Securing a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran

Our National Interests Dictate our Objectives

Vital Survival of the Iranian Islamic Republic with our Fundamental Institutions and Values intactStability of Iran and our Territorial IntegrityPrevention of a Military Attack on IranEnhancement of Iran‘s Power within the Region and Beyond

Very Important Survival of Iranian allies (Hezbollah, Syria)Promoting the prosperity and virtue of Iran‘s population

Objective

Secure a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran by completing at least three nuclear weapons by 2012 while avoiding an attack

IAEA inspectors obstruct secret enrichment

Single, concentrated enrichment facility in Natanz as large target

Economic situation inside Iran already fragile

Enemies‘ fear may trigger attack Economic sanctions may stir

turmoil inside Iran Technical difficulties with IR-2

may delay enrichment

Strong options for distraction and chaos (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi‘a Insurgents in Iraq)

Domestic enrichment process means time is our ally

IR-2 will speed up enrichment, offers diversification

Reluctant, over-stretched enemy may endure more provocations

Enemies‘ split interests offer chance for division

Background Analysis

Assessment of Key Players

Player Interests/ Drivers Weaknesses

U.S. Ensure stability in region; decrease price of oil; restore US credibility in region; avoid regional hegemon; ensure Israel’s security; ensure no nuclear weapons in the region (ex. Israel); Iran’s regime transformation/change

Weak standing and influence in the region due to Iraq and lack of progress in the Peace process; economic downturn; dependence on the regional oil supply; increasing influence of Russia/China in the region

Israel Ensure survival; mitigate Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah

Regional geopolitics; loss in the 2006 Lebanon war

EU/EU-3 Economic and energy ties to the region; sympathetic to peaceful nuclear energy

Lack of a unified policy toward Iran; economic dependence on oil

China/Russia Expand economic ties; get access to energy sector

Increasing economic ties to Iran; must maintain delicate balance between US and Iran

IAEA Maintain credibility of the NPT regime; prevent nuclear Iran; prevent nuclear arms race in the region

Iran controls access; NPT has loopholes

Nuclear map

Covert site possibility• Along route to Tehran• Provides cover for

transport• Sufficiently distant from

Natanz (approx 100 miles)

“Iran doesn’t have the bomb now, but will

have it soon, thus we have to act”

“Iran doesn’t have the bomb now, but will

have it soon, thus we have to act”

We need to change the enemies‘ perception

“Iran doesn‘t want the Bomb so we don‘t have to stop them“

“Iran doesn‘t want the Bomb so we don‘t have to stop them“

“Iran wants the bomb but it is too costly to

stop them“

“Iran wants the bomb but it is too costly to

stop them“

Problem: Continued enrichment reinforces

this perception

To prevent an attack we need to change the

perception in one of two ways

AA BB

Technological implementation cannot be our only concern

Geostrategic End-State

Information Policy

Technical Implementation

Middle EasternBrotherhood

Divide and Conquer

Autarky

Accomodating

Ambiguous

Assertive

Concealment

Diversification

Fast Forward

Current capabilities and paths for completion by 2012

Goal: 3 BombsGoal: 3 Bombs

Uranium EnrichmentUranium

Enrichment

Plutonium Option

Plutonium Option

BushehrLightwaterBushehr

Lightwater

Arak Heavy Water

Arak Heavy Water

Summer 2011

2012

• Must exit NPT• Single Target

Impossible

Problematic

Project Completion Completion

• 3,000 P-1 at Natanz• + 200 IR-2 per month• 1 bomb after 6 months• 3 bombs after 12 months• 6 bombs by 12/2008

Optimal Enrichment Scenario:

• Time-frame too long

All three options generate enough material by 12 / 2012

“Charming Our Way to the Bomb“1• 3,000 P-1 at Natanz (normal rate)• + 200 IR-2 per month (25% lower rate)• 1 bomb after 6 months• 3 bombs after 13 months• 5 bombs by 12/2009

“Distract and Deter“2• 3,000 P-1 at Natanz (25% lower rate)• + 200 IR-2 per month (25% lower rate,

no enrichment before 11/2008) • 1 bomb after 7 months• 3 bombs after 16 months• 4 bombs by 12/2009

“Autarky and Micro-Enrichment“3• 3,000 P-1 at Natanz (50% lower rate)• + 200 IR-2 per month (50% lower rate)

1 bomb after 8 months• 3 bombs after 20 months• 3 bombs by 12/2009

Charming our Way to the Bomb1

RISK of

attack

RISK of

attackIMPAC

T of attack

IMPACT of

attack

COSTCOST

60/100

60/100

80/100

80/100

20/100

20/100

Mislead the enemy:• Continue P-1 enrichment, but focus on IR-2• Seek to complicate and delay IAEA negotiations, e.g.

offer multinational consortium

Pacify the enemy: • Collaborate in Iraq; restrain Hezbollah in Lebanon• Abstain from provocation in the Gulf• Moderate public discourse and favor moderate Presidential candidate

Engage the enemy: Encourage economic and security collaboration with Arabs Offer advantageous energy deals to EU, China, India

CONoVery high risk that our real intentions will be detectedoNegotiation over IR-2 enrichment at Natanz will slow production process

CONoVery high risk that our real intentions will be detectedoNegotiation over IR-2 enrichment at Natanz will slow production process

PROoMinimizes economic sanctions to ensure political stability in IranoCreates the basis for long-term Iranian hegemony in the Middle East

Distract most likely attacker (Zionists)• Arm, instigate Hezbollah, Hamas• Provoke Zionist Aggression against Lebanon, Gaza

Demonstrate credible threat but don’t provoke U.S.• Conduct missile tests • Fake intelligence about possession of bomb• Allude to nuclear retaliation to Zionist attack• Keep Shi‘a Militias in Iraq generally calm but prepare to instigate of chaos

Accelerate and spread out enrichment• Make life harder for inspectors, conduct calculated violations of IAEA rules• Push Natanz and secret enrichment at other sites

Distract and Deter2

RISK of

attackIMPAC

T of attack

IMPACT of

attack

COSTCOST

30/100

30/100

40/100

40/100

40/100

40/100

CONoRisk of attack if we are caught bluffingoAdditional sanctions, but relatively easy to escape in the long run

CONoRisk of attack if we are caught bluffingoAdditional sanctions, but relatively easy to escape in the long run

PROoFastest way to the bomboUncertainty will split international community (especially China, Russia)

PROoFastest way to the bomboUncertainty will split international community (especially China, Russia)

Autarky and Micro-Enrichment3

RISK of

attack

RISK of

attackIMPAC

T of attack

IMPACT of

attack

COSTCOST

20/100

20/100

20/100

20/100

90/100

90/100

Undermine success of attack Immediately diversify to large number of targets Create capability to quickly reconstitute program Move most sensitive material to densely populated areas

Distract the enemy Trigger large conflict between Zionists, Hezbollah, Hamas Create chaos in Iraq by leveraging Shi‘a militias to tie down U.S.

Cut all links to the outside Exit Non-Proliferation Treaty Send inspectors home Prepare for Economic and Security autarky

CONoHigh economic cost, possibly also in the long runoRisk that difficulties of coordinating centrifuges may delay production

CONoHigh economic cost, possibly also in the long runoRisk that difficulties of coordinating centrifuges may delay production

PROoDoes not count on deceiving the enemyoVery narrow window for enemy attack

PROoDoes not count on deceiving the enemyoVery narrow window for enemy attack

Recommendation: “Distract and Deter“Fall back Option: „Autarky“

60/10060/100 80/10080/100 20/10020/100

30/10030/100 40/10040/100 40/10040/100

20/10020/100 20/10020/100 90/10090/100

RISK of

attack

RISK of

attack

IMPACT of

attack

IMPACT of

attack

COSTCOST

“Charming Our Way to the Bomb“

“Distract and Deter“

1

2

3 “Autarky and Micro-Enrichment “

Option 2: “Distract and Deter“ balances risk of attack, impact of attack and economic costs most effectively

Implementation requires 2-step strategy: moderation until US elections, escalation thereafter

Until 11 / 2012: Moderation, ambiguity and diversification Create ambiguity

o Publicly deny first use doctrineo Conduct missile testso Fake intelligence about possession of bomb

Continue current game with IAEA until US elections to moderate resulto Calculated violations of IAEA rules, obstruction of inspectionso Install IR-2 at secret enrichment sites but wait with operation

Lull the enemyo Moderate Hezbollah, Hamas while supplying with funds, armso Cooperate in Iraq and hold back Shi‘a militias

12 / 2012 Chaos and Enrichment Push Instigate major conflict between Zionists and Hezbollah / Hamas Initiate surge in Iraqi violence for initial distraction of Great Satan Condem aggression by Zionists, great Satan as excuse for short-term non-cooperation

with IAEA but continue cooperating after Use distraction to withdraw material from Natanz