roger n. parks 1961
TRANSCRIPT
HISTORIANS OF THE WAR OF 1812
Thesis far Hm Dogma» c! M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNF‘VERMTY
Roger N. Parks
1961
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terns of tne superior patriot1sm 0: he nest.
During the second nhe.se , historians i nored merit1me cte.uses
and exoleined the war in terns of the material interests of the
west. 1hey were influenced in this course by Fredrick Jackson
Turner's work in reletion to the M1snifice1ce o“ and*4-
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by Henry Adams' qtmstioning of nostern motives for espousinr
meritme grievances.
Since the early 1930's, interpre'etions have tended to
and less and less those of their successors. However, while
ier interpretations are becox'1in; less accepted among historians
o; tne war, the"r remain dominant in collee texts and p p ler
literature.
Th sirniiicent feet e‘out the lnoCTu‘“ tetions studied
.L - .
the mari“:
is that theyfail to attack the problem of tie causes 0
ron all perti;dent points of View. Rather, neny of then contain
only one set of causes and tend to 001tredict each other. Thus
1
the need i seen for a more well rounded apnroech.U
hISTCRIAKS OF THE ERR 'F 1812
Roger N. Parks
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Submitted to the College of Science and Arts of
Michigan State University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Department of History
1961
Apnroved f
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£1, £7 3‘00 C1,?
The author is indebted to Dr. Paul Varg and Dr. Stuart
Bruchey for their helpful advice.
III
IV
TABLE CF CCITZNT‘
Introduction
Early Views
Turner and Adams
An Economic Interpretation
Decline of Revisionism
--
Return to Political interpretations
Conclusion
Bibliography
Appendices
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1. .- 1". Page
14
Vote in House Of Reoresentatives on
Declaration of'war (hy Sections and Sta-
()
II ~tatistics Relating to Reapportionment of 1811...9S
III Value of American Denestic Exocrts, 1790—1815...100
IV Western Land Sales, 1302—1317................... 01
:35,”J. LK‘CD:ElGIL-i.- 0...;
The wer of 1812 he.5 never received anything resembling
a definitive+reatment fron historians. The relatively few v:ho have
written about it have found it a potent source of controversy. But
they have usually confined their perspective to one set of causes.
Some of them have conceded that other causes may have also be; (0
:5
important, but have defended tleir particular topic, whether maritime
U
rights, Epstern land hunger, Indian troubles, or economic conditions
on the frontier, as the decisive factor. However, so many objections
can be raised to each of these exclanations that any one of them seems
to be only partially correct at best.
It appears, therefore, that a definitive study would have
to view the causes of the T'nar of 1812 from a broader persyective than
poliical history, as nineteenth century historians and some more
recent ones have tended to view it, or economical and social history,
‘
as the generation or two following tne publication of Fredrick Jackson
Turner's frontier thesis tended to View it. A number of points of
View would have to be taken into con:sideration, and the Historian
would then have to attempt to determine their relative importance.
Such a study is overdue. The war of 1'312 was probably more
4-.1
than a minor skirmicthsat ended in a military stalemate. The
beginning of a wide-spread feeling of nationalism and of mani est
destiny see113 to have been an outcome of the war. It is even possible
that wi“nout the unifying effect of this war, the nation could not
have survived the Civil We . Whether this same nationalism and
7“.)
feeling of manifest destiny were also a cause of the war has
concerned historians but has not been fully answered as yet.
The essay that follows analyzes the major scholarship that
has been done on the coring of the War of 1812. It seeks to show the
strengths and weaknesses of the major theses and the significance
of their findings. It offers suggestions as to how these findings
can be expanded upon to reach a fuller understanding of the causes.
1he war of 1312, said}i:1ry Adams :nany year: later,
"was chiefly rcrtrksole for trze vehelence with which, from the
beginning to the end, it 'as resisted and thwarted by a very large
number of citizens who were conzonly com. wrd...by no me7ns the
least respectable, intelligen1t, or natriotic part of the country."1
The vote for var in the House of Representatives was
relatively close - 79 to Q9 - and was 'n large part - Hec1onal.
Cf the 79 votes for wc.r, only 17 1ere cast oy renre sentatives from
states to the north and east of Pennsylvania. Of the 49 votes a;a1list
war, only 12 were ca.st Ly representatives from states tn the south
’3
and west of Pennsylvania.“ Deposition was stror.e st in new :1nland,
which freely traded with Eritain during the war and with1eld troos
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es net in the herrtford Convention, the most
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On the other hand, the most outspoken advocates of the war came from
the frontier - particularly mennes see andlKentucky - which sent more
than its sh1re of the so—called Tar~1a1k representatives to.1
Twelfth Consress, including Henry Clay and Richard Johnson of
Kentucky, and Felix Grundy and John Rhea of Tennessee.
hith war to ular in some quarters and unpoeular in othe1s
it is not surrrisinthat conflicting inter'flreations of its origin
1 Xenrs Adams, Histerj g§_the United» 7t1§ g§_§nerica, 9
w York, 1890), p. 224.
i
2
3. Charles H. Wiltse, The 1cw Tntion, 1800- 3“5 (Jew York,
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arose. in his war mes sage to Con:re:s on June 1, ldla, President
Ja1nes Iadison attriouted the need for 'ar to the restrictions placed
upon American commerce by Britain duIi gher long and bitter struggle
against soranarcit Fraz:ce.5 Xadison listed four maritime grievances
a5zinst Britain. The fi'‘
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practice of boarding neutral merehar1t snins unon the hi5h seas in1
search of deserters from the royal navy. Because Americans often
1 ‘
looked and talxee like Englishmen, United States citizens were
sometimes among those seized by the British. 1ne secondgrievance
was that of aritish 2arships violating he coasts ofV 1 O
as United
States and occasionally blockadin5“ an Imerican port, althou5h critis
ships had been forcei e1 to enter sherican Haters most of the time
ince the r“:es'wmme affair in 1307. Third w~s the British policy
of declaring paper blocaaees of particular continental ports. The
final maritime grievance was tie hritish orders in council of January
and hoveneer, 1807. Lee first 01 these orders had authorized the
ritish navy to seize neutral vessels attempting to enter any
Baroncan or colonial port from vhich haeole n had_excluded British
ritish goods by his Eerlin decree of Hovember, 1806.
The second O‘dcr had sought to license neutra11 trade with tiese ports.
In additio1to the maritime grievances, hadison insinuatee
thmt the British in Cana.da had instiated the trouble American
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earticulerly strained 5 nos the battle ofA
Tippecanoe in hovember, 1811.
5. A nals f “01'153, 12th CongTess, lst Session, Part I
(“noninton, 1853), pm. 1034—low (hereafter cited as Annals.)
5
Hadison's views w-e re similar to those that had been
expressed by the var hawks in their speeches calling for war a3ainst
Britain since tre meeting of tie Twelfth Congm as in November, 1811.
In addition, they soxtetimes blanedLritain's restrictions for the
falling world prices of cotton, tobacco, and other Americn exaorts.6
But +bough the supporters of war thus alleged a number of grievances
against Britain, they put the greatest emphasis upon maritime restric-
tions, and e37ecia11y unon imeressment and the orders in council. Thomas
Jefferson, writing in anticipatior of t?e declaration of tar in April,
1812, sought to justify the forthcoxing measure as follows:
Surely the Igorld will acquit our 3overnment from
having sought it. never before has there been
an instance of a nation's bearing so much as we
have borne. Two items alone in our cata103ue
of wrongs will forever acquit us of being a33res~
sors: The imnressment of our Seanen, and the
excluding us from the ocean. The first foundations
of the social compact would be broken up, were we
fiinitively to re-use to its members the pro-
tee+ion of their persons and pronerty while in
their lawful pursuits.
The Opponents of the war, of whom none has more outspoken
than th flew 3n3land Federalists led by Josiah Quincy, admitted that
the United States had sufHieent grievances a3ainst Britain to
justify war. But they said the United States had been partly to blame
for En:31;nd' 3 actions. In the:as tter of inpressnent, for example,
funericans hs.d encour13ed British sailors to desert the royal navy for
the better pay and conditions to be found in the American n3 rehant
. s F .marine. 1urw1enuore, they said, war against Britain would b (
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a host
6. See below, Chao. V1, p. l.
7. Paul L. Ford, editor, The Writings
(few 1 rk, 1393), 11, p. 340.
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in reul'nt Me‘s‘re. American connerce had also sufiered at the
hands of Kapoleon, whose continental system sought to prohibit neutral
trade with Britain as well as dritisn trade Vith the continent. Thus,
said the Federalists in a minority protest following the declaratLon
of war:
It cannot be concealed that, to en‘age in the rres nt
we against England is to place ourselves on the sile
of France; and e-roses us to the vassalage of states
serving under the banner of the French emperor.9
des st essins the inexpeediency of the war, the sinersQ
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the protest implied that they and the nuclic in general had not
been told the real reason Ior the declaration.13 The "ostensible,”
reason was naritime grievances. But they implied that the "real" and
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tie osuezsiole reasons might not have been one same.
The distinction between real and ostensible causes has
.ar of 1812. Almost from£"
appeared important to many historians of the
the beginning, son1e of thezn began ma}cing such a differentiation. The
tendenc; oecame acceler~te early in the twentieth century, when a
c}-
scLool of in erpretation arose which found the real and ostensible
causes a1:nost com;letely Inrelated. The opponents of the war wer
defeated in their atteWits to nrevent it in 1819s and. w:.>re discwcede‘d
during and after the war because of the activ¢1tieoz some 0: t'
nest outspoken of heir number. Eut their Views have exerted a.
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strong influence on the historiography of the ear. liey have tenred
lands of} storians than have those who supportedf-l
to fare better at the
the war.
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ll. Ibid., II, pp. 710, 311.
ification is onl‘r a rourn 011 However. Some of them accepted
maritime ri5Hts unquestionin15/ as the re 31 ceu of the war. Cthers
accepted it only with qualifications.
The etre 1es in point of View within the me 'itime rights school
12are illustr{ited DJ J. T. I'iesdleJ and Theodore DLL5Ht. Headley
claimed t1stsHitin stHrt'd the war a sinst France without provocation,
and thus:
In order to sHield Herself from the inism5r wr1011
should follow such a violation oi‘ the ri5Hts of
‘
nations and waste of reasure and of blood, sHe
olaxlted 11erself on the 5r:dplatform of prilMClml ,
and in31isted that she went to war to preserve
Human libertv and the integrity of governments.......
"ith t11ese she turneddeclarations on her lips,
and deliocrctely arnulled 11er a¢5reaments with the
United tates, and invzded 1:er most sacred rights.
She impressed our seamen, plundered our commerce,
held fortresses on our soil, and stirred up the
savn'es to merciless warfare egainst the innocent
inhaoitants of our frontier.
Because of;rmtin' s actions, said Headley, the United States was
compelled "to decls war, or forcit all claim to tHe resoect of
‘1‘ n I O -- V“ IN .L‘ . n. o “s _o a _ w . 1' o ‘ .- l
cHe nst10ns of tuC eertn, and all ribnt to an inocpen ent elistence.
Dui5Ht, writing in defense of tHe Hartford Conventioz: said
that the stitgd grounds u n unich We was dcclarsa were lH1r ssmen.
red violation of leutrslrrLHts.15 Tm; se may Have besn the 5rounds
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York,11353), I; Theodore Dwi5ht, Hisso:1_o th Hartford stntcrsion
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13. Headlej, Second Her, I, pp. 37, 33.
14. Ibid. I, ,, 55.
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England was to help in preparing a terrible yoke for ourselves"22
Thus, according to Hildreth, while maritime grievances might have
argued for the justice of the war, inexpediency argued more strongly
against it.
7? c o I O 23 Y
Herman von nolst took a s1m11ar p051t10n. He saw the
coming of the war of 1812 as an example of the tyranny of majorities.
The majority, he said, knew the strong moral objections of the Feder-
alists to a war with England and should not have undertaken a course
of action that threatened to strain the bonds of the Union. Wisdom
and expediency argued against war, even though there was legal justiIi-
O O 24
cation for 1t.
James Schouler, on the other hand, called the war a maritime
rights measure, but said that while it might have been undertaken
rashly, it was strongly provoked and was preferable to "dishonor-
. a 25 :-
able sumeSSIOn." And A. T. hahan, who saw the war as an example
of the necessity for naval power, believed that the maritime differences
between Britain and the United States involved questions of funda-
mental principles and of necessity. The war was not only "justifiable,"
2but imperaive. " O
22. Ibid., VI, p. 324
23. Herman von Holst, The Constitutional and Political History
9: the United States ,8 vols. (Chicago 1889), I.
24.1bid., I, pp. 235-238.
25. James Schouler, Histcrv of the U;ited States of America, 7 vols.,
(New York, 1882), II, p. 395
—*.*—
2 vols., (London, 19057.3, pp. viii, 2-4.
Other historians of the period who accepted the maritime rights
interpretation included Nicholas Butler, The Effect 9__th§ Egg g£_1812
gppn the Consolida+ion of the Union (Johns Hookins University Sudies
in Historical and Political Science,Baltimore, 1887), Fifth Series,
Part VIII, pp. 22,23; Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of
the war of 1812 (new York, 1869), pp. 212, 226, 230; Theodore
Roosevelt, TheNavalfar of 1812 (New York, 1889), 6.
10
Thus nineteenth century historians were in fairly close agree-
ment as to what the causes of the war were. They differed principally
as to whether those causes were so great as to make the war both
justifiable and necessary.
A question that was to bother later historians was why the
South and West supported_a war for protection of maritime rights,
1 o 1 o o o ‘F‘ o 27 , I a
while the maritime section oi the country Opposed it. The maritime
rights historians, however, saw no paradox in this. As Headley said,
"The peeple of the South and west, between whom and their country's
honor and rights selfish interests and bitter party hate did not come,
28
nobly sustained the war sentiment." Nicholas Butler, Schouler, and
Lossing also accepted the idea that the South and West were more
0 o n V 1 2 o u o o a
patriotic than the Northeast. 9 Hildreth, a bitter critic of slavery,
saw the war spirit as the manifest desire of young men, idled by
’3
slavery, to win glory/O And both he and von Holst believed political
31ambition partially motivated the Congre851onal war hawks. But with
the exception of Hildreth, there is little indication that maritime
rights historians sensed that anything besides maritime grievances
lay behind Southern and western war spirit.
The maritime rights historians tended to believe that
"history is past politics." They were later to come under attack
for failing to see that social and economic problems of the South
27. See below, Chap. V, p.54.
28. Headley, Second.War, I, p. 66.
29. Butler, Effect g§_thg_§§§, pp. 22,23; Schouler, II, p. 395;
Lossing, Field-Book, p. 230.
30. Hildreth, VI, p. 318
31. Hildreth, VI, p. 225; von Holst, I, p. 229.
11
and Nest contributed to the desire for war in those sections.
Their failure was due primarily to the fact that they viewed history
through a particular philosophical framework, just as their critics
were to view it through another. Within their framework, the
maritime rights writers saw politics as the most important element of
history. And as one of their critics was to point out, a political
stu v of the period indicates that maritime grievances were decisive
’)
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in the coming of the war.3
32. See below, Chap. III, p. 22.
CEAPTNR II
During the 1890's the work of two historians led the way
to a gradual revision of the maritime rights interpretation. The
first of these historians, Fredrick Jackson Turner, did not deal
specifically with the causes of the war of 1812. But his frontier
thesis had a pronounced effect on the historiography of the war,
just as it had on the writing of most phases of American history.
Turner rejected the germ theory, which taught that the
course of American development was a result of the planting of
Anglo-Saxon values in the early colonial settlements, from whence they
were carried inland along the advancing frontier. Although he did
not discount the importance of old—world institutions, Turner believed
of free land on a vast, ever-moving frontier, and by the consequent
necessity for straws, self-reliant men to adapt themselves to life in
the wilderness. He and his followers saw the frontier as the dominant
factor in American history and the focal point from which American
history should be studied. They rejected the long-held theory that
politics and diplomacy are at the core of history. Instead, they said,
politics and diplomacy are merely reflections of the conflict of large
social forces, which must be understood if history is to be meaningful.
Under Turner's influence, a number of American historians began to
change their point of View from the seaboard to the wilderness, from
political and diplomatic to social and economic history. Julius W.
Pratt, whose Bxeansionists 9; 1812 (1925) became the most influential
revisionist interpretation, expressed the contribution of Turner to
12
13
the historiography of the War of 1812 in saying that Turner had
led him and his colleagues "to view the IIest - particularly the
'Northwest - with more scrutiny," and to reach new conclusions about
the causes of the war.
But frortier-oriented historianssic turned their attention
to he war of 1812 probably found confirmation of their point of
view'in Henry Adams' nine-volume stud.y of the Jefferson and Madison
administrations, the first volume of which appeeared in 1890.2 The
eifeet of Adams on the revisionists was indirect. For, like the
maritime rights historians, he treated political, rather than social
factors as primary causes of the war. But he placed firmer emphasis
on the sectional character of the war party than had his predecessors.
And he attributed net motives to the leadaers of that party, making
it apparent that their actionscould not be explained in terms of
disgust at Britain's maritime restrictions or even their own desire
for political popularity alone. Adams thus demonstrated the possibility
of re-interpreting the war fros‘a a frontier point of view.
According to Adams, patriotism played a part in war-hawk
thinking. But he implied.other motives, too. After all, he said, the
1. Julius W. Pratt, Exeansionists 9§_1§1§ (New York, 1925), pp. 9,
10. The influence of Turner on revisionist thought also is particularly
apparent in John F. Cady, "western Opinion and the war of 1812," Ohio
Archaeological and Historical Society Publications, XYVIII (1924), pp.
427-476. Claude H. Van lyne, who accepted essentially the maritime
rights interpretation, also noted that Turner had demonstrated the
significance of the frontier to students of the war. See "Why Did
we Fight in 1812? The Causes an Significnce of our Last war with
Great Britain," Independent, L"(IV (1913), p. 1331.
2. Addams, Historv.M
14
United States had seethed over the Chesapeake affair and the failure
of the Erskine agreement, and yet had failed to carry out its threats
of war. In 1811-12, on the other hand, the war hawks had no new
grievances to allege. At tiis time, with the country divided over the
question of war or peace, the treasure nearly empty, and_Britain's
policy no longer as belligerent as it had been under George Canning,
there seemed to be some basis for hepe that the orders in council
' 3 . . .would be revoked.“ dot only were the reasons for g01ng to war w1th
Britain no longer as clear-cut as they once had been, but the war
hawks, ano talked/hf going to war to recover the nation's honor,
ignored the fact that war with Britain meant "continued submission
to one robber (Hapoleon) as the price of resistance to another.”r
These observations led Adams to conclude that the war party
tried to arouse he nation by appealing to the justice of a war at a
time when the only relevant question was whether or not war would be
expedient. The justice of war long had been apparent, he said, but
war previously had been rejected on the grounds of inexpediency,
which grounds he said the war hawks now ignored.5 To illustrate
this point he rejected a number of arguments that were raised from
the point of View of expediency. He dismissed for example, the
arguments that the nation would profit, from driving a hostile
power from the continent and that farmers again would be able to
3. Ibid., VI, pp. 122, 123, 223-225.
h. Ibid., VI, 113. See above, pp. 6, 8.
5
p.
. Ibid., V1, p. 223. See above, pp. 6, 8.
15
rof1t. Adams, who made a
5)
export their surplus crops at a 1air
*U
number of caustic comments about the mental capacities of most of
n.
the leading :1ures o10
7w
the war period, called such arguments
"declamation."
Probably these appeals carried weight with the
western 7eo;71a; but even earnest supporters of war
7 might GOUCtlrhether men of sense could be concil-
iated by such 0 tory.6
ine orators, said Adams, were nationalistic young Republicans
from the newer parts of the country, who had become dissatisfied with
the whole Jeffersonian system of weak government, as well as Jefferson-
ian foreign policy, which was based on peaceful coercion. They tried
to effect a political revolution in order to replace that system with
one based on old-world.models. Thus, according to Adams, war was to
have been a vehicle for a political revolution much like the one older
Republicans had ac u-sed Hamilton of plotting in 1798 - a revoluion
whereby ‘overnncnt woulda sume the function assigned to it by John
Calhoun. In what Adams called an unprecedented speech for a
7 CeRepublican, houn said:
6. Ibid., VI, pp. 142, 143. Adam's sarcasm was not directed at
war hawks alone. He found the actions of Haw England Federalists
irrational and at times almost treasonous. (VI, pp. 153, 170-173) And
the Jeffersonian system of peaceful coercion seemed insipid. Discussing
Jefferson's embargo, he said, "if war made men brutal, at least it
made them strong; it called out the qualities best fitted to survive
in the struggle for existen e. To risk life for one's country was
no mean act even when done for selfish motives; and to die that
others might more happily live was the highest act of self-sacrifice
to be reached by man. war, with all its horrors, could purify as
.rell as debase; it dealt with high motives and vast interests; taught
courage, disciplinno, and a stern sense of duty. Jefferson must have
c.sked himself in vainwhat lessons oflheroism or duty were taught by
his system of peaeeeable coercion." See Harvey wish, The American
Historian (He: York, 1960), p. 170.
7. Ibid., VI, pp. 143, 144, 170, 171, 210, 211.
16
I know of but one principle to make a nation 5 eat,
to produce in this country not the fo1n but the ca
spirit of urion, and that is to protect every citizen
in the lawful pursuit of his cusiness....Protection
and patriotism are reciprocal. This is the road that
all great nations have trod.S
To Ad°“*1s the important point about the revolution was its
political manifestations. war hawks seeking to cringiit about tried
to persuade 01d Republicans, who previously had resisted any measureJ.
more belligerent than economic coercion, "to do in a single session
at required half a century or more of time erd ernerience, — to
create a new government and to invest it with the attributes of old-
. 4- 1 4- .9 7 __ "Q a in" c o J_
w rld sovereignty uncer pretext 01 the war poker. ’ These nationalists
succeeded to the extent of securing a declaration of war. Adams
believed the question of war or peace finally was settled in Conbress,
by Old Republicans, who held the balance of power in the war vote and
were motivated by different considerations than those that caused the
n 1 ’ ., .t' , r10 .01" ' ~47 °. 5 .L
var hawks to press 1or wa The Je11erson1ans were persuaded in part
by patriotic "declamation" and pressure from war men in key chair-
'4.
manships n the house of Representatives, he said, and in part by
hadison, who "thorouphly twisted" the threads of netotiation with
England in an effort to get a settlement on his own inflexible terms,
and also pressed for a declaration of war when his e1forts failed.ll
Even at the time of the vote, said Adaa1s, there probably would have
een no war if the Old Aepublicans had known Britain was revoicing
8. Annals., 12, I, p. 479.
9. Adams, VI, pp. 170, 171.
10. gpig., VI, pp. 142-144. 146. 158, 159, 170, 171.
11. Ibid., VI, pp. 62, 117, 118, 175, 193-198, 205, 206, 220—229.
See below, Chap. VII.
17
her orders in council in what seeme to be an effort to conciliate
the United States.12
Thus Adams, although attributing different motives to the
war hawks than did his predecessors, interpreted the decisive causes
of the‘Var of 1812 in a political and diplomatic context. And thus
he differs from the revisionists, whose interpretations were based on
the assumption that the decisive causes are to be found in the social
and economic problems of the frontier. That assumption, as Pratt
indicated, was rooted in Turner. But sucn an assumption does not
necessarily preclude the possibility that frontiersmen we genuinely
concerned about the honor the United States was sacrificing to the
belligerents on the seas. The insignificance of such concern,
however, is another assumption of most revisionist writings, and seems
to be a logical implication of Adams' interpretation. For Adams also
differed from the maritime rights school in the amount of emphasis he
placed on war-hawk concern with national honor.
Adams' predecessors had assumed that the Nest and South
"felt the humiliation if not the pecuniary loss occasioned by the
13British measures." But Adams scoffed at the idea that maritime
grievances had an important influence on frontier sentiment. The
war-haw: argument that Britain's persistence in the orders in council
0' 1 o n V 14 1 n I
meritee.war "was not skilllully mace." And as for impressment - ”the
12. Ibid. ’ ,
13. Pratt, Emma o —
1M. Adams, VI, p. 13 .
13
worst of all American grievances" - war men began to denounce it in
earnest as a political maneuver, which they undertook only after they
had determined to have a war. They hope d tiereo to underscore the
justice 0; their position.15 Such an interpretation, if accepted,
makes it doubtful that wa men had any concern for national honor and
that their statements can be trusted. Adams him }__I
f continued to put
/
a degree of emphasis on concern for honor.lo And three of his
17V
successors teen a similar point of View. But woodrow Wilson,
eramining the maritime rights interpretation in View of Adams' work
"18 It isN
..
found the camles 01 the war of 1312 “singularly uncertain.
not surprising, then, that revisionist writers were to generally
nore the importance of maritime grievances and seek the tr e causes
of the war in only those proolesis tEat affected the frontier materially.
Adams influenced tile development of the revisionist school in
anotherJ37 also. is viii h: seen in succeeding eha_fters, He pointed
to the spa c:Liie fr ntier proelems from which revisionists were to infer
the causes 01 the war. hildreth and other maritime rights historians
had known that frontiersmen talked of conquering Canada arid East
Florida and thet the‘ were anoittered by the belief that the :ritish
in Canada were eehind their trou3les with the Indians.19 But thes
earlier wrlters, although not always without misgivings as to war-hawk
motives, never connected such proolems with frontier war sentiment.
15. I_:’:____\id° , VPI, I33. 117, :1.13
16. :T:d., v1, 3p. 115, , 21 43, 144, 155,: o, 211
J,
17. Van Tvne, "Causes an Si;ni;icsnce, p. 1331; :LloeHt.Hart,
233:“:lpn of the Union,lLCG—1333(;ew York,l1333), no. 204, 205.
Kendric C. Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality (lew York, 1906),
pp. 3. 3 . 50— 53. 34. 85. 30.f) IT.
e. Hoodrow Jilson, g LlStCTV of the American Pee£1 ,5 vols.,
(Iew York,l1906), 111, p. 2 2.
19. See, for example, nildreth, VI, pp. 251-255, 267, fill, 313, 322.
19
Adams actually did not do so, either. But he came close at times.
He said war hawks were willing to risk war withLnland "on the chance
of creating a nation, of conquering Canada and carrying the American
5+ "20 '-flag to Iooi1eand Keyh .. he also said they sought to over-
throw the?enuolicen oart5r's stand against a strong arhnr at a timeJ.
"when no foreign nation threatened attack, and...avowedly for the
purpose of conquest."41 And, he said, William Lenrv Harrison'sIt
*ainst the Indians in Indiana terrritory was a“*reswivolyuh)
undertaken and ”begun for no other object than to win the valley of
the'wabash. "23 How much signiHfcanoe Adams personally placed on
these statenerts is difficult to say. In the context of his
interpretation, they aspear to indica esteps the war pa ty wished to
take in bringing about a general nationalization of the country. The
reasons behind this program were of less interest to Adams than the
political maneuvers undertaken to carry it out. But to the revisionists,
who were more interested in social and economic causes than in political
effects, these state‘ents conce1vahly coald have appeared to point to
the real causes of the war.
Adams' Historv did not necessarily lead to the revisionist
interpretations. In fact, some recent non- evisionist interpretations
are related more closely to AdaLS' work than are those of Pratt,
Howard Lewis, and Louis Hacker, which nevertheless seem to have
developed from it. On the other hand, the revisionists, who were
oriented towards a frontier-social approach to American history, might
20. Adams, VI, p. 123
21. -oid., VI, p. 154.
22. Ibid., V1, p. 140
20
have develooed cheir interpretations independently of Adams’ work
had there been reason to suppose the'Uar of 1812 would be a good
subject for re-interpretation. But the war is a fairly obscure
event in American history. And if they saw such reason, it is
probably because of ’dans' respected study, which presented
evidence of the inadequa y of the maritime rights interpretation
and implied that he frontier had ‘easons of its own for wanting
CELQ III
The veer 1911, the 100th anniversary of the meeting of the
Mar Congress, saw two important develonnents. One was the intro—
duction of the monograph as a vehicle for studying the causes 0
the war. The other was the puolication of the first of the revision-
ist interpretations. ReviH10ism dominated writinr on the subject
for 20 years, and remains inf uential today.
With theeexce2tion of rqilitany or naval histories, such as
Benson J. Lossing's or Mahan's, historians previously wrote of the
war as an episode in the larger panorama of American history. how
began a snecialised treatmentothe coming of the war. Howard Lewis'
"A Re-anal3sis of t11e Causes of tLe Efar of 1812" marks a turring
point.1 The more intensive studies stemmed from a series of new
approaches, from Progres ive deflation of nationalism, from the
Turner frontier school, and from Marxism.
The n no:raphic approach to the war of 1812 sacrificed a well
rounded explanation of causes to a study of one or more causes fitting
revisionists' points of view.. 11neteerth century historians such
as Hildreth, at less mentioned both the problems of the frontier and
those connected with the war in Europe. In the major revisionist
W
monographs, however, the spotlight was focused a.lmost entire3' on
frontier causes, and rarely, if ever, on more tran one or t:o of the
important :rorMticr proclens. Thus the historian who thinks, as
1. Howard T. Lexis, "A31e-ana1ysis -
0‘" 1:31:39 Pg‘loflcang, VI (1911), pp. 506-51 , 577-585.
I0
[\3
Pratt himself conceded, that maritime causes may have been as
important as frontier ones,2 noot only finds no rlention of maritime
auses in these studies, but finds little evidence to help him gauge
the relative importance of various frontier causes. The impression
usually gained from these studies, if college te:Htooo5 may be
considered an accurate gauge, is that the only factors relevant to
the coming of the war are selected economic and social problems of
the sparsely settled frontier.
Lewis, whoarote t11e first of these monographic studies,
recognized the implications of Adans' findings and concluded:
The war of 1812 was not waged primarily over the
question of neutral rights and impressment, but
was rather forced on by men who were prompted by
other motives using this excuse.3
e of the "ezicuse" he said, makes it appear in a study of theF—
,J
CD
:1"
U)
Anna1 f Conrress that neutral rights were the most important causesfi—w
‘ I. 1 ' ° 1 ‘ 1 o 3? 7'1
of tne war.* Eat, if this was so, he asked, why did new sngland,
the section most vit&ly interested in Britain's maritime restrictions,
I o 5 1 o o ‘
vote alt.n st solidly against war, wn1le "Pennsylvan1a and the states
/
to the Nest and South of it" voted almost solidly for war?0
n
Although other historians had been struck by this paradox,(
none had offered the solution to it that Lewis did. He concluded
that with the xception of possibly six votes cast by members of
the anti-British Society of United Irish1en, and a few others cast
L4- T‘wr3% ,A .
1‘an cal—s'321310111’
S 3
ts p. 14.
, "Re-anal3 s,
2 s
3 i " p. 583.
a ., p. 506
5. Ibid. p. 507.1.ew England cast 12 votes in favor of war
0
6
7
’
st it in the house of Representatives. (Appendix I.)
se states voted for war, 62 to 14. (Appendix I.)
. Schouler, II, p. 395.
23
by Congressmen who represented manufacturing interests, the majority
of votes for war we e cast by representatives (including some from
Pennsylvania and flew York), whose interests were ”as thoroughly
3
'Western....as those of Kentucky or Ohio.“ The western interests they
represented had little to do with impressment or orders in council,
Lewis implied.
Western interests, he said, centered upon desire for land.
What Henry Adams saw as one factor, Lewis saw as the whole explanation.
According to Adams, although the west blamed the Britisn in Canada
for inciting and arming Tecumseh's Indian federation, it was Tecumseh's
+s
veto of the cession o the habash valley to the United States that
led to war.9 The white population of the Indiana territory, said
Adams, "wanted the lands of the habash even at the risk of war.
Lewis took a similar position. He said the conflict between whites
and Indians, thich led to conflict with England, was the result of
_ 1
American settlers' need for Western land.l*
There were three possible wave to bring about an "absolutely
necessary" expansion and make land available for the country's growing
pOpulation, according to Lewis. Americans could acquire land from
the Indians, "peacefully or otherwise," could move into Spanish Florida,
’3
or could expand into Canada.l“ Because they wished to live under the
jurisdiction of the United States, hey took the first course and
purchased land from the Indians until the rise of Tecumseh threatened
8. Lewis, ”Re-analysis," pp. 507, 510. Hildreth also mentioned
the number of Irishmen in politics and in editorial positions. He
attributed the observation to August Foster, the British envoy. (Hild-
reth, VI, pp. 316, 317.)
9. Adams, VI, pp. 83, lQO.
lO. gp;g,, VI, p. 140.
ll. Lewis, "Re-ana ysis," p. 511.
2. Lbid., pp. 511, 512.
24
the arrangement.13 Thenceforth, a fear that Tecumseh, with British
eneouraSGZHGII‘Lb,
I-rhite man off the frontier became a driving force.
also
14
believed "Ergli sh gold and English duplicity" had prevented the
United States from acquiring East Florida from Spain.15 Thus,
Frontiersmen
might unite Northern and Southern tribes to drive the
according to Lewis, conflict with Britain we 5 the indirect result of
American efforts to acquire territories held by allies of
Americans bitterly looked toward Canada
a
tnense
l/
lves of a tormenter by conquering it. They also anticipa
Britain.
ted
- 1 o o O o a q o -.
deSiraele political results. As Felix uruncy of Tennessee said:
I am willing to receive the Canadians as adopted
brethren; it will have oeneficial political effect;
it will preserve the equilibrium of the government.
Jhen Louisiana shall be fully peopled, the Horthern
states will lose their power; they will be at the
discretion of others, they can be depressed at
pleasure, and then the union might be endangered.-
I therefore feel anxious not only to add the Flori
to the Ceuth, but the Canadas to the horth tohe
empire.
Louis Hacker, the only other major exponent of the land
hunger interpretation, read an en ely differcrt motive into the
proje cted conquest of Canada. hacker at t1mi time accepted the mark
3,-
and saw an Opportunity to rid
i
interpretation of history, and srw the Bar of 1812 as an illustration
. . . . loof ca.1talistic waste making iiuperialistic expansion necessary.
A pioneering society is always on the move because its primitive
agricultural techniques rapidly wear out the land,
tile pioneers who eXploited the Ohio River valley during
said Hacker.
the early
,0
But
13- Lean pp. 510-512-
14. Ibid., .p. 513-516.
15- IPA-A. p- 578. 579.
16. Ipid., . 577.
17. Annals, 2, I, p. 426.
18. Wish, American Historian, p. 203.
i-Oror
st
part of the nineteenth century faced a dilemma. If they continued
to move west the; would run into the prairie, where lumber, fuel,
1» . . . .
and.water were scarce. 9 On the other hand, tne agricultural lands
of Canada were lush and invitin" but under the control of a foreignng ’
power, Hacker believed the frontier pressed for war with Great
0 I O 0 IO U ’5
Britain in order to seize these lands.“ Despite the "lOity
pretenSions in which war sentiment was wrapped," he said:
The War of 1812 was ordered by an agricultural
peOple interested and sustained by the soil and
was to have as its goal the acquisition of Canada,
not so much because that meant the cutting off of
the living threat of England, as because Canada
stood for great re serves of agricultural land.
In short, the u'est desired Canada and...sought
war with England. 21
Hacker's arguments can be criticized.in several ways. First,
his interpretation implies that the West brought about the war by
itself. It had he .er the Opulation nor the representation in
'(3
id
, 22Congress to do so.
Secondly, although he claimed.that white settlers only pre-
tended to fear the Indian menace as a means of justifying war, his
evidence fails to show that the fear was not real. He based his
contention on the fact that white settlers brought much of the
\)J
2trouble upon themselves ey treating the Ilm' mis like wild animals.
Adarus had been aware of this, but nevertheless maintained that the
’5 ln . L , , ,
iear of the Indians was geenuine. hacxer, however, sought to support
1...]
9. Louis M. Hacker,‘“aestern Land Hunger and the war of 1812,"
I-Iissi. uni Valley historic:1 Review X (1924), pp. 365-395.
laid” 3-31.0— 371. 392+-
laid. p. 366-
See below, Chap. IV, p.jfl+
:mcler, "Land Hunger," pp. 372-374.
See f.n. 9, this chapter.
Ho
dFJI—JOC)
0
m\N
to
tom
to
I
41/
(.0
his contention by setting up a false standard to judge the problem.
Should not the question be, not were the Indians
a menace to some isolated aeas of settlement,
were both sides erred in their conduct, but, rather,
’id the Indians as a host threaten the existence
of the white civilization in the Ohio Valley725
This should not be the question. As Adams said of the Indian problem
following Tippecanoe: "A general panic seized the peeple. The militia
dared not turn out, for while they collected at one spot, the Indians
mi ht attack their isolated cabins. Even Vincennes was thought to
be in denser, and the stream of fugitives passed through it as
"26rapidly as possible until depopulation threatened the territory.
The Lidian co"Ld strike quickly and disappear quickly. The individual.1.
‘
setuler had reason to fear for his own safety and that of nis family,
rather than about the future of the white race.
Blacker took statements out of context in order to illustrate
western de efor Canada. He said, for example, that Jolm Randolph
of Virginia uncovered the real motive of the 'rar hawks in his state-
ment that "agrarian cupidity, not maritime rights, rges the war."27
But Randolph, at one time or another, attributed various motives
a. 8 .
to thei.“ Hacker also ignored evidezlce in travel accounts tmit the
rairies were considered a desirable place to live He claimed that
‘O
"returning travelers could write only of the possibilities of graning
25. Hacker, ”Land Hunger," p. 373.
26. Adams, VI, p. 110.
27. Hacker, "Land Hunger," pp. 387, 333.
28. At other tines, Randolph said the war was to be fought for
he benefit of hemp growers, for those wh wished to make profits
selling to the Army, and to give the North political dominan e. (Annals,
12, I, pp. 450’ 55').)
#117-
in this region. However, there was no likelihood that the poor
immigrant would.be tempted on this score, for herds needed capital."49
As Julius Pratt has noointed out, however, Jom 3rr1:ibury, one of.n
Ha ker' 5 sources for this statement, called t1“.e lands bordering u30h
tne prairies the best1in t% United States and de son'bed KissouIi
o o 1 a o 0 Q '
territo-J as unsurnassed 1n the Opportun1t1es it offered settlersHO
Pratt also has noted that in 1812 the United 8+ates still containec
within its borders, vast amounts of virtually unpeopled timberland,
including about one-third of Ohio, most of Indiana, parts of Illinois,
‘
all of Hichigan and_Hisconsin, much of Minnesota and ' hardfood belt
100 miles wide stretching from the Hississinoi throu h Lissouri and
’3.
arkansas into Oklahoma.”
Final y, Hacker read unwarranted meanings into his evidence.
For example in commentiLg on an article in the Hational Intellisencer,LAJ
he said:
The writer, in talking of the ands beyond the
Mississippi, of course declared that the river
bottoms were most desirable. But he went on t
say (the orairies) are by no me:ns coatemutible....
Grass, grain, and even hemp and corn, may be
raised in abundance. Hater is easily obtained by
liggin and there are coals for fuel. Bences may7
be of? ct:d DJ hechn" or by plowing up the tough
svard of the prairiesa, cutting it into chunks,
and laying then up liL:e stone or brick. As for
buildings, earth houses Jould do very nicely.32
inis state1aent, according to Hacker, illustrated the contempt in
‘ ,0
which the idea 0 settling theo airie {Jae held. It is "an excellent
example of.:hat1 do- n psychology has so aptly named the deiense
29. Hacker, ”Land Elunger," pp. 391, 392.
30. Julius H. Pratt, ".estern'Tr Aims in thewar of 1312,"
His issiopi Val qgi istori al Revie”, XII (1325), .Q9.
31.. Dido
qm
’
)2. Hacker, "Land H 15er," 99- 339.399-
connlex. ”33 Perhaps it is a
nethedolo;y.
Hacker disagreed 1
Canada in the coming of the n
been content to continue nevi
“een blocked by the Inciians.
nada o'“e into focus onlJ aZ"(~.RL
)
9;
31+accuaulated\A.Britain had H
men he
going to war was lust for Can
Desoite this import
are vulnerable on similar gro
of a compelling land hunger.
this ass no ion, which neithe
evidence. Lewis inferred the
that the center of popu ation
adooted the hytotheis t1at 1
ad no intention of moving
better examole of Hae'ar's littorical
th LOU1° as to the importance of
1r. Lexis thouht Americans could have
n; westward if their progress had no
He implied that desire to conquer
:ter a long list of grievances against
cker , on the other hand, said frontiers-
fartner Lest. Treir real reason _or
adhnifanalends.
ant difference, however, Lewis and Hacker
unds. For both assumed the skistence
Their interpretations both rest on
r of them sueorteed with concrete
reality of land hunger from the fact
0 . I ’3‘: T‘.‘ ‘ u
we nov1n: VGSEWQFQ.’J nacxer Simply
and hunger is a characteristic of a
nioneerin; society. He tried b0 :it the evidence to that hyrgaothesis.
Lack of ev1dence, together with efindink's 01 UQOT‘ Rogers
Taylor, indicates that the assumption is ialse. iarlor has sncrn
tan a brief noula+ioon £001 immediately 50110 in‘ the Louisiana
purchase slowed to a trickle v loO7 - at least three years before
Tecumseh became a threat and four years before the Hest started
..<
talkingseriously about the conexme of Canada.“” Thus it seems
33. Ibid., 390.
3#. Lewis, "He-analysis," PP- 513-516.
35. Ibid., no. Sll, 512.
36. George no:ers avlor, "ngrcrian Discontert in the Kississ-
inai Valley Preceding thefar of 18-2,” gournal 9; Political Scenenv,
12:11.1: (19:31), on. 72, 12.73.
improbable that expansionist pressure was great enough during
the ore-war oe-iod to explain western moti1es. The land.hun;cr
thesis aopears inarequate, even as an explanation of frontier
.e 1 1.. a Q 0
causes 01 the Jar o1 lol1.
GILu1PTER IV
The land-hunger interpretations of Lewis and Hacker have
1 0 I ‘ ‘ I
won 1ew f01101vers. But some writers have Cited Pratt as tne authority
for statements that contain Hacker's interpretation, as well as
q
Pratt's. For example, Charles and Mary Beard sai1a in The Rise 2:
American Civilization:
If in form the war on England was declared for
commercial motives, it was in reality conceived
primarily in the interests of agriculture.....
This fact the scholarly researches of Julius w.
Pratt have demonstrated in a convincing fashion..
..The men who voted in 1812 for the declaratinn
of war on England represented the agrarian
constituencies of the interior and their prime
object was the annexation of Florida and Canada.
... for the purpose of adding more farmers and
planters to the over-balancing majority.Z
And according to Richard Hofstadter, the war of 1812 was caused
by:
Expansionism - what John Randolph called 'agrarian
cupidity' .... Southern planters wanted the Floridas
and Kort11ern farmers wanted Canada....As Julius W.
Pratt has shown, enthusiasm for war with England
raged along the broad arc of the frontier; resistance
to war was hottest in the old Federalist and mercantile
sections.3
These statements are misrepresentations of Pratt's position.
Despite the title of his book - Expansionists g: 18l2 - Pratt did
not say that e)szansionism, at least insofar as it manifested itself
in desire for Canada, was the primary cause of the war. He fid charrge
1. One exception to this is Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry
Steele Commager, The Growth 9; the American Republic (Kew York, 1937),
I. pp- 307-310
2. Charles andlIary Beard, The Pisa 9: American Civil tion,
2 vols. (New York, 1920), I, p. 393.
3. Richard Hofstadter, The anerican Political Tradtion (New
York, 1951), pp. 39’ LL00
that the men of the Southwestern frontier, who wanted Florida, were
primarily xpansionists. But he connected xpansionism with a feeling
of manifest destiny, rather than 'agrarian cupidity.‘ The latter
interpretation is that of Hacker. Pratt disagreed with it and wrote
an article in which he attempted to disprove it.”
Before Pratt's interpretation can be appraised properly, it
is necessary to know its sources and its contents. As Kendric Babcock
pointed out in reviewing the book, it contained few new ideas.5 A
re-interpretation of previously develope‘ ideas, it wove together
three main strands: The Indian problem of the Northwest, Southwestern
dreams of expansion, and the political problems arising out of the
conflicting qar aims of these two sections.
The Indian problem had been stressed by several of Pratt's
revisionist predecessors. It was an important part of Lewis' land-
hunger interpretation.6 Dice R. Anderson called the conflict between
whites and Indians a natural outcome of western expansion, but put
less emphasis on the critical nature of the expansion than didLewis.7
Christopher Coleman likewise stressed the Indian problem.8 So did
John F. Cady, who said Canada became the center of hostilities between
Indians and.American settlers following the battle of Tippecanoe,
because:
4. Pratt, "western war Aims." See above, Chap. III, p. 273 ‘.
5. American Historical Review, ‘KXI (1926), p. 3/'.
6. See above, Chap. III, p. 23, 24.
7. Dice R. Anderson, "The Insurgents of lBll," American Historical
Association Annual Report, 1911 (hashington, 1913), I, pp. 171-176.
8. ChristOpher B. Coleman, "The Ohio Valley in the Preliminaries
of the war of 1812," Kississippi Valley Historical Review, VII
(1920), pp. 41, '2, 48.
There was no longer an Indian town to attack; it
was no longer possible to strike at the hostile
Indians except in connection with their British
allies in Canada....Great Britain, in one of her
choicest possessions, was Open to attack; and the
west suddenly became interested in it as a future
field for expansion.9
As for desire for the Floridas, both Hildreth and Adams were
' ' ' ' 1° 0 "ts w
aware of American intrigues in that area preceding the warr.l aeware
Channing called the nos Mi‘ility of conuering the Floridas a motiveA
.D m
1or war among Southern frontiersmen, and implied there was a conflict
in war aims between those who wanted Florida and those who wanted
Canada.ll These ideas form the structure Upon which Pratt deveIOped
his interpretation. But he went into more detail than did his
predecessorsaand did a better job of documenting his assertions. His
work also has been better accepted than any of th.e others. For
these reasons, is ar’ument deserves consideration in some detail.
Pratt devoted the first chapter of his book to the Indian
proelem and to the war fever he said developed out of it. The
primary cause of desire for war in the Korthwest, he decided, was
"the conviction that the British in Canada were in unholy alliance
with the'Nestern Indians, and that only by cutting off the Indians
12from :ritish support could tie1.est gain peace and security. “
9. Cady, "Test rn Cpinion, " p. 454.
10. adans, VI, up. 23; Hildreth, VI, p. 311.
ll. Edward Channing, g Histo1[ of the Lnited States, 7 vols.,
(few York,1935), IV, p. 456.
2. “ratt, ~xnansionists, n. 53.A
33
Other motives - commercial, political, punitive -
played a part, but the overwastlrin' desire of the
people of the Emortkwet was to feel iree to develop
eir country without re ril from those Indian
conspiracies which were univer::ally believed to
have their oriigin in British Canada.l3
Pratt traced the origin of this is: ing to the days
of the Revolution, when Britain had enlisted the military aid of
the Indians. During the period between the peace of 1783 and Jay' s
treaty, the Indians had resisted American attemets to settle the
horthwest territory in order to protect their allies'monopoly of the
- 1
fur trade. Even at this early time, he Said, "relations between the
. . .. . . - . , 14British and Indians became astandin3 grievance to tne Lnited States."
Tension eased temporarily along the bor or after Britain turned over
the Northwest posts to the United tates in 1796, but began to increase
' PL 1 1 °. .0 ‘1 T‘ .p \ o 0 f1 15 a
again a1ter tne breaning 01 the :eace o1 amiens in nurope. such
war-like talk as cane from the frontier between 1807 and 1310 was
the result of impressnent and other British maritime offenses, said
Pratt, but gradually the fear of renewed Indian attacks in case of
, . . 16war oecane uppermost in western minds. Also, increaSing conilict
with the Indians sloxrly helpedoform new Western grievanceSaagaiinst
Britain and to brin3 demands that, instead of fighting a defensive,
naval war against Britain, he United States should ta”he the offensive,
drive Britain iron Canada, and thus end the Indian menace for all time.17
1°. Ibi-., pp. 58, 59.
14. loid., p. 19, See also pp. 20, 27, 23.
15. Ibid., pp. 13, 2Q.
16. laid., pp. 24-33.
17. Ibid., pp. 31-42.
34
Pratt said this change in attitude was the result of "the rise of
Tecumseh and the Prophet, the oatle of Tippecanoe, the outspoken
position of their Congressmen, together with the current belief that
n
the British were behind all their Indian troubles."
Thus far Pratt's inter~3re ation resembles that of Cady and
others. But the problem of Indian-British relations was important
19primarily in the Ohio Valley, which at this time contained only two
states. 0LiO and Kentucky had a combined total of seven seats in
the House of Representatives and cast only sLJ of the 79 votes for
war.20 Among their representatives were such outspoken advocates of
war as Henry Clay and R. M. Johnson of Kentuckv. But earlier revision—
ists obviously took too narrow a perspective when they said, "that
section of the coutry, aided by elements in the South, virtually
brought on the war."21 Afer all, thos "elements" in the South
east nearly half the votes for war.
Pratt realized this. He also realized that the Indian
problem could not explain the Southern votes. Casting about f
a peculiarly Southern reason for wanting war, he hit upon desire for
the Floridas and concluded tha:t
If the frontierslan of the Korthwest demanded war
with Grea.t Britain as indispensable, his kinsman
of the Southern border at least saw init a means
of fulfilling his expansionist dreams.2~
18. Ibig., p. 54.
19. Pratt, ”mar Ailns, pp. .6, 37.
20. gnnalg, 12, I, p. "1637. Cla;r, the Speaker of the House did
not vote.
21. Colemqn, "Ohio Valley," p. 40. See Appen 't I.
2. Pratt, Exeansioni sts, p. 120.
°5I
/
Southern frontiersmen wanted war in order to conquer not
3 a q n ‘1 - —. o o 2"
only the Floridas, but the nexican hmp1re as well, said Pratt. )
But he could show evidence of this desire only in the states of
Tennessee and Georgia, which sent such war men as Felix Grundy, James
Rhea, and George Troup to the Twelfth Congress. This added six more
votes to the total cast for war, making a total of only 12 votes for
war from the Eorthwestern and Southwestern frontier states. These
states, it may well be noted are the ones which best fit Turner's
definition of the frontier as the territory on the hither edge of
free land. The relative insignificance of the frontier, as Turner
0..
efined it, in the coming of the war is thus obvious. Pratt, however,
called the war a frontier measure, and partially solved the problem
of a lack of frontier votes by claiming under this category :ost
of the war votes of New Pameshire, Vermont, New York,24 western
Pennsylvania and S uth Carolina. Under his definition, the frontier
consisted of the rim of a huge crescent stretching from New Hampshire
to Georgia. It included all the territory bordering on Canada, Indian
country, and Spanish holdings.25 Along this rim lived those
representatives who were most outspoken in demanding war and in
desiring expansion.26 (Pratt implied that Ohio Valley Congressmen
had been ahead of their constituents in desiring the annexation of
Canada.)27 A vote cast by a representative living on the rim of
2 . Ibid., p. 225.
2 . Some border constituencies in Vermont and haw York did
not vote for war, however, while one of the three hew York votes
was cast by a representative from maritime Long Island. See voting
map in Samuel F. Bemis, g Diplomati History 2f the United Stat—s,
(Jew York, 1955), p. 157.
25. Pratt, Expansionists, pp. 126, 127.
26. gp;g., pp. 126-128.
27. Ibid., p. 54.
O
fi/
)0
' 1
the crescent generally was a vote for expansion, he sa1d, while
Congressmen living closer to the center of the crescent tended to be
08 I _
disinterested in expansion.“ Even under Proth' inition tie
war of 1812 does not“near an overwhelmingly frontier—expansionist
enterprise. The votes from the "rim of the cre scent" included three
each from I.ew Hampd ire and Vermont, two from New York the other vote
for war in that state was cast by the representative from1Long Island),
29 .D'
one from Ohio, perhaps eight from Pennsylvania, live from Kentucky,
three from Tennessee, possibly six from South Carolina (two other
South Carolina votes were cast by Charlestonians whom Pratt admitted
were not expansionists), an1d three from Georgia. The total is 34, or
31 less than the 65 votes that would have given the war measure a
bait majority. Even with the possible addition of two votes from
what was then the Hassa husett sdistrict of haine, plus the votes of
Henry Clay and Peter Porter - wa men who did not particcipatein the
voting - less than half the votes cast for war can be interpreted as
representing frontier interests. Further1nore, the total is even les
impress1ve if the six South Carolina votes are subtracted, as the
findings of Hargaret Latimer suggest they should be.)
29. gpgg., pp. RS-128
2~. This is based on an estimate by warren H. Goodman, "TeCrigirs
ofthe War of 13' 2; A Study of Chan3ing Interpretations," Kiss
Vallev Historical Review,&'"VIII (1941), pp. 171-186.
30. Margaret K. Latimer, ”South Carolina - A Protagonist of the
war of 1812," finerican Historical Review,L (1”9C‘), pp. 914-929.
According to Kiss Latimer, SouthCarolina alreay:was ahomogeneous
state. Tidewater planter and upland farmer both1aaced the same major
problem- the price of cotton. The effect of Britain' 5 maritime
restrictions on that price influenced SouMti Carolina sattitude
toward war, according to hiss Latimer.
37
Thus aSS“nin:3 for the moment tm even 34 or 36 votes did
represent expansionist sentiment, it seems c ear that the outcome
of the vote on war cannot oe e:{plained in terms of expansion alone.
At least #3 votes for war were cast by Congressmen livin3 toward the
center of the crescent, who, oy Pratt's admission, were not interested
in expansion. At least four of these votes were cast by Hassachusetts
men, one was from Kew York, two from New Jersey, at least eight from
Pennsylvania, 14 from Virginia, and six each from Maryland and Korth
Carolina. Thus it would seem reasonable that a meaningful analys_s
of the vote should consider their motives, as well as those of
frontiersnen, since it is evident that the men from the rim of the
crescent, who adnitted y included in their number most of the talent
q
of the 1mrpartV, 2id not have enough votes to pass the war measur— O
H
by themselves.3 Pratt's analysis of the proceedings of the Twelfth
Congress does not take the motives of non-e1:pansionists into account.
Pratt believed that the her of 1812 was the result of a
deal between Eorthern and Southern frontiersmen, who entered the
Twelfth Congress in a mood to fi31ht a war for expansion but nearly
changed their minds after the debate over Congressional reapportion-
ment underscored the differences between Northern and Southern
interests. They finally agreed to declare war only on the condition
th.t both Canada and thne Floridas would‘eincorporated into the
’3’)
Union to preserve tne sectional balance of power.’“
31. war eade rs who did not represent frontier interests in-
cluded Roperc‘Wrignt of Haryland, Lan3don Cheve s and William Lowndes
Charleston, South Carolina, and perhaps John C. Calhoun, if Kiss
Latiner's analgrsis of -flout1 Carolina causes is correct.
22. Pratt, 313;;e onists, Chap. III../
38
Even if this analysis were correct, a full explanation of
the war vote would still reouire a study f the motives of the more
than 40 men who apparently voted for war for some reason other than
exeansionism. Hovrever even this partial e::planation cannot be_. ’
The Congressional apportionment of 1811 was the one bit
of concrete evidence which Pratt could present to support his
interpretation. zpsortionment in the Tt-relfth Congress (1811-13) had
been based on the ratio of one representative to ever;r 33,000 residents
the census of 1810, several other ratios were0 H)
0)
U)
cf-
(+-
(D
*1]
O H H 9
proposed, including 35,000, 37,000, 38,000, and 40,000. The one
finally decide d upon in the Huse 0; Feoeresentatives was 37,000
{'7‘
the highest ratio atshich no state would lose a r-poresentative. the
Senate, however, changed the ratio to 35,000, which would give flew
York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania two extra seats each, and New
Hampshire, Vermont, Delaware, Virginia, and Georgia one additional
seat.)3 The IIouse turned down this amendrlent but voted again when the
Senate refused to yield. This tilne it approved the 35,000 ratio,
34Jr ‘,
I
l
(\D
to 62.
Pratt saw this vote as evidence of a serious north-South
cleaveage in the country, with Northern Republicans and Federalists
voting together against their Southern counterparts and Northwestern
frontiersmen voting with the horth against the South and Southwest.
An 31 most solid North faced an almost solid South across the Poonac,
96:37.3 e ”tar, I, (10v. 30,1181
L". rflido, I, EEC. 21,1811), pp. 2/
l
Q
\‘.'3b)
).
5
(H
.1
illustratiig a “cleavare oetueen the commercial and nlanter states,- Q L
the free and the slave states."“ As a result, the war party split
If nolitical leaders of each section, regardless of
eartv, distrusted any addition to the power of the
other, it u uld seem natural that Sorthern and
Southern Republicans should have viewed different
the or gram of territorial expansion now before
t;1e coun r3. Lorthern Reeublieans, though till now
thev had suneorte d t11e occu1ation of Florida and
the admission 0: new staes to the Southwest9
would :ear the additions. for r th.t such measures
would eventuall3r give the South. And on the other
h nd, could a sou*ern Resublican...favor wholeheart-
edly the annexation of CaMd shich LOdld mean
severral northern sta.tes?eventually the adoition of
Kentuckians, oer.aps, mi ght wisl1 with ecual zeal
for expansion north and south,....3ut the states
north and northeast of Kentuckv could hope to
.L
Ureceive no ooneefi , and must see a political danger
in annenin“ Florida, while the states to the south
and southeast must feel a sirilarly 1uke1rarm interest
in the annexation of Car1ad .30
*4.
O :5
k!)
C)
H (D
*3
This ilternretation is highly cuest
evidence that other interests were at least as in ortant as sectional
ones in dcternining the re1noort1onreno vote. If the vote was
strictly a sectional one, it would mean that Georgia, Maryland, and
telepare, w11ich voted for the azendmene, must have idenified their
interests with those of the North, while her Jersey and onio, which
uvoted asainst it, appa ently were alianin” themselves with the South.
xith tne excention of Har31a11d, however, the vote of each of these
states coincided 1:ith the states own 111terest.- In the case of
eeorgia and Delaware, each stood to gain an additional seat under 1e
35. Pratt, Expansionists, pp. 135-138.
36. Ibid., p. 139
37. Statistics relating to the reapportionment vote are to be
found in Appendix II.
Q0
amendment, which was introduced by Senator James A. Bayard of
Deleuoarefi'8 Chic and flew Jersey, on the other hand,faced larger
unI'Epresented fractions if 35,000, rather tha 37,000, were
divided into their nosulations. This :aeant they would be relatively
less well represented than states 1.'h so fractions were smaller, and
(—1
’20 A.
would have to pay hi her tetesrper reresentative.// 1nus sell-interest,
rather than sectional feeling, probably governed the votes of these
Self-interest may have influenced the vote of every frontier
state, as well. In addition to Weorgia, the states of Vermont and
New Hannshire each stood to gain a seat. Each voted for the amendment.L
50 did: Ilork and Pennsylvania, which had frontier districts, and
which stood to gain two seats each. Kentucky, Tennessee, and South
‘
Carolina, which facea much higher unrepresented frantions at 35,000
than at 37,000 voted against the amendment. Thus it is ee~haps.5
significant that the votes of every frontier state excert Geris
and Ohio coincided with both state and sectional interests, but that
‘ I O
in tnose two 1nstances, it was state interest that took precedence
f‘
In addition, Ohio' 5 vote can as seen as 1ailing to coincide with
sectional interest only if one assumes that Ohio consiicered itself a
Hortz1ern, raeher than a western state. There is no evidence that
it did.
f’T‘
his is not to sa'r that sectiona Melin~s played no demon—Q.“
strable role. If the liscussion is expanded to include non-frontierfl
1‘ 0
states, it will be noted that both Rhode Island and onnecticut
)u. Liles Regfster, I (December 7,1312), p. 252.
‘
1 ‘ .9 ' . n
or unrepresented 1ractions1der the amenene nt,
1
nevertheless voted for it. But Sew finglanders had objected stren-
J\uously to the id:a 01 admittin3 Louisiwna and other new a rarian
U
2
tates to the Union, out of fear tlat thei own section would bec:
*3
*4
0
Q;
tr ofi spoliticalpower. Under the amendment, flew England0‘08(0
stood to gain four seats, which would increase its repreesentation in
r 1 1 bro
the douse oy more tian 10 per cent.
Virginia,1-:hich voted unanimously against the amendment,
may also have been motivated by fear of losing political power.
The "cradle of Pre siclents" was in some dn3er of losing its near-
nonoooly of that of1ice. DeJitt Clinton, a New York Republican, was
attempting to rally Horthern and western support to end Vir3inia's
Mldomination. And the 1epublican faction that included Senators
Samuel Smi'ch of Harvland and Hieinel LeiboPennsylvania andE itor
P...
('2-
I)"
William Chane of the Philadel:hia Aurora, alreacy had broLen
hdison over his dis1mi sal of Smith's brother as secretary of state
and his retention of Albert Gallatin as secretary of the treasury.
.. . 1L7 ,
This group was moving into the Clinton cano.'“ T11omas Gnolson of
Virginia pointed out that the Korthern and asten states stood to
0 1
3ain nine seats under the “erdnent while the South and.West would
only gain two. Gholson nay well have been referring to the b1ackers
40. At a ratio of 37, 000, Yew 3n3land would have ha
reeresentatives in the Thirteenth Conress; at 35,000 it w
have Pl.
#1. Irving“ Brant, Jenes gadi son, The r1r1eent, 180Q—lC12
(Iew York and Indiana1oli ,1950 , pp. 52, 455.
Clinton was unsuccessiul in his efforts to gain the supoort of
nestern Republicans. However, it is ironic that tile Erie Canal, the
construction of which Clinton w:s urring in lCll, was to slay an
imoortant role two or tlm decades later in helping to galvanize the
Jest to the Lortheast politically and economically.
2. Ibid., p. 455.
I4,2
of Clinton when he char ed the Northern states with seeking political
mevonderance. For Charles Cutts of New Ianpshire, a Eadison
supporter, interpreted the Senate amendment as an atte1npt ey lortherners
5.1411, JDLL; any rate, Virginia was the only state
ainst the amendment in the face of a potential e1tra
LL 0 0
seat. 5 11e amendment would have given her 23 representatives. But
according to Gholson, Vir3inians originally favored making the ratio
40,000 even though that would hvs given them 20 seats - two fewer3
a 1 1 46 ? V | l 0 o 1
than they alread;f osses eo. Lnaer that particular ratio, the
states to the north and east of Virginia would have gained only five
seats over their representation in the Twelfth Con3ress, wLile the
' 1
South and west would have gained nine seats, despite Virrinia's 1035.47
Thus the South and West would have made a net gain of four seats.
it the ratio of 37,000, the South and.hest would have had a net gain
three seats. But at 35,000, the ’zforth and East were to gain a
PI\.
'1 14".) 1' o o o o a
iour seats. Virginia's vote thus may represent a sectional.L 0
net 0;.
3
interest. But her own anoition to remain the home of Presidents may
.. . 1 . . . 4have caused her to identify herself with a certain section. 9
Other than in Virrinia and the tw Iew Ensland statesQ 0
pre"iously mentiored, the votes on rea1rort1onn-nt in only tJo other
states seem to just fy the conclusion that any factor beside state
.3. 333333, 12, I, pp. 411, 412.
44. Erant, The President, p. 384.
45. See Appendix II.
46. gnnals, 12 I, pp. 411,4 2.
47.1 1 er, I (Iov. 30, 1811), p. 237.
4’8 0 Ibis)“,
49. Perhaps it is not entirely coincidental that Vir°inia and
the states to the south andIcest of her all voted for Ladison in
1812. Only three other sta -Vernont, Pennsylvania, and Lany-
land - joined them.
inerest was decisive. Maryland cast only one vote against the
amendment, despite the fact that she was thereby voting for a larger
unrepresented fraction. And Pennsyl ania voted for the amendment only
V
by a vote of 11 to 7, despite the fact that it offered her two
additional seats.SO Both of these votes, however, may reflect the
quarrel of the political leaders of Maryland and Pennsylvania with
the administration. It is interesting to note in this regard, that
the House of Tepresentatives, which turned down the Senate amendment
Dec. 5, voted to accept it Dec. 18 primarily beca se three represent-
atives from haryland and one from Pennsylvania changed their votes
in favor of it, while two other PennSVlvanians who failed to vote
1 n c .L o J. o 5]- , ‘ o if 1
the lirst time also voted for 1t. The Pennsylvania and narylana
votes thus apoear to rew)r sent political maneuvering, rather than
the deep-seated, sectional inerests sug._e sted by Pratt. Pennsy vania
'0 ‘ o o 52 l 1
was still a strong-hold of Jeffe sonian Repuolicanism. and
Pennsylvania and Haryl nd were to join Virginia in voting for Hadison
in 1812, thus thwarting the Clintonians and other opponents of Hadison,
"’3
10 could have defeated him with their co-Operation.DJ(a
Cold
Is for the states on the edge of Pratt's Crescent, there is
little to indicate that they would have voted against state interest
if sectional or factional interests had failed to coincide with it.
50. Appendix II.
51. Hiles' Refiister, I, pp. 256
defeated Dec. 5, 05 to 04; it mic na
, ” e anendnent was
A s . 18, 72 to 62. Thos
who changed their votes in favor of i J seph Kent, Peter Li
and S muel Ringgold, of Karyland, and Aaron Lyle of PennaiJa.la.
PWilliam Rodman and Adam Siybert, of ennsvlvania, vere the two who
0IX)
_.\O
\A
O{“3
\D
G\
t-
s—d De
.L
e
ttle,
had.not voted the Hist tine. &lwere Pepuolicans.
52. JL185.18, XJI’}1‘1). 1,70, l '7;le
3.123dison defeats Clinton in the electoral college, 123 to
O rm
U3. lne 3o electoral votes of PennseriJia and Maryland w
necessaif for his victory.
1 1_
did Ja.1cs Fisk and the rest 01 the Vermont celer-
onlv Sew England state to vote for Hadison in 1312, also stood toU
,.. '. ~ .1. 1“ - ‘ . in 2 -L'1"' 4.1 ..N. . 1. J-
03131 0.33 SBQU. 21.33, WHO WctS a 1?er 1111-111, JLlellle . USO uuGIlFLJCI’lu
the ground tn‘at it providcd Hell-deserved seats for Vermont
and Federalist Delaware, both of whichwrviously had had lacL)
Q
inia, nevertheless lumped-of which state coincided with that of Virf
Virsinia with the other lar tates - few York, Lcnn'"lvanLa, and0-!— U)
' 1
I
-assacausetts - denouncing a measure that would giveI—I
fraction larger than the combined total of these iour states.55
From a study of he Congressional debates andthe results
of the vote on reaoportionhent, it is evident that state interest
was the dominant issue. There is no evidence that this vote
illustrat osectinnsl interest in any of the states which Pratt claimed
were represented by expansionists. Thus there seems to be no basis
for Pratt's conclusion that the reapportionnent vote proves the
existence of a split within the war part;' which had to be mended
before war could be declared.
whether one accepts Pratt's interpretation of a split in
the war party thus depends largely on whether he is convinced that
the apportionment vote proves the eXistezce of such a split. host
of his other evidence is circumstantia1 end, as Pratt adzli ted, would
r\
, ’1 Q
514’ O 311:.1:”#4. 5:: ’ I ’ 3‘ O k“) .
55. loid., p. 40?.
1+5
prove little ex apt for the "knozzl situation" tin the claimed his
analysis of this one vote demonstrated. This evidence consists
prima'ily of a statement by Grundy, replies to it by John Randolph,
the results of the debate over use of militia, and the conjectures
erundy's statement is the often-quoted one in which he said
he was willing to receive both Canada and the Floridas into the Union
in order to preserve the political balance.50 It may be significant
that this statement was made while thea lortion1ent bill waseeing
...-u
decided and was presum1blv of reat ivportance in the minds 0
Congres glen. It would be even more significant to know to when the
statement Las directed. If it was intended for fellow members of the
frontier war partv, this is evidence of a split. However, if Henry
Adams I-ras correct in assuming that this and all other remarks of the
war hawks were dim“ cte d at the "40 or 50" House members who "would
vote for war onl;.r if theJ must," this does not indicate that members
of the war partv we e Iorlied about anneecation. 57 A studv of the
aeportionment debates and vote indicates, as has been stated previously,
that representatives from the "center of the Crescent," such as Robert
Wright of-leand and Gholson of Virginia were more concerne about
'hc sectional balaince 0: power than were frontiersnen, who tended
53
to think in terms of their own states' interests. Thus if there was
anv fear at this time as to the consequences 01 a war for expansion,
'4. a '1- - 1 u... v. , 1., - n. 1 4. ...
lb prooa01y has oe1n; eapressed by members of a Qroup that has not
interested in evoans1on nvvav.
56. See above, Chap. III, p. 24.
57. Adams, 1I, pp. 153, 159.
58. Annals, 12, I, pp. 0“-412.
2+6
If the "school of Virginia and YennSVIvania" actua.lly was
the tarfet of this and other Con1res31onal speeches, Randolph's
reply zucdies more sense than it otherwise would. There would be
advantages 1n '4var for men from goth lennessee and Genessee," he
said. 293g the Korthwest and the Southwest Lould psoiit from the
acquisition 0? Canada. t was the eastern seaboard, said Randolph,
that had nothing to gain and much to lose from war. It would be
desenseless in the face of British invasion and probable slave
1’1
uprisings, while n said19 could soethe capital m ving prO'ressivelvJ.
Randolph, as P‘att admitted, stood alone at the time and
' 60p1cked any argument he could.find to discredithe war part;.
This does not mean, however, that he hOped or attempted to discredit
these men in their own eyes. His chief hope of preventina war\J
lay in convin i1g the "he or 50" that war was not in their interest.
t was probably to then that he addressed these remarks.
Pratt, however, concluded that for once Randolph's remarks
made such an impression on Southern war men that they refused to
Grant permission to the President to use militia for the conquest
of Canada.61 The vote on that issue is not recorded in the A11nals
O ‘‘3
Conrrress, but the "wearying debate," which Pratt neglected toAw
analyze, gives sone indication of.the reasons permission was not
ts, p. 144. See above, Cnao. IV, f.n. 28.
L3, 7
A F’)
ew speakers - nootaslj,r Cheves of South Carolina, wright
of Karyland, and_Samuel McKee f Kmtuckv, argued that although the
1iliti a to executin3 the laws of the.J
Constitution li1its the use 051
nation, suppressing insurrection, and repelling invasion, the section
that grants Congress the ri3ht to declare war andr ise armies permits
it to desi1mate other uses to which the militia may be out, as long
as those uses are ”necessary and proper.”62 Federalists and Old
Reeublicans, on the other hand, took the View that Con ress must
limit the use of mi itia to the specific situations prescribed by
the Constitution, rather than re ad implied powers into the right
/
h
V
K»)
to declare war. The qu.etion thus was a constitutior.al one and
Crundv, who oelieved it would be unconstitutional to use the militia
I
to invade Canada, said he favored keeping it within the United States
to release volunteers for the invasion. The actionof Con3ress,
he said, could not make an unconstitutional measure constitutional.
Therefore, the decision as to how to use the militia should be left
up to Madison.64 There is no evidence that any member of the war
party was trying to prevent the conquest of Canada. The party
traditionallv had char1pioned strict interpretation of the Constitution,
and most of its members undoubtedly found it difficult to see how
implied pOLers could be read into the use of militia, when the
Constitution snec1fically listed the conditions under which militia
could be employed. Again a "lenown situation" would have to be assumed
in oreer to read anvthing more han an honest di:fe1mnce of Constitu-
__‘
62. Annals, 2, I, pp. 7315,739, 743, 792.
63' Ibid-‘a pp' 740 7UO: 765-768, 7741 775:7777 7789 701’ 79
CO
Q\
4.:
C H Mir;4. , no. 728’ 77
.L; .k1.)
48
ti01a interpretation into the debates on this matter.
The remainder of Pratt's evidence consists primarily of
guesses by Bayard and.William Hunter as to the motives of the war men.
Bayard wrote to his nephew in Kay, 1812, that the war vote had been
held up by a split in the war partJ over incorporating Canada into
. 6 . . .the United.Sta+es. 5 Hurter, speakinr a ainst a declaration of war
V
unon Spain in 1813, charged that Iortnerners and Southerners had made
deal to split the spoils of war. ":fe consent theyou meV conquer
Canada, permit us to conquer Florida."66
Bayard admitted that his conjecture was based on rumor,
although "I am inclined to think it true."67 But it may be signif-
icant that he said no more about the matter, although he could
write on June ll, "there is no secrecy between the members of the
two houses." In the same letter, he said:
You will perceive the prOpriiety of not quoting
my name for an3 Opinions you. r;aJform inferred from
my letters. What I suggestis conjectural and has
no advantage over Jour or:n conjectures......03
As for Hunter's charge, Pratt noted that Hunter "was a Federalist,
d his testimony relative to Republican log—rolling is to be
received with caution, but this statement fits so neath with the
(‘\
\0
known situation that :Ie cannot disregard it."
be stressed that Pratt never successzullJ established the- existence
of this "known situation."
65. Paners of Jares A. nPVard annual Renort f the American
HistOI C' anOC-_J-Ol,—(1913) II, en. 136, 197.
* >
so. annals, 12, II, pp. 520, 52-.
67.:""""ard, p. 197.
/ ‘ .
08. Ibid., p. 200.
69. Pratt, an"r°lolists
’6
k5
H ?'
hf)
Thus far the discussion has been concerned ILth de11onSWating
the lack of evideice for Pratt's interpretation of a split between
northern and souther: :gran_ioniste. low a further question must
be ashed. Did the war party want war primarily as a means of
bringing about territorial expansQion?
As Pratt said, Congressmen from the Hortin:est gradually came
to call for an offensive war a*ainst Britain, "perhaps most of all
[because of) sheer exaseeration at the long continued dilatory fashion
handling the nation's foreign affairs."70 Furthermore, according
to his testimony, if Zorthve stern Congressmen wanted war for expansion,
thsey evident y did not reflect the attitudes of their constiMuen8.71
Thus on the basis of his own admissions, it is difficult to se h w
ya
rratt could justiiv his expansionist interpretation of the causes 0 rs
the war.
It should be re embered in this conrlection that there had
seen war Lawns in Congress before lBll. As horman Risjord has shown,
the elections of late 181O and 1811 added considerably to the talent
the war party in the persons of Calhoun, John Harper of New
Hampshire, Peter Porter of Le:Iork, and 0+hers. But this party
was no stronger numerically than it had been in the Eleventh Congress,
from Irhich Pratt citea only three speeches urging the conquest of
Canada or expounding manifest destini.72 In one of those Speeches
Clay told the Senate, "the conquest of Canada is in your power," and
said he saw a "Zen United States...enbracing not only tie old
70. Ibid., p. #2. This is similar to what Adams had said. See
Adams, VI, pp. 115, 123, 155.
71. See asove, Chap. IV, pp. 33, BL.
72. horman K. Risjord, "1012 : Conservatives, Ear Haks, and
tr1e i.ation's Honor," Killian and lazy Quarterly, XVIII (1901), p. 200.
v
0
U1
nirteen states, but the entire country'east of the hississini,
includins East Florida, and some of the territories to the north of
Vir3inia Senator Hillian Giles, who later voted a3ainst
a resolution callin; for the invasion of both Canada and East Florida,
urged du‘ing the Eleventh Congiess the expulsion of the aritish iron
V
Canada. So did Johnson of Kentucky, who saw the corGuest of Canada
the nation. 75 Other than these three saeeches, all the s
Pratt cited as indicating desire for Canada were made after the battle
of Tippecanoe in Iovexoer, 1811. Nor did Pratt show any evidence of
such sentiment in the horthuestern press before Tieoecanoe. Yet a
Irar part;r ezc sted for sons reason in the Eleventh Congre ss and was
elected to the Twelfth Con} ss as much as a year bei"ore the nest and
an to call seriously for the conQ‘est of
anada. ‘t apnears, then, thet even as an explanation of th-
.L‘I
actions of Con'ressnenfrem the nornern frontier, Pratt's exw>nsionist
interpretation is sneer_ic1al.
rm ~ 1
(J
The sane statement can oe mad aoout his explanation of
causes of war in the South, wherre he claimed both Con3ressnen and_
their constituents waited -:ar for e2: (ansion. A recent article by
J'lliam A. walker, jr. supports Pratt's contention thet Ternesseeans,
q 76 aat least, were exansion—ninded prior to the Bar of 181a. sut
neither walker nor Pratt has shown that Tenless seeans needed or even
74. Pratt, Exaansiorist . J
750 31:11381.8, 11,1,13130 J'/9, 53.3.
76. 411119] A. walker, jr., "Ha'
the Ear of 1312," Tennessee Iistorical Quarterly, II(lQal)
20—37.
73. Anzals, ii, I, in. 579
h
c:
5‘)
O '1
‘0
x)
C
51
.0
though t ey needed a Uar in 0.‘der to lulfill the destin
from certain that the United States Uould have to ipilit the m st
pOUerful na tion in the Uorld in order to take the Floridas from a
Ueak Sgain. Rest Florida revo ted and Uas incorporated into the
‘ --- .z. . ,. V3,- 7., .L' . . n v, .-- n .L- ,..
Lniced S.ates o; shecutivc order even beiore the tar partf Was
r'v" A
elected to the $7311til Congress./0 In Januargr, loll, Con3ress
gave Eadison authority to occuny East Florida either as a result of
neace;ul neotiations Uith the S‘Wanih authorities or as a means
79of nrevech; n3 British occupation.
the neutrality laUs of the United States so flagrantlir
as to bring str n3 rotests from both Spain and he Eritish ally,
there is no eVidence that the Americaan poliocy of supportin; insu 3ent
factions, as continued by D. B. witchell, Uas not expected to bring
allooiFlorida under control of he united Sta
As it Uas, Pratt showed no evidence that the press 0
and Geor3ia linked the conquest of Florida with a war Uith Britain
oefore the -xel‘th Con3rcs s met, at which time, as Adams put it,
. n - -- ..4. v, ,4.-
Uar lever s ego the nation.
- 4.1d ,1 . v ,. - -,, * .LJ- - 4.- 4.3.1.-
In V18” 0 the aoone discusSioh, Pratt's in.crprecation
.- . - la ., .0 .. . , 2.. 'r .L .z . ' -- - i- -.$03.13 I181 one? 11 ., _L31"O_O'Lu'ld, HOT COI‘I‘BCL” 3.9L; -Lt GEJOJS QTGSolbO
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n, - La .. - . , 7-,“ V - I)’\.’.Loren Inerica (L3H haven, 19¢0/, 0. Joe.
"“3 m, 'Z- ...' ... - CA 0/(o. hrant, The iresidenc, pa. lot-loo.
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me
GdGSE‘Ofl.
m' 'V vs ‘- 1 - (w . 7- 5- h-y w . - ~ 4" l
1Le reasOn 1or this prestige 1 r l1e 1n the 1act tjdt
"‘—\n-.r\ n; Aw . r" n A .fil I...) ‘r 1" r~ fi \r ' ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ' #- ~r ‘r f'v' 1'E131111ouiets v. 1311 1e1lecto an approacn to fllSuOrJ that was
.... l .. . r... ....3 1° _n-.,11 . ». r. .~.'.J. ,—.L.
pepular 40 years aQo and stil iihcs supporters. Pratt's Loner-c103
-‘ 1-. N. . ' v- ‘-\ ‘I J-‘, Nfi 1f‘F-N D .j v A "v'i L -l~1~1- T‘, O J- ‘ fi-Lr-+- r1 ‘ r '
has cisillusioned o the co 3e 01 QGJJlOgHGJb the unloe‘ acaces :1
taken since the Civil Jar. American society11ad hecone class-riden
w .:"1 " J-
ana comi1x.te a by irre son31o1eca31talists. The c antry had liken a.7
1 _I n _»_'\ I ‘ ....
or1e1 111n5 at imperialism. 1ne war to "make the world safe for
democracy" had_ended in anot11er rao for spoils and in the 1ailure of
J‘"\ "1 3““ o '3.“ ‘3- -\ ' r '5‘ r- . -'1 T‘!‘ . 'L - n '1 J- 7 -n
an senate to rat11y the Treatr o1 Versailles. The Lulbed otaces gas
(I)
(D
(i-
LI
i—J
Ho
5J
5—)
Ho
nto smug complacency, with the zeal of the pro~re551ve
movement apf'rently gone and its goal of a more democratic society
apparently forgotte.. 11e intellectue s 01 Pratt's eneration saw
no reason for Americans to feel morally superior to the rest of the
world and to absolve themselves from a she e in the blame for the
world 31ituation. 1he historians oi Mli generation, who looked at
‘
hiStorv throu h the disillusioned eyes of the 1920's, attacked much
of what they found in American historiography as pious, nationalistic
mythology. Thef attacked lone-standi13 inte 1retations of colonial
.fl
society and the A erican Revolution, as well as interpretations of
Denis, Diplomatic :istorg, p.150; William Killer , A ch
Kitty}; 9; the Unite-:1 Sites (;:c:r1or, 1953), pp. 147-149; Zienry
3.351193, 1‘29 11:11:33 states __;"_ imp-122:1 (Lieu loric, 1959), p. 153.;
Georre I. oteeherson, Averican Histrvt_135 (Lew York, 1940),
pp. ”l7-cl~; J. E. Joodvard, é Se: A;e1mialistcrlp ” U York, 1936),
p. 32!.
o). Sranc The T're:‘3’.cl_«~,_ggw, p. 112. See als below, Chap. VI. p.66.
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ar have discounted low fa
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COL-4.5.10
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section of the nation a
’1
scarcely affected?" J
Such a question implies
15 that flew En3land opposition to
in economic tenns. The secor-d is
interest in commerce and therefore was not
...:
(D
Q.
John Adams, who
time the "calves John Bull,"
opposition to war measures
which ex- Senator Timothy
’rit of disunion in the horthea
tain a3ricultural prad
would be one result of war.
rm prices
ineir attitude has been tlat "if the real
evances Opposeo‘
d ured by tile inland sec
that the
on commercial
Pickering
British commercial restrictions for the
‘
cts and argued that improved
'denry Adams, however, found this
and many other historians of the
as an important factor in the
bi.
aportant factor on the fron+1er.
,4
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emaritine
tion, which they
(‘I
two ialse assumptions. The first
the war can be explained primarily
Q
west had no economic
genuix1elv interested in
m‘land Fed:rali sof th
letter to Je11erson that
uncle was a pretense upon
and others to build a
L,
honed
st.
.;4, 470, 471, 482, 503, 517, 518,
l. « I, ,
647, 636, 805, 836, 977.
2. Adams, VI, no. 139, 140.
3. Pratt, Endansionists, p. 9.
'. Lester J. oaowor, editor, Tie Adams-'efLQrson Letters,
1 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1959}, II, p. 303.
I ha
but t11
11e
inportations, non-intercourse
oeoosition to
elavinr
‘ Q
Thus, 3145,1011
rallri
were other motives
the political climate
of the dadison administra
national honor dictate
«L1
one
would unalte
ve lon3 Opaosed. these
3h c m_cr01al con
N , ' w.- 1‘ ‘ .‘r v-
‘JE-IOlnLJ -Or 119W 4.4
"bitter" Federalists were
rably Oppose
rr:
)J
people in all such orojects;
nt 03* m1bar3oes, non-
s, and above all, by the
any na.val p0"er, have been constantly
into their hands.5
national orernl
~ ‘1- '1 4-1 - -\ .- ~,' ~ ~1 -' -
apparently were a gopalar
-‘."
war, there evidently
also, which can be exelained n-y in ii3ht 01
of net: snol-a. At any ra e, a recent stuiy
tion indicates that while ladison believed
d a defense 01 commercial ri3hts, he realized
the one faction in the country that
such
Feelings of l n 11p for ”ritain and hatred for France
probably helned 0 cause hen England Opposition. As Hild eth
To the Federalists of this school a war with England
was e):ceedingly abhorrent; not merely as a throwing
away ofgreat connercia oportunitiees; nor solely
nor chiefly by reason of the alarm and the danger
to whilch it
of+the countly,
uselessly co
erations, moral and
France in
A
JV 3 the whole maritime section
t11e blood and none;r it "osld
on 1ar more :undamental consid-
political. To take sides with
would ex
and
(‘4' O ‘Dut
tJU,
th~ nendin3astruggle - and to make we
on England."ould be to take sides with .nCc -
“ppeared to then a h'gh crime aainst the best
interests of humanity, the aking sides with a tyrant
hostile ali1
K3 .)
to the rights of nationsand ri htsthe: 3
of men, when to heln to overthrow En:land was to help
0 I .-1 '7
1n prepar1n3 terrible yoke or ourselv05.1
It is therefore apparent that how England Opposition to the
”er of 1812 cannot be explained_solely in economic terns. But on the
Ibid.
(’1
Brent, ll? Dr“"1ra «4-
V‘AU, 111, 112.“a11".}.
O filldredqU11 ‘JrI ,
4
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:3 U AAJrl ‘JJ-Ii1C’ .- V30‘]. A-J -Qélu O ‘4 -/OC)1\J‘M I‘J'ufi (LOU I.)
it nartlv 1‘ecause of maritime grievances. Pratt erred in dismissing
the possibility that ”esocrne s "felt the humiliation if not the
pecuniarv loss" brou3ht about bv the belli3erents' 1aritimeU
restrictions. To suppose that depth 0‘ patriotic feeling can be
rea-mured in terns of economic inerests is to set us a false
standard.9 However, even if such a standard 18 sed, there is
reason to believe that the West was concerned over what vas raeeenin
to American commerce. 1t had an interesc in the export trade.
Grundyrut it this 15a;-r
“‘1"
It is not the carryin3 trade, properly so called,
abe“t which th' s nation and Great Britain are new
contending. were th's the only Huestion now under
consideration, I should feel 3 eat nIillin.<3ness
(however clear our C1ain night be) to invoke the
nation in var «or the asserti01 of a ri.ht in the
enjoyment of which the community at large are not
more dteply concerned. The true qua tion in
controver3 is of a very ifierent
J.
character; it
invol1es tl1e ri.3ht of Uhe '.:hole nation: It is the
ri;ht 01 e::portin3 theeroductions of our own soil
a11d incustry to 10rei3n markets.
m1... 3,..... '. 1. ..1 1 1-, 1 1,, .. .11 ..
11a Carryin3 and re-elport trWu snad accoantee 1or mac;
f.
the growth of anerican commerce btween 1790 and 180?. 'hhile the(I)
value 0; doxestic oxoorts merelv doa‘le du1in3 the period, the earnings of
the caiiyin3 trade incrtased from $5.9 rillion to "”2. Milion, and
.K n , f! 1
the re-export trader usrroomed from 9300,000 to g39.o nill1on. 1he
8. Pratt, Eisensipnism, p. 9. Pratt conceded in his introduction
that the above might be a 1 Mi1 exolanation of Hestesn sentiments.
But he thereafter ignored,such a possibility.
9. By analoev, it mi3ht be wondered if the or Americans
genuinely disturbed b' Fidel Castro's 11cent seisrre o“ Aherioaa
oreperti s in Cuba were those “he held stock in tre companies i velvee.
lO. fim111ls, 12, I, p. 424..4..-
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restrictions on
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9.
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t of Inr;rlend olsnedhese felling
1 system, Inich created a never
“1 _ Q 1'1, - .L 1 I r.‘ V I _ 7. ’n -, '_" ~.. A 9
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131'].
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British manufactu es -:ere xcluded. The price of
tooeeco never w s materially varied by the consumption
in en; e;c, but ceneqded on theHerin derland from
Jhi h, by their e"clusien fr ;u theGreat Britmi},
continent, i
John Each Acuistcr, writing
inplie that economic
?
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'1
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toward the end of
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t entirely arrested.13
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n n- q -, -L . ‘—'.'r~vrv- ~ . ‘1', J- ~,r-‘. a —. ~ - V7.-.~P Jir . -r— a
In a seCOno article, -quOf SOUQJU to ehblain JhJ lallih;
3 n ‘ ‘, r J—n-z— . .‘ "1"! J- .Ilfifl q ‘ v, w $.1-v- ': .-\. Dp_,« . a
prices has a cevascacinu e-lecc Lyon tne Jest and I the ellect is
v- . .5 J- r" '9 ‘V ‘1 - j r ‘ 1
1313 oi the causes oi the war. J Lien uorla
- 3 w v 4‘, j - . . ., f1. .1. 1 1 3i , 1 .-4. ‘ ..o-i.
prices were hi3n, as sale, “ester; or Laces coals be solo at a prolic
n .1. 1. '1 3.. .L -. k“broaa no in a call narhet, sucn a e 013 Moaht alflout the
_’_ _a .L’,‘ “L o 0 ('1- («J- i) o J- o n .L ‘7'! o .L. 1 T-L
naricine me orlCthDS oi rrahc,, treat JlLleu, ald the bjlbea states,
“.3, r.J. D - .. .a ,L ".2. m, 7.7 .L ..., —, ..
”estern iarners obcrated at a loss. the Less has a marginal a‘ea
for a nunoer of casons, includin3 h'3h transaortation costs, long
to markets, lack of marketing organizations and.mark3t
data, a shorta e or cash and capital, infriority of agricultural
wroducts, and Door methods 01 ‘achagiLg. szort good5 had to he
snipced down the hissiSSipci “ecausc of the prohibitive costs of
overland tronsaortation, but imports had to beHrouht in across the
mountMlsuntil the introduction of the steamboat ,ermitted upriverA
J.
naVigation. :urthernore, because of the lack of marketing organizations
farmers often had to tahe their own goods to Lew Crleans on flat boats.
:ecause 01 the great aistances involved, Lew Orleans marhe t news
often was two months old before it reached the farne and he could
reach hex O-leans. Once a‘rive , he usually was forced to sell his
products as soon as pOSSiClG, rewardless of tie type of market he
found, because of the unlealthy clir,mmt . Final y, Jestern goods
1 - ‘
snicueo froml.eJ Crleans, such as cotton tocacco, hemp, sugar, n.{‘3
corn, not only were inferior to the same ero\ucts gwrorn elsevsere in
the country, but often spoi"le d en;cute to narket cecause of incorrect
’34L.
Ta;lor, "a3rcrian Disconte;'t."
Icid., pp.Q’Fl-Lfl.1:\o
O
I\)
(O
O
61
n :L ‘ . -- M: - L n° m - u
seeiite tacos pro: itc-lillitlf -dctoro, sui’ -z3lor, tug
Yr ~Ffl"- o A ' Q - o -“ v~ “ _o‘ ‘. u x- I. ~~ ’. _I o
uGSt suhc‘thCcd a DflCl youulation OOOJ lollouin. the Louis one
‘4 |_ . r‘ I _;_ I 4- ’3‘ J. O '1 N“ _O
purcneso. Dut then meritime resorictions cousoo grLCCS all
the boom collapsed and ”acute depre
’5‘ .-~r .\
1:9-1 bylbi‘ws
r- ‘.,.\_~ ..- ,, ' .‘ -,._r~ \ .
ior new» 3rouers in ano inlert nu.nuf:
;on, practically
(I)
.0.
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T \
Taylor, aeste rwi rs bel'
. n_' .
...-LLforce
it even after Lot for long, ho
Slre"”ron*ier"‘°n sho"3d no dc
‘
o“" 1 oL1H f4)
t :‘lures ml shzkon
(3
v
,
T; rev-r we re s 3ready to pr
admission, his work
of.)
4A.).A
~18 3n 0
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ton/'1falling ,-ices in r
kJ.
'
riotions on tradeC)
ci‘
cct in by
_"
-EV \J
leved
t their restrictions.
T'fl‘ffivow I V
11"“
in
(1
4-1_ ‘1 -‘.\
oxirou‘ba the
u. 0 L4-
CCA‘IL u we
licen dislike of Britain, and reLCtiOfl to impres
other maritime grievances, all of Lhich he
99feetor" is the coming of tee mar. ”hus his a
O ‘Q‘
U.
uring int
c4"
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long prices eventually dropned, too.
the
I".
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v
9
an anal"s's of onl9.8
He made no attempt to
tion to such other
+npthv
1'1 .
rloridas,
3 ALent gold t'le
"n“AAoth-e
A ...4- 3-: y u:- 9' , L J— . 'n . .-o J- r‘fl ('V
iroic-cr cause of toe *ar or tie scale :lcflOUb atteuvtin3 b0 assess
_. .L a “ _ c v o ..L‘
its re ative nei34 .
f) - ' V _‘ ’ q, ’1 -
4,5. 12110.0 , 12}. W4, %)50
'3" 2: . .77. ' ’20
tL'Do Itch}. u. , r31 -.‘7-L:‘KJ‘ o
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no 7-: "A,
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r‘ T‘ - w
LL90 .g.“1.Cio
-. “1,.- -.f. ' -.L - ' ' . flea-y J—‘.- \ \ 1‘ -. ”'2"
-ae enact usl is o: t11s or QLJ other cause Lerooasl3
cw. ‘A ..--, . -—« -- .1 - v .1 -,L ‘— . ‘ L . 1
ne‘er will ea hno h. LOHCJGT, lu seens possiole b0 reach tie
nsortan e in thel
H.— -:-r-'-. \. "\ ‘.'\ J- .J' 'V‘F‘ fl ‘ ‘- f~ '\
ten bail clVC 0011011131011 ti). 'o 1 c Ina-Q 01 COHSluBlfiLlC
‘Uast. That section res still sparselv settled and ““0o1o1;
majority of its inhabitants was not producing for the export market
regularl".30 Iove-the ess, th East already was osconin important
as an exorter. In 1739, doenriver trade reaching flew Orleans
(n unted to earoinately *1 million; eight years later the tot:
31J. o n 1 no n1 w .
was $5.4 million. In View 01 tne obstacles to ero11taole proeuction,
th's was a sizeable increase. Ha‘ qorld pices re.nained high, it
ole that the pepulation boom w uld have continued and that
many :arners wee remains ericwral to the market would have
r Taylor indicates
1
t was bitter over falling prices andplacced the blanc
on the bellisersnts - particularly on Great Britain. Thus as
' ‘ "1.7 n .2..°' ,L. T 1 . 4.3.3 n ‘ .. 1 ._ h' "
sa1d, tee atelttee oi ere ”escern sessler can hardl3 oe e‘aluated
f‘l‘.
without an unde m‘andin" of his001011 oosition."’”
It probably would be a mistake, hoxever, to assume the
existence of axgthin; rescnsliis a direct, one-for—one relationsh'p
n prices and re sentirert. lapole n announced his contine1tal
q
svssem in aovember, 1306, and the total value of unerican denestic
~xports did not decline until 13381 large drog in Yestern puuolic
land 5? es during th fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1806, however,
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[11,)
I)e Tirst decade following the publication of -a;rlor 8
articles saw a return to older points of view. Two major interpreta-
tions appeared during the period. In one of then, Bernard fiayo
reem1HIasiz d the imeortance of frontier nationalism in the coming of
the war. In the other, A. L. Burt returned to a maritime rights
interoretation. Both writers made use of the findin;s of the
revisionists, although Burt did so to a lesser degree than did Mayo.
But each stressed a point that had been emphasized by maritime rights
historians — theeemotional sensitivit;r of Jesterners and the importaIce
of maritime grievances. Neither Lay.o nor Burt used t.e vehicle of the
monograph, which had been nebular with the revisionists.3 Nor did
either write solely to explain the causes of the war. hayo was
interested primarily in the role ola ed by Henr; Clay, while Burt's-
l-
study covered emerican-bWritirelations during the period between
1776 and 1820
Ha;r0' 5 interpretation of fr01tier nationalism contained ele-
ments of both the revisionist and maritime rights inter retations.
Frontiersmen were so sensitive to insults against the nation's honor
L7 .D J. .0 . LL "
bflat they ielt outra 3e at theyli3h» oi far-away seamen. however, he
implied that he thought the war was not fou tprinarily for maritime
rights.5 Rather, local problems were a more direct cause of frontier
Bernard hayo, I-Ienrv Clay Boston, 1937).
Burt, United States (Jew Haven, l9h0).
See above, Chap. III, pp. 21, 22.
Ibid., n. 326.
SEES, Clav, p. 328.
mtkoNH
65
sensitivity. hayo relied on the findin s of Pratt, Taylor, andU
1__
others as explanations of base frooolem1s. He accepted Pratt's con~
clusions concerning the Indian situation, expansion, and conflict with-
in the war party. He also made use of 'aylor's interpretation of
the causaleffect of falli "farm prices upon var sentiment. But
whereas most revisionists had put primergr enchasis on the importance
of “interest" and only paid 11 service to the role played by "honor",
in the coming of the war, Kayo attributed as much importance to the
latter as to the former. The Jar o: lolZ was not-ought nrimarily
for material gain, he saii. Fetlzer, it was brought about by “Free
Sons of the west," who were "uncontauinated by the seaboard' 5 intimate
British ties,” and "had a deeter unoerstanding of nationalism and
democracy" han did the European-oriented Lasterners.7 The Lest's
nationalism was emotional, rather than rational and calculating. And
hesterners felt that
OutrightI-.'ar w’s preferable, and even desirable,
to a m n6relooeace in which America, eft naked and
unarmed oy a lo:ocratic Congress, was assa ted and
robbed with impunity, subjected to a Canning-Jackson
insolence, and taunted by Pickeronians (.rh frustrated
all efforts to avoid ooth tar and outri3ht submission)
without oein' so craven that she could never even be
V OI _
.xiCJGd léito Iii-RINS
Although the influence of Turner and Adams can be seen in these
statements, Kaye's nosition also resembles that of the maritime
ri3h s writers.9
' .3 . _ QI‘A r) rs Q I O
O *Olgo ’ pi). 329-1) “)4, )9‘3, 294" ”do.
7-“ 3 1a nr- /
4.1.1:. , :10 H.0-
I-Dido , p. 3270
See above, Chap. I, npu 9, 10.\OCO“
0\
g-
(T\
7
Each of the revisionist writers whose fiildin
had attempted to prove that one particular cause was decisivve. Layo,
however, was unwilling to call one frontier cause decisive or even to
call one more important than another. Kany factors played a part
1"
in the coming or war. All were important, he implied.
It may well be that the coming of the Jar of 1812 can be
explains .only in tenns of a multiplicity of causes. But it is
also erobably true that some factors weished more heavily thani J
others. Thus hayo' s approach would seem to be valid only if it
Jere impossiole to dif1erentiate between factors. As Reginald
1
Horsman has sug3ested, however, it probaoly is possible to diflcr—
lO 1
entiate. The historian can set up a critical standard to judge
v1
any cause and compare it with others. 5v asking questions about
the number of votes in Congress it could have influenced, the number
’1
o: Jeorle affected by a particular grievance, its importance at
b-v—J
critical times when war was being advocated most strenuously, and
the importance which contemporaries seemed to attribute to it, he
can begin to understand which causes were of major importance and
which were not. Such an approach admittedly would work best in
analyzing these grievances in which interest, rather than honor,
was at stake. But having checked the validity of war-hawk statements
in rerd to those grievances in which material interests were meas-
urably affected, one would also have an improved basis for judging
the trustworthiness of pronouncemen s in regard to impresr1ent and(0
other non-economic grievances.
10. Horsnan,'fika‘éims," 9.1+.
Iayo, in assertin the equal ix1portance of many causes, nav
have been reacting against the tendency of revisionists (and other
historians of the war as well) to be uncritical of the particular
causes whose importance they stressed. Revisionists had failed to
take into consideration such evidence as might disprove the de-
cisiveness of their causes, and confusion had resulted. However,
., o n
it might oe wondered 11 Kaye's approach is any less confusing.
To make no effort to differentiate Lhen differentiation is seemingly
’eossible is to give undue importance to some causes and too little
importance to others. Such an approach steps far short of theL
knowable truth about the causes of the war.
‘
e of failing to differentiate cannot ee made against
Hayo's successor, Burt. A dl‘lOmaic historian, Burt viewed the
coriin3 of the war r11ar1lv from a maritime-ri:3hts point of view.
During the previous 30 years or so, maritime causes had been largely
ignored. Those}istorians who discussed them at all, such as
Harry Barnes, Alln Johnson, and.Ralph Paine, consiaeered maritime
factors less im31ortant than the Indian problem and desire for
Canada. Burt, on the other hand, discussed the problems of the
frontier only briefly and dismissed then as of decidedly less
anortance tm11 maritime causes.
According to Burt, theroble11 of mariti1e ri3rts Opened a.d
continually widened the rift bet1meen the United States and great
.1.
Britain. The uwo nations had con1licu1r‘ inter1re atio11s of national
C4
ll. Barnes, ”War for Independence, " pp. 47,,V/‘; Allen Johnson,
e;fgrson and Eis Colleagues (23for1cles of America See ries..-———.--
.ev-I
’
For
I - ..r- . . I“. '“ I f.f‘u . :- .“n .1 ' h ‘-
Haven, 19231), Av, p3. LU”, 1t , .Alg1 D. 1aine, The ri'ht a Free
A .’ .1 ..'. « _. _ l
Sea (Clronicles of Amer-ca Sar1es, Sew haven, 19:1 , JlI pp. 3, 4.
rights to jurisdiction on the hi”h seas, and these interpretations
9 1 , ,
mflecte d vital interests Nllch could not be cemprom1sea.l” srltain
(‘1
the ri3hts to U‘.ich the superiority of her navy entitled her. she
previously had accepted the prin01ph that neutrals could trade with
belli3erenta in any articles except centrat1and. But now she claimed
ave her the i::ht to stop any vessel attenptin; to
. A l? n .- 1seen a continenta port, regardless o: car3e. J :urtnermore, ne
clained that the nec ssitv of maintainin
her to board neutral ships at sea in search of deserters,
Ame;icans, on the other hand, believed Brita1n Uas usinv
Uartime necessitv as an excuse for sainin a nonOpoly over the commerce
of the Uorld.15 Lacchin; a pOUerful na.vy to protect her merchant
marine, he United States insisted upon Uhat Uas then a new principle:
That American private ships, as Uell as public ones, Uerc sueject only
to American law at sea.16 If Brit'sh laU and practice were to rule
’ 1
the waves because of Britisn power to enforce them, Americans
belicved their comuercecould not be indevendent. .
7‘ 4- r I\ ‘1‘. 1 I . "II ' 1' r~ v‘ . " 1 J' l"‘\J‘ " n " ’
Aeutral tracing r13Ats Le a an inpertant aspect 01 the
stru“"la :erjurisdict1on, accordin; to Burt, and the United StatesU4
had a greater 3riev1mce a3mnst Britain in this respect than.a<
13
Frannee. For most of Britain's seizures were made at sea, there,
12. 3111‘ Ulll'ti‘ 3:31.135, 1:). 21.2. t.
13. aid., p. 214.
14. :bid., n. 2 2.
15. Ibid., 0. 223.
16. £2;§., p. 212.
17.3g1§., p. 22%.
x *1... ' 6'1
according to her former nractice, 810 nad no r1
neutral sitins not carrying contraband. 1a oleon, on the ther hand,
usually made his seizures in continental ports, where his jurisoiction
could not be di Wit‘ .19 In addition, French seizures could not be
construed as an effort to injure American shiéning in orcer to aid
Frencn connerce since France's ner hant me.rrine had virtually ceased
But England's seizures could be and were thus construed.
lne orders in council see_ed to be "designed to establish the
, . _ . ,+ p a , _. 21economic SU§eFlOTlay oi sn3lane."
‘Veie the nroblems associated with the right to
trade, however, the problems esultin? from impressnent were even
greater. Lives, rather than goods, were touched_by impressnent.
And abuses on both sides continua]_lv contributed to international
DJ.
ill-will. British boardin3 parties 0 en were brutal in their
treatment of American crews, zhile the American eractice of providing
ion "hich our sailors could easilr sell to BritishH.
(L
k)
S (i-
H.
H)
H.
O )3
c+
desertershceft the British suseicious oi the Unites States.‘
any time Cinnressment] might cause violent clashes, and all the tine70
'5
it was producing liotle inccidents shich had a cum ative effect. /
hese incidents, according to Burt, influenced the American
decisions to invoke embargo, non-intercourse, and other forns of
economic coercion . With its roots in the American vaolution,
H ‘3
o r-=‘(N
U .;. G .
...—..—
2 . 3233.
21. gglg.
22. gggg., p. 213
71
economic coercion appeared.to be a weaeon that nature "had pla ed
at
"Jr 'T'
in the “nerican armors. 1t1i1volved less danger than war, and
was the only compromise that could be reached between those who
’)
1 n q 1 a o L: . 1 o a
wanted war and those wn :avorea suom1531on. 5 ACCOTang to Alexander
Balinkv, the fiscal eolicies of Jefferson and his secretary of the
ecisive role in the choicep.
treasury, Albert Gal atin, play d a
.
Ithat was made. Their emonasis on the prilnary importance of debt
C l ‘
retirement had not only deprived the nation 5 def nses of adesuate
3
iinancial sueport, out had also swept away the legislative and
'3’
administrative machinery whereby needed revenue might be recovered.”0
FT”
inus when economic coercion failed to force Lritain to revoke the
orders in council or relinquish the riht of inpressment, Americans
nad to choose bettmen suo1m1 sion and a war for which thev were
,27unereparee.
According to Burt, Britain's refusal to revoke the orders in
council until theweek that war was decl=red 1.35 the immediate cause
28
of var. A51 arjison said in laaer years, the dec1sion to ask for
war was based on a letter from Castlereagh to Foster, read 07
T. W. ‘,' ’23 o 1. 1 "a; 10 yo +_\1
Aanson say 27, 18121n WHlCJ lb was distinctly and e‘.nnatio”ll
.4
state .that the orders in council, to which we had declare we
Would not submit, would not be repealed....flith this formal notice,
no choice remained but oet"een war and de11ecation, a decredationr
w
inviting fresh provocations and rendering war sooner or later
21+. Egg” p. 255.
25. “id., p. 231.
26. Ale}tender Balinky, Elbert Gallatin, Fiscal Theories and
Policie" (flew Brunsrick, H.J., iQJJ) pp. 130, ff.
“ rt p
0 (”U
"5
Cf.
t United Statess, pp. 3l5, 316.
The President, p. 466.
{\D
to
(Di:
a
“Q
I)
(N
' ' ‘ 5.0
138V1taole." /
Had the repeal of the orders been suostituted for
the declaration that they.,*ould not be reseale‘,
or had they seen repealed but a few weeks sooner,
our declaration,o- :ar as proceeding from that
cause would have ”ea: stayed,aand negociations
on the suo‘ect of 1m1ress:1ent), that other great
cause, would have seen purssued with fresh vigor
and hoses, under the aus_eices o: success in the
case of the orders in council.
However, desyite the repeal of the orders in council, it was impress—
ment that prevented an early armistice. Lore Cartlereagh told
Jonathan Russell, the American gharfie d'affaires, who had. ”een
instructed to make Britain's abandonn:ent of iripressment a necessa.ry
‘0 o o o ql
condition of armistice:“
You are not aware of the great sensibility and
jealousy of the peOple of England on the subject;
and no administration could expect to remain in
power that should consent to renounce the right
of inpressnent, or to susaend the practice, without
the certainty of an arrang-ment which should
obviously be calculated to most unequivocally
secue its object.33
V
Like a number of historians of tne War of 1812, Burt seems to have
gone too far in attemitins to portray maritix1e causes as the
,3
decisive ones. The national—rights implications of the orders in
council were extremely important to American diolomats. But Burt's
‘
ar3 nent that Inaritine causes were the decisive one in the minds of
westerners were 8W1tionally innvolved.in the problems of anerican
commerce and seamen. But it r.1:1_t be wondered how Burt COL d
29. Gaillard Hunt, editor, -ne LJritirs
9 vols. (few York, 1910), II, p.. 272, 273.
30. ;p;g,, II, p. 273 See also, up. 195, 106.
31. American State Padsrs: Q_gs§ I: Fore 3n Relations
(Washington, 1832), Vol. III, p. "85.
32. I‘fi1d., III, p. 594.
73
justify his dismissal of the Indian problem because its roots were
DO
I‘
"in a remote corner“ u-ich had 1ew renre entatives in Congress.)3(D
For he contended, on the other hand, thatasssterners felt the shame
occasioned by British maritime restr'ctions more deeply than did
amasterners, primarily because they were farther removed from the
’31"
dangers of a maritime war and”.dad no direct interest 1n commerce.)
In ad:ition , Burt's assertion that the problem of fallin<r ricesD
we 3 not inn rtant out 1de the South - "the one section of the country
9.11
that was vit”ll de1enndent ufxon the ma :ets controlled by napoleon"/J
T”
hestern" .0
seems higaly duestiowuabl in View 01 Taylor's evidence 01
belief that only if continental markets were Opened would Anerican
.L
O'oods cease glutting the market and inferior western goods be sold
“6.
I
at a profit.“
‘
mailso, well documented discussion of the maritime(L
(‘i‘
sa:t.’
causes of the war, however, Burt's study is probably without equal.
His findings in regard to the importance whicl Madison placed upon
the revocation of the orders in council have been corroborated
in a recent, equally well documented study of the Madison admin-
. a7.15trat10n.’ his apnarent overstatenent of the importance of
maritime grievances to the ue3t is more than offset by the light
he shed on an asnect ofhe coxrins of the war that nad too long0
been neglected.
36. Taylor, "Agraria.n Discontent,"
37. See below, Shed). VII.
4‘.
h
HAPTZR VII
- .u A J- . 1‘,~-o Jo . .fi . ‘-L 4- .
Two recent lnthCTGoethAS SngGSC a reV1val 01 interest 1n
In one of
them, Irvine Brant closelv scrutinized the role of Presicle r1t Eadison
2in t21e conirit of the Bar of 1812. In the ot11er, flornan h. Risjord
analyze d the part played by Southern conservatives in the Twelfth
\J)
Congress.
to Brant, Eadison had been a strong nationalist
a the time 01 the Constitutional Convention, began to champion state
rignts primarily because he d:leiked the nationalistic program of
Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists, and acted as a nationalist
aja n as President. a tho‘gn dedicates to peace, he was willing to
risn a var with either Britain or Fr1nce in order to COApOl then to
(D
respect the rights of tlie Urited Sta 8. "played an active part
in the events leading to war.
Brent's intereretation differs coniderfi'ly from that ofL
Hildreth, who claimsd that Iadison secretlv orooed the policy of
the mar hanks, out e"ercised smell feeole leadersnip that thev Icere
"Q’
() ,3.
C}-
(Di
Q;
to rain control of Contress. The war men became so Dower-Q \J 4.
511, he said, that thev were able to offer Eadison the choice 01
either supporting their war nte asures or bein
I O 4 I I
ation in 1812. The Freeident was forced to come to tesms Hitn then
in which:
1. See aLo e, Cha1. II.
2. Irving Brant, Jages Ladis n, The President, 1392:1312 (icv
iork and Indianapo-is, fi).
3. Risjord, ”Conmgatives."
Q. Hildreth, VI, pp. 239, 316.
r7)
(’4’
lne leaders of the Var 1Mary Vere iiexorasle.
The :r ‘LSt not seen to caiorced on theo:re icmt;
1-:aI‘- but his. .Ac mutt. , not their ee
headed by the i1Jerrioas Cla;r, waited upon0him .Jith
assurances to that effect. He must consent to
recommend a declaration of Var, or the;r Vould not
accept hlJ as Prcs1dent.5
Von Holst, Lchster, and Schoulcr accepted Hildreth's
interpretation. Adams, hOVever, declared there was no evidence of
a deal and no reason to S‘ppose that Ladison had to oe Von over
to the Var—haVk cause. "The President, as his office required,
stood midVay between the masses of his followers, but never failed
"I
to approve the acts ard meet the Vishes of the Var members."{ {len
even the Var ha.Vks aspcared to falto r in the face of continued
grievances a ainst France, Ledison helped to rekindle the spark.
1 ‘
He made puslic the Henrv letters, V1 ich, ne claLVeeo, proved the
existence of a treasonous tie between Lew England Federalists and
_L 1“ 0 IL. . fl 8 U P O + ‘ o D $
LLe sritisn. Le was not lorced into calling ior war. On tne
contrand.
Ho sig' of hesitation could be detected n la’ son's
conduct betreen the nee ing of Congress n Lovember
and the declaration of war in June. atever Vere
his private ;eeling 5, he acted in constiht agreement
with the majority of his part‘q and at: ost asked
only time for some sliht ar.anentc.
i
i
-vw/‘
\O
acanls weas unsympathetic with Lacison's policy. He said the
President clung to the fiction that Kapoleon had revoked his decrees
"until the world laughed in nis ace," in an effort to force Lritain
'1'". ° ,3 T f)":
5. -L_'..>.-I.KJ.. ’ II, I). LLyQO
rwnr' fir ~' I
6. Von Holst, I, pp. L/J-230 Lenaster, III, p. “W3; Schouler,
76
to revoke the orders in council.10 When the British refused to
comply, Madison saw no choice but to call for war. In order to win
votes for war in Congress, he designed his war message to make it
appear that impressment, rather than Britain's refusal to revoke
the orders, was the casus belli.11 Thus:
If students of national history can bear with
patience the labor of retaining in mind the threads
of negotiation which President Madison so thoroughly
tangled before breaking, they can partially enter
into the feelings of citiiens who held themselves
aloof from.Madison's war. 2
This interpretation of Madison made little impression on
Adams' immediate successors. Francis walker said the charge that
Madison sold out to the war hawks in return for their political support
could neither be proved nor disproved.13 Babcock, who withheld the
charge that a deal had been made, implied that Madison had gradually
been won over by the war hawks.14 And D. R. Anderson, one of the
first revisionists, implied that if the war hawks did not actually
put pressure on Madison, at least he recognized the importance of
politics in the coming of the war. Pratt, the one notable exception,
confined his discussion to sectional politics within the war party.16
Madison's role was largely ignored.
In 1932, however, Theodore Smith sought to revive interest in
Madison as a progenitor of the war.17 Like Adams, he believed Madison
10. Ibid., VI, pp. 117, 118.
11. Ibid., VI, pp. 220-224.
12. Ibid., p. 225.
13. Frances walker, Making 2£.£E§ Nation, 1783-1817 (New
York, 1895), p. 224.
14. Babcock, American Nationality, pp. 51, 52.
15. Anderson, "Insurgents," p. 170.
16. See above, Chap. IV.
17. Theodore C. Smith, "war Guilt in 1812," Massachusetts
Historical Society Proceedings, LXIV (1932), pp. 319-345.
77
should be censured, rather than praised for his role. But Federalists
and historians had blamed Madison for the wrong reasons, he said.
According to Smith, the standard interpretation of Madison,
first stated by Hildreth, was based on several false conjectures.
Hildreth read an unwarranted meaning into the fact that the Republican
caucus, which ordinarily met in April of a presidential election year
to endorse a candidate, did not meet to endorse Madison until May 18,
1812. He also accepted a rumor, begun by Foster and Federalists
Alexander c. Hanson of Maryland and Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts,
that the war hawks forced Madison to accede to their demands.18 And
Hildreth incorrectly supposed, as Smith put it, that "Madison was
known in the winter and spring of 1812 to be positively averse to war
and that some form of coercion, Open or veiled, was needed to overcome
his reluctance."19
Smith, asserted that Madison's actions had been mis-
interpreted. Quiet and aloof, the President never bothered to
answer his attackers. He permitted himself to be misunderstood.20
But according to Smith, a study of Madison's letters and papers
indicates that the President was neither indifferent nor hostile to
the war spirit. 0n the contrary, Madison was privately impatient with
the slowness of the nation to act. Smith cited a letter written to
Jefferson in February, 1812, in which Madison criticized the
recently passed army bill as inadequate.21 In another letter to
Jefferson, Madison wrote that the House finally had "got down the dose
18. bid., p. 338.
19. Ibid., p. 329.
20. Ibid., p. 320.
21. Ibid., pp. 329, 330.
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firant agreed Irit11 Adams and Smith hat erison p12.ved an
active, Killing role in the coming of the‘War of 13 2. But ;e {id not
a ree that Ialison spolic1es were indefensible. Brant departed from
his predecessors primarily in natters of interpretation. Although
his arguncnt was more fully cos“cnte than
or Smith, its factual basis was similar to theirs. Brant interereted
s in a manner fav rable to Kadison.
According to Bran , Hadison Iras decicated to peace, but
was extreme y sensi its upon the character of his countr;
He :-.'as willing to ri “A war if war was needed to make the United
States resnectee 0y other natioxs.' Thus, although he honed war
U of the naniiesto - in Konroe's
01 ired by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1914. See
t, illustration facing D. 41s.Y‘
)1. I3;lit11, "tJVELrELLTWl-t, Do 3+5.
)Lo Brant, The President, 9. 112
....vp‘ra . a
11831;?TTI‘l o1; - :as 8.
h
rm sident until the decision was made to ask for war, nadison
sought to play one eellierent ase’nst the other in an effort to
5. O (f‘
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0get them to remove their maritine rest
:efore Eadie n had been two Heel;s in office he
he: nut the full I-reir-fht of tie Preideency behind
a ecret unders ending Jith either England or
F1:nce, involvingaa call for war against the other
unless it too stepped molesting American commerce..
..This does not:neen that he either wished for or
ezpected war in 1309. His he re was to use an agree-
ment witl Mizler belli>:erent to oetain one with the
other.34
About s’t n eks afterh.1e entered office, Madison became a
1"
b7 siigning the ; shine
J E: 01
ci‘
U) D E;
VI
(Dhero to Republicans and Federe
gregement. Under this Treement Britain was to revoke the orders in
council insofer as they eifecteetnnericen iiuv1n and the United
States was to withdraw non-intercourse a ainst Britain and lceeep it
in effect against Trance.99 However, England's envoy, David H.
Er L_n a1lod to inform hddison th:% the British government hc.d
O K O O
' ‘
navy.JQ Britain's sub sequent re‘udietion of the agreement orou4ht
quicx disillusionnent. Madison belie*ed the British had "reverted to
1ne failure of the Erskine agreement brought about two
develonnents in nadison's @01303. accorciH
33. Ibid.
Oi." rifld.’ 1,".
sr p.153.
6. Brent, The !resident, pp. 73, 7%.n
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ceased v0 no.e one. eieier sellipere1tm1ld r3‘0-101to
.'.._' 4. r“: IILO J. 4....
restric tions CL. once. 111ere1o ‘9, he ten;ted s_;.ur the we
belligerents to a series of alternate jumps," in which they would
remove their restricHlOIS gradually. "Th diffi ulty 1P3 to make
either of them jumo fiust."93 n“t he in order to win subvert for
HI
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of}. ign colicye‘based on the economic self-interest and Chest”
pride of a younr and growing nation," he bean advocatir:\J
development and national self-sufficiency.“i His aim was to unio—
eehind him "all1actions, except the bitter neeeralists led by
I
"wePickerin:.
Politically this meant that the Iadi son ad:inistration
ceild safelr accent increasing 1tzards in a 'risk of
war' policy. If it succeeded in Jrotecting cert-neree
by neotiation, all but the most fanatic Eederalis
would be won over. If ne30tiation ;-ailed, every st:p
.L'.
L;that led toward war would be be.elmdby 1: self-inter st
and hih nationali—an of the fast-shreaeilg naxau;act-
uring element and the territorial ex nsienists.
Every boliti cal loss gr0"ing out of oana,3 to foreign
trsle would be oifset among the new industrialists.
:ar 3 -
C.)
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_tse f-fatal to overseas trade - would bring
c me
those 1rJured Ly
nt to a Climax, sustainin" the govern-
tile di sription of
couneree.‘i
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53 a means 01 1mg CMChtlhb his 1ore1 n yOliCj, n1e1.on tOOn
' 'L r- V 'L F V . I‘ "\ ‘ r‘
an extraordinary step for a Ranuelican. He asxed tile eleventh Conress
I P v1: -. v— ~‘r‘~\(, 1" ‘9 w~. ‘.h '3 '. P! vr. '
Lor increaon fun 1or m1litarg spendin,, 'es\1te Lullutln'o advlCC
'J)
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c
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that defense aEpro)rlitwohU U9 Gap in nal1. oon_res , he ever, has
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not ready 10? such a step.42 her was it ready to replace the aginfi
non-intercourse bill with a strener form of as noic coercion, as
Iadison wished. E t it did pass nacon's Bill Iunber Two, which
rngave Kadison a small lever to use against the belligerents. 1he
ll restor~d t3ace With both England andVrru-ce, out provided that0‘
FJ.
if either of them should revoke its re strictiens betore Harch 5, lSll,
ainst the other in the event
45
non-intercourse would be restored a
that it did not follow suit within three months.
After hovezher, 1810, Madison sought to use the lever
provided ty theI con oill against Britai1. The Due de Cadsre,
Kanoleon's minister of foreign affairs, had announced August 5 that
as of hoveruser 1, France's dc rees would ease to have effect, "it
being urderstood tha in consequence of tl's declaration, the En'li sh
shall revoke their orders in counci and ren unce the new principles
of blockade....or that the United States...shall cause their rights
to be respected by the En:lish."46 Madison had rese ations as
to the rea.litv cf the repeal. Ere11ce still claired.the right to
license Euneriean ships and to lin1it tlm nuqber admitted to continental
ports. ‘ She also continued to seize ships under the guise of the
right to m:“ee municinal regulations, rather tin under international
[11" __ ' -. _ .
law.’Q nut, accor61ng to irant, M{.d1son was ui‘..J
H I...
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iction of repeal because his only hepe of gettin: Britain to mane
the'hext jump" was to do so, and because America's grievances
I W". . ‘. p-l /
#3. 191e., pp. 133, 130.
o
d., p0. 120, 117.
its. .LDido, p0 13¢).
“1" a 1 11 . e/ o1 3.2.1.1., Ill, p0. 3o“, 3o7.
47. brant, fhg_firesissnt, p. ~17.
’1
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o r“:48. Ibid., p. 131. See above,
2KO
a '\ u o ' ‘ . 3 3 : 3—, . (- ~o ' . ..- --
agairst srntain we e greater tzan ner grieranCes a3ainst trance.
m x r p- (-1: ‘a-r o ‘. , r- - ’6 ‘4 a:
L ereal ter, he consisten'ly worked to gain tne repeal oi the oreers
in council. Hhen Cong ess voted to declare war in June, 1312, no
one in the United States realized thatdodison finallr had succeeded.“
rant's interpretation fortifies th- contention of Adonls
and Smith that Laaison ias been misunoerstood. He presented
evidence to shoon tat it was Hadison who HP te tough diplomatic
notes over the signature of his incompetczlt first secretary of state,
who putlished diolomatic dispatches containing news of new belligerent
outrages in order to encoura3e the election of a niliteit Twelfth
Congress, and who time and again warned English and rrench ministers
‘
sole consequences 0:. their governments' actions. asO F},
g'
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15
O ("I
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Brent also pointed out, if Madison ac sally had been at the mercv
of the Welfth Conglcss, he could not have assured Lester in Lov-
enber, 1511, that there would be no serious change in relations
between the lnited Strtes "ed Great Britain before the return of
the Hernet with Britain's answer to the demand that she revoke the
orders in council.
(This) was in effect an assurance a
be no declaration of var eefore Anril cr Ear.
Coualed with other remrcs...it Lurnis c;
proox that the President re3e.rded n ms lf as guiding
national policy. This vas made even n_air r by his
blunt refuse to let the cent oversy with 3n3 3rd
hin:e on the misconduct of France. “adison was
if in? Gree.t Lritein a period 0: grace in which\1
(D
0 or
to CI»ange her policies without a sacrifice of pride
and ercane an otherwise inevitable war.“w
. . 1 Y F." A, q ' ‘. rd ' *3 w-J- T- « ~\»-\ —. v r
\ o .5010. r‘:‘. 3/9, 734’Uo lLCCOI‘QiY‘ LO LIT-like, lIFILI‘GSE-Ilupht VIC.
4 , , n3 5
tne grievance that set off Lritain i‘ronx trance.
50. Britain reznover the orders in council June lo; the United
States declared war June 18.
51. eront, The President, Pessin.
f? 7"k3 3, - ’jr‘fl Om
56v. .1. LL’, 1:3}. J/U, )"llo
(
\:
lesnite the evidence that Isdison has seen misuz1derstood,
‘
it may still he "ondered if the 4*act that he was misunderstood was
not in itself a factor in the cominr of the'Nar 01 1812. The
9,)
1-ilure of Con;ress to pass a strong coercive bill in l310, for
examwl may have been Partly due to the fact that Congrzssmen did
not know where Madison stood.ij Erant could say:
From Foster's own disratches it is clear that the
President laid down a policy with full knowledge
that it would lead to war if Great Britain did not
change her course....fiad the hritisheenvoy trvn13-
mitted the bare verbal records of his talks hibh
Hadison and Honore, and had no Fedcr.list soeeches
or editorials reached England, the british cabinet
might have been able to discern American intentions
and act on the De sis of its knowlede.34
But Foster,1fl1o hed direct can act with Madison, nevertheless
acceted the Federalists' interpretation of him as weak and in-
decisive and tonsered his diseatches according y. He interoreted
the “period of grace" as evidence tha+u Ladis.cn want: d to delay the
actions of a Congress he was too weak to resis . J Federalists
who convinced Foster that their interpretation of Xadison was the
correct one, were prejudiced and undoubtedly guilty of wishful
trlinking But even V?r harks were sometimes unsure of the Free-
ident's leadershis. "If the trumpet give an uncertain sound,"
said Calhoun of Madison, ”rho shall prepare for the battle?”(3
Mb
rue coming of the war probably cannot oe exelained with-
Q "av: ’v‘fifi‘ no=~w"'vs 3 .3911 e t‘o Y1 ”'1‘“ 3 an“ TNecrtU 4.. 1L9.“ va, cal La 0 S as p as $.v tOQ~ULV~J Otlv a—J‘ 4
HA 1 / P
3:. 111:, 131’). l .0, 1r-,.
:3" Tx1r‘u I'xf‘v
J11. *44—J.’ [\. 3‘4.
T ’3' ’L‘ ’3
55. --d., p1. 171, ,7m.
L” .. ,iO/
J3. ..«ZJO, Cliq r, n. JV.
stressed. iadison lacked leadershio. Contemporaries Oiten were
unaware of his true feelin 5. he see unable to convince his own
party in the Eleventh Con"Jress of the necessity for military
preparedness. It would seem that Brant failed to emonasize these
Erant emnnasized one of the two key f ctors 1n henry Adams'
interpretation of the causes of war - the role ofhadison. Lornan
in the Trelfth Consres s. Risjord's lindings supported those of Adams.
the contests :or indiV1dua Congressional
seats in the South in 1810 and lound no evidence tin tthe winners
were given a manda e to vote for var. Host of the Soutzern repre-
Twelfth C no see were hold vers iron previousC)
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Congressess, and na11y of then Here re-elected without op1osition.
Some of the new nerabers replaced like-minded represeuta
chosen not to seek re-election. Even in these case where a seat
was closelv contested, ”the election seldom turned on the issues
km0
U 1
Of foreign FOliCY-" Some of tne Southernrs she entered the
Twelfth Conrress did so with a decided preference for war. Others,
0 - q. 7 _L J. n ‘ . ‘ 1" (‘9
1ncluc1ng some who later voted 10r war were cec1deoly ior peace.“
Thus, although he Southeastern states ofl-Iaryland, V11-ginia, North
Carolinr, and south Carolina were to cast J votes for war and only
11 against it, Risjord found no evidence that the vote reflected
wicescale “isontent with the status one among the electorate of
E?
sjcrd, "Conservatives ," p. 197.
Kn
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~id., pp. 197-200.0 F'
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4-“hu \-L& ereluc t
~ .- J- '
It... c1011
“ j _ '1 v? v . _ 1': ‘ 1.1.”. . ., ._. -_-
Jere oelieved ARR? -ouuncrn Jon1‘ss1en here
go to var
,ox'r‘ '1: ~‘ '— ~v11 W ‘ «pn'x‘. ”N’i run-eve? $1-n 1y"- Y‘fin "vn'r'4-"1clfi 3',fi(3'1\'*3 “- .... l ofc'C L5. "9' CK; 461.1111; 0011 'I _L..ux-'4 b--u . Ml" .‘aL-Q l;LV\I.LlJ\J. (I) vadktCL 0L
(’1.
t . 1‘ ’32 ‘P «an r" n .., ‘1 Mr: J" . 1“ “cc: "(“3“- wn f 9' C -.' ~‘-- ' - L'119 1---l Jr 0; P‘vwn 0-11» C3-;:I‘C...On (1-1.... ufle lubrauulb “Lg. 0.x. “1.1.0.13.le
[‘"L‘ ‘4 ‘ I" w '1 J. . —rs ~ '0 r ‘ 4‘ ‘1‘. ‘ 1 .
toners, 513: s n.1nan1el hbcon o1 ortl .a‘oliia, ¢h3 to oelieve
ctill anL1: «L‘Jfur
1.. .2 ' . 4.‘ '
cheir minds on one issue
. no— \ - 2 .L
T1113 $-01” finally voted
ti-er nari6,.
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01 war or pencemmtcil tile 133
h v n -L 13" j
01 lx>5u b0 » r‘\ly
‘ +1v ‘v‘ V , 1 h r v n. “ J- f‘rs .', 'Lifi
oecause 1e5 b-z lieved t.1e country had alread5 moved too .ur in 440
’1’1"
rt}, “A “J“; . m‘ A “.- ‘ T“ .L I") 1” a ‘_ ‘\ __-' +w w+ “yo («I "3 ‘_: ,-. . J. “'1 _\ U1"? «"1 a \n
“-4. ‘V 91-13;; 0. {.11 DO Q1104 Cl'h's‘j‘ I..; uL.OLLu Lula-Jrr. 1.; iv... ‘-.‘..o Ludo blie
. . J 1 ... 4.‘ 1 1'. ~ 11.11. .-.. H, 1. .,_ , 1 ..w,
.0; vouca o“ Ler in the oelie_ the. “1‘ his the ohl5 nonoraole
.. '1 0 V- w: o o - n J.‘,. TTm'J. CL: _L h
p011c3 TOAllan' ior 1e united uudbcu.
r“! - .z. a; .r- 1A ’1 . 4.} .A 1 ;
-ue mar, at 191 t as lar as the begun as corcerncu,
... 1- --xx. 1,- .. 1 ,j ._ v. ,-_ w ~ -5.“ 0
Las uFOu;nb on o] men mno had HJQ a oell¢1ul oi
fl 0-] A r. -L .-- » v‘n . J- + 0 v~/. Jp-
Zzaiznn nousoramn Lno THE lnoCTBSJB leuestern
lands,
. /~ I“
Valley. “J
*3- a
13.57 L‘.0rd
(.1.
to believe that the
+1 ,’ '- J- ‘ . f
9J3 he5 to tne coming of
.L 1_ v 1‘
so the duraoilitr 0' the
I L“ V. J) —!-‘.
1n general so dies oi the
_ fl.”
(flr‘ I’g “L
recte
$00131
1‘. n r‘ . -. .- - r (v -. "‘ -. <'-\ a .
.QLQLc, or nrice. 1n the 10er Lies;Slygl
‘ . u .~—‘| ~§ -. x -L :1 vv, -
d n13 ar11ncn ugalhsb those ”he contir.1ed
, . - - _ 1 .. o 1. 9 . .1;
and econonic “coolens o- the .roncier ase
:3. m1. 1 4., 1° an..- ..- 1.-.
one "er. .an ne indirecclJ nald tiloute
7| ‘~ ~-: ~ ' mt \ 3*. 4- f -' q v ~ A 73" “...-’1 (vi-re1.0 [Lu40l'llb “0.1.; u 0 V1341}, 1.... Cu. 1. Jr. 91.119.)
*n A '3‘“ Y‘ J“ 'N "n T"~-'- "3' 'rr‘ :- "r '-(-erOJ.’ 1.1. 1LOU 111 11:10 ' .Lu._;.V.-;) 0.. RlUCQI‘ ‘
pp. 1.70 , l7]. 0’
/ ' ' H1 - n e /_. ~ fi-y‘ x ‘ - e n -- .‘ . 4‘
cl. ..sJo ~ uLLSCCVutLVGL, n. l c.
1: ", T1_ 0 - A0"?
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(A ‘7 . .- 1
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r’ -' _ 1 ,
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tne ccuces c1resset cg bfle “cwisionists Acre not luuortalt cfwn 1c
.1 1'.‘ . .. 1,, 1, 1.11 .1, ,. ' ..-.. :1 L ,- 1 -1.
tne nest, and assertcj tnat 'tne Only unifging -actor, or SQUU 13
-u ' . ‘6 ‘V -'—- 9 vvn 1, - .-.- ‘fi 1“ . -.-'. ‘n '\q- . ' .
all seetions ol the COuntn}, Las tgc growinU lecliub oi putriotism,
the ealization that something must be done to Vinuicctc the
1T1",
o '11 1.qu "‘ '1 C -= fl 3” . ‘ rs J- r L
nat1onclnon03. ' r “321130 plnc=1d rcz1t e1_E9110 on one 11:13 Luau
r1 1.. ._, r- . 4.1 1 11, U: ,3 _.1. ., .L-‘ 4!..- 1. ' ,3.. ,1
oonvrcssxcn 1ron one 3011t1 3mg bJG uinlc Atlantic st1tcs Hur .101
the Lajor sut,ort for war," and "1nd little to gain econonical1y
(Q‘1‘ ‘ L1} .1
1ron no conilict. "
if :1 ‘ J- ' -. 4~~.- . r ‘ u .- 4 ~ 7 '1 ~ --.J- 1‘ ‘— ‘
so“; 01 t11c1 SLQCQKSUtS m-ce by ulSQOFC 1n suLLOLt 01 tnctc
m m
-. '- - . . \u, f ~ ~ g I h - ~ ‘,~ Hr — , . - Vr . ‘5‘ .3 ‘.~.
-ocrt1ons unoccr inaccurate ano poorly CuOth. 1o: e11ntlc Le
. ‘ 'L" J” w - .‘-' ‘ O I) -c 4-” »-4 . - '. ; ‘-. “v . a
scio udat ”the war of lcli Lao ode uOSt unec LOnic War
- ~o.1 ,. 1- .0 .1 1U 1:..4. ”4. n, .1. — ,3 ° - 4.x" -.-
otcto~ .cs ever 1ouunt.' / nut ne l1tcr Had b0 q11111v unis LJ
0""— . r‘ ‘I‘V 0 w 0 fi‘ .. u,‘ -‘~.‘ J...
odflnb that econ uic i1ctorsere present, cxocc1c l; in tne nest.
And although economic factors cannot by t.cmclvos accont for
' P
”tho gc1’1ercl dc: and 101‘ 1:5.r,"hc said that ”ti-1e final synthesis 01
the causes of t}1e war 1.'ill ha a to tak into account various material
9
on n L Y "zar ~ ‘1cctors. ‘ Le QLQALSDQC
m
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y or's interpretation or 5131 o tout tnc
cxtent of British rcsoonsi lity ior fallin1; prices cannot be
L W'. 3 l ? n r m m - . Kn T ’+n’~
determ1nco. LOLchr, 1aglor's intoe-t Las notn Lhotncr trituin
4"“P‘ jvc v ~- -’- -.“\ -‘~1-L- ~v‘~ L‘sn- 3“» so»
cct11liJ was soo0431cle, b1t Lnetncr ..JStQT ors t1ou-nt she Lcs.
Also, in criticizin“ Pratt, Risjord said t}1ct the ioec of the
3 - o +1 1 n «A' a '1 n . ' ma06.che 1 use most TBCCut s uuies of tnc csrlf nation
1 . n 1 11 1 c. ~1V V’ :1, ma 1 "gOTlOdE w;ts the rrctt cn-s s. see uJar A. ”11503, 119 Le”
7,-fl '4‘ . ".l‘ ‘.5 -.v 7 w", ‘ I- f‘a -’- -y ‘-
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6U. Ibid., D9 ZJW
690 igiéf’ p. 196
70. Ibid., pp. 20%, 2.5.
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1790 19,905 303 92,406
1791 18,512 1334 u1,ué7
1792 19.753 1805 43»3 779’ 39,260 1306 41,353
179 26,549 1337 40 0991795 39.689
303 9:434
1796 40,764 1-3 9 31,405
1797 29,850 1816 («.307
179, 33,527 1811 45.3741790 31,l@3 1312 30 028
130 47,973 1313 25,C‘03
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APPEEDIX 1V
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(-nousaAds of acres)
A res Year Acres
340 1811 20?
199 1812 392
31@ 1813 256
619 1814 123
'73 1815 l,C93
28’ 1810 —
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Vol. II, pp. 7, ff.; ‘01. III, Ep. 39, 229.
101
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