RULE 21

Canilla vs Pelayo/Mendoza

Facts:

-Canillas charged Pelayo, Clerk of Court, with Grave Abuse of Authority.

-Canillas alleged that he received a subpoena merely to compel him to settle his obligation or as an invitation for mediation conference

 

Issue: w/n the act of the clerk of court of sending a subpoena as an invitation for mediation conference was violative of sec. 1 of Rule 21.

 

Held:

-it was a violation

-Section 1 Rule 21 simply states that a subpoena is a process directing a person to attend or to testiy in the trial or hearing of a case or at an investigation.

-in the instant case, the subpoena sent was not for the complainant to attend or testify since there was no case filed yet.

-this was sent merely as an invitation for mediation conference which is a violation of the rule.

HC Liebenow v PVOC

HC Liebenow v. Philippine Vegetable Oil Company

Nov. 9 1918

Facts: The purpose of the proceeding is to recover a sum of money to which the Liebenow considers himself entitled by way of a bonus in addition to the salary earned by him while in the employment of the defendant company as superintendent of its factory in the district of Nagtahan, city of Manila.

A question which we consider of much importance is presented in an assignment of error directed to the action of the trial court with reference to a subpoena duces tecum which the Liebenow caused to be issued a few days prior to the hearing in the Court of First Instance. Said subpoena was directed to the managing director of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company and commanded him to produce in court upon the day set for the hearing of the cause the following documents. records, and papers relative to the company's business.

When the case was called for hearing the attorney for the PVOC moved the court to vacate this subpoena on the ground that the Liebenow was not entitled to require the production of the documents called for. The court ruled that the witness was excused from producing the papers in the subpoena.

Issue: WON the subpoena duces tecum was proper.

Held: No.

The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum, with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena. It is issued in the same manner as the ordinary subpoena, and is procurable from the clerk as of course without application to the court. Section 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that the subpoena duces tecum may be used to compel the witness to bring any book, document, or other thing under his control, which he is bound by law to produce in evidence. The words "which he is bound by law to produce in evidence" indicate a limitation upon the exigency of the writ; and it is evident that there is this difference between the ordinary subpoena to testify an the subpoena duces tecum, namely, that while the person to whom the subpoena to testify is directed is bound absolutely and without qualification to appear in response to the subpoena, the person to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed is bound only in so far as he is required by law to produce the documents in evidence.

To enforce the production of these great piles of material unconditionally in court would in many cases operate with unreasonable hardship on the party against whom the subpoena is issued and not infrequently the step would be barren of results to the person seeking to examine them. Such procedure is not to be encouraged; and it is the duty of the court, in such a situation, to control the process so as to make it conformable to law and justice. (Subsection 7, section 11, Code of Civil Procedure.) The motion to vacate or set aside the subpoena gives the court the requisite opportunity to examine the issues raised by the pleadings in the cause and to consider not only the relevancy of the evidence which is to be elicited but also to consider whether an order for the production of the document would constitute an unlawful invasion of privacy.

In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be enforced. (Street, Federal Equity Practice, vol. 2, sec. 1844.) No court, it is needless to say, would punish a witness for contempt in refusing to obey a subpoena duces tecum the issuance of which has been procured with such end in view. 

Gil Geñorga vs. Hon. Pedro QuitainAM No. 981-CFI (July 29, 1977) FACTS

In 1975, Judge Quitain issued a subpoena which was duly served upon Dr. Geñorga to appear as government witness in a murder case.

Dr. Geñorga failed to appear in court, which prompted Judge Quitain to order the former’s arrest, upon motion of the Fiscal.

Dr. Geñorga filed the present administrative complaint against Judge Quitain, for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge.

Dr. Geñorga explained that his failure to testify was due to the far distance between his place in Tayasan, Negros Occidental and the CFI in Masbate.

Dr. Geñorga added that he questioned via telegram who would reimburse his traveling expenses, but Judge Quitain did not reply, so Geñorga failed to testify on the given date.

Acting Assistant Judicial Consultant Relova of the CA recommended that Judge Quitain is not guilty of the administrative charges, since it is within the coercive power of the courts to compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoena.

 ISSUE:

WON Judge Quitain or CFI hearing a case may compel by subpoena the attendance of a witness in Masbate, when the known address of such witness is in Negros Occidental? ~ YES.

HELD:

Yes. Judge Quitain may compel attendance by subpoena and is therefore, not administratively liable. 

Under Rule 21 Sec 3, it is within the coercive power of the courts to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify in court.

The order of arrest was not done in abuse of authority, since failure of the government witness to attend would subject the prosecution to a serious handicap in proving its case.

What was done by Judge Quitain was lawfully within his judicial discretion. 

Furthermore, Geñorga was already furnished a copy of Quitain’s explanation but no longer replied to such, leading the Court to infer that he is already satisfied with such explanation.

UNIVERSAL RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. CA, CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION, EDWARDSON MANUFACTURING CO., INC. AND HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO

FACTS:

Converse Rubber Corporation and Edwardson Manufacturing Co. sued Universal Rubber Products for unfair competition.

After they have presented about nine witnesses and various pieces of documentary evidence, Converse and Edwardson made a request to Judge Navarro to issue a subpoena duces tecum which was granted by the court. Judge Navarro issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the treasurer of Universal Rubber to bring with him "all sales invoices, sales books and ledgers wherein are recorded the sales of Plymouth Star Player rubber shoes from the time the corporation started manufacturing and selling said shoes up to the present."

Universal Rubber filed a motion praying that the subpoena duces tecum be quashed on the grounds that: (1) the said subpoena is both Unreasonable and oppressive as the books and documents caned for are numerous and voluminous; (2) there is no good cause shown for the issuance thereof; and (3) the books and documents are not relevant to the case pending below.

On the other hand, Converse and Edwardson claims that (1) the subpoena duces tecum in question specifically designates the books and documents that should be produced in court and they are 4 sales invoices, sales books and ledgers where are recorded the sales of Plymouth Star Player Rubber Shoes from the time the corporation started manufacturing and selling shoes (that is from April 1, 1963) up to the present; and (2) the relevance of the books subject to the controverted subpoena duces tecum cannot be seriously denied, because if and when they are ultimately adjudged to be entitled to recover compensatory damages from the Universal Rubber, there would be no factual basis for the amount of such damages unless those books and documents are laid open for the court's scrutiny.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of the "subpoena duces tecum" is proper in a suit for unfair competition. YES

HELD:

While this petition remains pending before the Court, Universal Rubber manifested that their

establishment was totally burned together with all the records which is sought to be produced in court by the questioned "subpoena duces tecum". In effect, it renders the present petition moot and academic. However, the legal principles arising from the issues deserve Our discussion and resolution.

Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum ", it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified.

A "subpoena duces tecum once issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance thereof is unreasonable and oppressive or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.

In the instant case, in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint for unfair competition, We have to examine Republic Act No. 166.

In recovering the loss suffered by the aggrieved party due to unfair competition," Sec. 23 of R.A. 166 grants the complainant three options within which to ascertain the amount of damages recoverable. One of which is the (2) the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement.

In giving life to this remedial statute, We must uphold the order of the lower court denying the motion to quash the "subpoena duces tecum". In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of redress.

The sufficiency in the description of the books sought to be produced in court by the questioned "subpoena duces tecum is not disputed in this case, hence, We hold that the same has passed the test of sufficient description.

As We said earlier, the establishment of the Universal Rubber burned down together with all the records sought to be produced by the questioned "subpoena duces tecum," hence this case has become moot and academic. We have no recourse but to dismiss the same.

Collado vs. Bravo/Murcia

FACTS: Lorena Collado filed an administrative complaint against Teresita bravo, Clerk of Court, alleging that Teresita Bravo issued a subpoena directed to Lorena Collado for the mere purpose of allowing a certain PerlaBaterina to talk to Lorena Collado.

Bravo averred in her answer that her only purpose in issuing the subpoena was to enable Lorena Collado and the Baterinas to settle their differences.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of the subpoena was valid?

HELD: NO. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition. Bravo should have known that a process is the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant before it, or a compliance with its demands. Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before a court, a subpoena may not issue. In this case, Bravo knew there was no case filed against Collado. Neither had Collado commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Bravo, then, had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena to the complainant.

MACASPAC VS. FLORES/PADER Facts: 

Rommel Macaspac filed an administrative case against Ricardo Flores, the Process Server of RTC Bataan, charging him with Serious Neglect of Duty for his failure to serve a copy of the subpoena on the former and for perjuring his report.

 Macaspac countered that the reason why he failed to serve a copy of

the subpoena was that at the time he went to the police station to effect the service, Macaspac was nowhere to be found and upon inquiry, he was informed by Macaspac’s colleague that he was assigned to Tondo, Manila.

 In his Reply, complainant reacted that Flores merely went through the

process of serving a subpoena without exerting much effort to locate him. He asserted that during the time where the subpoena was allegedly served, he was not assigned or transferred to another station, and that he was the desk officer-on-duty in that same station. Issue: WON there was compliance by Flores of the manner of service of subpoena under Sec. 6, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. Held: NO. 

Under Section 6, Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of Court, service of a subpoena shall be made in the same manner as personal or substituted service of summons.

 Personal service and substituted service are the two modes of

serving a subpoena. In this case, after Flores’s frustrated attempt to personally serve complainant a copy of the subpoena he acted no further.  This he cannot deny since the certification itself only reflected: “I have this 18th day of November 2003 not served of (sic) witness subpoena upon PO1 Rommel Macaspac on the ground that the said PO1 Rommel Macaspac is now [assigned] at WPD Station 2[,] Tondo, Manila according to SPO3 Antonio Capuli of the PNP, Orani, Bataan.”  He did not attest in his report or aver in his Comment that, upon learning that personal service is not possible, he served the subpoena by leaving a copy thereof to some responsible person at complainant’s dwelling place in Orani,   Bataan   or in the police station. Flores actually had ample time to properly serve it thereafter because complainant was only required to appear as a witness on February 12, 2004, but Flores chose to be apathetic.  The manner by which he served

the court process clearly does not suffice to comply with the requirements of the Rules.

RULE 22Luz vs. nat'l Amnesty commission/REYESFacts: 

luz was charged with a violation  (for illegal possession of fire arms) and was convicted. He applied for amnesty which was denied. He had until December 7, 2002 which was a saturday to file a petition for review. on December 9, 2002 he filed a motion for extension for 15 days to file said petition for review which was going to be on december 24, and the 24th and 25th are both legal holiday. december 26, 2002 luz filed a second motion for extension. CA denied since the time to file said motion for extension already expires.

issue:

WON luz timely filed his second motion for extension (to file his petition for review) 

Ruling: 

SC said yes. SC explained that the ca was correct for granting the first motion for extension reckoned from december 7, 2002 and not from december 9, 2002 as stated in the general rule that it merely applied rule 22 sec.1 as amended. otherwise, he would have acted with grave abuse of discretion. however, as stated in the court in labad vs. USEP the underpinning consideration in this case is the liberal interpretation of the rules of court, to attain substantial justice. it appears that luz relied in good faith. the SC said that there would be apparent unfairness if the extension was to be counted from the original period and not from the date she had prayed for.   

Neypes v. CA / Sagarino / Rule 22.1

Facts: Neypes filed in the RTC an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion against the delMundo's. The delMundo's filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of prescription. In February 12, 1998, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the action has already prescribed. Neypes received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed MR. On July 1, 1998, the RTC issued another order dismissing the MR which Neypes received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, Neypes filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the RTC denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by Neypes on August 31, 1998. Neypes filed a MR but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Neypes assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the CA, Neypes claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the RTC denying their MR. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.

CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the CA, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules.

Issue:A. What should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?B. WON Neypes file their notice of APPEAL on time? YES

Held:

Final order: the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR. The. SC has ruled in previous cases that it was the denial of the MR of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Under Rule 41, Section 3, Neypes had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the RTC. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), Neypes did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the RTC, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that Neypes, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Neypes, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, SC deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

This "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the MTC to the RTC; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTC to CA; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the SC. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

SC thus hold that Neypes seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

15-DAY FRESH PERIOD RULE applies only to APPEALS. Final order is the FINAL NOT INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, and not FINAL & EXECUTORY ORDER.

AGUILAR VS. CAFACTS:

Arnulfo Aguilar was an EO of COMELEC-Navotas during the 1998 National and Local Elections. He was designated as the Acting EO and Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.Due to the failure of Aguilar to report in his post during the canvassing of the ER, he was charged with Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty, Abandonment, and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer Prejudicial to the Interest of Public Service before the COMELEC.The COMELEC through a resolution on May 31, 1999 found him guilty of the charged and imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the service for 6 months.Instead of filing an appeal with the CSC, Aguilar, sought, on November 26, 1999, a reconsideration of his suspension, but this was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution dated January 27, 2000. Aguilar filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation but this was likewise denied by COMELEC on February 17, 2000.Aguilar filed a Notice of Appeal with the CSC on April 28, 2000.On August 17, 2001, CSC denied Aguilar’s appeal and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from service. Aguilar moved for the reconsideration of the decision but was denied by the CSC on January 3, 2002.Aguilar brought his case with the CA on September 23, 2004. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the CSC resolution on August 17, 2001 had become final and executory without any timely MR having been filed, and therefore could no longer be modified and set aside. The appellate court found that Aguilar’s MR was filed only on October 1, 2001, more than 15 days from September 7, 2001, when Aguilar received a copy of the said resolution.Aguilar now contends that he filed his MR on September 25, 2001 as indicated by the date stamped on the motion and not on October 1, 2001 as declared by the CA. He further argues that his MR was filed only 1 day late since the 15 day period from September 7, 2001 fell on September 22, 2001, which is a Saturday, therefore, he had only until September 24, 2001, a Monday, to file his motion.ISSUE:HELD:The MR with the CSC was not filed on time resulting in finality of judgment sought to be reconsidered.COMELEC decision lapsed into finality for reasons subsequent to the MR, therefore, they affect the jurisdiction of CSC.Jurisprudence teaches us that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.26 This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.Rule III of CSC Resolution No. 991936,30 otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), provides the following remedies to a party adversely affected by the decision of the disciplining authority:Section 38.Filing of Motion for Reconsideration. – The party adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.x xxSection 41.Limitation. – Only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.x xx

Section 43.Filing of Appeals. – Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. x xx (Emphasis supplied)In the present case, the Aguilar, instead of filing a proper appeal with the CSC, filed a second motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC on November 26, 1999 after the denial of his first motion for reconsideration in COMELEC Resolution No. 99-1805 dated October 11, 1999. Aguilar also subsequently filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. When Aguilar filed his Notice of Appeal with the CSC on April 28, 2000, more than six (6) months had lapsed, and the CSC should have forthwith denied his Notice of Appeal for non-compliance with Rule III of the URACCS. The petitioner's Notice of Appeal on April 28, 2000, having been filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period, did not toll COMELEC Resolution No. 99-1067 from becoming final and executory.The settled and firmly established rule is that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of the judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land.Being an immutable decision, COMELEC Resolution No. 99-1067 may no longer be modified, altered or changed. CSC Resolution No. 011396 which modified a final and executory judgment is a void judgment. As such, it is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. 34 Thus, CSC Resolution No. 011396 finding the petitioner guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and the consequent penalty of dismissal from the service is rendered ineffectual.

RULE 22.2/SEREDRICA/sumawayvs urban bank, inc.

SUMAWAY VS URBAN BANK, INC./SEREDRICA

~~~digest proper~~~

DonatoSumaway, et al versusUrban Bank, Inc., et al

G.R. No. 142534June 27, 2006AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for Reformation of Contract, Specific Performance, Damages, Consignation with Injunction, with Restraining Order, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-0026.

Respondents Urban Bank, Isabela Sugar Co., Inc., and Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña, filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action; the claim is

unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds; the action has prescribed; and the pendency of another action.

The trial court, in its Order dated September 12, 1995, granted the motion to dismiss. The order of dismissal was received on September 19, 1995, and filed a motion for reconsideration on October 2, 1995. [12 days passed excluding October 2from count, remaining balance 3 days]

On January 30, 1996, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, which order was received by petitioners’ counsel on April 25, 1996.

On May 3, 1996, petitioners’ counsel filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the trial court in its Order dated May 17, 1996, and the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53270.

On June 3, 1997, respondent Urban Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.  Respondent contended that petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed five days late, as it should have been filed on April 28, 1997, and not May 3, 1997.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sumaway and company's appeal was filed out of time?

HELD: No. In this case, the liberal construction provided in the Neypes ruling was applied.

Strictly speaking, Jurisprudence is consistent in ruling that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory, although the Court, in exceptional circumstances, allowed the filing of a belated notice of appeal.

Fortunately, however, for petitioners, the Court recently modified the rule on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal.  In the precedent-setting case of Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal.

Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

This fresh 15-day period within which to file notice of appeal counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration may be applied to petitioners’ case inasmuch as rules of procedure may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.

Therefore, the appeal before the CA should be deemed as timely filed and the case be remanded to the CA for further proceedings as was done in the Neypes case.

RULE 23RULE 23.01/SOLANO/RP vs. SBFACTS:Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants.After having been served with summons, the defendants filed a motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court and Interrogatories under the same rule.The defendants moved to strike out said motion and interrogatories.ISSUES:1)     W/N Modes of Discovery was proper? 

YESThe various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. 33To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial.2)     W/N Leave of Court is necessary?NOIn line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served.  It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear. On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.

Producers Bank vs. CA/TauthoFACTS:

State Investment House Inc.(SIHI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP). When the trial of the merits started, SIHI served written interrogatories to PBP. PBP filed a motion to quash on the ground that they were improper since the trial was about to be terminated. The trial court denied the motion and admitted the written interrogatories. MR was filed by PBP but was likewise denied. On appeal, the CA still dismissed the petition stating that the Rules do not provide a time frame in the filling of written interrogatories and other modes of discovery.ISSUE: WON the court was correct in allowing the admission of the written interrogatories filed by SIHI as the rebuttal stage of the proceedings.HELD: YES! Sec.1, Rule 23 does not provide for any time frame within which the modes of discovery can be utilized other than stating that it must be availed of with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or without such leave after an answer has been served.

Since the rules are silent as to period within which written interrogatories may still be requested, it is necessary for the resolution of the case to determine the purpose of written interrogatories.In the case at bar, PBP alleged that it issued the 2M in the name of Johnny Lu and they already paid it, thus there is no more liability. The questions propounded in the written interrogatories were meant to illicit information

pertinent to the nature of PBP’s defense. Thus, allowing the admission of the written interrogatories, the trial court is in a better position to examine the evidence presented and to determine whether the information sought by SIHI would expedite the resolution of the case.

ELENA S. ONG, Ong, vs. HON. FRANCISCO V. MAZO/ ALABASTRO

Elvira C. Lanuevo (Lanuevo) and Charito A. Tomilloso (Tomilloso) fileda complaint for damages against Ong along with Iluminado J. Caramoan(Caramoan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guiuan, EasternSamar.

This is a collision case:

-Ong is a bus owner

-Caramaon is the driver

-Lanuevo is the driver/owner of the jeepney

-Tomisillo is the passenger

On November 14, 1996, Ong served written interrogatories [7] uponLanuevo and Tomisillo

on November 21, 1996, she filed a "Manifestation and Omnibus Motion"[8] seeking, among other things, an order from the trial courtdirecting the latter to answer the interrogatories.

Lanuevo and Tomisillo filed their objection.

RTC denied the motion to compel Lanuevo and Tomisillo to answer theinterrogatories upon the ground that it constituted a "fishingexpedition" which would be more properly ventilated in a pre-trialconference

was the denial on the answer and the availment of the writteninterrogatories proper? No, it was not proper.

This Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availmentof the various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules24 to 29 of the Revised Rules of Court.

in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, [31] it held:

. . . Indeed it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties- before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial - shoulddiscover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action,not only those known to them individually, but also those known totheir adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civiltrials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Courtmake this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanismset forth in Rules 24 to 29.

The thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes ofdiscovery - depositions, interrogatories and requests for admissions -without much court intervention since leave of court is not necessaryto put into motion such modes after an answer to the complaint hasbeen served.

The rationale behind the recognition accorded the modes of discoveryis that they enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverseparty and thus facilitate an amicable settlement or expedite the trialof the case.

In this case, to deny a party the liberty to have his writteninterrogatories answered by his opponent, as what the trial court did,on the premise that the interrogatories were a "fishing expedition,"is to disregard the categorical pronouncement in aforementioned caseof Republic vs. Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of 'fishingexpedition' can no longer provide a reason to prevent a party frominquiring into the facts underlying the opposing party's case throughthe discovery procedures.

Ayala Land vs Judge Tagle/ALVAR

FACTS:ASB Realty filed a case for nullification of Contract to Sell and damages against Ayala Land, et al. Ayala Land (ALI) thereafter filed its Answer. ASB subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to take testimony by deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos Sr. The depositions happened on 6 different occasions. But before they could proceed to the cross-examination, ALI filed a Motion to Resolve Objections regarding the admissibility and conformity of the deposition proceedings to the Rules. ALI contends that the preqrequisites of a valid deposition were disregarded. It repeatedly insists that what transpired was simply a recordation of testimony of Emerito Ramos, Sr. intended to form part of a deposition for submission to the trial court but not a deposition itself considering that it never underwent the process of a valid deposition taken under Rules 23 and 132 of the Rules of Court, as the deposition was not completed, signed, certified, filed or offered before the court a quo, hence, under the Rules, considered incompetent evidence. ISSUE: WON the deposition was valid   YES HELD:The deposition of the late Emerito Ramos, Sr. was taken inside the courtroom by the Clerk of Court in the presence of the parties and their lawyers, and the entire proceedings was transcribed by the stenographers of the Court.  Thus, the requirements that the deposition has to be sealed, examined and signed by the deponent, and also certified, sealed and signed by the deposition officer would be, to the mind of the court, already unnecessary.  Strict compliance with the formal requirements of Rule 23 would hold true in cases of depositions taken outside the Court.  As intimated earlier, the rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted; otherwise, the perceived advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.  On the objection of ALI owing to the lack of signature of the deponent, it should be noted that a deposition not signed does not preclude its use during the trial.  A deponent’s signature to the deposition is not in all events indispensable since the presence of signature goes primarily to the form of deposition.  The requirement that the deposition must be examined and signed by the witness is only to ensure that the deponent is afforded the opportunity to correct any errors contained therein and to ensure its accuracy. It has been repeatedly held that the deposition – discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law, as in the case at bar.

Rule 23 Section 1/ ANIMAPhilippines Computer Solution Inc. vs Hernandez and Manzo

FACTS:PCSI alleged that its corporate name was being unlawfully used in an unauthorized business transaction.That Candol, Lisama and Manzo executed a Trustee’s Certificate where they made it appear that PCSI created a Board of Trustees where they were appointed as members.That they entered into a partnership with People Soft AustraliaIn the SEC complaint, only Manzo filed an answerFor their failure to file an answer, PCSI filed a motion dated September 16, 2003 for the issuance of a commission to take the deposition in Australia of a corporate officer of People Soft Australia as well as that of Bergen, are of PCSI’s incorporators and stockholders, who was then in US.

The RTC denied the motion since a party can only avail of any of the modes of discovery not later than 15 days from the joinder of issues. Rule 3 sec. 1 of the Interior Rules on Intra-Corporate Controversies.ISSUE:        WON, deposition may be accepted by the Court in lieu of direct testimony of the witness especially when the party could have taken such deposition at the earliest possible opportunity and within the period prescribed by law, but failed to do so.RULING: NOThere is deemed to have been a joinder of issues as of July 3, 2002 or immediately after the period where Manzo et.al to file their answer has lapsed.PCSI had until July 18, 2002 of 15 days there from within which to serve written interrogatives on its witnesses abroad.However, it is not disputed that a decision in the main case in the SEC has already been rendered and the prayer of PCSI was substantially needed by the trail court.Even more, during the hearings before the trial court, Mr. Bergen had already testified, hence, foregoing any need for taking his disposition.Since a decision has already been rendered, the order denying the motion to take deposition, being an order, should have been included and raised in the petition for review filed by PCSI before the CA.

Rule 23.4 Jonathan land Oil vsMangudadatu

FACTS: Mangudadatu filed a complaint for damages against JL before the RTC of Tacurong City. JL was declared in default. JL filed a motion for new trial but I was denied. Writ of execution was issued. JL filed a motion to quash/recall the writ of execution claiming that it has not yet received the order denying the motion for new trial. It took the deposition of its witness in Makati City to prove the non-receipt of the order. Mangudadatu filed a motion to strike off the deposition on the ground that trial (for complaint for damages) was already terminated.

ISSUE: WON the position can be taken even after trial has been terminated. YES.

HELD: A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been served.60 Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.61 The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is "well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.

The Rules of Court65 and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes,66 we allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial.

Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial."67 There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.68

The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.

Jowel Sales vs. Cyril Sabino

Facts:Cyril Sabino filed a case for damages against Jowel Sales for the death of his son in a vehicular accident.

Before any responsive pleading was filed, Cyril Sabino notified Jowel Sales that he will take the deposition of one Buanares Corral.

Then after the deposition taking, Cyril Sabino formally offered the deposition of Buanares Corral as evidence. But during this time, Buanares Corral is no longer in the Philippines and to prove it, Cyril Sabino attached the certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral.

But this was opposed by Jowel Sales on the ground that Cyril Sabino could not admit the deposition as evidence because the requirements under Section 4 Rule 23 were not complied.

Issues:

1.     W/N the deposition taken from Buanares Corral can be used during the trial although he is not here in the Philippines.

2.     W/N the plaintiff in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of his deposition waived any and all objections in connection therewith.

Holding:1.    The deposition of Buanares Corral can be used during the trial although he is not here in the Philippines in accordance with Rule 23 Section 4. Though the general rule is that deposition offered during trial in lieu of actual testimony is not accepted. There are exceptions to the same in which depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. One of which is paragraph 2  of Subsection C of Section 4 Rule 23 which provides

Section 4 Use of depositions.- At the trial . . . any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: 

(2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.

 

 

2.    No. The plaintiff in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of deposition did not waived all objections in connection therewith. Because according to Section 29 Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides that  while errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice, qualifications of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if not objected to before or during the taking of the deposition, objections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated at that point.

Rule 23 sec 4 /CAMELLO/ Tiu v Ca, Sps Montebon

Tiu and Sps Montebon entered into a contract of sale. It was a pacto de retro sale (sale with right of repurchase), however, the Deed of Absolute Sale which was procured by Tiu through Judge Bornia says that the sale was absolute. Because of that, the Montebon sps filed an action for reformation of the instrument before the rtc. 

During trial, Tiu offered in evidence the deposition of Judge Bornia, the one who notarized the deed. He said that because Judge Bornia could not testify due to sickness, the deposition should be taken to substitute for his oral testimony in court.

The use of such deposition was however assailed on the ground that it was not formally offered in evidence. 

ISSUE: WON the deposition of witness Bornia may be admitted in lieu of his oral testimony in court. NO. The deposition was not admissible under the rules of evidence. 

RULE: A deposition is not intended to substitute for the actual testimony of the deponent witness in open court.

: However, a deposition may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand, provided, any of the circumstances under Rule 23, Sec 4 par c. exists. One of these is when the deponent witness is unable to testify because he is sick.

In this case, while it is true that Judge Bornia was sick during the trial, his deposition cannot be admitted because it was not formally offered in evidence - the deposition was NOT SIGNED by him, it does not contain the CERTIFICATION of the deposition officer and there was NO NOTICE of the filing of the deposition given to the parties.

The SC emphasized that Section 4 allows the use of deposition only in so far as admissible under the rules of evidence.

Fortune Corporation vs. Inter-Merchants Corporation

Facts: An action for breach of contract was filed by Fortune Corporation against Inter-Merchants Corporation before the Regional Trial Court. After Inter-Merchants corporation had filed its Answer, Fortune corporation served the former with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories were answered by Inter-Merchants through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope.

Subsequently, however, Fortune served upon Inter-Merchants a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination and would take the deposition of said Juanito A. Teope.Inter-Merchants filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, alleging inter alia that :

(a) Fortune has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case and to which the proposed deponent already responded;(b) Mr. Teope, the proposed deponent has no intention of leaving the country and even signified his availability to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits;(b) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope.The trial court thereafter issued an order that the requested deposition shall not be taken.

Issue: WON the grounds cited constitute the “good cause” contemplated under Rule 23, Sec. 16 and 18.

Held: No. In the present case, Inter-Merchants failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken, for several reasons.

1. We agree with Fortune's submission that the fact that petitioner had previously availed of the mode of discovery, which is by written interrogatories supposedly covering all claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case,  cannot be considered "good cause", because: (a) the fact that information similar to that sought had been obtained by answers to interrogatories does not bar an examination before trial, and is not a valid objection to the taking of a deposition where there is no duplication and the examining party is not acting in bad faith; and (b) knowledge of the facts by the petitioner concerning which the proposed deponent is to be examined does not justify a refusal of such examination.

As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential to the expenditious and proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the various methods of discovery as provided for in the Rules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or mutually exclusive.Under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party.

2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the facts before the trial. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable.

3. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that Fortune merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.

Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.

Once a party has requested discovery, the burden is on the party objecting to show that the discovery requested is not relevant to the issues, and to establish the existence of any claimed privilege. These, Inter-Merchants has failed to do so. Consequently, its objection to the taking of the deposition cannot be sustained.

Note: Read the FT for SCs exhaustive discussion on the reason, purpose, benefit/s and importance of discovery procedu