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The Effects of Nanjing Massacre Revisionism on Japanese Conservat ism

William Cheng

2018 MIT INSPIRE RESEARCH WINNER

The Nanking Massacre* was one of the most controversial atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The display of brutality and the number of mass executions in the Kuomintang (KMT) capital was nearly unparalleled in the Pacific Theatre and contributed heavily to anti-Japanese sentiment in China, among the strongest in the world. After Japan?s unconditional surrender in 1945, Allied and KMT forces held war tribunals to try Japanese leaders. The former held the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo War Trials) which aimed to convict Japanese leaders for ?Class A? war crimes, while the latter held the Nanjing Tribunals to specifically address the war crimes committed during the Nanking Massacre. Initially, under the Allied occupation, nationalist sentiments died down in Japan along with curbing away from imperialism.However, a vocal, modern force soon began to question the convictions of Japanese ?war heroes? during the Tokyo War Trials and Nanjing Tribunals, and the legitimate existence of the Nanking massacre. That sentiment would be carried into the present age, with a denialist movement surging? and arguably peaking? during the 21st century.

* When Nanking was Romanized as Nanjing, the massacre was also referred to as the Nanjing Massacre.

INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

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military, Chinese soldiers were ordered to retreat from Nanking by General Tang Sheng-chi.

The city, with no weapons to defend it, was now at the mercy of the Japanese. Angered by the losses they sustained in Shanghai, the Japanese pillaged and torched nearly one-third of the city (Cook). Civilians were captured and brought to a trench known as the "Ten-Thousand-Corpse Ditch" and were either shot or buried alive. A contest to kill 100 civilians with a sword was also held by two Japanese officers, and after tying held another competition to kill 150 more. The Japanese used torture methods such as unleashing rabid dogs on the victim, piercing them with sharpened bamboo rods, or burning them alive with gasoline (Smith). Rape was so prevalent that numerous accounts recorded up to 1,000 cases in one day alone, and the Japanese began searching door-to-door for victims. The massacre was also an opportunity for Japanese officers to continue recruiting locals as ?comfort women? (Smith).

After the war, the Nanking Massacre was heavily contested by both sides, especially the death toll. The Chinese government places the official figure at around 300,000 casualties, while many Japanese now claim that this statistic was heavily inflated.

Evaluating the Shokun! survey and the centrist shift in academia, politics, and media

Arguably, a gradual shift from the center right towards nationalism? especially regarding the Nanking Massacre? redefined 21st century Japanese conservatism. One of the traces of this movement was the Shokun! questionnaire survey. In 2001, the Japanese publication Shokun! surveyed 23 of the nation?s most influential and high-ranking researchers, academics, and politicians about the massacre1. It sought to separate out the respondents into divisions? known as schools? regarding their stances on Nanking. There were three general schools that Shokun! used that took off in popularity during the late 20th to early 21st

he Nanking Massacre was the sacking and subsequent genocide of the Chinese capital of Nanking during World War II

by Japanese forces. From December 13, 1937, until mid-January 1938, some 40,000-300,000 Chinese civilians and disarmed combatants were killed, although the death toll was contested by both sides.

This display of violence mainly stemmed from the result of the Battle of Shanghai a few months earlier. The four-month engagement was an unpleasant surprise for the Japanese, who expected an easy victory and not a hard-lined Chinese resistance (Cook). Even when Chinese troops were vastly outnumbered in terms of ground, air, and naval power, they managed to hold out Shanghai for nearly three months. While the city itself was captured, over 160,000 Japanese were killed and troops became increasingly demoralized with the state of the war. (Matson).

With the path cleared of most Chinese opposition, the Japanese marched towards Nanking. Due to the losses Chiang Kai-shek?s Nationalist army sustained in Shanghai, the city was largely defenseless against the Japanese. The only available fighting force was a regiment of 100,000 inexperienced soldiers, but the Nationalist military commander Tang Shengzhi still expected the city to hold. Civilians were ordered to stay in their homes, with the military preventing them from escaping through the port. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek realized that the city was lost and ordered Chinese government officials to move to Wuhan, farther into the mainland (Matson).

The Imperial Japanese Army first arrived at the city gates on December 9th and proceeded to lay siege. In a last-ditch attempt to save the

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?There's no solution except to break the power of Chiang Kai-shek by capturing Nanking. That is what I must do."

? General Iwane Matsui, Imperial Japanese Army, 1937

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century: the ?illusion? school, the ?middle-of-the-road? school, and the ?great massacre? school. Figure 1.1 defines the given schools using their general estimates of the Nanking Massacre death toll as well as other general characteristics that members exhibit:


Schools Death Toll General Characteristics

Illusion 0-50 Narratives of the past that serve the political, ideological and emotional needs of neo-nationalists. Steady flow of younger generations aligning with the school.

Middle-of-Road 7000-20,000 Large number of academics who bring a great deal of authority in governmental policy. Draws support from more moderate and conservative viewpoints.

Great Massacre 100,000-200,000 Generally views all deaths with abhorrence. Maximizes the effects of the massacre.

Figure 1.1: The Three Schools as def ined by Shokun! and Askew

Source: Askew?s New Research on the Nanjing Incident: The Asia Pacific Journal - Japan Focus, 2004

1 Those included in the Shokun! survey :

1. Akira Fujiwara (Professor emeritus at Hitotsubashi University)

2. Akira Nakamura (Professor at Dokkyo University)

3. Akira Suzuki (Author of The Illusion of the Nanjing Massacre and freelance journalist)

4. Hisahiko Okazaki (Advisor to Hakuhodo, Inc. and head of the Okazaki Institute)

5. Hisashi Inoue (Professor at Surugadai University)

6. Katsuhiko Takaike (Attorney and director of the JINF think tank)

7. Kenichi Ara (Journalist)

8. Keiichi Eguchi (Professor at Aichi University)

9. Masaaki Tanaka (President of the Society to Protect the Koa Kannon)

10. Masaki Unemoto (Researcher on military history)

11. Mitsuru Oi (Researcher on military history)

12. Mitsuyoshi Himeta (Professor at Chuo University)

13. Nobukatsu Fujioka (Professor of Education at Tokyo University)

14. Nobuo Fuji (Researcher on the Tokyo War Crimes Trials)

15. Ryuji Takasaki (Critic)

16.Shoichi Watanabe (Professor at Sophia University and prominent denialist)

17.Takeshi Hara (Former head researcher at the War History Department of the NIDS)

18. Tokushi Kasahara (Professor at Tsuru University)

19. Toshio Matsumura (Researcher on the Nanking Incident)

20. Toshio Tanabe (Researcher on Showa Period history)

21.Yoshiko Sakurai (Journalist)

22.Yoshinori Kobayashi (Artist of the revisionist G?manism Sengen manga)

23.Yutaka Yoshida (Professor at Hitotsubashi University)

In part to its use in Japan?s political spectrum, the "school" system has been accepted as the general methodology in Japanese academia when separating stances on the Nanking Massacre. Those who were associated with the ?illusion? school tended to be far-right or nationalist, center-right conservatives and moderates tended to align with the ?middle-of-the-road?, and the ?great massacre? was usually considered a center-left to left-wing perspective. The recommendations in Figure 1.1 have stayed generally consistent, although analyst David Askew modified the subsequent benchmarks in his 2004 research brief ?New Research on the Nanjing Incident?. With the death toll being the main factor taken into account, the results of the Shokun! survey?s first question served as a baseline to identify the three schools in the sample size:

Three respondents answered ?other? based on the lack of primary source materials at Nanjing but still gave rough estimates, while two answered that those who were ?mistakenly executed? only went into the hundreds, thus it wouldn?t be considered a ?massacre?. The three schools are defined in the data, with those who identified with answer choices 11-12 being identified as ?illusion?, those who answered 6-10 were considered ?middle of the road?, and those who answered 1-5 separated into the ?great massacre?. If we utilize Shokun! and Askew?s methodology, then the schools are roughly divided into the following (Figure 1.3):

However, many ?middle-of-the-road? respondents deviated from their school when asked about historical data that proved that there was a massacre at Nanking (Figures 1.4 & 1.5).


There are a couple of takeaways. Moderates who fit under the ?middle-of-the-road? schools tended to respond in two ways to the question presented in Figure 1.4. A few argued that foreigners did not understand what was happening at Nanking and therefore can?t claim that there were illegal murders, while others argued that there was no declaration of war and so the international laws of war couldn?t be applied. The first answer appears to be a direct response to the testimonies and evidence presented by foreign witnesses at the Tokyo and Nanking War Crimes Trials. The second answer appears to be a response to the overall viability of the Allied war trials and criticizes the convictions of Japanese military leaders at Nanking who were accused of violating the laws of war. Others declined to respond to the question.

Those who generally identified with the ?middle-of-the-road? school tended to agree with the ?illusion? school that there was no real data of war crimes committed at Nanking and considered The Rape of Nanking as


exaggerated propaganda. Hisahiko Okazaki, who initially placed the death toll at around 10,000, described it as a ?bizarre piece of pulp historical fiction?. Akira Nakamura, who also had similar casualty estimates to Okazaki, commented that The Rape of Nanking was an ?absurd book with an anti-Japanese political agenda that doesn?t merit serious criticism.? Takeshi Hara, who placed the toll at around 20,000, said the book was ?a publicity book for the ?great massacre? interpretation and hence does not have any factual value.? Their refusal to accept the accounts described in The Rape of Nanking and similar books written by foreign witnesses like John Rabe as legitimate forms of evidence has always been a characteristic of the ?illusion? school and nationalist groups.

Far-right groups have tendencies to only consider Japanese first-person accounts as ?smoking-gun? evidence, and there appears to be a shift among moderate demographics towards this idea. Although these groups often claim that such evidence exists, there is a major lack of Japanese first-person accounts of the massacre. There were

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2 The Rape of Nanking (1999) describes the events leading up to the Nanking Massacre and the atrocities that were committed. While the author Iris Chang interviewed Chinese survivors of the massacre, she did not conduct any research in Japan or interview any Japanese soldiers. The book won many accolades in China and America, but was highly controversial and its contents were initially blocked from publishing in Japan.

Figure 1.4: If there is smoking gun historical data that clearly states that the executions carried out by the Japanese Army were violations of international law then present them

Figure 1.5: What do you think about the book "The Rape of Nanking" by Iris Chang?2

testifying witnesses, but many were incriminated by Japanese nationalists, including those presented in The Rape of Nanking.

This ?ideological obscuring? would make its way into the ?illusion? school?s attempts to exert their influence on Japanese history textbooks. Curriculum reforms issued by the Ministry of Education in 2001 sought to ?correct history? by removing traces of ?dark history? from textbooks to instill a ?love of country? (Masalski & Heinzen). Shokun! respondents were presented with a question concerning how the massacre should be presented in Japanese history textbooks.

Those belonging to the ?illusion? school shunned The Rape of Nanking and tended to respond with answer choices 1 & 2. The center-right tended to align with these viewpoints as well. Toshio Matsumura answered, ?Historical consciousness is what each individual should have after understanding the facts of history, so we should describe the Battle of Nanking as a fact. The "Nanking Incident" is simply an illusion springing from the executions of plainclothes troops, including those trying to flee, as well as the rumors spread by KMT agents plotting to sow disorder behind the lines. Foreigners in Nanking then depicted these things via their own blinkered view of reality.? Other moderates including Takeshi Hara and Akira Nakamura said that the textbooks should deny Chinese assertions and clearly mention that there wasn?t a massacre of 200,000?300,000 people. As a swing demographic in conservative parties, the changing stances of the center-right have led to a surge in denialist

around 100 Japanese journalists in Nanking in the first week of the massacre, but the Japanese government imposed a ?media blackout? on its reporters (Smith). Due to the excessive censorship, stories about the massacre itself never made it to newspapers back home. Instead, the front pages were of celebratory titles such as ?Nanking entirely conquered: Historical grand ceremony three days ahead in the walled city.? itself. Here is one controversial passage from Azuma?s diary:

The Japanese Army was largely glorified by propaganda and media censorship, and it wasn?t until former soldiers such as Shiro Azuma published their accounts did Japanese veterans begin to publicly speak out about the massacre itself. Here is one controversial passage from Azuma?s diary:

?We had fun killing Chinese. When we caught some Chinese civilians, we either buried them alive, or pushed them into a fire, or beat them to death with clubs. When they were half dead we pushed them into ditches and burned them, torturing them to death. Everyone gets his entertainment this way.? Shiro Azuma, The Diary of Shiro Azuma, 1987

Azuma?s work was largely dismissed for what many nationalists considered libel, and he was largely ostracized in Japan (Kamimura). He was sued and lost a defamation case by a veteran mentioned in the book to have killed civilians, and threats against Azuma continued until his death in 2006. Part of this rush to censor veterans result in a growing number of centrists who are likely to identify with the ?illusion? school, not because of their unwillingness to accept evidence that the massacre was a war crime, but because the general cultural shift towards nationalism has whittled down ?legitimate evidence? considerably. No other massacre in Sino-Japanese history has had so many


Figure 1.6: How should Japanese history textbooks describe the Nanking Incident?

cryptic denialist circle that has grown to nearly 38,000 members in just two decades. Known as the Nippon Kaigi, the reactionary far-right group rose to prominence on their accusations that the Nanking Massacre was either exaggerated or fabricated and that Japan should be ?applauded for liberating much of East Asia? during World War II (Chanlett-Avery). Nippon Kaigi currently counts Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Tar? As? among its ranks, as well as 15 of the 18 members of the Third Abe Cabinet and 289 out of the 480 National Diet members (Hyun-Ki). Relatively unknown before 2015, Nippon Kaigi is now instrumental in governance and is one of the most powerful lobbying groups in Japanese politics (Yoshifumi).

The immense growth of these groups reflects the shift in power from more moderate conservatives to far-right coalitions. To cement their political stances, members of the LDP and Nippon Kaigi often conduct the highly-publicized rituals of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. The Shinto shrine holds the remains of 1068 convicted war criminals, 14 of them convicted for Class A war crimes, and is the final resting place for General Iwani Matsui3. The shine also gives its own explanation of the ?Nanking Operation? 4:

?The purpose of the Nanking Operation was to surround the capital, thus discouraging the Chinese from waging war against the Japanese. Tang Thengzhi, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps. ignored the Japanese warning to open the gates of the city. He

representatives who hold major influence in Japanese politics. One of those parties was the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who developed stances against apologizing for the Nanking Massacre since it began to dominate elections during the early 2000s.

Yasukuni and the r ise of the LDP and Nippon Kaigi (? ? ? ? )

With a renewed public interest in protecting cultural identity, several nationalist and revisionist groups have surged in popularity and political power. Denial of the Nanking massacre has been a common tactic employed by many in these circles, including the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. For instance, the LDP council held a 100-legislator review in 2007 over the death toll and concluded that ?the toll was nothing more or less than the death toll that would be expected in a normal battle?. Nariaki Nakayama, the head of the council, claimed that the actual death toll was 20,000 at most, and thus determined that there was no violation of international law? a viewpoint that many ?middle-of-the-road? moderates now share as well (see Figures 1.4 and 1.6). Nakayama later denounced the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunals and the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals and demanded that China remove photos depicting Japanese soldiers in a negative light be removed from war memorials. Later that year, several LDP lawmakers and nearly 5,000 donors publicly supported Satoru Mizushima?s film ?The Truth About Nanjing?, which presented the atrocities as doctored Chinese myths and fantasies (McNell).

Within the LDP, there has been a more


3 During the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, General Matsui? commander of the Japanese forces at Nanking? and other aggressors at the massacre were convicted of "deliberately and recklessly disregarding their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches.? Matsui was sentenced to death and his ashes were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978. 4 It should be noted that Yasukuni is not owned by the Japanese government, rather it has been privately owned and operated since 1946.

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were held in Chongqing, Zhengzhou, and several other major Chinese cities. Koizumi?s visits to Yasukuni quickly became one of the most contentious topics of East Asian diplomacy.

The Japanese felt more conflicted about the issue. That same month, Mainichi Shimbun conducted a poll of 1,046 Japanese that showed that 65% supported his visit to the shrine, while 28% viewed the visit as inappropriate. Koizumi would later visit the shrine five more times as prime minister. The 2006 Pew Global Affairs Survey found that by the end of his term in 2006, 52% of Japanese supported the visits and 45% of Japanese opposed them. Pew?s results were supported by Asahi Shimbun?s 2006 ?Tokyo Trials Poll? which found that 50% of Japanese supported the visits and 31% opposed them. Many of those who supported the PM visits cited Yasukuni as a shrine dedicated to memorializing the war dead.

In the same Pew survey, older Japanese generations were found to be increasingly unlikely to feel apologetic for Japan?s actions (Figure 2.1).

ordered his troops to defend Nanking to the death and then escaped. Therefore, when the hostilities commenced, the leaderless Chinese troops either deserted or surrendered. Nanking fell on December 15.?

Source: Yasukuni Museum, translation by Haruna Yamakawa at Oxford University.

Yasukuni?s description of the Nanking Massacre not as a war crime but as a necessary component of the Japanese ?liberation? of East Asia resonated with many nationalists. The statement mostly focuses on the cowardice of Chinese military leadership in the face of the Japanese war machine and avoids addressing the ?massacre? itself. Accordingly, visiting the shrine of Yasukuni has become a favored destination by many conservative members of the Japanese government. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who was in office from 2001 through 2006 and a member of Nippon Kaigi, was the first PM to make regular visits to the shrine, the first one held four months after his inauguration. In response to the outrage felt by Japan?s neighbors, Koizumi delivered a statement that apologized for Japan?s ?colonial rule and aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering, particularly to the people of the neighboring countries in Asia? (Mathur). After his first visit, five South Korean politicians traveled to Japan to demand Koizumi to apologize, as well as a promise that ?no other head of state would ever visit the shrine? (Mathur). The Chinese and Korean governments heavily criticized Koizumi, and massive anti-Japanese riots


3 During the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, General Matsui? commander of the Japanese forces at Nanking? and other aggressors at the massacre were convicted of "deliberately and recklessly disregarding their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches.? Matsui was sentenced to death and his ashes were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978. 4 It should be noted that Yasukuni is not owned by the Japanese government, rather it has been privately owned and operated since 1946.

most powerful political demographic in Japan, as they are 25-50% more likely to vote than younger generations (OECD). During the 2014 House of Representatives election, 68% of those in their sixties turned out, while only 32% of those in their twenties did. Rural and elderly districts have now been a mainstay for conservative power in Japan for decades, and continue to elect LDP representatives to government positions. The growing political strength in the older generation contributed heavily to the domestic popularity of Koizumi?s controversial actions. Indeed, Koizumi?s tactics secured him the presidency of the LDP in 2001, a spot he competed for twice before but lost both times to candidates with a broader appeal in the party. Visiting Yasukuni solidified Koizumi?s stance as a traditionalist maverick and helped woo the growing nationalist force in the LDP, winning him over 65.7% of the final votes.

Since 2006, there has been a greater shift among the general Japanese population towards a satisfaction with the current amount of apologies for WWII actions. What initially appeared to be viewpoints exclusively held by those 65+ and those between 35-49 are spreading to younger demographics such as those between 18 and 34 years of age (Figure 2.2).

In just a decade, the number of respondents who

A majority of those over 65 years of age favored not apologizing at all, a break away from the trend of younger demographics favoring further apology. Japan has issued over 50 governmental war apologies, but the continued actions of several high-ranking government officials have largely negated the impact of these statements. Those who have witnessed many of these pledges ? namely the growing number of older Japanese citizens ? are far likelier to argue that these 50+ statements have been enough. Of those in older demographics, they are much likelier to have witnessed the prime peak of nationalism ? the years of World War II ? and the quick decline of it in the Allied executions of Japanese wartime leaders and the adoption of a democratic constitution in 1947. Thus, many who witnessed this timeframe psychologically feel with the decline of the Japanese empire and a turn towards Westernization as enough of an apology for World War II (Jansen). By reshaping the ethical values of imperialist Japan, as well as convicting war heroes, the Allied occupation sowed emotional confusion among those who lived through this abrupt change (Heinzen 157). Those between the ages of 50-64 witnessed very little of the nationalist Japanese empire, with many being born during the Allied occupation and only having sources such as the testimonies of massacre victims to formulate their opinions of the war. Moreover, they tend to have witnessed the negative outcomes of the war instead of the war itself, including the Tokyo Trials, Nanjing Tribunals, and the dismantling of the Japanese military by SCAP (Department of State). As a result in Figure 2.1, the clear majority of the 50-64 demographic now favor further apology. The 50-64 age group also has the smallest amount of respondents who favor not apologizing at 10%, a massive break from the 65+ demographic with nearly one in five favoring ?no apology necessary?.

While these are major ideological divisions between generations, those in the 65+ bloc have consolidated voting power to become the


Figure 2.2: % of Japanese saying Japan has __ for military actions during the 1930s-1940s

Murayama-Kono statements, the official statements of the Japanese government that apologized for the suffering caused during WWII (Dujarric). Earlier in 2013, Abe planned to ?revise? these statements with his own, and close advisors predicted that he would not include some keywords and phrases of remorse and apology for Japan?s role (Sekiguchi). Abe intended to follow suit with the 1995 LDP and New Progressive Party response to PM Murayama Tomichii when a Diet petition of protest against his Murayama statement and his ?Critical Self-Reflection? was signed by over 5.06 million people (Wakabayashi). Had Abe had followed through with this initial statement, he would have likely been applauded by his fellow conservatives for following the footsteps of his predecessor. The international pressure caved in too great, and Abe initially retracted his positions later that year in May when he stated, ?My administration upholds the statement as a whole? (Abe). However, Abe?s planned omissions could be seen in his 2015 speech commemorating Japan?s WWII surrender. His address did not offer an apology, nor did he include the words ?colonial rule and aggression? to describe Japan?s wartime behavior? a phrase both of Abe?s predecessors used to reflect the treatment of China and Korea. More pointedly, Abe argued that the past allowed Japan to become the modernized country it is today and future generations, ?who had nothing to do with the war, [should not be] predestined to apologize? (Groll).

By 2014, the Japanese think tank Genron NPO found that when combined with the 27.5% who saw ?no problem with the prime minister visiting in a private capacity?, over 70% of Japanese tolerated visits to Yasukuni by the prime minister (27). The statement is reflected in Figure 2.2, where nearly 55% of the general Japanese population now see their country?s apologies as sufficient.

Conclusions

Denial or downplaying the existence and effects of the Nanking Massacre remains a vital component of 21st century Japanese nationalist

said the apologies were not sufficient dwindled by nearly half, perhaps reflecting the same trend that was seen by younger demographics at the polls. For one, voters aged 18-19 polled in 39.9% for the LDP in the latest elections, an overwhelming majority over the runner-up, Kib? no T?, another conservative political party (Moriyasu). It?s highly unlikely that government stances on the Nanking Massacre play a vital part in the decisions of younger voters? who are more concerned with the economy and the unemployment rate? but their votes help Nanking revisionists hold on to government seats and thus their strong influence over the Japanese public.

Another explanation for the data in Figure 2.2 is the escalation of geopolitics between Chinese and Japanese, with disputes near the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. It?s likely that the Japanese responses to the 2008-2016 Global Attitudes Surveys reflected that sentiment, in part that many see the Chinese as guilty of the same imperialist actions which they accuse Japan of. A clear majority of Japanese now view the Chinese as ?arrogant? (81%), ?nationalistic? (76%), and ?violent? (71%). That growing sentiment is reflected in the popularity and political success of Koizumi?s hand-picked successor Shinzo Abe.

Since his rise to the top of the LDP ranks, Abe has been known as a prominent defender of Nippon Kaigi and like his predecessor, he favors frequent visits to Yasukuni. In 2012, forty Japanese government officials, including Abe, ran an advertisement in the U.S. newspaper StarLedger, titled ?Yes, we remember the facts?. The ad claimed that ?no historical document has ever been found? that demonstrates that women were forced into prostitution by the Japanese Army?. It also argued that the ianfu working in the Japanese army were paid and were treated well (Lewis). The bottom of the page linked to studies including The Nanking Hoax, which attacked the Tokyo and Nanking Trials and concluded that the crimes brought against the Japanese were ?unimaginable?. Initially, Abe?s Cabinet denied support for the


NOTESremained in power since Koizumi?s tenure as PM. As the voting bloc still heavily favors the older generations, their shift towards more far-right ideologies will be reflected in their elections for both national leadership positions and rural representatives. Even so, the slowly but gradually growing trends of young Japanese generations backing the LDP in elections at record rates suggest that nationalist parties will not weaken and that far-right voices in the LDP will, in the next few years, reshape the leading party?s vision to favor historical ambiguity when regarding the Nanking Massacre.

Politicians have attracted the support of this growing nationalist base by visiting the Yasukuni shrine, a move that was key to Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe?s victories. Positive public opinion about the Yasukuni visits has stayed relatively consistent over time, only dipping slightly after China and South Korea heavily condemned Japan, but Koizumi and Abe recovered nevertheless. Yasukuni continues to play a key symbolical role in the LDP, as Nanking denialists and revisionists in the party continue to make the pilgrimage every year. However, these visits also make the backtracking of Koizumi?s and Abe?s stances on the Nanking Massacre problematic. On one hand, Asian neighbors view the official government apologies as insincere or politically motivated. For one, a clear majority of Chinese still believe that Japanese apologies have been insufficient, a statistic that has stayed relatively consistent for decades. On the other hand, it leads Japanese demographics to favor not apologizing in the first place, as they see that numerous apologies never appease China or South Korea. Thus, a growing majority of Japanese now look towards the LDP/NK approach to curtail the legacy of the Nanking Massacre.

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