Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol

Russia’s resurgence: Prospects for space policyand international cooperation

Bertrand de Montluc1

SciencesPo Paris, Associate Expert, Centre d’etudes des relations internationales, France

Available online 12 January 2010

Abstract

Based on a joint study initiated in 2007e2008 by the Policy planning staff (CAP) of the French Foreign Ministry and the space agencyCNES, which brought together experts, researchers and industry insiders, this article considers the factors behind Russia’s recent resurgence andthe possible revival of its space programme. It examines how far the latter will require international cooperation in order to progress further anddiscusses likely areas of profitable collaboration with Europe in general and France in particular, given that country’s long history of spacecooperation with Russia and the need in the mid-term future to share the burden of developing ambitious new space programs. While there is inprinciple much potential, especially in the area of space transportation, there are also numerous challenges and uncertainties. How these areresolved will affect the level and success of any cooperative efforts of both sides.� 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Fortified by past technological investments and byimprovements in its economy,2 Russia has begun reconstitut-ing its capabilities in the aerospace and defence fields,although it is not yet clear which sectors or programmes willbe favoured.3 As the role given to space programmes in thepower politics being conducted by Prime Minister Putin andPresident Medvedev becomes clearer, how will the space

E-mail address: bertranddemontluc@yahoo.fr1 In this article Dr de Montluc expresses only personal views. The paper

has been re-written in 2009 by Frances Brown, Editor, to whom the author

delivers his very warm thanks. The original research for this paper was

carried out in France with inputs from several experts from ministry of

Foreign Affairs (X. Rey), University (J. Sapir), French space agency CNES

(P. Frisch, C. Ivanov), think tanks (I. Facon, FRS, I. Sourbes-Verger, CNRS,

L. Nardon et T. Jean, IFRI) and industry (J. Chenet, B. Planas, M.

Doubovick).2 The last year recession should be followed by a period of economic growth

of 5% for national production (PIB/GIP) according to OECD data (publication

n�86).3 The Russian state industry is presently under review by political leaders

(website RiaNovosti, http://fr.rian.ru/economic_news/).

0265-9646/$ - see front matter � 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.12.002

lobby compare with other client groups and what are its actualmodes of action not only in budgetary terms but wheremobilisable human resources are concerned? Do proposals fornew projects (‘useful’ applications, space exploration,launchers, etc) and a real ability to mobilise political supportfor them exist?

We already know for sure that the restructuring of theaerospace sector has been accompanied by a new divisionbetween civil and military, and aeronautics and space. Indus-trial reorganisations have taken place, particularly in the spacesector: Roskosmos is now only concerned with civil space.One of its goals has been developing international cooperatione among others, with France (Soyuz launched from Kourou)e in areas like space transportation and scientific research, inpartnership with institutions related to the influential RussianAcademy of Sciences. Space budgets have been rising forseveral years (see below). At the same time Russian industrialfirms have been concluding joint ventures with Europeancompanies. For their part, various European firms (Alcatel,Snecma-Safran, Astrium) have been developing a turnover,albeit modest, with Russia.

There are thus several positive indicators that an in-depthexploration of the possibilities for European and particularly

16 B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

French civil space cooperation with Russia is worth under-taking, as confirmed by a variety of parliamentary groups(WEU assembly,4 European Parliamentary Group for Space,Groupe Parlementaire pour l’Espace (GPE) of the FrenchParliament, etc).

Nevertheless, there remain uncertainties about the globaldevelopment of Russian policy, with several specific questionmarks over:

� the budgets available for civil space, while laboratoriesfunded by the Academy of Sciences still seem starved ofbasic resources or of a new supply of young researchers tomitigate the effects of the brain drain of the 1990s;� political support for the space agency to implement an

ambitious policy, at a time when its long-term plans arenot clear;5

� the apparent vagueness of the reorganisation of the aero-space and defence industries,6 and the lack of clarity overthe reorganisation of Rosoboronexport;� Russian reluctance to engage in true, lasting and balanced

industrial partnerships, the often only short-term profit-orientated aims of cooperation,7 and the difficulty ofmoving from a logic of supply through technology transferto one of acquisition;� the strengthening of the regulations governing the spread

of sensitive technical information.

Franco-Russian space cooperation, which has been ongoingfor over 40 years, has been an original axis of France’s spacepolicy. Assuming a deepening of this trend in the new Russiancontext, how much room for manoeuvre does a country likeFrance, together with other European member states, have,given current developments? This paper will attempt toanalyse the current conditions of interdependence within theRussian militaryeindustrial complex and the elements whichare shaping it, with a view to sketching out some low-riskoptions. The first part analyses the economic and politicalcontext in Russia and the specific situation of the aerospaceand defence industries. The second part discusses the presentstate of cooperation between Europe and Russia. Finally, somefuture paths for possible new directions in French and Euro-pean space cooperation with Russia will tentatively beoutlined.

4 Document C/2008, May 6, 2008, A. Rigni.5 I. Facon, I. Sourbes-Verger, ‘Le spatiale russe, implications nationales et

internationales d’une apparente remontee en puissance’ [Space in Russia,

national and international consequences of a possible resurgence], Recherches

et Documents, FRS, June 2007, at http://www.frstrategie.org.6 Les Echos, 19 September 2006; L. Nardon, ‘Les reorganisations de l’in-

dustrie spatiale russe’, Paris, IFRI, December 2006 (in French); and

A Yakovlev, ‘The evolution of businessestate interaction in Russia: from state

capture to business capture’, Europe-Asia Studies, 58 (7), 2006.7 A. Ionin, ‘Does Russia need the European cosmodrome?, Moscow Defence

Brief, 2, 2005.

2. Specifics of the Russian context

2.1. Geopolitical context

The loss of their country’s status as an imperial power hasbeen the major trauma for Russians since the dissolution of theUSSR and they clearly find it difficult to give such status up.8

For the first time since the 15th century the territory in whichthe historical Russian consciousness developed, and triumphssuch as the conquest of space took place, has indeed dramat-ically shrunk. Today Russians have a new need to be respectedby the world, to speak as an equal with the ‘European bloc’and to give free rein to their sovereignty and indeed to theirimperium. Over the past few years Russia has entered a phaseof power affirmation. This new assurance rests on a substantialimprovement in its economic situation (see below) and on theideological corpus promoted by President, now PrimeMinister, Putin and his entourage: internally, restoration of thestate and of the unity of the Russian federation; externally,restoration of the country’s power and independence of action.

But the successful tackling of this task has vastly exceededits initial objectives, reducing democratic freedoms and callinginto question the nature and longevity of the regime itself. TheWestern model of liberal democracy no longer serves as anexample for Russia’s internal development; at the same timethe West has discovered the absence of any real tools forinfluencing Russia’s choices. The rhetoric of sovereignty and‘the Russian way’ that is developing is obsessed with stability,justifies the concentration of power and the calling intoquestion of democratic attainments, and is promoting patri-otism, if not outright nationalism.9

The hardening of Russia’s foreign policy is noticeable.Russia has become a more demanding and difficult partner onmajor international issues (Iran, Kosovo, 2008 war in Georgia,crises at the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria). Where relations between the EUand Russia are concerned, progress has been very modest(questions over the integrity of Russia as a critical energysupplier, bilateral disagreements with the new member states).The Kremlin thinks of its near environment in terms that harkback to spheres of influence, within a logic of zero-sum gameswith the EU, which hobbles any possibility of cooperationwithin the ‘common neighbourhood’. Its principal fear is ofthe expansion of NATO into the territory of the former SovietUnion (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan) and of the contagiouseffect of the ‘pink’ and ‘orange revolutions’.

8 CERI/SciencesPo-CNRS-MGIMO (State Institute of International Rela-

tions of Moscow) colloquium, ‘Fifteen years after the creation of the CIS:

developments in post-Soviet space activities and energy questions’, Paris,

7 June 2007(www.ceri-sciences-po.org).9 See research works by Th. Gomart (IFRI), X. Rey (CAP Policy planning

staff of the French ministry of Foreign and European affairs) and M. Mendras,

professor at Paris SciencesPo and the London School of Economics (recent

paper for France’s Higher College for Defense Studies (IHEDN), Paris April,

18, 2009 (http://russiactuprime.com).

17B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

Relations with the USA have been strained since 2004 asthe Bush administration became less careful to deal tactfullywith Russia, hardening its tone over domestic politicaldevelopments and announcing the build-up of missile defencefacilities in Eastern Europe10 and its support for those states ofthe CIS whose relationship with Moscow is tricky. For its partthe Kremlin has profited from the USA’s diplomatic weakness(Iraq) to assert itself, as demonstrated by Putin’s denunciationof US ‘unilateralism’ in a famous speech in Munich inFebruary 2007;11 by obstinate and pretty aggressive reaction toUS plans e now shelved e to site missile defence hardware inPoland and the Czech Republic; and by its continued apparentopposition to any weaponisation of space.12

The fact that, on the one hand, in his 17 September 2009White House speech President Obama announced that the USAwould scrap the Bush plans for a European missile shield and, onthe other hand, that Washington was planning a major shake-upof the Pentagon’s weapons priorities e with Defense SecretaryRobert Gates writing in Foreign Affairs that the USA ‘cannotexpect to eliminate national security risks through higherdefense budgets’- should provide smoother relationships.13

Moreover the USA has declared that Washington and Moscoware to start talking about strategic disarmament in the future.14

On the other side, Russia has stated that a new Russian militarydoctrine is going to be adopted before 2010.15 It might be that insome respects the Obama administration feels the need to turna page rather than simply tinker at the edge.16

In home affairs, the succession from President Putin toPresident Medvedev demonstrated a broad continuation ofearlier policy and a shuffling of the cards at the heart of thesame elite. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the obstaclescreated by the system (lack of any credible link between thestate and its citizens, corruption), the modernisation of thecountry, the spread of a middle class anxious about judicialprotections, and generational change within the establishment,all argue for structural political changes.

Other doubts over the direction the country is taking are ofa structural nature: there are dangers from an unbalanceddevelopment weighted too heavily in favour of hydrocarbons;

10 V. Dvorkin, ‘The Threats Posed by the U.S. Missile Shield’, Russia in

Global Affairs, Vol. 5 n�2, AprileJune 2007 (pp. 23e32). Major General (Ret)

Dvorkin commanded the Russian Space Forces; he described the American

plans as obvious threat (Jane’s JDW, 31 January 2007, p. 7).11 This speech for the 43rd Wehrkunde Munich conference (9e11/2/2007)

was published in French in Revue de Defense nationale, June 2007.12 Col. Gen. V. Popovkin, responsible for ‘Russian space forces’, ‘We don’t

want to wage a war in space, we don’t want to gain dominance in space, but

we won’t allow any other nation to dominate space’, IHT, 28 September 2007.13 Star Wars Retreat ?, M. O’Halon, September 23, 2009, Foreign Affairs

notes on website (www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65420/michel-ohanlon/star-

wars-retreats). The Robert Gates’s article ‘A Balanced Strategy’ is from

Jaunary/February 2009.14 IHT, 18/9/2009, 21/9/2009, and 18/12/2009 for the new perspectives of

disarmamant (nuclear arms limitation talks).15 Statement by General N. Makarov (JCS), ‘RussiaNovosty’ (website quoted

infra), November, 11, 2009.16 ‘The Russia File’, R. Levgold, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009

(pp. 78e94).

there is underinvestment in ageing infrastructure, and anunprecedented demographic crisis (half a million inhabitantsfewer each year). The political direction for the mid-termfuture is in such conditions rather opened.

2.2. Economic context

Russia’s economic growth at around 7% since 2003 e haltedby the worldwide financial and economic collapse of 2008 withthe Moscow financial market falling in the fourth trimester of2008 by 73% e has not wiped out the earlier worse depression(1990e98). One should not forget that Russia only reached its1990 GDP level in the first quarter of 2007! The cumulativeimpoverishment during the 1990s explains the breadth of thefrustration felt and the sometimes clumsy vigour of the country’sefforts to return to the global stage. Between mid-2008 and mid-2009 Russian GDP again fell by more than 10%. However afterthe negative economic growth in 2009 (�8.7), things are expectedto get better in 2010 and 2011 (þ4%e5% increase) with lowinflation, no deficit of public finances, foreign exchange reservesstabilized at about US$430 billion and the budget deficit itselflimited at 6% or less of industrial production.17

2.3. Industrial policy

The restoration of a Russian high-tech industry capable ofmeasuring up to those of the major industrial powers thanks toa more significant role taken by state-controlled companies in theenergy sector and restructuring in sectors like aeronautics,nanotechnologies, nuclear power and naval construction, hasceased to be a purely economic goal and is becoming a strategicobjective.18 It may be seen as a response to a US challenge toregional domination signalled by the Iraq war, the OrangeRevolution in Ukraine or events in Georgia, Central Asia,Afghanistan and Pakistan. Achieving this restoration was initiallyaided by a strong international financial situation created by therise in the price of hydrocarbons (growth, in monthly balance,reaching $10 billion in 2005, followed by a collapse at themoment of the 2008 financial crisis, the price of a barrel of oil atthe end of 2009 growing significantly again) and by the fall inimports, which allowed the restoration of a positive commercialbalance. Today Russia exports about $400 billion worth of goodsand imports $263 billion worth (with between $340 to $380billion expected in 2010 and 2011, according to the OECD).19

The lack of a true modern financial system capable of oper-ating as an intermediary between the reserves produced in thetraditional domestic small business sector and the sectors needing

17 OECD, World Bank, Coe-Rexecode, 2009 data (ECO/CPE(2009)20/EO86/4).

See also October 2009 analysis by the services of BNP-Paribas bank, ‘Bresil,

Russia: why so different evolutions in regard to the international crisis’ A. Dorbec,

V. Perracino, 15/10/2009 (pp.23e33), accessible through the website http://

bourses.bnpparibas.net.18 I. Facon, I Sourbes-Verger, ‘Le spatial russe, presence internationale et

souverainete nationale’ (in French), Courrier des Pays de l’Est, n�1061, 2007.19 Above quoted references and data of ‘Diagnostic(s)’ published by Coe-

Rexecode (www.coe-rexecode.fr) and ‘RIAnovosti’ news agency cited

website.

18 B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

capital nevertheless continues to create difficulties for the Russianeconomy. This situation has made necessary the use of the majorpublic enterprises in the role of industrial investor. The aim ea priority from the point of view of the national interest e ofrebuilding an industry centred on advanced technologies and fit torepresent Russian competitiveness at the international scale in theimportant strategic sectors (aerospace, nuclear power, telecom-munications, weapons production) implies the mobilisation ofconsiderable amounts of capital. This suggests that the revenuesfrom the exploitation of raw materials (a monthly total exceeding$15 billion for the commercial balance) should be controlled inorder to be reinvested in industry.

The winter of 2005 saw the emergence of a clear industrialstrategy connecting up Russian industry into three majorsectors:

� a priority sector for economic development, controlled bythe state (energy and raw materials);� a strategic industry sector aimed at diversifying produc-

tion, whose strategic direction is laid down by the state(engineering, automotive industry, aerospace);� a ‘third market’ sector where the state does not intend to

interfere.20

This structure has a double aspect: the vertical ascent of thestate in the economy and the concentration of activity, as isapparent in the arms, aeronautical and, to a lesser degree,space sectors.21

2.4. Characteristics and evolution of the defence industry

The defence industry is in a rather poor condition, being nolonger capable of producing a whole range of conventionalweapons systems, and is even ready to buy armament equip-ment, drones or ships from abroad. The failure of the Bulavaballistic missile is an example among others of the difficultiesmet by the armament sector.22 Through an increasedbudgetary effort and the determination to place the restruc-turing process in a strong framework with the same basicprinciple e the formation of industrial poles concentratingproduction capacity, design and scientists, with a more or lesssignificant role for the state in the capital of the companies ethe Russian state now wants to make the most of what theindustries did of their own accord to survive during the lean

20 The entry of foreign shareholders in this sector can be envisaged if these

identify themselves with the strategic directions. See J. Sapir, in french, ‘Les

conditions d’une perennisation de la croissance en Russie’, Ecole des Hautes

Etudes en Sciences Sociales EHESS-CEMI, July 2008 (http://cemi.ehess.fr/)

and Quelle economie pour le XXIeme siecle ?, O. Jacob, 2005.21 For the space industry and the movement of consolidation through

‘holdings’, see L. Nardon, ‘Les reorganisations de l’industrie spatiale russe’,

December 2006, at the IFRI website. On the new organisation of the Khru-

nichev launcher company, see Air & Cosmos, 20 083, 22 June 2007. The

workloads of the satellite company Lavochkin and of Ukrainian firms are

presented in Air & Cosmos, 2085, 6 July 2007.22 ‘‘Russia Reborn’’, D. Trenin, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2009

(pp. 64e79).

years and utilise this experience so that the country can ensureits own defence and remain in world markets. These two goalsobviously require a raising of the technological level ofnational production. Presently it seems that in the overallstrategic and space defence militaryeindustrial field thebudget would be about V40 billion, with which 30 ballisticmissiles and 11 ‘ground space facilities’ have to be built.

A similar effort has been undertaken to help firms find newmarkets at a time when, for Russia, the traditional market (inthe Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia) is slowing down.Thus the majority of countries with which Russia is devel-oping space cooperation are, also, important (China, India,Iran) or potential (Venezuela, Malaysia, South Korea)customers of the arms industry. Another point in commonbetween the two sectors is their opening to more internationalcollaboration opportunities, space e though of less macro-economic weight e being a precursor from this point of view(engines, launchers). Nowadays the Russians do not shy awayfrom integrating foreign components or sub-systems into theirspacecraft.

The government is encouraging or accompanying partner-ships targeting the acquisition of skills. In the defence industryeven more than in the space industry, action consists in seekingthe margins of technological advance. Hence the interest inbuying production licences, the search for complementarypartners and the interest, albeit still limited, in sharing thetechnical and financial risks through industrial partnerships.

Yet for each sector, the action goes hand in hand withstrong criticism of unequal partnerships (or partnerships thatare experienced as unequal) as a result of exploitation ofRussian resources to the benefit of international partnerswithout any skills transfer, a concern that recalls the‘pillaging’ of the militaryeindustrial complex in the 1990s.Incidentally, Russia no longer seems necessarily to be relyingon partnerships with Western firms. It is seeking openings withrising technological powers.

The underlying reason for the return of the state in thesesectors can be found in the PutineMedvedev strategy ofpromoting the national interest. The legitimation of publicinvolvement in particular in the arms or aerospace field isexplained by a policy of national re-engagement in strategiceconomic sectors in order to give them an impetus that wouldallow diversification of the economy, i.e. ensuring Russia’sindependence as an industrial and technological power e notjust as an energy-rich power.

Another point that the defence industry and space sectorshave in common may be found in the government’s project torationalise the use of state credits. The policy would consist intaking greater control over the uses of such credits; thegovernment believes these are not so much insufficient aspoorly utilised by businesses and research departments. Inparticular, the excessive number of R&D projects causescredits to be uselessly spread too thinly and even the misap-propriation of funds (which are easily misappropriated sincethere is nothing concrete to be produced). An example of thisin the space field is Glonass, the project of navigation satel-lites: the tardiness of progress with the Russian satellite

19B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

constellation, whose refurbishment was announced overa decade ago, illustrates the inefficiency, indeed the corruptionof whole sections of the space sector, which has been accusedof using R&D funding for other ends or of citing insufficientbudgets to justify the absence of results. By extension the‘prototype policy’ is labelled dilatory (emphasising R&Dfunding when the means to guarantee mass production do notexist). Today the Kremlin is insisting on ‘true’ R&D, startingfrom the fact that the potential for innovation and the tech-nology base did not progress very far during the 1990s.

In all cases the response is the same: stricter centralisationvia the militaryeindustrial complex and Rosoboronexport forthe arms industry e without trying to find out whether sucha step might not also lead to the creation of sources ofcorruption and opaqueness in other hands.

The return of the state is more marked in the defence than inthe space industry, thanks to the former’s greater role in nationalsecurity. Any direct or major role for space in national securityis, outside of the rhetoric, badly understood, except by certainhigh rank general officers of the Army, or considered marginal atthis stage by the politicians, even though a real consolidationeffort based around launcher and satellite prime contractors,having complete mastery of their entire chain of production(avionics, propulsion, integration), certainly seems to have beensuccessfully undertaken. Feeling itself responsible for the wholeof the space industry, the government may have decided that,when the time comes, a high-level return to the world stage willbe easier and quicker to arrange. But, this calculation couldprove risky, if it later appeared that this sector had developeda real tendency to resist change e and ultimately showed itself tobe deprived of resurgence capability!

2.5. The specific case of the space industry

23 Euroconsult ‘Government space markets’, World Prospects to 2017 (2008).24 B. Harvey, The rebirth of Russian space program, Springer, 2007.25 French Embassy in Moscow, interview with Space attache, C. Ivanov

(December 2009).

When discussing the Russian space industry, three notablefacts are worth underlining.

1. Since 2001 there has been greater political interest in thespace sector, essentially in words. But this has, also, beenexpressed in some actions: selective budget support,steering documents, intention to restore Glonass to itsstatus as national programme, security council meeting onmilitary space, reorganisation of the Roskosmos agency,new policy for the ‘cosmodromes’ launch sites .Everything is happening as if the government wanted toretake ownership of the achievements of the Soviet era,while wishing to exploit the knowledge gained differentlyand at a political level, increasing the credibility of the roleof the state. Space would thus become one of the meansfor integrating ‘postmodern’ (post-industrial) society. Inthis regard, the presence of one of Putin’s advisors at theMoscow celebrations of 40 years of Franco-Russiancooperation in October 2006 can be interpreted as a markof the new political interest in this sector. On the otherhand, Roskosmos has seen its role restricted to that ofexecutive agency, at a lower level than in the past incomparison with the era of Koptev and the oligarchs.

2. At the budgetary level the space budget, as far as one canknow, remains weak: $1.3 billion per year,23 or $2.4billion according to other sources (Glonass budget for2007 being $260 million).24 Over the 2006e2015 periodthe Roskosmos budget is expected to be around V7 billion(305 billion roubles).25 At that funding, budgets fordefence and security ‘space forces’, for the alreadymentioned Glonass, and for development of ground spacelaunch infrastructures should be added. Of course it isobvious that the civil budget is topped up by comparablemilitary budgets for strategic programmes.

In the short term we should not expect much moresubstantial support, until the sector has been reviewed forgreater economic efficiency. So, without a larger budget,can the Russian space sector flourish without beingdependent on the West? Can it allow the development ofambitious cooperative ventures? Can the logic whichforms the basis of this policy, coherent with that whichaccompanies the industrial restructurings around holdingcompanies, lead to licensing arrangements in the industry?If measures are not taken to attract young people, ifnecessary in the form of short-term-type contracts, theproblem of skills maintenance will inevitably arise.Cooperation between European and Russian firms asequals, in such conditions, would not be automatic.

3. Taking the example of the prospects for cooperation overfuture launchers, it must be admitted that concrete progressin the ‘Soyuz at Kourou’ deal, and in other future launchers,has been somehow rather haphazard and slow. To speakquite bluntly, Russians have a tendency to think about theshort term, the modernisation of their own systems, coop-eration starting from current assets, rather than about thelong term and work on truly new concepts. To cross thisbarrier, it will be necessary to pass to a higher, political level(of the order of the tradeoff made at the time in favour of the‘Soyuz at Kourou’ cooperation). Or again, we would need toimagine a different thematic domain for cooperation. Thequestion of realistic prospects for Euro-Russian cooperationon the Clipper vehicle, by the time the major internationalspace exploration programmes are due to set off (2012),needs to be posed: what might be the Russian motives for itand what the European objectives? What type of mission(servicing the ISS, exploration missions?) for such a vehiclewould be the sort to create a political and industrialconsensus in its favour?

On the whole, we can confirm that the return of the state inthe arms industry is more marked than it is in the spaceindustry. The strategic and economic stakes, notably but notsolely where exports are concerned, are of more immediateimportance for the defence industries. As for space, we cannotyet clearly make out the government’s objectives, nor the

26 The Russians are interested in the idea of a reusable booster that would

diminish pollution over the plains of Kazakhstan.

20 B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

industrial strategy in action. Certainly Russia will wish todemonstrate both at home and on the international stage that inthis field it is both the heir to a ‘long history’ (50th anniversaryof the launch of Sputnik in 2007) and has every intention ofmaintaining its rank, making the most of its technologicalknowledge and being well on the way to modernisation(launchers, Glonass system). Beyond this, the goals of thebudgetary mobilisation and of the industrial restructuringcurrently underway remain somewhat blurred. One possibleinterpretation of the relatively static situation could be that the‘space lobby’ is resisting change and continues to benefit froma form of guaranteed income.

It is probably best not to approach the space question in tooglobal a manner. In reality, the situation and the stakes in theindustry are different according to whether we are talkingabout satellites, launchers or human spaceflight technologies.For example, in the field of telecommunications satellites,Russia has been modernising its fleet for the past 10 years, nothesitating to cooperate with France (Alcatel payloads).Russian equipment is being modernised and the well organ-ised industry actively responds to international calls fortenders.

For launchers the situation is evolving from the strategy ofthe past decade, which aimed to get more value from theProton and Zenith launchers via joint-ventures with theAmericans. This policy had the merit of bringing a market tothe Soviet-era launch industry. Per contra, the transferpayments fixed and made by the US manufacturers wereexcessively low. Today Russia is demonstrating an intention totake back more autonomy over its means of access to spaceand is refusing to yield up its assets and services at too lowa price. It has been able to modernise its production.

Finally, where future space vehicle programmes are con-cerned (Clipper programme), the situation remains confused(planetary exploration or ISS service?). At any rate Russiadoes not envisage offering cooperative partnership opportu-nities to all comers, at any price. For its part, Europe has beenslow to demonstrate a clear political will and adequate budgetplanning.

3. The current state of French and European spacecooperation with Russia

Although Russia is currently reaffirming its power,reforming its industrial structures and winning back expertiseand technology from abroad, this process has only just begunin the space sector, one of the crowning successes of theformer Soviet state.

The Russian Federation’s above mentioned ‘Space Plan for2006 to 2015’ envisages about V7 billion, to which should beadded classified defence funds and non-budgetary (in-kind)sources. This ‘dual’ budget, which could be seen for the bestyears as of the same order of size as that allocated each yearto NASA for civil programmes only (with salary costs somethree to five times lower!), clearly demonstrates a policy ofrelaunch of the space sector in Russia and an intention tomake up the deficit that occurred following the collapse of

the Soviet system by modernising the Soyuz and Protonlaunchers and reconfiguring Glonass with regular satellitelaunches.

Change has swept through the sector, with the creation ofthe federal space agency Roskosmos in 2004 (separation ofspace and aeronautical activities) and the consolidation of thesector’s institutes and businesses (establishment of primecontractors able to undertake the entire industrial process).

3.1. The federal space programme and the axes ofcooperation

The 2006e2011 Russian space programme covers allsectors of the space field: construction of a manned spacecraftfor visiting the ISS and exploration (Clipper), development ofnew launchers (Soyuz 2, Proton M and Angara), launch ofa probe to the Martian moon Phobos (Phobos-Grunt), anda doubling of the number of scientific, telecommunications,navigation and Earth observation satellites.

The Russian space agency has entered into cooperativerelationships with the major space agencies in diverse areasand to varying degrees, mainly in the scientific field and toservice the ISS. In addition, after the fall of the Berlin Wallindustrial partnerships in the form of commercial businesseswere undertaken on US initiatives in order to take advantageof Russian and Ukrainian rockets (ILS for Proton, Sea Launchfor Zenith).

3.2. Launcher cooperation

The leader in this field, Russia has started, alone or incooperation, a series of measures to ensure, in the shortterm, the maintenance of its autonomy and the competi-tiveness of its industry on the international market forlaunch services. They include extending the lease on theBaikonur launch centre; development of the infrastructure atPlesetsk; installation of the Soyuz rocket at the ESA equa-torial site in French Guiana; development of more powerfulversions of Soyuz; development of the modular launcherAngara, which will be launched from Baikonur and Plesetsk;modernisation of Proton, which has been completely refur-bished in order to augment its performance by 15%; andinstallation at Baikonur of the Zenith-3SL as part of the‘Land launch’ project.

In the longer term Russia’s strategy is less explicit. There isnot really any development of a heavy-lift launcher beyondAngara nor of any vehicle to launch manned craft to orbitalstations. Reusable launchers will not be on the cards foranother 30 years.26

As a historic Russian partner, with whom it has cooperatedfor 40 years in successive circles (space science, then mannedflights, then launch services and finally launchers), France, viaits space agency CNES, has maybe a special role to play as an

21B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

interface between Europe and Russia, particularly in itsspecialist area, that of launchers.

3.3. Installation of Soyuz at the Guyana Space Centre

This European project (V344 million invested, of whichV233 is the European share under ESA responsibility, with63% of that borne by France) is not a bilateral arrangementwith France, even though it is the extension of the creation ofthe Franco-Russian company Starsem in 1996. France hasnevertheless carried the project from the start and agreed tosupport the whole of the loan guarantee of V121 granted bythe European Investment Bank (EIB). It has a securityagreement with Russia (the result of tough negotiations)through the persons of CNES and Roskosmos, whose actualoperation has yet to be tested. The first launch of a Soyuz fromthe Guyana Space Centre is slated for mid-2010.

This type of cooperation, which creates major infrastruc-ture, constitutes a long-term bond (20 years) and thus posesthe question of the stability of the agreements which saw itsbirth and of Russian intentions towards exploitation of theSoyuz family. Vigilance must be maintained over the latterbecause:

� Arianespace, which is the operator, does not havea monopoly on the commercial use of Soyuz and nothinghas been said at this stage about future developments of it(use for commercial launches from Baikonur; develop-ment of a cryogenic upper stage). Potential futurecompetition in the market for the European Ariane 5launcher might thus remain a concern, even if the prices ofthe Russian launching services are progressivelyincreased.� If Russia’s economic take-off is confirmed, this would

mean that the differential in salary costs between Russiaand Europe is likely to diminish, eroding the currentcompetitive advantage of Russian manufacture. It remainsto be seen how this evolution in costs will be reclaimed onthe relative margins between Russian and Europeancompanies in the future. In order to compensate for thislikely change in production costs, the Russian spaceindustry should put in place productivity efforts that willallow it to remain attractive on the international market assoon as possible, avoiding the need to request a renegoti-ation of the 2003 agreement on Soyuz at Kourou.

3.4. The Oural future launchers programme

27 The propulsion system manufacturer Energomash will have obtained an

increase in its capital (250 million roubles) for the construction of new

facilities, following a visit to the site in early December 2009 by V. Putin.

The agreement of November 2003, ratified by an inter-agency protocol of 15 March 2005, covers among things thedevelopment of future launch vehicles (with no exchange offunds). It is concerned with the development and concertedvalidation of the technologies necessary for a new generationof launchers, to be developed around 2015. There remaindifficulties over the transfer of data from the Russian party,which requires an intergovernmental agreement dedicated to

exchanges on future launcher technologies. Discussions onthis agreement got underway within an inter-agency workinggroup.

The pursuit of joint technical activities awaits a solution tothe problem of exchanging technological data. Tests on theKVD1-Lox/methane engine are being carried out on theRussian side; however, it is not possible for the Russians toobtain the results of French studies.

The ultimate goals of the Oural programme are not clearlyfixed yet. This is considered a serious obstacle to the mobi-lisation of funds by the Russian side. If, in the case of ‘reus-able launchers’ there is consensus on bringing forward theobjective, the question of ‘reusability’ itself as a good way ofadvancing technology, especially engine technology, remains.Russia is interested in reusable motors/thrusters (of the Baikalor Bargouzine type using LOX/methane with strong thrust)which would improve the ecology around Baikonur and wouldjustify studies on a Volga engine (400 t). The bilateral ‘Oural’management group is currently working on the redefinition ofcommon, concrete and driving goals, via demonstrators forexample.

In reality the future of the framework of exchanges repre-sented by Oural remains highly dependent on Russian will tolead new and realistically shared activities. The difficultiesencountered over the transfer of data are not a good omen.With cooperation over future launchers being part of the‘Soyuz at Kourou’ agreement, the Russian party certainlycan’t totally disregard it. Nevertheless said cooperationappears to be dormant.

3.5. Future propulsion systems

The Safran/Snecma industrial corporation has been coop-erating with Russia for 15 years and has signed over 250contracts with it, of which around a dozen are in progress. TheVolga programme, in partnership with the propulsion systemsmanufacturers KBKhA, NPO Energomash27 and the KeldyshInstitute, and EADS Volvo, is aiming to develop a LOX/methane engine of 200e400 tons for future launch vehicles. Itseems still to be on ‘stand-by’ and requires a relaunch,pending the development of an innovative LOX/methanepropulsion sector.

3.6. Manned flight and exploration

3.6.1. Experiments on board the ISSESA is the usual interface for the Russians on the general

management of the International Space Station and forexperiments in the Russian sector of the ISS, with someexceptions for certain bilateral Franco-Russian experiments.France has specialised in microgravity experiments and inspace medicine. These are activities that are destined to

28 Astrium and RNIIKP have created Synertech, in order to transfer a degree

of competence in design and production of payloads for civil telecommuni-

cations; Alcatel has formed a joint-venture with NPO-PM to commercialise

satellites manufactured on the territory of the Russian Federation based on

certain technologies supplied by Alcatel.

22 B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

endure, CNES remaining a driving force in these fields. Futureexperiments proposed by CNES in the Russian sector are themicrogravity experiments VIP-KRIT, which are to be devel-oped within an ESA framework, and Cardiomed, which is theobject of a direct bilateral agreement between CNES andRoskosmos.

3.6.2. Space exploration and ClipperBeyond the ISS, the creation of new manned vehicles for

the post-Shuttle era (2012?) is a necessity, both for theAmericans, who want to support their exploration programmeto the Moon and beyond, and for the Russians, who areanxious to make large-scale Russian access to the orbitalstation permanent and to take part in the new lunar pro-grammes. Roskosmos is to make the choice of manned vehiclelauncher, but the manned craft has not been definitely definedand the proposals from Energia on the ‘Clipper’ conceptappear to be moribund. While, doubtless thanks to a lack offunding, the system was open to cooperative participation(Roskosmos has insisted for years on its desire to see Europeparticipating in the development of a high-performing trans-portation vehicle) ESA has had doubts about the project.

Since the context of space exploration is evolving quiterapidly, possible cooperation with Russia on this subjectwould necessarily have to be envisaged with a much largerframework, situating the European or Euro-Russian contribu-tion in the context of the new planning proposed by NASA,but also by China and India, and maybe Japan.

3.6.3. Space scienceAfter a dark period for Russian space science activities,

a brighter spell is emerging. It remains to be seen whether thiswill arrive in time, given the ageing profile of the teams ofresearchers. The highest priority project is the launch of NPOLavotchkin’s Phobos-Grunt probe, which is to bring samplesof the Martian moon Phobos’s soil back to Earth. Thismission, in partnership with China, was due to launch in 2009but has been postponed until 2011. France is to have instru-ments on board.

In order to mitigate the deficiency in public funding forscientific missions, Russian firms have also strengthened thework they do developing scientific instruments for foreigninterplanetary missions. Thus Russian entities are taking partin the following projects: Mars Express, Venus Express,BepiColombo, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and theMars Science Laboratory; within these projects Euro-Russiancooperation, led by ESA, involves the European Exo Marsrover programme, which may carry Russian radio-isotopeheater units (RHUs), BepiColombo, which will have a Russianinstrument on board, and the Russian Spectrum Gammamission, which will use European instruments.

3.6.4. Applications satellitesThe Russian satellite sector has suffered from a serious lack

of performance culture in the past, linked notably to theexistence of very powerful launchers whose costs areaccounted for nearly nothing, which favours the development

of heavy satellites with a short lifespan. This state of affairshas thwarted the development of an industrial export marketfor satellites, following the dismemberment of the Soviet bloc,in contrast to the situation for launchers. This sector hastherefore fallen significantly behind its international rivals,a situation from which Russia is now attempting to catch up.

Satellite earth observation is a field in which Russia isrebuilding its potential thanks to a marked rise in the federalspace programme budgets. The latest satellite, Ressours-DK,is now operational; others are in preparation. This is a ‘dualuse’ civil/military sector in which Russia wishes to cooperatein order to initiate the exchange of data and could thuspossibly constitute a new axis of cooperation.

In the telecommunications sector Russia offers significantpotential for growth from a commercial viewpoint. Here thepartnerships are of manufacturers and the policy is the formingof joint-ventures with European actors, allowing, beyond thesales, ‘russification’ of some of the products while respectingthe legal procedures on sensitive technologies.28 In the field ofsatellite navigation, cooperation with France takes placethrough the European Union and is aimed at making theGlonass and Galileo systems interoperable.

Lastly, plasma propulsion for spacecraft is an area for R&Tcooperation, since Safran, allied to the US company Loral, hasbeen commercialising the SPT-100 satellite motor, with theRussian OKB Fakel, since 1993 and has developed theimproved PPS-1350 version which sent Europe’s SMART 1probe to the Moon.

4. Conclusion

In a once more buoyant context for strategic industries, orfor those linked to political power, space in Russia should intheory be benefiting from some powerful leverage. In reality,this has not yet been clearly demonstrated (resistance tochange, secondary priority?), even though the country has bothobvious needs (for satellites) and technical instruments thatare dated but modernisable.

Analysis of the factors favourable to a deepening ofcooperation in space with Russia must be accompanied bya firm grasp of the reality of the daily constraints on theexchange of high-level technological information (launchersand associated infrastructures) encountered in real life and, ata more general level, of the existence of a strong Russiandesire to systematically reassert the country’s sovereignty.Other unfavourable factors must be cited, ranging fromuncertainty about the political future, despite economic andfinancial progress, to the lack of clarity in the reorganisation ofthe aerospace and arms sectors.

Last but not least, the positive evolution of the diplomaticand strategic dialogue between Washington and Moscow at the

23B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

end of 2009 may result in a true change of their bilateralrelationships, or a limited step forward. In order to serve itsinterests, Russia should strengthen its ties with Europe and theworld’s most influential actors rather than remaining obsessedwith a focus on power balance.29

In as much as, in France and Europe, clear needs anda programmatic strategy could be well established, the path toa more substantial space partnership with Russia is not toodifficult to imagine. But the path is narrow. Everythingdepends on the way the uncertainty factors develop and on theendurance of the positive factors, on the cooperative field, onthe empirical conditions and finally on the timetable we wouldwant to envisage for large-scale joint undertakings. Faced withthis methodological difficulty, it seems reasonable to preparea cautious approach comprising a choice of options orscenarios. These are briefly presented below.

Before doing this, however, we should remember that theRussian authorities do not expect trustworthiness and trans-parency from us Europeans. They still have a bitter memory ofthe pressure exerted on the weakened Russia of the 1990s andconsider that they have often been forced into concessionswhich they deem shameful.30 The new Russia is linked toEurope by trade, but it is not pro-European.

In addition, this analysis of future prospects must takeaccount of the specific international context for the spaceindustries and services, particularly of the fact that, in contrast tothe base years (1970e80), the major actors in the launcher orsatellite fields, alongside Russia, are no longer just the USA andFrance but half-a-dozen other states (India, China, Japan, etc).Some of these may lay claim to a future position as rivals to theageing Russian systems, others may become candidates forcooperation with Russia, thus competing with their traditionalpartners (like France). We should also note that, for its part,Europe has been concentrating on its goal of autonomy over theyears. It no longer seems to be in a position, as it was in the 1980swith the Hermes project, to commit itself with the meansappropriate for international space cooperation on a grand scale.

Among the various options that might be envisaged for thefuture, three principal scenarios are presented below:

1. A ‘wait-and-see’ option would involve honouring theundertakings made with Russia relating to the imple-mentation of an ESA launch pad reserved for the Soyuzlauncher in French Guiana, while renouncing the possibilityof real joint work on European launchers beyond Ariane 5,despite the anticipated advantages. Such an option wouldinvolve a sort of waiting game on both sides, leaving noplace for any large-scale inter-state cooperation. After all,Russia is well equipped with modernised launch industriescovering its needs for the next 30 years; it has time to think

29 ‘Russia Reborn’, D. Tremin, Foreign Affairs, Vol.88 N�6, November/

December 2009 (p.78).30 See the remarks about V. Putin sayings, reported in N. Sokov, ‘The origins

and prospects for Russian nuclear doctrine’, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14,

n�2, July 2007: ‘‘In the fall of 2004, President Vladimir Putin spoke openly

about the desire of unnamed countries to ‘tear juicy morsels’ from Russia’’.

about what to do next. It means to keep the advances made inseveral areas of propulsion for itself. Its needs for Westerntechnologies are limited to applications for satellites (tele-communications and remote sensing). Who knows, Russiamay even be wanting to ‘leave the West’ e according to oneof the best research fellows in Europe on these issues,I. Facon.31 For its part, Europe, finally, still has time to thinkabout Ariane 6 or planetary exploration projects.

2. In contrast, a proactive scenario e rather unlikely at thisstage e would be based on Russia’s intention to invest inEurope for the long term, showing itself ready to play fully bythe rules of confidentiality, of security, and of balancedsharing of technical information. This scenario would becombined with a hypothesis of major desired evolution in theEuropean policy for the launch industry: confirmation of thepolitical will to engage in a new programme of post-Ariane 5heavy launchers, favouring a diminution of the developmentcosts and the sharing of risks with a major internationalpartner, the whole being acceptable to the European industry.The future of European launchers would be Euro-Russian.

3. An even more ambitious option would assume a stormingreturn of Russia to the international space stage anda parallel confirmation of its intention to open up coopera-tion with Europe as well as of its respect for internationallaw. For its part Europe would take full cognisance of thestrategic nature of space competence and would demon-strate a renewal of ambition for programmes on the scale ofthe 1980s, in order to keep pace, for example, with theacceleration of the US programmes of space exploration, orwith the Chinese, Indian or Japanese lunar programmes.Insuch a scenario, it would be conceivable to imaginea structured Franco-Euro-Russian cooperation aiming tocontribute to the international community, as a complementto US, Chinese or Indian efforts, an essential element of theglobal infrastructures for the conquest of space in the 21stcentury. Such could be the case of a proposal, in industrialpartnership supported by the agencies, of a grand roboticmission to Mars or manned flights to the Moon, if Russiadoes not wish to be left behind in the lunar missions race.

We should emphasise that these different options all startfrom the same assumption that Russia is not going tobecome impossible to deal with, that it is not going tofollow a path of narrow nationalism, of jealous neo-impe-rialism, and shut itself off from Europe or provide evidenceof duplicity. In a catastrophe scenario of negative develop-ment in space cooperation, one could imagine Russia raisingthe price of Soyuz, multiplying its launches from Baikonuror elsewhere, pocketing the profits, should the occasionarise asking to review the terms for the use of Soyuz atKourou in order to obtain extra financial compensation and,finally, not being a bona fide party to the application of thesecurity and safety rules for the site.Forced to take on an

31 The West and post-Putin Russia:does Russia ‘leave the West’?, I. Facon,

FRS Note, April 22, 2008, for Berstelsmann Stiftung.

24 B. de Montluc / Space Policy 26 (2010) 15e24

investment of several hundred million euros, we woulddiscover that we had no useful lever with which to lean onour negotiating partners and we would find ourselves facingan iniquitous dilemma: whether to close the Russian site atKourou or put it to bed in the hope of better times to come.But this is an abhorrent scenario.

Whatever hypothesis we take, the position of our Europeanpartners, especially the Germans, will condition the possibleinflections in favour of strengthened cooperation in space withRussia on a path that is promising but extremely narrow.Analysis of their own priorities will be required in order todetermine the direction desired by European member states.