySecurity Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) University of Stellenbosch, South Africa Promoting maritime security off Africa: Threats, cooperation and the use of data

Rear Admiral (Retired) Hanno Teuteberg SM MMMSouth African NavyThe Forgotten Choke Point

Dr. Stephen Blackwell Trends Research and Advisory, UAE Arabian Gulf states and maritime security in the Horn of Africa

Dr. Jude CocodiaNiger Delta University, NigeriaMaritime Policing and Illegal Fishing in West Africa: Implications for Environmentaland Human Security

Q&A at end of conference by submitting written questions via Chat only

This volume is a collection of the proceedings of theinternational conference “Shipping Security: MaritimeAspects off Africa,” that was held as an online event due toCOVID-19 on 18 February 2021 and open to a globalpublic audience. The video recording of the webinar wasmade available after the event. There has been a rigorouspeer-review of the presentations published in this volume.The volume has been edited by Dr. Glen Segell, Ezri Centerfor Iran & Gulf States Research, University of Haifa, Israeland the Department of Political Studies and Governance,University of the Free State, South Africa. Contributors inaddition to the Chapter from the Editor are Openingremarks by Dr. Serge Tshibangu, Special Envoy of thePresident of the Democratic Republic of the Congo /Chairperson of the African Union, and Chapters by RearAdmiral (Retired) Hanno Teuteberg SM MMM, SouthAfrican Navy, Mr. Hirotaka Mori, Japan Ship Centre,London and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO),London Office, Emeritus Professor Francois Vrey, SecurityInstitute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA)University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, Mr. TimothyWalker, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, Dr.Stephen Blackwell, Trends Research and Advisory, UAE,and Dr. Jude Cocodia, Niger Delta University, Nigeria .

shipping security: maritime aspects off africa

Documents