schopenhauer and the cartesian tradition

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Schopenhauer and the Cartesian Tradition

Ted Humphrey

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Number 2, April 1981,

pp. 191-212 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0724

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Schopenhauer and the

artesian Tradition

TE HUMPHREY

IN THIS CENTURY, we have relegated Schopenhauer to a position outside the

mainstream of modern philosophy, primarily, I suspect,

bec use

his metaphysi-

cal views, some would say excesses, do not accord with our more analytical and

otherwise circu mspect attitudes. Our neglect also derives from not knowing just

how he fits into the historical flow, for rather th an comprising part of the flood of

idealism that swept Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century, he seems

to have been only an isolated spring that soon ran dry. This perception of him is

unfortunate. His thought was not unrelated to the dominant philosophical tradi-

tion, as his writings profuse admiring and critical reference s to its major and

minor figures attest; nor did he fail to influence those who came after him,

Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Sartre, among others.

Our reason for finding it difficult to fit Schope nhauer s thought into the

dominant tradition of philosophy extending from I)escartes to the present is that

we regard his views as wildly deviating from it, particularly in metaphysics and

epistemology. This is a mistake. Actually, his metaphisical and epistemological

views were deep ly i nfluenced by Kant s, and are i mporta ntly similar to

Hobbes s and Hume s, and this alone is sufficient to force admission that he is

part of the mainstream. But because Schopenhauer follows the tendency in

Hobbes and Hume to attribute predominance of the will and passions over

reason in human nature, he ten ds to offend the rather more Cartesian and Kan-

tian tendencies of our present age. Just how (1) Schopenhauer fits into the

Cartesian tradition and (2) his views extend crucial positions of one of that

tradit ion s branches b ecome clear only when we examin e the relations among

being, reason, and will in the theories of its major figures. In this paper I will

restrict the discussion to Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Schopenhauer--and in

them to only the most central points- -with the intent of showing that Schopen-

hauer is an important figure in our philosophical tradition and that his argu-

ments, correcting and extending as they do doctrines crucial to that tradition,

warrant our attention and respect.

Several persons read earlier versions of this paper and made numerous comments, for which I

am most grateful. I want particularly to mention Professors Michael J. White, John D. Stone,

Thomas Auxterand Jerrold Levinson, whose meticulouscommentsprevented several blunders. The

mistakes that remain are, of course, my own.

[191]


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192 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

T h e a n a l y s i s b e g in s w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f D e s c a r t e s s v i e w s , w h i c h I u s e t o

d e f i n e t h e m a i n i s s u e s a t s t a k e a n d t o il lu m i n a t e w h a t I t h i n k i s c l o s e t o t h e

p r e f e r r e d v i e w i n o u r t r a d i t i o n o n t h e r e l a t i o n s a m o n g b e i n g , r e a s o n a n d w i l l .

D e s c a r t e s i s m o s t e x e r c i s e d a b o u t t h e r e l a ti o n o f r e a s o n t o b e in g , a n d q u e s t i o n s

a b o u t w i l l a r i s e f o r h i m o n l y i n a v e r y c i r c u m s c r i b e d c o n t e x t ; h o w e v e r , c o n s i d -

e r a t i o n s a b o u t t h e w i l l a r e c r u c i a l t o h o w , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s ,

H u m e , K a n t , a n d S c h o p e n h a u e r c o n c e i v e a n d d e v e l o p t h ei r p o s i t io n s r e ga r d in g

b e i n g a n d r e a s o n . I n f a c t , a m o n g t h e s e f o u r w r i t e r s I f in d a c o n t i n u i n g d i a l e c t i c

o v e r t h e r e l a t i o n s a m o n g b e i n g , r e a s o n , a n d w i l l- - -a d ia l e c t i c th a t e x t e n d s t o t h e

v i e w s o f o t h e r f i g u r e s in t h e m o d e r n t r a d i ti o n . P a y i n g a t t e n t io n t o it , e v e n i n t h e

p r e s e n t p r o s c r i b e d c o n t e x t , y i e ld s i m p o r t a n t c l u e s a b o u t t h e s t ra t e g i e s, d e v e l o p -

m e n t a n d g o a l s o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y .

A s t h e y d e v e l o p t h e i r p o s i t i o n s a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s a m o n g r e a s o n , w i l l a n d

b e i n g , I f in d t h a t K a n t s v i e w s a r e i m p o r t a n tl y a n a l o g o u s t o D e s c a r t e s s a n d

S c h o p e n h a u e r s t o H u m e s . F u r th e r , S c h o p e n h a u e r e x p a n d s K a n t s c r it ic i sm s

b o t h o f H u m e a n s k e p t i c i sm a n d C a r t e s i a n r a t io n a l is m . H e r e o n e f i nd S c h o p e n -

h a u e r a t h i n k e r o f c o n s i d e r a b l e c o m p l e x i t y , i n v e n t i v e n e s s a n d s u b t l e t y - - b u t

t h e n t h i s i s t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h S c h o p e n h a u e r s a w h i m s e l f . T h e d i a l e c t i c I

d i s c e r n s h o w s t h a t h i s t o r y r e p e a t s i t se l f . H o w e v e r , t h e m o r a l o f t h i s is n o t t h a t i f

w e a r e i g n o ra n t o f h i s t o r y w e a r e b o u n d t o r e p e a t i t , b u t r a t h e r t h a t f f w e a r e

s u f f i c i e n t l y a c q u a i n t e d w i t h h i s t o r y , w e c a n , w i t h i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d i n g e n u i t y ,

r e p e a t a n d e x t e n d i t t o o u r a d v a n t a g e .

I. THE FIRST PHASE

A. Descartes s Assertions. D e s c a r t e s s f i r st t ru t h , Cogito ergo sum, i s an

u n e q u i v o c a l s i gn o f h is r a t i o n a l i sm . I t im p l i c i tl y c o n t a i n s h i s p r e d i l e c t i o n t o th e

v i e w s t h a t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e r e la t i o n b e t w e e n r e a s o n a n d b e i n g , c o g n i t io n i s

p r i m e , a n d t h a t in th e e c o n o m y o f h u m a n n a t u r e , r a ti o n a li ty h a s p r e c e d e n c e o v e r

w i l l. T h e c o u r s e o f th o u g h t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e cogito a n d d e v e l o p e d i n t h e Medita-

tions r u n s a s f o l l o w s : I k n o w I a m b e c a u s e I th i n k ; h e n c e , f o r m e , k n o w i n g

p r e c e d e s b e i n g , e v e n t h o u g h i n th e o r d e r o f t h in g s b e i n g m a y p r e c e d e k n o w i n g .

M y m e t a p h y s i c a l n a t u r e m u s t b e t h a t o f a t h i n k e r / k n o w e r . T h i s l a t t e r c l a i m , i t

t u r n s o u t , i s n o t o n l y m e t a p h y s i c a l b u t e x i s t e n t ia l a s w e l l , f o r t o fu lf il l m y

n a t u r e , t h a t i s , t o b e c o m e m o s t f u l ly h u m a n , I m u s t , in f a c t , k n o w . A c c o r d i n g t o

D e s c a r t e s , w h o h o l ds a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y o f t r u th , k n o w i n g e n t a il s b e c o m -

i n g a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f w h a t t h e r e i s. T o s p e a k m e t a p h o r i c a l l y ,

k n o w i n g c o n s i s t s o f m o l d i n g th e m i n d t o t h e s h a p e o f o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s , s tr ip -

p i n g o u r n o t i o n o f t h e m o f al l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t m i g h t p e r t a i n t o o r d e r i v e f r o m

o n e s e l f . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i n so r t i n g t h r o u g h t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e b a ll o f w a x ,

D e s c a r t e s d i s c a r d s ( 1) t h e s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s - - th e y e x i s t o n l y b e c a u s e o f i n te r -

a c t i o n b e t w e e n s e l f a n d o b j e c t e d (2 ) t h e a c c i d e n t a l b u t n o n - s u bj e c t- i nf l u -

e n c e d p r o p e r t i e s , f o r e x a m p l e , s h a p e a n d w e i g h t , s e t tl i n g o n t h a t p r o p e r t y t h a t

w o u l d b e , e v e n i f t h e b a l l o f w a x w e r e n o t , n a m e l y , e x t e n s io n . J u s t a s t h o u g h t is

t h e p r i m a r y q u a l i t y o f t h e s e l f , e x t e n s i o n i s t h e p r i m a r y q u a l i t y o f b o d i e s . B y

n o w t h i s i s a fa m i l i a r s t o r y .


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SCHOPENHAUER 193

In telling it for the first time, Descartes never mentions either the tertiary

qualifies or the will.t Will does not enter into his consideration of the essential

nature of the self, and, perhaps more surprisingly, tertiary qualities do not enter

into his conside ration of the nature of body. 2 The claims about thought and exten-

sion go hand-in-hand. As Descartes conceives them, they are what remains of

human nature and the material world when we have completely abstracted from

life.

Tertiary qualities are signs of life: Th e nature here described [ tho se things

given by God to me as a being composed o f mind and body ] truly teach es me to

flee from things which cause the sensation of pain, and seek after the things

which communicate to me the sentiment of pleasure and so fort h (AT, IX:65;

HR,

I

193). These qualities that we feel in the face of the world stimulate us to

act; they prevent us from responding to the effects of the world on our compos-

ite nature with the detac hment of a pilo t of a vessel to a rent in the hull of his

ship. Neverthe less, the y te ach me nothing but what is most obscure and con-

fus ed. Descartes cites two reasons why tertiary qualities cannot serve as a

source of knowledge: First, he believes that while they are properly taken as

signs of what is happening to us, they are signs only of affections of the body,

which is neither an intrinsic part of the self, so far as I can tell qua knower, nor a

thing necessar y for knowing, because, mi nd alone, and not mind and body in

conjunction . . . is requisite to a knowledge of the t r ut h . . . (AT, IX:65; HR,

I: 193). Second, bod y's extended nature is the very basis for mist akennes sabout

what occurs in the world, for stimuli must be transmitted and may on occasion

arise from deviant sources or from malfunctions in the mechanical system itself,

e.g., sickness. Consequently, notwithst anding the supreme goodness of God,

the nature of man, inasmuch as it is composed of mind and body, cannot be

otherwise than sometimes a source of dece ption (AT, IX: 70; HR, I: 198). And

r e as o n. . . persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent

from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those

which appear to me manifestly to be fal se (AT, IX: 14; HR, I: 15). In other

words, the source of motivation in composite hum n n ture is intrinsic lly sub-

ject to error and, therefore, untrustworthy. However, the tertiary qualities are

not the only source of motivation or error in human nature.

t B u t s e e : W h a t i s a t h i n g w h i c h t h i n k s ? I t i s a th i n g w h i c h d o u b t s , u n d e r s t a n d s , [ c o n c e i v e s ] ,

a f f ir m s , d e n i e s , w i l l s , r e f u s e s , w h i c h a l s o i m a g i n e s a n d f e e l s ( A T , I X : 2 2 ; H R , I : 5 3 ) . T h e o r d e r

h e r e i s i m p o r t a n t , p l a c i n g w i l li n g a f t e r t h e m o r e s t r i c t l y in t e l l e c tu a l a s p e c t s o f t h i n k i n g b u t b e f o r e

t h o s e t h a t i n c l u d e t h o u g h t f o r m a l l y i n t h e i r c o n c e p t , y e t i n v o l v e t h e o t h e r a s p e c t o f h u m a n n a t u r e ,

b o d y . T h e o r d e r i s i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e i t e m p h a s i z e s t h e a m b i g u o u s p o s i t i o n o f w i l l in g in t h e e c o n o m y

o f h u m a n n a t u r e . A l l c i t a t i o n s t o D e s c a r t e s a r e t o

Oeuvres de Descartes

e d . C . A d a m a n d P .

T a n n e r y , 1 2 v o l s . ( P a r i s : L i b r a i r i e P h i l o s o p h i q u e J . V r i n , 1 8 9 7 -1 9 1 0 ), c i t e d a s A T f o U o w c d b y

v o l u m e a n d p a g e n u m b e r . I u s e t h e t r a n s l a t i o n s o f E l i z a b e t h S. H a l d a n e a n d G . R . T . R o s s ,

Philosophical Wor ks of Descartes

2 v o l s . (C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 96 7) , c it e d a s

H R f o l l o w e d b y v o l u m e a n d p a g e n u m b e r s . H e r a f t c r c i t a t i o n s w i l l b e p l a c e d i n p a r e n t h e s e s i n t h e

t e x t a n d h a v e t h i s f o rm : ( A T , v o l . : p a g e ; H R , v o l . : p a g e ) .

2 D e s c a r t e s ' s v i e w t h a t t e r t i a r y q u a l i ti e s d o n o t p r o v i d e a n y t r u e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t r e a l i t y i s

b r o a d l y h i n t e d a t i n M e d i t a t i o n I , w h e r e h e f a i ls t o s u b j e c t t h e m t o t h e d o u b t i n g p r o c e s s t o w h i c h h e

s u b j e c t s a l l k n o w l e d g e .


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194 HISTORY OF PHILO SOPHY

Will, because it is included in the concept of a thinking thing, is the source of

motivation uniquely proper to man, the power of choosing to do a thing or not

to do it (AT, IX: 46; HR, 1:475). Descartes does not maintain that will is

intrinsically prone to error; rather, error arises from a lack of proportion be-

tween will and understanding. In man, understanding is a finite capacity to

comprehend what there is, and will is an unlimited capacity to affirm, deny,

pursue or flee.

Whence then come my errors? They come from the sole fact that since the will is much

wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the

same b ounds, but extend it also to things which I do not under stand: a nd as the will is of

itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the

good, or the false for the true. (AT, IX:46; HR, I: 175-76)

In the economy of human nature, reason is the guide to will, even to the extent

that men must rationally constrain the will not to motivate them precipitately,

i.e., on the basis o f inadequate knowledge. 3 Failure to constra in the will inevita-

bly leads to error. Because will is the capacity to affirm, error ultimately rests

with it, even though the err or lies in judg ment, which is viewed by Descartes as

the unique product of rationality. Will's exigency but absolute incapacity is to

know.

Descartes holds that reason and will are quite distinct, although both are

contained in the concept of a thinking thing. Reason is only a faculty of

knowledge, otherwise inefficacious in itself, and will is an arbitrarily free capac-

ity for action, necessarily prone to error when exercised independently of rea-

son's constraint. These views capture the essence of Descartes's rationalism, his

refusal to accept any form of skepticism. Descartes' s affirmation of the primacy

of reason and knowledge in human nature raises this problem: One essential

action is affirming the truth or falsity of a proposition. Now will is a necessary

and sufficient condition for making affirmations, as it is for any act; however,

reason is the necessary condition for right affirmation or action, for these depend

on knowledge. Thus, for right action, reason must either constrain will within

the limits of knowledge or will must have a criterion of truth intrinsic to itself.

Applying constraint is an action, one that in the case presently under discussion

must originate in reason, but for which reason is only a necessary condition. On

the other hand, Descartes quite obviously cannot admit that will possesses its

own criterion of truth, for that would seem to render its freedom less than

absolute, as well as to make his entire search for a criterion of truth quite

unnecessary. Descartes's rejection of skepticism rests equally on his affirma-

tions of r eason's primacy and will's absolute freedom, but the separation of the

Beginning with the foregoing quote the perspicuous reader will detect an unsettling vagueness

and ambiguity in the reference of the first person personal pronouns. Here their reference is inelucta-

bly caught between rationality and will. Rationality mus t instruct will to constrain itself to act in a

certain way but has not, of itself, the knowledge needed to effect the proper const raint. The separa-

tion of abilities is necessary to Descartes s rationalism, but untenable. This point is taken up by

Fichte (see note 14) and by Schopenhauer.


6/23

S C H O P E N H A U E R 1 9 5

t w o r a i s e s l o g ic a l p r o b l e m s a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l it y o f r ig h t a c t i o n t h a t c o u l d o n l y

r e s u l t i n d e n y i n g t h e v i e w .

B. Hu me s Denials. H u m e i s a n a t u ra l i s ti c s k e p t i c . 4 T h e c o r e o f h is p a r -

t i c u l a r n a tu r a l i s m i s h i s t h e o r y o f th e r o l e t h a t t e r t i a r y q u a l i ti e s a n d p a s s i o n s p l a y

i n h u m a n l if e. T h e c u t ti n g e d g e o f H u m e ' s a t t a c k o n D e s c a r t e s i s t h e a r g u m e n t

t h a t t h e t e r t i a r y q u a l i t i e s p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r o u r b e l i e f i n t h e c o n t i n u e d , a n d

h e n c e i n d e p e n d e n t , e x i s t e n c e o f t h in g s . T h i s a r g u m e n t s i m p l y s t a n d s D e s c a r t e s ' s

r a t i o n a l i s m o n i t s h e a d . I t p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t a l l o u r k n o w l e d g e b e g i n s w i t h a n d

d e r i v e s f r o m e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h a t t h e m i n d q u a r e a s o n i s p r o p e r l y s u b j e c t t o th e

pas s i on s ' i n f l uence s (T , 415 ) . s

H u m e b e g i n s th e a r g u m e n t b y a s s e rt i n g ( 1) t h a t b o t h p h i l O s o p h e r s a n d t h e

v u l g a r a s s u m e p r i m a r y q u a l it ie s t o h a v e a d i s ti n c t c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e ( T ,

1 92 ), (2 ) t h a t t h e v u l g a r g r a n t s u c h e x i s t e n c e t o s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s , a n d ( 3 ) t h a t

n e i t h e r b e l i e v e s t e r t i a r y q u a l i ti e s t o h a v e i t. B u t a ll t h e s e k i n d s o f p e r c e p t i o n s

a r e e s s e n t ia l l y e q u i v a le n t q u a p e r c e p t i o n s , i n a s m u c h a s w e k n o w t h e m t o e x i s t

o n l y w h e n w e p e r c e i v e t h e m ; t h e r e f o r e , w e m a y c o n c l u d e , th a t a s f a r a s t h e

s e n s e s a r e j u d g e s , a l l p e r c e p t io n s a r e t h e s a m e in th e m a n n e r o f t h e ir e x i s t e n c e

( T , 1 9 3 ) . N o r d o r e a s o n a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t s p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r o u r

b e l i e f t h a t p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y q u a li ti e s h a v e i n d e p e n d e n t e x i s t e n c e , f o r

' t i s o b v i o u s t h e s e a r g u m e n t s a r e k n o w n b u t t o v e r y f e w , a n d t h a t ' t i s n o t b y

t h e m , t h a t c h i l d re n , p e a s a n t s , a n d t h e g r e a t e s t p a r t o f m a n k i n d a r e i n d u c ' d t o

a t t ri b u t e o b j e c t s t o s o m e i m p r e s s i o n s , a n d d e n y th e m t o o t h e r s ( T , 19 3). H u m e

c o n t e n d s t h a t a v e r s i o n o f t h e c o n s i s t e n t d r e a m h y p o t h e s i s 6 a c c o u n t s f o r o u r

b e l i e f t h a t p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y q u a l i ti e s p r o v i d e i n f o rm a t i o n a b o u t i n d e p e n -

d e n t , c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e . B e c a u s e t h e y l a c k c o n s i s t e n c y , w e d o n o t b e l i e v e

t e r ti a r y q u a l it ie s p o s s e s s s u c h e x i s t e n c e . H o w e v e r , t h e p r o p e r t ie s o f p r i m a r y

a n d s e c o n d a r y q u a l i ti e s t h a t i n d u c e u s t o a s c r ib e i n d e p e n d e n t e x i s t e n c e t o t h e m

a r e n o t i n t r i n s i c b u t e x t r i n s i c , t h a t i s , t h e y h a v e t o d o w i t h r e l a t i o n s a m o n g

i d e as - -- th e r e l a ti o n s c o h e r e n c e a n d c o n s t a n c y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e c a n n o t o n t h e

4 T h i s p o i nt i s e s ta b l i s h e d i n R i c h a r d H . P o p k i n ' s c l a s si c p a p e r D a v i d H u m e : H i s P y r r h o n i s m

a n d hi s C ri t iq u e o f P y r r h o n i s m , i n Hume e d . V . C . C h a p p e l l , ( G a r d e n C i t y : A n c h o r B o o k s , 1 96 7) ,

p p . 5 3 - 9 8 .

s A l l r e f e r e n c e s t o H u m e a r e t o t h e S e l b y - B i g g e e d i t i o n s : D a v i d H u m e , A Treatise of Human

Nature ed. L. A.

S e i b y - B i g g e ( O x f o r d : T h e C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 96 3) . C i t a t i o n s w i l l b e i n p a r e n t h e s e s

a n d w i l l h a v e t h i s f o r m : ( T , p a g e ) f o r r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e Treatise a n d ( E M , p a g e ) f o r r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e

Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.

6 I b o r r o w t h e t e r m c o n s i s t e n t d r e a m H y p o t h e s i s f r o m L e w i s W h i t e B e c k , w h o in Early

German Philosophy a r g u e s t h a t i t i s o n e o f t w o a r g u m e n t s t h a t t h e C a r t e s i a n t r a d i t i o n u s e d t o j u s t i f y

b e l i e f i n a n e x t e r n a l w o r l d . T h e o t h e r i s t h e p a s s i v i t y a r g u m e n t . B o t h a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e M e d i t a -

t i o n s , t h e l a t t e r i n M e d i t a t i o n I I I , t h e f o r m e r a t t h e e n d o f M e d i t a t i o n V I . H u m e ' s u s e o f t h e

c o n s i s t e n t d r ea m h y p o t h e s i s i s i n t e r es t i n g a n d i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e i t m a r k s a d i s t i n ct i o n b e t w e e n h i m

a n d o t h e r e m p i r ic i s ts , w h o u s e d t h e p a s s i v i t y a r g u m e n t a s t h e i r p r i m a r y p r o o f o f a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y

e x i s t i n g w o r ld . B u t H u m e s a w c l e a r l y t h a t t h i s w o u l d n o t d o , fo r , ' t i s n e i t h e r u p o n a c c o u n t o f t h e

i n v o l u n t a ri n e s s o f c e r t a in i m p r e s s i o n s , a s i s c o m m o n l y s u p p o s ' d , n o r o f t h e s u p e r i o r f o r c e a n d

v i o l e n c e t h a t w e a t t r i b u t e to t h e m [ p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y q u a li t i e s] c o n t i n u ' d e x i s t e n c e . . . . F o r ' t i s

e v i d e n t o u r p a i n s a n d p l e a s u r e s , o u r p a s s i o n s a n d a f fe c t io n s , w h i c h w e n e v e r s u p p o s e t o h a v e a n y

e x i s t e n c e b e y o n d o u r p e r c e p t i o n , o p e r a t e w i t h g r e a t e r v i o l e n c e , a n d a r e e q u a l l y i n v o l u n t a r y , a s t h e

i m p r e s s io n s o f f ig u re a n d e x t e n s i o n , c o l o u r a n d s o u n d , w h i c h w e s u p p o s e t o b e p e r m a n e n t b e i n g s

(T, 194).


7/23

196

H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

b a s is o f o u r a s c r i p t io n o f i n d e p e n d e n c e t o t h e m v a l id l y i n fe r t h a t, i n fa c t , t h e y

p r o v i d e t r u e i n f o r m a t i on a b o u t w h a t t h e r e i s . O n e c a n n o t i n f e r f r o m t h e i n t r in s ic

p r o p e r t ie s o f

ny

p e r c e p t t h a t i t p r o v i d e s o b j e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t a n e x t e r -

n a l , i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t i n g w o r l d .

T h i s a r g u m e n t u n d e r m i n e s D e s c a r t e s ' s c o n t e n t i o n s a b o u t p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s

a n d , u l t im a t e l y , a b o u t r e a s o n ' s r o l e in h u m a n a c t i o n . F o r i f p r i m a r y , s e c o n d a r y

a n d t e r t i a ry q u a l i t ie s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y e q u i v a l e n t i n p ro v i d i n g k n o w l e d g e o f o b j e c -

t iv e e x i s t e n c e , a n d i f w e r e s p o n d t o o u r e x p e r i e n c e p r i m a r il y o n t h e b a s is o f

t e r t ia r y q u a l i ti e s , t h e y a s s u m e p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e f o r o u r e x i s t e n c e in t h e

w o r l d . A l t o g e t h e r in d e p e n d e n t l y o f w h e t h e r t h e y p r o v i d e o b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f

t h i n g s a s t h e y a r e i n t h e m s e l v e s , t e r t i a ry q u a l i t ie s c o n s t i t u t e t h e r e l e v a n t in fo r -

m a t i o n a b o u t t h e e f f e c t s o f t h i ng s o n u s , a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , a r e t h e b a s i s f o r o u r

r e s p o n s e s t o t h e w o r l d . H o w e v e r , t o m a k e t h i s p o i n t w e m u s t e x a m i n e H u m e ' s

t h e o r y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s a m o n g t h e w i l l , t h e p a s s i o n s a n d t h e t e r t i a ry q u a l i t ie s .

Th e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t e r t i a ry q u a l i ti e s a n d t h e p a s s i o n s i s i m m e d i a t e fo r

H u m e , b e c a u s e t h e d i r e c t p a s s i o n s , w h i c h i n c l u d e d e s i r e , a v e rs i o n , g r ie f ,

j o y , h o p e , f e a r , d e s p a i r a n d s e c u r i t y , a r is e i m m e d i a t e l y f r o m g o o d o r e v il ,

f r o m p a in o r p l e a s u r e , a n d t h e i n d i r e c t , a m o n g w h i c h h e i n c lu d e s p r i d e ,

h u m i l it y , l o v e a n d h a t r e d , f r o m t h e s a m e p r in c i p le s , b u t b y t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f

o t h e r q u a l i t ie s ( T , 2 7 6 -7 7 ) . H u m e f u r t h e r m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e c a u s e s o f p r i d e

a n d h u m i l i t y [ a r e ] p l a i n ly n a t u r a l (T , 2 81 ). Th e s e c o n d r e a s o n i s e s p e c i a l l y

i m p o r t a n t : H u m e c o n s t a n t l y a rg u e s t h a t t h e o r ig i n a l a n d n a t u r a l w e l l s a n d

s p r i n g s o f h u m a n n a t u r e a r e fo u n d t o o p e ra t e s i m i l a r l y i n a l l m e n a t a ll t i m e s .

H u m e ' s n a t u r a l i s m l i es i n t h e c o n t e n t i o n s t h a t t h e t e r t i a ry q u a li f i e s a r e t h e d i r e c t

s t im u l i o f t h e p a s s i o n s a n d t h a t t h e p a s s i o n s a r e t h e n a t u r a l r e s p o n s e s o f o r i g in a l

p r i n ci p le s i n h u m a n n a t u r e t o o u r e x p e r i e n c e . T h u s , a l t ho u g h w e m a y r e g a r d th e

p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y q u a l it ie s a s t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f c o n t i n u in g , i n d e p e n d e n t

e x i s t e n c e s , w e r e s p o n d t o t h e m o n l y b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e e f f e c t s o n u s t h a t g i v e

r i s e t o t e r t i a ry q u a l i f i e s , w h i c h i n t h e i r t u rn a ro u s e t h e p a s s i o n s . Th e c a p s t o n e o f

H u m e ' s a r g u m e n t a g a i n st D e s c a r t e s ' s r a t io n a l is m i s th i s t h e o r y o f t h e r el a t io n

b e t w e e n t h e p a s s i o n s a n d t h e w i l l .

H u m e ' s s t a n d a g a i n s t t h e v i e w t h a t t h e w i l l i s liberium rbitrium i s r e s o l u t e .

T h e c r u x o f t h e d i s a g r e e m e n t i s h is c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e a c t i on s o f m e n e x h i b i t t h e

s a m e c o n s t a n c y t h a t w e d i s c o v e r a m o n g o b j e c t s . T h e c o n s t a n c y o f c o n ju n c t i o n

a n d c o n t i g u i t y t h a t g i v e r i se t o o u r n o t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n i n m a t e r i a l n a t u r e w e f i n d

a l s o a m o n g t h e m o t i v e s , te m p e r s , s i tu a t io n s a n d a c t i on s o f m e n : n e c e s s i t y

m a k e s a n e s s e n t ia l p a r t o f c a u s a ti o n ; a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y l i b e rt y , b y r e m o v i n g

n e c e s s i t y , r e m o v e s a l so c a u s e s , a n d i s t h e v e r y s a m e w i t h c h a n g e ( T , 4 07 ). T h e

w i l l i s f r e e o n l y i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i t s p o n t a n e o u s l y o r i g i n a t e s n e w c o u r s e s o f

e v e n t s . A c t i o n s b e g i n w i t h i t, b u t n o t f r o m s h e e r i n d i f f e r e n c e (T , 39 9) . Ev e r y

a c t io n i s m o t i v a t e d a n d t h e m o t i v e s a r e p a s si o n a t e r e s p o n s e s , h o w e v e r c a l m a n d

d i s i n t e r e s t e d , t o p l e a s u re a n d p a i n . Th i s i s so e v e n i n th e c a s e o f m o ra l a c t i o n s ,

t h a t is , a c ti o n s o c c a s i o n e d b y b e n e v o l e n c e , th a t s e n t i m e n t , s o u n i v e r sa l a n d

c o m p r e h e n s i v e a s t o e x t e n d to a ll m a n k i n d , a nd r e n d e r . . , a c t i o ns a n d

c o n d u c t . . , t h e o b j ec t o f a p p la u s e o r c e n s u r e ( E M , 27 2).


8/23


W h e n H u m e w r i t e s , R e a s o n i s , a n d o u g h t o n ly t o b e t h e sl a v e o f t h e

p a s s i o n s , a n d c a n n e v e r p r e t e n d t o a n y o t h e r o ff ic e t h a n t o s e r v e a n d o b e y

t h e m ( T , 41 5 ), h e tu r n s t h e t a b l e s o n D e s c a r t e s ' s p o s i ti o n . O f c o u r s e t h is

d i f f e re n c e i n v i e w s t e m s f r o m H u m e ' s t h e o r y t h a t r e a s o n i n a nd o f i t s e lf i s

p a s s i v e , t h a t i t c a n d e a l o n l y w i t h r e l a t i o n s , t h a t a r e o b j e c t s o f s c i e n c e , a n d

m a t t e r s o f f a c t , n e i t h e r o f w h i c h i s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n m o r a l i t y ( T , 4 68 ) . T h e

m a t t e r s o f f a c t t h a t c o n c e r n m o r a l i t y a r e f e e l in g s in v o l v i n g t h e p a s s i o n s . T h e

o n l y f u n c t io n s o f r e a s o n i n h u m a n a c t i o n a r e i ts d i s c o v e r y o f c a u s a l r e l a ti o n s i n

e x p e r i e n c e , w h e r e b y i t p r o v i d e s k n o w l e d g e o f p o s s i b l e m e a n s t o e n d s , a n d i ts

c l a r i f y i n g s i t u a t i o n s , w h e r e b y i t a l l o w s u s t o r e s p o n d t o t h e m i n e m o t i o n a l l y

a p p r o p r i a t e w a y s :

reason and sen t i ment

con cur in almost al l moral determinations and conclusions.

The

f ina l sen t ence . . . which pronounce s charac ters and ac t ions amiable or od ious pra ise -

wor thy or b lameable . . . depends on some in ternal sense or fee l ing which nature has

made universa l in the whole spec ies .

But in order to pave the way for such a sent i -

m e n t . . , i t i s o f t en ne c es sa ry . . , t ha t much r easoni ng shou ld p recede , tha t n ice di st inc-

t ions be mad e, just conclusions be draw n, d is tant compar isons formed, co mpl icated rela-

t ions examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. (EM , 172-73, emphasis mine)

T h u s , H u m e r e j e c t s D e s c a r t e s ' s v i e w t h at r e a s o n c a n o r s h o u ld c o n s t r a in w i l l

w i th i n t h e b o u n d s o f ra t io n a l k n o w l e d g e . O u r p a s s i o n s , w h o s e s o u r c e is a n

o r ig i n a l q u a l i t y o f h u m a n n a t u r e , a r e a n d o u g h t t o b e t h e g u i d e s t o a c t i o n s , f o r

o t h e r w i s e m a n w o u l d s t a n d l ik e th e s c h o o l m a n ' s a s s , i r r e s o lu t e a n d u n d e t e r -

m i n e d , b e t w e e n e q u al m o t i v e s ( E M , 2 3 5) .

H u m e a v o i d s t h e p r o b l e m r e g a rd i n g r i gh t a c t io n t h a t w e f o u n d i n D e s c a r t e s '

t h e o r i e s o f r e a s o n , w i ll a n d t h e r e l a t io n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m . W i l l , th o u g h n o t

a r b i t ra r i ly f r e e , i s t h e n e c e s s a r y a n d s u f f ic i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r a c t i o n , a n d t h e

m o t i v e t o r ig h t a c t i o n i s o n e o f i t s c o n s t i t u e n t s . R e a s o n i s n e i t h e r a n e c e s s a r y

n o r s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r ri g h t a c t i o n . W h e r e a c t io n i s c o n c e r n e d , r e a s o n

s e r v e s o n l y t o p r o v i d e a n d c l a r i fy i n f o rm a t i o n . I.t c a n b e m o t i v a t e d t o d o s o b y

w i ll , a n d t h i s i s t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h H u m e a s s e r t s th a t r e a s o n i s a n d o u g h t t o b e

t h e s l a v e o f t h e p a s s i o n s . N a t u r a l i s t ic , a s it m a y b e , s k e p t i c a l , a s ra t i o n a l is t s

m a y w a n t t o c a ll it , H u m e ' s p o s i ti o n is a c o h e r e n t t h e o r y o f m a n ' s r e a lt io n t o t h e

w o r l d a n d o f h is a b i l i t y t o a c t .

T h e r e v o l u t io n i s h e r e c o m p l e t e . I n D e s c a r t e s ' s t h e o r y o f t h e r e la t io n b e -

t w e e n b e i n g a n d r e a s o n , t h e t w o c o n v e r g e i n r e a s o n ' s a p p r e h e n s i o n o f p r i m a r y

q u a l i t i e s . T h e o t h e r q u a l i t i e s a r e d e n i g r a t e d , a n d t h e t e r t i a r y , b e c a u s e w h o l l y

s u b j e c t i v e , h a v e n o g e n u i n e p l a c e i n h u m a n l i f e i n s o f a r a s D e s c a r t e s b a s e s i t o n

k n o w l e d g e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , w i ll c a n n o t p r o p e r l y b e g u i d e d b y s u c h q u a l i ti e s a n d

t h e p a s s i o n s t h a t m i g h t a t t e n d t h e m . R e a s o n is w i l l ' s s o l e p r o p e r s o u r c e o f

m o t i v a t i o n . H u m e , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d e t a c h e s a ll q u a l i ti e s f r o m i n d e p e n d e n t

e x i s t e n c e , f r e e i n g h i m s e l f f r o m t h e c o n t e n t io n t h a t r e a s o n i s c a p a b l e o f a b s o l u t e ,

o b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e , f o r n o i n t r in s i c p r o p e r t i e s o f q u a li t ie s s i g n a l t h e ir o b j e c t i v e


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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

existence. Hence, his claim that our passionate responses motivate human ac-

tion is not irrationalistic. 7 Rather., be cause the deepest roots of human nature

respond to those qualities and because the passions are human nature's deepest

and most universal response to those qualities, they are the tie that binds us to

the world we experience. Hume, with his skepticism in knowledge and his natu-

ralism in human action, inverts De sca rte s's theory of the relation of being to

reason; his asertion of will 's primacy in human nature is the antithesis of ration-

alism. We have now to consider still another revolution.

II. THE SECOND PHASE

A . K a n t s R e v i v a l o f R a t i o n a l i s m . Kant ' s realization that i t was neces sary

to deny k n o w l e d g e , in order to make room for faith (B xxx), 8 motivated his

Coper nican revolution in the met hodol ogy of philosophical thought. Thou gh he

was certainly con cerne d to secure s ynthetic a priori status for the foundational

propositions o f human k nowledge, Kan t's interest in the objects of faith was every

bit as great as Desca rtes's . God plays an importan t role in both of their systems,

guaranteeing the veracit y of the criterion of truth in Des cart es' s and serving as the

highest postulate of morality in Kant 's. But between Go d and reason lies will; and

whatever Kant's intentions regarding God may have been, he was most ass.uredly

interested to make a place for freedom, which in man is a proxima te conditio n or

morality. Kan t's views on the proper relation of will to reason in the ec ono my of

the moral life of finite rational beings are remar kably similar to Desca rtes 's, even

though freedom is only an hypothesis for Kant. However, before we examine that

relation in more detail, we must consider Kant 's response to that remem branc e

of Hume.

Kant reacted to the Cartesian rationalist and empiricist tradition that we

normally regard as culminating with Hume by rejecting its conc eptio n of the

relation betwee n being and reason. Wh en he wrote that rea son has insight only

into that which it produc es after a plan of its ow n (B xiii), and that whereas

hith erto it has been assume d that all our knowledge must conform to objects ,

The claim is not irrationalistic for two reasons: (1) The claim that primary qualities are objec-

tive cannot be defended; consequently, one cannot accuse Hume of attempting to base action on

some aspect of reality less real or reliable than some other. (2) Hume does have a theory of reason

and its role in action. That he should not give pride of place to this capacity and that he locates the

motivation to be rational in the passions and will does not make his view irrationalistic.

It is , a theory

of rationality and its place in hum an li fe .

s In 1798 Kant wrote to Christian Garve: It was not from the investigation of the existence of

God, of immortality, and so on, that I started but from the antinomy of pure reason, 'The world has a

beginning--; it has no beginning--;' and so on, up to the fourth [sic] antinomy: 'Man has freedom'--

against this: 'There is no freedom; everything belongs to natural necessity'. These were the first that

awoke me from the dogmatic slumbers .. . (XII , 258). One finds this view also expressed in Kant's

final essay on metaphysics and epistemology, What Ac tua l Progress has Metaphys ics Made s ince

the T ime o f Le ibn iz and Wol ff? .

All references to Kant are to Immanuel Kant, Kant s gesam mel te Schr i f ten , ed . Preussischen

Akademie der Wissenschaften, 28 vols. (Berlin and Leipzig: G. Reimer and Walter de Gruyter,

1901--). I will cite the Kritik der reinen Vernunft in the normal manner by A and B edition; citations

to other works will be by volume and page number, e.g., (If, page). All translations are my own.


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SCHOPENHAUER 199

it is now necess ary to mak e trial whether we may not have more success in the

tasks of metaphysics, if we assume that objects must conform to our knowl-

edg e (B xvi), he expressed in a very self-conscious way the view that the

concept of truth does not entail that the mind conform itself to reality. This

realization allowed him to break away from both Cartesian rationalism and Hu-

mean skepticism, even though his newly articulated position was formulated on

the basis of insights gained from and critical reactions to both. Because his

statements on the development of his thought are so diverse and, often, inconsis-

tent, and because so little of a systematic nature is actually known about the

crucial period of the Seventies, the precise concatenation of stimuli that led him

to the critical position will likely remain a matter of speculation and controversy.

But we can identify the basic steps.

The first step in Kant' s march towar d criticism was taken in 1768, in the

essay, Regions in Space, where, as against Leibniz's received rationalist

view, Kant argues that space cannot be a function of the relations of existen t

physical entities, because it possesses certain irreducible global relational char-

acteristics (II, 377-83). Within two years, he formulated, in his

I n a u g u r a l D i s -

ser ta t ion the theory of space and time that, with the exception of a single

element,9 would constitute the Transcendent al Aestheti c and serve as one of

the two fundamental supports of the critical epistemology. Roughly two years

after that, in his letter of February 1772 to Marcus Herz, he posed the central

epistemological question that would continue to bemuse him until he completed

the second edition of the

Kri t i k der r e inen Vernunf t

namely, on what basis

rests the relation to the object of that which in ourselves we call representa-

tion? (X, 124). This, of course, is just the quest ion about the relation of reason

to being. Asking it became inevitable once Kant had formulated the theory that

the space and time of which humans are aware originate in their cognitive capac-

ties, for the most obvious objects of human experience are spatiotemporal.

Kant's final developmental step before publishing the Kri t i k was to formulate the

concept and doctrine of synthetic a priori propositions, which occurred around

1774. Geometrical propositions are the first to which Kant is known to have

ascribed this status, but he must very soon have realized that it belonged to the

causal maxim,

ex n ih i lo n ih i l f i t .

Kant's formulation of the doctrine of synthetic

a priori propositions and his realization that mathematical and fundamental me-

taphysical propositions, among others, enjoy this status, allowed him to recog-

nize and traverse the narrow ridge between Descartes's rationalism and Hume's

skepticism. 1~ This is the heart of the Kantia n synthesi s.

Kant 's solution to the problem of the relation of representation to object and

to the problem of synthetic a priori truth, which turn out for him to be aspects of

9 I n 1 7 70 Ka n t d id n o t y e t h o ld t h e v i e w d e f in i t i v e o f t h e f ir s t Kritik n a m e l y , t h a t s p a c e a n d t i m e

a r e n e c e s s a r y a p r i o r i r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . H e a d o p t e d t h i s v i e w s o m e t i m e d u r i n g i 7 7 4 - 7 5 , a t l e a s t if o u r

d a t i n g o f h i s N a c h l a s s c a n b e t r u s t e d .

~0 T h i s i s o n l y t h e b r i e f e s t s k e t c h o f m a t e r ia l d i s c u s s e d i n T e d B . H u m p h r e y , T h e H i s t o r i c a l

a n d C o n c e p t u a l R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n K a n t ' s M e t a p h y s ic s o f S p a c e a n d G e o m e t r y , J o u r n a l o f t h e

H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y 1 1 ( Oc to b e r , 1 9 73 ) : 4 8 3 - 5 1 2 .


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200 HISTORY OF PHIL OSOPH Y

a single problem, requires two co-ordinate parts--a theory of intuition and a

theory of concepts. The essence of these is contained in his view that sensuous

awareness or intuition, which provides the content, and conceptualization,

which supplies the form, are equally necessary for knowledge. Kant expresses

this mutual limitation of reason and sensibility that is missing in both Descartes

and Hume, when he writes, Though ts without content are empty, intuitions

with out concepts are bl ind (A 51/B 75). He arrives at this central point of his

epistemology only after formulating the views that space and time are neces-

sary a priori representation[s], which underlie al l . . , intuit ions (A 24/B 38; cp.

A 31/B 46). and tha t und ers tan din g in us men is not itself a faculty of intu-

itions (B 153). Here we find the doctrines that most basically distinguish the

Kri t i k

from the

Di s se r t a t i on

In the latter, Kant , following the Leibnizian tradi-

tion, allowed for two different sources and orders of knowledge, sensibility a n d

reason. In the Kri t i k he argues for a single order of knowle dge that involves both

sources essentially. The new doctrine about the role of space and time in human

cognition has dual significance: First it comprises a theory of primary qualities,

relativizing them, in spite of the Cartesian tradition, to t he huma n subject. 11

Still, space and time retain their mathematically analyzable status and thereby

provide a basis for the kind of natural knowledge so important to the rationalists.

This theory allows Kant to avoid the controvers y concerning the primacy of the

different kinds of qualities that was the focal point of Hume's attack on Des-

cartes. No quality appears to men independently of the forms of intuition; conse-

quently, one cannot consistently argue that any of them more truly represent

being than any others.

This doctrine has two important consequences: First, it restricts our aware-

ness to the appearances to us of things-in-themselves. This is not a pernicious

result~ It means only that our perceptions are ord ered in accord with conditions

of receptivity whose source is our own cognitive capacities. This is as true of our

introspective awareness of ourselves as o f our awareness of independently exist-

ing objects. The concl usion that we apprehend only our empirical selveg our

spatiotemporally ordered bodies conjoined with our temporally ordered minds --

not ourselves as they may be in themselves, allows Kant to set aside both

Descartes's and Hume' s claims about the essential nature of the self, claims

central to their controversy. We shall see that this limitation of self-knowledge is

one of the crucial bases of his effort to place the argument concerning the

relation of reason and will on a new level. Second, Kant uses the doctrine of

space and time to delimit the scope of concept s by reconceiving the nature of

concepts and their function in human knowledge.

Cartesianism's use of the concept of causality--especial ly the Leibnizio-

Wolffian School's use of the principle of sufficient reason--was crucial in stimu-

lating Kant to formulate a new theory of concepts. Kant's central contention

regarding that principle, along with every other proposition that is supposed to

express pure conceptual knowledge, is that in order to have a real use, and

iz Kant makes this point in w Note II of the

Prolegomena

(See IV, 288-90.)


12/23

S C H O P E N H A U E R 201

h e n c e t o b e m e a n i n g f u l , it m u s t r e f e r t o w h a t c a n b e i n t u it e d . B e c a u s e a l l

i n t u it i o n is s e n s u o u s , f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n t o h a v e r e a l m e a n i n g i t m u s t r e f e r t o

s p a c e o r t i m e , b u t p r i m a r il y t h e l a tt e r . 12 U n l i k e D e s c a r t e s , w h o c o n c e i v e d o f

t h in k i n g a s a u n i q u e f o r m o f a p p r e h e n d i n g , K a n t c o n c e i v e s i t a s j u d g i n g . J u d g -

i n g is t h e a c t o f li n ki n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . T h e b a s i c k i n d s o f j u d g m e n t s t h a t

h u m a n s c a n m a k e - - t h e b a s i c k i n d s o f l in k s t h e y c a n e s t ab l i s h a m o n g r e p r e s e n -

t a t i o n s - - a r e l im i t e d in n u m b e r . K a n t c a l ls t h e s e f o r m s o f l in k i n g p u r e c o n c e p t s

o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g .

T o h a v e r e a l m e a n i n g p u r e c o n c e p t s m u s t r e f e r t o a n in t u i ti v e c o n t e n t , e v e n

i f t h is c o n t e n t i n t u r n i s a l t o g e t h e r p u r e ; o t h e r w i s e , t h e y r e m a i n e m p t y f o r m s o f

t h o u g h t . I n t h e i r i' ea l u s e , p u r e c o n c e p t s c o - o r d i n a t e i n t u i ti o n , t h a t is , c o n c e p t u -

a l l y s y n t h e s i z e i t i n t o a r t i c u l a b l e p a r t s o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r i s -

t i c s i t d i s p l a y s . N o w j u s t a s c o n c e p t s r e q u i r e i n t u i t i o n f o r t h e i r real u s e , i n t u i t i o n

n e e d s t h o u g ht , f o r T h e

I think

m u s t b e

able

t o a c c o m p a n y a ll m y r e p r e s e n t a -

t i o n s , b e c a u s e o t h e r w i s e s o m e t h i n g w o u l d b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n m e t h a t c o u l d n o t

b e t h o u g h t ( B 1 3 1 - 3 2 ). T o g e t h e r p u r e i n tu i t io n a n d p u r e c o n c e p t s c o m p r i s e t h e

c o n t e x t o f p o s s ib l e e x p e r i e n c e , s p a c e a n d t i m e p r o v i d i n g t h e o n l y m a t r i c e s o f

r e f e r e n c e t h a t w e a r e a b l e to a p p r e h e n d a n d t h e p u r e c o n c e p t s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g

c o n s t i tu t i n g t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e p u r e c o n c e p t o f a n o b j e c t i n g e n e r a l t h a t w e c a n

h a v e : Object i s t h a t i n w h o s e c o n c e p t t h e m a n i f o l d o f a g i v e n i n t u i t i o n is

unified

(B 137) .

T h e f o r e g o i n g s e n t e n c e i s o n e o f t h e m o s t a b s t r u s e i n K a n t ' s w r i ti n g s . I t

a n s w e r s t h e q u e s t i o n h e p o s e d i n t h e l e t te r t o H e r z t h a t f o r c e d h i m t o m a k e t h e

c r i t ic a l t u r n . I n i t h e i n t e n d s t o e x p r e s s t h e v i e w t h a t an object i s f o r u s t h e m e r e

p r o d u c t o f o u r a b i l it y t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e w h a t i s g i v e n i n i n t u i t io n , a n a b i l i ty

c o n s t i t u t e d b y t h e p u r e c o n c e p t s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W e d e r i v e n o s e n s e o f w h a t

t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l o r c o n c e p t u a l form o f a n o b j ec t m a y b e f r o m o u r e n c o u n t e r s

w i t h i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t in g th i n g s . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h o s e f o r m s a r e i n h e r e n t

(vorbereit) i n u s , a n d a r e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f o u r v e r y a b i li ty to c o m p r e h e n d

a s a n o b j e c t w h a t i s g i v e n a s m a t t e r o f s e n s a t io n , t h a t is , t o c o m p r e h e n d t h i s

m a t t e r a s a s p a t i o t e m p o r a l l y a n d c o n c e p t u a l l y u n i fi e d s e t o f q u a li ti e s. T h u s , t h e

v e r y c o n c e p t o f w h a t f o r u s a n o b j e c t c a n b e i s t h o r o u g h l y i d e a l iz e d , d e p e n d e n t

o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f m a n ' s a b i l i ty t o i n t u i t a n d t h i n k . I f t h i s b e s o , r e a s o n a n d

b e i n g h a v e b e e n c o m p l e t e l y s e p a r a t e d . K a n t h a s b l a z e d t h e t r a il o f f a it h .

I n K a n t ' s s y s t e m f a i t h 's p r i m a r y f o c u s i s f r e e d o m : S o f a r a s i ts r e a l it y is

p r o v e n b y a n a p o d i c t i c la w o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , t h e c o n c e p t o f f r e e d o m i s t h e

~2 The schem atization of the p ure co ncepts o f the understanding sets out the conditions for the

real meaningfulness of pure co ncepts. Em pirical meaningfulness, of course, d erves from a concept's

reference to actual experience. The con cept of real meaningfulness is best developed by Lewis White

Beck in Ka nt 's Theory of Definition, in

Studies in the Philosophy of Kant

(Indianapolis: Bobbs-

Merrill, 1965), pp. 61-73. I think it impo rtant to note that K ant schem atizes pure concepts so lely in

terms o f t ime, which al lows him to give a univocal real sense to them. Schopenhauer argues that the

only pure concepts, for example, a priori ones, are the four forms of the principle of sufficient

reason. Sinc e each of the four fo rms has the sam e fundamental conceptual content, they m ust be

differently schematized in order to distinguish among them. Thus, Schopenhauer schematizes them

in terms of different concatenations o f space and t im e. Th is is a crucial move on Schopenhauer 's

part.


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202

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

capstone of the whole structure of pure, even speculative reason (V, 3). We

first come to the concept of freedom through theoretical reason, which Kant

calls th e faculty of infer ring (A 330/B 386) from conditioned to condition:

Reason does not really produce any concepts; at best, it c n free a concept of

the underst nding from the inevitable limitations of possible experience, and

endeavor to extend it beyond the bounds of, yet in connection with, the empiri-

cal (A 408/B 435-A 409/B 436). In Kant 's schema of rational capacities, theo-

retical reason is the ability and drive to apprehend the uncondit ioned total ity

of the phenomenal world, which entails transcending possible experience. Rea-

son operates with the empty conceptual form of the pure concepts of under-

standing and, independently of the conditions of possible experience contained

in their schematization, goes beyond experien ce--which it takes as conditioned,

since all experience is subject to space, time and causality--to conceivable pos-

sible conditions. One of the possible conditions of experience, according to the

Third Antinomy, is freedom. Fr eedom may be conceived as one source of what

we experience as a sequence of causally related events. It is neither immanent in

experience nor strictly verifiable, but merely inferred as one possible condition

of what we experience. Nonetheless, Kant does argue that we have good rea-

sons for believing that we are actually free.

Kant 's contention pivots on his assertion that the same object can be viewed

in two ways: first, as object of experience, phenomenon, subject to all the forms

imposed by our cognitive capacities on the matter of sensation, and second, as

thing-in-itself. This pertains particularly to man, who experiences h imself as

empirical self but who is also virtually compelled to regard himsel f as free agent:

Man, who otherwise knows all of nature only through the senses, knows himself also

through mere apperception in acts and inner determinations that cannot be attributed to

the senses. Certainly to himself he is, on the one hand, phenomenon, and, on the other, in

respect of certain faculties, whose acts cannot be ascribed to sensibility's receptivity, a

mere intelligible object. We call these faculties understanding and reason. The latter in

particular we distinguish in a wholly unique and special way from all empirically condi-

honed powers; for it considers its objects merely through ideas and then determines the

understanding accordingly. (A 546/B 574-A 547/B 575)

Theoretical reason leads us to the possibility of freedom through its search for

totality. Its spontaneous acts of synthesis, which we cannot ascribe to receptiv-

ity, are our source of a sense of freedom's actual existence. Reason provides

even more evidence for this in its practical function.

Breaking with the Aristotelian tradition, Kant characterizes practical reason

as the source of moral imperatives, that is, conceiving and commanding goals,

rather than merely determining means. We regard reason in this role as indicat-

ing free causality, because the ought expresses a kind of necessity and connec-

tion with grounds that is not met with anywhere else in the whole of nature,

and because this ought expresses a possible action the ground of which is

nothing other than a conc ept (A 547/B 575). The sense of causality we have in


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SCHOPENHAUER 203

these situations differs from natural causality because the evidence we have for

it, our peculiar awareness of it, is not subject to the schema of natural causality:

its basis is wholly conceptual. Nonetheless, we feel that the imperatives we

impose on ourselves command absolutely and that we can conform to them.

Thus, Kant maintains that the moral law is the condition under which we can

first become consc ious of fre edom, and consequently that while fre edom is

the ra t io e ssendi of the moral law, the moral law is the ra t io c ognosc e nd i of

freed om (V, 4). O u g h t implies can.

Human will (Willkiir) is arb i t r ium se ns i t i v um l i be rum - - f r e e will that can be

affected by sensuous mot ives (A 534/B 562). ~3 Like De scar tes, Kant conce ives

the will as requiring guidance from reason. Our belief that man has a will,

according to them, means that we understand man to have a capacity for initiat-

ing acts independently of the chain of natural causality. But for Kant, will is not

its own source of motivation. As at a crossroads , the will (Wille) stands be-

tween its a priori principle and its a posteriori incentive, which is materi al (IV

400). Consequently, men are faced with this situation: Will is the foundation of

morality. A will's moral value is a function of the motives of its willing. The only

possible motives by virtue of which will can be regarded as morally good come

from reason in its practical function. Hence, will needs reason, for rea son has

been alloted to us [to serve] as a practical faculty, for example, as one that ought

to influence the will (Wi l len) (IV, 396).

Kant' s views on reason and will resemble Descartes's insofar as both main-

tain that while the will's free indifference, spontaneity, is a necessary condition

for morality, it must submit to rea son's control if its acts are to be morally good.

Their views regarding the respective roles of reason and will in the economy of

the self are similar as well. Just as Descartes grants primacy to the cognitive

subject through the cogi to argument, Kant grants it the same pride of place in his

appeal to the transcendental unity of apperception, the I thi nk, when he

argues that men have a sense of themselves as existing in two worlds. Thus, acts

of reason--which cannot be attributed to the senses--and most particularly rea-

son's formulation of the moral imperative, may well be the ra t io c ogno sc e nd i of

the will. But they are more: They are for Kant the very locus of the self, and the

will assumes a role wholly subsidiary to it. In this, Kant's view is no less

rationalistic than Descartes' s.

~3 T w o t e r m s i n K a n t ' s l e x i c o n a r e t r a n s l a t e d b y w i l l i n E n g l i s h , Willkiir and Wille. T h e t e r m s

a r e n o t e q u i v a l e n t , t h e f i r s t d e n o t i n g s p o n t a n e i t y , t h e a b i l i t y t o c h o o s e a n d t h e r e b y i n i t i a t e c o u r s e s o f

a c t i o n , t h e s e c o n d c o n n o t i n g la w g i v i n g a n d p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n a s s u c h , t h a t i s ,, a u t o n o m y . T h e

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o c o n c e p t s o f w il l i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n e d b y K a n t , p a r t ia l l y

b e c a u s e h i s v o c a b u l a r y e v o l v es f r o m t h e Critique of Pure Reason, w h e r e h e t e n d s t o u s e Willkiir.

t h r o u g h t h e

Critique of Practical Reason.

w h e r e

Wille

p r e d o m i n a t e s . I n a n y c a s e , w h e n K a n t u s e s

Wille h e t e n d s p r i m a r i l y t o m e a n t h a t c a p a c i t y w e h a v e , f o r e x a m p l e , p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , t o d i r e c t t h e

c h o i c e o f o u r a c t i o n s b y r e a s o n . T h i s i s t h e v i e w a d v o c a t e d b y L e w i s W h i t e B e c k , A Commentary on

Kant s Critique of Practical Reason ( C h i c a g o : T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1 96 0) , p p . 1 7 6 - 8 1 ;

H . J . P a t o n , The Categorical Imperative ( C h i c a g o : T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1 94 8) , p p . 2 0 7 -

1 6; a n d J ef f ri e G . M u r p h y , M o r a l D e a t h : A K a n t i a n E s s a y o n P s y c h o p a t h y , Ethics 8 2 , n o . 4 ( Ju ly ,

1972): 285.


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2 04 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

K a n t a v o i d s H u m e ' s c r i t i c i s m o f D e s c a r t e s o n l y b y c o m p l e t e l y d i v o r c i n g t h e

ordo essendi

f r o m t h e

ordo cognoscendi

a n d b y m a k i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f w i ll a n

h y p o t h e s i s . H o w e v e r , t h e s e p a r a t i o n i s n o t a s c o m p l e t e a s K a n t m i g h t w a n t :

W h e n h e a s s e r t s t h a t o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e fe l t s p o n t a n e i t y o f r e a s o n m e n f e e l

t h e m s e l v e s f r e e h e r e n d s t h e c o g n i t i v e s c r e e n h e h a s s o m e t i c u l o u s l y f a s h -

i o n e d .

T

T h e q u e s t i o n s , w h a t i s t h e s o u r c e o f t h e s p o n t a n e i t y a n d w h a t i s t h e

n a t u r e o f m y a w a r e n e s s o f it , l ie i m p l ic i t in t h e i ni ti al a s s e r t i o n . T h r o u g h t h e

t e a r , s o n e c e s s a r y t o th e a r c h i t e c t o n i c s t r u c t u r e o f t h e c r i t ic a l s y s t e m , K a n t ' s

s u c c e s s o r s m a d e t h e i r w a y b a c k t o t h e th i n g -i n - it s e lf .

B. Sch openh auer s R evolu t ion in the Revolu t ion .

S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s i n t e n -

t i o n to e f f e c t a r e v o l u t i o n i n K a n t ' s C o p e r n i c a n r e v o l u t i o n i s r e v e a l e d m o s t

s u b tl y a n d s u c c i n c t l y in t h is r e p h r a si n g o f t h e s tr a t e gy o f K a n t ' s n e w m e t h o d o f

t h o u g h t : W e m u s t l e a rn to u n d e r s t a n d n a t u r e f ro m o u r s e lv e s , n o t o u r s e l v e s

f r o m n a t u re . ' '1 5 T h e d e e p i r o n y i n S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s r e v i si o n o f K a n t i a n d o c t r i n e

i s h i s r e t u r n t o t h e L e i b n i z i o - W o i f f i a n s c h o o l o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d t o H u m e f o r t h e

f o u n d a t i o n s o f h is t h e o r i e s o f th e p r i n c i p l e o f su f f ic i e n t r e a s o n a n d m o t i v a t i o n ,

r e s p e c t i v e l y .

S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s a b il it y to r e v is e t h o s e d o c t r i n e s w i t h o u t o b v i o u s l y b e g g i n g

a n y i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a g a i n s t K a n t i s t e s t i m o n y t o h i s i n g e n u i t y . A s u b s t a n t i a l

p o r t i o n o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f c a u s a l i ty w a s f o r m u l a t e d a s d i r e c t c r it i c i sm o f t h e

L e i b n l z i o - W o l f f i a n d o c t r i n e o f th e p r i n c i p l e o f s u f f ic i e n t r e a s o n , a n d h i s e t h ic s i s

a r e b u tt a l o f th e t h e o r y o f m o t iv a t i o n p r e s e n t i n H u m e ' s d o c t r i n e o f th e m o r a l

s e n s e . S c h o p e n h a u e r w a s a b l e t o r e s u s c i t a t e t h e s e d o c t r i n e s i n t h e f a c e o f

K a n t ' s c r i t i c is m s b y g e n e r a li z i n g a n d i n t e g r a t in g t h e m i n t o a c o m p l e t e s y s t e m o f

b e i n g , k n o w i n g a n d w i ll in g . T h e v i e w s c e n t r a l t o th i s s y s t e m a r e (1 ) t h a t t h e

~4 Fichte , w ho Ka nt first recognized an d later rejected as a true prop onen t of the critical philoso-

phy, w as the f irs t to expose the hole Kant had torn in the screen. He did so in 1797 in the Secon d

Introduction to his

Science of Knowledge.

Fichte writes, Th e intuiting of himself that is required o f

the philosopher in performing the a ct wh ereby the I come s to exist I cal l

intellectual intuition.

It is

the unmediated consciousness tha t I a ct and o f what I d o: i t is that through which I know something

because I do it . . . Every one who attr ibutes an act ivity to himself appeals to thus intui tion . . . . The

concept o f act ion, which is possible only through this intui t ion of the self-act ive is the only one that

unifies both w orlds that there are fo r us, the sensible and the intelligible. Fich te challenges Kan t on

his own grounds, calling the doctrine that all intuition is sensuous into question by appealing to the

ver y experience th at comprises the crucial transition in and professed cap stone o f the critical system .

One can see that Fichte 's move in these passages revives Hum e's at tack on Descartes . But this is

only the f irs t s tep in an at tack that Schopen hauer continues and deepens, as we shall see.

The quotat ion is from Johann Gott l ieb Fichte,

Erste und Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaft-

slehre, ed.

Fritz Medicus (Ham burg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1967), pp. 49 -50, 53. Translation mine.

,5 Arthur Schopenhauer,

Sdmtliche Werke.

2rid ed., ed. Arthur H 0bscher , 7 vols. (Wiesbaden:

Eberhard Brockh ans V eflag, 1948), I II , 219 . Volume I contains

Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des

Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde,

and volume II and III, volumes I and II respectively

of Die Welt

als WiUe und VorsteUung.

Citations to the

Fourfold Root will be

to the Germ an edition only, and wil l

have this form: (I, page) Citations to

The World as Will and Representation,

t rans. E. F. J . Payne, 2

vols. (Indian H ills: The Fal con 's Wing Press, 1958), will have the following form (II, page; I, page).

The first num ber refers to the German, the sec ond to the English edition. All translations are my

own. In the analysis that follows I have freely mixed passages from the

Fourfold Root

with passages

from the World,

beca use in their final form , for example, the one in which they a ppea r in Hi~bscher's

edition, they were integrated by Schopenhaner. In their f inal form, none of Scbop enhaue r 's works is

actually earlier than another.


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S C H O P E N H A U E R 205

p r i n c i p le o f s u f f i c ie n t r e a s o n h a s f o u r f o r m s , e a c h o f w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e s a

d i s t i n c t r e a l m o f k n o w l e d g e , ( 2 ) th a t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s r e v e a l s t h e w i ll -l ik e e s -

s e n c e o f t h e s e l f a n d t h e r e s t o f r e a l i ty , ( 3) t h a t k n o w l e d g e i s th e i n s t r u m e n t o f

w i l l, b u t ( 4) t h a t t h r o u g h o n e s o r t o f e x p e r i e n c e r e a s o n t r a n s f o r m s t h e s u f f i c i e n t

c o n d i t i o n f o r w i l l ' s m o t i v a t i o n . T h e i r c o n c a t e n a t i o n y i e l d s t h e m o s t c o m p l e x a n d

i n t e r e s ti n g t h e o r y o f th e r e l a t io n a m o n g b e i n g , r e a s o n a n d w i ll t h a t w e s h a ll

e x a m i n e .

T h e l o g ic a l s t a r ti n g p o i n t o f S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s t h o u g h t is a n a n t i n o m y in o u r

f a c u l t y o f k n o w l e d g e ( I I, 3 6 ; I , 3 0) . I t c o n t r a s t s i d e a l is m a n d m a t e r e a l i s m , t h e

t w o g e n e r a ll y a c c e p t e d s u f f ic i en t e x p la n a t i o n s f o r k n o w l e d g e . S c h o p e n h a u e r r e -

j e c t s b o t h b e c a u s e t h e y p r e s u p p o s e t h a t k n o w l e d g e d e p e n d s e s s e n t i a ll y o n o n l y

a s i n g le f a c t o r , e i t h e r o n l y t h e s u b j e c t o r o n l y t h e o b j e c t , a n d t h a t e i t h e r o n l y t h e

s u b j e c t o r o n l y th e o b j e c t h a s g e n u i n e i n t e g r i ty o f e x i s t e n c e . L i k e K a n t , S c h o -

p e n h a u e r r e j e c t s m e t a p h y s i c a l r e d u c t i o n i s m b e c a u s e h e b e l i e v e s i t u n d e r l i e s

b o t h id e a li s m a n d e m p i r ic i s m . C o n s e q u e n t l y , h e b e g i n s n e i t h e r f r o m t h e o b j e c t

n o r t h e s u b j e c t , b u t f r o m t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , w h i c h c o n t a i n s a n d p r e s u p p o s e s

b o t h ; d e c o m p o s i t i o n i n t o o b j e c t a n d s u b j e c t i s i ts f i rs t , m o s t u n i v e r s a l a n d e s s e n -

t ia l f o r m . . , t h e o t h e r f o r m s th a t a re s u b o r d i n a t e to it , s p a c e , t im e a n d c a u s a l-

i t y , p e r ta i n o n l y t o t h e o b j e c t ( I I , 3 0 ; I , 2 5 ) . B e c a u s e s p a c e , t i m e , a n d c a u s a l i t y

a r e e s s e n t ia l f o r m s o f o b j e c t s a s s u c h , t h o s e f o r m s c a n b e k n o w n a p r i o r i l o c .

c i t . ) . T h e f o u r f o r m s o f th e p r i n c i p l e o f s u f f ic i e n t r e a s o n p e r t a i n t o o b j e c t s

b e c a u s e o b j e c t s a r e o r d e r e d i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e a p r io r i f o rm s o f s p a c e , t im e a n d

c a u s a l i t y , e i t h e r s i n g l y o r i n c o m b i n a t i o n ; h e n c e , t h e p r i n c ip l e o f s u f fi c i e n t r e a -

s o n i n e a c h o f i ts v e r s i o n s i s a n a p r io r i f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e a l s o .

T h i s o r d e r o f p r e s e n t a t io n , b y w h i c h w e a r r iv e a t t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f S c h o p e n -

h a u e r ' s e p i s t e m o l o g y a n d m e t a p h y s i c s , t h e f o u r f o l d r o o t o f s u f fi c ie n t r e a s o n , i s ,

i n th e K a n t i a n s e n s e , a n a l yt ic . S c h o l p e n h a u e r d o e s n o t a t te m p t t o r e d u c e e x p e r i -

e n c e t o s o m e s i n g le f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p le . I n s t e a d , h e b e g i n s w i t h t h e e x p e r i e n -

t i a l s i t u a t i o n a s g i v e n , t h a t i s , w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d r e g r e s s e s t o i t s c o n s t i t u -

e n t s , s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t , a n d t h e t h e n r e g r e s s e s t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e e x p e r i -

e n t i a l s i t u a ti o n , t h e a p r io r i fo r m s o f r e p r e s e n t t a t i o n ( c f. I, 1 4 1 - 4 2 ) . T h e n S c h o -

p e n h a u e r ' s t h o u g h t f o l l o w s th i s c o u r s e : E x p e r i e n c e , i f w e t a k e t h a t t e rm i n th e

K a n t i a n s e n s e ( a s e n t a i l i n g c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e o r r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e ) , i s s o

o r d e r e d t h a t w i t h i n i t o n e c a n p r o v i d e r e a s o n s f o r w h a t o n e s a y s o n e k n o w s ( f o r

e x a m p l e , m a i n t a in s w i t h a n y e p i s te m i c a t t i tu d e ) o r d o e s . D e p e n d i n g o n c o n t e x t ,

t h e r e a s o n s o n e o f f e r s a nd a c c e p t s a s r e le v a n t d i f fe r i n k i n d . R e a s o n s m a y b e

c a u s a l , l o g i c a l , m a t h e m a t i c a l , o r m o t i v a t i o n a l . A l l a r e e q u a l l y r e a s o n s , b u t e a c h

k i n d p r o v i d e s a u n i q u e t y p e o f e x p l a n a t i o n a n d i s w h o l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y o n l y i n a

s i n g le k i n d o f c o n t e x t .

T h e p r i n c i p le o f s u f f i c ie n t r e a s o n i t s e l f i s a g e n e r a l i z a t io n f r o m t h e f o u r

d i s t in c t f o r m s o f s u f f ic i e n t r e a s o n , a n d a s s e r t s t h a t f o r e a c h t h i n g t h e r e m u s t b e a

s u f f ic i e n t r e a s o n w h y i t is o r is n o t . W h e n h e d e f e n d s t h e g e n e r a l v a l i d it y o f t h e

p r i n c i p le , S c h o p e n h a u e r r e t u r n s i n p a r t t o th e S c h o o l P h i l o s o p h y . W h i l e h e

r e j e c t s K a n t ' s v i e w t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e h a s o n l y o n e r e a l u s e , t h e c a u s a l o n e , h e

a l s o a d o p t s o n e e s s e n t ia l f e a t u r e o f K a n t ' s v i e w : A l t h o u g h i t h a s f o u r f o rm s , t h e


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206 HISTORY OF PHIL OSOPH Y

principle can be applied only in terms of specific a priori features of experience.

Its application requires, in Kant' s terminology, schematization. Disagreeing with

Kant's view concerning the essential univocality of the principle of sufficient

reason's real use, Schopenhauer also denies the School Philosophy view that it

can be used independently of the conditions of experience.

(1) The dominant form of the PSR, the causal form, belongs to and defines

understanding. It governs, intuiti ve, complete, empirical represent ations (I,

28). These are all objects of perception, including the body, and incorporate both

sensuous form, spatiotemporality, and matter, by virtue of which we attribute

causality to such objects, both in their relations to ourselves and among one

another; for caus e and effect i s . . . the entire essence of matter; its being is its

act ion (II, I0; I, 8). Causality is schematized as the concat enati on of space and

time that constitutes materiality. In this, Schopenhauer's theory differs com-

pletely from Kan t' s. ~6 (2) The second form o f the PSR per tains t o knowing. It

governs concepts. All concepts are abstractions from perception, and abstrac-

tion entails eliminating reference to specific spatiotemporal features of objects,

that is, eliminating the principium individu tionis from perceptual awareness.

This form of the principle, belonging to and defining reason, is twofold. I t asserts

that all concepts (a) must h ave some ultimate relation to perception o r (b) if the

relation to perception is indirect, must be related to one another by the laws of

logic. Concepts that fail to meet at least one of these conditions have no real use.

Schopenhauer eliminates the notion of pure concepts of understanding; all con-

cepts are abstractions fro m experience. The ultimate sufficient reason for the

existence of a concept is its derivation from perception, even if it is logically

deduced from some other concepts . (3) The mathematical form of the PSR, the

PSR of being, belongs to and defines sensibility; it applies to objects only insofar

as they are in either space or time, but not both. It governs the pure forms of

sensibility independently of their relation to understanding, and comprises

mathematics, which for Schopenhauer, as for Kant, derives its significance

solely from its reference to the pure sensuous manifolds of space and time. (4)

Finally, the motivational form of the PSR, the PSR of acting, belongs to and

defines self-consciousness; it governs the willing of each individual. Will constit-

utes the sufficient reason for each pers on's acts, and a perso n's motives always

provide a completely sufficient reason for his choices. As the originating source

of courses of action, will is free, but choices are not arbitrary. They can always

be adequately explained in terms of specific motivation.

In all its fo rms the principle of sufficient reason is an epistemological princi-

ple. Schopeahauer' s t heory of the PSR is an important revision of Kant' s episte-

mology. It abides by the spirit of the latter doctrine because Schopenhauer

,6 This particular criticism of Kant's doctrine of schematization, an attack on the view that the

pure concepts are schematizable solely n terms of time, is one of the most fascinatingdoctrines in

Schopenhauer. Essentially he holds that the concepts of materialityand efficientcausalityare com-

plementary. This view, as well as Schopenhauer's more general doctrine of schematization, has

much to recommend it. Although further analysis of them is relevant to the issues at hand, space

does not permit it.


18/23


m a i n t a in s t h a t e x p e r i e n c e p r e s u p p o s e s t h e f o u r f o rm s o f th e P S R a n d t h a t th e

P S R h a s n o u s e i n d e p e n d e n t ly o f e x p e r i e n c e . H o w e v e r , i t t o u c h e s t h e th in g -i n-

i t se l f t h ro u g h s e r f - c o n s c io u s n e s s , w h e r e b y w e a r e a w a r e o f o u r s e lv e s n o t m e r e l y

a s o b j e c t s b u t a s s u b j e c t s .

S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s d o c t r in e o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e s e c o n d f u n d a m e n t a l s u p -

p o r t o f h i s s y s t e m , i s n o t j u s t a r e v i s i o n o f K a n t i a n d o c t r i n e , b u t a c o m p l e t e

b r e a k w i t h i t. K a n t a r g u e s t h a t b e c a u s e w e c a n b e a w a r e o f o u r s e l v e s o n l y i n

t i m e , o u r s e l f - k n o w l e d g e i s n e c e s s a r i l y s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s e n s ib i l it y ,

a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , w e c a n k n o w o u r s e l v e s o n l y e m p i r ic a l ly . W h e n w e i n tr o -

s p e c t , w e a r e a w a r e o n l y o f s e r ia l l y o r d e r e d s t a t e s o f m i n d . T h a t , a t l e a s t , is t h e

c a n o n i c a l d o g m a . T h i s v i e w i s r a t h e r H u m e a n ; K a n t a v o i d s i ts c o n s e q u e n c e s

o n l y b y a p p e a l t o t h e d o c t r in e o f a p p e r c e p t i o n . B u t t h e p a s s a g e a b o u t o u r a w a r e -

n e s s o f th e s e l f t h a t I q u o t e d f r o m t h e D i a l e c ti c a n d d i s c u s s e d a b o v e m a y b e r e a d

a s a n a d m i s s io n o f th e d e f e a t a n d i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f C a r t e s i a n i s m ' s f u n d a m e n t a l

e p i s te m o l o g i c a l a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s , a n a d m i s s i o n a s p oi g n a n t a s th e

o n e c o n t a i n e d i n H u m e ' s Appendix.

K a n t a s s e r t s th a t all k n o w l e d g e lo g i c a l ly p r e s u p p o s e s o r i g i n a l a p p e r c e p -

t i o n ( B 13 2), S c h o p e n h a u e r t h a t A l l k n o w l e d g e n e c e s s a r i l y p r e s u p p o s e s s u b -

j e c t a n d o b j e c t ( I , 1 40 ). T h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s s i m p l y m a r k a n e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e

b e t w e e n t h e t w o : K a n t p r e s u p p o s e s ( 1 ) t h a t s c i e n c e i s t h e p r e - e m i n e n t f o r m o f

c o g n i t i v e k n o w l e d g e , a n d ( 2) t h a t t h e p e c u l i a r k in d o f c e r t a i n t y d e m a n d e d b y

s c i e n c e , a p o d i c t i c c e r t a i n t y , e n t a i ls t h e s u b j e c t a s it s e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n . S c h o -

p e n h a u e r ' s b a s i c p o i n t o f v ie w i s l e s s r e s t ri c t e d a n d h is m e t h o d , t h e r e f o r e , m o r e

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l . H e g r a n ts e q u a l w e i g h t to b o t h s u b j e c t a nd o b j e c t , j u s t b e -

c a u s e t h e y a r e t h e e s s e n t i a l c o n s t i tu e n t s o f e v e r y k n o w i n g s i tu a t io n , n o m a t t e r

w h a t k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e i s s o u g h t i n it .

I n S e c t i o n 4 1 o f t h e Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,

S c h o p e n h a u e r t a c k l e s t h e p r o b l e m o f s e l f - k n o w l e d g e t h a t p l a g u e d K a n t . H e

s i m p l y d e n i e s t h e K a n t i a n v i e w t h a t t h e o b j e c t o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h

S c h o p e n h a u e r s o m e t i m e s c a l ls i n n er s e n s e , i s t h e s u b j e c t q u a k n o w e r . K a n t ' s

d o c t r i n e m a k e s t h e k n o w e r q u a k n o w e r i ts o w n o b je c t , w h i c h S c h o p e n h a u e r

b e l i e v e s t o i n v o l v e a n i ll ic i t, b e c a u s e t h o r o u g h l y r e d u n d a n t , r a m i f i c a t io n o f t h e

k n o w i n g s i tu a ti o n: Y o u r k n o w l e d g e (Wissen) o f y o u r k n o w l e d g e (Erkennen) is

d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m y o u r k n o w l e d g e (Erkennen) o n l y b y e x p r e s s i o n . ' I k n o w

(weiss) t h a t I k n o w (erkenne) e x p r e s s e s n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n ' I k n o w (erkenne) ,

a n d t h i s , l a c k i n g f u r t h e r c o n t e n t (Bestimmung), e x p r e s s e s n o t hi n g m o r e th a n

T ( I , 1 41 ). T h e p o i n t h e r e is t h a t k n o w i n g r e q u i r e s b o t h s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t .

T h e e x p r e s s i o n I k n o w a l w a y s ta k e s a d i r ec t o b j e c t a s i ts g r a m m a t i c a l

c o m p l e m e n t , f f o n e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d i r e c t o b j e c t o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n I k n o w

i s t h e s u b j e c t o f k n o w l e d g e i t se l f , t h e n o n e i ll ic i tl y tr a n s f o r m s t h e i n t ri n s ic s u b -

j e c t i n t o a n o b j e c t . T h i s m i s c o n s t r u e s t h e s u b j e c t ' s r o l e in k n o w i n g . I f t h e s u b -

j e c t i s k n o w a b l e i t m u s t r e v e a l i t s e l f a s a g e n u i n e o b j e c t , f o r e x a m p l e , a s p o s -

s e s s i n g a u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r .

T h e c e n t r a l c l a i m i n S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s t h o u g h t i s t h a t t h e I r e v e a l s it s e l f a s

w i l li n g s u b j e c t : t h e k n o w n i n u s a s s u c h i s n o t th e k n o w i n g b u t t h e w il li n g


19/23

208 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

s u b j e c t , t h e s u b j e c t o f w i ll i n g , t h e w i l l. B e g i n n i n g f ro m [ t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f ] k n o w -

i n g , o n e c a n s a y t h a t 'I k n o w

(erkenne)

i s a n a n a l y t i c p ro p o s i t i o n , a s o p p o s e d t o

' I w i l l ', w h i c h i s a s y n t h e t i c a n d , i n d e e d , a p o s t e r i o r i o n e , o n e g i v e n th ro u g h

i n n e r ( th a t i s, i n ti m e o n l y ) e x p e r i e n c e ( I , 1 4 3 ). O n S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s a c c o u n t ,

a p p e r c e p t i o n , t h e I t h i n k o r I k n o w , i s a n a l y ti c a l ly c o n t a i n e d i n e v e r y

c o g n i t i v e s

schopenhauer and the cartesian tradition

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