Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace by John M. ThompsonReview by: Harry HanakThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 48, No. 113 (Oct., 1970), pp. 616-617Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4206299 .

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6l6 SLAVONIC REVIEW

sources, so that one can still form a good picture of Soviet policy in action as well as under debate. Swansea Eleanor Breuning

Thompson, John M. Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace. Princeton

University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966. 429 pp.

The allied leaders in Paris in 1919 were concerned to settle the affairs of the world, and of Europe in particular, as speedily as possible. Colonel House believed that the statesmen were 'sitting on an open powder magazine and some day a spark may ignite it.' Professor Thompson, the author of this study of the Russian problem in Paris, agrees and describes the deliberations at the Peace Conference as 'a race with anarchy'.

In fact, what the peace-makers in Paris lacked was not so much time

(except for Wilson whom electoral defeat in Congress and illness was to rob of influence) as power. Their orders were carried on the bayonets of their troops. They could therefore influence events in western Europe, indeed they could impose their views. In the east their military forces were thinly spread and they had to cajole and influence. In Russia the situation was worse. The Bolsheviks were in control of the bulk of

European Russia, hemmed in by motley forces of White Russian troops and the small military formations of the allies. The Bolsheviks had an excellent claim to be regarded as the successor government of the pro? visional republic and hence of the government which had gone to war on the side of the western democracies in 1914. Unfortunately, not only had

they declared ideological war on all the capitalist governments and called on the peoples of the world to overthrow their oppressors, they had also taken Russia out of the war.

A military crusade against the Bolsheviks was not popular in a war-

weary west. Churchill for the British and Foch for the French were pre? pared to send troops to Russia but Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau were against this. The French foreign minister Pichon spoke of 'no contract with crime', words which were not likely to intimidate the new men in Moscow. The French forces in Odessa were another matter, but after a defeat in a minor skirmish they withdrew precipitately. The White Russian armies did not. Kolchak was regarded as a monarchist and the Allies did not want a Russian reaction but a Russian democracy. Denikin 'was occupying a little backyard near the Black Sea', while the White Russian agents in Paris were described as representing 'every opinion except the prevalent one in Russia.'

The alternative was to talk to the Bolsheviks. This was the aim of the Prinkipo proposals and of the Bullitt mission. However, the success of talking to the Bolsheviks was no greater than fighting them. The trouble was that while one section of allied public opinion was opposed to a vigorous prosecution of war against the Bolsheviks another section was equally opposed to talking to them.

The most important parts of Professor Thompson's book are those where he deals with the negotiations between the Allies in Paris and the

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REVIEWS 617

Russian emigre's centred in the Russian Political Conference. One must, however, disagree with Professor Thompson's view of Wilson and Lloyd George. He credits them with an understanding of Bolshevism. Wilson, however, was honest enough to admit that 'we do not even know exactly what its causes are,' meaning Bolshevism. At other times he could be silly, albeit amusing about it. As he wrote to Sir William Wiseman in October

1918 about Russia, 'I visualise it like this: A lot of impossible folk, fighting among themselves. You cannot do business with them, so you shut them all up in a room and lock the door and tell them when they have settled matters among themselves you will unlock the door and do business.'

At the same time both Lloyd George and Wilson showed greater reality in dealing with the situation than did some of their supporters. 'To try to stop a revolutionary movement by a line of armies,' Wilson declared, was 'to employ a broom to stop a great flood.' Both Wilson and Lloyd George could allow themselves to be carried away by their oratory and by their visionary views of the future. Moreover their emotional radicalism was touched by the great movements of peoples in Russia and by the intellectual ferment, with its promise of a golden future, released by the Bolsheviks. That much they understood about Bolshevism, but little else.

The attitude of the Allied leaders towards Russia, as told by Professor

Thompson, is fascinating. In spite of the considerable disagreements among them which Professor Thompson has most faithfully chronicled

they were all agreed on one thing: Russia would have to be restored. A

policy of partition as pursued by the Germans in 1918 and by Pilsudski in

1919 and 1920 was not one which the Allies favoured though the British looked sympathetically at the establishment of independent states in the Caucasus and the Black Sea area. It was feared that a weak Russia would be? come an area of German penetration?a new victim of the Drang nach Osten.

The Russian problem pervaded the discussions in Paris. It was in Herbert Hoover's colourful phrase 'Banquo's ghost sitting at every Council table.' Although Professor Thompson spends nearly four hundred

pages analysing its effect in Paris he comes to the surprising conclusion that 'it would be difficult to prove that Bolshevism affected the general structure of the Versailles settlement in major ways.' This seems to be

contrary to the evidence that he himself has collected and is at variance with the views of Professor Arno Mayer in Politics and Diplomacy of Peace?

making (1967). The speed of the settlement, the treatment of Germany and of eastern Europe in general, were all directly affected by the Russian issue. It is a pity that Professor Thompson could not include more treat? ment of the kind of influence that the representatives of the small east

European states had on the Russian issue in Paris.

His other conclusion is more orthodox. A peace treaty concluded against Germany and in disregard of Russia was not likely to be successful.

In his final chapter Professor Thompson writes that the subject of his

study 'has been a story of confusion, frustration and failure.' It must be said to his credit that little of this confusion can be found in this very clear account of the Russian problem in Paris. London Harry Hanak

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