secured operating regions of slotted aloha in the presence of interfering signals from other...
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Secured Operating Regions of Slotted ALOHA in the Presence of Interfering Signals from Other Networks and DoS Attacking Signals
Jahangir H. Sarker and Hussein T. Mouftah
School of Information Technology and Engineering (SITE), University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 6N5
E-mail: [email protected]
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Outline of the Presentation• Potential applications of Slotted ALOHA.
• GSM-the most successful cellular system.• Slotted ALOHA and GSM system.
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)-next most widely used technology.
• Slotted ALOHA and RFID system.• Applications of RFID technology.• Slotted ALOHA in the presence of interfering signals from other
networks and the DoS attacking signals.• Security problem of Slotted ALOHA system in the presence of
interfering signals from other networks and the DoS attacking signals.• Security improvement using multiple channels and capture. • Security improvement by limiting the number of retransmission trials.• Security improvement using new packet rejection. • Conclusions
2J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Potential Applications of Slotted ALOHA
• The random access channels (RACH) of Global System for Mobile (GSM) communications
• The random packet access channels (RPACH) General Packet Radio Services (GPRS)
• Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) system
• cdma2000• IEEE 802.16 • IEEE 802.11
3J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
GSM-the Most Successful Cellular System 1/(2)
4
http://www.dailywireless.org/2009/08/21/4-billion-gsm-users-sept-2009/
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
GSM-the Most Successful Cellular System 2/(2)
5
http://www.dailywireless.org/2009/08/21/4-billion-gsm-users-sept-2009/
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Slotted ALOHA and GSM System 1/(7)
6
• Mainly 3 elements– MS– BS– MSC
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Slotted ALOHA and GSM System 2/(2)
7J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Slotted ALOHA and GSM System 3/(7)
8
UPLINK DOWNLINK 25 MHz 25 MHz
200 kHz
TDMA burst, time slot, 0.557 ms
8 x 0.557 msTDMA frame
3 58 bit 26 bit 58 bit 3 8.25
TB message test sequence message TB GP
FDMA
GSM CHANNEL ALLOCATION• 890-915 MHz for uplink • 935-960 MHz for Downlink• 200 kHz carrier spacing• This gives 124 possible carriers in UL
and DL.• Fu(n)=890.2+0.2(n-1) MHz
1<=n<=124• Fu(n) =Fu(n)+45 MHz
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Slotted ALOHA and GSM System 4/(7)
9
UPLINK DOWNLINK 25 MHz 25 MHz
200 kHz
TDMA burst, time slot, 0.557 ms
8 x 0.557 msTDMA frame
3 58 bit 26 bit 58 bit 3 8.25
TB message test sequence message TB GP
FDMA
GSM CHANNEL ALLOCATION
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Slotted ALOHA and GSM System 5/(7)
10
UPLINK DOWNLINK 25 MHz 25 MHz
200 kHz
TDMA burst, time slot, 0.557 ms
8 x 0.557 msTDMA frame
3 58 bit 26 bit 58 bit 3 8.25
TB message test sequence message TB GP
FDMA
GSM CHANNEL ALLOCATION
Random accesschannels
Traffic channels
R BR1
BR 11
BR 111
2
x
x/
x/
x/S
S
S
Sx
R
Rx/1
Rx/
Rx/
rejection
success
blocked
RSx 1
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Slotted ALOHA and GSM System 6/(7)
11
Random accesschannels
Traffic channels
R BR1
BR 11
BR 111
2
x
x/
x/
x/S
S
S
Sx
R
Rx/1
Rx/
Rx/
rejection
success
blocked
RSx 1
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Slotted ALOHA and GSM System 7/(7)
12
There are five different structures of the RACH [24, 25] with approximately 400,000 and n*780,000 RACH slots per hour (n= 1, 2, 3, 4). It is interesting to know the exact choice of these five different possibilities. According to specifications, a maximum of r retransmissions is allowed for each mobile call during the access period. The parameter r can be set to four different possible values 1, 2, 4 or 7
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
How Slotted ALOHA Works 1/(2)?
13J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
How Slotted ALOHA Works 2/(2)?
14J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
How Mobile RFID Works 1/(4)?
15J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
How Mobile RFID Works 2/(4)?
16J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
How Mobile RFID Works 3/(4)?
17J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
How Mobile RFID Works 4/(4)?
18J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
+
Success =
Channel
1st Failure
Ret
rans
mis
sion
s
Active
RT1
RT2
RTr
2nd Failure
rth Failure
(r+1)th Failure
Rejected
G
GGe
Ge 1
Geqn 11
Gr eqn 11
qn1
qn2
qnr
Gr eqn 1
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Future Store Checkout with RFID tagged items
19J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Video Show
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zBz3aoikLpU
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
RFID Technology in Construction 1/(3)
20J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
RFID chips are tied to the rebar at apredetermined location before concrete is poured. The encapsulated RFID tag is placed in the area shown by the red circle.
RFID chips are read with a handheld scanner.
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
RFID Technology in Construction 2/(3)
21J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Tunnel segments stored in theWoodstock plant all contain RFID chips that can be scanned through the concrete.
The application of RFID for tracking construction materials can provide an accurate and efficient means for reducing time and resources being spent collecting and managing data.
In a recent example, the NRC in collaboration with Armtec, has developed a system for tracking precast tunnel liner segments manufactured in Armtec’sWoodstock, Ontario plant.
The commercially availableencapsulated RFID tags which,during the fabrication process, areembedded in the liner segments.
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
RFID Technology in Construction 3/(3)
22J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
• As the segments move through the plant, their status (i.e., fabrication, quality,storage and shipping) and associated data are updated by the field crewusing mobile computers.
• Armtec is using the system in its Woodstock plant to track the fabrication and inventory data for 58,000 tunnel liner segments being supplied for the York-Spadina subway extension project in Toronto, for two 6.5 km tunnels.
•The system helps reduce time and resources spent locating concrete units in the storage yard and managing production and quality control data.
• Another key benefit of the system is that it generates the product handover documentation in electronic format that many asset owners are now requesting. •For example, the product handover documentation is currently used by Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) construction contractors working at the subway site to validate the materials received.Source: http://www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/eng/ci/v16n2/9RFID-based life cycle tracking of precast concrete units
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
RFID Technology and Printed Electronics 1/(3)
23J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Electronic devices can be printed on commercial off-set machines. (Source: pmTUC)
Reel-to-reel flexographic printing ofelectronic devices. (Source: Acreo)
Dimatix Materials Printer(DMP) DMP-2800 Series PrinterFUJIFILM
RFID can be used widely in almost all items Printed electronics opened that door
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
RFID Technology and Printed Electronics 2/(3)
24J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Printed RFID tags (Source: PolyIC)Printed RFID tag.(Source: PolyIC)
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
RFID Technology and Printed Electronics 3/(3)
25J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
RFID can be used widely in almost all items Price per tag is an important issue
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Success of Printed Electronics
26J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Intelligent Packaging Application
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Biomedical Applications of RFID
27J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Wearable RFID-Enabled Sensor Nodes for Biomedical Applications
Source: Wearable RFID-Enabled Sensor Nodes for Biomedical Applications, Li Yang, Rushi Vyas, Amin Rida, Jonathan Pan, and Manos M. Tentzeris, IEEE 2008
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Biosensor and Indicator & RFID
28J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Inkjet printed oxygen indicator
Source: VTT 2008
Printed enzymatic power supply with integrated capacitor
Active RFID tag is better
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Organic RFID
29J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Source: Design and manufacturing of organic RFID circuits Coping with intrinsic parameter variations in organic devices by circuit design, Jan Genoe, Kris Myny, Soeren Steudel, and Paul Heremans, IEEE 2010
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Multi-channel Slotted ALOHA System in the Presence of Interference from other Net. & Attacking Signals
30J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
+
Success =
Channel
1st FailureR
etra
nsm
issi
ons
Active
RT1
RT2
RTr
2nd Failure
rth Failure
(r+1)th Failure
Rejected
G
GGe
Ge 1
Geqn 11
Gr eqn 11
qn1
qn2
qnr
Gr eqn 1
Application of Slotted ALOHA with retransmission cut-off is huge
Interference from other Net.
DoS attacking signals
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Security Improvements of Slotted ALOHA System
31J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Four ways of improving the security
1 & 2. Security improvement using multiple channels and capture . 3. Security improvement by limiting the number of retransmission trials4. Security improvement using new packet rejection
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Security Problem under DoS Attacking Signal & Interference from Other Networks
32J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Message packet generation rate G
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
1
J=00.10.20.30.5
0 3 6 9 12 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
mfa zzz , ,
I=0, L=1
0 3 6 9 12 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Message packet generation rate GT
hrou
ghpu
t per
slo
t S
mfa zzz , ,
I=0.3, L=1
1
J=0
0.10.2
0.30.5
+
Success =
Channel
1st Failure
Ret
rans
mis
sion
s
Active
RT1
RT2
RTr
2nd Failure
rth Failure
(r+1)th Failure
Rejected
G
GGe
Ge 1
Geqn 11
Gr eqn 11
qn1
qn2
qnr
Gr eqn 1
Interference from other
Net.
DoS attacking signals
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Security Improvement Using Capture
33J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Message packet generation rate G
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
1
J=00.10.20.30.5
0 3 6 9 12 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
mfa zzz , ,
I=0, L=1
0 3 6 9 12 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Message packet generation rate G
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
mfa zzz , ,
I=0.3, L=1
1
J=0
0.10.2
0.30.5
0 3 6 9 12 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Message packet generation rate G
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
I=0.3, L=1J=0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.5
1 , , mfa zzz
1
Improvement with capture 1
1 ,1 , mfa zzz
0 3 6 9 12 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
I=0.3, L=1
J=0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.5
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
Message packet generation rate G
1
Improvement with capture 2
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Security Improvement using Multiple Channels
34
1-channel system5-channel system
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
0 3 6 9 12 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Message packet generation rate G
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
mfa zzz , ,
I=0.3, L=1
1
J=0
0.10.2
0.30.5
0 3 6 9 12 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Message packet generation rate G
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
mfa zzz , ,I=0.3, L=5
1
J=00.10.20.30.5
Improvement with multi-channel
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Security Improvement using Multiple Channels
35
ActiveL-parallel channels
Retransmission trials <=r
+
+
Total rejection
Retransmission rejection=
Retransmissions=
Yes
No
Success
G/L
1L
L
L
r
i
iPL 1
)Su(11
1)Su(11 rPL
Attacking signal with rate J
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Number of channels L
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
opt
J=0
1
52
1020
0 ,
,
Iz
zz
m
fa
0 10 20 30 40 500
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Number of channels L
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
opt
510
20
0 10 20 30 40 500
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
J=0 1 2
2 ,
,
Im
fa
z
zz
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Security Improvement using Multiple Channels & Capture
36J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
Interfering signal rate I
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
opt
L=20
25
3
10
1
0 1 2 3 4 50
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0 ,
,
Jz
zz
m
fa
Interfering signal rate I
Thr
ough
put p
er s
lot S
opt
L=20
25
3
10
1
0 1 2 3 4 50
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
2 ,
,
Jz
zz
m
fa
Interfering signal rate IT
hrou
ghpu
t per
slo
t Sop
t
L=20
2
5
3
10
1
0 1 2 3 4 50
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
2 ,1
1 ,1
Jz
zz
m
fa
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Security Improvement by Limiting the Number of Retransmission Trials
37J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
1 11 21 31 41 510
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4
Opt
imum
new
pac
ket g
ener
atio
n
rat
e pe
r sl
ot
Number of channels L
mfa zzz , ,
Secured region without limiting r
I = 0, J = 0
Secured region with limiting r
Unsecured operating region
r
0r
Opt
imum
new
pac
ket g
ener
atio
n
rat
e pe
r sl
otNumber of channels L
1 11 21 31 41 510
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4
mfa zzz , ,
I = 2.5, J = 0
r
0r
Secured region without limiting r
Secured region with limiting r
Unsecured operating region
1 11 21 31 41 510
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4
Number of channels L
Opt
imum
new
pac
ket g
ener
atio
n
rat
e pe
r sl
ot
mfa zzz , ,
Secured region without limiting r
I = 2.5, J = 2.5
Secured region with limiting r
Unsecured operating region
r
0r
1 11 21 31 41 510
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4
Number of channels L
Secured region without limiting r
I = 2.5, J = 2.5
1 , , mfa zzz
Opt
imum
new
pac
ket g
ener
atio
n
rat
e pe
r sl
ot
0r
r
Secured region with limiting r
Unsecured operating region
1 11 21 31 41 510
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4
Number of channels L
Opt
imum
new
pac
ket g
ener
atio
n
rat
e pe
r sl
ot
1 ,1 , mfa zzz
I = 2.5, J = 2.5
Unsecured operating region
Secured region without limiting r
r
0r
Secured region with limiting r
1 11 21 31 41 510
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4
mfa zzz ,1 ,1
I = 2.5, J = 2.5
r
0r
Secured region without limiting r
Unsecured operating region
Number of channels L
Opt
imum
new
pac
ket g
ener
atio
n
rat
e pe
r sl
ot
Secured region with limiting r
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Security Improvement using New Packet Rejection
38J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarker
1 10 1000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
Opt
imum
new
pac
ket g
ener
atio
n
rat
e pe
r sl
ot
Retransmission trials r+1
Secured region without limiting r
X*
Secured region with limiting r
Unsecured operating region
Sopt
Gopt
The y-axis should be multiplied by
1opt*
GX
Source: Secured Operating Regions of Slotted ALOHA in the Presence of Interfering Signals from Other Networks and DoS Attacking Signals, Journal of Advanced Research – Elsevier, 2011, Vol. 2, Issue 3, July 2011, pp. 207-218. Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2090123211000488
WiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Conclusions
39
• The potential application of Slotted ALOHA based technologies are presented• The security improvement of Slotted ALOHA in the presence of interference from other networks and
DoS attacking signals is studied• The current security protected measures such as encryption makes the packets unreadable by
unauthorized users. The authentication technique is used to protect the system from illegal users and authorization separates the legal users.
• In a Slotted ALOHA based network, the interference from other networks and DoS attacking noise packets may collide with message packets and reduces the secured transmission.
• We have used four different techniques to improve the security of Slotted ALOHA.• Security improvement using multiple channels
– The use of multiple channels in the Slotted ALOHA protocol reduces the packet collisions• Security improvement using capture effect
– Capture effect reduces the packet collisions– 3 types of captures are considered
• Security improvement by limiting the number of retransmission trials.– The retransmissions cut-off technique can limit the aggregate packet flow– It is possible that the 3rd technique retransmissions cut-off technique is not enough to control the
flow of message packets.• Because of that the 4th technique called new packet rejection probability is introduced.
– The system is secured or stable with almost any high value of new packet generation rate.
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Thank you
40
Thanks a lot for
your kind attention
J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011
Questions?
41J. H. Sarker / SITE.uOttawa.ca/~jsarkerWiSense Seminar November 3, 2011