scherner german
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
1/30
1
German Industrial Productivity and Exploitation of Occupied Europe
During World War II:
New Insights from Revised German Import Statistics
Jonas Scherner
German Historical Institute, Washington D.C.
and
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Abstract
According to estimates made by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after World War
II, German industrial labour productivity grew significantly during the war, especially in 1940
and 1941. These estimates are based on the assumption that the intermediate inputsale
ratios in the different industrial sectors remained constant over time. However, after the
beginning of the war, German armament producers started to outsource the manufacturing of
intermediate goods to other companies, especially to firms in occupied Europe. In order to
trace the impact of such outsourcing, German imports are re-estimated on the basis of
information given about payment flows because the official German import data are highly
distorted, suggesting that German net imports during the war were almost insignificant.
Instead, this re-estimation shows that Germany imported a huge amount of goods from
occupied countries, especially intermediate inputs for the armament production.Consequently, Germanys industrial labour productivity grew much less than assumed by the
study of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
November 2008
Preliminary
Please do not cite without permission
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
2/30
2
1. Introduction
Based on data provided by the German Armament Ministry, labour productivity in the
German armament industry during World War II only increased significantly after 1942the
event known as the so-called armament miracle.1 In this year, Albert Speer was appointed
armament minister and implemented measures which allegedly caused this growth. However,
the data provided by the armament ministry has several shortcomings.2 Adam Tooze recently
questioned whether this data really reflects the production of armaments at least in the first
years of the war.3 His critique is based on figures of the Industrial Sales Report, a survey
compiled by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), which was never
published and which was rediscovered by Tooze.
According to this report, labour productivity in German industry grew significantly
throughout the duration of World War II. The growth was particularly impressive during the
first two years of the war. It was mainly caused by the productivity growth of the metal-
working sector which included the bulk of German armament industries.In light of these
figures, and given that the share of armament production on metalworking sectors total
production made up about 70%, Toozes recent conclusion seems to be plausible, namley that
labour productivity in the armament industry could not have decreased during the first years
of warin contrast to what the data of the armament ministry suggest. Otherwise, labour
productivity of the civilian metalworking production must have increased in an amount not
1R. Wagenfhr,Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, Berlin1954, p. 125; D. Eichholtz, Geschichte der
deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, Vol. 2: 1941-1943, Berlin 1985; R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich,
Oxford 1994, p. 344; W. Abelshauser, Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles, in: Harrison, M. (ed.),
The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge, 122-76.
2J. Scherner/J. Streb, Das Ende eines Mythos? Albert Speer und das so genannte Rstungswunder, in:
Vierteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 93, 2006, pp. 172-96.3J. A. Tooze, No Room for Miracles. German Industrial Output in World War II Reassessed in: Geschichte
und Gesellschaft2005/31,3, pp. 439-44.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
3/30
3
credible. However, growth rates in 1940 are a little bit misleading: First, the adaption process
from a peace to a war economy which led to significant productivity losses, as often reported,
took place during the last four months of 1939. Second, the adaption process meant that at its
end a big share of workers was re-allocated from civilian sectors which had an under-average
value-added per worker (such as the textile industry) to industries which had a over-average
value-added per worker (such as the metalworking sector. Finally, labour productivity
numbers were calculated on the basis of the survey of workers conducted each May of the
respective year. Whereas in the years from 1940 on, the May-figure represented more or less
the average monthly employment figure in the respective year, it also represented the peak of
employment in 19394, such that the use of this figure led to an underestimate of true labour
productivity in this year. However, even if we consider that the growth rate of labour
productivity in 1940 calculated by the Industrial Sales Report is exaggerated, Toozes
conclusion mentioned above seems to be valid, given that the second highest growth rate of
the metalworking sectors labour productivity is reported for 1941.
Table 1: USSBS Estimate of Labour Productivity Growth (% p.a.; 1939-prices)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Whole industry9,5 3,1 3,1 5,0 0,5
Whole industry without
metal-working sector 6,2 -1,7 1,4 2,3 -8,2
Metal-working sector13,2 8,6 4,8 7,5 7,0
Source: National Archives, RG 243, Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European Survey,
Special Paper No 8, Industrial Sales, Output, and Productivity, Prewar Area of Germany
4Bundesarchiv (herafter BArch) R 3901/20238, employment in the industry, fol. 143.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
4/30
4
This contradiction regarding a fundamental aspect of the German war economythe
performance of the industrial labour productivity, especially labour productivity growth in the
armament industrysuggests checking the data: those provided by the armament ministry
and those employed by the USSBS. In another project, I am checking in conjunction with
Adam Tooze and Jochen Streb the data of the armament ministry. Here, I am going to check
the USSBS figures. How were these figures derived? Labour productivity is measured by the
ratio of real value-added (sales minus value of intermediate inputs) and working hours of the
workforce. Prices, sales, and working hours were surveyed continuously by the German
authorities. Intermediate inputs value in the different industries was estimated by employing
the intermediate inputs-sales ratios erstablished by the industrial census in 1936.5
However, did the ratio between intermediate inputs and sales really remain constant over
time? Today we know that in some branches of the German armament industry, especially
those manufacturing technical complex armaments such as tanks or aircrafts, outsourcing of
intermediate goods within the metal-working sector (wings of aircrafts or other parts of
armament goods) increased dramatically during the war, especially at its beginnings, due to
several reasons.6 Before the war, armament production was concentrated in central Germany
because these regions were out of the range of foreign aircrafts attacks. However, after the
5About the industrial census in 1936, see especially R. Fremdling, The German Industrial Census of 1936.
Statistics as Preparation for the War, in:Jahrbuch fr Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2005/2, 155-65; R. Fremdling/R.
Stglin, Die Industrieerhebung von 1936: Ein Input-Output-Ansatz zur Rekonstruktion der
volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechung fr Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundertein Arbeitsbericht, in:
Vierteljahresschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 90, 416-28. R. Fremdling/H. De Jong, H./M. P.
Timmer, British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared: A New Benchmark for 1935/36 Based on
Double Deflated Value Added, in:Journal of Economic History, Vol. 67, No. 2, 2007, pp. 350-78; J. A. Tooze,
Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge. Cambridge 2001.6For details, see J. Scherner/J. Streb/J. A. Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich, working paper,
2008.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
5/30
5
war had started, some problems arose. The military placed a huge amount of armament
demands on the firms in central Germany, exceeding both the capacities of these plants and
their workforce. The latter did not seem to be a problem, given that raw materials were mainly
allocated to the war-production after the war had started, effecting especially metalworking
companies of the border regions which, as mentioned, produced only civilian goods. These
companies had to reduce production such that many workers of these companies could be
released. And based on the law on Dienstverpflichtung enacted in 1938, these workers
could and were commanded by the authorities to the armament firms in central Germany.
However, armament producers were not at all satisfied with the performance of these forced
German workers (Dienstverpflichtete).7 These workers obviously tried to prove their
incompetence in the hopes that they would be released and returned to their families. Also
these forced workers were much more prone to sickness than normal workers. 8 This
unwillingness, coupled with the complaints of regional Nazi leaders of border regions in
which metalworking companies were threatened to close down due to the lack of military
orders and the rationing of raw materials for civlian production led, some months after the
beginnings of the war, to a major change of the procurement policy. The authorities issued an
order which stated that armaments assembled as a finished product should be produced in
central Germany, whereas intermediate inputs (such as parts of weapons) should be produced
also in border regions. This decision was also influenced by the fact that the procurement
agencies were aware that a division of labour would increase labour productivity in the long
run.
7See for example L. Budra/J. Scherner/J. Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing: Explaining
the Continuous Growth of Output and Labour Productivity in the German Aircraft Industry during World WarII,Economic History Review (forthcoming).
8Scherner/Streb/Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
6/30
6
This outsourcing is shown in table 2, citing the example of companies which produced the
engines of the JU 88 and of firms which were involved in the final assembly of this heavy
bomber. Notice that the share of the JU 88 on the total German aircraft production between
1939 and 1943 amounted to about one third and a half, and that the aircraft production had a
share on total German munitions production of more than 40%.9 The JU 88 production was no
exception in the aircraft production. Whereas the ratio between suppliers workforce and
workers of companies involved in final assembly and engine production amounted constantly
to 0.3 between mid 1936 and summer 1939, it increased sharply after the war had started to
0.45 until May 1940.10 Also, in the production of another technical complex armament good,
tank, we can observe a similar development as such shown in table 2.11
Table 2: Share of intermediate goods in total costs in the German aircraft industry
Junkers Siebel Mimo Weser ATG
1939 56% 53% 58% 41% 59%
1940 63% 66% 64% 47% 58%
1941 71% 63% 66% 43% 62%
1942 79% 69% 68% 54% 63%
1943 88% 72% 72% n.a. 71%
Source: Budra/Scherner/Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing.
9Budra/Scherner/Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing.
10Bundesarchiv-Militrarchiv (hereafter BA MA) RL 3/2638; workforce of the aircraft inustries, monthly data,
1933May 1940. Unfortunately, data for the later period are not avialable.
11
See for example the case of the tank producer Alkett. The share of intermediate goods in total costs of thiscompany was about 26% in 1938/39; 38% in 1939/40, and 58% in 1940/41. BArch R 2301/5517; audit reports of
Alkett.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
7/30
7
This data clearly suggests that the labour productivity figures calculated by the USSBS by
employing constant input-sales ratios in the metalworking sector are highly distorted.
However, the basis, given the data, for calculating the total distortion due to the outsourcing
in the German armament industry is small. Only data for some single firms, such as reported
in table 2, is available. However, the final producers did not only outsource to German firms,
but also to companies in occupied Europe.12 And in this case, as will be shown later, complete
data is available for analysis.
The USSBS was aware of the outsourcing to companies in occupied Europe; however, backed
by the official German Import Statistics it assumed that the impact of foreign deliveries was
insignificant. However, German imports were dramatically underreported in the official
statistics. German authorities were aware of this, as noted the Economics Department of the
Reichsbank in mid 1944: According to confidential information of the German Statistical
Office the German foreign trade statistics only captures exports correctly, whereas the import
figures do not reflect in any way true imports.13 The Germans published this data for
propagandistic purposes, because this data show that Germany did not exploit occupied
Europe, in contrast to the claims made by the Allies.14 The official data suggests that
Germanys trade during the war was more or less balanced, and that in the case of some
occupied countries, such as Poland, Germany was even a net exporter. Moreover, as shown in
the last line of table 3, net imports from all occupied countries were surprisingly small.
12For details, see J. Scherner, Europas Beitrag zu Hitlers Krieg. Die Verlagerung von Industrieauftrgen der
Wehrmacht in die besetzten Gebiete und ihre Bedeutung fr die deutsche Rstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in:
Christoph Buchheim (Ed.), Europische Volkswirtschaften unter deutscher Hegemonie. (forthcoming)
13BArch R 2/13502, Economics department of the Reichsbank, memo, 8. July 1944
14
BA-MA RW 19/3189, Europapress-Wirtschaftsdienst, 6.7.1944, fol. 63; Neue Zricher Zeitung, 30.6.1944,Deutschlands Auenhandel im Krieg, fol. 66; press conference of the German Government, 20.6.1944, fol. 67-
72.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
8/30
8
Table 3: German foreign trade 1940-44 according to German trade statistics (m. RM,
current prices)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Sum 1940-44
Imports 5021 6925 8691 8258 6827 35,722
Exports 4867 6840 7559 8558 6767 34,591
German net imports 154 85 1132 -300 60 1,131
German net imports from
occupied countries
261 256 1,552 1,141 1,999 5,209
Sources: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland, Munich 1949, p. 394 (1940-43); BArch R 3102/6039 (1944);
BArch R 3/1626a, report about Germanys foreign trade, written for the military court IV in Nuremberg,17.7.1948.
Yet, this result should have given rise to serious doubts with regard to the official import
datas credibility, given the financial dues occupied countries were expected to pay to
Germanyoccupation costs and clearing credits they had to grantmade up during the war
to a total of about 110 bn. RM. And this calls into question how Germany spent this money
obviously only a small fraction for financing net imports if we believe that the import
statistics figures are true. Anyway, official import data is used until today in the literature and
is normally not questioned. 15 However, as mentioned before, given our patchy knowledge
about the total amount of outsourcing, our analysis of industrial labour productivity would
benefit if we could find information about true German imports and the amount of
intermediate input goods.
15See for example, A. Ritschl, Nazi economic imperialism and the exploitation of the small: evidence from
Germanys secret foreign exchange balances, 1938-1940, in:Economic History Review, LIV, 2 (2001), pp.324-
45; W. Rhr, Forschungsprobleme zur deutschen Okkupationspolitik im Spiegel der Reihe Europa unterm
Hakenkreuz, in: Bundesarchiv (Ed.), Europa unterm Hakenkreuz, Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen
Faschismus (1938-1945), 8, Analysen, Quellen, Register, Heidelberg 1996, p. 25-343, here: 236. However, some
authors had doubts whether the import statistics is correct. See e.g. W.A. Boelcke,Deutschland alsWelthandelsmacht 1930-1945, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 126-8; B. H. Klein, Germanys Economic Preparations for
War. Cambridge/Massachusetts 1959.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
9/30
9
This paper is organized in the following sections: In section 2 we explain why the German
import statistics do not capture all imports and which imports are not included. In section 3, a
lower limit of true German imports is estimated employing both the re-discovered detailed
German clearing statistics and the data of the military authorities about armament goods
produced abroad, which are collected in several archives. Based on this data, we can illustrate
how Germany experienced a huge import boom during World War II. German net imports
from occupied countries did not amount to only 5 bn. RM, as suggested by the official
German import statistics, rather at least to 35 bn. RM. Huge shares of these imports were
intermediate inputs for the German armament industry, as shown in section 4. This in turn, as
will be shown, has important implications for our knowledge about the performance of labour
productivity in the German industry. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion. The paper is
mainly based on archival evidence unknown or ignored until today in the literature.
2. Distortion of the German import statistics
The German trade statistics were based upon the customs declaration method. Both importers
and exporters had to declare quantity, type and value of the products exported or imported in
the German customs area.16 Import values were based on cif-prices, those of export goods on
fob-prices.17 Importers and exporters had to pay a statistic fee. Customs authorities had a
control right. On 19.9.1939, a decree of theReichsfinanzminister(Reich Minister of finance)
established that the so called Wehrmachtgut, i.e. goods ownedby the army or goods which
were imported to be usedby the army, were exempted of import duties, consumption taxes,
16The German customs area increased during the war. For details, see Statistisches Reichsamt, Sondernachweis.
Der Auenhandel Deutschlands, Januar und Februar 1944, Berlin 1944, p. 1; Statistisches Handbuch vonDeutschland, Munich 1949, p. 390.
17BArch R 3102/3587, Introduction in the Trade Statistics, 1941.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
10/30
10
and the statistic fee. Further, those goods were to be controlled neither by the customs
authorities nor to be registered by the import statistics.18 In May 1940, the decree was
modified, establishing that only such goods fulfil the characteristics ofWehrmachtgutwhich
are accompanied by soldiers or by persons charged by the army. Also goods, which were
transported by the railways with a so called Wehrmachtticket, were accepted as
Wehrmachtgut.19 From the end of 1940 onward, a further modification occurred and the army
had to certify that the goods imported were really Wehrmachtgut.20
Why would Wehrmachtgutbe treated differently compared to normal goods? The dominant
reasons were to accelerate the transport of such goods and to reduce administration costs,
reasons which overruled the interests of the German authorities to collect import data in an
accurate way.21 Besides, in the case of goods looted by the army it was normally not possible
to establish the country of origin.22
A decree from August 1940 extended the customs duties exemptions to so called armament
goods (Rstungsgut), i.e. goods which could not only be munitions (or intermediate inputs of
these) in a narrow definition, but also civilian goods for the German market. The idea was that
the more civilian goods demanded in Germany were produced abroad, the more German
companies, which in peacetime manufactured such goods, were enabled to convert their
18BArch R 3102/10087, finance ministry, decree O 1005 Z6 II, 19.9.1939; BArch R 3102/4051,note, finance
ministry m, 19.9.1939, fol. 201; finance ministry, Z 2056-120II, 10.3.1942.
19BA MA RW 19/1903, finance ministry, decree O 1005 Z, 18.5.1940. The same regulations were in force for
goods looted in the occupied countries and imported by the Wehrmacht. BArch R 3102/3480, German Statistical
Office (SRA) to customs authorities, 12.9.1940; main customs office Stettin to SRA, 23.8.1941.
20BArch R 2/58087, customs authorities Nordmark, Kiel, to finance ministry, 25.2.1941, fol. 164-5.
21
BA MA RW 19/1903, aviation ministry to finance ministry, 31. 7.1940, fol. 26; economic department of theHigh Military Comand, note, 13.8.1940, fol. 33-4.
22BA MA RW 19/1903, Wifo GmbH to High Military Comand (OKW), 18.7.1940, fol. 29.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
11/30
11
production to armament production.23 In the case of all these goods, customs declarations
would be normally accepted by the customs authorities without controls in order to accelerate
transportation.24 Although, as well as in the case ofWehrmachtgut, the statistic fee was not to
be paid for armament goods, they would be registered in the import statistics. The military,
the armament ministry, or theReichswirtschaftsministerium (economic ministry) had to
certify that such goods were to be considered armament goods according to the decree. The
driving force for the implementation of this decree was the Reich aviation ministry based on
the desire to exploit the occupied countries for the planned massive expansion of the air
force.25
All these decrees led to many misunderstandings during the following years and contributed
to the fact that real imports exceeded by far those captured by the import statistics. First,
customs authorities often assumed, due to the fact that no statistic fee had to be paid for
armament goods, that these were also exempted from the import statistic. 26 Second, the
concepts ofWehrmachtgutand armament goods often led to a confusion among the
customs authorities. For example, a letter written at the end of 1941 by the military
commander of occupied France to the customs department of the Reich ministry of finance
stated: As observed during an inspection of the German customs authorities at the western
border, they are sometimes confused with regard to the concept of armament goods.
Sometimes they assumed that armament goods are the same as Wehrmachtgut and that for
23BA-MA RW 19/1614, finance ministry to OKW, 7.11.1941, fol. 27.
24BA-MA RW 19/1603, finance ministry, decree 0 1oo5Z Allg. 190 II, 31. August 1940, fol. 19.
25BA-MA RW 19/1603, aviation ministry to finance ministry, 31.7.1940, fol. 25-8. Generally about the
expansion of the airforce from autumn 1940 on and the strategic considerations, see Lutz Budra,
Flugzeugindustrie und Luftrstung in Deutschland 1918-1945, Dsseldorf 1998; Adam Tooze, The Wages of
Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, London 2006.26
See for instance BArch, R 3102/4067, General customs office to SRA, 21.3.1941; SRA to General customs
office, 27.3.1941, Hochtief AG to SRA, 5.6.1941.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
12/30
12
this reason these goods should not be registered.27 Third, control possibilities during the war
were reduced compared to peacetime: Often armament goods were transported with army
trucks without correct customs declarations, i.e. without information regarding quantity,
weight or value.28 However, sometimes the transport officers were not disposed to allow
inspections of the customs authorities, emphasizing the urgency of the transport. In other
cases, the customs authorities accepted the incorrect customs declaration in order to avoid
traffic hold-ups at the borders.29As a consequence of these procedures, often armament
goods would not be registered by the import statistics.
But the concepts ofWehrmachtgutand armament goods were also incorrectly used by
military authorities for different reasons. The army sometimes misinterpreted the meaning of
armament goods. They assumed that all imports which eventually were used by the army
fulfilled the conditions ofWehrmachtgutregardless if these goods were finished armaments
(such as weapons) or not (such as shell casings or wings of warplanes). In other words, they
treated also the latter as Wehrmachtgut.30 Often parts of armaments were imported by army-
owned armament producers or were sent first to acceptance test departments of the army,
thereby fulfilling the norms of the decree according to which all goods which are ownedby
27BArch R 2/59000, military commander in France to customs department of the finance ministry, 12.9.1941;
BArch R 2/58993, Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft mbH to finance ministry, 13.6.1941, fol. 148-9;
customs office Hannover to Reichsfinanzministerium, 7.7.1941, fol. 150-2.
28See for example BArch R 3102/4068, customs office Wehr to SRA, 2.12.1941; BArch R 2/58986, customs
office Kln to finance ministry, 1.3.1943.
29See for example BArch R 2/58088, customs office Niederdonau, Wien, to finance ministry, 19.11.1941, fol.
26-7; customs office Kln to finance ministry, 27.5.1942, fol. 100.
30For this interpretation, see BArch R 2/58088, transcript of a meeting in the OKW, 26.10.1943, fol. 379. See
also BArch R 2/58993, note, May 1941, fol. 109; BArch R 2/58087, OKW to finance ministry, 9.9.1941, fol.
304; customs office Kassel to finance ministry, 30.9.1941, fol. 309; finance ministry to OKW, 8.10.1941, fol.
310; R 2/58088, customs office Berlin-Brandenburg to General customs office, 14.7.1942, customs officeDanzig-Westpreuen to finance ministry, 25.7.1942, Bl. 140; finance ministry to Schichau AG, 31.7.1942, Bl.
142;. BArch R 3102/4067, military procurement agency to SRA, 29.9.1941; SRA, note, 4.10.1941.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
13/30
13
the army have to be classified as Wehrmachtgut.31 In other cases, the army consciously
certified imports of intermediate inputs for armaments as Wehrmachtgutin order to avoid
delays of deliveries. Wehmachtgut, as already mentioned, were not be controlled by the
customs authorities, and Wehrmachtguthad also a priority compared to other goods in the
case of transport shortages or transport stops which occurred often.32 The army was interested
that the firms who were producing armaments receive the parts as soon as possible in order to
rapidly produce weapons. However, the authorities were aware of the misuse of these
certificates. In order to provide the incentive for the army officers to correctly certify goods,
the authorities implemented in 1942 the rule that transportation costs of those goods were to
be paid automatically by the army, which were delivered by the railways and declared to be
Wehrmachtgut.33 However, the implementation of this rule did not bring with it the desired
effect because the officers of the occupation armies who were responsible to issue certificates
normally assumed that money is no problem.34 In fact, in the case that in an occupied
country the occupation revenue was exceeded by expenditures, the Germans normally
increased the amount to be paid by the respective country. Therefore, the officers responsible
for the expenditure of the occupation army were never able to manage and control expenses in
31See for example BArch R 8 IX/15, aviation ministry to Firma Mikron Optisch-Przisionsmechanische und
elektrotechnische Werksttten, Belgrad VII, 7.5.1942;BArch R 2/58087, OKW to finance ministry, 9.9.1941,
Bl. 304; customs office Kassel to finance ministry, 30.9.1941, fol. 309; finance ministry to OKW, 8.10.1941, fol.
310.
32See for example BArch R 3/3029, military administration in France, instruction for German orders in France,
fol. 20; BArch R 2/58088, transcript of a meeting in the OKW, 26.10.1943, fol. 379; BA MA RW 32/6, German
military procurement agency in Italy, monthly report, 30.4.1943, fol. 76.
33BArch R 2/58088, transportation ministry to finance ministry and to OKW, 29.10.1942. This norm created
also new confusion among the army. For details, see for example BArch R 2/58088, High Army Comand (OKH)
to OKW, 2.1943, fol. 354; BArch R 3102/4051, finance ministry, letter, 10.3.1943; BArch R 2/58091, OKH tofinance ministry, 17.12.1943.
34BA MA RW 7/1710a, OKW to finance department of the OKW, 24.12.1942, fol. 190.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
14/30
14
an efficient way.35 Also, the fact that authorities of occupied countries did not have the right
to control those exports which were labeled Wehrmachtgutgenerated an incentive to
incorrectly certify goods because by doing so the extent of occupied countries exploitation
could be concealed.36
In summary, it has been demonstrated that the facts
(i) that from 1939 on imports of so called Wehrmachtgut(goods ownedby the military or
goods which were imported to be used directly by the military) were exempted of
statistical registration;
(ii) that the several regulations were confusing, and
(iii) that these regulations were also intentionally interpreted in a very broad way by the
military authorities who were in charge to issue certificates forWehrmachtgut,
explain why the German import statistics included less than claimed in the previously written
literature. This literature relies on the information provided by the Statistical Handbook for
Germany, published in 1949.37 In this compendium, based on the import statistics of the SRA,
it is stressed that only import goods which were already usedby the army abroad are not
included in the import statistics. 38
However, the import statistics are distorted for further reasons. Normally, imports of country
A are the goods which are delivered form foreign countries in the customs area of country A.
These imports are basically registered by the method used in Germany. Yet, during the war,
exports of foreign countries for the benefit of Germany did not necessarily have to cross the
35Vgl. z.B. BA MA RW 7/1711a, OKW, instruction for the military finance department in Denmark, 14.1.1944,
fol. 65-6.
36H. Umbreit,Der Militrbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940-1944, Boppard 1968, p. 317; BArch R 2/58993,
note, May 1941, fol. 109; BA-MA RW 35/262, Final Report of the military government in France, fol 13.37
See e.g. W.A. Boelcke,Deutschland als Welthandelmacht 1930-1945, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 126-7.
38Statistisches Handbuch, p. 391.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
15/30
15
German borders, for example gasoline from Rumania which was directly delivered to the
German troops at the eastern front.39 Besides, the imports of the so calledProtektorat, i.e.
Bohemia and Moravia, are not registered in the German import statistics from March 1939 on.
The same is true for imports resulting from black market purchases of German authorities in
the occupied countries, which were declared Wehrmachtgut, as well as from black-market
purchases of German soldiers.
3. Estimate of true imports
In order to estimate true imports, we use information provided in different sources about
payment flows between Germany and foreign countries. One source is the statistics about
Germanys payments to foreign countries, compiled by the German Statistic Office and the
Reichsbank. These compilations subdivide all payments made by Germany according to the
method of payments, i.e. whether payments were for example made in foreign currency or
within clearing agreements. Also, the use of these payments is broken down, i.e. payments for
imports of specific goods, for capital transfer, for the supply of services, and so on. 40 Unlike
the import statistics, the import figures of the payments statistics also include the imports in
favour of Germany which did not cross the Germanys borders. Unfortunately, import values
given by the payments statistics and subdivided for different countries are only available for
1943. This problem, however, can be solved by utilizing the detailed clearing statistics, which
between 1941 and 1944 are available.41 Due to foreign exchange controls, transactions with
foreign countries required the permission of the state from the beginnings of the 1930s on.
39BArch R 2501/7127, economics department of the Reichsbank, The clearing problem, 15.11.1943; BArch R
3/XX, Industrie, Bl. 11; Statistisches Handbuch, p. 390.
40
BArch R 3101/33632, German payments 1943; BArch R 3101/33635, German payments 1942.41
Politisches Archiv des Auswrtigen Amts (hereafter: PA AA) R 106483, annual reports of the German
Clearing Bank.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
16/30
16
Given that during the war almost all payments to foreign countries, especially to occupied
countries, were made within clearing agreements, the annual clearing statistics can be used as
a substitute for the payments statistics.42Imports were basically registered by the clearing
account goods traffic; broken down in subaccounts for each country and for different
categories of goods (e.g. grain from France; steel from Belgium).
However, for several reasons, a part of industrial imports in favour of the Wehrmachtwere
financed in a different way. Both the import values of the payments statistics and the clearing
statistics include only imports which are made by regular import payments, i.e. payments
according to the German currency legislation, which were registered by the so called Reich
entities (Reichsstellen). They do not include payments for imports in favour of the military
and other state authorities made (i) by the service account of the German Clearing Bank
(DVK) (exactly subaccount: payments of governmental agencies), and (ii) those made by
occupation tributes.43
Originally, occupation tributes should, according to the Hague Convention, only to be used to
finance the needs of the occupation army.44 Yet, in reality, occupation tributes were also used
for financing such transactions which could not be subsumed under the needs of the
occupation army.45 A decree stipulated that least all directdemands the military placed in
42BArch R 3101/34749, interrogation, 14. Aug. 1945, fol. 5-7; BArch R 184/186, memo of the German Clearing
Bank (DVK). For example, import fob-values in 1943 according the clearing statistics made up 11.8 bn. RM and
according to the payments statistics 12.1 bn. RM.
43BArch R 3101/33641, economic ministry, internal letter, 1.9.1944, foll. 144-5.
44BA MA RW 7/1711b, OKW to different Reich authorities, 21.10.1941, fol. 154.
45BA MA RW 7/1710a, OKW to different Reich authorities, 2.3.1944, fol. 173. For the different countries, see
for example BA-MA RW 35/262, Final report of the department of trade, money and insurance of the German
occupation administration in France, fol. 32, 34, 65; C. Buchheim, Die besetzten Lnder im Dienste derdeutschen Kriegswirtschaft whrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Ein Bericht der Forschungsstelle fr
Wehrwirtschaft, Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte 34, 1986, S. 117-145, here 129-31; BArch R 3101/32287,
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
17/30
17
occupied countries were to be financed by occupation tributes.46 Black market purchases
made by German soldiers and by German governmental agencies were also financed in this
way.47
Why did the Germans violate this principle mentioned above regarding the use of occupation
tributes? Firstly, clearing debts were debts, which at least in theory had to be redeemed after
the war. Therefore, different German agencies, especially the finance ministry, did not want
clearing debts to increase too much.48 Secondly, there were occupied countries, whose
governments appealing to Art. 56 of the Hague Convention, did not want to see Germany pay
the cost of armament imports through clearing measures.49 Thirdly, financing with the
clearing method required more administration efforts than financing with occupation tributes,
which is why Hans Frank, General Governor of occupied Poland, supported financing as
much as possible by occupation tributes, emphasizing that in the end the Polish would incur
anyway all expenses in Poland which would be favourable for the German war economy.50
Finally, financing exports with occupation tributes was a method consciously employed by
the Germans in order to conceal from the occupied countries the amount of goods exported in
Final report of the armistice delegation, Salzburg, 15. 12.1944, p. 12.; BArch R 184/128, DVK to foreign office,
29.4.1942; BA MA R 19/1602, OKW, economic department note, fol. 20; payment instructions for Belgium, fol.
79; OKW, internal letter, 14.10.1940, OKW, internal letter, 21.10.1940; OKW, note, 28.4.1941, fol. 55; BArch
R 2/14117, finance ministry, 26.9.1941, fol. 374.
46PA AA R 107000, economic ministry, decree, 30.1.1941.
47See for example PA AA R 129064, internal letter, foreign office, 25.11.1941; OKW to finance ministry,
26.6.1942.
48See for example BArch R 3101/33636, fol. 22-3; BArch R 2/14117, aviation ministry to finance ministry,
11.3.1942, fol. 391. BArch R 3102/3551, Institute of Defence Economy, 3.11.1942, fol. 1-11.
49
BArch R 2/14117, note, 17.6.1942, fol. 396-8; BArch R 8 IX/19, economic ministry, decree no. 36/44 D.St./27/44 R. St., 22.8.1944.
50BA MA RW 7/1710a, note, 22.2.1944, fol. 211-3.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
18/30
18
favour of Germany, as explicitly emphasized in the case of France.51 For similar reasons,
imports were also financed via the service account of the clearing operations. 52
Unfortunately, neither the service account nor occupation tributes are allocated according to
their use. However, the amount of imports in favour of the Wehrmachtfinanced in this way
can be estimated in an indirect way by employing further statistics: (i) the statistics of
armament production in occupied countries; (ii) clearing account goods traffic/clearing
subaccount: industrial goods imported with currency permissions of the Reich entity for
Technical Products (Reichstelle fr technische Erzeugnisse) (RTE).
The statistics of the armament ministry reported monthly figures for the armament production
between October 1940 and summer 1944 in almost each occupied country.53 Armament
productions of the countries included in these statistics after summer 1944 were probably
insignificant for Germany, because from this point of time on, countries were liberated who
had significantly contributed to Germanys armament production, such as France, Belgium
and Poland. The statistics of the armament ministry include only industrial orders which were
exported to Germany. Yet, these statistics do not include the armament production in
Bohemia and Moravia, Hungary, and Italy. However, other sources provide the information
necessary for a complete picture of German armament imports.
51PA AA R 107000, German Embassy, Paris, to foreign office, 13.2.1941; economic ministry to foreign office,
3.3.1941.
52With this subaccount also imports of the military were finally financed, which before werefor several
reasonsprovisionally paid by occupation tributes. BA MA RW 7/1711b, OKW to different military branches,
26.6.1942, fol. 156; BA-MA RW 19/1602, note, OKW, economics department, 26.8.1940, fol. 3; note, fol. 66;
OKH, payment instructions for armys industrial purchases in France; BA-MA RL 3/2638, aviation ministry,office Paris, 3.8.1940.
53For the following, and for the data, see Scherner, Europas Beitrag.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
19/30
19
For the armaments imports financed by regular import payments, we are able to estimate
an upper bound. This upper bound relies on the currency permissions issued by the RTE,
which had to issue these permissions for all industrial orders of the Wehrmachtabroad, which
were financed by regular import payments.54 Yet, the RTE did not only issue currency
permissions for armament goods, but also for civilian goods produced mainly by the
engineering industries, such as sewing machines. Thus, we can conclude that the currency
permissions issued by the RTE constitute an upper bound of the import of armament goods
import financed on the basis of the currency legislation. Therefore, we can estimate an lower
bound for the industrial Wehrmachtimports notfinanced by regular import payments. This
lower bound is the difference between industrial Wehrmachtorders abroad and the currency
permissions issued by the RTE.55
Moving further, we can estimate true imports by adding up the payments made for regular
imports and the lower bound forWehrmachtimports financed by the service account and by
occupation tributes. This method is checked with an estimate made by the so called plan
office. Why did this agency estimate true imports? The plan office (Planungsamt), founded
in the autumn of 1943 as an agency of the armament ministry, was responsible for planning
the German imports, which was also a precondition for planning the German balance of
payments.56 Based on the import plans, the economics ministry, responsible for planning the
54BA-MA RW 19/2397, OKW, economics department, note, 18.2.1941, fol. 60; BArch R 8 IX/19, economic
ministry, decree, no. 10/41 D. St./14/41 R. St., 30.1.1941; BArch R 8 IX/15, aviation ministry to RTE, 15.3.44.
55These values represent fob figures. For calculating cif-values, we employed the normal cif-fob ratio, which
can be calculated on the basis of the clearing statistics for each country in the different years.
56R.-D. Mller, Albert Speer und die Rstungspolitik im Totalen Krieg, in: B. R. Kroener/R.-D. Mller/H.
Umbreit, Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und
personelle Ressourcen 1942 - 1944/45. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 5/2, Stuttgart 1999,
pp. 275-776, here p. 505; BArch R 3101/15263, agreement between the economic ministry and the plan office,fol. 142-4. BArch R 3101/33641, internal letter, economic ministry, 1.9.1944, fol. 144-5. About the plan office,
see R.-D. Mller, Albert Speer, p. 343-8.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
20/30
20
exports, prepared negotiations between Germany and foreign countries. Yet, planning imports
required correct information about true imports.57 Given that the German authorities were
aware of the shortcomings of the import statistics, they decided to estimate true imports. For
purposes of propaganda, the Reich did not want to publish these statistics.58 However, the
estimation of detailed true import figures was probably never finished due to military
events.59Only some rough estimates for some countries exports to Germany in 1943 were
effectuated.
Table 4:Estimates for true imports from Belgium and France and official Figures 1943;
m. RM)
Belgium France
Regular German payments for imports1
1,442 3,098
+ Armament imports paid through the service accountand occupation tributes (cif)
659 644
=True imports 2,101 3,742
Estimates of the plan office 2,200 3,800
Published official import figures (cif) 681 1,416
1
Imports financed by the clearing account goods traffic (cif).
Source: See text.
57BArch R 3101/33414, internal letter, economic ministry, 1.8.1944, fol. 7; BArch R 3101/33641, economic
ministry to SRA, 13.6.1944, fol. 112; economic ministry, draft of a letter, 18.5.1944, fol. 119.58
BArch R 3101/33641, draft of a letter, 17.5.1944, fol. 119.
59BArch R 3101/33641, internal letter, economic ministry, 7.9.1944, fol. 110.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
21/30
21
These estimates were reported in a survey about the German war economy, written by the
plan office in first half of 1944.60 Unfortunately, the report does not explain the way in which
these values were estimated. But, we know that the plan office had access to the same data we
do. The comparison of these estimates with our estimates suggests that the method applied by
us is appropriate, given that the results are almost the same, as shown in table 4. And both
estimates exceed by far the official import figures.
However, this method cannot be employed in order to estimate true imports made from all
countries in favour of Germany. Neither the Netherlands nor Bohemia and Moravia were
included in both the payments and the clearing statistics.61 In the case of the Netherlands, this
is due to the fact that the currency border between the Netherlands and Germany was
suspended in 1941.62 From this point of time on, imports from Netherlands could be paid in
RM. The suspension of the currency border, however, did not imply that the customs controls
between the two countries were suspended. Even if tariffs were also suspended, imports and
exports until the end of the war were controlled and registered by the customs authorities in
order to fight the so called war corruption.63Thus, in order to estimate true imports from
60J. Scherner, Bericht zur deutschen Wirtschaftslage 1943/44. Eine Bilanz des Reichsministeriums fr Rstung
und Kriegsproduktion ber die Entwicklung der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft bis Sommer 1944. Vierteljahrshefte
fr Zeitgeschichte, 55, Heft 3, 2007, 499-546.
61BArch R 184/186, DVK, annual report 1944, Appendix 7.
62BA MA RW 19/1602, decree, economic ministry, no. 29/41 D.St /13/41 R.St., 31.3.1941, fol.44; BArch R
184/188, DVK, report about clearing operations.
63BArch R 3102/SRA to Firma Frans Maas, 24.4.1941. BA MA RW 19/1602, decree, economic ministry, no.
29/41 D.St /13/41 R.St., 31.3.1941, fol.44; BArch R 43 II/371 b., note, 9.2.1942, fol. 12; G . Aly,Hitlers
Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus. Frankfurt am Main 2005, S. 168; BArch R 2/58987,
finance ministry, decree, no. 21/43 D. St./11/43 R. S. , 29.3.1943; BArch R 2/58988, economic ministry to Reich
entities, 28.6.1943. The currency border between Germany and the Netherlands was re-implemented in 1944;however, without including the Netherlands in the clearing operations. Aly,Hitlers Volksstaat, p. 167; R
2/56059.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
22/30
22
the Netherlands, we use the information given by the official import statistics and data
provided by the occupation administration about finished goods exported to Germany. The
difference between finished goods officially imported from the Netherlands and the figures
provided by the occupation administration is added to the official imports. This estimate is
very close to one made by the plan office for the true imports from the Netherlands in
1943.64 In the case of Bohemia and Moravia, where not only the currency but also the
customs borders with the Reich were suspended on October, 1, 1940, import estimates are
available.65In the case of Italy true imports from 1943 on are estimated in a different way
than by the method described above because for this country data about the amount of imports
financed by occupation tributes is available. 66
Table 5: Estimate of German Import Statistics 1941-44 (bn. RM; Current prices; excluding
looted goods and black market purchases)
1941 1942 1943 1944 Sum 1941-44
Import estimate 12.8 15.5 20.7 17.5 66.5
Official imports 6.9 8.7 8.3 6.8 30.7
Sources and method: see text.
Given these considerations, and relying on the estimate method described above, we are able
to estimate a lower limit for true imports from all countries between 1941 and 1944. The
annual aggregation of all countries exports in favour of Germany is shown in table 5. As
mentioned, occupation tributes were also used for financing imports of goods purchased in
64The plan office estimated that the value of imports amounted to 1.6 1.8. bn RM in 1943, whereas our method
led to a value of 1.734 bn. RM. For the amount of finished goods exported in favour of the Germans, see Barch
R 3101/33188, annual report 1943, fol. 33.
65BA-MA RW 19/1603, note, OKW, economic department, 14.10.1940, fol. 11; J. Krej, The Bohemian-
Moravian War Economy, in: M. C. Kaser/E. A. Radice (Hgg.), The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919-1975, Volume II, Oxfrod 1986, pp. 452-94, here p. 462 Tab. 19.9.
66Scherner, Europas Beitrag.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
23/30
23
black markets of occupied countries. Given that detailed annual information is not available
for all countries, we have chosen not to include such imports in our estimate. However, we
can assume that such black markets imports in nominal values were considerable: for France
alone black market purchases amounted to 1 bn. RM in average at least per year. We have
also neglected to include looted goods transported to Germany, because there is not enough
data available on this topic.
4. Implications
Our estimate shows that true imports were significant for the German economy, citing that
for example the German GDP between 1941 and 1944 made up to about 500 bn. RM.
Considering that the financial exploitation of occupied Europe amounted to about 110 bn. RM
(about 30 bn. enforced clearing credits from occupied countries to Germany and about 80 bn.
RM occupation tributes), we can see, that according the revised import statistics, financing of
German net imports had a significant impact. If one includes black market purchases, far
more than one third of the financial exploitation served to finance the German import surplus
in contrast to the official numbers, according to which German net imports had only a small
share on use of the money occupied Europe had to pay to the Germans.
Table 6: Real Imports and Import Structure (constant 1928-prices)
Imports
(1928=100)
Share of manufactures for
final use (%)
Share of manufactures not for final
use (%)
1928 100 6.2 6.7
1936 62 2.8 4.4
1940 53 2.2 6.0
1941 109(67) 34.4(11.3) 13.3(9.6)
1942 121(72) 38.4(22.1) 21.0(12.1)
1943 147(58) 44.7(23.1) 20.3(9.3)
Sources and method: see text.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
24/30
24
But does this nominal import boom also imply a boom in real numbers, given the remarkable
inflation tendencies we can observe in some occupied and allied countries? Yes! Relying on
import price indexes calculated by different German agencies, an estimate of real imports
shows (table 6, estimate in bold letters; official figures in italics) that from the beginnings of
the war real imports rose dramatically.67 We can also observe that the import structure
changed significantly: Germany became a country, which predominately imported
manufactured goods, such that Germanys import structure during the war was more similar
to Germanys current trade situation than to the import structure before the Great Depression.
Table 7: The Impact of Occupied Europe on the German Armament Production
(I)
Armament production in occupied Europe
(m. RM; current prices)
(II)
(I) in percent of true
imports
1940 756 15
1941 4,226 32
1942 7,292 47
1943 8,976 43
1944 11,397 65
Source: Scherner, Europas Beitrag.
Who benefitted from this import boom?not surprisingly the Wehrmacht. Basically, for
security reasons, often only parts of armament goods were manufactured in occupied
67For the price index forofficial imports, see Statistisches Handbuch; fort he price index of armament goods,
see Scherner, Europas Beitrag.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
25/30
25
countries. 68 About 50% of armament goods produced abroad were not finished weapons but
such parts. 80% of manufactures not for final use shipped to Germany were parts of
armaments.
Maybe the most important implication pertains to our knowledge about labour productivity
growth in the German industry during World War II. According to our import estimate, the
metal-working sectors imports of manufactures not for final use (such as parts of armaments)
amounted to 4.5 bn. RM in 1943 instead of 600 m. RM (official figure). This means that the
intermediate inputssales ratio of the German metal-working sector increased significantly
compared to 1936 (industrial census) as a result of the outsourcing of intermediate goods in
occupied countries metalworking sectors. If we consider this, as shown in table 8, labour
productivity, both in this sector and in industry as a whole, grew much less than suggested by
the figures calculated in the Industrial Sales Report of the USSBS.
Table 8: Labour Productivity in German Industry 1940-44 (% p.a.)1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Whole industry (USSBS) 9.5 3.1 3.1 5.0 0.5
Wohle industry (Re-estimate) 8.7 -0,3 0.9 4.5 -1.1
Metal-working sector (USSBS) 13.2 8.6 4.8 7.5 7.0
Metal-working sector (Re-estimate) 11.1 1.2 0.6 7.3 6.0Source: See text.
One should note that the figure for 1940 is misleading for several reasons besides those
mentioned already in the introduction. First, outsourcing in occupied countries was still taking
place on a relatively limited basis in this year. Second, outsourcing within the German
68Scherner, Europas Beitrag.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
26/30
26
metalworking sector, which increased heavily when the war started, is not included. But there
is evidence, based especially on firm level data, that except for 1940 the trend of total
outsourcing resembled that of the outsourcing in occupied countries. In other words: The
intermediate goods-sales ratio in the metalworking sector seems to have increased throughout
the war, but the growth rates were decreasing.So it seems that except for 1940the trend of
the growth rates of the labour productivity figures estimated in table 8 is reminiscent of the
trend we would uncovered when one includes data regarding Germanys outsourcing.
Given these considerations, the result supports the hypothesis that labour productivity in the
armament industry increased only merely in a significant way during the last years of the
war.69 This is in line with preliminary results of a research project of Jonas Scherner, Jochen
Streb and Adam Tooze, who are checking and adjusting the armament ministry figures based
on monthly data. According to this data, labour productivity was in the annual average more
or less stagnating during the first years of the war and only increasing later.70
5. Conluding remarks
The published German trade statistics underreported significantly true German imports
because of registration problems. The results of the estimates presented in this paper
contributes first to our knowledge for which purposes the Germans spent the money occupied
countries had to pay them. Second, the results of the estimate reveal who benefitted from
these importsunsuprisingly in a significant and increasing way the Wehrmacht, especially
because intermediate inputs for armaments were imported in a remarkable amount. And given
69For this hypothesis, see Scherner/Streb, Das Ende eines Mythos.
70Scherner/Streb/Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
27/30
27
the import of the latter, it seems finally that labour productivity in the German industry grew
much less than previously assumed.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
28/30
28
References
Abelshauser, W. ( 1998). Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles, in: Harrison, M.
(ed.), The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison.
Cambridge, 122-76
Aly, G. (2005). Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus. Frankfurt
am Main
Boelcke, W.A. (1994),Deutschland als Welthandelsmacht 1930-1945, Stuttgart
Buchheim, C., (1986), Die besetzten Lnder im Dienste der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft
whrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Ein Bericht der Forschungsstelle fr
Wehrwirtschaft, Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte 34, S. 117-145
Budra, L. (1998).Flugzeugindustrie und Luftrstung in Deutschland 1918-1945. Dsseldorf
Budra, L./Scherner, J./Streb, J., Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing:
Explaining the Continuous Growth of Output and Labour Productivity in the German
Aircraft Industry during World War II,Economic History Review (forthcoming)
Eichholtz, D. (1999). Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945, vol. II 1941-
1943, part 2. Mnchen
Fremdling, R. (2005). The German Industrial Census of 1936. Statistics as Preparation for the
War, in:Jahrbuch fr Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2005/2, 155-65.
Fremdling, R./Stglin, R. (2003). Die Industrieerhebung von 1936: Ein Input-Output-Ansatz
zur Rekonstruktion der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechung fr Deutschland im 19.
und 20. Jahrhundertein Arbeitsbericht, in: Vierteljahresschrift fr Sozial- und
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 90, 416-28.
Fremdling, R. /De Jong, H./Timmer, M. P. (2007). British and German Manufacturing
Productivity Compared: A New Benchmark for 1935/36 Based on Double Deflated
Value Added, in:Journal of Economic History, Vol. 67, No. 2, 350-78.
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
29/30
29
Harrison, M. (ed.) (1998). The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International
Comparison. Cambridge
Klein, B. H. (1959). Germanys Economic Preparations for War. Cambridge/Massachusetts
Krej (1986), J., The Bohemian-Moravian War Economy, in: M. C. Kaser/E. A. Radice
(Hgg.), The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919-1975, Volume II, Oxfrod, pp.
452-94
Krner, B. R.. (1988). Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld
zwischen Wehrmacht, Brokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1942, in:
Militrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite
Weltkrieg, vol. 5/1. Stuttgart, 693-1016.
Mller, R.-D. (1988). Die Mobilisierung der Deutschen Wirtschaft fr Hitlers Kriegsfhrung,
in: Militrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite
Weltkrieg, vol. 5/1. Stuttgart, 349-692.
Mller, R.-D. (1999). Albert Speer und die Rstungspolitik im Totalen Krieg, in:
Militrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite
Weltkrieg, vol. 5/2. Stuttgart, 275-776
Overy, R. J. (1994). War and Economy in the Third Reich. Oxford
Ritschl, A. (2001),Nazi economic imperialism and the exploitation of the small: evidence
from Germanys secret foreign exchange balances, 1938-1940, in:Economic History
Review, LIV, 2, pp.324-45.
Rhr, W. (1996),Forschungsprobleme zur deutschen Okkupationspolitik im Spiegel der
Reihe Europa unterm Hakenkreuz, in: Bundesarchiv (Ed.), Europa unterm
Hakenkreuz, Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus (1938-1945), 8,
Analysen, Quellen, Register, Heidelberg, pp. 25-343
Scherner, J. (2007a). Bericht zur deutschen Wirtschaftslage 1943/44. Eine Bilanz des
Reichsministeriums fr Rstung und Kriegsproduktion ber die Entwicklung der
-
7/28/2019 Scherner German
30/30
deutschen Kriegswirtschaft bis Sommer 1944." Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte,
55, Heft 3, 2007, 499-546.
Scherner, J. (2008), Europas Beitrag zu Hitlers Krieg. Die Verlagerung von
Industrieauftrgen der Wehrmacht in die besetzten Gebiete und ihre Bedeutung fr die
deutsche Rstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Christoph Buchheim (Ed.), Europische
Volkswirtschaften unter deutscher Hegemonie. (forthcoming)
Scherner, J./Streb, J. (2006). Das Ende eines Mythos? Albert Speer und das so genannte
Rstungswunder, in: Vierteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 93, 172-
96.
Scherner, J./Streb, J. /Tooze, J.A. (2008), Armament Production in the Third Reich, working
paper
Statistisches Reichsamt (1944), Sondernachweis. Der Auenhandel Deutschlands, Januar und
Februar 1944, Berlin
Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944 (1949). Mnchen
Tooze, J. A. (2001). Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern
Economic Knowledge. Cambridge
Tooze, J. A. (2005). No Room for Miracles. German Industrial Output in World War II
Reassessed, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft31,3, 439-64
Tooze, J. A. (2006). The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi
Economy. London
Umbreit, H. (1968),Der Militrbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940-1944, Boppard
Wagenfhr, R. (1954).Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945. Berlin