sayyid talib and the young turks in basra

This article was downloaded by: [University of Strathclyde]On: 18 November 2014, At: 04:12Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Middle Eastern StudiesPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20

Sayyid Talib and the youngturks in BasraEliezer TauberPublished online: 06 Dec 2006.

To cite this article: Eliezer Tauber (1989) Sayyid Talib and the young turks inBasra, Middle Eastern Studies, 25:1, 3-22, DOI: 10.1080/00263208908700764

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263208908700764

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions andviews of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor& Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information.Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly inconnection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/00263208908700764

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263208908700764

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Sayyid Talib and the Young Turks in Basra

Eliezer Tauber

Ottoman Iraq at the beginning of the twentieth century was divided intothree provinces: Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. Mosul was the least disposedof the three to participate in the anti-Turkish trends that were current atthe time in many circles among the Iraqi Arabs, and it was controlledby families who had supported the deposed Hamidian regime, by con-servative Ulama and by Kurds. Baghdad, located between Mosul andBasra, was split between several parties: pro-Turkish, decentralizers andreligious leaders who focused on Pan-Islamic and anti-Christian ideas.Basra, which was farthest from the heart of the empire and closest to theindependent rulers of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, was themoving spirit in the anti-Turkish reform movement in Iraq. Reformingtrends and ambitions for administrative decentralization were common inthe period after the Young Turk Revolution in most of the Arab provincesof the Ottoman Empire. However, the story of the anti-Turkish reformmovement in Basra at that time is completely different from the story ofthe reform and decentralization movements which arose in the other Arabprovinces of the Ottoman Empire. The story of this movement is in effectthe story of one individual: Sayyid Talib al-Naqib, the 'strong man' ofBasra, whose hometown was transformed by him into the 'Wild South' ofIraq.

Sayyid Talib al-Naqib (18687-1929), the young and unloved son ofSayyid Rajab, the Naqib of Basra, began his political career in 1899 whenhis father sent him to Istanbul to complain about the Vali of Basra who washated both by Sayyid Rajab and by the Sheikh of Kuwait, Mubarak al-Sabah. He succeeded in the mission. The Vali was ousted, and in his placeanother Vali was appointed, who was friendly towards both the Naqibfamily and the Sheikh of Kuwait. From then on the Sheikh of Kuwaitsupported Sayyid Talib who, helped by the new Vali, began to gaininfluence and strength. He began to collect money by levying a yearly 'tax'on the town notables. The following year Sayyid Talib took care ofanother enemy, an advocate by the name of Abdallah al-Ruwanduzi whorepresented one of his victims. Sayyid Talib sent some of his henchmen tobeat up the lawyer. Abdallah did not 'get the message' and continued hisactivities against him, whereupon his assassination was ordered. Theremoval of the advocate, who had also been hampering the activities ofSheikh Khaz'al of Muhammara, was most convenient for this Sheikh andpleased him very much. He befriended Talib and gave him funds, ample tofinance his personal bodyguards and to improve his extortion methods.

However, the murder of Abdallah al-Ruwanduzi, who was well liked inBasra, caused more than a little bitterness against Sayyid Talib and he,feeling that the ground was giving way under his feet, turned for help toAbu al-Huda, a man who had befriended him on his mission to Istanbul

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

4 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDES

and who was close to the Sultan Abd al-Hamid II. In 1902, Abu al-Hudahad been instrumental in obtaining the appointment of Mutasarrif of Hasafor him. Shortly afterwards, claiming that ammunition and the British flagwere concealed on his property, Talib attacked and burnt down the homeof the Sheikh of Qatif, Hajj Mansur Pasha, and took the opportunity torob him of 35,000 (another version of 100,000) Turkish pounds. Againthere was an outcry against Talib, who was forced to give up his positionand return to Basra. There, he continued to send professional robbers tothe homes of notables who refused to pay him 'protection money' until1904 when a new and aggressive Vali came to the town. This Vali had hissoldiers surround Talib's home and arrest the entire robber-band livingthere. In 1905 he decided finally to get rid of Talib and forced him to leavetown. Talib went to Istanbul where for a bribe of 5,000 Turkish pounds hewas able to persuade Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, a man close to the Sultan Abdal-Hamid II, to obtain an appointment as a member of the State Councilfor him. This appointment Talib used to remove the file containing thecomplaints of Hajj Mansur about the stolen money. With the Young TurkRevolution in 1908, Talib hastened to leave Istanbul because of fear ofrevenge from members of the Committee of Union and Progress [CUP]1

who knew of his connections with Abu al-Huda and Izzat Pasha, both ofwhom they hated. He returned to Basra by boat, but not before setting fireto his house in Istanbul so that he could collect the insurance on thefurniture.2

Shortly after his return to Basra, elections for Parliament were held andTalib used his influence to organize the elections in such a manner that hewas returned as a deputy for Basra. In Istanbul, he attempted to contactmembers of the CUP, but when he saw that he could gain no personaladvantage from them, he contacted Sadiq Bey and became one of thefounders of the Moderate Liberal Party. He returned to Basra, this time asa declared opponent of the CUP, thereby gaining the friendship of the ex-Grand Vizir, Kamil Pasha. In his activities against the local CUP, he wasassisted at the beginning of 1909 by the new Vali, Arif al-Mardini. ThisVali was soon replaced by an activist Vali, Sulayman Nazif, who restrictedTalib's activity. In 1910 Talib sent a petition signed by notables of Basra tothe Minister of Interior, Tal'at, with the demand to oust the Vali. Tal'at,of course, did not accede to the request and probably saw in Talib'sopposition a confirmation of the Vali's good qualities. Then, an idea wasbom in Talib's brain: he would make all the riff-raff of Basra sign apetition requesting the continuation of the services of their beloved andgracious Vali. When Tal'at received this petition he dismissed the Valiimmediately. This was the first direct confrontation between Talib and theCUP government, and he emerged - even if by cunning and duplicity - tocelebrate his victory. His prestige in the town soared sky-high.3

From then until the First World War was declared, Talib was, ineffect, the ruler of Basra. He roamed the town with an armed guard inattendance. The newspapers were under his thumb and wrote as hedictated. Towards the poor of the town he was very generous andwas called a modem 'Robin Hood', the money that he so generously

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

SAYYID TALIB AND THE YOUNG TURKS IN BASRA 5

distributed being extorted from the rich by threats. When they refused tocomply, force was resorted to. However, this was not his only source ofincome. He owned large palm groves outside the town that brought inquite an income. His father supported him financially. He also received amonthly salary of 70 Turkish pounds from the Sheikh of Kuwait andanother salary of 50 Turkish pounds from the Sheikh of Muhammara foroverseeing their considerable possessions in Basra. Somewhat later, hetried to raise his status by making contact with the British Consuls inBasra, Muhammara and Bushir. He once helped them to carry out a secretexploration around Faw and, another time, he wanted to assist a group ofBritish officers on a scouting trip to the neighbourhood of Qarmat Ali,without the knowledge of the Ottoman rulers. This plan fell through sinceone of his people revealed it to the commander of the Ottoman guard. Heoften invited the British Consul in Basra to his home, to impress him withhis ability to protect himself against the government and to tell him abouthis heroic adventures.4

On 11 February 1911, while in Istanbul as a member of Parliament,Talib sent a letter to Sharif Husayn of Mecca in which he said that since theTurks were 'pushing us to the gallows', the Arab members of Parliamentwould support Husayn with all their hearts and would stand by him if hewould remove the Ottoman yoke from Arab shoulders. He enclosed adeclaration, signed by 35 Arab members of Parliament, in which theysaid:

We, the representatives of the Arabs in Parliament recognize inHusayn the ruler of Mecca and we recognize, in the name of the Arabcountries which we represent, that he and only he is the religiousleader of the Arab countries. We are ready to take this bay'a (oath ofloyalty) publicly when circumstances require it.

Husayn's reaction to this letter is unknown.5

While in Istanbul, Talib worked toward the prevention of the centralgovernment's plan to confiscate private lands (mulk) and to turn themover the state (miri), an activity that gained for him great popularityamong the landowners of Basra. In the middle of 1911, he began to feelthat his life was not safe in Istanbul and, fearing that he would be murderedby CUP men, as other adversaries had been, he returned to Basra. There,on 7 September 1911, he opened a branch of the Moderate Liberal Party, aparty opposed to CUP, which later became the Party of Liberty andUnion. At the head of the branch, whose members were mainly land-owners and notables, stood Talib himself. For his vice-president, hechose Hajj Mahmud Pasha Abd al-Wahid who had previously been thepresident of the local CUP branch. Following the desertion of this manand others from the CUP branch, it practically ceased to exist. An attemptto revive it ended in failure when its new president Abd al-Muhsin Pashaal-Zuhayr also deserted and joined the Party of Liberty and Union.6

In 1911, Talib made his most relentless and sworn enemy, 'Ujaymi ibnSa'dun, the leader of the Muntafik tribes. From 1904 to 1908 a struggle forleadership of the Muntafik tribes of Southern Iraq took place between

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

6 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Sa'dun Pasha and his brother, Falih. In 1908 Falih died, leaving Sa'dun theuncrowned ruler of the Muntafik. Sa'dun became an ardent supporter ofthe CUP and exploited the connections he made with them to rule by areign of terror, obliterating his enemies mercilessly and extorting moneyfrom the rest. In 1911 he got involved in a campaign against the Shafirtribes which ended in a debacle. The two sons of Falih saw their oppor-tunity and rose up against him. Sa'dun, who wanted to maintain his statusas the leader of the Muntafik tribes, sent his son, 'Ujaymi, to eliminate 15sheikhs who opposed him. This chain of murders created havoc andanarchy in the entire region and forced the Ottoman authorities, in June1911, to appoint a committee of inquiry. The committee pointed to Sa'dunas responsible for the situation, and the CUP decided to get rid of him. InJuly 1911 the Vali of Basra invited Sa'dun to an 'interview'. Sa'duninformed Talib that he would be coming to town and would be his guestunder his 'protection' (amari). On 20 July, Sa'dun came to town with a1500-man bodyguard, but so sure was he in the security of Talib's amanthat he stationed his men outside the town. He went to the governmentbuilding where he was informed that the Vali was waiting for him on thecoastguard ship, Marmaris. Suspecting nothing, Sa'dun boarded the ship,and after waiting for the Vali in vain he realized that he had been takenprisoner. On instructions from Istanbul, the ship, under guard, sailed forBaghdad, and from there Sa'dun was sent to Aleppo where he wasimprisoned in the fortress. On 25 September, shortly before he was to besent to Istanbul to stand trial, it was reported that he had died of apoplexyand heart failure. Most people were of the opinion that he had beenpoisoned by the authorities. 'Ujaymi, his son, saw this as a breach of truston the part of Talib, and was convinced that there had been connivancebetween him and the government. This he could never forgive and tried tokill him, even to the extent of co-operating with the CUP men who, in fact,were responsible for his father's death. Actually, by January 1912, whenthe new Mutasarrif for the Muntafik region, Farid Bek, was appointed,'Ujaymi had already renewed his good relations with the CUP. It seemsthat in his scale of values deceit by the government was more legitimatethan the breach of trust he ascribed to Talib and for which no forgivenesswas possible. In October 1912, 'Ujaymi robbed the house of his cousin,Mizyad, the son of Falih, and entered into severe conflict with Mizyad'sbrother, Abdallah. Talib, who had never had much sympathy withthe pro-CUP leanings of Sa'dun and had supported Falih's sons, tookadvantage of this and following the rule that 'the enemies of my enemiesare my friends', he befriended Abdallah ibn Falih and assisted him in hisefforts to wrest the leadership of the Muntafik from the hands of 'Ujaymi.7

In 1912, Talib was again elected to Parliament, having presentedhimself as a candidate of the Party of Liberty and Union. Along with himcame another member of the party and two who presented themselves ascandidates of the CUP but were actually from Talib's circle, passingthemselves off as sympathizers of the CUP only in order to get intoParliament and strengthen Talib's position there. During the electionperiod itself, the Valis of Basra and Baghdad hired a professional 'hatchet

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


man' for 1,500 pounds to assassinate Talib. Immediately after receivingthe money, the 'gentleman' went straight to Talib and told him of the plotagainst his life. Talib was not found wanting and, after the Party of Libertyand Union attained power in July 1912, he helped the Vali of Basraappointed by the new government, Ali Rida al-Rikabi, to shadow thelocal CUP members and to hinder their activities. With the appointmentof Kamil Pasha as Grand Vizir, the Mutasarrif Farid Bek, a staunchmember of the CUP and a great friend of 'Ujaymi, was dismissed. Thisangered 'Ujaymi very much and he decided at the end of the year to attackBasra. Ah' Rida al-Rikabi and Talib organized protection for the town and'Ujaymi had to drop his plan.8

Kamil Pasha, the Grand Vizir of the Party of Liberty and Union, whoserelations with Talib were good, advised him at this time to strengthen hisposition by cultivating high British officials. Taking this advice, Talibwent to Egypt that year (1912) where he met with the Khedive and with theBritish Consul General, Lord Kitchener, whom he tried to persuade tosupport him as the 'strong man' of Basra. On his way back, he passedthrough India and there met Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy, and ArthurHenry McMahon, the Foreign Secretary of the government of India.These contacts did not lead to any practical result, but enhanced Talib'sconfidence in himself so much that he already saw himself as a leader ofinternational stature.9

On 23 January 1913, by means of a coup, the CUP returned to powerand Talib again found himself at odds with the authorities. With hissharpened political sense he perceived that the hour of the Party of Libertyand Union had passed, and on 26 January, arranged a convention ofnotables in his home where it was decided that the Arabs were notinterested in the political quarrels between the Liberals and the CUP andthat they would concentrate, in future, on non-political activity for thesole sake of the empire. At the beginning of February, an agreement withthe local CUP members was reached whereby they would close theirclubhouse (which in any case was rarely visited) in exchange for the closingof the local clubhouse of the Party of Liberty and Union. However, at thisstage, Talib had no intention of appeasing the CUP. On the contrary, hedecided to follow the pattern of the 'Decentralization Party' and the'Reform Society' which had been established not long before in Cairo andin Beirut. The idea of opening a branch of the 'Decentralization Party' inthe town was dropped because it was beneath his dignity to be the head ofonly a branch. He decided to establish his own Reform Society. On 20February, he again called the notables to a meeting in his home, where itwas decided to send a petition to the capital demanding that a GeneralCouncil be established in Basra that would make a list of all the thingsneeded by the Province, as had been done in Beirut a month previously.They also demanded that part of the income of the Province be retainedand used for the welfare of its inhabitants whose condition, it waspointed out, was miserable and neglected, worse than any other partof the Empire, and who were therefore 'all eyes' to see the reformsaccomplished. On 22 February, the petition was sent to the Grand Vizir

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


and the Minister of Interior bearing the signatures of 300 notables. Talib,for reasons of his own, preferred not to sign.10

Some days after the mutual closing of the clubs of the CUP and the Partyof Liberty and Union, Talib started preparations for establishing theReform Society of Basra {Jam'iyyat al-Islah al-Basriyya or Jam'iyyat al-Basra al-Islabiyya). The society officially opened in Talib's home on 28February 1913, with all the past members of the club of the Party of Libertyand Union. Besides the notables of Basra, army officers stationed in theneighbourhood joined, among them a Turk, named Ahmad Nutqi, whohad been especially invited to join so that he could see with his own eyesthat the society was not working against the interests of the empire. Itseems that what he saw there convinced him of just the opposite, sinceafter a rather short time he left the society to become one of Talib'sgreatest opponents. The joining up of Mubdir al-Fir'awn, one of the greatsheikhs of the Middle Euphrates and of considerable influence, wasconsidered by Talib as a great stride forward. In general, most of themembers of the society were to Talib's liking, such as Abd al-LatifMandil, a rich landowner who exploited every opportunity to expandat his neighbours' expense; Abd al-Razzaq al-Ni'ma, a rich gambler anddrunkard who gambled most of his possessions away; and SulaymanFaydi, lawyer and journalist who was described by the British as 'a leechand clinger to patrons' although it appears that he was Talib's only truefriend.11

The CUP men then decided to try to make peace with Talib and Tal'atwrote to the Valis of Basra and Baghdad to act accordingly. The Vali ofBaghdad pressed Rashid al-Khoja, head of the army staff there, to write toTalib saying that he recommended making peace with the CUP. But afterhaving sent that letter, he sent another saying just the opposite. Receivingthe two letters at the same time, Talib decided to act according to thesecond.12 At this stage he decided to extend his demands and not besatisfied simply with reforms. In March 1913, he initiated a meeting in thepalace of the Sheikh of Muhammara with the Sheikh of Kuwait and a highOttoman official attending, and it was decided to demand independencefor Iraq or at least autonomy. At the same time, 'Ujaymi prepared a forceof 5,000 armed horsemen to storm Basra and finish off Talib.13

On 23 April 1913, Talib organized a large group of notables who wentto demonstrate before the acting Vali of Basra. He, for reasons bestknown to himself, did not join the demonstrators. They complainedabout the lack of security in the area and the numerous robberies andmurders. They accused the local gendarmerie of inefficiency and evenof being participants in the crimes. According to them, the chief of thegendarmerie of Abu al-Khasib had the audacity to rob a store in broaddaylight claiming that he was looking for smuggled merchandise. Afisherman had been shot to death by a gendarme who was not punished forit. For these reasons, they gave him an ultimatum in the name ofthe population of Basra, demanding that within two days 'Akif Bek,the commandant of the gendarmerie of Basra, Husayn Hijrani, the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


commander of the tabur (regiment) of the gendarmerie there (bothenemies of Talib) and also Mulazim Awwal (lieutenant) Ibrahim, thechief of the gendarmerie of Abu al-Khasib, be dismissed. If the govern-ment did not dismiss them, the Arabs would eliminate both the police andthe gendarmerie and would take charge of public security in the regionthemselves. The acting Vali answered that he could not accept theultimatum on his own authority, and requested a delay of several days sothat he could consult Istanbul. They agreed to extend the time limit by aweek; if by then these men had not been dismissed, they would themselvesget rid of them by force.14

At the end of April 1913, a new Vilayets Law was published which gavethe Vali very broad powers. He could appoint and discharge officials atwill, declare emergency conditions and martial law, and even employ thearmy according to his own judgement. He could cancel meetings of theGeneral Council of the province or even request the Ministry of Interior toeliminate it altogether. The powers of the General Council were so limitedby the new law that it had to obtain the consent of the Vali for all itsdecisions.15 The inhabitants of the Arab provinces, who had expected thatthe new law would grant them some reforms and greater autonomy, wereshocked. Talib and his cohorts could not possibly agree to such a law. On25 April, al-Dustur, the local newspaper which was Talib's mouthpiece,sharply attacked the new law 'that was passed for the benefit of the Valiand not for the good of the nation', and reported to its readers that 'thegreat reformer, Talib al-Naqib', had decided to protest against thisoppressive law. That same night telegrams of protest streamed from Basrato the Grand Vizir and the Minister of Interior in Istanbul until 3 a.m.Among the telegrams was one containing 400 signatures with Talib'sleading the rest. It was followed by a telegraphic exchange between theGrand Vizir, the Minister of the Interior and Talib that lasted for manyhours. They begged him not to press the empire in its difficult hour when itwas engaged in a war in the Balkans. Talib was not ready to concedeanything, and demanded full administrative autonomy for the Province ofBasra. In particular, he objected strongly to the articles in the law whichenlarged the jurisdiction of the Vali and diminished the powers ofthe General Council. He also demanded that the General Council beempowered to draw up a list of the reforms that the province required.

As a result of these demands the government decided to increase itsmilitary strength in Basra. Talib reacted by sending letters of incitement toBaghdad in which he called on the inhabitants to join in a collectiveprotest against the new law that turned the inhabitants of Iraq into theslaves of their Valis. The notables of Basra themselves decided to breakoff relations with the authorties and not to take any part in the elections tothe General Council according to the new law. The perplexed Valicontacted the Minister of the Interior and asked him what to do. The latteradvised him not to make any changes in the law but to elect a GeneralCouncil as prescribed by it. Talib and his followers reacted angrily,informing the Vali that they would use force and threatening rebellion.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


The British Consul requested that a British warship be sent to Basra toprotect British subjects in the region in the event of the threats beingcarried out. 'Ujaymi began bringing up his forces to the town.16

The government then decided that Talib had to be killed at any cost. On2 May 1913, a new Vali, Ala al-Din al-Durubi, nondescript and lackingauthority, was sent to Basra. In the meantime, in Istanbul, a secretdiscussion had been carried on between Najati (the public prosecutor inBaghdad), Tal'at (Minister of the Interior), Jamal (military governor ofIstanbul), Adil (former Minister of the Interior and an important memberof the CUP) and Azmi (Chief of the General Security Service), and it wasdecided to send a new military commandant, Farid Bek, the ex-Mutasarrif of the Muntafik, to Basra to kill Talib and all the others whowere demanding reforms. They promised Farid Bek that they wouldappoint him Vali of Basra when he had successfully carried out thismission. At the same time, the Mutasarrif of the Muntafik, Badi' Nuri (thebrother of Sati* al-Husri), who was in Istanbul, was chosen to seek'Ujaymi ibn Sa'dun's co-operation in the plan. Badi' Nuri suggested thatto ensure his support they should give 'Ujaymi an honorary decoration,military rank and a monthly salary of 300 Turkish pounds.

Farid Bek understood the dangers involved in this mission very well.The night before he left Baghdad for Basra, he sat at a last poker game,and one European who was present later reported that Farid suddenlythrew his cards down and shouted, trembling: 'How much longer willSayyid Talib let me live?' Farid's fears proved to be quite correct. Heproceeded on his mission, arrived in Basra on 6 May, took over themilitary command of the town, appointed Hijrani commander of thegendarmerie and invited 'Atif, the tabur's commander of the Muntafik, tothe town. Talib rushed to the new Vali to ask the meaning of thesechanges. The latter answered that he had nothing to worry about becauseFarid Bek would occupy himself only with military affairs and would notinterfere in the administration. Farid Bek then began making contact withTalib's enemies like Sheikh Salim al-Khayun, the chief of the Banu Asadtribe who was commander of the river police (the shabana), 'Ujaymi ibnSa'dun and his brother Hamed. Badi' Nuri also turned to 'Ujaymi, inkeeping with his mission, and 'Ujaymi answered with alacrity and con-tributed 1,500 horsemen to the elimination of Talib. As a reward theOttoman officers promised him the property of some of his own relativesin the town, with whom he was in conflict, and he, to show his loyalty andsupport for the project, sent on account 1,000 pounds to Farid, 100 poundsto Hijrani, and 700 pounds to the Vali. On 7 May, ' Ujaymi's forces wereseven hours away from the town, and he started to move forward. TheVali, in order to appear to fulfil his duty, sent him a telegram ordering himto halt. 'Ujaymi, of course, continued to advance, and by the end of themonth had arrived close to the town. To justify this activity, 'Ujaymi sentan official telegram to the Grand Vizir and to the Minister of the Interior inIstanbul in which he said that on investigation he had found that Talib wasresponsible for the disorder and the intrigues that were rampant in Basraand that he, 'Ujaymi, had brought his men only to assist the government in

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


suppressing Talib's followers. The telegram ended with the request thatTalib be exiled from the town.

Talib, who had a premonition of what was about to happen, beganorganizing his counter-measures. His ally, the Sheikh of Muhammara,sent him a bodyguard of 50 men to be used in an emergency. Farid Bek,apparently wanting to allay Talib's fears and perhaps also to spy on hishome, showed unusual courage in visiting him at his home several timesduring those days, and even slept there once overnight. Talib could not, ofcourse, refuse him hospitality for fear of damaging his reputation as a'welcomer of guests'. The motive for these visits was soon revealed whenthree assassins were discovered hiding in a nearby ruin by some of Talib'smen, who killed them. After the discovery of his would-be assassins, FaridBek came to the conclusion that there was no killing Talib by deceitfulmeans, and he decided on a public attack.

And here the first mistake in the plan to eliminate Talib was made. Atthe beginning of June, a messenger of 'Ujaymi's went to the Sheikhs ofKuwait and Muhammara to ask what their attitude would be if 'Ujaymiwere to kill Talib. These two, who were allies of Talib's rushed to tell himof the plan and even urged him to leave the town until things quieteneddown. Talib could not comply with this request as it would have seriouslydamaged his prestige. Instead, he asked for their help and they respondedby sending him a large quantity of arms.

On 9 June, 'Ujaymi conquered the palace of one of Talib's relatives inShu'ayba, a town near Basra, and when the owner of the palace com-plained to the Vali he received no answer. From this town, 'Ujaymistarted to organize his activities, maintaining regular contact with FaridBek through Muhammad al-'Usaymi, a native of Zubayr and an enemy ofTalib's. On 10 June, Badi' Nuri came to Basra for consultation andsuggested that Abdallah ibn Falih be drafted to join the plot against Talib.This was their second mistake. They related the plot to Abdallah ibn Falihwho, being a friend of Talib's, refused to join them, and probably revealedthe plot to him. In any event, the plan was not dropped and on 15 June,Salim al-Khayun, the chief of the Banu Asad tribe, and Hamed ibnSa'dun, 'Ujaymi's brother, came to town. In a house purchased bySalim, they stationed 100 armed fighters, in another 80, and in a nearbyplantation, they placed 120 additional fighters with another 100 outsidethe town in Kut al-Hajaj. The British Consul, noticing that the town wasfilled with armed men, turned to the Vali and asked for his intervention,but the Vali denied all knowledge including Farid Bek's role in the events.At any rate, seeming to fulfil his duty, he asked Farid Bek to oust'Ujaymi's men. Farid Bek, for his part, asked 'Ujaymi to advance furthertowards the town.

The time had arrived for the final stage of the plot which was as follows:On the night of 20/21 June 1913, all Arab officers would be freed from dutyand replaced by officers who were members of the CUP. These officerswould be stationed in all the suburbs of the town. The officer AhmadNutqi was to be stationed with a number of others, near Talib's homewhere they were to open fire, and when, as they expected, Talib answered

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


with fire, they would immediately report that Talib was causing dis-turbances in the town. Then the army and the artillery would move intothe neighbourhood of his palace, conquer it and take Talib dead or alive,even if this meant burning down the whole neighbourhood. Hamed ibnSa'dun and Salim al-Khayun would then capture another part of the town,and 'Ujaymi and his followers would enter the town from the Zubayr gate.At the same time, under the command of Hijrani and 'Atif, gendarmeswould surround the houses of twelve of Talib's supporters, ask them tocome out of their houses and then immediately shoot them dead. Afterthat a military regime would prevail in the town. A list of twelve of Talib'ssupporters was prepared by Farid Bek and included his fellow members ofthe Reform Society like Sulayman Faydi, Abd al-Latif Mandil, Abdal Razzaq al-Ni'ma, Mahmud al-Ahmad al-Ni'ma, Ahmad Chalabi-al-Sani', Abdallah Sa'ib (the president of the local criminal court) andothers. As a subplot, probably in compliance with a request of 'Ujaymi's,it was decided also to assassinate Abdallah ibn Falih who was to havejoined Farid and Badi' Nuri for a boatride on the coastguard shipMarmaris.

The plot in all its details was known to Talib who, together withSulayman Faydi, planned a three-stage counter-plan: 1. to remove fromthe town all the families of the persons designated for elimination; 2. tobring as many armed men as possible into his neighbourhood; 3. to defeatFarid Bek's plan by a sudden attack on its initiators. Talib's plan pro-ceeded as schedule. The families were evacuated, and armed men werestationed in the homes of those who were marked down for execution. InTalib's home 100 men were stationed, and all the key positions in theneighbourhood were in the hands of his supporters.

On 19 June, Farid Bek, Badi' Nuri, Abdallah ibn Falih and a number ofTurkish officers boarded the Marmaris and sailed to Faw, intending toreturn the following evening. As the ship set sail, four men waving ahandkerchief could be seen. These were the gang which was to assassinateAbdallah ibn Falih on the ship's return. Three of them were Salim al-Khayun's men and the fourth a slave of Hamed ibn Sa'dun. Now the timehad come for Talib to execute the third step in his plan. On 20 June, in themorning, a man dressed in rags carrying a dirty straw mat on his head cameout of his house. Half an hour later, another man similarly dressed cameout, followed by two more. The four found cover in an old house whichoverlooked the dock of the Ashar river, where boats from Basra sailed ontheir way to Shatt al-Arab, and until nightfall, took turns watching theriver. At sunset, the Marmaris drew up at the dock, and Farid Bek andothers disembarked. The Talib's four men opened their mats, drew outrifles and moved in the direction of Farid Bek. Farid Bek jumped on thesteps of the dock, and at the same moment Catoni of the ImperialOttoman Bank went to meet him to shake his hand. At the instant whenthey were about to shake hands, Farid Bek and his entourage weresurrounded by Talib's men who shot several times at Farid Bek and Badi'Nuri. Farid Bek was killed on the spot. Badi' Nuri suffered fatal woundsand one gendarme was wounded. Abdallah ibn Falih who had been with

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


them, came through unscathed. The assassins retreated, quickly, firingbehind them, escaping among the narrow alleys to the date plantationswhere they disappeared in the darkness.

Then began a series of errors that were exploited to the utmost by Talib.Hijrani, commandant of the gendarmerie who had been present at thescene of the murder, was convinced that the four assassins were the men ofSalim al-Khayun and Hamed ibn Sa'dun who were to have killed Abdallahibn Falih and, as bad luck would have it, perhaps because of the darkness,had killed the wrong people. He therefore prevented the gendarmes whohad been present from pursuing the murderers, and instructed a police-man to go to Salim al-Khayun and Hamed and tell them that Farid Bek wasdead, that the plan had been foiled, and that they should 'lie low' in theirhomes and do nothing. But it seemed strange to the policeman thatHijrani did not order murders to be pursued, and he reported the story tothe chief of police. In the meantime, confusion reigned in the Ottomancamp. There were those who wanted to continue with the plan in spite ofeverything. In the end, however, after they came to realize that the fourmurderers were Talib's men, they decided that just catching them wouldsuffice. Patrols began to search the palm groves and the four men of Salimal-Khayun and Hamed were found. Sure it had caught the murderers ofFarid Bek and Badi' Nuri, the patrol started shooting. In the exchange ofshots, one of them was wounded and they were all caught and arrested asmurder suspects.

All this time, Talib and Sulayman Faydi were sitting in the former'spalace waiting for news. Their main fear was that Farid Bek would escape,and therefore all the ammunition boxes were ordered to be opened. In theneighbourhood, the officer Abd al-Jalil al-Shaliji, a member of theReform Society who was a brigade commander, roamed the streetsunhampered. Even after he received the news that Farid Bek was dead,Talib still feared lest the authorities decide, nevertheless, to pursue theoriginal plan, and Abd al-Jalil and his men continued to scour theneighbourhood until morning. In the meantime, the Vali finally decidedto intervene, summoned Hamed ibn Sa'dun and instructed him to leavethe town immediately. When Hamed refused, the Vali told him that hehad received instructions from Istanbul and that, if Hamed did not obey,he would be treated as rebel. Hamed and Salim al-Khayun were forced toleave the town immediately under guard. The Vali also notified 'Ujaymithat under instruction from the Minister of Interior he was to leave theregion immediately. On 21 June, the town had already quietened down.The Turkish officers held funeral services for Farid Bek, and on his gravethe officer Ahmad Nutqi called for 'blood revenge'. But the opportunityto eliminate Talib had already been lost.

Now came the turn of the judicial system, comprised wholly ot Talib'ssupporters, to become active. The judiciary insisted on treating the fourprisoners as the murderers of Farid Bek and Badi' Nuri, and the officialinvestigators determined that the four - it was finally made clear than thatthey were Salim al-Khayun's men - were supposed to kill Abdallah ibnFalih, but owing to the darkness, had killed Farid Bek and Badi' Nuri by

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


mistake. The court, therefore (and as will be remembered its presidentwas one of those on Farid Bek's death list) ordered the arrest of Salim al-Khayun, of Hijrani who was accused of being an accomplice, and of 'Atif.Being in such a tight spot, they telegraphed to Istanbul requestingprotection. Najati, the public prosecutor of Baghdad, decided to takethings into his own hands and to investigate what had actually happened.But since Najati was one of those who had sent Farid Bek to B asra, and thiswas brought out in the inquiry, Talib hinted to him that if he came to Basra,his life would be in danger. He also began a campaign against Najati,distributing blank papers through the town to be filled out with signatures,after which the demand for the public prosecutor to be returned toBaghdad was inscribed above the signatures and the petitions were sent toIstanbul. In spite of all this, Najati came to Basra on the Marmaris but,before he could disembark, Ottoman officers came aboard and warnedhim that if he left the ship, he would surely be killed. Najati returned thatsame day to Baghdad and wrote a short report in which he removed theguilt from the shoulders of Hijrani and 'Atif and ordered the release of thefour prisoners. He also found the court of Basra guilty of perversion ofjustice in favour of Talib. Following this report, the government decidedto dismiss Baha al-Din, president of the Court of Appeals of Basra. TheMinister of Justice sent him a telegram: 'You are dismissed from youroffice'. The astounded judge answered with a telegram: 'Where shall I goand where am I transferred to?' To this came the answer of the Minister ofJustice, 'Go to Hell!'. In reply to these events, al-Dustur published a sharpattack on the public prosecutor. To the leaders of the CUP, the papersuggested that they lock the doors of the CUP centre and write on it 'Storefor Rent'.

Talib could now celebrate his victory, without doubt his greatest in thisperiod. The one who did not celebrate at all was 'Ujaymi. He was greatlyfrustrated that after all the money he had wasted on the Ottoman officials,among them the Vali, he was now instructed to leave the town withoutreceiving any return for his money and efforts. He wanted to meet theBritish Consul and complain to him about the ingratitude of the Turks, butthe Consul refused to meet him, saying that such a meeting would notplease the government. Then in a dramatic turnabout 'Ujaymi announcedthat he had made peace with Talib and that past differences of opinionwere forgotten. He sent telegrams to all government authorities in whichhe announced that he had come to Basra to protect it from Talib'smachinations but had found out that his information had been false andwas a libel against Talib, and that from now on he was his friend and theywould work together for the rights of the Arabs. Muhammad al-'Usaymi,a supporter of 'Ujaymi and an opponent of Talib's, also apologized to himfor his past behaviour, probably at 'Ujaymi's request. Future eventsproved that neither of these meant, even for a moment, to make a truepeace with Talib and that this was only a tactic on their part. However,Talib felt himself strong enough now to allow the elections of the GeneralCouncil to go ahead.17

At that time, Talib began to consolidate a broader support. The officers

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


of the garrison openly expressed their sympathy for him, and the newmilitary commandant Izzat al-Kirkukli, who was one of his friends, hadrefused to join in the plot against him. The Vali himself, who then had 100loyal Turkish troops altogether behind him, was, in fact, under the controlof Talib who, at that time, was considered the head of all the tribes fromAmara to Faw. In the elections to the General Council, Talib's henchmenwere elected, but Talib did not consider this of moment and warned thatpublic opinion at the moment was more in favour of inqilab (revolution)rather than intikhab (elections). Therefore, he had decided to renewhis demands for reforms and self-government, threatening that if thedemands were not met, the inhabitants would not hesitate to fight forthem with whatever means they had at their disposal.18

On 22 August 1913, the Reform Society of Basra distributed its list ofdemands, which was also published in the newspaper al-Dustur. The listwent to extremes, and among others these demands appeared:

Art. 2 - No concessions to be made to foreigners in our country.It must be protected against foreign intrigues, andforeign influences must be prevented from seeping intothe country.

Art. 3 - Activities connected with the existence of the Sultanateand its basic concerns, which are: foreign policy andsecurity, taxes, post and telegraph, law-making andamending and the laying of general taxes, are withinthe jurisdiction of the central government. Activitiesconnected with the internal and administrative concernsof the Province and with the complete fulfilment of allthose conditions that are essential for its progress and itssettlement are within the jurisdiction of the GeneralCouncil of the Province.

Art. 5 - The Vali executes the decisions of the central govern-ment and of the General Council...

Art. 7 - The General Council has wide authority to discuss any-thing that is for the benefit of the Province ...

Art. 8 - The General Council has the power to increase theGendarmerie and the police force and to set up guardstations wherever necessary ...

Art. 9 - The General Council is completely independent andhas complete jurisdiction over the Vali and the otherofficials ...

Art. 12 - All lands of the state in the Province are to be handedover to the General Council...

Art. 14 - The central government has the right to appoint the Vali,on condition that he is an Iraqi so that he will be awareof the circumstances and characteristics of the localtribes, and to appoint a religious judge, head accountant(daftardar), mutasarrifs and directors of taxes, postsand telegraph, after consultation with the General

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


Council through the Vali and on condition that theVali and officials have a perfect knowledge of Arabic.The remainder of the officials and the judges have to benatives who know the local language and the nationalcustoms ...

Art. 16 - Appointment and dismissal of officials in the Provinceshall be determined by a special law. The Vali shallbe dismissed by a two-thirds majority in the GeneralCouncil.

Art. 17 - The income of the Province is to be divided into twoparts. The first, the income from taxes, posts & telegraphand money paid for exception from military service, shallbe totally assigned to the headquarters of the sultanate.The rest, all other income, shall be assigned totally to theProvince and be spent within it.

Art. 19 - The local Arabic shall be the official language in allaffairs of the Province and between its inhabitants. So itshall be in every courthouse and all the announcementsshall be written in Arabic.

Art. 23 - Regular soldiers shall serve in their own province intimes of peace but in times of war the government has theright to send them where it pleases.

Art. 24 - Officers knowing Arabic shall be employed in their owncountry ...

Art. 25 - All sciences and arts shall be taught in our schools inArabic...'19

At the end of August 1913, the Society issued a threatening noticedirected at the Arab soldiers in Iraq and to the tribesmen. The notice,Islamically orientated, warned against selling the homeland by the'heretical group' which had robbed the government of the IslamicKhalifate and had killed hundreds of innocent people. The authoritieswere accused of selling Bulgaria and Bosnia and Hercegovina, of agreeingto the Zionist plan of buying Palestine by the Jews, of the loss of Rumeliaand of the desire to sell Iraqi lands to foreigners. The notice also accusedthe government of wishing to 'turkify' (tatrik) the population and, amongother accusations, to make Sunday the day of rest, as it was in Europe. Thenotice reported to its readers that societies of Muslims and non-Muslimswere established in Basra, Aleppo. Beirut and Syria to fight againstthese tendencies and to demand that the government grant them de-centralization, and warned that if it refused, the Arabs would cease toconsider it as their lawful government. Finally, came a call to Arabsoldiers to draw their swords and force the government to carry out thisdecentralization, whether it wanted to or not, since that was the onlyway to protect the country from foreigners. The notice was favourablyreceived wherever it was seen. In reaction, Enver gave the new militarycommandant instructions to arrest Talib, but the latter, being on friendly

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


terms with him, announced that he did not have the power to carry it out,which was in fact correct.20

At the beginning of October, the CUP hired six Bedouins from BanuSa'ad for 600 Turkish pounds, on contract to go to Basra and killTalib. Two of them were caught and sent to prison, and the villagefrom which they came was burned to the ground and its inhabitantsexpelled.21 In November, Talib attempted to organize a congress ofArab chieftains to be held at the beginning of 1914 in Kuwait or in someother place, where they would discuss Arab problems, their rights, andthe crystallization of their co-operation in dealing with the government.Representatives of Husayn, Ibn Saud, Ibn Rashid, Sheikh Mubarak ofKuwait, Sheikh Khaz'al of Muhammara and 'Ujaymi were supposed tocome. As expected, the congress never took place as these chieftainscould not overcome their personal quarrels.22 In December, the govern-ment again started an inquiry about the murder of Farid Bek. In reaction,Talib sent a petition to the War Ministry, signed by more than 70 people -not all of whom signed of their own free will - in which they complainedthat the government, instead of believing the loyal citizens of Basra,believed the false reports of intriguers of the type of Hijrani, 'Atif and'Akif. The inhabitants expressed their astonishment at this, and stressedthat their faith in the government had been greatly undermined because ofit. In their minds, a fair government would understand with what injusticeBasra was being treated and would make every effort to remove themisunderstandings. If this was indeed done, justice would prevail in theland. However, the petition concluded, if the government did not act asthe people wanted, the people would take steps 'as long as we have a singleman left and a single inch of ground remains to us, to defend our rights andour honour'.23

The Minister of the Interior, Tal'at, did not remain indifferent to thishaughty behaviour of Talib's and he ordered that all Iraqi officers berelieved of duty in Basra and, as a punishment for their support of Talib,be sent to distant places. He sent a new Vali to the town, accompanied byTurkish officers and soldiers. He also ordered the removal of the militarycommandant, Izzat al-Kirkukli, whose rank he lowered. Talib under-stood very well that these orders would put him in a dangerous position,and he started a correspondence with Tal'at and Enver offering fourconditions for peace:

1. Return of his rank to Izzat al-Kirkukli;2. An oath by the two ministers swearing that the Iraqi officers who

were in Basra would not be harmed, though having the right totransfer them to other places if need be;

3. Soldiers bom in Basra to remain there;4. The promise of the two ministers to carry out all the reforms

demanded by the Basra Reform Society.

The government accepted the first three conditions to be acted uponimmediately and the fourth to be done in stages. On its side, the govern-ment put forward two demands:

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


1. That Talib mediate between the government and Ibn Saud on thequestion of al-Hasa (that had been conquered by him severalmonths previously);

2. That he undertake to form a committee for the assistance of theOttoman Navy.

Talib agreed to these conditions as well and started raising money. Hehimself contributed 500 Turkish pounds for the purchase of warships ofthe Dreadnought type for the Ottoman Navy. The Minister of War,Enver, informed Talib that for his part he had ordered the Valis ofBaghdad and Basra to consult him on everything that they did. At theconclusion of the negotiations, on 2 February 1914, Talib issued thefollowing statement:

I herewith respectfully announce to all the inhabitants of theProvince and its environs that we have agreed to join forces as if wewere one soul and one body, to raise the prestige and the power ofour government, which has officially bestowed its friendship uponus. No differences of any kind remain between us and the govern-ment. The misunderstandings between us have been smoothed outcompletely and we shall be one unit to work for the happiness of oureternal state and to strive to retain our Ottoman unity with all ourstrength and to the last man.

Following this announcement, Tal'at and Enver sent Talib telegrams ofcongratulations.24

With the publication of this announcement, the reform movement inBasra virtually came to an end, although Talib continued to have epicadventures until the outbreak of the war. In the elections to the Parlia-ment of 1914, Talib and the members of his Reform Society, as expected,gained all the seats. The CUP wanted to disqualify their election and,when this became known to Talib, he ordered the Basra deputies who hadarrived in Istanbul to leave immediately for Egypt and to wait there forfurther instructions. Tal'at urged the CUP to admit these representativessince, if new elections were held in Basra, Talib's people would only winthem again, he being in control in Basra, and there was no point in bringingthings to 'boiling point' when no advantage could be gained. Thus Talib'smen were finally confirmed as elected. Talib himself resigned fromParliament during the year, probably after concluding that that positionhad no meaning for him. In any case, if he valued his life, going to Istanbulwas impossible.25

In accordance with his earlier obligation, in April 1914, Talib went toIbn Saud, the ruler of Najd, in order to mediate between him and theempire in the case of al-Hasa. The Vali of Basra exploited his absence and,at the beginning of May, he brought in dozens of 'Ujaymi's armed men,among them two of the latter's brothers. On 5 May, Talib returned, butbefore he entered the town, he gathered 250 armed men and, accompaniedby them, approached the Vali and demanded that he order 'Ujaymi'sbrothers and their men to leave the town at once - or else there would be

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


bloodshed. The Vali had to agree, and that very night 'Ujaymi's men wereescorted out of town under military guard.

The negotiations with Ibn Saud were concluded successfully on 15 Maywhen Ibn Saud agreed to recognize the Ottoman flag in exchange for hisbecoming the de facto ruler of Najd and al-Hasa. The Sultan sent acongratulatory telegram to Talib on his part in the success of the affair, andat the end of the same month, Tal'at sent him a telegram suggesting that hebecome an ambassador, a Vali or a senator, whichever he chose. The lastchoice was impossible for Talib since he feared for his life in Istanbul.Being an ambassador also did not please him considering the distance hewould then be away from his armed bodyguards. He chose therefore theposition on which he had long set his eyes, that of Vali of Basra.26 InJuly 1914, Tal'at informed the British Ambassador in Istanbul that hehad decided to appoint Talib as Vali. Since the Ambassador was wellacquainted with Talib's exploits and the Consul in Basra also had warnedthat this appiontment would cause an inevitable clash with 'Ujaymi andchaos would then reign in the entire region, he persuaded Tal'at towithdraw the appointment. Instead, secret orders were issued to Jawid,the Vali of Baghdad, to send a military column to Basra to arrest Talib.Jawid did this in October 1914 and started moving towards Basra with alarge force, but the First World War supervened.

Before the war, Talib had one last opportunity to try to settle accountswith his enemies. He secretly organized a force of 50 to 60 men whoattacked Basra on 15 June and retreated after an exchange of shots with theguard, leaving one casualty. Everyone was convinced that it was 'Ujaymiwho was responsible for the incident, having been insulted because hismen had been expelled from the town a month before. The Vali thereforesent a force of 600 soldiers with six cannons to Zubayr, a town south ofBasra which was 'Ujaymi's stronghold, in order to catch the attackers.Talib's supporters, all well armed, attached themselves to this force.When they arrived at Zubayr, a battle broke out and the town was taken bythe soldiers. The Vali and Talib appeared on the scene immediately. Amilitary trial was held and three people were sentenced to death, amongthem Muhammad al-'Usaymi, an old enemy of Talib's. Talib was actuallyon the very verge of success in this venture, but Muhammad al-'Usaymiescaped and sent a telegram to Istanbul in which he revealed to thegovernment that it was Talib who had organized the attack on Basra. As aresult of this information, the government pardoned all the prisoners inZubayr who had received the death penalty.28

At the beginning of October 1914, Talib went to the British Consul andexpressed his desire to have contact with the British in the light of the factthat the empire was about to enter the war. He asked him to remindKitchener (who was then already Secretary of State for War) of themeeting they had had almost three years before and to tell him that 'thetime has come'. The British were in a dilemma about whether to dependon a man whom they considered to be a manipulator ready to work for anyside for personal advantage, and whether he would indeed be a valuableasset when they attacked Basra, by inciting the Arab soldiers to desert and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


start a rebellion against the Ottomans. Kitchener, to whom Talib's wordswere relayed, thought that it was possible that this man could be useful. Atthe end of the month, Talib, through Sheikh Khaz'al, applied to theBritish representative in Muhammara and requested, in exchange for hisassistance, the assurance that his position and possessions in the townwould remain intact. He also asked for a large sum of money, and for hisappointment as the Sheikh or the Amir of Basra under British patronage.The response of the Indian government to this offer was more decisivethan that of the British Foreign Office; it informed the Consul inMuhammara that absolutely no commitment in writing should be made toTalib and that the Indian government was not prepared to recognize himas the Sheikh or as the Amir of Basra.

At that time, Talib's position in Basra was already quite difficult. Hewas aware of the force led by Jawid that was nearing the town on its way toarrest him, and he decided to leave Basra, as it were on a mission, to IbnSaud to persuade him to co-operate with the Ottomans and against theBritish during the war. He arrived in Kuwait on 12 November, afterthe British had already invaded Mesopotamia, and met the Britishrepresentative there to discuss his future. The latter turned to Percy Cox,the British Resident of the Persian Gulf, and the Chief Political Officer ofthe Indian Expeditionary Force, who told him to inform Talib that theBritish would offer him no conditions. Even the Sheikh of Kuwait, who bythen had no further interest in supporting Talib, urged the British not totrust him, and after he had left Kuwait, on 15 November, Sheikh Mubarakcynically remarked that 'Sayid Talib now has every door closed againsthim'. He had no success with Ibn Saud either, perhaps because CaptainWilliam Shakespear, a British officer close to Ibn Saud, was quick to warnhim of possible treachery on Talib's part. In these straits, Talib wrote apersonal letter to Percy Cox on 12 December in which he asked for anappointment and promised to do everything for the British. The letter wasbrought to Cox by Sulayman Faydi. On 3 January 1915, Talib returned toKuwait, and there he received Cox's answer. Cox informed him that hewould not meet him, and that for his own good he had better go to Bombayimmediately on the very next ship. With Cox's letter was enclosed apassport.29 With no alternative, Talib agreed to go into exile to India, andit was not until 1920 that he saw Iraq again.

NOTES

1. The most important committee of the Young Turks that later became the ruling party.2. India Office, Library and Records (London), L/P&S/10/535: Memorandum, 'History

of Sayid Talib and his Family', by Henry Dobbs (Basra), 19 July 1916. Memorandumon Sayid Talib by Francis E. Crow (Consul in Basra from 1903 to 1914), 3 January 1915.Personalities - 'Iraq (London, October 1919), p. 93. Arab Bulletin [hereafter AS] no.17 (Cairo) 30 August 1916, pp. 183-4. Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres(Paris) [MAE], Nouvelle Serie, Turquie 151: d[=depeche] 63, Rouet (Baghdad) auMinistre des Affaires Etrangeres [Mre.AE] 29 decembre 1908. Muhammad al-Mahdial-Basir, Ta'rikh al-Qadiyya al-'Iraqiyya (Baghdad, 1342/1923), pp.38-40.

3. L/P&S/10/535: Memorandum, Dobbs, 19 July 1916. The Public Record Office,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


Foreign Office Records [hereafter: FO] 882/13: Note by Philip P. Graves (Cairo), 5December 1914. FO 195/2275: d[=despatch] 88, Crow to Lowther (Constantinople),14 December 1908. Personalities - 'Iraq, p.93. AB no. 17 (Cairo), 30 August 1916,p. 184.

4. L/P&S/10/535: Memorandum, Crow (Basra), 3 January 1915. Sulayman Faydi, FiGhamrat al-Nidal: Mudhakkirat Sulayman Faydi (Baghdad, 1952), p. 134. (Faydi wasTalib's right-hand man, and his memoirs are a primary source for the history of thisman.) Al-Basir, pp.44-5.

5. Faydi, pp.87-8. Ahmad Izzat al-A'zami, Al-Qadiyya al-'Arabiyya: AsbabuhaMuqaddimatuha Tatwwuruha wa-Nata' ijuha (Baghdad, 1350-1353/ 1931-1934), Vol.4, pp. 93-4. Ahad A'da'al-Jam'iyyat al-'Arabiyya [As'ad Daghir], Thawrat al-'Arab:Muqaddimatuha - Asbabuha - Nata'ijuha (Cairo, 1335/1916), p.78. K.T. Khairallah,Le Problime du Levant: Les Regions Arabes Libiries. Syrie-Irak-Liban (Paris, 1919),pp.32-3. There are those who doubt the very existence of this letter. See e.g. Tawfiq'Ali Baru, Al-'Arab wal-Turk fil-'Ahd al-Dusturi al-'Uthmani 1908-1914 (Cairo,1960), pp.292-4.

6. FO 195/2369: d49, William D.W. Matthews (Basra) to Lowther, 9 September 1911.FO 371/1246: d736, Lowther to Grey, 18 October 1911. FO 371/1487: d9, Lowther toGrey, 3 January 1912. L/P&S/l0/617: 'Extracts from Baghdad Residency Diaries, July1911-July 1914' by Dobbs (Basra), 19 July 1916. Faydi, p.97.

7. L/P&S/10/617: 'Note on the Muntafik' (Basra), 4 March 1917. Ibid 535: Memorandum,Dobbs (Basra), 19 July 1916. FO 424/228 [No. 95]: d39, Matthews to Marling(Constantinople), 28 July 1911. MAE, NS Turquie 152: d76, Ferdinand Wiet(Baghdad) au Mre. AE, 28 juillet 1911. FO 371/1236: d42, Wilkie Young (Aleppo) toLowther, 28 November 1911. Personalities — 'Iraq pp.93, 103-4. Revue du MondeMusulman, Vol. 17 (fevrier-mars 1912), p.223.

8. FO 195/2389: d24, Crow to Lowther, 20 April 1912; FO 371/1521: d47. Crow toLowther, 1 October 112; d52, Crow to Lowther, 29 November 1912. L/P&S/l0/617:'Note on the Muntafik' (Basra), 4 March 1917. Faydi, p. 101.

9. L/P&S/10/535: letter, Talib (Bellary, India) to Viceroy, 24 November 1915.Memorandum, Dobbs, 19 July 1916. Personalities - 'Iraq p.93. AB no. 17 (Cairo), 30August 1916, pp. 184-5.

10. FO 424/237 [No. 104]: d6, Crow to Lowther, 1 February 1913. [No. 100]: t[=telegram]5, Crow to Lowther, 22 February 1913. [No. 171]: d236, Lowther to Grey, 24 March1913; d l l , Crow to Lowther, 24 February 1913. MAE, NS Turquie 152: d21, Wiet auMre. AE, 15 mars 1913.

11. Personalities - 'Iraq pp.70-71, 92, 120. Faydi, p. 130. Al-Basir, pp.40-41. 'Abdallahal-Fayad, Al-Thawra al-'Iraqiyya al-Kubra Sanat 1920 (Baghdad, 1963) pp.75-6.

12. Faydi, pp. 130-31.13. L/P&S/10/617: 'Extracts from Baghdad Residency Diaries, July 1911-July 1914' by

Dobbs, 19 July 1916. FO 424/238 [No. 37]: dl6. Crow to Lowther, 15 March 1913.14. FO 371/1822: d21, Crow to Lowther, 26 April 1913.15. A summary of the law can be found in FO 371/2137: 'Turkey Annual Report 1913' by

Henry Beaumont (Constantinople), 4 December 1914 pp.24-5; and in Baru, pp.481-8.

16. FO 424/238 [No. 377]: d22. Crow to Lowther 29 April 1913, MAE. NS Turquie 152:d39, Wiet au Mre. AE, 1 mai 1913. FO 371/1801: d26, Crow to Lowther, 8 May 1913. L/P&S/10/617: 'Extracts from Baghdad Residency Diaries, July 1911-July 1914' byDobbs, 19 July 1916. Baru, pp.494-5.

17. The episode of Talib's attempted assassination and the assassination of Farid Bek andBadi' Nuri is a very complicated one and the sources dealing with it sometimescontradict one another. The above description of this episode is based on the followingsources: FO 371/1799: d34, Crow to Lowther, 31 May 1913. FO 371/1801: d26. Crow toLowther, 8 May 1913. FO 424/238 [No. 399]: t284, Lowther to Grey, 17 June 1913. Ibid[No. 416]: t288, Lowther to Grey, 19 June 1913. Ibid [No. 426]: d30, Crow to Lowther,18 May 1913. Ibid [No. 438]: t291, Lowther to Grey, 22 June 1913. FO 424/239 [No.146]: d39. Crow to Lowther, 20 June 1913. Ibid [No. 174]: d40, Crow to Lowther, 27June 1913. Ibid [No. 206]: d41, Crow to Marling, 5 July 1913. Ibid [No. 290]: d43.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014


Crow to Marling, 19 July 1913. L/P&S/10/617: 'Extracts from Baghdad ResidencyDiaries, July 1911-July 1914" by Dobbs, 19 July 1916. L/P&S/11/57: dl8, A.E. Wood(Commander of 'Alert') to C.-in-C, East Indies, 7 May 1913. Ibid 64: Wood to C.-in-C, East Indies, 6 July 1913. MAE, NS Turquie 152: d46, Philippe Dozon (Baghdad) aPichon, 28 juin 1913; d52, Dozon a Pichon, 3 aout, 1913; d53, Dozon k Pichon, 9 aoflt1913; d55, Dozon a" Pichon, 14 aout 1913. Faydi, pp. 105-15. Al-Basir, pp.43-4. Baru,p.495.

18. FO 424/239 [No. 206]: d41, Crow to Marling, 5 July 1913. L/P&S/11/64: report 250/75,Wood to C.-in-C, East Indies, 12 July 1913. FO 195/2451/153: d44, Crow to Marling,19 July 1913.

19. An original placard of the list of reforms of the society is enclosed with FO 195/2451/423: d51, Crow to Marling, 28 August 1913.

20. An original placard is enclosed with ibid: d52, Crow to Marling, 30 August 1913. SeealsoL/P&S/10/535: Memorandum, Dobbs, 19 July 1916. Personalities - 'Iraq, p.94.

21. FO 195/2451/423: d55, Crow to Marling, 9 October 1913.22. MAE, NS Turquie 123: dlO2, Ottavi (Damas) a Pichon, 21 novembre 1913. FO 195/

2457/350: dl93, Mallet (Constantinople) to Grey, 18 March 1914. Eugene Jung, LaRivolte arabe (Paris, 1924-25) Vol. 1, p.76. Ahmad Shafiq Pasha, Mudhakkiratifi NisfQarn (Cairo, [1352/1934]) Vol. 3, pp.78-9, indicates that Prince Muhammad Ali of theKhedivial family participated in this plan.

23. FO 195/2451/423: d71. Crow to Mallet, 22 December 1913.24. Faydi, pp. 131-2. Al-Basir, pp.46-7. Al-A'zami, Vol. 4, pp.96-7. Amin Sa'id, Al-

thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra (Cairo, [1934]) Vol. 1, p.24. FO 195/2457/350: d9, Crowto Mallet, 4 February 1914. L/P&S/10/535: Memorandum, Dobbs, 19 July 1916.Personalities - 'Iraq, p.94. AB no. 17 (Cairo), 30 August 1916, p. 186.

25. L/P&S/10/617: 'Extracts from Baghdad Residency Diaries, July 1911-July 1914' byDobbs, 19 July 1916. FO 195/2457/350: d9, Crow to Mallet, 4 February 1914. Faydi,pp. 140-41, 143. Al-Ahram, 13 February 1914, cited in Baru, p. 598.

26. FO 195/1457/350 and602/21:d29,Crow to Mallet, 9 May 1914. FO 371/2135: 'Summaryof Events in Turkish Iraq for June-July 1914' by Norman Scott (Baghdad), 15 August1914. L/P&S/10/535: letter, Talib (Bellary, India) to Viceroy, 24 November 1915. Inthis letter Talib indicates that he was offered to be governor of Baghdad or Syria, orambassador in Tehran, or Ottoman Commissioner in Egypt. On the agreement withIbn Saud see H.V.F. Winstone, The Illicit Adventure: The Story of Political andMilitary Intelligence in the Middle East from 1898 to 1926. (London, 1982), pp. 146, 148.

27. FO 424/253 [Nos. 5,16,17,25]: ts.399,413, 414 and 422, Mallet to Grey, 2,6 and 9 July1914 respectively. L/P&S/l0/535: Memorandum, Dobbs, 19 July 1916. Personalities -'Iraq, p.94.

28. FO 195/2457/350 and 602/21: ds.38 and 39, Reader W. Bullard (Basra) to Mallet, 20 and27 June 1914.

29. FO 371/2140: ts.941,942 and 1019, Mallet to Grey, 7 and 21 October 1914; t655, Grey toMallet, 10 October 1914. L/P&S/10/535: t S992, Secretary to the Government of Indiain the Foreign and Political Department [FSI] to Consul in Muhammara, 28 October1914; t. Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 30 October 1914; letter, Talib to Cox, 22Muharram, 1333 (10 October 1914); letter, Cox to Talib, 12 January 1915 (includingpassport); letter, Talib (Bellary, India) to Viceroy, 24 November 1915. L/P&S/U/88:t46-B, Cox (Basra) to FSI, 13 January 1915. Winstone, pp.145, 148-9.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f St

rath

clyd

e] a

t 04:

12 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

sayyid talib and the young turks in basra

Documents