risk management the essential elements of pipeline risk ...by w.kent muhlbauer, wkm consulting,...

1
40 | Pipelines International | March 2018 Follow us on Twitter @Pipelines | www.pipelinesinternational.com www.pipelinesinternational.com | Follow us on Twitter @Pipelines March 2018 | Pipelines International | 41 RISK MANAGEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT T he inaugural article of this regular column – vintage 2012 – questioned whether formal risk assessments performed on pipelines were truly helping all stakeholders to understand and manage risks. Much has been accomplished since then to help practitioners more efficiently and more accurately measure risk, but the newer ideas and methods have still not yet reached all corners of our industry. The essential elements proposed back in 2011 have now been tested and battle-hardened; they have proven to be a complete and helpful guide to establishing or judging methodologies. That is why this is a good time to revisit that first article where the essential elements of good risk assessment were introduced. SUPERIOR RISK ASSESSMENT As the desire for more robust pipeline risk management grows, so too does the need for superior risk assessment. A formal risk assessment provides the structure to increase understanding, reduce subjectivity and ensure that important considerations are not overlooked; the associated decision making is therefore more consistent and reliable when formal techniques are used. But has pipeline risk assessment been improving? Not according to some regulators, including in the US, who – since 2011 – have voiced scepticism regarding how pipeline operators are measuring risks. This column seeks to address this situation by offering insights into risk concepts, especially efficient and appropriate ways to measure pipeline risk. Tackling the specifics of pipeline risk in bite-sized portions will hopefully make this challenging subject more approachable to those not yet well initiated. We begin with the immediate concern of how to help ensure efficient regulatory oversight. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s recent criticisms are not unjustified. There is currently great disparity in approaches and level of rigour applied to risk assessment by pipeline operators. This is largely due to the absence of complete standards or guidelines covering this complex topic. The disparity leads to inconsistent and problematic oversight by regulatory agencies. Without some standardisation, or at least consistency of understanding, auditors cannot readily determine where deficiencies may lie. On the other hand, too much standardisation – a mandated, prescriptive approach – is inefficient and stifles innovation in this complex arena. INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT Formal risk assessment is relatively immature in most industries, including pipelining. Many relative risk assessment techniques in current use by pipeline operators were developed before formalised and regulated integrity management programs (IMP) were established. As such, the assessments often do not meet the demanding objectives of the more recent regulatory initiatives. As the author of one of the most widely used indexing models, I can attest W. Kent Muhlbauer is a regular columnist for Pipelines International, author of Pipeline Risk Assessment: the Definitive Approach and its Role in Risk Management, and presenter of the Advanced Pipeline Risk Management course run internationally with Clarion Technical Conferences and Tiratsoo Technical. For details surrounding the essential elements, see www.pipelinerisk.net The essential elements proposed back in 2011 have now been tested and battle-hardened; they have proven to be a complete and helpful guide to establishing or judging methodologies. that such models were not designed for many of the applications now envisioned by regulatory IMP or other uses of risk assessment that are becoming commonplace today. Due to the simplicity offered by relative or scoring type risk assessment models, their usage became widespread. However, most of the early models will indeed require modifications in order to keep up with the new demands. A mandated risk assessment approach is not the best solution. That would introduce a prescriptive element with substantial ‘overhead’ related to the establishment and documentation of the approach's specific requirements. A better solution is to establish guidelines of essential ingredients necessary in any pipeline risk assessment. Critical elements would be identified and it would be left to the operator’s subject matter expert (SME) to detail those elements. Properly crafted, a defined list of the essential ingredients in a risk assessment would introduce a beneficial amount of standardisation without becoming prescriptive. Specifying that all risk assessments contain, at a minimum, a few essential ingredients ensures that both regulators and the regulated are on the same page. For example, possible essential elements include the following: 1. A definition of ‘failure’ to accompany a measurement of ‘probability of failure’ (PoF). 2. A measure of consequence potential, separate from the PoF measurement and representative of the full range of possible consequences. 3. Production of a risk profile – all failure mechanisms and consequence potential must be measured at all points along a pipeline, showing changes in risk along the entire route. Summary values of risk – aggregating values from point to point – must be producible without masking true risks. 4. Sufficient resolution – the risk assessment must divide the pipeline into segments where risks are unchanging. While modern risk assessment routinely produces hundreds of segments per kilometre, a rule of thumb is that less than about 10-20 segments per kilometre is suspicious. 5. All inputs and results must be measurements (or estimates) expressed in commonly used and verifiable units. The use of measurements (e.g. events/ km-year, mpy, etc.) instead of points or scores reduces subjectivity and complexity (it’s actually simpler once the scoring system is discontinued) and allows validation. 6. Measurements (or estimates) of the three key aspects of PoF – i.e. the attack, the effectiveness of each of the defences and the resistance to failure if all defences are breached – are required for every failure mechanism. Without an estimate of each PoF ingredient independently, a full understanding of PoF is not possible. 7. A theoretical remaining life estimate for each time dependent failure mechanism is required. Without this, how can an integrity re-assessment interval be defensible? 8. A level of conservatism for inputs and other model aspects must be declared. For example, an assessment might reflect P50 (most likely) or, alternatively, P99 (worst case) risks; note that both are useful, but for different applications. Perhaps we can all agree that, regardless of the specifics of modelling, a list of essential elements such as these must be a part of a proper risk analysis. The essential elements recommended here are actually very simple concepts and easy to implement. As a side benefit, potential modelling issues surrounding aspects such as ‘threat interaction’ and ‘proper aggregation of risk results’ largely disappear when these elements are present. When all parties agree on what is essential and everyone measures those essential things in some fashion, then everyone is ‘speaking the same language’. A limited amount of standardisation in measuring risk is therefore appropriate and useful to all stakeholders. Expectations are managed, audits run smoother, information sharing is improved and risk management becomes more efficient. As the need for better risk management continues, pipeline operators’ formal risk assessment methodologies must keep pace in order to remain relevant. This article revisits the essential elements of risk assessment introduced in 2012. This is the idea of developing efficient and appropriate risk measurements to help stakeholders and operators better understand and effectively manage risk. by W. Kent Muhlbauer, WKM Consulting, Austin, Texas, US The essential elements of pipeline risk assessment www.pipelinesinternational.com +61 3 9248 5100 [email protected] VISIT OUR ONLINE SHOP PROJECTS REGIONS MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT OPERATIONS INTEGRITY & MAINTENANCE HOME Pipelines International June 2016 Pipelines International March 2016 Pipelines International December 2015 FREE E-NEWS NEWS MAGAZINE SUBSCRIBE GALLERY EVENTS ADVERTISE Cover story: Cover story: Cover story: MAJOR PIPELINE SYSTEMS OF THE USA A detailed overview of select existing major pipeline systems in the USA. MAJOR PIPELINE SYSTEMS OF CANADA A detailed overview of select existing major pipeline systems in Canada

Upload: others

Post on 25-Mar-2021

6 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: RISK MANAGEMENT The essential elements of pipeline risk ...by W.Kent Muhlbauer, WKM Consulting, Austin, Texas, US The essential elements of pipeline risk assessment 1 248 100 uery@pipelinesinternational.com

40 | Pipelines International | March 2018 Follow us on Twitter @Pipelines | www.pipelinesinternational.com www.pipelinesinternational.com | Follow us on Twitter @Pipelines March 2018 | Pipelines International | 41

RISK MANAGEMENTRISK MANAGEMENT

The inaugural article of this regular column – vintage 2012 – questioned whether formal risk assessments

performed on pipelines were truly helping all stakeholders to understand and manage risks. Much has been accomplished since then to help practitioners more efficiently and more accurately measure risk, but the newer ideas and methods have still not yet reached all corners of our industry.

The essential elements proposed back in 2011 have now been tested and battle-hardened; they have proven to be a complete and helpful guide to establishing or judging methodologies. That is why this is a good time to revisit that first article where the essential elements of good risk assessment were introduced.

SUPERIOR RISK ASSESSMENTAs the desire for more robust pipeline risk

management grows, so too does the need for superior risk assessment. A formal risk assessment provides the structure to increase understanding, reduce subjectivity and ensure that important considerations are not overlooked; the associated decision making is therefore more consistent and reliable when formal techniques are used.

But has pipeline risk assessment been

improving? Not according to some regulators, including in the US, who – since 2011 – have voiced scepticism regarding how pipeline operators are measuring risks.

This column seeks to address this situation by offering insights into risk concepts, especially efficient and appropriate ways to measure pipeline risk. Tackling the specifics of pipeline risk in bite-sized portions will hopefully make this challenging subject more approachable to those not yet well initiated.

We begin with the immediate concern of how to help ensure efficient regulatory oversight.

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s recent criticisms are not unjustified. There is currently great disparity in approaches and level of rigour applied to risk assessment by pipeline operators.

This is largely due to the absence of complete standards or guidelines covering this complex

topic. The disparity leads to inconsistent and problematic oversight by regulatory agencies.

Without some standardisation, or at least consistency of understanding, auditors cannot readily determine where deficiencies may lie. On the other hand, too much standardisation – a mandated, prescriptive approach – is inefficient and stifles innovation in this complex arena.

INTEGRITY MANAGEMENTFormal risk assessment is relatively immature in

most industries, including pipelining. Many relative risk assessment techniques in current use by pipeline operators were developed before formalised and regulated integrity management programs (IMP) were established.

As such, the assessments often do not meet the demanding objectives of the more recent regulatory initiatives. As the author of one of the most widely used indexing models, I can attest

W. Kent Muhlbauer is a regular columnist for Pipelines International, author of Pipeline Risk Assessment: the Definitive Approach and its Role in Risk Management, and presenter of the Advanced Pipeline Risk Management course run internationally with Clarion Technical Conferences and Tiratsoo Technical.

For details surrounding the essential elements, see www.pipelinerisk.net

The essential elements proposed back in 2011 have now been tested and battle-hardened; they have proven to be a complete and helpful guide to establishing or judging methodologies.

that such models were not designed for many of the applications now envisioned by regulatory IMP or other uses of risk assessment that are becoming commonplace today.

Due to the simplicity offered by relative or scoring type risk assessment models, their usage became widespread. However, most of the early models will indeed require modifications in order to keep up with the new demands.

A mandated risk assessment approach is not the best solution. That would introduce a prescriptive element with substantial ‘overhead’ related to the establishment and documentation of the approach's specific requirements.

A better solution is to establish guidelines of essential ingredients necessary in any pipeline risk assessment. Critical elements would be identified and it would be left to the operator’s subject matter expert (SME) to detail those elements.

Properly crafted, a defined list of the essential ingredients in a risk assessment would introduce a beneficial amount of standardisation without becoming prescriptive. Specifying that all risk assessments contain, at a minimum, a few essential ingredients ensures that both regulators and the regulated are on the same page.

For example, possible essential elements include the following:

1. A definition of ‘failure’ to accompany a measurement of ‘probability of failure’ (PoF).

2. A measure of consequence potential, separate from the PoF measurement and

representative of the full range of possible consequences.

3. Production of a risk profile – all failure mechanisms and consequence potential must be measured at all points along a pipeline, showing changes in risk along the entire route. Summary values of risk – aggregating values from point to point – must be producible without masking true risks.

4. Sufficient resolution – the risk assessment must divide the pipeline into segments where risks are unchanging. While modern risk assessment routinely produces hundreds of segments per kilometre, a rule of thumb is that less than about 10-20 segments per kilometre is suspicious.

5. All inputs and results must be measurements (or estimates) expressed in commonly used and verifiable units. The use of measurements (e.g. events/km-year, mpy, etc.) instead of points or scores reduces subjectivity and complexity (it’s actually simpler once the scoring system is discontinued) and allows validation.

6. Measurements (or estimates) of the three key aspects of PoF – i.e. the attack, the effectiveness of each of the defences and the resistance to failure if all defences are breached – are required for every failure mechanism. Without an estimate of each

PoF ingredient independently, a full understanding of PoF is not possible.

7. A theoretical remaining life estimate for each time dependent failure mechanism is required. Without this, how can an integrity re-assessment interval be defensible?

8. A level of conservatism for inputs and other model aspects must be declared. For example, an assessment might reflect P50 (most likely) or, alternatively, P99 (worst case) risks; note that both are useful, but for different applications.

Perhaps we can all agree that, regardless of the specifics of modelling, a list of essential elements such as these must be a part of a proper risk analysis. The essential elements recommended here are actually very simple concepts and easy to implement.

As a side benefit, potential modelling issues surrounding aspects such as ‘threat interaction’ and ‘proper aggregation of risk results’ largely disappear when these elements are present.

When all parties agree on what is essential and everyone measures those essential things in some fashion, then everyone is ‘speaking the same language’.

A limited amount of standardisation in measuring risk is therefore appropriate and useful to all stakeholders. Expectations are managed, audits run smoother, information sharing is improved and risk management becomes more efficient.

As the need for better risk management continues, pipeline operators’ formal risk assessment methodologies must keep pace in order to remain relevant. This article revisits the essential elements of risk assessment introduced in 2012. This is the idea of developing efficient and appropriate risk measurements to help stakeholders and operators better understand and effectively manage risk.

by W. Kent Muhlbauer, WKM Consulting, Austin, Texas, US

The essential elements of pipeline risk assessment

www.pipelinesinternational.com

+61 3 9248 5100

[email protected]

VISIT OUR ONLINE SHOP

PROJECTS REGIONS MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT OPERATIONSINTEGRITY & MAINTENANCE

HOME

Pipelines International June 2016

Major Pipeline Systems of the USAWallchart

Major Pipeline Systems of the USAWallchart

Pipelines International March 2016

Pipelines International December 2015

FREE E-NEWS

NEWS MAGAZINE SUBSCRIBE GALLERYEVENTS ADVERTISE

Pipelines International

• Home

• News

• Magazine

• Directory

• Events

Contact

Phone: +61 3 9248 5100

Fax: +61 3 9602 2708

Email: [email protected]

Address: GPO Box 4967, Melbourne, Victoria 3001 Australia

Key topics

• Markets

• Installation

• Rehabilitation

• Asset management

• Utility location

• Tenders

About

• Privacy policy

• Disclaimer

• Refund and returns policy

• Shipping policy

Great Southern Press

• The Australian Pipeliner

• Gas Today

• Pipeline, Plant and O� shore

• Pipelines International

• Trenchless Australasia

• Trenchless International

ISSUE 28 | JUNE 2016

Flexible pipeline integrity management Page 26

Natural gas and investment opportunities in Iran Page 18

Cover story: Construction gets underway on the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project.Page 38

PIN_June_2016_Cover_1up.indd 1 7/05/2016 2:02 PM

ISSUE 27 | MARCH 2016

The history of the first HDD rig designs Page 46

Douglas-Westwood: pipeline industry forecast to 2019 Page 10

Cover story: Read about Saudi Aramco’s plans for the future. Saudi Aramco General Manager Pipelines Mohammed Sultan Al-Qahtani exclusivePage 30

PIN_March_2016_Cover_1up.indd 1 19/02/2016 4:29 PM

Creating an effective crack management programme Page 34

ISSUE 26 | DECEMBER 2015

Investigating pipeline airborne leak detection Page 14

Cover story:Record pipelaying in the Norwegian SeaPage 42

PIN_December_2015_Cover_1up.indd 1 19/11/2015 5:30 PM

FLORIDA

LOUISIANA

MISSISSIPPI

GEORGIAALABAMA

SOUTH CAROLINA

ARKANSAS

TEXAS

NORTH CAROLINA

TENNESSEENEW MEXICOOKLAHOMA

ARIZONA

KENTUCKY VIRGINIA

MARYLAND

DELAWARE

KANSAS

MISSOURI

WEST VIRGINIA

COLORADO

NEW JERSEY

INDIANA

OHIO

NEVADA UTAH

CALIFORNIA

RHODE ISLAND

CONNECTICUT

PENNSYLVANIA

ILLINOIS

MASSACHUSETTS

NEBRASKA

IOWA

WYOMING

NEW YORK

VERMONT

NEW HAMPSHIRE

MICHIGAN

SOUTH DAKOTA

OREGON

WISCONSIN

MAINE

NORTH DAKOTA

IDAHO

MONTANA

WASHINGTON

MINNESOTA

BRITISH COLUMBIA

ALBERTASASKATCHEWAN

MANITOBAQUEBEC

NEWBRUNSWICK

ONTARIO

BAJACALIFORNIA

SONORA

CHIHUAHUA

COAHUILA

NUEVOLEÓN

TAMAULIPAS

DURANGO

SINALOABAJA

CALIFORNIASUR

San Antonio Houston

El Paso

Jacksonville

Dallas

San Diego

Memphis

Los AngelesCharlotte

San Jose

San FranciscoBaltimore

Chicago

Philadelphia

Detroit

Milwaukee

New York

Portland

Seattle

Austin

Tallahassee

Jackson

Montgomery

Phoenix Atlanta

Little Rock

Oklahoma City

Columbia

Santa FeNashville

Raleigh

Jefferson City

Topeka

Frankfort

Denver

CharlestonRichmond

Springfield Indianapolis

SacramentoLincolnCarson City

Cheyenne

Columbus

Salt Lake City

Annapolis

Des MoinesHarrisburg

Trenton

Madison

Lansing

Pierre

Boise

Hartford

Saint Paul

Albany Boston

Concord

Bismarck

HelenaSalem

Montpelier

Augusta

Olympia

Washington D.C.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18*

19

20*

21*

22

23

24

25

26*

27

28*

29

30

31*

32

33

34

35

36

37

39*

40*

41 42

0

0 500 km250 km125 km

500 miles250 miles125 miles

CANADAALASKA

38

0

0 500 km

500 miles

KEYNAME OWNER PRODUCT CAPACITY

LENGTH (miles)

1 El Paso Natural Gas Pipeline System Kinder Morgan Gas 6,182 MMcf/d 10,200

2 Algonquin Gas Transmission Spectra Energy Partners Gas 3,347 MMcf/d 1,129

3 Texas Eastern Transmission Spectra Energy Partners Gas 7,332 MMcf/d 9,022

4 Tennessee Gas Pipeline Kinder Morgan Gas 6,686 MMcf/d 13,900

5 Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Panhandle Energy Gas 2,840 MMcf/d 6,445

6 Northern Natural Gas Pipeline Northern Natural Gas Gas 7,442 MMcf/d 14,700

7 ANR Pipeline ANR Pipeline Company Gas 7,129 MMcf/d 10,600

8 Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Williams Gas 8,466 MMcf/d 10,500

9 Gulf South Pipeline Gulf South Pipeline Company Gas 6,260 MMcf/d 6,886

10 Natural Gas Pipeline Co of America Kinder Morgan Gas 4,848 MMcf/d 9,200

11 Florida Gas Transmission Pipeline Florida Gas Transmission Company Gas 2,217 MMcf/d 4,889

12 Kern River Gas Transmission Pipeline Kern River Gas Transmission Company Gas 1,833 MMcf/d 1,680

13 Trunkline Pipeline Panhandle Energy Gas 3,025 MMcf/d 4,202

14 Texas Gas Transmission Boardwalk Pipelines Gas 4,065 MMcf/d 5,671

KEYNAME OWNER PRODUCT CAPACITY

LENGTH (miles)

15 Southern Star Central Pipeline Southern Star Gas 2,801 MMcf/d 5,803

16 Dominion Pipeline Dominion Resources Gas 6,655 MMcf/d 3,505

17 Colorado Interstate Gas Pipeline Kinder Morgan Gas 4,099 MMcf/d 4,300

18 Alliance Pipeline System* Alliance Pipeline Gas 2,053 MMcf/d 2,311

19 Columbia Gulf Transmission Columbia Pipeline Group Gas 2,386 MMcf/d 4,124

20 Northern Border Pipeline* TC PipeLines; ONEOK Partners Gas 2,400 MMcf/d 1,408

21 Great Lakes Gas Transmission Pipeline* Great Lakes Gas Transmission Company Gas 2,958 MMcf/d 2,115

22 Transwestern Interstate Pipeline Energy Transfer Gas 2,439 MMcf/d 2,560

23 Questar Pipeline Questar Pipeline Gas 3,192 MMcf/d 1,858

24 Wyoming Interstate Pipeline Kinder Morgan Gas 2,736 MMcf/d 800

25 Centerpoint Energy Gas Transmission CenterPoint Energy Gas 5,385 MMcf/d 6,374

26 Northwest Pipeline* Williams Gas 4,950 MMcf/d 3,880

27 Southern Natural Gas Company System Kinder Morgan Gas 3,967 MMcf/d 7,635

28 Gas Transmission Northwest* TransCanada Gas 2,636 MMcf/d 1,356

KEYNAME OWNER PRODUCT CAPACITY

LENGTH (miles)

29 Columbia Gas Transmission NiSource Gas Transmission & Storage Gas 9,350 MMcf/d 10,365

30 National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation System National Fuel Gas 2,312 MMcf/d 2,300

31 Keystone Pipeline* TransCanada Crude oil - 2,639

32 Seaway Pipeline Enterprise Products Partners; Enbridge Crude oil 850,000 bbl/d 500

33 Gulf Coast Project TransCanada Crude oil 700,000 bbl/d 485

34 Longhorn Pipeline Magellan Midstream Partners Crude oil - 700

35 Double H Pipeline Hiland Partners Crude oil 84,000 bbl/d 485

36 Pony Express Pipeline Tallgrass Energy Crude oil 230,000 bbl/d 690

37 Olympic Pipeline BP Crude oil 315,000 bbl/d 400

38 Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Alyeska Pipeline Service Company Crude oil - 800

39 US Mainline (Lakehead System)* Enbridge Crude oil 2,600,000 bbl/d 1,900

40 Alberta Clipper* Enbridge Crude oil 800,000 bbl/d 1,000

41 Roadrunner Gas Pipeline ONEOK Partners Gas 640 MMcf/d 200 miles

41 WesTex Gas Transmission Pipeline ONEOK Partners Gas 100 MMcf/d 2,227 miles

MAJOR PIPELINE SYSTEMS OF THE USA

Compiled and published by Great Southern Press Pty Ltd. Tel: +61 3 9248 5100

Product information and graphic design © Great Southern Press, 2016. Source map courtesy Map Resources.

www.mapresources.com.au

For additional copies of this poster and for advertising enquiries, email [email protected]

This map is intended as a general source of information only.

NOTE: This is a schematic representation and shows approximate routes of major US pipelines. It does not show exact pipeline routes. Route, length, and capacity information is approximate and intended as a guide only, and is correct as at May 2016.

A detailed overview of select existing major pipeline systems in the USA.

Pipelines marked with * indicate a pipeline route that begins in Canada.

www.pipelinesinternational.com

0

0 300 km150 km

300 miles150 miles

123

45

6

7

8

9

10

1112 13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

YUKON TERRITORY

NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

NUNAVUT

BRITISH COLUMBIA

ALBERTA

SASKATCHEWAN

MANITOBA

ONTARIO

QUEBEC

NEWFOUNDLAND&

LABRADOR

NEW BRUNSWICK

NOVASCOTIA

PRINCEEDWARDISLAND

Kamloops

Lethbridge

Red Deer

Kingston

Moncton

Drummondville

Trois-Rivieres

Brandon

Moose Jaw

Saint John

Richmond

Thunder Bay

Saskatoon

Brampton

VancouverCalgary

London

Montreal

Hamilton

Edmonton

Toronto

HalifaxQuebec

Winnipeg

Regina

Victoria

St. John's

Fredericton

Yellowknife

Whitehorse

Charlottetown

Iqaluit

Ottawa

KEYNAME OWNER PRODUCT LENGTH DIAMETER

1 Alberta Clipper (Line 67) * Enbridge Inc. Crude oil 1,069 km 36 inches

2 Alliance Pipeline * Enbridge Inc. (50%); Versan (50%) Natural gas 1,560 km 36–42 inches

3 Brunswick Pipeline Emera Brunswick Pipeline Company Natural gas 143 km 30 inch

4 Canadian Mainline TransCanada Pipelines Natural gas 14,114 km 36 inch

5 Cochin Pipeline System Kinder Morgan Propane and ethane-propane 995 km 12 inches

6 Deep Panuke Pipeline Encana Corporation Natural gas 175 km

7 Enbridge Pipelines (NW) Inc. System Enbridge Inc. Crude oil 855 km

8 Enbridge Mainline * Enbridge Inc. Crude oil 2,306 km 30–36 inches

9 Enbridge Westspur Pipeline Enbridge Inc. Crude oil 175 km 12 inches

10 Enbridge Southern Lights (Line 13) * Enbridge Inc. Crude oil 1,241 km 20 inches

11 Express-Platte Pipeline System * Spectra Energy Crude oil 434 km 24 inch

12 Foothills Pipeline System TransCanada Pipelines Natural gas 1,241 km 36–42 inches

13 Keystone Pipeline * TransCanada Pipelines Crude oil 1,227 km 30–36 inches

14 Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline Spectra Energy (77.53%); Emera (12.92%); ExxonMobil Corporation (9.55%) Natural gas 575 km 30 inch

15 Nova Gas Transmission Pipeline System (NGTL) TransCanada Pipelines Natural gas 24,373 km 16–42 inches

16 Ontario–Quebec Pipeline TransNorthern Pipeline Inc. Refined fuel products 850 km

17 PTC Pipeline Spectra Energy Natural gas liquids 930 km

18 Trans Mountain Pipeline System Kinder Morgan Crude oil and refined products 1,142 km 24–36 inches

19 TransQuebec and Maritimes Pipeline Mainline TransCanada Pipelines (50%), Gaz Metro (50%) Natural gas 572 km

20 Westcoast Pipeline System (B.C Pipeline) Spectra Energy Natural gas 2,900 km 24–42 inches

21 Dawn to Parkway Trunkline Union Gas Natural gas 257 km

* Pipeline continues into United States of America.

The Major Pipeline Systems of Canada map provides an overview of existing major pipeline systems in Canada that are over 100 km in length. The map includes the name, owner, product, approximate length and diameter of the pipeline.

Information used to collate this map was directly provided by companies, the National Energy Board (NEB) and the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA).

Information on this map is intended as a general source of information only. Compiled and published by Great Southern Press Pty Ltd. Tel: +61 3 9248 5100

Product information and graphic design © Great Southern Press, 2016. Source map courtesy Map Resources.

www.mapresources.com.au

For additional copies of this poster and for advertising enquiries, email [email protected]

With the support of:

www.pipelinesinternational.com

MAJOR PIPELINE SYSTEMS OF CANADAA detailed overview of select existing major pipeline systems in Canada