safety report (pre-opening) - highways...

MAJOR PROJECTS DIRECTORATE

PCF Quality Control M25 LUS Section 5

of 84

M25 DBFO LUS SECTION 5

Safety Report (Pre-opening)

JOB NUMBER: 5108945 DOCUMENT REF: 5108945-ATK-1204-S5-DOC-X-0130

F Final P.Whitfield J.P Doherty J.P Doherty S.Moore 13/02/14

E PCF Stage 6 sign-off P.Whitfield J.P Doherty J.P Doherty S.Moore 5/12/13

D PCF Stage 6 update P.Whitfield J.P Doherty J.P Doherty S.Moore 18/10/13

C For PCF Stage 3 sign-off P.Whitfield J.P Doherty R.Thorn S.Moore 30/4/13

B For PCF Stage 3 sign-off P.Whitfield J.P Doherty R.Thorn S.Moore 25/3/13

A HA Review P.Whitfield J.P Doherty R.Thorn S.Moore 25/08/12

Originated Checked Reviewed Authorised Date

Revision Purpose Description

Distribution Record

Copy No. Copy Holder Document Revision

C D E F G

01 Business Collaborator * * * *

02 Atkins File Copy * * * *

Note: This Document will be distributed via Business Collaborator. Details of distribution can be obtained from that system

Please note that Section 2.2 of the attached Product provides the introduction and background to the project. The text has been approved by the Highways Agency Project Leader for inclusion in all the PCF Products for this project. These sections have been included for information purposes only, and will be common across the whole suit of PCF Products for the project. You do not need to review and comment on these Sections as a PCF consultee.

M25 LUS Section 5 Safety Report (pre-opening)

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Contents

Section Page

PCF Product Sign Off Sheet 2

1. Executive Summary 6

1.1 Purpose of this Document 6

1.2 Safety Objectives 6

1.3 Hazard Log and Risk Assessment Activity 6

1.4 Safety Plan Activities 7

1.5 Safety Conclusions 7

1.6 Outstanding Key Actions 7

2. Introduction 8

2.1 Scheme Background 8

2.2 Project Description 8

2.3 Report Scope and Objectives 9

2.4 Document Status, History and Future Development 10

2.5 Contents of this Report 11

3. Scenario Appraisal 12

3.1 Typical MM-ALR Scheme 12

3.2 Scheme Data and Assumptions 13

4. Safety Objectives 14

4.1 Safety Objectives for Road Users and Road Workers 14

4.2 Safety Baseline 14

4.3 Methodology for Achieving Safety Objectives 14

4.4 Evidence that Safety Objectives have been/will be achieved 15

4.5 Future Validation of Safety Objectives 15

4.6 Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) 16

4.7 Additional HA centralised monitoring 17

4.8 Monitoring Required at Scheme Level 18

5. Safety Management System: Evidence a Robust System Followed 19

5.2 Robust Project Safety Management Process in Place 20

5.3 Robust Approval Process in Place 20

5.4 Road Safety Audits 21

5.5 Project Safety Control Review Group (PSCRG) 22

6. Hazard Log Scoring 24

6.1 Initial Population of the Hazard Log 24

6.2 Mitigation and Design Features 25

6.3 Assumptions 25

6.4 Provision of a Controlled Environment 25

6.5 Hazard Log Results 29

6.6 Detailed Analysis 30

6.7 Close-out of Hazard Log Actions 32

6.8 Safety Tasks 33

6.9 Safety Requirements 33

6.10 Compliance with Requirements and impact on the Safety Report 33

6.11 Evidence that Safety Requirements and Restrictions met by Design 34


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6.12 Verification Reviews 34

7. Project Practice: Methods and Processes been followed during the Project 35

7.1 Design Compatibility with Standards and Regulations 35

7.2 Use of Good Practice during the Project 35

8. Conclusions 36

8.1 General Conclusions 36

8.2 Outstanding Key Actions 36

Appendix A – Hazard Scoring Indices 38

Appendix B – Hazard Log Scores 42

Appendix C – Previously Outstanding Safety Tasks 54

Appendix D – Safety Requirements 59

Appendix E – Safety Requirements Verification 64


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Glossary

Acronym/Term Meaning/Explanation

AMI Advanced Motorway Indicator

AQMA Air Quality Management Area

AST Appraisal Summary Table

ATC Automatic Traffic Count

ATM Active Traffic Management

Auxiliary Lane An additional lane at the side of the mainline carriageway to provide increased merge or diverge opportunity or additional space for weaving traffic

BAS Biodiversity Alert Site

SBB Skanska Balfour Beatty Joint Venture

BT British Telecom

ALR All Lane Running

CDM Regulations Construction (Design and Management) Regulations

Central Reserve The area that separates the carriageways of a dual carriageway / motorway exclusive of any hard strips

CM Controlled Motorway

COBA Cost Benefit Analysis

CSR Client Scheme Requirements

CWS Country Wildlife Site

D3M Dual three lane motorway

D4M Dual four lane motorway

DHS Dynamic Use of the Hard Shoulder

DfT Department for Transport

DMRB Design Manual for Roads and Bridges

DROBB Double Rail Open Box Beam (safety barrier)

EAR Environmental Assessment Report

EcAR Economic Appraisal Report

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EMMR1TAM East Midlands M1 Traffic Assessment Model

EMMR Existing Motorway Minimum Requirements

ERA Emergency Refuge Area

ERT Emergency Roadside Telephone

ES Environmental Statement

ESS Entry Stop Signal

EU European Union

Ghost Island An area of the carriageway suitably marked to separate lanes of traffic travelling in the same direction on both merge and diverge layouts.

HA Highways Agency

Headroom The minimum distance between the surface of the highway cross-section and the deflected structure

HGV Heavy Goods Vehicle

HVCB Higher Vertical Concrete Barrier

IAN Interim Advice Note

INCA INcident Cost-benefit Assessment – economics tools for calculating delays and travel time variability costs

ITR Indirect Tax Revenue

JTDB Journey Time Database

LBS Lane Below Signal; refer to terminology at the end of this list

LMVR Local Model Validation Report


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LGV Light Goods Vehicle

LWS Local Wildlife Sites

MAC Managing Agent Contractor

Mainline The carriageway carrying the main flow of traffic (generally traffic passing straight through a junction or interchange)

Maintained Headroom The minimum value of Headroom that must be preserved at all times

MHS Maintenance Hard Standing

MCDHW Manual of Contract Documents for Highway Work

MIDAS Motorway Incident and Automated Signals

MM Managed Motorway(s)

MM-ALR Managed Motorways All Lanes Running

MMDO Managed Motorways Delivery Office

MMSG Managed Motorways Steering Group

MRSS Maintenance and Repair Strategy Statement

MSA Motorway Service Area

NDD HA Network Delivery and Development Directorate

NetServ HA Network Services Directorate

North facing slip roads The merge and diverge on the north side of a junction

Nose A paved area, approximately triangular in shape, between the connector road and the mainline at a merge or diverge

NRTS National Roads Telecommunications Services

NSCRG National Safety & Control Review Group

NTEM National Trip End Model

OBB Open Box Beam (safety barrier)

Overbridge A bridge that spans the road under consideration

Parallel Merge / Diverge

A layout where an auxiliary lane is provided alongside the mainline carriageway

PCF Project Control Framework

PIA Personal Injury Accident

PIE Public Information Exhibition

P4L Permanent Four Lanes

PL Project Leader

POP Police Observation Platforms

POPE Post Opening Project Evaluation

PSSR Preliminary Sources Study Report

PSCRG Project Safety & Control Review Group

PTJR Permanent Through Junction Running

PTZ Pan Tilt Zoom (CCTV)

QUADRO QUeues And Delays at ROadworks – economics programme to evaluate delay impacts during construction

Ramp Metering The control of vehicles joining the main carriageway from slip roads by the means of traffic lights or similar

RCC Regional Control Centre

RPI Retail Price Index

SAR Scheme Assessment Report

SBI Site of Biological Importance

SGAR Stage Gate Assessment Reviews

SoS Secretary of State

South facing slip roads The merge and diverge on the south side of the junction

SoW Start of Works

SPZ Source Protection Zone

SRO Senior Responsible Owner (Highways Agency)

SSD Stopping Site Distance

SSSI Site of Special Scientific Interest


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Taper Merge / Diverge A layout where merging or diverging traffic joins or leaves the mainline carriageway through an area forming a funnel to or flare from the mainline carriageway

TCB Tensioned Corrugated Beam (safety barrier)

TIS Traffic Impact Study

TERN Trans European Road Network

TFR Traffic Forecasting Report

TJR Through Junction Running

TOS Traffic Officer Service

TPI Targeted Programme of Improvements

TRADS HA Traffic Information Data base, containing traffic flows for motorways and major trunk roads in England

TM Traffic Management

TMD HA Traffic Management Directorate

TUBA Transport Users Benefit Appraisal

Underbridge A bridge that carries the road under consideration

VCB Vertical Concrete Barrier

Verge Any nominally flat area between the edge of the paved width and either the start of an adjacent side or slope, in the absence of a side slope, the highway boundary or bridge parapet

VMS Variable Message Signs

VMSL Variable Mandatory Speed Limit

VOC Vehicle Operating Costs

VPH Vehicles per Hour

VRS Vehicle Restraint System

Weaving Section The length of the carriageway between a successive merge or lane gain and diverge or lane drop

WebTAG Website for Transport Analysis Guidance


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1. Executive Summary

1.1 Purpose of this Document

This Safety Report (Pre-opening version) has been produced towards the end of the construction

stage of Section 5A of the M25 LUS Section 5 scheme. At this stage the Safety Report contains a

summary of the safety activities, identified in the Safety Plan, that have taken place to date and

describes the available evidence that demonstrates that the scheme Safety Objectives will be

achieved.

Different phased opening dates are planned for J23-J25 (Section 5A) and J25-J27 (Section 5B). Section 5A will open first and the document is presented for approval for Section 5A only. An update will be provided in early 2014 to support the opening of Section 5B.

A further version of the document at PCF stage 7 will report on the safety performance of the fully

operational scheme.

1.2 Safety Objectives

Before a Managed Motorway is implemented it has to be demonstrated in advance that the

scheme Safety Objectives are likely to be met. The PCF Product for the Safety Plan describes the

Safety Objectives as follows:

Road Users:

The safety impact of the project will be measured by comparing the “before” and “after” casualty numbers and severities using 3 year before data (the safety baseline) and 3 year after data. The project will meet its Safety Objective for road users if it is demonstrated for a period of three years after becoming fully operational that:

the average number of Fatal and Weighted Injuries (FWI) casualties per year is no more than the safety baseline, and

the rate of FWIs per billion vehicle miles per annum is no more than the safety baseline, and

no population (e.g. car drivers, pedestrians, HGV drivers and motorcyclists) is adversely affected in terms of safety.

Road Workers:

There will be no specific numerical safety objective set for road workers. These risks will be

managed to be “So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable.

1.3 Hazard Log and Risk Assessment Activity

The risk assessment work, through the application of the Hazard Log process, provides a method

for identifying the potential barriers to the good safety performance of the scheme. Following

identification of high scoring hazards, the design of the key features were scrutinised. Individual

design disciplines undertook a number of risk assessments via Hazard Log Safety Tasks, the

results of which contributed to the formation of a list of Safety Requirements for the scheme.

These Safety Requirements identify key features, working methods or actions which are

considered necessary for the safe functioning of the scheme.


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1.4 Safety Plan Activities

The Safety Team1 has had an opportunity to review and contribute to a number of PCF

deliverables which will have an impact on the safe operation of the scheme. This involvement has

insured that the safety challenges identified in the Safety Plan and throughout the Hazard Log

process have been properly addressed.

A Project Safety Control Review Group (PSCRG) has been set up and has provided an

opportunity for key design decisions to be challenged by a range of stakeholders.

1.5 Safety Conclusions

The results of the quantitative assessment indicate that the risk after Managed

Motorway implementation is likely to be lower for all populations of road users,

including road workers.

Therefore the evidence available at this time suggests that the Safety Objectives are achievable

for both road users and road workers. The evidence is provided by:

The work done to complete the safety activities outlined in the scheme Safety Plan.

The results of the scheme Hazard Log Risk Assessment activity.

The results of the generic programme level Hazard Log Risk Assessment activity, including

driver simulation.

Verification of Safety Requirements

1.6 Outstanding Key Actions

A Stage 3 (pre-opening) Road Safety Audit Report will be required in accordance with DMRB HD19; the process can be phased to suit incremental go-live dates for different links.

There is one2 outstanding Departure from Standard; confirmation of approval should be

ascertained.

The Scheme Safety Requirements have been subject to a verification assessment, seeking

evidence of compliance. The results of this exercise are listed at Appendix E.

Appendix E shows a number of Safety Requirements that cannot be verified at this time and

therefore these should be re-checked later. These are further sub-divided into two categories:

Those that should be fully verified before any decision to “go-live” for ALR operating

regime is taken

Those that could be closed-out shortly after ALR “go-live”

Both types of un-verified Safety Requirements must be added to a single central action tracker to ensure they are kept under regular review before “go live”. The necessary action is for the SRO to satisfy himself that these outstanding Safety Requirements are all closed out before the ALR phase of the scheme opens.

1 The Safety Team is currently an Atkins Team. The term is included throughout the document in recognition that as the project

progresses responsibility may changes, but regardless of any changes in project resourcing arrangements it is envisaged that a team

with sufficient competence in matters of safety will be retained. The Safety Plan set out the agreed arrangements and any changes

would require client authorisation through a revised Safety Plan.

2 Webdas ref 69708


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2. Introduction

2.1 Scheme Background

2.1.1 In 2002, the M25 London Orbit Multi-Modal Study (ORBIT MMS) recommended the provision of additional capacity on the M25 Junctions 5 to 7 (Section 2) and on the M25 Junctions 23 to 27 (Section 5), generally in the form of one additional lane in each direction. Subsequently, the Advanced Motorway Signalling and Traffic Management Feasibility Study (Department for Transport (DfT), 2008) concluded that Hard Shoulder Running (HSR) could provide a large proportion of the benefits of widening at significantly lower cost.

2.1.2 A scheme was developed for an option called HSR and the environmental effects of this proposal were reported in the Stage 2 Environmental Assessment Report (2010). This scheme was further refined as part of the Stage 3 commission but the scheme was then put on hold in the autumn of 2010 pending the government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). In the spring of 2011 the schemes to upgrade the M25 in Section 2 and Section 5 were included in the government’s plans for transport improvements for this parliamentary session and approval for work on the project to recommence was given.

2.1.3 In December 2011 it was announced that new guidance (IAN 161/12) should be followed whereby Managed Motorway Controlled All Lanes Running (MM-ALR) would replace Dynamic Hard Shoulder Running with reduced number of signs, gantries and Emergency Refuge Areas (ERAs).

2.1.4 In March 2012 the Interim Advice Note IAN 161/12 was published entitled ‘Managed motorways All lanes running’, which set out the design parameters and the associated infrastructure and technology requirements.

2.1.5 In September 2013 a further revision of Interim Advice Note IAN 161/12 was issued in the form of IAN 161/13. As the standards cut off date for this contract is 1st January 2012, the revised IAN is not to be implemented on this scheme, unless specifically instructed by the Highways Agency via a Departments Works Change (DWC). No DWC to implement this standard or any part of it has been received to date.

2.1.6 Construction Works for Section 5 commenced in January 2013.

2.2 Project Description

2.2.1 Section 5 of the Project is within the counties of Hertfordshire, Essex and the Greater London Authority and located in the northern segment of the M25 starting at Junction 23 (A1(M)) and finishing at Junction 27 (M11). This Section will incorporate an existing climbing lane and recent improvements to two tunnels (Holmesdale and Bell Common), so as to provide a traditional hard shoulder with four running lanes at the tunnels and portals.

2.2.2 Construction is being undertaken to two phases, 5A from J23 to J25 (Ch 37+000 to 53+000) and S5B from J25 to J27 (Ch 53+000 to 63+300), with Section 5A being expected to be completed in early January 2014, at which time it is intended to open and operate this section as a MM-ALR scheme, whilst construction works in S5B commences.

2.2.3 MM-ALR makes use of the existing hard shoulder to provide the additional lane capacity. This is achieved by using a system of gantry mounted electronic signs and signals. Safe refuges are provided in accordance with IAN 161/12, approximately every 2.5km where topography and road layout permits. Outside of that required for effective operation of MM-ALR, this Project only includes the minimum improvements to the road infrastructure (e.g. surfacing, vehicle restraint systems, environmental mitigation and drainage improvements), that would be required to achieve safe and legal operation of MM-ALR. A general upgrade to full standards has not been undertaken.

2.2.4 New low noise surfacing has been used to replace life expired surface course in the hard shoulder

with replacement of the main running lanes and hard shoulder with a low noise surface taking


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place only when the maintaining authority (DBFO) have programmed resurfacing works e.g.

where the surfacing is not fit for purpose. Concrete surface repairs have also taken place.

2.2.5 The drainage arrangements for the Project have been assessed as part of the detailed design, in

order to meet the requirements of IAN161/12, with respect to ‘flow path’ of the water in the road

edge. This comprises additional gullies & kerbs, V Channel or Slot Drains, as identified in the

Detailed Design. The drainage of the ERAs will collect the water into manholes and discharge to

the existing networks where it is attenuated using flow controls and therefore no alteration to the

drainage system was required.

2.2.6 Overall, the proposed drainage system comprises a combination of:

Kerbs and gullies, slot drains and open channels where appropriate.

The existing carrier drain system kept in place for the whole length of the section, taking the

discharge from the collection drain arrangement.

2.2.7 In addition to the implementation of the MM-ALR requirements where appropriate and as agreed

with the Highways Agency, elements of planned maintenance / lifecycle renewal works have been

incorporated into the overall Project scope, including the installation of vertical concrete barriers

and the hardening of the central reserve including any consequential amendments to the drainage

system required as part of these works.

The Overseeing Organisation

2.2.8 The Highways Agency is an Executive Agency of the DfT and is responsible for operating, maintaining and improving the strategic road network in England on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport. The contact details for the Highways Agency are:

Highways Agency

Federated House

London Road

Dorking

Surrey

RH4 1SZ

The DBFO Co

2.2.9 The DBFO Co is responsible for the delivery of all M25 Projects and maintenance of the M25 for a 30 year period. Connect Plus was appointed in 2009 by the Secretary of State (SoS) for Transport. The contact details are:

Connect Plus

Connect Plus House

St Albans Road

South Mimms

Potters Bar

Hertfordshire

EN6 3NP

2.3 Report Scope and Objectives 2.3.1 This document is the Safety Report (Pre-opening) for the M25 LUS MM – Section 5.

2.3.2 Different phased opening dates are planned for J23-J25 (Section 5A) and J25-J27(Section 5B). Section 5A will open first and the document is presented for approval for Section 5A only. An updated document will be provided in 2014 to support the opening of Section 5B.

2.3.3 This document considers future road user and road worker safety of the completed operational project.

2.3.4 The objectives of this version of the Safety Report are:


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To describe the safety related activities that have taken place since the production of the

Safety Plan3.

To summarise the contents of the Hazard Log4 for the scheme including the Safety

Requirements defined within it.

To define the main scheme assumptions and thereby by definition benchmark the changes to

the design or operation that would subsequently necessitate consideration of updated safety

reviews in the future.

To define the process which needs to be followed if a significant change in the design or

operation of the scheme is planned or if a defined Safety Requirement cannot be met.

To summarise the evidence in relation to demonstrating achievement of the Safety Objectives.

To provide evidence of compliance with the requirements of the Highways Agency Project

Safety Risk Management System (PSRMS).

2.3.5 This report also describes the relationship between the scheme and the HA’s generic hazard log for a typical MM-ALR scheme and focuses only on the principal differences between the two. It is not necessary to reprise the generic programme level safety work which is separately reported.

2.3.6 The HA has adopted an approach to asset management decisions for the MM-ALR programme that utilises the principle that a MM scheme should include only work that is essential to the safe and efficient implementation, operation and maintenance of the range of operating regimes being implemented. Non-essential maintenance, upgrading and replacement are generally not within the scope of Managed Motorways projects. The risk assessment work described in this report has been guided by these principles.

2.3.7 A glossary of terms has been included after the document sign off sheet.

2.4 Document Status, History and Future Development 2.4.1 This Safety Report (Pre-opening) is issued at the end of the construction phase (PCF Stage 6) of

the scheme prior to the commencement of operation.

2.4.2 This document has been informed by a number of other PCF products, including the following:

Safety Plan

Hazard Log Report

Maintenance and Repair Strategy Statement (MRSS)

Operating Regime, Compliance Strategy, Implications on Core Responders (Combined

Product)

2.4.3 A further version of the document, at PCF stage 7, will report on the safety performance of the fully operational scheme.

3 See document 5108945-ATK-1204-S5-DOC-X-0024

4 See document 5108945-ATK-1204-S5-DOC-X-0090


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2.5 Contents of this Report

2.5.1 This document is split into a number of sections as described below.

3.0 Scenario Appraisal: describes the typical features of a managed motorway and compares

this to the measures being implemented on the scheme. Also considers the combined safety

impact of the different operating regimes.

4.0 Safety Objectives: summarises the Safety Objectives for the scheme. Further background

and analysis of the existing motorway safety performance can be found in the scheme Safety

Plan.

5.0 Safety Management System: describes how the appropriate Safety Management system

was chosen, how the project safety risk management work instructions were applied and the

approvals process used throughout the safety work.

6.0 Hazard Log: describes how the risk assessment process was utilised on this scheme and

describes how the hazard log provides evidence to support the achievement of the safety

objectives. Further background and a detailed description of how the hazard log was used on

the scheme can be found in the Hazard Log Report.

7.0 Project Practice: discusses how the use of standards and quality control has been managed

on the project to ensure the appropriate level of safety performance is achieved.

8.0 Conclusions: summarises the evidence provided in this version of the Safety Report to

determine whether the scheme is likely to meet its Safety Objectives.

2.5.2 The following Appendices are also included:

Appendix A - Hazard Log Scoring Indices

Appendix B - Hazard Log Scores

Appendix C – Previously Outstanding Safety Tasks

Appendix D - Safety Requirements

Appendix E - Safety Requirements Verification


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3. Scenario Appraisal

3.1 Typical MM-ALR Scheme

3.1.1 A typical MM-ALR scheme is shown below in Figure 1 (extracted from IAN 161/13).

Figure 1 – Typical MM-ALR Scheme Layout

3.1.2 Two key documents have been produced at programme level to support safety assessment:

Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running Demonstration of Meeting Safety

Objective Report5

5 Highways Agency August 2013 – see: http://www.highways.gov.uk/knowledge/publications/managed-motorways-all-lane-running-

documents/

http://www.highways.gov.uk/knowledge/publications/managed-motorways-all-lane-running-documents/



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Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running Generic Safety Report6

3.1.3 The above documents are also supported by a Concept of Operations document7.

3.1.4 A substantial amount of data is included in the generic Hazard Log, principally from previous studies undertaken as part of the MM programme. Further data requirements were considered during the initial data population exercise where the existing data was insufficient and the hazard was likely to be high scoring or the M25 schemes were likely to differ from a typical motorway. The values suggested in the generic Hazard Log were typically found to be appropriate and a lean approach was adopted such that additional data (see Section 3.2 below) was only sourced where it was likely to be of material value in understanding risks.

3.2 Scheme Data and Assumptions

3.2.1 The current list of principal scheme features, and associated data values, that are assumed to be part of the final design are:

The scheme does not currently have a complete MIDAS system that includes sufficient overhead signals. The assumed scheme proportion of existing MIDAS by total vehicle kilometres travelled is 27%.

The hard shoulder will be retained, for emergency use, on approximately 23% of the scheme in terms of total vehicle kilometres travelled.

In line with the advice provided in IAN161 suitable safe haven stopping places are provided at maximum 2500m spacing

8.

Off-slips with hard shoulders are considered as safe havens.

Verge barrier will be provided in accordance with DMRB standards but as a result of applying standards it will not be a continuous barrier.

Central reserve concrete barrier will be installed throughout except for small sections at a small number of structures.

The hard shoulder will be resurfaced and strengthened if required.

The ‘before’ and ‘after’ lighting provision will be as per PSCRG Technical Note 6.

Permanent remote controlled (secret) signs in the verge and central reserve will be installed in pairs linked to fixed taper positions; these signs will be blank in their normal state and will show standard TSRGD legends when needed for roadworks.

The set-up and take-down of cones will be mitigated by use of overhead lane closure and Variable Mandatory Speed Limits during the service life of the opened road

6 Highways Agency August 2013 – see: http://www.highways.gov.uk/knowledge/publications/managed-motorways-all-lane-running-

documents/

7 Highways Agency August 2013 – see http://www.dft.gov.uk/ha/standards/tech_info/files/MM-ALR_Concept_of_Operations_v2_0.pdf

8 This is typically achieved but in a few cases marginal increases above 2500m are provided. The risk has been assessed as low via

PSCRG TN11. In other cases spacings of less than 2500m are provided.



http://www.dft.gov.uk/ha/standards/tech_info/files/MM-ALR_Concept_of_Operations_v2_0.pdf


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4. Safety Objectives

4.1 Safety Objectives for Road Users and Road Workers

4.1.1 Before a Managed Motorway is implemented it has to be demonstrated in advance that the scheme Safety Objectives are likely to be met. The PCF Product for the Safety Plan describes the Safety Objectives as follows:

Road Users:

The safety impact of the project will be measured by comparing the “before” and “after” casualty numbers and severities using 3 year before data (the safety baseline) and 3 year after data. The project will meet its Safety Objective for road users if it is demonstrated for a period of three years after becoming fully operational that:

the average number of Fatal and Weighted Injuries (FWI)9 casualties per year is no

more than the safety baseline, and

the rate of FWIs per billion vehicle miles per annum is no more than the safety

baseline, and

no population (e.g. car drivers, pedestrians, HGV drivers and motorcyclists) is

adversely affected in terms of safety.

Road Workers:

There will be no specific numerical safety objective set for road workers. These risks will be

managed to be “So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable.

4.2 Safety Baseline

4.2.1 In accordance with the Managed Motorways Generic Safety Review, the Safety Baseline identifies the level of safety against which the Safety Objectives will be measured (i.e. in safety terms, what the scheme will be compared to).

4.2.2 Section 4.7 describes the role played by the Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) process, as part of this process the baseline should be defined using the most up to date accident/casualty data available at that time.

4.2.3 The Safety Baseline will be the 3 year accident/casualty data calculated back from the scheme start of works date, defined as when a speed limit was put in force to allow major works to begin.

4.3 Methodology for Achieving Safety Objectives

4.3.1 The method adopted for achieving the Safety Objectives is the application of the Project Safety Management System. This specifies the process to proactively manage the safety risk using a number of different techniques. The Safety Plan listed the activities that collectively will help ensure that the Safety Objectives for the scheme are met. This method is multi-faceted and utilises a mixture of innovative and long established safety approaches which are applied at various project stages to manage the risk for the different user groups.

9 This indicator is defined in the Safety Plan and places the highest significance of fatal casualties, a high significance on serious

casualties and lowest significance on slight casualties.


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4.3.2 The principle tool for ensuring the Safety Objectives are met has been the completion of risk assessment activities documented in the Hazard Log application. The development of the Operating Regime and Maintenance and Repair Strategy Statement has also provided opportunities to influence the scheme design for the purposes of safety. The management of these hazards and the development of scheme specific mitigation measures provide a system for reducing the risk to both main targeted groups. Hazards related to Road Users and Road Workers can be treated separately with the different Safety Objectives applied.

4.4 Evidence that Safety Objectives have been/will be achieved

4.4.1 At the time of preparation of this version of the Safety Report there is no direct performance data from the scheme or another MM-ALR scheme. Post-opening, Version 3 of this Safety Report will be able to report on accident/casualty data from the operation of the scheme, therefore demonstrating its performance.

4.4.2 The risk assessment work done to date, through the application of the Hazard Log process, provides a method of identifying the potential barriers to the good safety performance of the scheme. Further details of the Hazard Log methodology are included in Section 6 and the Hazard Log Report.

4.4.3 The methodology behind the Hazard Log makes it possible to combine mathematically the risk assessments for individual hazards to produce a global risk score for both the Managed Motorway and the baseline (existing motorway) and to compare these scores.

4.4.4 The generic Hazard Log is the chosen method of hazard analysis and risk assessment. The Hazard Log is in effect a ‘risk model’ which predicts the impact of introducing Managed Motorway features on a baseline motorway. Risk Score changes can be equated to potential changes in actual FWI.

4.4.5 The generic Hazard Log has been developed using the experience of developing hazard assessments for other forms of Managed Motorway scheme types with additional comparison to all purpose trunk roads without hard shoulders.

4.4.6 The Hazard Log represents an excellent tool to understand how design decisions affect risk quantum and prioritisation. Validation against real schemes can only be fully achieved once more schemes are built and operated successfully. Care must be taken not to assume that the numbers generated represent a higher degree of precision than is actually possible given the finite accuracy and availability of input data.

4.4.7 The Hazard Log process provides the opportunity to focus the safety work on the elements of the scheme that pose the greatest risk to increase confidence that the Safety Objectives will be achieved.

4.5 Future Validation of Safety Objectives

4.5.1 Validation of the Safety Objectives will be possible once sufficient performance data is available. As there is a time lag to collect validated and unvalidated casualty information, it is important to consider if monitoring is required.

4.5.2 It is expected that in the first days and weeks of opening the scheme, RCC/TOS staff will feed back early experiences. This is not considered to be formal monitoring but will nevertheless be useful.

4.5.3 The possible sources of monitoring data are:

Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE)

Additional HA required centralised monitoring


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Monitoring Required at Scheme Level

Incident reporting

These different sources of monitoring information are considered in the following sections.

4.6 Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE)

4.6.1 The Highways Agency will collect casualty data using consultants responsible for the Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) project. The data to be collected relevant to safety comprises traffic data, RCC command and control logs, casualty data and incident data. The main purpose of POPE is to:

Identify the degree to which major schemes have offered good value for money by addressing

each of the New Approach to Appraisal (NATA) objectives;

Ascertain the extent to which forecasts of scheme costs and benefits are accurate;

Identify the main factors affecting the accuracy of forecasting; and

Make recommendations regarding how scheme appraisal methods could be improved to help

offer greater accuracy, and therefore ensure that the HA continue to make good investment

decisions.

POPE Traffic Data

Traffic data on traffic counts will be obtained from HA HATRIS. To examine the wider impacts of

the surrounding area there may also be a requirement to examine Local Authority count sites, and

to commission traffic counts on minor roads.

Journey time data will be obtained from:

Journey times from HATRIS; and

Speed data from MIDAS

It is not intended to commission moving observer surveys on the motorway.

POPE Personal Injury Accident (PIA) Data

STATS19 Accident data is requested for five years prior to the start of scheme construction and

the 12 months post full opening (60 months for the five years after). Data is requested for the

PIAs including details of the numbers of casualties and severities and should be obtained for the

same area as covered in the scheme’s appraisal. The local authority is normally the first point of

contact. Agents can also be sources of accident data for HA roads. Records for the motorways

are held by the HA area teams. Accident records are generally not collated very speedily – there

is generally a time lag of two to three months for the data received, hence the need to request the

information at the earliest opportunity.

It should be noted that the accident data obtained for POPE studies has not normally been

validated by the DfT. It is acceptable to use non-validated data if necessary, as long as this is

noted in the report along with: why that decision was made; what the source of the data is; why

that source is deemed appropriate; and, noting the risk that the data may alter when it has been

validated.

POPE collection of Incident Data

In addition to the safety data described above, for the POPE evaluation of MM schemes it is

intended that additional data will be obtained from the record of critical incidents collected by the

National Incident Liaison Officer (NILO) team.

POPE Safety Evaluation

The key areas to be evaluated will be:

Accident numbers


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(If appropriate and feasible) analysis of accident numbers in the before and after periods by

causation factor

Casualty numbers – by severity

PIA per million vehicle km travelled

The core evaluation of accidents broadly consists of the following elements:

Comparison of before and after accident numbers – This is usually undertaken across the

wider area covered by the appraisal and on a more local area in order to isolate the effects of

the scheme. For this scheme consideration will need to be given to the extending the local

area to include the adjoining links. A consistent approach will need to be taken across the MM

programme.

Comparison of before and after accident severity levels – This covers the same area and will

examine whether the proportion of fatal and serious accidents has changed;

Comparison of before and after casualty numbers – This covers the same area;

Comparison of before and after accident locations - The location of accidents is usually

mapped by severity. This makes it possible to identify any accident ‘hotspots’ in both the

before and after situation;

Analysis of accident causation factors – In order to draw any firm conclusions from this

analysis; it is more practical to undertake this evaluation at the five year after opening stage

when more data is available. This evaluation is particularly relevant if specific types of

accidents have been identified at the appraisal stage;

Comparison of predicted and observed accident numbers – This is key part of the evaluation

as the changes in the number of accidents feed into the evaluation of economic impacts

generated by the scheme. Where there is a difference, further analysis is undertaken to

examine the reasons why this is occurring. This could be related to differences in expected

traffic flows, or could be a specific design issue related to the scheme; and

Statistical tests to determine if accident change can be attributed to the scheme

It must be ensured that the analysis of the accident causation factors considers the impact

that darkness may have on accidents. This will be equally relevant on lit and unlit sections of

the scheme.

4.7 Additional HA centralised monitoring

4.7.1 The HA has agreed that centralised monitoring of early delivery MM-ALR schemes will be undertaken, including M25 Section 5 as one of the earliest opened MM-ALR link across the HA programme.

4.7.2 A consultant commission is expected to be let during December 2013. The specification is known to be comprehensive and commensurate with the type of detailed monitoring undertaken when the first generation of dynamic hard shoulder running schemes were introduced.

4.7.3 Figure 4.1 below provides an indicative set of milestones for centralised monitoring. The diagram shows how a three year monitoring contract period may progress. It shows an interim report based on the first few months of operations. It shows a 1 year report with interim hazard analysis. Figure 4.1 is subject to change and has been directly extracted from a draft specification.


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Figure 4.1 – Indicative timescales for centralised monitoring

4.8 Monitoring Required at Scheme Level

4.8.1 Any scheme has the opportunity to promote the need for local specific monitoring, particularly during the very early operation. Such work has to be agreed on a case by case basis, recognising that monitoring attracts a cost and the methodology and ownership needs to be robust to make the process worthwhile. The identification of local scheme monitoring requirements would normally come from these main sources:

As a ‘condition’ of a significant departure from standard where some doubt exists as to the

potential safety outcomes.

As a result of the Safety Report and Hazard Log process identifying a key safety challenge

where doubt exists as to the potential safety outcome

4.8.2 It is confirmed that scheme departure from standards approvals for M25 LUS do not include any conditions associated with specific monitoring.

4.8.3 In the early stages of operation it is also recommended that the RCC and Regional Intelligence Unit provide a summary of early experiences. Such observation of network performance is considered to be “business as usual” and no specific additional action is recorded here. Safety Requirement SR-33 (see Appendix D) notes that the RCC should feed back their experiences of dealing with heavy rain events within the first 3 months of opening.

4.8.4 Given the comprehensive nature of the centralised monitoring (see Section 4.7 above), there is no requirement to duplicate such work and therefore no action is recorded here


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5. Safety Management System: Evidence a

Robust System Followed 5.1.1 The Safety Plan outlined how the PSRMP would be applied to the scheme. The Safety Plan also

described the key features of the PSRMP and this is illustrated in Figure 5.1 below.

Figure 5.1 - PSRMP features defined in the Safety Plan


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5.2 Robust Project Safety Management Process in Place

5.2.1 PSRM Work Instruction 001 (contained in IAN 139) was applied to the scheme to determine the appropriate Safety Management System (SMS) to use. The process used to select the SMS is described in detail in the scheme Safety Plan and only a summary of the activities are described here. The main steps involved in the SMS selection process and their constituent parts are as follows:

Review of Project Scope – This included a review of the project against comparison norms.

Categorisation of Project Features – This included a review to characterise the scheme in

terms of Stakeholder Interest; Operational Experience, Technology, Standards and

Legislation, Organisational Impact and Project Scale.

Application of SMS – The selection was then completed by determining the appropriate level

of safety management required.

5.2.2 The application of Work Instruction 001 resulted in application of a Type B SMS. Type B requires a moderate level of safety management to be applied with a commitment to produce a Safety Report and an appropriate level of risk assessment. In addition the HA generic safety report for MM-ALR notes that MM ALR schemes would normally make use of a Type B SMS.

5.3 Robust Approval Process in Place

5.3.1 The safety approvals process used on the scheme is in line with the requirements of PSRM Work Instruction 003 (contained in IAN 139) and as required for a Type B SMS. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The phases of Safety Acceptance and Approval and examples of which deliverables have passed through these phases are described in Table 5.1 below:

Phase Purpose Evidence

Verification. The project executor verified that to the best of their knowledge, the work

produced demonstrates that the Project Safety Requirements are fulfilled.

As authors of the Safety Plan, Hazard Log Report and Safety Report the Safety Team has verified these deliverables.

Consultation The project team undertook consultation with HA Directorates

Consultation with internal stakeholders has been mainly via

Project Safety Control Review Group (PSCRG). Consultation

with Network Services has taken place as design (and Departures)

progressed.

Review and Approval

When consultation is complete, the HA’s Major Projects consider the information

provided to them, including both that submitted by the project executor and the appropriate technical approvals provided

by other Directorates. Once Major Projects has confirmed that all necessary issues have been addressed, approval

for the project is granted.

Consultation has been completed for the Safety Plan, Hazard Log

Report and pre-construction Safety Report and approval was

granted.

Table 5.1 - Safety Approval Process and Progress


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Figure 5.2 - Safety Acceptance and Approvals process

Evidence that the relevant phases of approval have occurred is recorded via signatures on a

standard HA PCF product cover sheet. A further safety approvals cover sheet is included for the

principal safety deliverables, the Safety Plan, Hazard Log Report and this document, the Safety

Report.

5.4 Road Safety Audits

5.4.1 The requirements of HD19 have been followed in the production of Stage 1 and Stage 2 Road Safety Audits.

5.4.2 Stage 3 (pre-opening) road safety audits will take place before any link opens to traffic.


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Roads Programme Steering Group

National Safety Control Review Group (NSCRG)

Project Safety Control Review Group (PSCRG)

"Hub" Operational Safety and

Maintenance Techncial Advisory Group

5.5 Project Safety Control Review Group (PSCRG)

5.5.1 A Project Safety Control Review Group was first convened for the MM-ALR scheme in January 2012. At the first meeting a proposed remit was circulated

10 and subsequently agreed.

5.5.2 The PSCRG is made up of representatives from several HA directorates (NDD, TMD, NetServ, and MP), the designer, the Main Contractor and the maintenance community. The Highways Agency has produced an easy guide to MM Safety Governance

11 that explains the relationship

between the PSCRG, safety approval processes and other governance functions.

5.5.3 Figure 5.3 is an amended extract from the guide showing the relationship between the different groups.

Figure 5.3 – Safety Governance Hierarchy for the MM Programme

5.5.4 Regular PSCRG meetings have taken place and the scheme has been represented on the Technical Advisory Group for Operations, Safety and Maintenance.

5.5.5 Any tasks that could impact the achievement of the Safety Objectives have been brought to the attention of the PSCRG via a Technical Note. This process has yielded a number of PSCRG technical notes. The relevant technical notes are as follows:

TN2 – Drainage

TN 3 – Gantry Arrangement

TN4 - Temporary Traffic Management

10 Technical note 32 Revision 1

11 Managed Motorways Safety Governance – An Easy Guide: December 2012 – Version 2


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TN 5 – Initial hazard review and collision data

TN 6 – Lighting

TN 8 – Scoping paper on maintenance access

TN10 - Lane drop / lane gain / TJR

TN 11 - ERT’s and ERAs that are not paired

TN 13 - Hazard Log – Summary

TN 15 - Lane Provision at Holmesdale Tunnel

TN 20 - ERA Provision for section 5

TN21 – J26 Clockwise Merge/Climbing Lane

TN23 – Secret signs (for roadworks)

TN 24 - Lane Provision at Bell Common Tunnel

TN26 – Use of Wavetronics

TN27 - Section 5 Retained Hard shoulders

TN28 - Safety Report Timeline


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6. Hazard Log Scoring

6.1 Initial Population of the Hazard Log

6.1.1 The initial population of the Hazard Log took place during a series of internal meetings in June and July 2012. Each generic hazard included in the Highways Agency’s generic Hazard Log was discussed in the context of the preliminary scheme proposals.

6.1.2 The risk assessment of each hazard was guided by the information provided in the Highways Agency’s Risk Assessment Support Documents

12. In assessing each hazard the following

fundamental issues were considered:

Is the ‘frequency’ of hazard occurrence on the M25 currently different to that of a typical section of motorway nationally?

Are the default13

values given for hazard ‘frequency’, ‘probability’ and ‘severity’ appropriate for the M25?

How will the features of a Managed Motorway scheme mitigate or worsen the hazard?

How will the proposed features of M25 impact the scores for hazard frequency, probability and severity?

Is there more data needed or is better definition of the scheme features needed to properly assess the hazard?

Is there further mitigation that could be included to reduce the hazard and how should this be progressed?

Is there a key feature, procedure or process that should be mandated as a requirement to control the hazard?

6.1.3 Prior to this, in February 2012, the safety team undertook a desk based review of the initial scheme drawings to make safety observations; background documents relating to the development of the scheme were also reviewed. This initial review resulted in a list of ‘tasks’, effectively safety considerations, for the design team. This task list along with a progress report on these issues is included in Appendix C.

6.1.4 A PCF Hazard Log Report was produced. It is emphasised that although the PCF Hazard Log Report was produced only once, the Hazard Log Assessment is not a one-off event and the Log remains live as the design evolves.

6.1.5 It is also emphasised that the process, whilst numerically based, is not purely numerical in nature – the discipline of reviewing designs against hazard lists is a key process in challenging designs and assumptions, including feedback on programme level advice or guidance documents.

6.1.6 In August 2013 the Highways Agency amended the Generic MM-ALR Safety Report and its embedded risk scoring information. The M25 LUS Hazard Log results were updated to take account of these minor changes. PSCRG endorsed TN28 and a decision was thereby taken to include the results of these changes in the pre-opening Safety Report rather than via a revised Hazard Log Report.

12 These documents were originally produced for the MM-DHSR generic Hazard Log and have not been updated for MM-ALR.

Nonetheless the generic nature of the hazard descriptions means they are still relevant.

13 The term “default” refers to suggested values contained in MM-ALR generic Hazard Log; these can be changed to suit the local

scheme circumstances


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6.2 Mitigation and Design Features

6.2.1 In order to assess the risk in the ‘after’ scenario it is necessary to recognise the mitigation that will be provided in applying the requirements of IAN161. Any departures from the requirements of IAN161 or the Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (DMRB) are identified in the Design Strategy Report (DSR) and Departures Checklist. The DSR is used to capture all significant design decisions and provides an auditable record of these decisions. In addition IAN161 states that the DSR must be used to demonstrate that the existing accident record and operational and maintenance performance has been considered.

6.2.2 The Highways Agency has recognised that in order to reduce risks to road workers, the assumptions and designs described in IAN161/12 are likely to require enhancement by scheme designers. The scheme has included a number of additional features listed in Section 3.2 and those specifically of assistance for road worker safety are listed in section 6.6.11.

6.3 Assumptions

6.3.1 A substantial amount of data is included in the generic Hazard Log, principally from previous studies undertaken as part of the MM programme. Further data requirements were considered during the initial data population exercise where the existing data was insufficient and the hazard was likely to be high scoring or the M25 schemes were likely to differ from a typical motorway. The values suggested in the Hazard Log Risk Assessment documents were typically found to be appropriate and a lean approach was adopted such that additional data was only to be sourced where it was likely to be of material value in understanding risks.

6.3.2 The length of the proposed scheme was calculated and used to calculate scheme specific Hazard Log frequencies, probabilities and severity indices.

6.4 Provision of a Controlled Environment

6.4.1 Operation of a high speed road in a way that supports reliable journeys, by effective management of congestion and planned, and unplanned incidents, in a safe and sustainable manner depends primarily on appropriate driver behaviour. This behaviour can be achieved through the implementation of an intuitive system / network of roadside signs and signals along with enforcement measures that when combined (a toolkit of measures and mitigations) has become known as the ‘controlled environment’.

6.4.2 A controlled environment provides road users with the right (i.e. relevant and accurate) information at the right location at the right time; thereby promoting the desired driver behaviour (through situational awareness). Driver information is provided through the appropriate provision and effective operation of infrastructure and technology.

6.4.3 There are a number of key measures deployed under a managed motorways scheme that affect the hazards on a high speed road. These can be broken into operations, technology and infrastructure. The appropriate application of infrastructure and technology, along with how the road is operated can lead to the achievement of the desired outcomes. The most significant hazards are listed in Table 6.1 along with the measures which affect those hazards. The majority of the significant hazards are mitigated by more than one measure.

6.4.4 The key measures that make up a controlled environment can be summarised as follows:

Operations

Suitable and relevant information, visible to road users and provided at regular intervals – ‘right place, right time, right message’, This ensures drivers have limited opportunity to forget key information before being reminded of the required behaviour.

Education and Encouragement enable an understanding (driver comprehension) of the information and the reasons why and this will change a driver’s behaviour.


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Enforcement - The perception that motorists will be prosecuted for non-compliance with the signs and signals on display also helps to create a controlled environment.

Traffic Officer procedures and RCC monitoring results in a scheme which is operated to improve network performance and thus engender driver ‘confidence’ in the scheme.

A high level of compliance can be achieved with the implementation of a well designed signalling regime which promotes compliant driver behaviour together with driver education, demonstrating the benefits of obeying the verge and overhead signals displaying the varying speed limits. In order to achieve compliant driver behaviour it only requires a small percentage of drivers on a congested section of road to comply with the information displayed and drivers following the compliant driver will be ‘forced’ to comply .

Infrastructure

Advanced Direction Signs which are visible and display clear information ensure that motorists move into the right lane at an appropriate time.

The use of overhead signals to display information provides a different environment for motorists that will change behaviour.

The permanent removal of the hard shoulder (for most of the scheme length) and its use as a running lane.

The provision of Emergency Refuge Areas (ERAs) with Emergency Roadside Telephones (ERTs). The ERAs will help to provide motorists with an area for safe refuge should they need to stop immediately in an emergency, such as a breakdown

Fixed traffic enforcement signs provide a warning to motorists and encourage compliant driver behaviour.

Lining and studs provide clear information so that drivers understand the status of the carriageway.

Technology

Various means of displaying key appropriate information to road users including Variable Message Signs (VMS) which can display appropriate messages, lane closure information, or display an appropriate speed limit. These are supported by a network/system of data gathering of the traffic flow characteristics which form part of the MIDAS system.

Advanced Motorway Indicator (AMI) on gantries which will display appropriate speeds or lane closure information.

The provision of enforcement cameras along with mock/dummy cameras will help to obtain compliance with speed limits on display.

A CCTV system with full coverage will help provide the perception to motorists that they face prosecution should they commit an offence. This also enables reactive and efficient incident management. In unlit areas the CCTV will be enhanced with infra-red emitters to improve the image quality.


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Table 6.1 - Measures to enable a Controlled Environment

Hazard (Approximate % of overall scheme risk)

Operational Infrastructure Technology

Driver fatigued – unable to perceive hazards effectively (24%)

- Information displayed in timely manner - Well designed signalling regime

- Lining and stud provision - Signals on verge mounted MS4s and overhead gantries

Individual vehicle is driven too fast (14%)

- Education – driver understanding of information - Encouragement – changing behaviour on the road - Suitable and relevant information - Information displayed in timely manner - Customer perception - Visibility of information - Perceived enforcement (surveillance / ‘being watched’) - Well designed signalling regime

- Gantries - Cantilevers - Enforcement signs

- Signals on verge mounted MS4s and overhead gantries - Full CCTV - Enforcement cameras - Inductive loops and radar (MIDAS)

Vehicle stops in running lane – (off peak in MM-ALR) (8%)

- Suitable and relevant information - Traffic Officer procedures and RCC ability to monitor

- Additional lane (no hard shoulder) - Gaps in nearside safety barrier - Gantries Enforcement signs

- Signals on verge mounted MS4s and overhead gantries - Full CCTV - Inductive loops and radar (MIDAS)

Pedestrian in running lane – live traffic (6%)

- Suitable and relevant information - Traffic Officer and RCC ability to monitor

- ERAs with ERTs - Signals on verge mounted MS4s and overhead gantries - Full CCTV

Rapid change of general vehicle speed (4%)

- Education - driver understanding of information - Suitable and relevant information - Information displayed in timely manner - Visibility of information - Perceived enforcement (surveillance / ‘being watched’) - Traffic Officer procedures and RCC ability to monitor - Well designed signalling regime

- Gantries - Cantilevers - Additional lane (no hard shoulder) - Enforcement signs

- Signals on verge mounted - MS4s and overhead gantries - Enforcement cameras - Inductive loops and radar (MIDAS)

Tailgating (4%)

- Education - driver understanding of information - Encouragement – changing behaviour on the road - Suitable and relevant information - Customer perception - Perceived enforcement (surveillance / ‘being watched’) - Well designed signalling regime

- Additional lane (no hard shoulder)


Vehicle stops in running lane - Peak (4%)

- Education - driver understanding of information - Encouragement – changing behaviour on the road - Suitable and relevant information - Information displayed in timely manner - Visibility of information - Well designed signalling regime

- Gaps in nearside safety barrier - Gantries - Enforcement signs

- Signals on verge mounted MS4s and overhead gantries - Full CCTV - Inductive loops and radar (MIDAS)

Vehicle drifts off carriageway (2%)

- Encouragement – changing behaviour on the road - Suitable and relevant information - Information displayed in timely manner

- Gantries - Cantilevers - Lining and stud provision - Safety barriers

- Signals on verge mounted MS4s and overhead gantries

Sudden weaving at exit point (2%)

- Suitable and relevant information - Information displayed in timely manner - Visibility of information - Well designed signalling regime

- Advanced Direction Signs - Lining and stud provision

- Full CCTV - Inductive loops and radar (MIDAS)


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Hazard (Approximate % of overall scheme risk)

Operational Infrastructure Technology

Motorcycles filter through traffic (2%)

- Education – driver understanding of information - Encouragement – changing behaviour on the road - Suitable and relevant information - Information displayed in timely manner - Perceived enforcement (surveillance / ‘being watched’)

- Gantries - Additional lane (no hard shoulder)

- Signals on verge mounted MS4s and overhead gantries - Full CCTV - Enforcement cameras

Driver loses control of vehicle (2%)

- Education - driver understanding of information - Encouragement – changing behaviour on the road - Suitable and relevant information - Information displayed in timely manner - Visibility of information - Well designed signalling regime

- Gantries - Additional lane (no hard shoulder) - Enforcement signs - Lining and stud provision - Safety barriers


Vehicle rejoins running lane (2%)

- Visibility of information - Well designed signalling regime

- ERAs with ERTs - Additional lane (no hard shoulder)


Vehicle reversing along exit slip (2%)

- Visibility of information - Perceived enforcement (surveillance / ‘being watched’)

- Enforcement signs - Lining and stud provision


Unsafe lane changing (2%)

- Education – driver understanding of information - Information displayed in timely manner - Customer perception - Perceived enforcement (surveillance / ‘being watched’) - Well designed signalling regime

- Advanced Direction Signs - Additional lane (no hard shoulder) - Lining and stud provision


Vehicle enters main carriageway unsafely (2%)

- Education – driver understanding of information - Suitable and relevant information - Visibility of information - Well designed signalling regime

- Enforcement signs - Lining and stud provision


Driver ignores closed lane(s) signals that are protecting an incident (2%)

- Suitable and relevant information - Customer perception - Visibility of information - Well designed signalling regime

- Gantries - Cantilevers - Enforcement signs


Vehicle recovered from ERA (2%)

- Traffic Officer procedures and RCC ability to monitor

- ERAs with ERTs - Full CCTV - Signals on verge mounted MS4s and overhead gantries


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6.5 Hazard Log Results

6.5.1 Before a Managed Motorway is implemented it has to be demonstrated in advance that the scheme Safety Objective is likely to be met.

6.5.2 The methodology behind the Hazard Log makes it possible to combine mathematically the risk assessments for individual hazards to produce a global risk score for both the Managed Motorway and the baseline (existing motorway) and to compare these scores. However, care must be taken not to assume that the numbers generated represent a higher degree of precision than is actually possible given the finite accuracy and availability of input data. To avoid such misinterpretation, this document merely quotes the numerical calculations as a tool for guiding the construction of a qualitative argument to compare the safety of the project with the baseline existing motorway. The reader is required to judge for themselves whether they find the qualitative argument convincing, . In outline, the reasoning is as follows:

Managed Motorways reduce the risk of a large number of existing motorway hazards.

Managed Motorways introduce a number of new hazards to the operation of the motorway.

However, various mitigating measures are to be adopted to reduce the risk of these hazards.

Real-world experience on the other forms of Managed Motorway scheme has produced real

world accident reductions.

Driver simulation of MM-ALR has been carried out

The generic risk assessment work on MM-ALR has been produced with a high degree of

rigour, challenge and governance and is based on comparisons of similar scenarios, such as

all-purpose dual carriageways (with no hard shoulders)

The risk assessment process is deliberately pessimistic in its assumptions for individual

hazards.

The risk identification process tends to concentrate on new features (ERAs etc) and may

therefore overestimate the quantum of risk that these contribute to the total.

6.5.3 Additionally it is noted that the current Hazard Log has been generated against a baseline of a Managed Motorway design contained within IAN161 and as such there is no existing scheme to validate the results, in the same way a traffic model might be validated. However the Hazard Log represents an excellent tool to understand how design decisions affect risk quantum and prioritisation and has been developed from other Hazard Logs that now have some real-world level of validation. Validation against MM-ALR real schemes can only be fully achieved once schemes are built and operated successfully.

6.5.4 The scoring of hazards has been considered against the background of the HA’s Generic Hazard Log

14. The generic Hazard Log contains around 100 hazards which are relevant to the operating

regime of the M25 Section 5 scheme. This considers the safety impact of a generic MM-ALR scheme on the following specific user groups whilst ensuring that the scheme does not seek to improve safety for one user group at the expense of another:

Pedestrians

Motorcyclists

HGV Drivers

On road resources

Maintenance workers

14 This was distributed via email in Excel format by Hub OMS TAG in May 2012


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6.5.5 In scoring the hazards for the M25 LUS Section 5, the generic score were taken as a starting point and then each hazard was considered against the scheme design with scores amended to reflect the scheme features.

6.5.6 The scoring exercise and the Hazard Log structure enabled the safety team to target further safety appraisal at those issues that pose the greatest safety risk and where further action will likely have the greatest safety impact.

6.5.7 The key hazard groupings are considered to be:

High scoring hazards i.e. those with a ‘before’ or ‘after’ risk score of 8 or more; or

Those associated with maintenance activities

Those associated with the different populations listed in 6.5.4 above.

6.5.8 A list of all the Hazards with descriptions is presented in Appendix B.

6.6 Detailed Analysis

6.6.1 The generic Hazard Log structure is designed to include hazards that exist on all motorways and those that are specific to a Managed Motorway. The new hazards that are specific to a Managed Motorway within the log are only scored for the ‘after’ scenario and as such these represent a substantial proportion of the total ‘after’ risk score as the ‘before’ score for these items is zero.

6.6.2 The generic hazard log reports a risk reduction of around 18% for implementation of an IAN 161 compliant MM-ALR scheme. The M25 LUS Section 5 scheme specific risk assessments indicate that the scheme will meet the road user safety objective. In principal the small difference between the generic and M25 LUS Section 5 assessment is due to the following assumptions in the generic HA log for a “typical MM-ALR” scheme:

No MIDAS.

Each junction has through junction running and so no hard shoulder is retained intra-junction

There are no Controlled Motorway (CM) sections i.e. where the hard shoulder is retained.

6.6.3 The results of the hazard log risk assessment are summarised in Table 6.2 below.

Table 6.2 - Hazard Log Results Summary

All hazards

Before Risk 4,562,503,985

After Risk 3,920,966,518

Expected Change on scheme implementation -14.06%

6.6.4 The overall risk reduction estimated by the Hazard Log should not normally be quoted in external documentation as this may incorrectly infer that this is a numerical “target” to be achieved; the agreed Safety Objectives do not contain such a target. The potential quantum of risk reductions simply provide a level of confidence the scheme Safety Objectives will be met.

6.6.5 The overall predicated scheme risk reduction of c.14% is within the same order of magnitude predicted by the HA’s generic work, which in summary predicts that a typical MM-ALR scheme may be able to generate around 18% accident savings.


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High Scoring Hazards

6.6.6 The HA’s ‘Demonstration of meeting the safety Objective’ report classifies a high scoring hazard as one with a before or after score of 8.0 or more and this classification has been adopted for the M25. Looking at the high scoring hazards in isolation is particularly useful as these 19 hazards account for 86.89% of the global risk on the scheme.

6.6.7 A summary of the impact the scheme has on these high scoring hazards is included in Table 6.3 below and the high scoring hazards are shown in Appendix B.

6.6.8 Table 6.3 shows that the M25 LUS Section 5 scheme shows a significant reduction in the risk score of the High Scoring Hazards. It is however noted that risk score of the following high scoring hazards increases:

H135 - Vehicle Stops in running lane - Off Peak

H155 - Vehicle stops in running lane - Peak

Table 6.3 - High scoring hazards summary

High Scoring Hazards

No. Hazards 19

Before Risk 4,127,642,423

After Risk 3,406,838,367

% of global after risk 86.89%

Expected Change on scheme implementation

-17.46%

6.6.9 The order of magnitude of hazards H155 and H135 is similar to the generic HA Hazard Log. The programme level safety work considered that individual increases in risk for these high scoring hazards was acceptable due to the reductions in other high ranking hazards.

Maintenance Hazards

6.6.10 There are eight maintenance hazards within the generic hazard log that are relevant to the M25 LUS scheme. The analysis undertaken is summarised in Table 6.4 below. Taking these hazards in isolation shows a reduction in risk from the ‘before’ to ‘after’ for both maintenance and on road resources (traffic officers/incident support staff). The combined result of scoring this small number of hazards is very sensitive to small changes and the scores selected have been based on the recommendations of a number of concurrent activities:

The Eliminate Reduce Isolate Combine (ERIC) assessment developed for the scheme

PSCRG TN 4 – Temporary Traffic Management

PSCRG TN 8 – Maintenance Access

The Maintenance and Repair Strategy Statement PCF product.

6.6.11 The relevant provisions for road workers are:

Inclusion of rigid concrete barrier, thereby reducing interventions for barrier repairs

Elimination of on foot carriageway crossings to set-out signing; permanent signs (remotely

operated “secret signs”) included within the central reserve and also verge.


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Use of overhead signals to show red X closures aspect and Variable Mandatory Speed Limits

whilst traffic cones are placed and removed

Remote diagnostics and re-boot of the majority of motorway communications (i.e. AMI and

MS4) equipment

Minimising equipment, particularly in the central reserve (e.g. removal of sections of lighting)

Use of upstream signals to reduce speeds and close lanes ahead of road users reaching an

incident scene where workers may be present

6.6.12 One Maintenance hazard has been shown to increase in risk, H34 - Incident management - rolling block, but none of the maintenance hazards are classed as High Scoring hazards due to the relatively low frequency of maintenance compared to other scheme risks.

6.6.13 The maintenance risk in the hazard log takes account of only the risk to operatives from working on the highway i.e. the risk of being involved in a Road Traffic Collision. Further information on control of non-traffic related risks is contained in the Maintenance and Repair Strategy Statement and the CDM risk register.

Other Populations

6.6.14 Table 6.4 summarise the results of the Hazard Log Assessment in terms of all individual populations.

6.6.15 The results indicate that all populations have a reduced risk score. It is noted that the risks from collisions involving HGVs are captured within “general” risks within the Hazard Log because incidents involving both cars and HGVs have an effect on both user types. The Hazard Log does identify a particular risk for large vehicles : “H141: HGV-LGV-Bus exits ERA”. This is a generic ALR issue that is controlled by:

Verge signs that require users to make contact with the RCC before leaving an ERA

Traffic Officer procedures to set signals to assist exits from ERA

Table 6.4 – All populations summary

Before After

Population No. Hazards

Risk % of global Risk % of global % Change

General +HGV

combined

70 3,837,557,458 84.11% 3,346,076,464 85.34%

-13%

Maintenance 8 90,670,109 1.99% 58,308,029 1.49% -36%

Motorcyclist 6 114,478,506 2.51% 90,751,949 2.31% -21%

Pedestrian 7 361,012,823 7.91% 300,274,563 7.66% -16.8%

Worker 9 158,785,054 3.48% 125,555,478 3.20% -21%

None 35 35 0.00% 35 0.00% 0%

Total

135

4562503985

3920966518 100% -14%

6.7 Close-out of Hazard Log Actions

6.7.1 The Hazard Log is a semi-quantitative assessment tool used to understand the main safety challenges posed by the scheme. The focus of the assessment work was to better understand how the scheme can most effectively reduce risk for the different user groups, resulting in consideration of minor changes to the design or operation of the scheme (whilst remaining within the Concept of Operations philosophy). To ensure that the Hazard Log assessment was output


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based the Safety Team has produced a list of both safety tasks and safety requirements that will need to be proactively managed by all those involved in the scheme.

6.7.2 The principal advantage of applying the Hazard Log process to the scheme has been to prioritise the importance of each hazard and as a result it has been possible to focus the safety effort on the areas that have the greatest potential to affect safety impacts of the scheme.

6.7.3 Sections 6.8 and 6.9 provide information of close-out of issues.

6.8 Safety Tasks

6.8.1 The initial population of the Hazard Log for the scheme resulted in a number of instances where further investigation of the hazard, or associated control measures was required. A full list of these ‘Safety Tasks’ was included in Appendix C of the pre-construction version of this report. This is now updated to report close-out of previously open actions. No actions remain.

6.8.2 Any significant tasks whose outcome could impact the achievement of the Safety Objectives were brought to the attention of the PSCRG via a Technical Note.

6.9 Safety Requirements

6.9.1 The population of the Hazard Log for the Section 5 scheme has also resulted in the identification of a number of safety crucial features which are either part of the design or operation process or need to be included (as a result of the analysis). These are deemed as Safety Requirements. A Safety Requirement is a mandatory instruction, such as the need for a certain feature or process, that must be included as part of the scheme to aid the achievement of the Safety Objectives. The full definition of a Safety Requirement is:

“Those features, operational procedures, working methods or actions which are considered necessary for the safe functioning of the Managed Motorway scheme.”

6.9.2 Appendix D includes a full list of the Safety Requirements. The existing list takes account of the Hazard Log findings, PSCRG Technical Notes and a generic list of Safety Requirements produced by the Highways Agency.

6.9.3 Appendix E reports on the Verification of Safety Requirements.

6.10 Compliance with Requirements and impact on the Safety Report

6.10.1 Because the Safety Report creates an important audit trail, with signatures, on project safety related decisions any scheme changes that potentially affect the Safety Report must be carefully assessed. This statement applies for the life of the road.

6.10.2 Although it is not anticipated that the Safety Requirements will be varied between now and road opening , where a post-opening proposal to amend the design or operation of the scheme is planned it is expected that the proposer would identify the potential impact on the Safety Requirements and scheme Hazard Log. These impacts must be reported in writing and the conclusions accepted by the Highways Agency before the design or operation is varied. The proposer must also report changes that they consider would have no impact on the Safety Requirements so that this can be verified.

6.10.3 Where a proposal to vary a Safety Requirement is put forward the potential outcomes are:

Not accepted: the proposal is refused on grounds of safety or for other reasons


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Accepted minor change: the wording of the Safety Requirements is amended after

confirmation that there is no affect on the safety assessment of the scheme. The Safety

Report is not re-issued for approval, but changes to Safety Requirements are logged. This

may be as a result of an emerging national procedure or revision of an existing guidance

document.

Accepted non-minor change: the Safety Requirements are amended. Safety Report re-

issued for approval containing explanation of changes and affects on the safety assessment.

6.11 Evidence that Safety Requirements and Restrictions met by Design

6.11.1 Each individual Safety Requirement requires verification to minimise the risk that the scheme safety performance will not be compromised by failure to follow a requirement.

6.12 Verification Reviews

6.12.1 A summary of the categorisation that was available to use during the Verification process is provided in Table 6.5 below.

Categorisation Description

Verified These requirements are verified

Allowable Non-

Compliance

These requirements have not been met, or have only been met in part.

This non compliance will not impact the achievement of the safety

objective and has been endorsed by the Safety Team and the PSCRG.

Revisit later in

current stage

This category is used where the requirement needs to be revisited once

further work has taken place.

Await evidence This category is used where the requirement needs to be revisited as

insufficient evidence was presented to the review team.

Retired These requirements are no longer relevant to the scheme.

Non Compliance The scheme design was not initially shown to comply with these

requirements.

Table 6.5 - Verification Categorisation

6.12.2 There are a number of Safety Requirements with the status “Revisit later in current stage”. These are identified in Appendix E. The majority of these are associated with the fact that M25 LUS is the first ALR scheme to “go-live” and associated operational procedures are still being finalised. Additionally this Safety Report has been requested to be produced in advance of when these Safety Requirements would normally be closed-out.

6.12.3 The necessary action is for the SRO to satisfy himself that these outstanding Safety Requirements are all closed out before the ALR phase of the scheme opens.


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7. Project Practice: Methods and Processes

been followed during the Project

7.1 Design Compatibility with Standards and Regulations

7.1.1 The design of the scheme has been carried out in accordance with the guidance contained in IAN 161/12. Where the design is not in compliance with IAN 161/12 or another standard within the Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (DMRB) a departure from standard has been produced and submitted to the HA for approval. Each departure produced has taken proper account of the potential safety benefits and disbenefits, the impact of which has been included within the risk assessment activities.

7.1.2 Each departure produced has taken proper account of the potential safety benefits and disbenefits, the impact of which has been included within the risk assessment activities. The authors of the Hazard Log have been included in the internal check and review process for Departures.

7.1.3 In addition to the departures from standard process a Design Strategy Record has been produced for the scheme. IAN 161/12 contains clauses that depart from other standards within the DMRB and as such removes the need for a departure to be approved. The Design Strategy Record identifies where and how each mandatory clause has been applied on the scheme and carefully records the cumulative effect of their application. This report demonstrates that the combined effect and interaction of these decisions will not negatively affect the achievement of the Safety Objectives.

7.1.4 The “Departures from Standard Checklist” PCF product describes the scheme Departures in detail.

7.1.5 No Departures were classed as high risk requiring National Safety & Control Review Group (NSCRG) review.

7.1.6 For Section 5A, one Departure from Standard is outstanding due to approval being awaited from HA Netserv.

7.2 Use of Good Practice during the Project

7.2.1 The scheme has been developed in line with the requirements of Atkins Business Management System (BMS). At project inception a quality plan was drafted detailing the communication, change control, programme, document storage and Health and Safety arrangements for staff working on the project. This document also established the project controls in terms of the checking, review and authorisation of scheme drawings and reports.

7.2.2 In order to manage communication and facilitate the efficient development of the scheme across the different disciplines a dedicated collaboration site was established.

7.2.3 Atkins staff from across the design disciplines contributed to the HA’s Technical Advisory Groups ensuring that best practice identified elsewhere within the managed motorway programme could be disseminated.

7.2.4 The Safety Team selected had experience gained on the other Managed Motorway schemes and were able to apply this to the scheme.

7.2.5 Full use has been made of the PSCRG forum. Key issues have been discussed and included in a series of Technical Notes.


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7.2.6 PSCRG has also inputted to formal PCF safety products before sign-off processes have been initiated.

8. Conclusions

8.1 General Conclusions

8.1.1 This Safety Report has summarised the safety work that has taken place to date on the M25 LUS Section 5 Managed Motorway scheme. The details of the principal safety challenges, the decisions made, including their justification and the actions taken to date have also been recorded.

8.1.2 The evidence available at this time suggests that the Safety Objectives are achievable for both road users and road workers. At the current project stage there is no performance data to demonstrate the achievement of the Safety Objectives. The evidence that the Safety Objectives are achievable is provided by:

The results of the scheme Hazard Log Risk Assessment activity.

The results of the generic programme level Hazard Log Risk Assessment activity, including

driver simulation.

The work done to complete the safety activities outlined in the scheme Safety Plan.

Verification of Safety Requirements

8.2 Outstanding Key Actions

8.2.1 A Stage 3 (pre-opening) Road Safety Audit Report will be required in accordance with DMRB HD19; the process can be phased to suit incremental go-live dates for different links.

8.2.2 There is one15

outstanding Departure from Standard for Section 5A; confirmation of approval should be ascertained. Non-approval of any departures requires the validity of Safety Report to be re-confirmed.

8.2.3 The Scheme Safety Requirements have been subject to a verification assessment, seeking evidence of compliance. The results of this exercise are listed at Appendix E.

8.2.4 Appendix E shows a number of Safety Requirements that cannot be verified at this time and therefore these should be re-checked later. These are further sub-divided into two categories:

Those that should be fully verified before any decision to “go-live” for ALR operating regime is

taken

Those that could be closed-out shortly after ALR “go-live”

8.2.5 Both types of un-verified Safety Requirements must be added to a single central action tracker to ensure they are kept under regular review before “go live”. The necessary action is for the SRO to satisfy himself that these outstanding Safety Requirements are all closed out before the ALR phase of the scheme opens.

15 Webdas ref 69708


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8.2.6 Longer term actions are as follows:

Highways Agency and Connect Plus to ensure that a safety review takes place for any future

changes to the scheme that could impact safety. Owner: Highways Agency and Connect

Plus, Timescale: Throughout PCF Stage 7.

The assessment of safety performance data when available. Owner: Highways Agency,

Timescale: PCF Stage 7.


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Appendix A – Hazard Scoring Indices


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Table A1 - Frequency table for hazardous events

Frequency Classification

Nominal Value: Occurrences/

year/mile

Occurrences/ year/entire

scheme

Frequency of occurrences (for the entire scheme)

Index Value

Very frequent 1,000 26060 Three times an hour 6.0

316 8235 Once an hour 5.5

Frequent 100 2606 Once every 2 hours 5.0

31.6 823 Twice per day 4.5

Probable 10 261 Once per day 4.0

3.16 82 Twice a week 3.5

Occasional 1 26 Twice a month 3.0

0.316 8 Once every 2 months 2.5

Remote 0.1 2.6 3 times a year 2.0

0.0316 0.82 Once per year 1.5

Improbable 0.01 0.26 Once every 2 years 1.0

0.00316 0.082 Once every 10 years 0.5

Incredible 0.001 0.026 Once every 50 years 0.0

Table A2 - Frequency table for hazardous states

Likelihood Classification

Interpretation (for the entire scheme) Nominal Value per

mile of motorway

Expected no. of

occurrences on scheme

Index Value

Very frequent 26 or more occurrences at any one time 1 26 6.0

8 occurrences at any one time 0.316 8 5.5

Frequent 3 occurrences at any one time 0.1 2.6 5.0

10 months a year 0.0316 0.82 4.5

Probable 3 months a year 0.01 0.26 4.0

30 days a year 0.00316 0.082 3.5

Occasional 10 days per year 0.001 0.026 3.0

3 days per year 0.000316 0.0082 2.5

Remote 1 day a year 0.0001 0.0026 2.0

7 hours per year 0.0000316 0.00082 1.5

Improbable 2 hours per year 0.00001 0.00026 1.0

1 hour year 0.0000031 0.000082 0.5

Incredible 15 or less minutes a year 0.000001 2.6E-05 0.0

Table A3 - Hazardous Events/State Probability/Rate Classifications


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Classification Interpretation Index value

Certain It is certain that this hazard, if it occurs, will cause an accident 4

Probable It is probable that this hazard, if it occurs, will cause an accident

3

Occasional This hazard, if it occurs, will occasionally cause an accident 2

Remote There is a remote chance that this hazard, if it occurs, will cause an accident

1

Improbable It is improbable that this hazard, if it occurs, will cause an accident

0

Table A4 - Hazardous Events/State Severity Classifications

Severity Classification

Interpretation Index Value

Person outside of

vehicle

Stationary Vehicle

Motorcycle Car Large Vehicle

(LHV, HGV, Bus)

Severe The proportion of collisions that are fatal is expected to be higher than average by at least a factor of 10

2.0 Involved Involved Involved Speed differential approx 60 mph

Speed differential approx 50 mph

Higher than average

The proportion of fatal collisions is expected to be higher than average by a factor between 3 and 10

1.5 No involvement

No involvement

No involvement



Average The distribution of collisions (i.e. ratio of damage-only to fatal) is expected to be similar to the motorway average

1.0 No involvement

No involvement

No involvement



Lower than average

The proportion of fatal collisions is expected to be lower than average by a factor between 3 and 10

0.5 No involvement

No involvement

No involvement



Minor The proportion of collisions that are fatal is expected to be lower than average by at least a factor of 10

0.0 No involvement

No involvement

No involvement

Speed differential < 20 mph

Speed differential < 10 mph

Table A5 – Measuring before and after risk changes using finer scale


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Change in risk score (logarithmic) Absolute change in risk

0.5 216% increase in risk


0.3 100% increase in risk (i.e. doubling of risk)



0.0 No change in risk

-0.1 20% decrease in risk


-0.3 50% decrease in risk (i.e. risk is halved)




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Appendix B – Hazard Log Scores


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Hazard ID

Description Further Information Status Population E/S Before Risk

After Risk

1 Abnormal loads -

escortable

If it encroaches into other lanes or changes lanes likely to send a shockwave through

traffic or irregular flow Existing General Event 6.00 5.80

2 Abnormal loads -

notifiable

If it encroaches into other lanes or changes lanes likely to send a shockwave through

traffic or irregular flow Existing General Event 7.00 6.90

3 Aborting or pausing

LBS1 sequence half way Removed None 0.00 0.00

4

Blanking of one gantry when LBS1 open to

traffic indicates sudden local closure of LBS1

Removed None 0.00 0.00

5

Closing sequence overtakes vehicles in

LBS1, requiring them to move out of LBS1

unnecessarily

Removed None 0.00 0.00

7 Conflicting signs and

signals set

Vehicles may collide in the running lane as different drivers respond differently to the

information they have been presented with. Existing General State 5.00 5.10

9 Driver changes mind about entering ERA

New General Event 0.00 5.40

11 Driver ignores closed

lane(s) signals that are protecting an incident

To avoid the incident a driver might make a late manoeuvre causing a collision with other

vehicles in the adjacent lanes Existing General Event 8.00 7.80

12 Driver ignores traffic

management protecting a maintenance site

Not Scored for Hazard Log Comparison (Used to score other Hazards)

To avoid the incident a driver might make a late manoeuvre causing a collision with other

vehicles in the adjacent lanes

Retired for M25

None Event 0.00 0.00

13 Driver loses control of

vehicle Due to the loss of control the vehicle may

collide with other vehicles or infrastructure. Existing General Event 8.00 7.90

14 Driver mistakes ERA for

exit slip New General Event 0.00 5.90

15 Driver observance of red

X changes on rest of network

Removed None Event 0.00 0.00


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16 Driver on LBS1 fails to exit and continues on LBS1 through junction


17 Driver stays on LBS1

when it is closing Removed None Event 0.00 0.00

18 Drivers assume that

LBS1 is open immediately after section


19 Drivers assume they can

use LBS1 on rest of network

This hazard has been removed from the analysis. Drivers already encounter Multi-

lane roads without a Hard Shoulder Removed None Event 0.00 0.00

20 Drivers enter LBS1 too early when LBS1 being

opened Removed None Event 0.00 0.00

21

Emergency services driving at speed down

the hard shoulder (LBS1)

Not Scored for Hazard Log Comparison (Used to score other Hazards)

Retired for M25


22 Emergency staff -TO etc

on foot at scene of an incident

TO might be hit by vehicles. Existing Worker State 6.00 6.00

23 Escorted convoys

Long convoys travelling at lower speeds might slow down traffic and result in irregular

flow. Vehicles might also collide in the running lane if trying to overtake or avoid the

lane taken up by convoy

Existing General State 5.00 4.80

25 Excessive lane merging required when lanes are

closed Vehicles collide when merging Existing General State 6.00 5.90

26 Excessive opening and

closing of LBS1 Removed None Event 0.00 0.00

28 Extreme weather

conditions lead to a pile-up

An incident has already happened, and because of poor visibility, e.g. fog, vehicles fail to stop and plough into the back of the

queue of stationary traffic

Existing General Event 6.00 5.90

29 Generic underlying causes for hazards

Retired for M25


30 Group of vehicles drive too fast (in relation to

set/not set speed limit)

Vehicles might collide in the running lane or the vehicle could collide with infrastructure or veer off road (Inappropriate speeds generally

increase the chance of collision)



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31

HADECS flash unit misaligned affecting drivers on opposite

carriageway

The flashing might distract drivers in the opposite carriageway or cause them to brake suddenly in order to reduce speed and avoid

being caught for speed

New General State 0.00 3.50

32 Health deterioration of

vehicle occupant

With all lane running emergency vehicles might take longer to reach the occupant and health might deteriorate more. Vehicle might

collide with other vehicle if the health condition affects occupant's driving.


34 Incident management -

rolling block

Vehicles might collide with ORR vehicles or brake suddenly when forced to slow down by

the rolling block. Existing Maintenance Event 5.00 5.20

35

Incident occurs in opened section of LBS1

during opening sequence


36

Incidents or congestion caused in other lanes or

carriageway due to rubber necking

Driver distracted by incidents and congestion may lead to vehicles slowing down which in

turn leads to incidents Existing General State 7.00 6.90

37 Individual vehicle is

driven too fast

Vehicles might collide in the running lane or the vehicle could collide with infrastructure or

veer off road (In appropriate speeds generally increase the chance of collision)


38 Infrastructure collapse Infrastructure falling may hit vehicle, or

vehicles might collide if trying to avoid the falling object.


39 Infrastructure collapse

due to additional load on LBS1


40

Lane closure signals are set in wrong lane

following an incident due to operator error

Vehicles may collide with unprotected incident or collision may result with drivers

swerving to avoid the incident Existing General State 5.00 5.00

41 Lane diverts into lane with incident due to

technical failure

Vehicles may collide if forced to stop/brake suddenly in a live lane in response to the

lane diversion. TO attending incident might be hit by a vehicle that has been diverted into

the wrong lane



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42 Lane(s) closed, but

driver unable to leave lane and stops

Vehicle travelling behind stopped vehicle might be unable to stop in time and the two

vehicles might collide. A vehicle trying to avoid the stopped vehicle might collide with

others in the adjacent lanes.


44 LBS1 closed too early Removed None State 0.00 0.00

45 LBS1 closed too late Removed None State 0.00 0.00

46 LBS1 opened before

required Removed None State 0.00 0.00

47 LBS1 opened too late (after traffic flow has

broken down) Removed None State 0.00 0.00

48 Legal-illegal

pedestrian(s) in path of vehicles in ERA

New Pedestrian Event 0.00 6.40

49

LGVs, HGVs or other wide vehicles avoid using LBS1 due to

narrowing effect of red studs


50 Limping vehicles in LBS1 (when open)

Removed None State 0.00 0.00

51 Maintenance workers in

carriageway Maintenance workers might be hit by vehicles

in other lanes. Existing Maintenance Event 6.00 6.00

52 Maintenance workers setting up and taking

down work site

Maintenance workers might be hit by vehicles in other lanes.

Existing Maintenance State 7.00 6.90

53 MIDAS queue protection does not operate for a

significant queue

Vehicles might collide in running lane if appropriate speeds are not advised.


54 Motorcycles filter

through traffic

Motorcyclist might collide with vehicles if he/she loses control whilst weaving through

traffic. Vehicles might collide if they swerve or change path in order to avoid the motorcyclist

Existing Motorcyclist Event 8.00 7.91

56 Motorcycle stopped on LBS1 as LBS1 opens


58 Motorcyclist cross wind

buffering Existing Motorcyclist State 6.50 6.50

59 Motorcyclist falls off

crossing line on entry to ERA

New Motorcyclist Event 0.00 6.40


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61

Object in LBS1 causes impediment to traffic - causes drivers to take avoiding action when

opening


62 On-road resources work

unprotected ORR might be hit by a vehicle Existing Worker State 7.50 7.40

63 Opening sequence is faster than the traffic


64

Operator closes LBS1 following an incident on

main carriageway, diverting traffic toward

incident


65 Operator fails to remove signals after an incident

If signal setting includes lane closures, additional unnecessary lane changing will

occur Existing General Event 4.00 3.90

66 Operator fails to set

signals to protect incident in timely manner

If signal setting includes lane closures, additional unnecessary lane changing will

occur Existing General State 5.50 5.40

67 Pedestrian in running

lane - live traffic

For some reason, possibly trying to reach an ERT on the opposite side of the carriageway

someone is on the live carriageway. Pedestrian might be hit by traffic. Vehicles

might collide whilst trying to avoid the pedestrian. For MM2 includes pedestrians walking along the carriageway to seek help

(as opposed to walking along verge see H73).

Existing Pedestrian Event 8.50 8.40

68 Pedestrian on slip road Pedestrian might be hit by traffic. Vehicles

might collide whilst trying to avoid the pedestrian.

Existing Pedestrian State 7.00 7.00

69 Pedestrians in a running

lane - stationary-slow moving traffic

After a major incident occurs and the motorway comes to a complete standstill,

people leave their vehicles and walk about. Pedestrian might be hit by traffic. Vehicles

might collide whilst trying to avoid the pedestrian. For MM2 includes pedestrians walking along the carriageway to seek help

(as opposed to walking along verge).

Existing Pedestrian State 7.50 7.40


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70

Pedestrians on hard shoulder adjacent to a parked vehicle (D3M = Hard Shoulder) (MM2 =

verge).

Only used to inform other hazards Retired for M25

None State 0.00 0.00

71 Pedestrians on LBS1 while opening LBS1


74 Person on off-side of

vehicle in ERA New Pedestrian State 0.00 6.40

75

Power failure of several/all gantries

during LBS1 running effectively indicates

sudden closure of LBS1


76 Rapid change of general

vehicle speed

Approaching vehicles are unlikely to be able to manoeuvre safely around the group of

vehicles that has decelerated (the lanes will be occupied) and therefore must rely on

being able to brake safely to avoid a collision. Approaching vehicles may also collide while changing or merging lanes in an attempt to

avoid the slower-moving vehicles ahead


77 Reduced visibility due to

weather conditions The reduction in stopping and decision sight

distances may lead to a collision Existing General State 7.00 6.80

78

Road Traffic Collision in live lane pushes one or

more vehicles into a maintenance site

Vehicle collides with maintenance site / vehicle - only required to inform other

hazards

Retired for M25


79 Roadworks - long term

static Vehicle collides with maintenance site /

vehicle or pedestrian worker Existing Maintenance State 7.50 7.50

80 Roadworks - short term

static Vehicle collides with maintenance site /

vehicle or pedestrian worker Existing Maintenance State 6.50 6.50

82 Short duration stops /

debris removal by TO / maintenance workers

Vehicle collides with maintenance site / vehicle or pedestrian worker. Includes visits

to equipment cabinets - if they exist. Existing Maintenance State 7.00 6.50

83 Signals change while

TO/ emergency services are still on motorway

Vehicle collides with maintenance site / vehicle or pedestrian worker

Existing Worker Event 6.00 5.90

84 Signals set in wrong

place (i.e. are not protecting the incident)

Vehicles are likely to collide if forced to stop suddenly in a live lane in response to the

signal set. Existing General State 4.00 3.90


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85 Significant incursion of

passing vehicle into ERA New General Event 0.00 5.90

86 Slow traffic in LBS2

passed by faster traffic on LBS1


87

Speed differential between emergency services and general

traffic


88 Stationary traffic backed up onto motorway at exit

Irregular traffic flow. Vehicles approaching the exit might misjudge the traffic conditions

and approach at an inappropriate speed, resulting in a collision between vehicles


89 Sudden weaving at exit

point Vehicles might brake suddenly resulting in a

collision with vehicles behind Existing General Event 8.00 7.93

90

System failure - signs or signals incorrectly

indicate that lanes with static roadworks are

open

Vehicles might change lanes or swerve suddenly to avoid roadworks resulting in a collision with other vehicles in the live lane

Retired for M25

None State 0.00 0.00

91 Tail gating

Any braking or sudden lane change by vehicle in front is likely to result in a collision. Space between the vehicles does not allow sufficient reaction time for driver/s behind


92 Terrorism of system A significant number of casualties might

result depending on the nature of the attack e.g. a bomb


93 The driver loses control

and enters the maintenance site

Vehicle might collide with maintenance site/workers

Retired for M25


94 TO arrives, but has

difficulty containing the scene

TO might be hit by vehicles in adjacent lane. Existing Worker Event 7.00 6.90

95 TO/ISUO in running lane TO might be hit by vehicles Existing Worker Event 8.00 7.90

96 TOs behave

hazardously at an incident

TO might be hit by vehicles Existing Worker Event 6.50 6.50

97 TOs/ emergency

services go to wrong location (incident)

Delay in attending incident might leave the original incident exposed to live traffic



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98 TOs/emergency services despatched but cannot

reach scene



99 TOs/emergency services

not despatched in a timely manner



100 Unable to remove settings of signs or

signals after incidents

Irregular traffic flow. Vehicles might collide while changing lanes


101 Unable to set signs and

signals to protect incidents

Secondary incident might occur of initial incident is left exposed to live traffic


102 Undertaking Vehicles collide when merging or changing

lanes Existing General Event 7.00 6.80

103 Unsafe lane changing Vehicles collide when merging or changing

lanes Existing General Event 8.00 7.80

104 Unsafe lane changing in

the slip road (both off and on slips)

Vehicles collide when merging or changing lanes


105 Vandalism of equipment Cost implications are likely to arias from the

vandalism of equipment Existing General Event 3.00 3.00

106

Vandalism or sabotage directed at injuring

members of the public or Managed Motorway staff

Casualties/death are likely to result from being hit by an object or equipment.


107 Vehicle accelerates into LBS1 immediately after

last red X Removed None Event 0.00 0.00

108 Vehicle decelerates

suddenly in response to signals

Vehicles are likely to collide in running lane if drivers behind do not react in time


110 Vehicle drifts out of lane Vehicle might collide with infrastructure or

with vehicles in adjacent running lane. Existing General Event 7.50 7.43

111 Vehicle drives down LBS1 when closed

Vehicle might collide with other vehicles stopped on the hard shoulder

Retired for M25


112 Vehicle enters main

carriageway unsafely Vehicles collide in the running lane Existing General Event 8.00 7.80

113 Vehicle exits ERA when LBS1 is open to traffic



Page 51

115

Vehicle in lane adjacent to hard shoulder (LBS1) straddles hard shoulder

(LBS1)

Vehicle might collide with other vehicles stopped on the hard shoulder

Retired for M25


116 Vehicle misjudges entry

to ERA New General Event 0.00 7.00

118 Vehicle on the main

carriageway decelerates suddenly

Vehicles might collide in the running lane Existing General Event 7.00 6.80

120 Vehicle rejoins running

lane

The vehicle may emerge directly into the path of a passing vehicle, resulting in a collision

between the emerging vehicle and an oncoming vehicle in the nearside lane.


121 Vehicle reversing along

exit slip Vehicles might collide on or around slip roads Existing General Event 8.00 7.90

122 Vehicle reversing back

to exit slip Vehicles might collide on or around slip roads Existing General Event 7.00 7.00

123 Vehicle reversing up

entry slip Vehicles might collide on or around slip roads Existing General Event 7.00 6.90

125 Vehicle stopped on

LBS1 as LBS1 opens Removed None Event 0.00 0.00

126 Vehicle stopped on slip

road (off or on slip) Vehicles might collide on or around slip roads Existing General Event 7.00 7.20

128 Vehicle stops in LBS1

when LBS1 open

Collisions may occur on LBS1, if a vehicle runs into the back of the queue, or in LBS2, if

a vehicle pulls out to avoid the queue. Removed None Event 0.00 0.00

130 Vehicle stops/attempts to stop on the central

reserve

If the vehicle encroaches onto the running a collision might result with vehicles in adjacent running lane. Vehicles swerving to avoid the

stopped vehicle might collide


131 Vehicle suddenly

decelerates at end of on slip road

Vehicles might collide on or around slip roads Existing General Event 7.10 7.00

132 Vehicle suddenly

decelerates while on off-slip

Vehicles might collide on or around slip roads Existing General Event 4.50 4.50

133 Vehicle travelling in

wrong direction Vehicle collides with vehicles travelling in the

opposite direction Existing General State 5.50 5.40

134 Vehicles with trailer /

caravans travelling too fast

Vehicles might collide in the running lane or when swerving/changing lanes to avoid the

articulated vehicles. Existing General Event 6.50 6.40


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135 Vehicle Stops in

Running Lane - Off Peak (Event)

A vehicles stopping might send a shockwave through traffic resulting in irregular flow. Other vehicles might also collide with the

stopped vehicles or if they swerve to avoid the stopped vehicle


136 Collision with workers doing maintenance on

verge

Defines such activities as grass-cutting, collection of litter from the verge, working on

Cabinets etc. Existing Maintenance State 6.50 6.10

137 Debris in running lane (being hit or causing unsafe manoeuvre)

Vehicles might hit debris or collide with other vehicles when trying to avoid debris in

running lane Existing General State 7.50 7.43

138 Driver Fatigued - unable

to perceive hazards effectively

Driver/rider was so tired that they could not drive effectively or were unable to perceive

hazards. Vehicle may be involved in collisions with

other vehicles/infrastructure or may lead to other vehicles taking evasive action


139 Excessive lane changing caused by availability of

an additional lane New General Event 0.00 2.90

140 Excessively slow moving vehicle in running lane

A collision might result if drivers swerve to avoid the vehicle or if this slow moving

vehicle tries to change lane to avoid vehicles moving at higher speeds.


141 HGV-LGV-Bus exits

ERA Note: H120 covers other types of rejoining

carriageway New HGV Event 0.00 7.40

142

Large vehicle does not completely clear the running lane when stopping on Hard

Shoulder (D3M) or Verge (MM-ALR)

Assume that in some cases the driver will attempt to move the vehicle off the main carriageway and onto verge (MM2 only)

Existing HGV State 4.50 4.30

143

Motorcycle stopped next to running lanes (D3M = Hard Shoulder, MM-ALR

= verge)

Motorcyclist at risk from other vehicles travelling on the hard shoulder. For dynamic

use of LBS1, only applies when LBS1 is closed

Existing Motorcyclist State 7.00 6.50

144

Motorcycle uses hard shoulder to pass slow moving or stationary

traffic

Motorcyclists might collide with vehicles already on the hard shoulder

Existing Motorcyclist State 6.00 5.50


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145 Motorcyclists crosses

rumble strips

Motorcyclist might fall off bike. Secondary incident likely to occur if he falls onto the live

lane Motorcyclist Event 5.50 5.50

146 Pedestrians walking

along the hard shoulder (Applies to D3M only)

If there is any rubber necking a vehicle might veer off lane and hit the pedestrian on the

verge/LBS1 Existing Pedestrian State 6.50 6.00

147 Pedestrians walking in lane 1 (applies to MM-

ALR only) New Pedestrian State 0.00 6.90

148 Roadworks - short term static on hard shoulder

Vehicle collides with maintenance site / vehicle or pedestrian worker

Existing Maintenance State 7.50 7.00

149

Vehicle drifts off carriageway (i.e. leaving

the carriageway as a result of Road Environment)

Vehicle might collide with infrastructure. HGV etc might go through barriers


150 Vehicle in ERA (or

verge_ obtrudes into Lane 1 (MM-ALR only)


151

Vehicle not fully in control when trying to stop on Hard Shoulder (D3M) or Verge (MM-

ALR)

Vehicle collides with infrastructure, pedestrians or runs off road.


152 Vehicle recovered from

ERA New General Event 0.00 7.90

153 Vehicle reversing up

Hard shoulder (D3M) or Lane 1 (MM-ALR)

Vehicle collides with vehicles travelling in the opposite direction


154 Vehicle stopped on Hard Shoulder (D3M) or verge

(MM-ALR) Existing General State 8.00 7.50

155 Vehicle stops in running

lane - Peak

A vehicles stopping might send a shockwave through traffic resulting in irregular flow. Other vehicles might also collide with the

stopped vehicles or if they swerve to avoid the stopped vehicle



Page 54

Appendix C – Previously Outstanding Safety Tasks


Page 55

Task Ref

Task Title Task Description Update as of October

2013 Task Status Owner

T6 Maintenance

Depots

Merge/Diverge Layouts - There is limited carriageway space to provide compliant layouts for the maintenance depots. Safe Haven - The area around the merge and diverge may appear to be a safe haven for motorists who are breaking down - consider measures to reduce this risk.

Gregory’s Lane access to be hatched to extent described in PSCRG TN27

Now closed

Atkins

T9 Height of

verge signs

Ensure height of underside of sign plate allows for maintainers to walk under. Extent and final routing of pathways is a long term task, so possibly assume all signs are higher until Value Engineering can take place. Also remember that public may try and use whole verge length during emergency so case for all signs (within say 3.0m of road) to be high regardless of pathway presence. Carefully consider if any flapped verge signs then become too high to reach to open/close.

Standard mounting heights to be used as no interaction with pathways. No flapped signs in existing or proposed situation

Now closed Atkins

T10 Removal of white lines

Previous lane markings often remain visible following changes to the layout and this can confuse drivers, especially in bad light and poor weather conditions. A long debate took place on MM-DHSR schemes – ghosting may best be avoided by hydro removal methods but this introduces higher risk of stone loss and joint opening. Consider trial of one or more methods.

The method of removal was tasked to SBB and the work has concluded successfully where lining has been removed already.

Now closed SBB

T12 Hard

shoulder breakdowns

Consider hatching hard shoulder at residual lengths Hatching only provided where stopping may be unsafe due to length/width. Extent described in PSCG TN27

Now closed Atkins

T15

Fixed Central

Reserve TM signing

It is anticipated that the majority of maintenance will be undertaken using Lane 1 closures. The need for operatives to cross the carriageway to install 'wicket ' signs would be reduced by the installation of fixed Central Reserve remote controlled signs.

The scheme approach is explained in PSCRG TN 4 and in PSCRG TN 23. The scheme Maintenance and Repair Strategy

Now closed Atkins/CPS


Page 56

Task Ref

Task Title Task Description Update as of October

2013 Task Status Owner

Statement summarises this issue – paired signs will be provided in verge and centre.

T16 MS4 Signs -

Criticality

Failure of an individual MS4 could result in a section of around 2km with no facility for incident or speed management. Options for carrying a stock of spare MS4s should be considered.

The HA has issued a draft contract change that defines response times for restoring signals. Service Providers will be able to decide how they can best achieve the contract requirements.

Now closed Atkins/CPS

T20 Diversion

routes

It is accepted that substantive change to diversion strategy is outside scope of scheme, but it is necessary to understand how existing strategy can be operated

It is confirmed that no flap signs are in use in the existing scenario

Now closed Atkins

T22 Slip road

ERT visibility Ensure slip road ERTs are not visible to a stranded motorist at a Intra junction location.

TJR junctions checked and no physical screening

is required . Lane drop junctions unaffected as

existing situation

Now closed Atkins


Page 57


Page 58


Page 59

Appendix D – Safety Requirements


Page 60

Ref Responsible Source Safety Requirement

SR-01 HA/Designer Generic Safety

Report

Signal sequencing rules must facilitate the required signalling outcomes in response to manual or automatic primary signal settings, and be appropriate for the signal / message sign spacing and operating speed.

SR-02 Designer Generic Safety

Report

Instruction on which lane(s) to use- For the prevailing traffic conditions, motorists shall be given clear instruction on which lane(s) to use. These instructions must facilitate vehicle movements (from lane to lane) in a controlled and safe manner.


Report Variable mandatory speed control must be provided


Report

An automatic queue protection system (e.g. MIDAS) to alert both operators and road users of changes in traffic conditions must be provided.

SR-05 Designer/Oper

ator Generic Safety

Report An enforcement strategy must be implemented to ensure creation and maintenance of a 'controlled' environment.

SR-06 Highways Agency

Generic Safety Report

A monitoring strategy must be in place to enable the creation and maintenance of the required network and safety performance data

SR-07 Highways Agency


Stakeholder engagement must be designed to facilitate and support effective education and encouragement of road users


Report

All equipment must be designed to eliminate or minimise the need for maintenance and reduce the exposure for road workers SFAIRP (So Far As Reasonably Practicable).


Report

Roadside equipment requiring maintenance should, where practicable, be clustered and an appropriate access strategy put in place minimising the need for temporary traffic management in live lanes.

SR-10 Maintainer Generic Safety

Report Maintenance contractors must be trained and competent in the appropriate maintenance procedures.


Report Winter treatment must include all designated refuge areas.

SR-12 HA/Designer Generic Safety

Report

Faults that impact on the safe and efficient operation of the system shall be defined and response / repair times incorporated into relevant contracts in accordance with their impact.


Report Sightlines must be effectively maintained to signs and signals

SR-14 Operator Generic Safety

Report Procedures and guidance must be appropriate and effective for safe operation


Page 61



Report

Traffic Officers must be trained and competent to work in accordance with the latest National Procedures and the Operational Procedures and Guidance provided within the MM Manual Operators must be trained in the MM-ALR scheme procedures. They must also be competent in carrying out the Procedures and guidance.D23


Report Operators must have instantaneous access to the current Procedures and Guidance at all relevant workstations.


Report The interfaces with Emergency Services must be effective and must allow them to carry out their functions


Report Procedures shall use a consistent lane referencing system across a scheme.

SR-19 Operator/Maint

ainer Generic Safety

Report A system must be established to operationally manage the access and actions of maintenance personnel.


Report Software/hardware must be in accordance with Highways Agency standards


Report Software development procedures and testing must be in accordance with Highways Agency standard


Report All site and system data must be maintained under strict version control.


Report

After maintenance activity has been carried out on the technology system and / or equipment, tests shall be carried out to re-commission them to the ‘as-built’ / as-commissioned.


Report

Full CCTV camera coverage must be provided of the carriageway (including refuge areas). The coverage must be such that an operator can interpret correctly the nature of each incident within the designed viewing range at all times of day and night, and in all ambient lighting levels whether the carriageway is lit or not, as they will be used to confirm the location of incidents on the main carriageway. To achieve this, at the extreme of the required coverage and maximum zoom, a 1.75m target should represent a minimum of 5% of screen


Report

Fixed signage must be provided directing motorists to ERTs (not including signage for pedestrians on marker posts which will not be provided on MM-ALR schemes).

SR-26 Not Used


Page 62



Report Safety barrier must only be installed where necessary, i.e. gaps should not be necessarily closed.

SR-28 Maintainer Scheme Hazard

Log Roadworkers shall not cross the mainline carriageway on foot

SR-29 Designer Scheme Hazard

Log A means of displaying roadworks wicket signs shall be included in the permanent works for each MM-ALR link

SR-30 Maintainer Scheme Hazard

Log ERAs will not be used by service providers whilst Lane 1 is trafficked

SR-31 Maintainer/ Operator

Scheme Hazard Log

VMSL will be displayed upstream of cone-laying and cone-removal plant

SR- 32 Relevant to M25 LUS Section 2 only; not used for Section 5

SR-33 Operator PSCRG TN2 RCC should be tasked with feeding back their experiences of dealing with heavy rain events within the first 3 months of opening

SR-34 Designer PSCRG TN2 The Edge of Carriageway Rib line should have drainage gaps as per SHW

SR-35 Designer PSCRG TN2 Chamber covers in flexible pavement should be orientated to reduce trafficking and re-located as close to the centre of the new Lane 1 as far as is reasonably practicable

SR-36 Maintainer MRSS

(Prior to opening) CPS to develop amended risk assessment for VRS to determine priority of response and any necessary control measures to manage risks after any impact damage reported on MM-ALR sections of scheme.

SR-37 Relevant to M25 LUS Section 2 only; not used for Section 5

SR-38 Designer PSCRG TN6 White-webbs footbridge staircase to be amended to reduce risk to pedestrian users

SR-39 Designer PSCRG TN6

It is recommended that a profiled lane line marking meeting the reflectivity requirements of SHW clause 1212.5 (commonly known as “rainline”) is used to assist with lane delineation on the concrete pavement. This line type may also assist in daytime on the predominantly east-west route. (J24-25)


Log Speed camera sign to be provided on all types of signal gantry i.e. Portal and cantilever.


Log Rigid concrete barrier to be provided in the central reserve where possible.

The following Safety Requirements have been added since the pre-construction Safety Report was produced

SR-42 Designer PSCRG TN 15

and 24

Holmesdale and Bell Common Tunnels to retain a usable hard shoulder; the hard shoulder is also to extend upstream and downstream of a tunnel to permit a stricken HGV to park at an Emergency Telephone outside of tunnel

SR-43 Maintainer MRSS and

PSCRG TN23

Maintainer to develop protocol for deployment of remotely operated temporary traffic management signs, including visual confirmation of correct deployment.


Page 63


SR-44 HA MRSS

Technology response times to be amended contractually to be suitable for MM-ALR so that technology outages are limited in number and duration by adherence to the contract requirements.

SR-45 Maintainer MRSS

To dissuade public comfort stops, the ALR verge shall not be hardened where traffic could mount the verge after leaving the hard strip. A 1.0m verge strip nearest to paved edge of ALR nearside shall be maintained such that the grass length shall be limited to an average not exceeding 350mm, so as to permit emergency public access to the verge.


Page 64

Appendix E – Safety Requirements Verification


Page 65

Ref Responsible Source Safety Requirement Verification Commentary Verification Status

SR-01

HA/Designer Generic Safety Report

Signal sequencing rules must facilitate the required signalling outcomes in response to manual or automatic primary signal settings, and be appropriate for the signal / message sign spacing and operating speed.

HA has confirmed that Version 3.2 of the Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running (MM-ALR) Driver Information Requirements Specification, will be issued in Autumn 2013. “Site data” work can only be finalised once rules fully published.

Revisit later in current stage A clear plan is in place. This requirement is a key issue before ALR can operate.

SR-02

Designer Generic Safety Report

Instruction on which lane(s) to use- For the prevailing traffic conditions, motorists shall be given clear instruction on which lane(s) to use. These instructions must facilitate vehicle movements (from lane to lane) in a controlled and safe manner.

Scheme follows IAN 161 requirements

Verified

SR-03


Variable mandatory speed control must be provided


Verified

SR-04


An automatic queue protection system (e.g. MIDAS) to alert both operators and road users of changes in traffic conditions must be provided.


Verified

SR-05

Designer/ Operator


An enforcement strategy must be implemented to ensure creation and maintenance of a 'controlled' environment.

Scheme follows IAN 161 requirements, but HADECS enforcement system version 3 is still awaiting Home Office Type Approval and this approval is needed before camera enforcement can occur.

Revisit later in current stage This requirement is a key issue before ALR can operate.


Page 66


SR-06

Highways Agency


A monitoring strategy must be in place to enable the creation and maintenance of the required network and safety performance data

The scheme will be the subject of a consultancy commission managed by HA Netserv. This work will involve detailed investigations of M25 and other early ALR schemes within the HA’s national programme. The HA POPE (post opening project evaluation) process will also be made use of.

Revisit later in current stage A clear plan is in place. This requirement is not considered essential for a decision to operate ALR, but must be verified shortly after go-live.

SR-07

Highway Agency


Stakeholder engagement must be designed to facilitate and support effective education and encouragement of road users

The HA has a detailed and timed programme of activity. This is based on delivery of MM-ALR generic programme level key messages to influence behaviours. On a local basis for LUS, HA will seek local media opportunities giving LUS scheme context; programme tied to opening dates.


SR-08


All equipment must be designed to eliminate or minimise the need for maintenance and reduce the exposure for road workers SFAIRP (So Far As Reasonably Practicable).

A maintenance and repair strategy has been prepared to verify this requirement.

Verified

SR-09


Roadside equipment requiring maintenance should, where practicable, be clustered and an appropriate access strategy put in place minimising the need for temporary traffic management in live lanes.

A maintenance and repair strategy has been prepared to verify this requirement.

Verified

SR-10

Maintainer Generic Safety Report

Maintenance contractors must be trained and competent in the appropriate maintenance procedures.

Contractors will be required to update their Risk Assessments and Method Statements and carry out any training necessary. The MRSS has been circulated to contractors and a meeting held to discuss.



Page 67


SR-11


Winter treatment must include all designated refuge areas.

Refuge areas and retained hard shoulders will be included in winter treatment with the same priority as hard shoulders on D3M. Updated Winter Service Plan is imminent.


SR-12

HA/Designer Generic Safety Report

Faults that impact on the safe and efficient operation of the system shall be defined and response / repair times incorporated into relevant contracts in accordance with their impact.

MM Programme Board paper entitled “MMALR and Technology Maintenance Requirements” [HA Author: Antony Atkins Dated: 25 July 2013] provides the details to be put in place via amended contracts


SR-13


Sightlines must be effectively maintained to signs and signals

New and relocated signs will be uploaded to signs inventory and passed to O&M team for sightline maintenance. Sightlines will be maintained as necessary.


SR-14

Operator Generic Safety Report

Procedures and guidance must be appropriate and effective for safe operation

Scheme is consistent with national ALR Concept of Operations Version 2 (August 2013). Final drafting of national TOS/RCC procedures is nearing completion and will be informed by a detailed risk assessment that is currently being assessed by a core team of TMD Staff. Following successful completion of the risk assessment, HA TMD will either be in a position to publish the final procedures.



Page 68


SR-15


Traffic Officers must be trained and competent to work in accordance with the latest National Procedures and the Operational Procedures and Guidance provided within the MM Manual Operators must be trained in the MM-ALR scheme procedures. They must also be competent in carrying out the Procedures and guidance.D23

The Resource and Capability Group are currently designing training for both On and Off Road staff; however this training will not be rolled out until the Risk Assessments have been completed (see SR14) and the procedures released.


SR-16


Operators must have instantaneous access to the current Procedures and Guidance at all relevant workstations.

Upon publication of Procedures and Guidance, they will be made available on the HA Way We Work portal as per other HA TMD Procedural Instructions


SR-17


The interfaces with Emergency Services must be effective and must allow them to carry out their functions

HA TMD Traffic Officer Procedures will detail formal operating interfaces during incident management. The local police forces are updating their own processes and procedures and this effort is being informed by national level Task and Finish Groups. Once the local emergency services have finished their work, a local meeting will take place to agree a MoU or joint protocols with HA TOS and service providers. It is anticipated that local joint tabletop exercises will be used to test all parties’ procedures.



Page 69


SR-18


Procedures shall use a consistent lane referencing system across a scheme.

This will form part of the National TOS Procedures once complete.


SR-19

Operator/Maintainer


A system must be established to operationally manage the access and actions of maintenance personnel.

Permit to Enter process will be included in CPS roadspace procedures for ALR sections


SR-20


Software/hardware must be in accordance with Highways Agency standards

All software/hardware provided for the scheme is compliant with relevant Highways Agency specifications.

Verified

SR-21


Software development procedures and testing must be in accordance with Highways Agency standard

No software development took place Verified

SR-22


All site and system data must be maintained under strict version control.

Site data and system data will be maintained as defined in the relevant Highways Agency specifications.



Page 70


SR-23


After maintenance activity has been carried out on the technology system and / or equipment, tests shall be carried out to re-commission them to the ‘as-built’ / as-commissioned.

The TechMAC has advised that the technology system will be maintained in accordance with the relevant Highways Agency Specification unless otherwise stated in Maintenance and Repair Strategy Statement documentation/Health and Safety Handover File, including MCH 1349, which will be incorporated into TechMAC maintenance procedures. MCH 1349 specifies the requirements for installation standards, spares, documentation, routine maintenance schedules, specialist test equipment, handover into maintenance and warranty.


SR-24


Full CCTV camera coverage must be provided of the carriageway (including refuge areas). The coverage must be such that an operator can interpret correctly the nature of each incident within the designed viewing range at all times of day and night, and in all ambient lighting levels whether the carriageway is lit or not, as they will be used to confirm the location of incidents on the main carriageway. To achieve this, at the extreme of the required coverage and maximum zoom, a 1.75m target should represent a minimum of 5% of screen

CCTV Coverage Reports produced. Verified CCTV Coverage Report for Section 5: 5108945-ATK-0715-S5-DOC-X-0143 details 99.5% coverage


Page 71


SR-25


Fixed signage must be provided directing motorists to ERTs (not including signage for pedestrians on marker posts which will not be provided on MM-ALR schemes).


Verified Advanced signing of ERA/ERT(SoS) provided Marker posts are only used within extents of hard shoulders to direct ex-vehicle pedestrians to ERTs. Specified in marker post schedule below: Section 5: 5108945-ATK-0712-S5-CH-X-0218 And 5108945_ATK_0712_S5_SCH_X_0534

SR-26

Designer Not used

SR-27


Safety barrier must only be installed where necessary, i.e. gaps should not be necessarily closed.

RRRAP used and barrier only provided where risk of non-provision is unacceptably high

Verified Where a gap between different sets of safety barrier is less than 20m it is infilled to remove the need for terminal sections. The 20m gap is stated in the IAN 161/12 paragraph 5.12. Report ref: Section 5 5108945-ATK-0704-S5-DIS-X-0022


Page 72


SR-28

Maintainer Scheme Hazard

Log

Roadworkers shall not cross the mainline carriageway on foot

Secret signs at fixed taper positions are provided as set out in the MRSS for ALR sections. These signs will negate the need to cross the main carriageway on foot to place temporary signs

Verified

SR-29

Designer Scheme Hazard

Log

A means of displaying roadworks wicket signs shall be included in the permanent works for each MM-ALR link

Secret signs at fixed taper positions are provided as set out in the MRSS for ALR sections. These signs will negate the need to cross the main carriageway on foot to place temporary signs

Verified

SR-30

Maintainer Scheme Hazard

Log

ERAs will not be used by service providers whilst Lane 1 is trafficked

Requirement stated in MRSS. CPS procedure is in draft and will prohibit use of ERAs and also prohibit retained hard shoulders for maintenance purposes. Any exceptions will be subject to dynamic risk assessment.


SR-31

Maintainer/ Operator

Scheme Hazard

Log

VMSL will be displayed upstream of cone-laying and cone-removal plant

HA document “Generic Safe Method for placing TTM on MM-ALR” confirms existing policy allows RCC to make use of VMSL. CPS O&M manual (currently being drafted) will include TM “launch” procedure and linkage to RCC procedure


SR-32

Relevant to M25 LUS Section 2 only; not used for Section 5


Page 73


SR-33

Operator PSCRG

TN2

RCC should be tasked with feeding back their experiences of dealing with heavy rain events within the first 3 months of opening

HA TMD has noted that as this will be the first MM-ALR (Smart) motorway to be opened a time table of review meetings will be set for each month with the RCC & On Road managers to feedback best practice and issues that may have encountered. Heavy rain events can be included in the agenda as a standing item


SR-34

Designer PSCRG

TN2 The Edge of Carriageway Rib line should have drainage gaps as per SHW

Specified in Appendix 12/3.

Verified Specified in Appendix 12/3. Section 5: 5108945-ATK-0712-S5-SPEX-0215

SR-35

Designer PSCRG

TN2

Chamber covers in flexible pavement should be orientated to reduce trafficking and re-located as close to the centre of the new Lane 1 as far as is reasonably practicable

Covers have been upgraded to E600 and have a minimum skid resistance, PSRV value of 60 to make them suitable for traffic loading. Where possible, the chamber cover slab has been rotated to move the cover out of the wheel track zone.

Verified

SR-36

Maintainer MRSS

(Prior to opening) CPS to develop amended risk assessment for VRS to determine priority of response and any necessary control measures to manage risks after any impact damage reported on MM-ALR sections of scheme.

CPS will ensure this is carried out for VRS in their maintenance.


SR-37

Relevant to M25 LUS Section 2 only; not used for Section 5


Page 74


SR-38


Log

White-webbs footbridge staircase to be amended to reduce risk to pedestrian users

New structural steel stair flights on concrete pad foundations were designed to move access provision away from the live carriageway.

Verified

Refer to drawings 5108945-ATK-0717-S518-DRG-X-011 to -016

SR-39

Designer PSCRG

TN6

It is recommended that a profiled lane line marking meeting the reflectivity requirements of SHW clause 1212.5 (commonly known as “rainline”) is used to assist with lane delineation on the concrete pavement. This line type may also assist in daytime on the predominantly east-west route. (J24-25)

Lane lines and raised rib edge lines on concrete pavements in areas without street lighting are to comply with Cl.1212.5. Specified in Appendix 12/3

Verified Specified in Appendix 12/3.

SR-40


Log

Speed camera sign to be provided on all types of signal gantry i.e. Portal and cantilever.

Prescribed enforcement signs are provided

Verified Signs are provided as per drawings; Section 5: 5108945-ATK-0712-S5-DRG-X-001 to 026

SR-41


Log

Rigid concrete barrier to be provided in the central reserve where possible.

Limited exceptions as noted. Verified Provided throughout scheme extents except at S527 River Lee UB using a Steel Step Barrier (with Departure for Standard) and emergency crossing locations using a steel gate.

SR-42

Designer PSCRG TN 15 and 24

Holmesdale and Bell Common Tunnels to retain a usable hard shoulder; the hard shoulder is also to extend upstream and downstream of a tunnel to permit a stricken HGV to park at an Emergency Telephone outside of tunnel

Provision agreed with TDSCG as per TN15 and TN24 such that both ends of both tunnels have hard shoulder and emergency phone

Verified


Page 75


SR-43

Maintainer

MRSS and

PSCRG TN23

Maintainer to develop protocol for deployment of remotely operated temporary traffic management signs, including visual confirmation of correct deployment.

CPS O&M manual (currently being drafted) will include TM “launch” procedure and linkage to RCC procedure


SR-44

HA MRSS

Technology response times to be amended contractually to be suitable for MM-ALR so that technology outages are limited in number and duration by adherence to the contract requirements.

A contract change has been drafted and proposed by HA and this will be incorporated before road opens.


SR-45

Maintainer MRSS

To dissuade public comfort stops, the verge shall not be hardened where traffic could mount the verge after leaving the hard strip. A 1.0m verge strip nearest to paved edge of nearside shall be maintained such that the grass length shall be limited to an average not exceeding 350mm, so as to permit emergency public access to the verge.

The design does not contain any hardened pull-off areas, other than ERAs. CPS has confirmed that the existing regime of spraying and cutting to limit grass growth accords with this requirement.

Verified