russian in syria

RUSSIAN AIR FORCES WAR ON TERRORLONG-RANGE MISSIONS AND FENCER DOWN

Equipped with cruise missiles, Tu-160 Blackjacks circumnavigated Europe, while medium-range Tu-22M3 bombers conducted carpet-bombing of areas of Syrian oil industry occupied by terrorist militia. Despite the fatal shooting-down of a Su-24M in November, the Russian Air Force has only stepped up its activities to reinforce the Assad regime and continues to build up its forces in Syria.

report: Stefan Bttner

RELEASED BY THE Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) at irregular intervals, the numbers of sorties and targets attacked by the Russian Air Forces so-called Special Purpose Aviation Brigade stationed in Latakia provide conclusive evidence of an escalating campaign. While in the rst few weeks an individual aircraft was likely to carry out an air-to-ground mission on average once a day, this has steadily increased. More than two ights per aircraft are now achieved each day. The number of targets attacked during each ight has also risen. The increase in sortie rates was made manifest from November 4 by the appearance of mission markings on the aircraft. A single red star indicates 10 missions, and a whole row of such stars painted near the cockpit makes a clear statement.

In the second half of November the capabilities of ghter and aircraft controllers at Latakia were improved signi cantly with the deployment of the appropriate radar systems (Odd Group height- nder, Spoon Rest range nder, and Parol IFF). Earlier that month the

Su-30SM ghters began increasingly to be used in the air-to-ground role. The number of long-range radar-guided R-27R air-to-air missiles carried as standard was reduced from four to two. Four OFAB-250-270 high-explosive/fragmentation bombs were instead carried under the fuselage and air intakes. The two infra-red-guided R-73s continued to be carried under the wings.

Some confusion surrounds the Su-24Ms at Latakia, relating to their exact identities and the distribution of the basic Su-24M and upgraded Su-24M2 versions. As of September 20 the squadron comprised 12 aircraft, which originally belonged to the 6980th Guards Air Base at Chelyabinsk-Shagol. It is possible that in November up to six more Su-24M2s arrived from the 277th Bomber Aviation Regiment at Churba near Komsomolsk-on-Amur. This would explain changes to the Bort numbers of the aircraft, in order to avoid any duplication of identities. A similar situation has been observed with two Mi-24P helicopters at Latakia. On the other hand, an attempt by the Russians to conceal the identities of their assets from prying eyes cannot be ruled out.

Bottom: Russian Tu-95MS long-range strategic bombers struck Syria for the rst time on November 17, marking a clear escalation in Russian activities inside Syria. Dr San Wilson

Above left to right: Su-24M Fencers at Latakia have started carrying extensive mission marking tallies behind the cockpit. MO RF via syria.mil.ru

A Su-30SM crew arrives on the ight line for the next mission. MO RF via syria.mil.ru

Inset right: The high point of Operation Reprisal was undoubtedly the long-range bombing mission, in which two Tu-160s ying from Engels circumnavigated Europe before being escorted through Syrian airspace by Su-30SMs. MO RF

COMBAT REPORT | RUSSIA IN SYRIA

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Operation ReprisalWhen a Metrojet Airbus A321-231 airliner was blown up in the skies over Egypt on October 31, it was clear that Russia was now a target for the terrorist militia of the so-called Islamic State (IS). The 224 passengers killed were mostly Russian citizens. Almost as soon as the cause and the culprit were clearly identi ed, the Russian Air Forces Long-Range Aviation arm swung into action. In Operation Reprisal, Tu-95MS6 and Tu-160 strategic long-range bombers completed their rst real combat missions. Also involved was the veteran Tu-22M3 medium bomber, used for carpet-bombing the oldest Russian aircraft in the Syrian war.

With aircraft drawn from various units, a reinforced squadron of 12 to 14 Tu-22M3s operated out of Mozdok and ew two waves each day. The missions

were repeated daily, and once over Syria air cover was provided by the Su-30SMs from Latakia. The average load per aircraft consisted

of just 12 OFAB-250-270 bombs in the weapons bay,

which represented only one-third of the maximum able to be

carried. In addition, the BD-45K pylons earmarked for Kh-22 missiles were removed from beneath the wings to save weight and reduce drag. Since the target areas were around 2,200km (1,367 miles) from the remote strategic air base at Mozdok, the actual range of the Tu-22M3 long a closely-guarded secret was made apparent. It is possible that the Tu-22M3s made occasional use of larger bombs or even Kh-15 air-to-surface missiles, as apparently indicated by some poor-quality TV recordings.

The sorties own by the ve Tu-95MS6s and between three and six Tu-160s were somewhat di erent. A total of 83 cruise missiles comprising examples of the Kh-555 and the new Kh-101 were launched from airspace over south-western Iran and the Mediterranean Sea, targeting oil industry in Syria. Lasting eight to nine hours, the non-stop ights were mainly carried out from the home base of Russias long-range bomber arm, Engels. Such missions extended over 6,500km (4,039 miles) and saw the aircraft delivering di erent types and numbers of cruise missiles. What little

that can be con rmed regarding loading con gurations is that the weapons bay of each Tu-160 and Tu-95MS6 accommodated six Kh-555s or Kh-101s. During one mission on November 19, it is likely that a single cruise missile was brought back to Engels, having not been expended. Why the Tu-95MS6s landed with weapons bay doors open remains unclear. Not all of these missiles reached their targets, as demonstrated by one or more that crashed along the route.

Iranian airspace witnessed some interesting meetings of aircraft from a bygone era. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force took the opportunity to accompany the Russian long-range bombers with its F-4E Phantom IIs and F-14A Tomcats. It is possible that Russian Su-27SM3s were also involved, with aircraft from the 3rd Mixed Guards Aviation Regiment at Krymsk ying escort, probably for the Il-78M tanker aircraft as they staged over Iran.

November 20 saw what was undoubtedly a highlight in the history of Long-Range Aviation. Two to four Tu-160s departed Engels for the Naval Aviation base at Olenegorsk (used as a stop-over for Russias strategic long-range bombers). From there they would hit targets located some 9,500km (5,903

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Tu-160

Tu-160

Tu-22M3

Su-34/Su-27SM3

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LONG-RANGE STRIKES BOMBER TRACKS FOR NOVEMBER 20 MISSIONS

Olenegorsk

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Left page, clockwise from top: Tu-22M3s carpet-bombed targets with OFAB-250-270 bombs. Yevgeni Kazhenov

The launch of a Kh-555 conventional cruise missile from a Tu-95MS6 strategic bomber. The MS6 designation applies to Tu-95s without underwing hardpoints. MO RF

A video screen-grab of a Tu-160 dropping a Kh-101 on the November 17 mission. MO RF via syria.mil.ru

Below: A Kh-555 cruise missile leaves the bomb bay of a Tu-95MS6. Apparently, the weapons bay of the Bear can only accommodate four of these weapons perhaps due to the size of their strap-on fuel tanks. MO RF

Cross-examining information released by both sides, Tom Cooper unravels whether the Su-24 shoot-down was the result of belligerence, or a simple breakdown in communications between Russian and Turkish armed forces.

Less than two weeks after their deployment to Syria, and only a few days after the launch of the Russian military intervention in that country, Russian Air Force Su-30SM fighter-bombers violated Turkish airspace at least twice, once on October 3 and again on October, 5, 2015. What is more, the Russian jets locked their radars on to Turkish Air Force F-16C Fighting Falcons under way north of the border, in an aggressive and reckless fashion.

Moscow subsequently issued a de facto apology for the border violations and explained them as a navigational error. However, reflecting on the Russian lock-ons, the Turkish government warned that it might apply wartime rules of engagement (RoEs), irrespective of who was penetrating its airspace.

In an effort to reduce tensions, the Russian Air Force deputy commander-in-chief, Maj Gen Sergey Dronov, visited Ankara to meet representatives of the Russian government and the Turkish Air Force on October 15. Among other things, an agreement was reached to use the usual international guard frequency, 121.5, as well as an additional, special frequency of 243MHz as a direct communications link between Russian and Turkish aircraft. Dronov explained that older Russian combat aircraft are not equipped with radios that can listen to the guard frequency. Furthermore, he agreed to provide flight plans for Russian aircraft formations that would be operating close to the Turkish border at least 12 hours in advance.

Nevertheless, a Russian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was shot down inside Turkish airspace only a day later. Despite Moscows denials, the government in Ankara felt prompted to issue a clear threat that it would shoot down any military aircraft violating its airspace. The same threat was publicly repeated via diplomatic channels and through Turkish media about 35 times in the course of the following 30 days.

Ever since the outbreak of violence in Syria in 2011, the Turkish Air Force has maintained intensive combat air patrols (CAPs) along the 1,200km (746-mile)-long border. Usually, Turkey maintained up to five CAP stations whenever Russian aircraft were airborne over Syria. Additional fighters were scrambled if Russian aircraft approached the border. Most of the Turkish fighters were either F-16C Block 40s from 181 and 182 Filo, based at Diyarbakr (8 AJ), or F-16C Block 50s from 132 Filo at Konya (3 AJ).

On November 18, Russian fighter-bombers began supporting a ground offensive by militias fighting for the Syrian regime against an area held by Syrian Turkmen insurgents. This was in the north-eastern

corner of the Syrian province of Latakia, only 30km (18.6 miles) from the Turkish border. While describing this action as bombing militants of the IS, mostly natives of the Russian Federation, Russia used a large number of cluster bombs and incendiary bombs to hit local Turkmen villages, driving a wave of refugees over the border into Turkey in what many said was a breach of Article 51 of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention regarding attacks on civilians.

Turkey not only protested against attacks on its minority living in Syria, but also demanded a meeting of the UN Security Council. The international community ignored Ankaras requests.

As the fighting on the ground heated up, and Turkmen insurgents repelled repeated attacks by militias loyal to the regime in Damascus, Russia moved in its ground troops, reinforced by the Russian Air Force, without much success. The Turkmen insurgents repelled all further ground offensives, and gained a few additional mountain peaks.

Steps to disasterOn the morning of November 24, around 09.42hrs local time, Turkish radars detected the take-off of two unknown aircraft from Hmeimin air base, or Bashar al-Assad International Airport, 25km (15.5 miles) south of Latakia, and less than 50km (31 miles) south of the southernmost tip of the Turkish border.

The two aircraft climbed to an altitude of 5,791m (19,000ft) and entered an orbit above the town of Jisr al-Shughur, in Syria. They were widely separated, one circling south of the southernmost part of the Turkish border, and the other nearly 10km (6.2 miles) further west. Because contrary to the agreements between the Russian and Turkish Air Forces of October 15 Russia did not announce that its aircraft would be flying close to the border, Turkey was unaware of their nationality. As the aircraft approached the frontier and flew an orbit parallel to it, the Turkish Air Force began radioing warnings on both the guard and specially-agreed frequency used for communication with the Russian Air Force, demanding that the unknown machines divert south immediately.

Over the following five minutes, the Turks issued 10 warnings via radio. Because Russia had failed to announce its mission, and since the two aircraft did not show any kind of reaction, the Turkish Air Force command responsible made a call to Ankara to request clearance to open fire. Considering the circumstances, the Turkish government and military concluded that the unknown aircraft were Syrian, and a pair of F-16s Continued on page 25

FENCER SHOOTDOWN ANALYSISmiles) distant in Syria. In the process the aircraft circled Europe in a counter-clockwise direction, before returning to Engels after a flight of about 13,000km (8,078 miles) lasting 16 hours and 20 minutes. It is likely that four to eight Il-78Ms from Ryazan were on station in the area of the Norwegian Sea to provide air refueling, but more detailed information is not available. Norwegian F-16s from Bod and Royal Air Force Typhoons from Lossiemouth intercepted the Blackjacks on their way into the Atlantic.

Until a point shortly before the bombers reached Gibraltar, everything appeared to be routine after all, similar flights have been conducted in the recent past. In the eastern Mediterranean two Su-30SM fighters from Latakia were waiting to escort the bombers as they continued over Syria. Finally, each Tu-160 launched four Kh-555 missiles at targets in the province of Idlib.

At the same time, Tu-154M RA-85155 of the 223rd Flight Detachment from Moscow-Chkalovsky was reportedly orbiting south of Cyprus in support of these strikes. It may have been used as an airborne command post, a platform for TV recordings, or as a means of navigation support for the Su-30SMs.

The same day saw long-range missions being launched from Frontal Aviation airfields in Russia. Eight Su-34s and four escorting Su-27SM3s flew two sorties from Krymsk, hitting targets around 2,500km (1,553 miles) away in the Syrian provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqah. These also took place with the support of Il-78M tankers operating over Iran.

The four-day reprisal was completed with the renewed use of 18 ship-based 3M14T Kalibr cruise missiles. As was the case with the first such launches on October 7, the missiles were fired from four Gepard- and Bujan-class corvettes of the Caspian Flotilla.


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A dark day Fencer shootdownIt had been building up for a while, and the result was inevitable. Turkey had repeatedly issued diplomatic protests and warnings. An agreement on rules and procedures for military aircraft over Syria apparently existed only between Russia and the United States. It was unavoidable that Russian aircraft movements and air raids along the border between Syria and Turkey would lead to a serious incident.

On the morning of November 24, pilot Lt Col Oleg Anatolyevich Peshkov and his navigator Capt Konstantin Muratkin boarded their Su-24M2 83 White at

Latakia, armed with four OFAB 250-270 fragmentation bombs for another air-to-ground mission. Once again, this would bring them to the small area of Turkish territory, just a few kilometers wide, that protrudes into Syria to the west of Jisr al-Shughur. In this area, Turkmen rebels are active against the Assad regime and serve as a protective force for Turkey. O cially, this was an air-to-ground attack against the terrorist militia of the self-styled Islamic State.

But Peshkov and Muratkin were not alone in the area. On the other side of the border, two Turkish Air Force F-16Cs from the 8th Main Jet Base at Diyarbakr (8 AJ) were on patrol. The tragedy began

FENCER SHOOTDOWN

to unfold when the Russian ight crew changed course (again?), ying westwards

after a wide loop heading directly towards the now infamous strip of

territory.The Turkish airspace controllers

responded by issuing radio messages on the international emergency frequency, adding that the aircraft was to turn left

in a southerly direction. These messages were repeated several

times. Meanwhile the F-16s received a new course from the Turkish ghter

controller, heading exactly towards the area where the Su-24M would cut through the strip of Turkish territory.

The warnings to the Russian crew were repeated in quick succession but it was already too late. The intruder had only just over- own Turkish territory when an air-to-air missile was red. The missile (either an AIM-9 Sidewinder or AIM-120 AMRAAM accounts di er) reached its target as the aircraft passed again over

Syria

FENCER SHOOTDOWN

Yayladagi

Kuljok

MISSILE IMPACT POINT

Su-24 CRASH SITE

Rabia

Qastal Maaf

Nibh Almur

Bidama

F-16 LAUNCH POSITION

Syria

Ras Al Basit Su-24 FLIGHTPATH

Syria-Turkey border

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Continued from page 23

airborne on a CAP station over the Turkish province of Hatay was given clearance to open re if the aircraft tried to violate Turkish airspace.

Consequently, when the two unknown aircraft both turned west, the F-16s went into action. The unidenti ed aircraft to the west passed through Turkish airspace but did so before Turkish interceptors were in a position to open re, and then turned south. Shortly before the unknown aircraft to the east entered Turkish airspace, the lead F-16 red one AIM-120C AMRAAM, an active radar-homing, medium-range air-to-air missile from beyond visual range (BVR). The two unknowns were up-sun relative to the F-16s, between 15 and 20km (9.3 and 12.4 miles) away Turkish sources have not revealed more details and thus invisible to the Turkish pilots, whose RoEs do not require a visual identi cation.

The ring of the AMRAAM was a de facto snap-shot, taken under di cult circumstances as the two unidenti ed machines were moving perpendicular to the F-16s. Most pulse-Doppler radars including the AN/APG-68 on Turkish Fighting Falcons have a problem tracking targets under such conditions because of well-known issues with the so-called Doppler shift. Nevertheless, the missile approached its target and proximity-fused underneath it, spraying its fuselage and wing with shrapnel.

Streaming burning fuel, what transpired to be Russian Su-24M2 83 White ipped out of control and plunged towards the ground. The aircraft crashed into hills just south of the Turkish border. The crew, consisting of Lt Col Oleg Peshkov and Capt Konstantin Muratkin, ejected while still at a signi cant altitude. Almost immediately, the two Russians came under re from a group of Jihadists who were Turkish citizens and members of the Turkish nationalist organization Grey Wolves, sided with the al-Qaida-linked Jihadist group Jabahat an-Nusra, which is ghting against the Syrian regime. It is generally assumed that they killed Lt Col Peshkov with machine-gun re while he was still under his parachute, but nal con rmation of this act which would constitute a war crime is still pending.

The Russian combat search and rescue (CSAR) operation was launched about three hours later, with two pairs of helicopters deployed to search for the downed crew, each pair comprising one Mi-8ATMSh CSAR helicopter and one Mi-24 gunship. In the course of this e ort, Mi-8 252 Yellow (RF-95601) was hit by ground re and forced to make an emergency landing. One of the 12 crew members and Russian marines on board, Private Alexander Posynitsch, was shot in the neck and killed. After the helicopter was evacuated, it was knocked out by a BGM-71A TOW anti-tank missile red by Turkmen insurgents from the 1st Coastal Division of the Free Syrian Army.

The crew of the downed helicopter, and Capt Muratkin, were according to Russian media subsequently extracted by a team of 12 Syrian and six Hezbollah special forces operators.

A stab in the back?The reaction of Russian o cials and media to the downing of the Su-24M2 and the loss of the Mi-8ATMSh was erce. The Turkish decision to open re on the Sukhois, which violated Turkish airspace for only about 2km (1.2 miles) over a duration of about 17 seconds, was declared an aggressive over-reaction, while President Vladimir Putin went on record to call it a stab in the back.

Ever since, Moscow has stubbornly denied that the Turkish authorities radioed any kind of warnings, and insists that the Sukhois did not enter Turkish airspace.

On the contrary, Russia claims that the Turks set up an ambush, and that the F-16s violated Syrian airspace in order to shoot down one of the Sukhois, supposedly deploying an AIM-9X Sidewinder for a rear-quarter attack at short range. However, not only do the three maps of this incident published by the Russian MoD between November 24 and 27 contradict each other, and show maneuvers no Su-24M could ever y, but some other Russian statements do not add up.

Firstly, as mentioned above, the Turkish Air Force has own intensive CAPs over Hatay province for four years. There is no evidence of any kind of unusual behavior by the Turkish F-16 pilots: they ew orbits at medium altitude, in clear view of Russian radars, although the latter are stationed low on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, their work massively hampered by 2,000m (6,562ft) mountains north-east of Latakia.

Secondly, Turkish radio warnings were heard by at least one Dutch commercial pilot under way over the area. The same pilot stated that he could track the F-16s with the radar of his airliner at the time the warnings were aired, and that both Turkish ghters were well within their airspace.

Thirdly, the tactical procedure for engagements in which RoEs do not demand a visual ID of the target dictates that F-16 pilots deploy their longer-ranged weapon in this case an AIM-120 rst, and long before any AIM-9. From that standpoint, it would be absurd for them to start some sort of a pursuit and violate Syrian airspace in order to catch the Sukhois and attack with Sidewinders from short range, no matter how slowly the bombers were ying.

Indeed, considering the various reactions from Turkey, it appears that the entire incident was caused by a regrettable breakdown in communications. Most likely, the responsible Russian o cers at Latakia failed to announce the sortie by their Su-24s along the Turkish border (otherwise the Turkish Air Force would have known the identity of two unknown aircraft right from their take-o ) and then decided to ignore the warnings given by the Turkish side. Tom Cooper

Syria, a maximum of 7km (4.3 miles) after leaving the strip of Turkish land.

The aircraft was hit, the crew ejected and, under the eyes of the world, came down, apparently externally undamaged but trailing re. It impacted the ground and went up in a reball on Syrian soil about 4km (2.5 miles) south of the border. The scenes that followed were shocking: while Muratkin reached the ground alive, Peshkov was targeted by a hail of bullets red from the small arms of at least a dozen ghters on the ground.

Around 15 minutes after the shootdown one Mi-24P and two Mi-8AMTSh helicopters took o from Latakia on a combat search and rescue (CSAR) mission to extract Capt Muratkin. Presumably the surviving crew member landed in no-mans land and headed successfully in a south-westerly direction, towards Syrian troops who were moving swiftly into the area.

Once it had arrived, the Russian CSAR mission also came under defensive re from the ground, during which a member of the marine infantry, Private Alexander Posynitsch, lost his life. Mi-8AMTSh 252 Yellow was abandoned after an emergency landing, and its crew and accompanying marines made their way on foot toward the Syrian armed forces. To make matters worse, rebel opposition in the area were equipped with BGM-71 TOW anti-armor missiles. It took only a few minutes before one of these American missiles scored a direct hit on the nearly brand-new Russian transport helicopter.

In the course of one day, Russia had lost two servicemen and two aircraft. In principle, it is perhaps not surprising that, as time goes on, Russian interpretations of the shootdown increasingly tell a contradictory story.

Left page: The Su-24M2 lost on November 24 returning to Latakia after a bombing mission earlier the same month. At the time, the markings on the fuselage indicated that it had own 50 sorties. MO RF via syria.mil.ru

Above: The stricken Fencer was captured in its nal seconds by a local cameraman. MO RF via syria.mil.ru


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The Russian responseOnly a few hours later came Russias first military response to the shootdown. It was announced that all air-to-ground operations would be immediately provided with a fighter escort. Obviously, this requirement could not be satisfied by the four Su-30SMs stationed in Latakia. Furthermore, it was made clear that ground-based air defenses would be significantly reinforced. To this end, the guided-missile cruiser Moskva (of

the Slava class) was ordered to coastal waters in the region of Latakia. Special emphasis was placed on this warships far-reaching S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). While the cruiser reached the operational area the following day, Russia meanwhile prepared to send to Syria at least one An-124 transport carrying elements of an S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) SAM system.

October 21, 1989: Two Syrian Arab Air Force MiG-21MFs penetrated 20km (12.4 miles) into Turkish airspace to shoot down a Britten-Norman BN-2L transport of the provincial Land Registry Directorate, killing all five on board. June 22, 2012: A Syrian SA-3 SAM site near Latakia shot down Turkish Air Force RF-4ETM Isik reconnaissance fighter serial 77-0314 after it violated Syrian airspace over the Mediterranean Sea. The crew of Capt Gkhan Ertan and Lt Hassan Hsseyin Aksoy were killed. September 16, 2013: Two Turkish Air Force F-16Cs shot down a Syrian Arab Air Force Mi-17 helicopter that penetrated Turkish airspace over Hatay province, using an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile. At least one of the Syrian crew bailed out and landed safely by parachute. March 23, 2014: Two Turkish Air Force F-16Cs shot down a Syrian Arab Air Force MiG-23MF that violated Turkish airspace over Hatay province, using an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile. The Syrian pilot ejected safely. May 16, 2015: Two Turkish Air Force F-16Cs shot down a UAV of unknown origin after it violated Turkish airspace over Hatay province, using an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile. Tom Cooper

A SHORT HISTORY OF SYRIAN-TURKISH BORDER INCIDENTS

Although the firing units initially flown to Latakia were limited to only two (instead of 12) 5P85SM2-01 launchers, the commitment had been achieved in limited time the S-400 was allegedly already in Syria by mid-day on November 26. The deployment of this far-reaching anti-aircraft system was no real surprise. Since at least the first half of November, an optional additional component of the S-400 had been in permanent operation in Latakia. The 96L6 (Cheese Board) acquisition radar, with a detection range of over 300km (186 miles), has been operated by Russian air defense troops since 2007 and was presumably being used to provide a wide-ranging air situation picture for the Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) SAM system used for airfield defense since the start of the Russian operation.

Generally, the 96L6 acquisition radar (or all-altitude detector) supplies target data to the 36N85 (Tomb Stone) missile guidance station of the S-300PMU-1/2 Favorit (SA-20 Gargoyle) and the 92N2 (Grave Stone) missile guidance station of the S-400 Triumf. Notably, the 92N2 missile guidance station, which is strictly necessary for operations (as well as the

Above: NATOs air defense of the Syrian border is entrusted to the F-16C Fighting Falcons of the Turkish Air Force, one of which claimed the Russian Fencer shot down in late November. Alexander Golz

Left: Russias ground-based air defenses at Latakia consist of modern S-400 (seen here) and Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems. MO RF via syria.mil.ru

Right: With multiple bomb racks below the fuselage, this Su-34 can carry between four and eight FAB-500M-54 high-explosive free-fall bombs. MO RF via syria.mil.ru



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55K6 command unit based on a Ural-5323 truck chassis?), remained invisible to photographers and television crews on November 26. The system parameters allow a maximum distance of 120m between the launchers and missile guidance station and a maximum of 500m between the missile guidance station and the acquisition radar.

Only on December 6 was the existence of the 92N2 missile guidance station (on an MZKT-7930 vehicle) con rmed by photos. This clearly demonstrated the operational readiness of the S-400 air defense system. At the same time the number of 5P85SM2-01 launch pads was doubled.

One day after the Fencer shoot-down Lt Col Oleg Anatolyevich Peshkov was posthumously declared a Hero of the Russian Federation by a presidential decree, while Capt Konstantin Muratkin and Private Alexander Posynitsch both received Order of Courage Medals. The transfer of Peshkovs body from Ankara to Moscow, as well as a funeral in Lipetsk, took place around the end of the month.

Another signi cant improvement in air defense capabilities became apparent on November 30. Previously, Su-34s operating from Latakia were used exclusively as platforms for precision and free-fall o ensive armament. Now, with the addition of two R-27 and two R-73 air-to-air missiles on each Fullback, the Su-34 demonstrated its multi-role capability. The air-to-air armament of the Su-34 is the same as that carried by the Su-30SM in its optional ghter-bomber role. For the rst time since the start of operations, there was a move from

partial utilization of armament capacities towards maximum load-outs and the use of almost all the weapons pylons available on each aircraft.

Expanding capabilitiesThe use of a possible second Russian air eld in Syria remains unclear. At the end of October an An-124 (RA-82037) from the 566th Transport Aviation Regiment at Seshcha landed at the mixed ghter-bomber base at Shayrat, not far from Homs in western Syria. At the same time, one of the two runways received a major overhaul including a new bitumen

covering over most of its length. One-and-a-half weeks later, four Mi-24s and a single Mi-8 were seen at the base, and later these were o cially declared as the 22nd Air Force Brigade. However, they may well belong to the Syrian armed forces.

From December 5 to 8, medium-range Tu-22M3 bombers from a reinforced squadron (including aircraft from Ryazan and Shaikovka) again left Mozdok for bombing sorties over Syria. At least in Syrian airspace, daily air cover was provided again by Su-30SMs from Latakia. Over three to four consecutive days, 60 sorties hit 30 targets in the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqah, using free-fall OFAB-250-270 bombs. This campaign was completed by a third wave of sea-launched cruise missiles. Submerged in the Mediterranean between Cyprus and Syria, a Kilo III-class submarine red four Kalibr-PL cruise missiles against two large terrorist points in the area of Ar-Raqqah.

In addition to the possible increase in numbers of Su-24Ms at Latakia, in early December more combat aircraft were own direct to Syria without stop-overs or aerial refueling. This relocation began on December 4. A few days earlier, when Tu-154M RA-85155 from the 223rd Aviation Department ew from Moscow-Chkalovsky to Astrakhan-Privolshskiy, several hours of training ights were observed, involving Su-34s in the territory around Astrakhan. Speci cally, these comprised around a dozen similar oval loops own along legs measuring 30 by 70km (18.6 to 43.5 miles), allowing

Above: The ghter escort detachment at Latakia consists of pilots and technicians drawn from the 120th Mixed Aviation Regiment at Domna. Their Su-30SM ghters were only delivered from the Irkut factory at the end of 2014. MO RF via syria.mil.ru


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Turkey

SyriaCyprus

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LATAKIA

Craig Dark, a former Royal Air Force ghter pilot with front-line experience on the F-4 Phantom, English Electric Lightning and Tornado F3, provides his personal view of the Su-24 shootdown, and how the engagement may have played out.

From a pilots perspective, the tragedy of the downing of the Russian Air Force Su-24 is perhaps the helpless feeling that it could have been avoided.

Hard facts remain di cult to gather in an age of information overload. Details of the actual engagement are sketchy, with con icting reports as to which weapon was red by the Turkish Air Force F-16C. As a former air defense pilot, this fact seems to be the missing part of a complex jigsaw.

Understandably, the Turkish Air Force is ying aircraft that are live-armed (in peacetime most air forces dont y with live weapons purely on cost grounds, due to the lifespan of live weapons). What is less clear is whether the aircraft were scrambled to engage a speci c threat or were sitting on CAP waiting for a target to enter their airspace.

The area in question is a di cult section of sky to patrol, being a toe shape that protrudes into Syria, forcing ghters to adopt a search pattern that makes a traditional intercept extremely di cult. The Russian Air Force claims that an agreement between the US and Russia signed in October 2015 dictated that Russia must give details of where and when its air force would be operating, fueling the theory that this information may have been passed on.

The Turkish F-16s will have had strict rules of engagement, but they would appear in this case to have been applied using a fairly broad brush any aircraft crossing into Turkish airspace risks being engaged and destroyed, presumably after warnings have been issued by voice via radio. This begs the question of whether the intruder would also have been shot down had it

been a transport aircraft, or an aircraft that was lost or su ering communications failure. This returns us to the initial question of which weapon type was red.

The missile debateIf, and this has not been veri ed, the F-16C shot a long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM, the pilot may have seen the Su-24 at more than 40 miles (64km) on radar, locked the target and red well beyond visual range. Once locked, the missile would have red and self-guided, giving little warning to the Su-24 crew of what was about to happen.

When you look at the geography, it would require considerable skill for a single-seat ghter pilot to engage at long range a target that may have only clipped the defended airspace and to hope the wreckage fell on the right side. It would need exceptionally good ground controllers or airborne early warning to feed information to the pilot that the target he was engaging was hostile.

If, on the other hand, the weapon red was an AIM-9 (I believe this to be more likely), and we understand the Su-24 was engaged at approximately 20,000ft (6,096m), then the F-16 would need to be visual with the target and probably ring from within 5 miles (8km).

An AIM-9 can be red without radar guidance and it is possible the Su-24 was even unaware of the ghters presence, as there are no indications it took evasive action or red decoy ares. Normal rules of engagement lay down strict rules for engaging other aircraft normally, is it committing a hostile act?, namely dropping weapons, ring guns or even

ying at supersonic speeds in your airspace. Certainly, a live-armed Su-24 ying over anyones airspace would not be considered friendly, but the F-16 may have had other options ying alongside the Su-24 as a show of presence or even ring its gun to show intent may have been a more diplomatic way of warning the Russian bomber to leave Turkish airspace.

Fighter pilots are not trigger-happy, and any weapon release is a step-by-step process of making weapons live and then obtaining authority to shoot from ground-based controllers or AWACS.

With little information, speculation can be a dangerous thing. Whats clear now is that Turkey is going to defend its airspace, and that the need for some form of joint airspace co-ordination is crucial. A simple and e ective solution would be to place a 10-mile (16km) bu er zone or no- y zone around the area to prevent further tragedies.

It is hard to apportion blame, as both sides seem to have been at fault one could consider the outcome if a fully-loaded Turkish F-16 had strayed into Russian airspace.

These are dangerous times in an area that is literally a kill zone one country needs to grasp the situation and take control of the airspace to avoid future blue on blue incidents. Another solution would be to divide the airspace into kill boxes, with each country allocated a di erent box that would give them the freedom of autonomous operations. If lessons are to be learnt then command and control of the region needs to be co-ordinated more closely. The incident also highlights the perils for aircrew ying in a war zone that operates outside the normal boundaries of con icts we have seen in the past.

SHOOT TO KILL A VIEW FROM THE COCKPIT

the Su-34 crews to train for a long-haul ight of over 2,600km (1,616 miles). The actual deployment from Astrakhan to Latakia took place on December 6 and was probably accompanied by Il-76 RA-78768. The number of Su-34s at Latakia was therefore doubled from four to eight.

A few days later, further changes appeared within the Mi-24P combat helicopter squadron, which now included at least one Mi-35M.

Altogether there are now 50 to 60 Russian aircraft permanently stationed in Syria, including examples of the Su-24M/M2, Su-25SM/UB, Su-30SM, Su-34, Mi-8AMTSh, Mi-24P, Mi-35M and Il-20M. In mid-December, the total number of sorties since September 30 exceeded 4,000. Of these, fewer than half were own against IS targets.

S-400 ENGAGEMENT ZONE



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