sarah vaughanis a research consultant and honorary fellow ...€¦ · sarah vaughan and kjetil...

For more than a decade, reforms designed to liberalise

Ethiopia’s economy, decentralise its state, and democratise

its politics have sought to reverse a history of centralised

autocracy and violent political conflict. Despite important

advances, the capacity and the freedom of action of civil

society and political opposition remain limited. The cur-

rent period is critical in terms both of political stability and

pluralism, and of pro-poor socio-economic development in

Ethiopia. The study advocates an analysis of power that

takes account of the political culture, knowledge, and be-

liefs of Ethiopia’s diverse citizens. The authors argue that

involving all Ethiopians in decisions affecting their lives is

one of the most significant challenges to socio-political

transformation.

SidaSidastudiesstudies no.no.

Sarah Vaughan is a Research Consultant and Honorary Fellow of the School

of Social and Political Studies of the University of Edinburgh. Kjetil Tronvoll is

a research fellow and Director of the Horn of Africa Programme at the

Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo.

Swedish International Development Cooperation AgencySwedish International Development Cooperation AgencyAddress: SE–105 25 Stockholm, Sweden.Address: SE–105 25 Stockholm, Sweden.VVisiting address: Sveavägen 20, Stockholm.isiting address: Sveavägen 20, Stockholm.TTel +46 8 698 50 00, e-mail: info@@sida.se.sida.se.www.sida.sewww.sida.se

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The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life

Sidastudies

no.

THE SIDA STUDIES-SERIES OFFERS A SELECTION OF THE REPORTS AND STUDIES COMMISSIONED BY DIFFERENT

DEPARTMENTS AT SIDA. THE SELECTION IS MADE TO REFLECT ISSUES OF RELEVANCE TO SIDA’S POLICIES AND PRACTICES,

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SARAH VAUGHAN AND KJETIL TRONVOLL SARAH VAUGHAN AND KJETIL TRONVOLL

Studies 10 omslag_edita 03-12-09 15.47 Sida 1

No 1 Moldova’s Transition to Destitution, No 1 Moldova’s Transition to Destitution, Per Ronnås and Nina Orlova. Art. nr. D 0708Per Ronnås and Nina Orlova. Art. nr. D 0708

No 2 Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: No 2 Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: Perspectives on Participation for Poverty Reduction,Perspectives on Participation for Poverty Reduction,

Andrea Cornwall. Art. nr. D 0718 Andrea Cornwall. Art. nr. D 0718

No 3 Discussing Women’s EmpowermentNo 3 Discussing Women’s Empowerment – Theory and Practice. – Theory and Practice. Art. nr. D 0738 Art. nr. D 0738

No 4 On Democracy’s SustainabilityNo 4 On Democracy’s Sustainability – Transition in Guinea-Bissau, – Transition in Guinea-Bissau, Lars Rudebeck. Lars Rudebeck.

Art. nr. D 0758 Art. nr. D 0758

No 5 The Least Developed Countries and World Trade,No 5 The Least Developed Countries and World Trade, Stefan de Vylder, Gunnel AxelssonStefan de Vylder, Gunnel Axelsson

Nycander and Marianne Laanatza. Art. nr. D 0792Nycander and Marianne Laanatza. Art. nr. D 0792

Swedish version: Swedish version: De minst utvecklade länderna och världshandeln, De minst utvecklade länderna och världshandeln, Art. nr. D 0769Art. nr. D 0769

No 6 Programme Support and Public Finance Management No 6 Programme Support and Public Finance Management – A New Role for Bilateral– A New Role for Bilateral

Donors in Poverty Strategy Work, Donors in Poverty Strategy Work, Ulrika Brobäck and Stefan Sjölander. Art. nr. D 0882Ulrika Brobäck and Stefan Sjölander. Art. nr. D 0882

No 7 One Step Further – No 7 One Step Further – Responses to HIV/AIDS. Responses to HIV/AIDS. Art. nr. 1693enArt. nr. 1693en

No 8 International Labour Migrants: Unsung heroes of globalisation.No 8 International Labour Migrants: Unsung heroes of globalisation.

Bhargavi Ramamurthy. Bhargavi Ramamurthy. Art. nr. Sida2899enArt. nr. Sida2899en

No 9No 9 Migranter på den internationella arbetsmarknaden:Migranter på den internationella arbetsmarknaden: Globaliseringens förbisedda hjältar.Globaliseringens förbisedda hjältar.

Bhargavi Ramamurthy.Bhargavi Ramamurthy. Art. nr. Sida2899svArt. nr. Sida2899sv

Previous issues in the Sida studies series:Previous issues in the Sida studies series:

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The Sida Studies-series offers a selection of the reports and studies recently commissioned

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Art. nr. Sidaen

Sidastudies


BY SARAH VAUGHAN AND KJETIL TRONVOLL

The mission of Sida is to contribute to poverty reduction in partner coun-tries. Sustained poverty reduction requires equitable growth – but it alsorequires that poor people have access to political power and resources.

To better understand the persistent and multi-dimensional aspects ofpoverty as well as the potential for and obstacles to poverty reduction anddevelopment, Sida decided to commission, on a pilot basis, a “poweranalysis” of Ethiopia during the preparation of the Swedish EthiopianCountry Strategy for ‒ in .

The purpose of the study is to provide Sida and the Swedish Embassyin Ethiopia with a deeper understanding of the formal and informalpolitical, economic and social power structures and power relations inEthiopian society as well as their implications for poverty reduction anddevelopment in Ethiopia. The study may also help Sida to identify dif-ferent processes and initiatives in Ethiopian society, which could con-tribute to poverty reduction, democratisation, and increased respect forhuman rights and socio-economic development. Our hope is that thestudy will also be of interest to everybody interested in developments inEthiopia.

To quote the authors of the report: “This study foregrounds culture,convention, and systems of shared belief in the study of relations andstructures of power. In doing so, it seeks to look beyond the so-called ‘for-mal’ or ‘modern’ political sphere, to investigate the way it is influencedby, and influences social developments more generally. … it seeks to movebeyond the constitutional developments, and formal structures which pro-vide the waxen form of politics in Ethiopia, to illuminate its ‘golden’alternate: the relations and systems of power and convention whichunderpin and give it life and meaning.”

Hitherto, Sida’s experience of conducting power analyses has beenrather limited. The first round of analyses includes Ethiopia, Kenya,Burkina Faso and Mali. All these analyses were carried out as an integralpart of each country strategy process. At present, Sidas’s Division forDemocratic Governance () is assessing the approaches used in thesefour analyses further to develop methods for these types of studies.

Thomas KjellsonActing Head of Division for Democratic Governance ()

Foreword by Sida

The paper was written in May and broadly represents the situationas it was perceived at that time. Whilst some revision and restructuringwas carried out in , no attempt has been made to update it to takefull account of developments subsequent to the initial writing.

Authors’ Foreword

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................10

1 INTRODUCTION: PERSPECTIVES ON POWER AND CULTURE ..............................24

1.1 Reform from 1991–2001...............................................................................26

1.1.1 The dynamics of reform .....................................................................26

1.2 Power and collective perceptions of power ......................................................29

1.2.1 Some theoretical reflections ...............................................................29

1.2.2 ‘Political culture’ in Ethiopia .................................................................32

2 POPULAR PRACTICE: POWER IN THE VILLAGE AND COMMUNITY ......................36

2.1 ‘Traditional’ patterns of interaction...................................................................36

2.1.1 Customary democratic practices ........................................................36

2.1.2 Customary power-holders...................................................................38

2.2 The experience of state power at the local level ................................................40

2.2.1 The wide influence of the kebele/wereda structure................................40

2.2.2 Implications and dynamics of local government reform..........................43

2.3 Implications and trends ..................................................................................45

2.3.1 At the limits of participation under federalism .......................................45

2.3.1.1 Women....................................................................................46

2.3.1.2 Occupational Minorities.............................................................48

2.3.1.3 ‘Peripheral’ Regions ..................................................................49

2.3.1.4 ‘Ethnic’ conflicts and ethnicity under federalism ...........................50

2.3.2 Human rights ....................................................................................53

2.3.2.1 Documented, reported, and alleged human rights abuses ............53

2.3.2.2 Government attitudes and responses .........................................56

2.4 Concluding remarks.......................................................................................57

3 ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AND THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY........................60

3.1 Spiritual activity: religious institutions and organisation......................................60

3.2 Developmental Activity: NGOs as ‘civil society’..................................................62

3.2.1 NGOs and the EPRDF .........................................................................63

3.2.1.1 Policy directions.......................................................................63

3.2.1.2 Government–NGO relations .......................................................64

3.2.2 International NGOs (INGOs) .................................................................65

3.2.3 Ethiopian National NGOs (NNGOs) .......................................................65

3.2.3.1 Government oriented NGOs (GONGOs) and Development

Associations ........................................................................................65

Table of Contents

3.2.3.2 Welfarist and traditional NNGOs .................................................66

3.2.3.3 Community-based organisations ................................................67

3.2.3.4 Advocacy, lobbying, research and consultancy outfits..................68

3.2.3.5 Networking ..............................................................................71

3.3 Information: The media ..................................................................................71

3.3.1 Slowness in the privatisation of radio ...................................................72

3.3.2 The explosive emergence of the private press ......................................72

3.3.3 Review of freedom of expression.........................................................73

3.4 Commercial Activity: the Private Sector ...........................................................73

3.4.1 The role of privatisation in economic policy making ...............................73

3.4.2 Trends in the ownership of assets........................................................74

3.4.3 Party-associated enterprises ..............................................................76

3.4.3.1 EFFORT and Endeavour: structures, strategies, and sectors.........76

3.4.3.2 Political and economic implications ............................................78

3.5 Implications and trends ‘beyond the state’ ........................................................79

3.5.1 Participation in associational life..........................................................79

3.5.1.1 Women....................................................................................80

3.5.1.2 The business community...........................................................80

3.5.1.3 Those beyond the reach of NGOs...............................................80

3.5.2 Human rights and the space outside the state ......................................81

3.5.3 Prospects for the future operation of power in the

sphere of civil society .................................................................................81

4 ‘YE MENGIST’: STATE AND GOVERNMENT ........................................................82

4.1 The nature of the Ethiopian State.....................................................................82

4.1.1 The imperial past ...............................................................................82

4.1.2 A federation of nine regional states......................................................84

4.1.3 The nature of the federation................................................................84

4.1.4 Self-determination and secession ........................................................85

4.1.5 Division of powers and functions between State and

Federal Governments..................................................................................86

4.2 The (re)organisation of the Executive under federalism ......................................89

4.2.1 Federal Ministries and Superministries .................................................89

4.2.2 Developments in the National Regional States ......................................92

4.2.3 Public Administration..........................................................................94

4.3 Representation and Recourse to Justice under federalism .................................96

4.3.1 The Legislature..................................................................................96

4.3.2 The Judiciary.....................................................................................98

4.3.2.1 Questions of capacity and independence ....................................98

4.3.2.2 Corruption proceedings: a surrogate arena for

political competition? ..........................................................................101

4.4 The Security Apparatus, Military, and Police ...................................................102

4.5 Trends and implications................................................................................103

4.5.1 Participation....................................................................................103

4.5.1.1 Women..................................................................................103

4.5.1.2 Ethnic groups ........................................................................107

4.5.2 Issues for the future: resource conflict ...............................................107

5 THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM.....................................................................111

5.1 Dynamics of the political party system...........................................................111

5.1.1 Asymmetry .....................................................................................111

5.1.2 Few women in leadership positions....................................................112

5.1.3 A return to single national party politics? ............................................112

5.2 The EPRDF parties.......................................................................................113

5.3 Ideological tools & resources: revolutionary capitalism, pluralism,

democratic centralism .......................................................................................116

5.3.1 Revolutionary v liberal democracy .....................................................116

5.3.2 The ‘national question’......................................................................117

5.3.3 Pluralism, dialogue and the development process ...............................119

5.3.4 Transparency ..................................................................................120

5.4 ‘Renewal’ and the TPLF/EPRDF crisis of 2001 ................................................121

5.5 EPRDF-affiliated (‘alliance’) parties .................................................................123

5.6 Decentralisation and ruling party dynamics ....................................................123

5.6.1 The ‘peripheral’ regions ....................................................................123

5.6.2 The EPRDF-administered core ...........................................................124

5.7 Opposition parties .......................................................................................126

5.8 Diaspora/armed opposition ..........................................................................129

5.9 Multi-party democracy and governance..........................................................132

5.9.1 Electoral practice ............................................................................132

5.9.2 Ruling party influence .......................................................................134

5.10 The links between the state and the ruling party coalition...............................135

5.10.1 Realigning state – party relations? ...................................................136

5.11 Trends and implications..............................................................................139

5.11.1 The participation of women.............................................................139

5.11.2 Shifting perceptions of political life? .................................................140

5.11.2.1 Economic confidence ...........................................................141

5.11.2.2 Political confidence ..............................................................143

6 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................146

6.1 Improving policy dialogue, understanding, and knowledge ...............................146

6.1.1 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper/Policy, PRSP ...........................147

6.2 Promoting democratisation: looking for agents of change ...............................148

6.3 Indicators of future trends ............................................................................149

6.3.1 The health and capacity of the state ..................................................149

6.3.2 Coercive powers of the state ............................................................151

6.3.3 Elections and the electorate .............................................................152

6.3.4 The health of the ruling party.............................................................154

6.3.5 Regional political dynamics...............................................................154

6.3.6 Conflict patterns ..............................................................................155

6.3.7 Economic indicators ........................................................................155

6.3.8 Living standards ..............................................................................155

6.3.9 Social norms, culture, and ‘institutions’ ..............................................156

6.4 Measuring and evaluating change..................................................................156

ANNEXES AND TABLES...............................................................................................159

Federal Cabinet & Agencies Accountable to Each Ministry ............................159

Political parties/seats in House of Peoples’ Representatives .........................161

Political Parties Registered at the National Electoral Board ...........................162

Ethiopia’s status in relation to international conventions ................................164

List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions (ILO) ........................165

Article 35 of the FDRE Constitution: Rights of Women...................................166

REFERENCES.............................................................................................................167

NOTES ON THE AUTHORS...........................................................................................172

GLOSSARY/ACRONYMS..............................................................................................174

The distribution of power in a given society is a function of the system ofknowledge as it operates throughout that collective, itself a function of theinteraction of all of its members, be they regarded as ‘powerful’ or ‘power-less’. It is continually constituted and reconstituted in each of theseinteractions, and it is here that the distribution of power inheres, ratherthan in the structures, or resources of the state per se. Thus a shift in therelations of power requires a shift in the ‘systems’ or ‘patterns’ of know-ledge and interaction which constitute the society.

Dominant socio-political culture in much of Ethiopia has historicallybeen vertically stratified, and rigidly hierarchical. As a result it is oftenthe case that processes of socialisation from birth teach Ethiopians thatpeople are not equal. Rather they instil an understanding of the roles andstatuses which are assigned to different individuals, marking them aseither marginal, and disenfranchised, or privileged and empowered, usu-ally on the basis of ethnicity, clan, class, gender, wealth or age. This con-tributes to a non-egalitarian distribution of power, which is deeply en-trenched, and resistant to change. Whilst male household heads mediateaccess to family and local political arenae, representatives of the state ateach level play the same powerful role vis-à-vis public life and resources,with little likelihood of challenge from their subordinates in either case.

Given that the state in Ethiopia continues to exercise extensive con-trol over major resources (budgets, salaried employment outside the majorcities, land, services, etc.), the question of expansion and equity of accessto the resources and decision-making powers of the state is more than usu-ally critical. This is a question of some urgency since inequality of accesshad been the primary root of conflict for many decades prior to .Even under circumstances of democratised access, such conflict couldnevertheless be expected to escalate in a context of growing population,and dwindling resources. On the approach to power adopted here, thedemocratisation of political life in Ethiopia would require the transfor-mation and the ‘democratisation’ of social and economic relations andinteraction at all levels of the collective. This is in line with the publiclyexpressed commitment of the ruling party to the entrenchment of‘people’s power’. The patterns and distribution of power are, therefore,investigated in this report in each of four arenae: the popular, ‘associa-tional’, state, and party political spheres.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, ,

Executive Summary

came to power in with a commitment to democratise and decen-tralise access to the resources of the state, and rapidly undertook threemajor processes of reform. In the political sphere the regime sought totransform a highly centralised single party arrangement into a radicallydeconcentrated federation, drawn along the lines of the major languagegroups, and subject to periodic multi-party elections. To achieve this,reform of the civil service attempts to overhaul its systems, culture, andcapacity. Finally, in the economic sphere the pre-existing commandeconomy is being liberalised with the gradual introduction of privatisationand plural systems in many areas.

Progress was interrupted in with the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war. In the wake of the war, the period from late saw bothpolitical and economic confidence shaken as a result of a combination ofcircumstances. Falling producer prices for cereals and coffee, the impactof the war, and the curtailment of investment loans in the wake ofcorruption scandals depressed the economy and damaged investor confi-dence. Political morale within the ruling party (together with the confi-dence of the wider population) was damaged by the unprecedented divi-sion within its leadership that emerged in March , and the politicaldepartures which followed. During a subsequent period of suspendedanimation the remaining leadership of the government and ruling partysought to consolidate its position, renew policy, and revise strategies forits implementation. As these new initiatives began to be implemented,Ethiopia’s leaders seemed poised for an intensification of efforts to pro-fessionalise and improve the capacity of the state and civil service. It is un-clear whether this will herald a revival of progress towards devolution and‘power sharing’.

On paper the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, , is aradically devolved ‘confederation’, with all residual powers and sover-eignty resting with the National Regional States, s, which enjoy rightsof self-determination including secession, and the Federal Governmentexisting only ‘because the states will it’. There are three centripetal influ-ences that counteract this degree of devolution in practice. Firstly, consti-tutional Chapter formally requires that policy-making develop inline with federal norms. Secondly, a combination of centralised policymaking by the ruling party, and lack of capacity in the s means thatthis formal constitutional requirement is in practice rarely challenged byautonomous development in the states. Thirdly and critically, the finan-cial balance of power is tipped overwhelming in favour of the centre,which controls the flow of federal subsidy (the overwhelming majority oftheir budgets) to the s.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY12

During /, three major steps have been taken to restructure theexecutive, its relations with the party, and with the other two branches ofgovernment. Firstly, all ministers at federal and levels are now polit-ical appointees of the ruling party: it is reported that civil servants andadvisors, meanwhile, will be appointed on the basis of professional con-siderations. This is intended to create a clearer demarcation betweenparty and state. Secondly, the leadership of legislative bodies at , zonal,wereda, and kebele levels has been removed from the purview of theexecutive at each level, with the creation of a new office of parliamentary‘speaker’ (af gubaye). This is intended to create a clearer separation ofexecutive and legislature. Thirdly, various of the functions of the PrimeMinister’s Office, (or of the chief administrator at each level) havebeen allocated to a series of newly established ‘superministries’, cateringfor Capacity Building, Infrastructure, Rural Development, and (at feder-al level) Federal Affairs. This group of ministers (or cabinet members atlower levels) can be regarded as forming the core leadership of the gov-ernment’s development programme at each level.

Two related changes are being effected in the structure of governmentwithin the states. The first is the ‘abolition’ of the zonal level of adminis-tration; the second is the move to a system of block grants which, sinceJuly , pass directly from the federal government to the weredas. Ethniczones in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ National Re-gional State, , and ‘special zones’ (which have a political as wellas an administrative status) elsewhere, continue to exist and function.Nevertheless, the proportion of expenditure and personnel allocated tozones and s has dropped significantly even in these cases, with a like-ly concomitant drop in capacity and authority. There is some indicationthat this move may be designed to curb calls for separate ethnic zonal sta-tus which have been prevalent in the , and which are thought tohave been encouraged by the relatively generous budgets previously allo-cated at ethnic zonal level. Whilst the increased focus on wereda level de-velopment is broadly welcomed, uncertain capacity for its ‘instantaneous’implementation has been of concern. The assignment of large numbersof civil servants from federal and offices to the greatly expanded weredalevel of government initially met with some resistance, in view of the re-duced facilities offered by weredas – particularly to government officerswith families. The government sought to counter this problem by meansof significant increases in salaries for administrators assigned to localareas.

The judiciary is constitutionally independent of both legislature andexecutive, an autonomy which remains functionally constrained in a num-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13

ber of respects. Recourse to the law is an important feature of Ethiopianlife, both urban and rural. The bottlenecks and delays in the court systemwhich emerged in the mid-s became a focus of frustration and vitri-ol. The incoming Transitional Government of Ethiopia, , was keen toestablish a ‘new’ judicial class, and had removed many judicially compe-tent former members of the Dergue’s Workers’ Party of Ethiopia, .With the removal of many cases brought by the Office of the Special Pros-ecutor, , to separately constituted benches, bottlenecks eased in recentyears, and centred primarily on labour courts, which were flooded withcompensation claims in the wake of privatisations. Since , attentionhas focused on high profile proceedings against former senior political fig-ures amongst the ruling party ‘dissidents’, and well-connected businesspeople, for alleged corruption. The view that these proceedings have beenpolitically motivated is widespread, a fact which risks undermining thecredibility of both the Anti-Corruption Commission, , and the courtsystem itself. Significant problems with the judiciary and police persist atlocal levels, where a potentially highly effective social court system lacksresources, training, and institutional autonomy.

Public administration in Ethiopia faces two core problems. Firstly thepublic sector has for some years been crippled by the heavy haemorr-haging of professional personnel, as a result of gross disparities in publicand private sector remuneration and opportunities. Secondly, the sectoris affected by a culture of inertia and ‘lowest common denominator self-preservation’, apparently fostered by the decline of living standards andjob security experienced by state sector workers over the last few years.There have been widespread complaints that the combined requirementsto recruit personnel on the basis of ethnic quotas, and political affiliationor loyalty means that the most able and efficient functionaries are con-tinually overlooked. It is notable that the educational level of zonal andwereda administrative personnel has increased dramatically in the last –years, with most if not all now graduates, many of the civil service collegedegree and diploma programmes in law, economics, and urban develop-ment. New government emphasis on capacity building is likely tocontinue this trend, which has both improved the capability of local gov-ernment, and built a class of educated administrators who share an in-vestment in, and commitment to, the current system of government, if notthe ruling party itself.

Throughout the s the government faced opposition from twoquarters. Firstly, a number of ethnic-based parties and liberation move-ments called for autonomy, or secession, for their constituents, andclaimed that under federalism was a ‘sham’ – a means of ‘divide

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY14

and rule’, rather than the genuine ‘self-determination of peoples’. Second-ly, pan-Ethiopian nationalists opposed both Eritrean secession, andEthiopian ethnic federalism in principle, regarding both as divisive anddestructive of Ethiopia’s ‘natural interests’. Both groups have had theirlegally registered, and their illegal and armed or exiled elements. To thesetwo wings has now been added the so-called internal ‘dissident group’,sacked from the leadership of in . It is possible that, despite aformer commitment to ethnic self-determination, this group may nowseek to appeal to pan-Ethiopian nationalist elements, stressing controver-sial issues of economic and territorial sovereignty, and even questioningthe manner in which the Eritrean referendum was held.

is one of a number of political organisations that grew out ofthe Marxist student movements of the late s and early s. Its pre-ferred conception of democracy has not been the liberal bourgeois vari-ety, based on individual participation, a diversity of interests and views,and plural representation. Rather ‘revolutionary’ democracy is based oncommunal collective participation, based on consensus forged throughdiscussion led by the vanguard organisation. The party’s long-standingcommitments to Leninist and Maoist precepts of mass political mobilisa-tion were confirmed by the ’s success in Tigray, where the peasantrywas mobilised on an ethnic basis. This, in turn, became the mode of par-ticipation and representation in the /. The extent to which theideology associated with this history may have been revised by during the recent period remains unclear and controversial.

The Front has drawn on a Stalinist understanding of the so-called‘national question’, which incorporates two contradictory elements. Thefirst is the (laudable, and demonstrably true) notion that a community canbe mobilised better in its own language, using its own culture, by its ownpeople – effectively ‘from within’. The second is the (more problematic)view that the criteria for the establishment of ‘nations, nationalities, andpeoples’ are objectively and externally identifiable, and verifiable by avanguard organisation independently of the views of the groups’ members– effectively ‘from above’. Tension between these contradictory tenden-cies can be seen at work in a number of shifts in policy towards ethnicautonomy over the decade to .

Finally, the has never appeared as an organisation committedto pluralism for its own sake, and it has long understood the great politi-cal potential of a coincidence of interest between peasant populationsbenefiting from socio-economic development, and the party/governmentwinning support by being seen as responsible for such benefits. It has thusbeen equally resistant to the emergence of competitors, whether for the


allocative power of government office (opposition parties), or over the dis-tribution of other resources and delivery of services (s, churches, etc.).A particularly frustrating area of ruling party philosophy is its unwilling-ness to engage in dialogue with alternative political perspectives. A dom-inant view has been that those who disagree with should look forpolitical competition with it, rather than policy dialogue. Given thepolitical culture referred to above, and the domination of resources by thestate, such attitudes are more likely to foster exclusion and conflict thanhealthy competition.

is composed of four organisations: the Tigray People’s Libera-tion Front, ; the Amhara National Democratic Movement, ; theOromo People’s Democratic Organisation, ; and the SouthernEthiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front, , itself a Front encompassingethnic people’s democratic organisations, or s, in each of the’s ethnic administrative units. There are indications that ismoving to become a single national party with local units, rather than afront of nominally separate organisations. Currently, however, it is co-ordinated by a -member politburo of representatives of each of theconstituent organisations or fronts. Each front is organised in classicMarxist-Leninist style, led, between congresses, by an elected CentralCommittee, and powerful executive committee. The structure extendshierarchically down through series of cadres, to party cells establishedthroughout the four National Regional States, s, administered by. Membership distinguishes between peasants (who pay a flat fee)and ‘intellectuals’ (salaried members, who pay a sliding percentage of theirincome). Recent changes in party structure have included the expansionof Central Committee membership, and the disassociation of the formermass associations for women, youth, and farmers.

Many of the opposition parties which operate within the constitution-al framework, seeking to mobilise support, and contesting elections, arealso organised on an ethnic basis, and include: Southern EthiopianPeoples’ Democratic Coalition, ; All Amhara People’s Organisation, (now the pan-Ethiopianist All-Ethiopia Unity Party, ); and theOromo National Congress, . An exception has been the relatively newEthiopian Democratic Party, , appealing to pan-Ethiopian national-ists, particularly regarding the issue of Assab, and recently merged withthe Ethiopian Democratic Union, , to form the Ethiopian Democra-tic Unity Party, . All opposition parties have complained of intimi-dation and harassment by members of the ruling party, and the securityinstruments of the state, between and during elections. It is true that theopposition parties are weak, lack clear programmes, and enjoy only lim-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY16

ited support in the rural areas (an exception is the support shown for theHadiya National Democratic Organisation, , in Hadiya in ).The pervasive character of the repression they seem to have faced, par-ticularly at local levels, suggests a systemic problem.

Of the armed opposition to the government, by far the most signifi-cant in political (and military) terms is the long-established Oromo Lib-eration Front, . Whilst organisationally and militarily weak, the nevertheless enjoys the residual attachment of many Oromo nationalistsand intellectuals, a fact that has been sufficient to cripple the capacity andcredibility of the ruling over the last decade. The activities of armedopposition groups tend to be concentrated in the pastoralist areas, an arcstretching from the border with Eritrea in the north-east, clockwisethrough the Ogaden and Borana, to the border with Sudan in the west.They involve Afars, Somalis, Oromos, and, increasingly, the small pas-toral groups along the border with Sudan. None of these armed cam-paigns in themselves represents a threat to the state or to the government.However, the containment of each involves considerable military and de-velopmental cost. Each of these armed campaigns is deeply implicated inregional security and diplomatic relations, involving at least the passivefacilitation of one of Ethiopia’s neighbours.

Whilst significant steps were taken during the to effect the formalseparation of the ruling party and the state, their roles remained closelyblurred and intertwined through the s, with a system of partydecision-making often overshadowing that of the state/government. It ispossible to interpret the power struggle within the , which culminat-ed in early , as a contest between those relying on the authority ofstate positions, and those influential only within the party. In its wake,significant changes seem to be being forged in the party-state relation.Political and administrative appointments are now more clearly demar-cated; the party is no longer involved in the evaluation (gimgema) of gov-ernment activities; and government policy is debated and evolved by gov-ernment bodies, not separately as previously throughout the party. At thelower levels, this generated dissatisfaction amongst veteran cadres whoquestion the changed functioning of the party. At the highest level the twostructures of party politburo/Central Committee and Council of Minis-ters seem effectively to have been fused. This kind of package of cen-tralised bureaucratic reform, involving either the downgrading, or theincorporation of the nationalist party, or ‘liberation movement’, by thestate, was undertaken in other parts of Africa in the postcolonial period,where it was uniformly accompanied by the downgrading of representa-tive institutions.


As in many cases where state structures are poorly emancipated fromsociety, throughout the s, local administrative and political party sys-tems were overlapping and interwoven, so that local government struc-tures and officers were rarely either politically ‘neutral’, or perceived assuch. The current system of kebele/wereda administration was inheritedfrom the Dergue, by whom it was devised as a means both of communi-cating development plans and ideology, and of gathering intelligence re-garding ‘anti-revolutionary’ activities. Ethiopians are well aware of theextensive authority of the kebele/wereda officials, and the fact that their re-lations with them will mediate the access they enjoy to all of the resourcesand services the state has to offer – jobs, health services, land rights, water,relief food, credit, rented houses, and so on. The fact that local militia,police, prosecutors, and judges are often part of the same party hierarchywhich has nominated such powerful officials, seems to have contributedto the instances of abuse of power by local officials. Many have enjoyedeffective impunity vis-à-vis the state, and little social sanction from com-munity and constituents.

In many instances, local religious leaders of all faiths have the powerto define appropriate social conduct, frequently resulting in limitationson the social space accorded to women. Given the hierarchical nature ofsocial and political relations in highland tradition, peasant-to-peasant re-lations in Ethiopia have been few, and restricted to the achievement ofpractical tasks, such as ploughing. Several common types of local associ-ation (iddir, mahaber, senbete, equub) offer either mutual socio-economicsupport and collaboration to members, particularly at times of stress orexpense, such as weddings or funerals (‘balanced’ reciprocity), or the moregeneralised reciprocity of social and religious obligation. Such relationsare commonly characterised by their horizontal orientation, with mem-bers co-operating on an equal basis, since traditional collaborative asso-ciations bring together existing peers. Community co-operation thus tendsto be reconstitutive of the status quo, and inimical to social transforma-tion. It is nevertheless significant that the leaders of such structures areselected by, and remain accountable to, their fellows. There is evidencethat, as a result, the collective sanctions (or other norms) they are able toapply – for instance regulating repayment of credit – may in some in-stances be more effective than those coming, externally, from governmentor other outside actors, including s.

Ethiopia’s human rights record under is a clear improvementupon the nadir it had reached under the Dergue regime, particularly theRed Terror period of the late s. A decade after came to power,however, human rights violations occur throughout the country, and are

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY18

sometimes very grave. Detention without trial, torture, ‘disappearances’and extra-judicial executions are regularly reported by international andnational human rights monitoring organisations. The government is sen-sitive to criticism of its human rights record, and generally reluctant toadmit direct responsibility for abuses, often blaming the unauthorisedactions of individuals outside the control of the central government.Recently there have been some indications of increasing willingness tohold local police and government officials responsible for violent inci-dents, such as those which took place in , particularly Tepi andAwassa, in the early and middle parts of .

A body of recent case studies of electoral practice indicates that theoperation of the political system in many parts of the country is such asto make it difficult for opposition parties and candidates to use the liber-al democratic provisions of the constitution and relevant legislation effec-tively to challenge the dominance of the ruling party. The studies docu-ment a range of tactics which commonly disadvantages the oppositionprior to and during elections. These include: the closure of offices,harassment and arrest of candidates, and refusal of some of their signa-tures of endorsement; last minute shifts in the regulations regarding thenumber of candidates to be fielded; and suspension of candidates falselyclaimed to be ‘under police investigation’. As a result, the oppositionparties which contest elections regard themselves as beleaguered on a far-from-level playing field. They do not see as responsible for bring-ing ‘democratisation’; and they do not consider that they should form anopposition ‘loyal’ to a regime they distrust and feel repressed by. Donorengagement in the democratic process, meanwhile, has been superficial,focusing on formal political institutions, and neglectful of the socio-political dynamics which give them meaning and significance.

The Ethiopian government is now in the midst of a second Five-YearDevelopment Plan, designed to enhance agricultural productivity, im-prove rural infrastructure, encourage private investment, promote par-ticipation of the private sector in the economy, mobilise external re-sources, and pursue ‘appropriate’ macroeconomic sectoral policies. Thegovernment has several times revised and liberalised the investment code,recently giving those of Ethiopian origin the same investment status asnationals. Ethiopia has privatised approximately enterprises, mostlyin the trade and service sectors, but also the large Lega Dembi GoldMine. None of Ethiopia’s utilities has yet been privatised, and the gov-ernment retains ownership of all land. The state retains its dominantposition in the ownership of key assets, although the emerging privatesector has played an increasing role, particularly with respect to the


service sector. What critics have called the ‘genuine private sector’, how-ever, has been dwarfed by the activities of two large blocs: the Midroc‘empire’ owned by Sheikh Mohammed Alamoudi, and the so-called‘party-associated’ enterprises.

The Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, , wasestablished by the in as a means of co-ordinating the effectivedevelopmental use of the material and cash resource in the possession ofthe at the end of the war with the Dergue. Under the umbrella ofthe foundation, and sister organisations in other -administeredregions, a range of commercial enterprises and factories were established,dealing in trade, agriculture, cement production, textiles and garment-ing, livestock and leather, transport, mining, engineering, and finance.Together these represent an enormously influential and strategically inte-grated bloc, dominating key sectors of the economy. Critics and support-ers fear the potential political and economic implications of the concen-tration of such economic power in the hands of bodies effectivelycontrolled by the ruling party, and allege the emergence of new mono-polistic and unfair trading practices.

It is ironic that whilst the sector has flourished, grown, and di-versified with the establishment of many new voluntary bodies under, it has also felt itself to be threatened from many sides. Bilateral andmulti-lateral government funding through the sector dropped offdramatically as the international community renewed government-to-government relations after the demise of the Dergue. The Ethiopian gov-ernment policy environment of the last decade has involved strict regula-tion and monitoring of the proliferating national and international s,curbing their income-generating, commercial, and autonomous activities,and requiring that they work increasingly through government structures.As in the commercial sector, the party has also been active in the devel-opment industry, establishing a series of powerful regional s withclose, if informal, government links. Recently, a number of independentresearch and consultancy associations have grown out of Addis AbabaUniversity, and are now producing useful and challenging studies.

Gender roles in Ethiopia are, as elsewhere, bound by social and cul-tural norms, and there is great variation across ethnic and socio-economicgroups. To a high degree, marriage and motherhood determine Ethiopi-an women’s relationships to work, property, and public space, and definetheir status as political actors. Many of the factors that disadvantagewomen are problems of poverty and underdevelopment, shared by thewider community. Female genital mutilation, however, is reportedly ex-perienced by between and % of Ethiopia’s women, ranging from in-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY20

fibulation and radical clitoridectomy, especially in lowland areas, to thepiercing of labia more common in the highlands. During its opposition tothe Dergue, / recruited women fighters and commanders, andendorsed the separate organisation of women ‘to prepare them to partic-ipate fully in the class struggle’. Since , however, women have seenlittle advancement to positions of political influence, and the proportionof women elected to representative office at all levels has not increased.The enrolment of female school students has recently gone up, and thiswill be profoundly important for the future. Meanwhile, there are someindications that the upsurge of ethnic consciousness in some parts of thecountry may have revived a number of traditional practices (often seen asethnic boundary markers) which further disadvantage women.

Given the ethnic federal arrangements, minority ethnic groups, evennumerically small ones, are less marginalised at the national political levelthan ever previously in modern Ethiopia’s history. However, a number ofoccupational or clan minorities within ethnic groups continue to be mar-ginalised, despised, and disadvantaged, their political representation sub-sumed within the wider ethnic group. Such stigmatised groups (oftencraftsmen or hunters) exist amongst many of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, anda number have been encouraged by ethnic federalism to petition for sep-arate representation. Since they live mixed amongst other groups they areunlikely to secure representation in a ‘first past the post’ (or ‘plurality-majority’) electoral system, and remain largely excluded from the localsocio-political arenae.

has chosen to stress the positive aspects of ethnic identity, whichinvest communities who share language and culture with a sense of com-mon identity. The ethnic federal arrangement was instituted as a meansof diffusing the pattern of conflict which had engulfed Ethiopia in the sec-ond half of the twentieth century, as a direct result of the coincidence ofethnic and class divisions under centralised imperial and military rule.Ethnic federalism, along with the cession of Eritrea, were seen as conflictresolution mechanisms designed to bring three decades of civil war to anend. Some critics have argued that ethnicity ‘captured’ within the politi-cal structure of the state is in fact likely to inspire conflict, bringing suchgroups explicitly into competition with one another over their share of thestate resources. Others argue that it is only its explicit invocation – andneutralisation – which can diffuse pre-existing tensions. Ethnic federal-ism has, in some instances, added a new dimension to pre-existing localconflicts over land, water, government budgets, and other resources,sometimes adding legitimacy and motivation to an ‘ethnic rationale’ fordispute. There are confusing and contradictory processes at work: some


inspired by ‘rightful’ or ‘exaggerated’ claims by local communities, othersimposed from above; some driven by political entrepreneurs for their ownpurposes, others perhaps seeking to diffuse opposition. This critical issue,requiring a full study in its own right, is not considered in this report ingreat detail.

Given the weakness of the opposition parties, and the strong centraldominance of the state, it seems likely that the major agents of change inEthiopia will continue for the foreseeable future to be the leadership ofthe ruling party. Since early , the intentions, objectives, organisationand methods of the ruling party have perhaps undergone a greater seachange than at any time since the inception of the in . The dra-matic challenge presented by the ‘dissident’ group in has had farreaching implications for the reorganisation and restructuring, ‘renewal’and remobilisation of both ruling party and state structures at all levels.These implications have taken on a life of their own, and have penetrat-ed far beyond the rapid and effective marginalisation of the initial group.Perhaps the single most important issue in Ethiopian politics in the im-mediate period will be the cohesion, stability, and vitality of the rulingparty leadership, all of which were challenged in /.

In the longer term, the educational strategy of the government, whichprioritises a dramatic expansion of educational access at all levels, is like-ly to promote both capacity and pluralism. The government sees thecreation of an educated population as a prerequisite for the democratisa-tion of a hierarchical socio-political culture. A risk is that without acommensurate expansion of opportunities for enterprise and employ-ment, a large pool of unemployed school and college leavers might provesocially and politically destabilising.

In mid- Ethiopia was potentially beginning to emerge from thecalamitous period of the last – years of developmental disappointmentcaused by war. The outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war marked a disas-trous setback for a state and government which had, until then, beenthought to have been making steady progress towards economic growthand administrative reform, capitalising on a context of peace. Periods ofchange are often also periods of uncertainty, and instability. This paper iswritten at a time when significant changes to the structures and relationsof power seem to be occurring. The coming period will demonstratewhether the ruling party has been able to reconsolidate the stability andcohesion it seeks, and whether this will be put to serve plural and inclu-sive, or authoritarian and exclusive ends. The report concludes with con-cern that the immediate period is a critical time for Ethiopia – in termsboth of political stability and economic development. Recognition that

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY22

there have been important changes, including significant downturns, in anumber of political indicators, however, should provide a basis for real-ism in constructive and increasingly active engagement with the socio-economic and political reform projects of the current Ethiopian govern-ment.

The paper gives lengthy consideration of the nature and potential ofpolitical opposition in Ethiopia. It is, however, a clear-cut conclusion that,despite the existence of a spectrum of alternately exciting, intriguing, orworrying shifts in the politics of this large country, there seem to be, atleast the next decade, few viable national alternative political forces to theparties of the . A key implication of this analysis is, therefore, thatthe most influential and important agents of change with whom Sida canwork in Ethiopia can be expected to continue to be the political leader-ship of the ruling party.


Insofar as Ethiopia is committed to the pursuit of modernity, she cannot

fail to be embarrassed to some extent by the wax-and-gold1 complex. For

nothing could be more at odds with the ethos of modernization, if not

with its actuality, than a cult of ambiguity. (Levine :)

There is a tendency for studies of Ethiopian political development to focusexclusively on ‘the modern’: the state and its projects, the formal arena ofpolitical competition, the developmental potential of civil society at thenational level. It is usually easier for researchers to canvass the views ofeducated officials, civil servants, opposition leaders, businessmen and activists, than of the many women, hunters, pastoralists, or farmers whoare fluent only in local languages, and resident far from towns and metalroads. Whilst social anthropologists and others have studied this more‘traditional sector’, their findings have been under-integrated into politi-cal analysis at the level of the Ethiopian state.

This has begun to change recently. A number of authors now focustheir investigations at the complex interface between the modern and thetraditional in Ethiopian political life (cf. for instance Donham ,Abbink , James et al. (eds) ). In demonstrating how much thetwo spheres influence, shape, even ‘reconstitute’ one another, they sug-gest the artificiality of the divisions and categories within which politicshas commonly been studied. Studies at the interface between state andpopulation, have demonstrated that there is no straightforward correla-tion between such dichotomies as ‘state/people’ ‘modern/traditional’

Introduction: perspectives on power and culture

CHAPTER 1

. ‘Wax and gold is the formula used by the Amhara to symbolize their favourite form of verse. Itis a form built of two semantic layers. The apparent, figurative meaning of the words is called‘wax’; their more or less hidden actual significance is the ‘gold’ […] (this terminology is devel-oped from the work of the goldsmith who constructs a clay mould around a form created in waxand then, draining the wax, pours the molten gold into that form)’ (Levine :)

‘urban/rural’ and ‘national/local’. Indeed, they have shown that trans-actions across and between these dualities are so important as to challengethe their status as preferred analytical categories.

This study foregrounds culture, convention, and systems of shared be-lief in the study of relations and structures of power. In doing so, it seeksto look beyond the so-called ‘formal’ or ‘modern’ political sphere, to in-vestigate the way it is influenced by, and influences social developmentsmore generally. In the terms suggested by Levine (above), it seeks to movebeyond the constitutional developments, and formal structures which pro-vide the waxen form of politics in Ethiopia, to illuminate its ‘golden’alternate: the relations and systems of power and convention which un-derpin and give it life and meaning.

In , after three decades of war, the incoming Ethiopian govern-ment inherited a centralised authoritarian state, and the ruins of a com-mand economy. It publicly committed itself to a series of radical reformmeasures designed to transform this situation. Below, this introductorysection gives a brief account of the kinds of changes the government en-visaged, and of the difficulties of evaluating the progress made over thelast decade in transforming the relations of power in Ethiopia. These dif-ficulties suggest that a broader approach, which goes beyond formalpolitical institutions, may help processes of understanding and evaluation.The introductory part of the paper, therefore, concludes with a briefaccount of the kind of theoretical framework under which power and cul-ture are brought centre stage in this study, and some introductory com-ments on the operation of ‘political culture’ in Ethiopia.

The main body of the study, then, is divided into four sections, whichinvestigate the patterns and distribution of power in each of four arenae:the popular, associational, political, and state spheres. It begins with anaccount of some of the key strands of popular practice, convention, andexperience that shape political life at the ‘grassroots’. This investigation isthen extended to the more familiar spheres of: associational life and civilsociety; the state/government arena which is referred to in Amharic as‘ye mengist’; and the political party system. Each of these sections offers notso much an exhaustive description of current circumstances, as a reviewof issues relevant to political culture and the operation of power. Eachshows how power and culture combine to produce an intertwining of ‘tra-ditional’ and ‘modern’ influences in each and all of the spheres examined,something which contributes to Ethiopia’s famous ‘cult of ambiguity’(Levine, above). Each part discusses cross cutting factors such as the par-ticipation of women, ethnic groups and minorities, and the status ofhuman rights. A concluding section considers relations between these four

CH. 1 • INTRODUCTION: PERSPECTIVES ON POWER AND CULTURE 25

arenae, and offers a review of trends and indicators for the future direc-tion of political culture, and patterns of power.

1.1 Reform from 1991–2001

1.1.1 The dynamics of reform

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, , came topower by force of arms in , after civil wars in Ethiopia and Eritreawhich had engulfed much of the north of the region for over a quarter ofa century, and which also resulted in the secession of Eritrea, de facto in, and de iure in . The quickly convened a conference ofthe major movements of opposition to the defeated Dergue regime, alongwith representatives of the country’s various other ethnic (or language)groups and certain social sectors2. The meeting adopted a TransitionalCharter under which the country would be governed for the time being,and set its principled approval on a raft of reforms, designed radically totransform the inherited political, economic, and administrative order inthe longer term3.

The new Transitional Government, , led by the , publiclypledged its commitment to three radical reform objectives: namely,

• the decentralisation of the state, • the democratisation of politics, and • the liberalisation of the economy.

announced its determination radically to decentralise power with-in the Ethiopian state of which it had won control. It had long identifiedthe extreme centralisation of state power, its ‘ethnocratic’4 concentrationin the hands of an elite from a single group, at the expense of the coun-try’s other impoverished, oppressed, and exploited populations, as thecentral root of Ethiopia’s modern political history of war, famine, and un-derdevelopment5. The solution it proposed was ‘self-determination’ for

INTRODUCTION: PERSPECTIVES ON POWER AND CULTURE • CH. 126

. Addis Ababa University, and the Trades Union Movement, for instance, were represented. Anumber of organisations (notably the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party, , and othermembers of the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces, ) were not included on thegrounds that they refused to surrender a commitment to armed opposition. The fact that theydid not participate maintained the tradition, and established a focus, of ‘extra-legal’ politicalopposition which has continued at varying levels, but uninterrupted, since.

. Cf. Vaughan () for further details of the preparation and dynamics of the conference.

. The term was coined by Ali Mazrui ().

5. There is a substantial body of literature available which documents the party’s analysis, of whichthe 1980s English language publication of the tplf, People’s Voice, is the most accessible. Theissue is summarised and discussed in Young (1997). Strongest ideological influences are Marxist-Leninist perspectives on the National Question, and the position bears close resemblances to

those populations: an expansion of popular access to decision-making andcontrol over resources, which would encompass the great majority ofEthiopia’s agricultural and pastoral producers, democratise relations be-tween them, and release their potential for socio-economic development.These were objectives with which few of Ethiopia’s donors found fault.

Over the decade since , then, the Ethiopian government underthe has been simultaneously engaged in a range of reform process-es, each of which would represent in itself an ambitious undertaking inany country, and each of which has drawn in high levels of support fromthe international community. In the political sphere, the regime hasmoved to transform a highly centralised single-party arrangement intowhat is potentially a radically devolved federation of nine Regional States,based on multi-party competitive election to representative office, the for-mal separation of the powers of legislature, executive, and judiciary, andaccession to a raft of international legal instruments related to human,economic, civil, and political rights. The reform of the Ethiopian civil ser-vice has focused not only on the extensive changes in administrative andfiscal arrangements required to underwrite changes in the political sphere,but also extends to attempts to overhaul its systems, capacity, and profes-sional culture in the five areas of: expenditure management and budgetcontrol; human resource development; senior management approaches;service delivery; and ethics and corruption-related issues. Finally, in theeconomic sphere, the Ethiopian government, with the extensive involve-ment of the international community and s, is seeking to restructure thepre-existing socialist command economy with the (gradual) introductionof market forces in many, although not all, sectors.

The decade from was marked by frantic activity in each of theseareas of reform of state, government, politics, and economy. The leader-ship of the ruling party and government have been consistent and persis-tent in their public expressions of ideological and practical commitmentto change6. In a number of areas there has been concrete progress thatwould have impressed observers a decade ago7. Nevertheless, fundamen-


Gellner’s views on uneven development, modernisation and nationalism (cf. esp.). The issueis further discussed below.

. Although it is worth recording that critics complain that these expressions have not been widelydisseminated, but rather confined to government, party, and diplomatic circles, such that thewider public is often not party to knowledge and discussion about these vision and intentions. Inturn one may observe the conscious determination of large sections of the middle class to dis-tance themselves from politics and any interest in the considerable information which is dissemi-nated through the government media.

. There is considerable disagreement as to the extent of development over the last decade, with arange of critics claiming that ‘nothing has changed since the Dergue’. Whilst it is certainly thecase that Ethiopia is subject to overwhelming continuities of political culture and context (andthat much of this influence is negative), such views fail to recognise extensive and significant

tal doubts remain with citizens, observers, and donors, about how to in-terpret and evaluate the changes that have occurred. This report seeks togo some way towards weighing up these queries, stressing issues of polit-ical culture and the distribution of power.

In doing so it draws on conversations, research and analysis onEthiopian political development over a fourteen-year period. It offers sug-gestions regarding the current situation, and also regarding the best placesto keep looking for evidence regarding future directions. In this sense, thereport also seeks to address what may seem to be the more modest, andlonger-term goal of looking for ways of ensuring that Sida’s involvementwith Ethiopia not only supports, but also seeks better to illuminate andunderstand, the processes at work. In a lot of ways, after years of dra-matic events, shifts, setbacks and hopes, analysis of social and politicaldevelopments and relations, especially as they operate at local levels, islittle advanced.

Particularly since the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia andEritrea in May , the international community has perhaps been over-ly engaged in evaluating and judging, at the expense of learning, under-standing, knowing – as a result of which the basis of evaluation has becomeall too brittle and thin8. This report is intended to fuel a discussion not onlyas to how to advance towards developmental goals which are shared bySida and the Government of the , but also as to how both parties can,in another years, be in a significantly better position to evaluate the ex-tent of their shared commitment, and scope for future collaboration. In-formation regarding social, political, and economic developments and per-spectives at the level of local communities remains at a premium.

The point may seem trite, but perhaps emerges as more significantwhen one considers that in many spheres inadequacies of basic data applynot only to the knowledge base from which donors’ decisions are made,but – far more crucially – to that on which the Ethiopian government’sown decisions are founded. A new concentration of support is required inthe development, expansion, and consolidation of institutions and re-sources geared to the generation, accumulation and analysis of relevant


developments, which are perhaps most prominent in the areas of infrastructural development(particularly arterial and feeder roads, electrification, and also urban expansion), and the reor-ganisation of public administration and government (which forms the subject of much of the fol-lowing).

. The rather sharp distinction between the relative enthusiasm of those members of the interna-tional community who came to know during the , and the more cautious approach ofmany of those who first encountered it during the Ethio-Eritrean war, can presumably be relat-ed to the different preoccupations and optimism of the two periods: it is sufficiently striking torequire mention in analysis which draws heavily on such sources. Such inconsistencies are, ofcourse, greatly exacerbated by high turnover of personnel in the international sector.

and accessible ‘base-line data’ regarding the development of Ethiopia’sdisparate populations, be it social, economic, or (most neglected of all)political.

1.2 Power and collective perceptions of power

An approach to the study of power which goes beyond the formal politi-cal arena, beginning with a consideration of power and political cultureat the grassroots, would seem also to be encouraged by the perspectivearticulated by the ruling party, which is as follows:

In the philosophy of the , the question of democracy is the ques-tion of peoples’ power. Unless there is peoples’ power, which is controlledby the people and beneficial to the people, the has the stand thatthe question of democracy shall never get an answer. As a result, the believes that in order to achieve the economic benefits of the entire peo-ple, to alleviate social problems and thus create a sustainable developmentgrowth, political power should rest with the majority of the people. (, unofficial translation from Tigrigna).

How then should we understand power, in terms which can accountfor its operation at every socio-political level and in every arena?

1.2.1 Some theoretical reflections

An interesting sociological account suggests the important connection be-tween the distribution of power and the pattern of knowledge operatingin a given society:

[The leader’s] underlings had knowledge of [him] and of each other. They

knew he was everywhere obeyed. Knowing what they did, they obeyed

him. By their obedience they confirmed the validity of what they knew,

and continued to accept it as valid. Acceptance of the knowledge generat-

ed confirming instances of it. Rejection of the knowledge would have led

to disconfirming instances. As a system, knowledge of the power structures

was self-referring and self-validating: indeed knowledge of the power struc-

ture was the power structure. The overall system of domination and obe-

dience had the character of a vast monumental self-fulfilling prophecy.

If social life is constituted by the actions of responsible knowledgeable

agents, then this is how we should understand the basis of such stability

and orderliness as it possesses. Not just crude systems of domination and

obedience, but all manner of organisations, institutions and hierarchies.

(Barnes:).


In considering structures and relations of power, this report treats the dis-tribution of power as both function and constitutive feature of the inter-action of a social collective: the system of power which operates in a givensociety is the continual product and resource of the interaction of all of itsmembers. Although the study aims to identify the effects of the operationof power on individuals and groups of citizens, that power cannot on thisanalysis be understood as wholly separable from them and their own ac-tivities and interactions. Power is not, for instance, a mere attribute of otherindividuals (agents who become ‘power-ful’, for instance, as a jug is filledwith water9): it is a function of the whole social system. Thus we need toapply an understanding of power that captures the positions of individu-als and groups of actors by means of their relations with others, and whatthey believe their options to be. Analysing structures of power does notimply that such structures have power; nor does a description of the dis-tribution of power in society by the relations between peoples imply thatthe relations between those people are themselves powerful (Dowding:).

Structures, then, do not have capacity to operate ‘on their own initia-tive’ – people do. It is true that a ‘system’ or ‘structure’ or ‘convention’can appear – indeed can be – powerful vis-à-vis individuals, even largegroups, caught up in that very system/structure/convention. But thispower is in fact a function of the interaction of the collectivity of individ-uals, who are themselves also all positioned in, and constitutive of, thestructure: all party to the same ‘system’ of knowledge, which encompass-es the experiences of all of those both constituting and subject to it. Whatwe argue, then, is that, independent of this interaction, there is no furthermysterious external force which constitutes social structure, and dictatessocial power.

Analysing an African state from this perspective, we conclude thatstate power is not an attribute of the state machinery as such, but a prod-uct of the interaction between (and resultant distribution of knowledgeamongst) the state’s ruling elite and all of its citizens.10 The concentrationof social power at certain points in this interaction (the fact that the elite‘wield power’) remains a function of the whole constellation, and will shiftas that constellation shifts. Now, perhaps, we can suggest a shift ofapproach which may provide a means of improving our understandingof power. Instead of imagining that the question of power is settled simplyby deciding who ‘has’ it, one can instead pay more attention to the ques-


. The metaphor is from Barnes ().

. For insightful studies on this issue, see, in particular Bayart (); Ayittey (); and Ake().

tion of what kind of power is seen to be being exercised11, and how this isunderstood or perceived (known), and by whom12.

From this point of departure, the state is neither the source of power,nor simply the projection of the power of an interested subject (a rulinggroup, for instance). Rather than an entity ‘holding’ or ‘exercising’ power,it may be more fruitful to think of the state, political parties, and all otherforms of organised associational social life, as instead forming points ofrelay or co-ordination and multiplication of power relations. ‘The state’(meaning the collectives that constitute it) will influence the structure ofpower in so far as it is influential in dictating the social distribution ofknowledge: and in Ethiopia the state does this to a very high degree. With-in this notion of ‘bureaucratic state power,’ the state as such is not an en-tity possessed of power (the jug metaphor as above) but a characteristicmode of exercise of power, a mode of power that is organised throughstate institutions, but which transcends them13. On this view of state andpower, it remains collectivities of people who influence and exercise power;and in order to illuminate this, our analytical focus is on the relational andoperational aspects of power, and the collective system(s) of knowledgewhich underpin them14.

Simply put, in the Ethiopian case this approach means that whetheror not the country enjoys democratic relations, justice, and an egalitari-an approach to social transformation depends not only on the activitiesand aspirations of its leaders, but also upon the nature of the social andpolitical relations, expectations, and perspectives of each and all of itscitizens; the state as it is experienced and shaped from below, as well ashow it is shaped and experienced from above. This would seem to tallyclosely with the view commonly articulated by the ruling party that de-mocratisation means ‘democratisation of society’, that is of relations at allsocial levels, and not just of formal political institutions. It also suggeststhe conventional and entrenched nature of political relations. Thus, forinstance, a failure to democratise relations which have for centuriesproved hierarchical and authoritarian cannot be attributed exclusively –


. James Ferguson (). This is also a point debated by Foucault in his analysis of ‘disciplinarypower’ ().

. The link between power and knowledge is of course famously developed and explored byMichel Foucault. The more radical connection, on which the present discussion draws heavily,is made by S. Barry Barnes (), based on his work in the sociology of knowledge. It is per-haps important to stress that this school rejects the distinction between knowledge and belief,regarding both true and false ‘knowledge’ as of equal sociological interest.

. Ferguson (: ).

. Inherent in this approach is a rejection of the structure / agency dichotomy which underpinsboth individualist and functionalist analyses, in favour of an interactionist emphasis which takessocial relations and the collectivity as its subject. Cf. Barnes (,).

or even primarily – to government policy. At this point, the significanceof an emphasis on political culture should be becoming clear: if power isintimately connected with patterns of knowledge, belief and convention,it is intimately connected with patterns of culture.

1.2.2 ‘Political culture’ in Ethiopia

A number of general observations concerning some of the pervasive traitsof the ‘political culture’ dominant in much of the country may provide abackground for the subsequent discussion.15

Hoben has suggested that

[i]t is a fundamental postulate of Amhara culture […] that social order,

which is good, can be created and maintained only through hierarchical,

legitimate control deriving ultimately from God. ().

In other words, ‘Abyssinian’16 political culture emphasises a strict hierar-chical understanding of society, where each member’s socio-politicalposition and status is clearly defined and understood. Social and politicalinteraction and behaviour are guided by an elaborate set of norms andrules, which establish socio-political order on the basis of a rigid systemof deference and sanction. This is not to say that all Ethiopian culturescan be compared to the Amhara tradition. Levine, for instance, in amuch-cited and much-criticised account, asserts that

The Oromo are in many ways the antithesis of the Amhara. […] Where

the Amhara system is hierarchical, the Oromo is egalitarian. Where the

Amhara is individualistic, the Oromo is solidaristic. (:).17

However, since the control of the Ethiopian state has historically beenassociated with the Abyssinian, or Amhara/Tigrayan, socio-political tra-dition, it may be argued that it provides the context for the formation ofthe dominant trends in the ‘political culture’ of contemporary Ethiopia.


. This brief review cannot but caricature the diversity and vitality of Ethiopian socio-politicalculture. Readers are encouraged to look, for more nuance, at such work as Poluha ()(forthcoming); Freeman & Pankhurst (); Donham & James ([]); James et al. (eds)(); Kurimoto & Simonse (eds) (); Fukui & Markakis (eds.) (); Baxter et al. (eds)(); amongst many others.

. Referring to the historically dominant Orthodox Christian highland area where the ge’ez lan-guage family (Amharic and Tigrigna) is in use.

. It is worth noting that Levine’s work (, ) has elicited strong criticism from the time ofits publication, and remains highly controversial, particularly amongst Oromo nationalist cir-cles, not least because of the kind of generalisation cited. Alternative sources for Oromo socio-political culture would include Mohammed Hassan ([]), and various of the contribu-tors to Baxter et al. (eds) (), particularly Bassi.

Ideas about, and norms of political culture and behaviour (i.e. that sys-tem of knowledge which, we asserted above, itself ‘constitutes’ the distri-bution of power) are transmitted to new generations first and foremostthrough the general pattern of socialisation. As such, a child receiveshis/her first impression of political behaviour, and all other social institu-tions, through observations, experiences, teaching and sanction at home,based on the interaction among family members and between familymembers and the outside world. Levine’s characterisation of the Amharahousehold is that it “is less a family unit than it is a vertically ordered setof status-roles” (:). The elaborate set of rules guiding social con-duct between family members, and within the community at large, en-sures that everyone, from an early age, knows their place in the hierarchywith respect to one another and is expected to show the appropriate de-gree of deference18. Thus, for instance, interaction continually reaffirmshow men are superior to women, and elders to those younger. Moreover,religious or political office gives added authority, whereas members of cer-tain despised groups (craftsmen, potters, tanners, hunters) are classified asinferior. A system of social classification along these lines continues to bewidely reproduced, imbuing new generations with cultural notions thatpeople are not equal and the world is not egalitarian. Individuals areranked according to a set of criteria which invests some people withgreater ‘value’ than others – both in social and political terms – and de-termines, moreover, that one should always be subservient to any indi-vidual regarded as superior to oneself.

The pattern of social interaction in Ethiopia hence sustains a strictlyhierarchical stratification of society, where one is constrained, by a large-ly invisible but rigid system of collective sanctions, to obey the ‘ordersfrom above’ (yebalal akal). This applies whether the orders are a fatherlycommand to assist in the chores of the household, or an instruction fromthe kebele to join in a political meeting. We may thus also say that the tra-ditional socio-political framework of highland Ethiopia defines both therelevant political arenae of interaction, and also the specific gate-keepers whocontrol access to these arenae, at different levels. In the political arena ofthe household, the male household head is the gate-keeper, and adminis-ters the political capital of the household. Women are commonly quies-cent in discussions outside the household, since the prevalent social normdefines that the household is controlled and represented by the malehousehold head, and that women are represented in public arenae by


. For an extremely critical study of Amhara tradition in these respects, see the controversialanalysis of Molvaer ().

their husbands. At the level of the village community, the relevant gate-keepers may be identified as the local kebele administrators.

A deeper understanding of the ‘political culture’ of Ethiopia suggestshow the distribution of power in the country must be viewed as both‘function and constitutive feature of the interaction of a social collective’.Focusing on the position of individuals and groups of actors by means oftheir relations with others allows one to understand the continuing mar-ginalisation of, for instance, women and minorities. Since the state andother institutions should be viewed as relay points of power and thus asfacilitating the enhancement and multiplication of power relations, theposition of individuals or groups disassociated from these institutions fromthe start is thereby the more likely to remain in powerlessness.

On the kind of analysis advocated, then, the social and cultural (andindeed economic) norms and institutions persisting between the groupsin question must be understood as much more than the ‘context’ withinwhich their political life develops. These institutions form part of the sys-tem of knowledge, which constitutes (which is) the pattern of distributionof ‘social power’. If power relations are to be democratised and trans-formed, these transformations must take place at every level and in everysphere of such social relations. Similarly, the corollary of this position isthat there is a powerful weight of inertia in the pre-existing social and cul-tural arrangements, which counteracts the attempts of any force (be it rul-ing or opposition party, or civil society group) committed to their reform.It seems essential to recognise that – whatever the aspirations of the gov-ernment – fundamental socio-political dynamics and norms in Ethiopia,as they currently operate, favour not democratisation, but the perpetua-tion of hierarchy and authoritarianism at many levels of interaction.

In Ethiopian tradition and in the Amharic language (which remainsthe language of state at the federal and some regional levels) no distinc-tion is made between ‘state’ and ‘government’, both being referred to asmengist. Since the kebele administrators are government representatives,they are also vested with the authority of the state/government, the primepower-holder in highland Ethiopian tradition (with the exception of God).Traditi

sarah vaughanis a research consultant and honorary fellow ...€¦ · sarah vaughan and kjetil...

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