right to food & budget guatemala 2008

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Right to Food Unit Guatemala office

Realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala Case study on Monitoring the Right to Food using the Budget Tool

Coordinator:

Ricardo Zepeda Gaitán

Researchers:

Jorge Santos Contreras Carla Caxaj Álvarez

Guatemala, October 2008.

The Realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala Case Study and Monitoring of the Right to Food using the Budget Tool

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Equivalencies US$1 = GTQ7.45136 (May 15, 2008)

GTQ7.63101 (January 1, 2008) Source: Bank of Guatemala

1 quintal [100lbs] = 45.36 kgs

0.4 tons

1 metric ton = 1,016.05 kgs

22.4 quintales[2200lbs]

Abbreviations and Acronyms AIDPI Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples

ASESA Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects of and Agrarian Situation

CONASAN National Food and Nutrition Security Council

CGN General Accounting Office

DESC Economic Social and Cultural Rights ESCR

DIGEPA General Office of Support Programs

DTP Budget Technical Board

ERP Poverty Reduction Strategy

ENCOVI National Survey of Conditions of Life

FONTIERRAS Land Fund

INCAP Nutrition Institute for Central America and Panama

INE National Statistics Institute

IVA Value Added Tax

MAGA Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock

MINEDUC Ministry of Education

MINUGUA Verification Mission for the United Nations in Guatemala

PAE School Feeding Programs

PRONADE National program for the self management for educational development

PSAN National Food and Nutrition Security Policy

PIDESC International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

PGIEE General State Budget of Incomes and Expenditures

SEGEPLAN General Planning and Programming Secretariat

SESAN Food and Nutrition Security Secretariat

SICOIN Integrated Accounting System

SINASAN National Food and Nutrition Security System

SOSEP Social Works of the First Lady Secretariat

VLE School Glass of Milk Program


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Table of Contents

Introduction................................................................................................................................... 5

I. The national context for the realization of the Right to Food .............................................. 7

a) Political Structure of Guatemala.................................................................................. 7

b) The access to information situation ........................................................................... 8

c) The Budget Process ……............................................................................................. 8

d) Legal framework related to the Right to Food ……….............................................. 10

e) History of the application of the Right to Food in Guatemala ………...................... 12

f) Levels of poverty and the situation of national food security ………....................... 13

g) The political framework to approach poverty............................................................. 16

II. Methodology of the study.................................................................................................... 18

III. The Right to Food and the Budget …………..................................................................... 21

IV. Budget Analysis of the realization of the Right to Food ………….................................... 23

IV.1 Support to vulnerable groups ........................................................................................... 23

a) The School Food Programs ……………......................................................................... 23

b) The School Food Programs of the MINEDUC ............................................................... 27

c) The School Food Programs of the MAGA ...................................................................... 29

d) The School Glass of Milk Program.................................................................................. 30

e) Perceptions of the School Glass of Milk Program……………………………………… 37

IV.2 Access to Land …............................................................................................................. 41

a) The Land Fund …...................................................................................................... 42

b) Perceptions on the Land Fund ………........................................................................ 48

Conclusions................................................................................................................................... 52

Bibliography................................................................................................................................. 54

Annexes ........................................................................................................................................ 55


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Introduction: This study seeks to use budget analysis as a tool to assess the realization of the Right to Food by the Guatemalan state by monitoring two policies related to this right: the School Glass of Milk Program and the Land Fund.

Both programs have a strong relationship with the realization of the Right to Food, as can be observed from the various components stated in the Voluntary Guidelines for the Right to Food. The School Glass of Milk Program can be approached from Guideline 13: support to vulnerable groups, while the Land Fund can be approached from Guideline 8: access to resources and goods, more specifically part 8B: Land. Both policies were designed to respond to the needs of two sensitive populations: the child population living in regions considered food vulnerable, and the peasant population that has historically maintained a strong demand for land.

In order to identify the institutions that would be the focuses of this study, we first identified two major aspects of the Right to Food: a) the Right to Live without Hunger, which implies adopting immediate actions for populations in food risk situations; and b) the Right to Adequate Food, which calls for the adoption of long term policies for the consolidation of an adequate environment that allows populations to develop their own capacities to feed themselves in dignity.

As a research method, we established a hypothetical deductive process, which starts from the general to the specific, through the identification of a hypothesis established from prior experience and observation. The hypothesis is supported by questions that try to delimit related topics. Likewise, the answers to the inquiries try to combine quantitative as well as qualitative aspects.

Existing budget transparency mechanisms in Guatemala will allow for this process to be applied to other areas related to the Right to Food from a rights approach. Clearly, budget analysis does not exhaust all possibilities of policy review, but it constitutes a strong tool in identifying administrative and operational weaknesses, difficulties in policy planning, and inappropriate management of resources. In this regard, budget analysis is directed at strengthening institutions in the medium term. We conducted budget research via the Integrated Accounting System SICOIN [by its Spanish acronym, Sistema de Contabilidad Integrado], which has as a starting point the General Income and Expenses Budget, then goes through the Ministry level until it reaches the programs and projects level. This instrument has the advantage of allowing you to observe in a regularly updated way the levels of expenses of the institutions in the Executive branch, the transfers, and cuts made. It has the limitation of not covering other decentralized institutions, although for approaching the issues established in this research, it was enough.

One of the challenges of the research was specifically trying to observe the existing relationship between budget information and information regarding the effects of policies. We searched for qualitative information, starting from interviewing people who are linked to both institutions: firstly, at the political level, secondly the technical level, and finally beneficiaries of theses policies at the community level. The methodological framework of the qualitative research aimed at contrasting the different levels in order to improve the review of the process, so as to elaborate proposals for strengthening it.

In terms of challenges, we were faced with the rupture of various political processes in the country, especially in terms of the change of government, which came with a proposal of change in social policies. This situation implied the open questioning in recent months by the new authorities regarding the continuation of the School Glass of Milk Program for example, with the idea of trying out new products, although in the end they decided in favor of its continuation. Another difficulty of importance is that the first months of the year 2008 have been extremely


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complex in regards to the national food issue. The prices of basic consumer products have increased at an accelerated pace, making the strong dependency that already exists on the imports of food evident. In regards to this, the new government has made some statements about reviewing the framework of the Food and Nutrition security Policy, although it isn’t clear they have done anything about this yet.

In broad terms, we can establish that even though an important advance has been made in the political framework to deal with the realization of the Right to Food by the Guatemalan state, the adaptation of these policies to the objectives established is still limited. At a first glance, one can state that the financial allocations to support actions are not enough; a more extensive approach reveals administrative and technical limitations. However, the most evident result of the research shows that the objectives of the programs have a weak relation with the actions carried out. In this way, we can affirm that the limited efforts being made to address the Right to Food of the Guatemalan population are not enough and do not have the effects hoped for.

We hope that this study can become a support for the strengthening of both policies. At the same time, we hope that this experience can guide the advancement of budget analysis as a tool that strengthens the processes of social monitoring and demands regarding the realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala.


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I. The national context for the realization of the Right to Food

a) Political Structure A decade ago Guatemala emerged from a 36-year internal armed conflict. With the end of the conflict in 1996, compromises reached focused on overcoming the causes that provoked the conflict initially. The Peace Accords were an effort to develop an agenda for a democratic and inclusive1 nation. They implied the recognition of a multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural nation. They also take into account the great inequities that make Guatemala the second most unequal country on the continent.

Guatemala is divided into 8 regions, 33 departments and 333 municipalities. Political power is divided between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. The Executive is headed by the current President of the Republic, Álvaro Colom, who took office on January 14, 2008. The President is elected every four years. The Executive works via 13 Ministries, 13 Secretariats, and 8 Social Funds. There are also various institutions that are autonomous and have diverse ways to choose their representatives. The Legislature is elected every four years and is made up of 158 congresspersons elected by a national listing and a district election. The Judicial branch is elected by the Congress. Thirteen judges are chosen for a period of 5 years and are responsible for administrating the judicial processes in the country.

The established channel for citizens’ demands is the System of Development Councils which is based in the Law on Councils of Urban and Rural Development (Decree No. 11-2002) [Ley de Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural]. The System has five levels:

National Council of Urban and Rural Development, headed by the President.

Regional Councils of Urban and Rural Development, which are headed by representatives of the President

Departmental Councils of Development, which are headed by the governors of each Department.

Municipal Councils of Development, which are headed by the municipal Mayors.

Community Development Councils, which are headed by the community Mayors.

The system of Development Councils attempts to deal with comprehensive issues for the development of the population; however as a system it has remained very weakened, due to the lack of political support for it to function from recent administrations. As a result, it is not a functional channel. At the municipal level, the systems opens up the possibility of establishing work commissions on issues related to ESC rights. However, weakness displayed by municipal mayors to respond to citizen demands has resulted in conflicts at different levels.2

1 The Peace Accords cover fundamental Human Rights issues in general. The most relevant cover issues related to Civil and Political Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. There are also agreements on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples; socio-economic issues and the agrarian situation, as well as the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the role of armed forces in a democratic society. 2 A constant problem in the system of Development Councils is the fact that usually the Central Government tries to favor the mayors of their political party, which has implied that mayors of other parties are not able to channel their projects. Also, the weakness of the system has led to the prioritization of projects known as “grey work”— investment in infrastructure, postponing other important actions such as monitoring of processes and audit by citizens.


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b) Access to information Access to information is guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution: “All acts of the administration are public. Interested parties have the right to obtain, in any moment, reports, copies, reproductions and certificates, and access files they wish to consult, with the exception of documents containing information on military or diplomatic affairs of national security, or information given by individuals under the guarantee of confidentiality.” In general, however, possibilities of accessing public information are very limited, since special legislation in this area is lacking.

Most of the information that can be accessed takes too long to be published. In addition, institutions lack adequate methodology for channeling information. While various proposals have been made for the creation of a Law on Access to Information, such have not been approved given the lack of political support for its approval in Congress. There is legislation in place that has allowed for the accessibility of information; however such legislation does not cover all possibilities that are supposed to be guaranteed under Article 30, with regard to promoting adequate processes for social audit. Some of the current laws include: the Law for Contracting by the State (Decree No. 57-92) [Ley de Contrataciones del Estado]; Municipal Code (Decree No 12-2002) [Código Municipal]; Law on the Council of Urban and Rural Development (Decree No. 11-2002); Organic Law of the General Finance Office (Decree No. 31-2002) [Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de Cuentas].

With regard to financial information, current “open” channels allow for some degree of transparency and citizen audit. These channels however, do not include information on all state institutions, such as the Judicial and Legislative organs, nor some decentralized institutions. Another obstacle for social monitoring involves the use of Trusteeships by some state institutions, such as municipal councils.3 The use of trusteeships is in place with the objective of facilitating the hiring of services from private organizations by the state. Nonetheless, monitoring processes are hindered by the state itself.4 It is evident that the state contracts and buys services and materials at overpriced rates, or disregards normal bidding processes, leading to corruption.

c) The Budget Process The governing body in the budget system is the Ministry of Public Finances (MFP), through the Budget Technical Board (DTP). However, the budget process involves all the institutions that implement resources from the State. These institutions must elaborate a strategic plan that identifies the activities that are to be undertaken, to allocate adequate resources according to the priorities established and the availability of resources. However, these proposals will be reviewed by the DTP, which analyzes the possibilities and priorities. The organic law for the budget (Decree No. 101-97) establishes six stages for the State budget:

3 Translator’s Note [T.N.]: The word used is Municipalidades which translates into municipalities; however the concept is commonly used to refer to the Council, the local government at the municipal level. 4 In 2008, the State of Guatemala manages 16% of its budget through 57 trusteeships, which in turn manage over 5 billion Quetzales. This raises two issues of transparency: first, the General Finance Office can not monitor these since they are funds deposited into the private banking system; second, private banks charge a high commission for managing resources, making the spoils system possible. (trafico de inflencias)


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Formulation Formulation is undertaken by the DTP and the General Secretariat for Planning (SEGEPLAN), which exchange information regarding the availability of resources and the prioritized needs in the planning system. This stage involves the setting of goals and corresponding allocation of resources, through two stages: global programming, which establishes macroeconomic bases for defining budget maximums, and the institutional programming, which is done by each public institution that presents budget drafts to the MFP.

Discussion and approval: The budget proposal is presented to Congress, which has until November 30th to approve it. The Public Finances and Currency Commission of the Congress must study the proposal and make a statement. It then presents a bill to the full session of the Congress for its approval. If approved, the President of the Republic must sanction or veto the approved budget. If any of these activities will involve the non-approval of the proposal within the established time, the budget of the current year will have to be used. 5

Execution: This stage goes from January 1 to December 31, time during which material and financial resources are mobilized by the State institutions. It involves the dealing with the planned objectives by each institution and their supervision, considering the orientations of the approved budget. This can be considered the principal stage of the budget process, and it is the most difficult to monitor, considering that it involves internal and external transfers, situations that could involve a change in the direction of the planned objectives and activities.

Audit: In this stage the MFP should monitor the administration of resources, while the General Finance Office ought to ensure that the resources are being managed in the correct form. To have this control, three levels are managed: a) financial, that related to the behavior of the incomes and outcomes; b) legal, that related to the application of administrative norms and procedures of budget execution; c) physical, through the monitoring of physical implementation reports.

Evaluation: SEGEPLAN and the DTP verify the actions and projects elaborated during the execution stage based on qualitative and quantitative criteria, in order to make recommendations and corrections. This is done by monthly, quarterly and annual evaluations, which are presented February 28 of the following year of the fiscal year evaluated.

Liquidation: The MFP does the closure of the fiscal year and elaborates a report on each budget entry related to incomes and outflows. This report is presented to the General Finance Office, who later hands it to the Congress of the Republic for its total or partial approval.

5 This stage has the disadvantage that members of the Congress can make revisions to the original proposal. This means a weakening of the technical criteria that were applied in the formulation stage. On the other hand during the years of closing of government, it is common that the proposal is not approved in the established time. This means that if the budget of the current year is used, the following year requires frequent reallocations by the new government.


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d) Legal framework related to the Right to Food The State of Guatemala as a signatory of the ICESCR has the obligation to realize the Right to Food. The Voluntary Guidelines are a reference for the State on how to do this.

Box 1 International Treaties ratified by the government of Guatemala related to the Right to Food. 6

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Article 25.1) - International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (Article 11) - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, (Article 5.e.) - Convention on the Rights of the Child (Articles 24 and 27) - ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, (Article 2) - Rome Declaration on World Food Security (Objective 7.1) - Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition - Protocol of San Salvador (Article 12)

In Guatemala, Food and Nutrition Security within the National Food and Nutrition Security System (SINASAN) is defined as: “the right of every person to have timely and permanent physical, economic and social access to adequate food in quantity and quality, with cultural relevance, preferably of national origin, as well as an adequate biological use, to maintain a healthy and active life.” At the same time, General Comment 12 states that the Right to Adequate Food is defined as: “the right to adequate food is exercised when all men, women and children, alone or in common with others have, at all times, physical and economic access to adequate food or to means to obtain it.” It is clear the two concepts broadly agree. There is thus an opportunity for the full realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala.

The objective of SINASAN is to establish and maintain, in context with the National Food and Nutrition Security Policy (PSAN), a strategic institutional space of organization and coordination to prioritize, organize, harmonize, design and execute actions of Food and Nutrition security through plans. The policies must maintain the same logic and sense, and not contradict the spirit of the PSAN. In particular, the objectives of PSAN are undertaken in strategic plans, programs and projects aimed at the socioeconomic development of the country. PSAN has the following specific objectives:

1. To ensure the permanent and sufficient availability and supply of necessary food for all of the population in quantity and quality, through reasonable balance between national production and food imports.

2. To promote and prioritize all actions oriented at improving the economic, physical, biological and cultural access of the population to food.

3. To favor political, economic, social, educational, environmental and cultural conditions to ensure all of the population a daily consumption of food in adequate quantities and qualities.

6 OACDH. “Immediate obligations of the State of Guatemala in regards to the economic, social and cultural rights, particularly to education, to adecuate housing and nutrition” (s.d.e)[T.N: lacking specific information]


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4. To advocate for the improvement of environmental conditions and access to basic services that guarantee all of the population the necessary health and environmental conditions for an optimum biological use of consumed food.

5. To observe the quality of national consumer foods with regard to sanitation, nutrition, and cultural relevance.

6. To implement a regulating, institutional and operational framework for food aid programs, including emergency situations.

7. To implement a permanent and truthful national information system on food and nutrition security in order to identify influencing structural, environmental and human factors with the purpose of executing timely alerts and making political and technical decisions in an opportune way.

8. To develop and strengthen mechanisms of prevention and treatment of food problems as relates to scarcity or surplus, making priority for groups most at risk—age, physiological condition, area of residency, socio-economic level, gender and/or cultural identity.

9. To establish coordinating policies and mechanisms between national and international institutions working on the subject matter to implement coherent and coordinated food and nutrition security programs, with aim of optimizing resources and capacities.

As can be observed, because of the issues that PSAN tackles, there are many challenges that have been brought to light. The policy itself constitutes an important starting point to deal with the food problem. Yet even after three years of existence, its actions are very weak. In fact, certain political moves have contradicted the very spirit of PSAN. For example, by encouraging commercial opportunities access to food has been hindered. On the other hand, precarious actions that intend to deal with food problems did not include the involvement of the system and coordinated processes have not taken place.

During the administration of Oscar Berger, there were many challenges in building the institutional structure for PSAN; hardly any modifications were made. Later, with the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA), commercial openings were strengthened. Now, the administration of Álvaro Colom has announced changes that could result in the weakening of PSAN. The recent situation with increased food prices globally has resulted in the need to make stronger and more effective policies.7 These actions are seen as risky and are not supported politically by social groups. In spite of its weaknesses, PSAN could become an opportunity for the realization of the right to food.

7 The government of Alvaro Colom has declared the installation for four years of a “Specific social environment Cabinet” (Government Agreement 128-2008) in which the topics of food and nutrition security are included; also an “Emergency national commission for the creation of employment, food and nutrition security, sustainability of the natural resources and governance” (Government Agreement 129-2008). This would imply for the PSAN to loose the political weight it already has, at the same time that the CONASAN weakens its functions.


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Box 2

Structure created by the Law on the National System for Food and Nutrition security

The Law on the National System for Food and Nutrition security is responsible for the creation of the National Food and Nutrition Security System (SINASAN). The SINASAN is made up of government institutions and civil society, with technical and financial support by international organisms. SINASAN’s basic function is to work intergovernmentally, maintaining the spirit of the PSAN. Food and nutrition security initiatives must be executed in a coordinated and planned manner. The following are the institutions created to support these initiatives:

CONASAN: The National Food and Nutrition Security Council is the highest entity that is in charge of implementing PSAN initiatives. It is comprised of government and civil society representatives, and receives technical assistance from international cooperation organisms. CONASAN sessions are scheduled on a trimester basis (on the last week of the months of March, June and September). The March session is important because members of SINASAN must submit their operational project plan to the SESAN.

SESAN: the Food and Nutrition security Secretariat of the Presidency handles coordination and technical planning for the implementation of the SINASAN Law. This Law is broad in the sense that it expresses that SESAN will be able to select its administrative and operational structure: technical personnel and team that will allow for the realization of work; as well as appropriate government employees in institutions of the CONASAN.

INCOPAS: this is considered the communication channel or space for participation, where proposals regarding Food and Nutrition security are presented by civil society. It is composed of one main representative and an alternate, designated by civil society groups linked to Food and Nutrition security (e.g. Indigenous, Peasants, Unions, businesses, Catholic and Protestant Churches, Academic, Non- governmental organizations, Women organizations, and Professional Associations).

Support institutions: are comprised of institutions or bodies that, without necessarily being obliged by or directly linked to the law, belong to the state or collaborate with it. Among these are the international community and those institutions that provide technical support to CONASAN’s initiatives (e.g. SEGEPLAN, the Budget Technical Board from the Ministry of Finance). These institutions are accredited by SESAN, and can contribute when required.

e) History of the application of the Right to Food in Guatemala For decades, food issues in Guatemala were not dealt with in a comprehensive way; rather food issues were oriented toward impoverished children and groups left vulnerable as a result of poorly planned programs. For Guatemala, this translates into a delay in physiological development. With regard to nutrition, one can observe Guatemala’s significant regression continent-wide in the last decade, particularly with regard to the consumption of food energy, which decreased from a national average of 2,350 kilocalories per person a day in 1990 to 2,210 kilocalories in 2003.

Food programs for school children began in the 1970s and have since included various products. It is evident that programs are based on maximum cost-saving strategies, negatively impacting the very spirit of the programs. The Incaparina, for example, was distributed from 1977 to 1985. Other programs included the School Cookie, Atole and Protemasa.8 However, these programs were not very successful, and were jeopardized by complex policies with regard to coverage, delivery, and corruption. 8 The Incaparina is a mixture of cereals and grains, cooked with water and sugar. It is a drink similar to atole [a corn or maize drink] regularly accepted by the population. Protemasa is a mixture of various vegetables that looks like ground meat. It is used as a substitute in the preparation of certain foods.


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The government of President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) made the first attempt to transfer funds directly to schools. The amount given consisted of a fixed quantity of 3 daily Quetzales per student, while parents would have to match this amount. This approach was also adopted and strengthened by the government of Oscar Berger (2004-2008).

During the administration of Oscar Berger, the National Policy for the Right to Food and Nutrition (PSAN), was made public in 2005. It was considered the most relevant initiative with regard to the Right to Food. Nonetheless, in spite of the initiatives to date, such have not yet received the necessary political support. During the inauguration of the PSAN, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, visited Guatemala. Mr. Ziegler made a series of recommendations to the state to modify initiatives within the PSAN framework on the Right to Food. 9

Jean Ziegler emphasized looking at the structural causes of hunger and malnutrition, as well as the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities that primarily affect the indigenous and peasant population. Yet two years after these recommendations were made, it was evident that the Berger administration did not follow through. Likewise, several months have past since the beginning of Alvaro Colom’s term, and the recommendations have not yet been addressed. In this sense, we lose the risk of losing valuable contributions that for three years now have served as a guide for social groups to promote the realization of the Right to Food.

f) Poverty and National Food Security The most recent National Survey on Living Conditions (ENCOVI 2006) defines Extreme Poverty as a condition in which people can not cover the minimum cost of food, which amounts to 8.78 daily Quetzales per person. General Poverty [Pobreza General] includes those whoe are above the extreme poverty line, but can not cover other essential needs (18.01 daily Quetzales).

Using these criteria the percentage of the national population living in poverty comes to 51%. With regard to advances in the Reduction of Poverty, a slight improvement can be observed from the 2000 survey: Poverty decreased from 56% to 51% and Extreme Poverty decreased from 15.7% to 15.2%. In absolute terms, the number of people living in poverty increased by 255,000, of which 185,000 are living in extreme poverty. These facts could be compromising considering that they are taken as a parameter to measure the total poverty, an amount of Q6,574 yearly per person, while for extreme poverty the parameter is Q3,206 yearly. The Basic Food Basket, on the other hand, increased by more than 248 Quetzales in the last year, while from 2005-200810 it increased by 344.

Beyond the statement that Poverty has diminished, it is evident that Extreme Poverty has not. Instead of been reduced, Extreme Poverty has been reconfigurated. Even though some advances have been made in regions where the state has focused on “reducing poverty,” it is important to observe that in the northeast region of the country, extreme poverty doubled. Also, in terms of general poverty, the indigenous population regressed in relation to the non indigenous population.

9 For more information about the follow-up of recommendations of Relator Jean Ziegler, see the study Misión Guatemala... Combatir el Hambre. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2007. 10 Taking the month of April as a reference, we can observe that in 2008 the cost of the Basic Food Basket went up to Q1,778.44; in 2007 it was priced at Q1,529.76; in 2006 it was priced at Q1,501.21, and in 2005, year during which information was gathered for the ENCOVI 2006, it was priced at Q1,434.28. Information from the National Statistics Institute, INE.


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Table 1

Guatemala: Distribution of poverty by ethnicity (in thousands of people and percentage)

Levels of Poverty

Characteristic Total Population Poor % Extreme

Poor % Not

extreme poor

% Not poor %

National total∗ 12,987.8 6,625.9 51.0 1,976.6 15.2 4,649.3 35.8 6,361.9 49.0 Indigenous 4,973.1 3,721.1 74.8 1,355.0 27.2 2,366.1 47.6 1,252.0 25.2 Non-indigenous 7,990.8 2,894.3 36.2 618.2 7.7 2,276.1 28.5 5,096.5 63.8 Source: Elaborated using information from the ENCOVI 2006.

Poverty is concentrated in the indigenous and peasant populations. The 2006 ENCOVI shows that the poverty rate among the indigenous population is twice that of the non-indigenous. With regard to extreme poverty, the situation is even more severe. The rate of extreme poverty among the indigenous population is more than three times that among the non-indigenous population. The heavy weight of ethnic origin in the process of wealth concentration is thus very noticeable.

With regard to regions, it is evident that in terms of General Poverty the biggest setback is in the northeastern region (more than 50%), although it does not reach the levels of the north and northwestern levels (which are around 80%), and the southeastern and Petén (close to 60%) [sic]. In terms of Extreme Poverty the biggest setback is in the northeast (which goes from 9% to 20%) and Petén (from 13% to 15%). The main advance is in the southeastern region, which goes from 20% to 14% and the northwest (32% to 23%). General Poverty is concentrated in the rural area, which goes from 80% to 71%, while in the urban areas General Poverty goes from 18% to 28%.

In terms of the ethnic origin, the indigenous population suffers a slight setback in relation to the non-indigenous population, going from 55.7% to 56.2% in a situation of poverty, while the non-indigenous population goes from 44.3% to 43.8%.

∗ It does not include the population with unknown ethnic identity.


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Graph 1

Guatemala: Levels of poverty by department (in thousands of people)

Source: Elaborated using information from the ENCOVI 2006.

In terms of the hunger situation, the number of malnourished persons has practically doubled in a relatively short period of time, going from 1.4 millions of people in 1991 to 2.8 million in 2002. Whereas in the year 1991 Guatemala had 31.1% of Central America’s malnourished, by 1996 it was 37.2%; and for the year 2002 it was 41.8%. Following this tendency, we could state that this year more than half of the hungry in Central America live in Guatemala, and the number has surely surpassed 3 million people. The trend in increasing number of malnourished people has not changed in Guatemala, whereas the trend has leveled in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and declined in El Salvador.

0 200 400 600 800

Guatemala

El Progreso

Sacatepéqu…

Chimaltena…

Escuintla

Santa Rosa

Sololá

Totonicapán

Quetzalten …

Suchitepéq…

Retalhuleu

San Marcos

Huehueten…

Quiché

Baja Verapaz

Alta Verapaz

Petén

Izabal

Zacapa

Chiquimula

Jalapa

Jutiapa

Pobreza extrema Pobreza no extrema


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Graph 2

Central America Total Malnourished Population

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

Guatemala ElSalvador

Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica

199119962002

Source: Elaborated using information from the official website of the United Nations Organization for the

indicators to measure progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. http://mdgs.un.org.

In terms of the changes the size of children studying in grade one, it can be observed that in over 15 years there have been important setbacks in the municipalities that were already considered high risk. Contrariwise, municipalities with low risk were the ones to improve the most.

Table 2

Categorization of the municipalities of Guatemala and of the zones of Guatemala city, in relation to the change in the size of children according to the 1986 and 2001 surveys.

Risk Category

Range of frequency

% Number of

municipalities and zones

Municipalities that worsened

Municipalities that improved

N/A

Very high 59.1 – 100 118 60 57 1 High 49.2 – 59.0 57 15 42 0

Moderate 34.5 – 49.1 87 19 65 3 Low 0.00 – 34.4 86 4 78 4

Source: Elaborated by CIIDH based on chart 19 of the Second National Size Census. Final Report. Guatemala, 2002.

g) The political framework to address poverty: In the framework of political commitments flowing out of the Peace Accords, it was possible to define a Poverty Reduction Strategy (ERP), which since 2001 has had the following objectives to deal with the problem of poverty in the country

Economic growth with equity of at least 4% annually through the increase of the fiscal deductions, the rationalization of public expense, the reduction of the fiscal deficit, the attraction of investment and a prudent monetary policy.

An increase to 6% of investments in human capital, especially in preventive health, the maternal and infant mortality index, elementary education and the reduction of illiteracy.


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To reach these goals sanitation services will be decentralized and deconcentrated, focusing on the rural sector and the indigenous population.

Investments in physical capital, especially in the most disfavored sectors of the rural zones (drinkable water, basic sanitation, energy and means of communication) with participation of municipal administration.

Agricultural development will be promoted through the distribution of land and the delivery of fertilizer to small farmers. Also anticipated in the supply of machinery and agricultural equipment.

During the government of Oscar Berger, these objectives were redefined, towards a more general format, and thus less specific: 11

Social protection through the provisions of basic services;

Strengthening of the human and productive capacities;

Generation of social and economic opportunities;

Enlargement of the individual and collective heritage of the poorest.

In general terms it is considered that the ERP has not been functional due to the fact that the structural causes of poverty have not been addressed. The effect of programs intended to alleviate poverty has been very limited. We start from the point that certain factors, such as the favorable development of the economy, the delivery of resources from immigrants outside of the country and especially the attraction of foreign investment in the country, were contemplated. This last factor is counterproductive in that through the extension of fiscal benefits to transnational businesses, they stop contributing important taxes to the treasury, thus weakening the possibilities of the State to strengthen itself financially. In addition, it is a constant that businesses violate the labor rights of the workers, while the Ministry of Labor is unable to adequately monitor their performance.

11 SEGEPLAN. Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza. Guatemala, 2006.


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II. Study Methodology In the elaboration of the study we used the hypothetical deductive method. We started from the experience that despite the policies and actions that have been taken at a national level to address food problems, the latter have failed, which is evidenced in the fact that the levels of hunger and malnutrition nationally have become more pronounced. We can thus pose questions, the answers to which will start to shape a valid hypothesis, whose proof will lead us to the expected answer.

The inquiry of the answers, in turn, permits us to establish a deductive logical route, by which a quantitative investigation is made possible, by means of budget analysis, complemented with qualitative character, by means of the assessments contributed by people who have intervened in the policy application processes. To define the range of the hypothesis, we began with general questions, which maintain within themselves a sense of process, made each time more specific.

Box 3

Initial Questions:

a) What impact have the Glass of Milk and Land Fund had on the decrease in Malnutrition and Hunger?

b) What impact have both programs had on the population they have assisted?

c) Has the allocation of resources to these programs been enough to reach the objectives sketched out?

d) Aside from financial aspects, are there other characteristics of the programs (technical, administrative or political) that condition its scope?

e) Is it advisable to maintain the current logic of both policies to fulfill the objectives established?

Hypothesis:

Although the School Glass of Milk Program and the Land Fund could have positive effects in assisting in the realization of the Guatemalan population´s Right to Food, they don’t have a notable impact on the dimensions of the problems, especially due to the weakness with which they are applied.

a) Quantitative Investigation: To try and visualize the Right to Food in the Guatemalan PGIEE implies a complex challenge, in that certain aspects are not yet recognized politically, even though they are broadly linked to the RtF issue; they have not been incorporated into the PSAN. This is evident in regards to the Land Fund: Even though they receive their budget from the MAGA, monitoring of the agrarian issue is not included within the PSAN. Another example is the labor issue, which is even more separated. However, for the present study there was the advantage that both de Glass of Milk Program and the Land Fund have a financial relationship with the MAGA.

Budget analysis has a logic that goes from the general to the specific. Moreover, it has a sense of “correction” from one budgetary year to another. This correction involves control and evaluation processes by the DTP and the SEGEPLAN, during and after the budget year, which should result in adjustments in the next year’s budget, so that each time the budget becomes more relevant to the fulfillment of the initial objectives.


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The budget analysis was done starting with the tool denominated Integrated Accounting System, (SICOIN), which is recognized as the most developed and trusted mechanism for monitoring the budget performance by the Executive. Budget performance can be consulted online, where its information in updated on a daily basis.12

Box 4 Steps to access information from SICOIN13

1° Enter into following web page: www.sicoin.minfin.gob.gt .

2° In order to access information it is necessary to be registered as a user. However, there is an option for the press to consult the page, and this is the most used option. On the first page there is a panel where data regarding the user and the password are asked for. Both should be filled out with the word “press”.

3° Then, the years which can be consulted appear—from 2004 to 2008.

4° Later, three options for Press Users appear, which are called, CLASSIFIERS, INCOME EXECUTION, EXECUTION OF EXPENDITURES. For the purposes of our investigation we will use EXECUTION OF EXPENDITURES.

5° The option EXECUTION OF EXPENDITURES will open up a subfolder called REPORTS, which opens up three more options: CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION, ACTUAL BUDGET, MANAGEMENT REPORTS. Our option will be CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION.

6° The option CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION opens up ten options, to obtain data that lets us know the totality of Budgetary information from the Executive, with the characteristics to know the resource allocations, reallocations, expenditures made and committed, as well as level of implementation of expenditures. We will opt for the option BUDGET EXECUTION (DYNAMIC GROUPS).

7° The option BUDGET EXECUTION (DYNAMIC GROUPS) will take us to a filter to define the structure of the report we requested. For the focus of our investigation, we will use the following order: in CUT we will choose ENTITY; in GROUP 1 we will choose PROGRAM; in GROUP 2 we will choose ACTIVITY or WORK.

8° Later the months you wish study should be chosen, which can be a range of months or one month in particular. In order to avoid possible changes in the information, we suggest limiting yourself to the month previous to the one in which we are realizing the investigation. In other words, if we are in mid-May, we will limit ourselves to the information available in April.

9° Finally, press the option ACCEPT, and this will produce PDF version of the report we want.

There can be multiple versions of the reports. However, the one derived from the steps we took has the characteristic that it provides us with information detailed at program and subprogram levels, with information about transfers and executed expenses.

12 However, from experience it has become evident that frequent “corrections” appear several weeks later for information that we have taken as valid. This means that one needs to do several “runs” a posteriori, having to prove several times the veracity of the information. 13 With information from Manual de auditoría presupuestaria. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2008.


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b) Qualitative Investigation:

The more relevant challenge in undertaking the study was to try each time to reach a more precise level concerning the topics analyzed. In regards to this, we tried to support our qualitative research through field studies at the community level in diverse regions, in order to do a comparative analysis of the assessments offered by each. The difficulty of most relevance in this aspect was to try and gain the communities’ trust, in order to have access and interview a range of personalities who had participated in both programs. We present the general framework for the qualitative research in the following box, where the thematic logic from the perspective of each actor as well as the topics that were considered in the design of the interviews can be seen.

Table 3 Methodological Framework for the Field Work

Actors BudgetaryIssues Regarding Performance

Political Public Officials

(FONTIERRAS)

Resource sufficiency Options for improvement Critical Assesments Bureaucratic mechanisms Sustainability

Advances and setbacks Social participation Assessments regarding impacts

Operative Public Officials

(FONTIERRAS and School Feeding

Programs)

Administrative Obstacles Considerations regarding

Performance Assessments regarding

Policies

Assesments regarding community expectations

Assessments regarding intervention (successes/ impacts/ perspectives)

Beneficiaries

Sufficiency Opinions about

improvements Crítical Assessments Social Participation

Regarding Land Poverty and hunger situation Labor/productive situation Comunity provisions Program considerations

Regarding PAE´s Situation of children (nutrition) School assistance Parent/ teacher relations

The qualitative investigation was done through semi-structured interviews with social actors who are involved at different levels in the processes of both programs studied. In addition, in order to put both programs into context, we included an interview with a Key Informant, an expert on Food Security, who could provide a first contextualization for both programs. With the key informant as well as operative and political public officials, we used open semi-structured interviews. At the community level, we did collective, open, semi-structured interviews. The purpouse of the collective interview was to generate a debate among the subjects, thus permitting a diversity of perceptions regarding life as a beneficiary from the greatest number of people possible. At a community level, two groups were selected for each one of the programs studied, in order to do a comparative analysis between the assessments that they were able to offer us.


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c. Right to Food and the Budget The SINASAN law states that, in order to apply the PSAN, the Guatemalan State must assign a half percentage point (0.5%) of what is collected from the Value Added Tax (IVA), to Food and Nutrition Security projects and programs directed to the population in poverty or extreme poverty. These resources will be channeled through entities that the CONASA defines through its Strategic Plan.14 Even though the system has achieved a certain level of stability, this obligation has not been fulfilled, although it is a fact that the amounts it is assumed they should determine usually are superior to this established quantity. However, the more contradictory effect is that the CONASAN is not permitted to propose its sense of the cost, according the needs that can be prioritized in line with its own analysis.

Currently, the IVA forms the largest single part of the total tax recollection (51%). It involves a 12 % charge on consumption. However, it is recognized that it is the tax that is most evaded by the sectors that are supposed to pay it. After the Superintendent of Tax Administration, SAT [by its Spanish Acronym, Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria] began to apply control actions, the amount collected practically doubled in the period of 2001-2007. In the debate about increasing tax collection, business sectors persist in pressuring for an increase to 15%, a position which is opposed by the popular sectors, because it implies an extra charge for the consumer, while, for higher income groups, the tax rates are quite low, given their level of acquisition and consumption.

Table 6

Annual tax collection Period 2001-2007

(in milions of quetzales)

Description 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Total budget 17,120.54 20,292.36 21,210.08 23,329.18 25,097.79 29,023.36 33,720.96

IVA contribution to the budget

7,983.52 9,395.26 9,955.03 11,530.77 12,202.34 13,912.54 17,179.28

Contribution % 46.63 46.30 46.94 49.43 48.62 47.94 50.95

0.5% IVA 399.18 469.76 497.75 576.54 610.12 695.63 858.96

While the amounts the government assigns to Food and Nutrition Security surpass the amount established by the law, two aspects need to be raised in the short term:

a) The difficulty of defining with more clarity what could be included within these expenses, since currently various related activities could fall within them;

b) The insufficiency of the amount allocated, since it is evident that the half percentage point is not enough given the dimensions of the food issue.

The primary programs designated to assist the population’s Food and Nutrition Security, are found in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAGA) through the Vice-Ministry of Food and Nutrition Security (VISAN), and in the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), through the School Feeding Programs at the elementary and pre-elementary level. The Ministry of Public Health promotes some curative type actions that have still not been consolidated, especially the

14 SINASAN Law. Article 38.


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Chronic Malnutrition Reduction Plan (PRDC), which was proposed by the previous government and the new government has announced its reframing. On the other hand, it has recently been announced that the Conditional Transfers methodology will be used. This means the handing out of cash to families considered vulnerable on the condition that their children attend school and they keep a health control. However, this proposal is still at a Pilot Project Stage.

The MAGA brings together the majority of programs defined for the SAN [Food and Nutritional Security]. For 2008, the allocation for Agriculture Development and Food Aid activities implies 34.7 % of the total budget. However, as of April it became obvious that the budget advance for this activity is extremely low, barely 0.5%, which seriously compromises the possibilities of taking advantage of these resources. The MAGA is the entity that channels the Land Fund´s contribution through the non-assignable Entries to programs.

Table 7

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food (MAGA) Budget Advancement Status

Period from January to April 2008 (in millions of quetzales)

Description Allocated Modified In force Amount executed Advances

Central activities 52.13 + 9.40 61.53 13.33 21.7% Amplified competitive agriculture 327.58 - 20.56 307.02 11.16 3.6% Agriculture development and Food aid 409.92 + 25.01 434.93 2.10 0.5%

Natural resource sustainability 28.20 + 1.70 29.90 1.95 6.5% Entries non-assignable to programs 412.69 + 7.45 420.14 76.59 18.2%

Total 1,230.51 + 23.00 1,253.51 105.13 8.4%

Source: SICOIN. Report at April 30th 2008.

Box 4. Vice-Ministry of Food and Nutrition Security (VISAN) Activities, May 2008

The VISAN reports that as of May the VISAN´s Food Aid Program handed out 10,153 tons of food to 75,821 people from 17 departments considered to be vulnerable. This is equivalent to 6 kgs of food per person on average.

During 2007 the Food in exchange for Actions Program handed out a total of 32,286 quintales of food to 232,868 people, the equivalent to 6.3 kgs per person on average. Currently it has been present in only 6 communities from 2 departments that are not included among the most food vulnerable (Guatemala and El Progreso). This has benefited 3,072 people with 232 quintales of food, the equivalent to 3.4 kilos of food per person. Another action, called “Food Aid for persons affected by the crisis,” which is implemented through these programs in coordination with the World Food Program (WFP), has distributed 16,956 quintales of food to 47,530 persons in 7 departments (Chiquimula, Escuintla, Izabal, San Marcos, Sololá and Zacapa) - on average 16.2 kgs per person.

During the February to May period, the School Glass of Milk Program distributed 19.9 millions portions, surpassing the 35.0 millions that were distributed during all of 2007. For this year, 460,854 students from 3,757 schools in 104 municipalities from 19 departments have benefitted. It is considered to cover 76 days of the school cycle. The handout of food in coordination with the PMA is of 36,900 quintales for 315,390 persons, or 5.3 kgs per person.

Synthesis of the VISAN activity Report. May16, 2008.


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IV. Budget Analysis in the realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala IV.1 Support for vulnerable groups:

Box 5.

Voluntary Guideline 13: Support for vulnerable groups

“13.2 States are invited to systematically undertake disaggregated analysis on the food insecurity, vulnerability and nutritional status of different groups in society, with particular attention to assessing any form of discrimination that may manifest itself in greater food insecurity and vulnerability to food insecurity, or in a higher prevalence of malnutrition among specific population groups, or both, with a view to removing and preventing such causes of food insecurity or malnutrition.”

a) School Feeding Programs [Programas de Alimentación Escolar, PAE]

The situation of children is a reflection of the inequality that prevails among the Guatemalan population. This situation is even more critical since the disruption in production that has primarily affected indigenous and peasant populations. Indicators of chronic malnutrition among the Guatemalan child population remain among the highest in the world. This has meant serious regression and stagnation in the physical and biological development of children.15 In this regard, School Feeding Programs serve as one policy within an overall strategic approach to the situation.

In 1956, UNICEF and the U.S. Government initiated food aid distribution in Guatemala. The country can trace the establishment of School Feeding Programs to the 80s. Diverse operational strategies and actions have been used, and there have been many changes in focuses in successive administrations.

Until 1985, the School Snack [refaccion escolar] consisted of a daily glass of “Incaparina,” a mixture of degermed corn flour with cotton seed flour. Vitamins and iron were later added to this mixture. To facilitate the management of this program and to reduce costs, a School Cookie [galleta escolar] was introduced (and formulated) by the Nutrition Institute for Central America and Panama (INCAP) in 1986. Until 1996, the School Cookie was considered a school snack, contributing between 7% and 10% of daily energy and protein requirements.

In 1997, a School Breakfast Program was introduced; operations were led by local support committees, made up of parents and supported by teachers and school directors. These local support committees were organized in official rural school settings, as part of the National Program for the Self management for Educational Development (PRONADE).16 Items such as milk, vegetables, pastas and cooking oils were donated in varying degrees by the community, as well as contracted distributers, private foundations and international cooperation organisms.

15 It is currently recognized that 49% of Guatemalan children suffer from some degree of chronic malnutrition. By disaggregating this figure, one can observe rates higher than 70% in the Departments of Sololá and Totonicapán. Furthermore, by doing analysis by ethnic groups, it becomes clear that groups such as the Tektiteko, Ixil and Chortí have indices higher than 80%, while the Chuj and Mam groups surpass 70%. 16 PRONADE is an educational program designed to extend educational coverage to rural areas and in places where “official” education systems don’t exist. Although it had been assumed that PRONADE would be a strategy of a “temporary” or emergency nature, the low costs it incurred in comparison with normal education resulted in its consolidation. The current government of Álvaro Colom has announced the end of PRONADE and has called for the incorporation of its teachers in to the official system.


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The School Breakfast Program began by offering coverage to 4 Departments. It extended its services to the entire country in 1999—although in reality, it was only able to cover approximately 10,000 schools at a cost of 11 cents (of a dollar) per ration with a budget allocation of 16.8, 67.7, and 92.4 million Quetzales in each of the three years. Interestingly, in 1999, 4,150 schools in urban areas were served a snack that included the fortified cookie and Incaparina, reaching an investment of 125 million Quetzales for both programs that year.

There were logistical problems with the School Breakfast Program, and the beneficiary population voiced dissatisfaction with the beverage and cookie. This was enough to justify the introduction of a new model in 2000, which consisted of private sellers bidding to provide breakfasts. This led to big losses due to irregularities in delivery and food spoilage. As a result, in 2001, the distribution of the fortified cookie and Incaparina became universal. In 2000, 149.5 million Quetzales were spent on school breakfasts and lunches, which amounts to 0.70 Quetzales per day per capita during a 180-day cycle, assuming a minimum coverage of 1.2 million students. In 2001, 92.6 million Quetzales were spent only on breakfasts; in other words, a per capita expenditure of less than 0.40 Quetzales per day.

In 2002, a new program on school lunches began. It was designed by the recently-created The National Food and Nutrition Security Council (CONSAN), and served nearly 3,250 schools of 106 municipalities in 17 departments. A new operational approach was adopted for this program, by which money was transferred in the form of cash to school committees within the regular system, and educational committees within PRONADE. Both were in charge of preparing the food. Initially, an allocation of 3 Quetzales was proposed daily for each student.

In 2003, School Feeding Programs (PAE) were moved from the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food (MAGA), transferring to the MAGA the role of delivering lunches to 331 municipalities. In addition, separate contracts were granted for the distribution of the cookie and atole, a drink made of cornstarch.

In the budget approved for 2002, 150 million Quetzales were allocated to the School Feeding Programs (PAE) for breakfasts for Pre-primary and Primary school populations. On the other hand, 169.2 million Quetzales were allocated for lunches, but actual expenditures were limited to breakfasts only. For the 2003 budget, 333.3 million Quetzales were approved with a goal of serving 48,647 students in Pre-primary levels and 1,791,353 students in Primary grade levels. In other words, only 13% of Pre-primary students and 84% of Primary students would be served.

In 2005, the bulk of School Feeding Programs were reincorporated back into the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), leaving the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food (MAGA) in charge of various supplementary programs, such as the distribution of bean flour [harina de frijol], the fortified beverage and the School Glass of Milk [Vaso de Leche Escolar].


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Chart 8 Historical Evolution of Investment in School Feeding Programs (PAE)

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007

Enrolled students (in thousands) 1,440.7 1,587.4 1,786.5 1,852.8 2,359.1 2,469.4 2,706.5 2,781.5 2,852.9

MINEDUC budget expenditure (millions of Quetzales) 16.8 67.7 92.4 149.5 92.6 185.6 216.3 337.6 437.2MAGA budget expenditure (millions of Quetzales)

233.5 55.3 79.2 70.7Total Budget expenditure (millions of Quetzales) 16.8 67.7 92.4 149.5 92.6 185.6 233.5 271.6 416.8 507.9

Real annual investment in school food programs (millions of Quetzales) 16.8 63.0 82.2 127.3 73.3 139.8 158.0 173.7 257.0 297.2Annual per capita investment in current value (Quetzales) 11.7 42.6 51.7 80.7 39.3 75.2 86.3 97.6 146.1 Annual per capita investment in real terms (Quetzales) 11.7 39.7 46.0 68.7 31.1 56.6 58.4 62.4 90.1 Daily per capita investment (180 day cycle) 0.06 0.24 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.42 0.48 0.54 0.81 Real daily per capita investment (180 day cycle) 0.06 0.22 0.26 0.38 0.17 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.50

Source: Own analysis of statistics from MINEDUC school registration; MINFIN [from its Spanish acronym, Ministerio de Finanzas, Minstry of Finances] budget expenditures; Inter-institutional Coordination for the Rights of the Child (Coordinación Interinstitucional por los Derechos del Niño, CIPRODENI), September 2000 report, Execution of School Food Programs 1997 to 1999: CIEN 2003 Report; SICOIN, budget expenditure reports; BANGUAT, Internal Gross Domestic Product based on National Accounts base 93 (Producto Bruto Interno según Cuentas Nacionales base 93); INE National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas), data on inflation. Note: 2003 is omitted because data on budget expenditure for the School Feeding Programs are not available; this was also the year such programs were handled exclusively by MAGA. Note: Investment carried out by PRONADE is not included. Note: For 2007, figures on per capita investment are omitted because of a lack of reliable data on school registration for that year.

As can be seen from Chart 8, there has certainly been an increase of public investment in School Feeding Programs in the decade since the signing of the Peace Accords, most notably during the 1997-2000 period. Since 2000, however, the rate of increase plummets significantly, indicating a fragile pattern in social programs.

It is important to note that food programs have continued in spite of turbulent situations produced by changes from various administrations, different political parties in power, significant opposition, and international environmental pressure to push for financial strengthening of the public sector destined for education.

It is also important to note that Chart 8 does not include investment carried out by the National Program for Educational Development (PRONADE) since it operates under the mandate of the System of Integrated Accounting (SICOIN), for which, relevant past studies are unknown.


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Chart 9

Investment in Education and School Feeding Programs (PAE) in relation to Gross Domestic Product and Public Spending

(millions of Quetzales)

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

GDP 146,977.8 162,506.8 174,044.1 190,440.1 208,293.9 230,271.7 255,856.6 Total Central Government Spending 12,618.2 16,637.0 18,685.4 19,801.2 22,182.2 23,512.3 27,542.1 27,068.5 30,885.0 36,494.5 39,543.8

MINEDUC Expenditure 1,282.6 1,690.9 2,143.6 2,534.0 3,062.1 3,157.8 3,386.7 3,691.0 4,280.4 4,920.8 5,415.5

Annual investment in PAE 16.8 67.7 92.4 149.5 92.6 185.6 233.5 271.6 416.8 437.2

MINEDUC spending in relation to GDP 2.08 1.94 1.95 1.94 2.05 2.14 2.12

MINEDUC spending in relation to total expenditure 10.16 10.16 11.47 12.80 13.80 13.43 12.30 13.64 13.86 13.48 13.70

PAE as a percentage in institutional budget 1.31 4.00 4.31 5.90 3.02 5.88 6.33 6.34 8.47 8.07

PAE in relation to GDP 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.17

PAE in relation to total expenditure 0.13 0.41 0.49 0.76 0.42 0.79 0.86 0.88 1.14 1.11Source: Own analysis of data from BANGUAT, Internal Gross Domestic Product based on National Accounts base 93 (Producto Bruto Interno según Cuentas Nacionales base 93); Ministry of Finances (MINFIN), budget expenditures. Note: 2003 figures are omitted because data on budget expenditure for School Feeding Programs (PAE), handled by MAGA, are not available. Note: Investment carried out by PRONADE is not included, except for exceptional 2007 data included later. Note: For 2004, investment in School Feeding Programs was handled by MAGA and as such, is presented in relation to the Ministry of Education’s (MINEDUC) spending—PAE flow through MAGA.

Data in Chart 917 again shows deliberate policies adopted by the various administrations following the signing to the Peace Accords in their prioritization of spending on education. It is important to highlight the growing investment in school feeding programs, showing a more continuous and steady rhythm in relation to the MINEDUC’s spending. Investment between 1995 and 1996 is unclear, however, due to the establishment of a Program on Reconstruction, following the damages caused by Hurricane Stan. There were issues with the handling of accounting reports, particularly by the MAGA, which reported information on actions to rebuild damaged communities as “regular” expenditures on School Feeding Programs (PAE).

17 Relations to GDP are limited to the years in which official information exists, since BANGUAT has not yet published values dating before 2001. This will serve as the foundation for the new System of National Accounts 93 (Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales 93).


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Chart 10 Budget Expenditure in School Feeding Programs (PAE) 2004 – 2008

(In Quetzales)

Year Ministry Program Approved Variation Actual Expended % expended

% spending/ approved

Pre-primary Breakfast 31,176,381 0 31,176,381 29,408,442 94.3

Primary Breakfast 124,615,101 -45,786,159 78,828,942 56,155,426 71.2MAGA

School lunches 177,536,683 -23,767,031 153,769,652 147,982,488 96.22004

Total 333,328,165 -69,553,190 263,774,975 233,546,356 88.5 70.1

Pre-primary Feeding 74,647,154 -52,578,954 22,068,200 21,783,434 98.7MINEDUC

Primary Feeding 275,196,746 -76,202,706 198,994,040 194,489,697 97.7

Fortified beverage 33,391,868 -11,000,000 22,391,868 22,391,868 100.0MAGA

Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) 0 +32,889,748 32,889,748 32,889,748 100.0

2005

Total 383,235,768 -106,891,912 276,343,856 271,554,747 98.3 70.9


Primary Feeding 299,821,030 -13,755,547 286,065,483 281,844,686 98.5

Fortified beverage 20,224,691 -2,000,000 18,224,691 18,224,691 100.0MAGA

Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) 61,000,000 0 61,000,000 61,000,000 100.0

2006

Total 439,299,217 -17,017,908 422,281,309 416,823,398 98.7 94.9


Primary Feeding 299,821,030 +23,469,408 323,290,438 293,766,530 90.9

MAGA Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) 61,000,000 +46,066,689 107,066,689 107,041,276 100.02007

Total 419,074,526 +61,733,941 480,808,467 443,068,540 92.2 105.7

Pre-primary Feeding 125,016,400 0 125,016,400 2,942,409 2.35MINEDUC

Primary Feeding 421,435,233 0 421,435,233 5,766,514 1.37

MAGA Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) 70,340,000 0 70,340,000 5,293 0.01

2008

Total 616,791,633 0 616,791,633 8,714,216 1.41 1.41

Source: Integrated Accounting System (SICOIN). All years from January to December included, except for 2008, with figures through April 31.

b) School Feeding Programs of the MINEDUC School Feeding Programs (PAE) of the Ministry of Education consist of transferring funds (cash) through bank transfers to School Committees within the mainstream education system and to Parent Committees within the National Program for the self management for Educational Development (PRONADE). A new temporary program was added by mandate of the law on budget restructuring on March of 2007, which called for the transfer of funds to directors of schools lacking established committees; this was in addition to the distribution of powdered milk [leche en polvo] donated by the World Food Programme (WFP).

The official system of recognized educational centers consists of: 23,784 Pre-Kinder (Párvulos), Pre-primary, and Primary schools—including those in the municipal sector. Close to 6,060 schools function in and are annexed to Pre-primary and Primary schools.18

18 This data is taken forme an oficial source (General Board for Education Planning DIGEPE). Eventhough this source includes a fast count of students registered in 2007 that information is not taken into consideration since it does not coinicide with the information registered in the MINEDUC’s web page for 2006 [sic]. However in this report we have used the information regarding the number and distribution of schools.


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In 2007, 18,720 Pre-Kinder (Párvulos), Pre-primary, and Primary schools (including the municipal sector) were served by the Ministry of Education’s (MINEDUC) School Food Programs and the General Office of Support Programs (DIGEPA) and PRONADE. That is, 78.7% of total schools were served. Financial disbursement rose to 437.23 million Quetzales—of which 338.67 million Quetzales were handled by DIGEPA and transferred to the regular system, while 98.56 million Quetzales were handled by PRONADE.

Service coverage within the regular system (including municipal sector) rose to 71.8% of total schools, whereas PRONADE reports 100% coverage. The most important explanation for the low coverage is the fact that the program requires as a pre-condition the establishment of School Committees in order for the school to receive funds from the various programs, among them the feeding program. This is also a basic pre-condition required by PRONADE, but being a program of extended coverage the pre-condition to create Educational Committees COEDUCAS applied to each new school prior to its opening, while within the regular system the condition applies since 2002.

Requests for renewals of agreements take place annually. In order to request a renewal, Educational Committees must be active and need to have already renewed their memberships, turned in a satisfactory accounting report of funds received, and fulfilled administrative requirements. The latter means they must maintain accounts and separate checkbooks for each program as well as keep back-up documentation for expenses greater than 100 Quetzales.

Given these administrative requirements, of the 9,900 registered agreements with DIGEPA, only 7,756 remained active in 2007. There was also resistance by groups of students’ parents to form Educational Committees. The resistance was largely due to the time and responsibilities involved in having to purchase and prepare food, as well as follow administrative procedures of programs they must execute.

The data gathered for this report consists of the total transfers processed by DIGEPA and PRONADE to schools within the regular system during 2007. With regard to a future program to accompany donations from the World Food Programme, we were only able to obtain the number of beneficiaries of such program, without any further details. In spite of the efforts made, all we know is that a check of 35 Quetzales was added to the powdered milk donation for each registered student in beneficiary schools. The total number of beneficiaries was 141,748, dispersed throughout 8 departments: 29,587 in Baja Verapaz; 9,317 in Chimaltenango; 7,645 in Quiché; 41,662 in Huehuetenango; 8,688 in Quetzaltenango; 35, 297 in San Marcos; 4,677 in Sololá; and 4,875 in Totonicapán. One can infer that the total investment amounted to less than 5 million Quetzales—the budget allocation for this remains unknown. While 337,597,459 Quetzales were transferred through DIGEPA (serving 12,578 schools), 98,562,636 Quetzales were transferred through PRONADE (reaching approximately 6,142 schools).

The actual number of beneficiary students does not appear in the information we obtained. While we could make an estimate based on the amount allocated per capita for each program, such data would be imprecise because of the significant degree of irregularities observed in the implementation of such programs. For example, a number of schools have not received the entire amount of expecting funds, which could be due to penalizations for failing to render accounts. Other schools have been hit with adjustments in the number of beneficiaries. In many cases, there are disparities that lead one to believe that new procedures may have been added to the original agreement and may apply to annexed schools, for example.

The program managed by DIGEPA has transferred to Educational Committees 234.0 Quetzales per year for each enrolled student in rural areas and 194.0 Quetzales to urban schools. In other words, 1.30 and 1.08 Quetzales respectively were transferred daily during the 180-day school year. Fund transfers processed by PRONADE amount to 237.5 Quetzales per year per enrolled


28

student (or 1.32 Quetzales per day for the 180-day school year). While beneficiary schools should be located in rural settings, we found that was not always the case.

By contrast, according to calculations from the Human Rights Omubudsman’s Office presented in the 2006 Report on the “Management of the Ministry of Education’s Food Program,” 2.80 Quetzales per day were needed to provide 570 calories per day to each child.

c) School Food Programs of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food (MAGA)

In 2003, School Feeding Programs consisted of breakfasts and lunches for Pre-primary and Primary students and were transferred from the Ministry of Education to MAGA’s Special Unit on School Feeding (Unidad Especial de Alimentación Escolar). With an allocation of 319.2 million Quetzales, the initial proposed goal was to serve 2.2 million students, assigning 2 Quetzales per student per day in the 207 most vulnerable municipalities according to the Census on Height (censo de talla) and 1 Quetzal for the remainder. Results for 2003 are unknown, and the year 2004 not only brought a change in administration but a budgetary adjustment as well. A new budget was not approved in 2004, and as a result, allocations for School Feedingd Programs were reduced to 236.6 million Quetzales, changing the makeup of such programs. Bean flour and the fortified beverage were substituted for school breakfasts and lunches. Initially, these substitutions were programmed to be distributed in 12,129 schools in 22 departments. While details of the results are unknown, SICOIN reports a 70%+ achievement rate with regard to MAGA’s School Feeding Programs.

In 2005, the fortified beverage was reincorporated into MINEDUC’s program and continued under constrained circumstances. According to official information from MAGA, in 2005 15.9 million Quetzales were invested toward the distribution of the beverage destined to reach 92 municipalities of 10 departments, while in 2006, 17.8 million Quetzales were invested among 105 municipalities of 16 departments.

The Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche Escolar, VLE) began as a pilot project in 2005, directed at 1,108 schools of 37 municipalities in 5 departments (Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Guatemala, Jalapa and Jutiapa) and two zones in the capital (6 and 17), amounting to an investment of 32.9 million Quetzales. Since 2007, the VLE is the only School Feeding Program carried out by the MAGA, given the elimination of the fortified beverage service.

Since 2005, the criterion with regard to servicing schools through School Committees and Educational Committees (COEDUCA) has been applied universally, as a strategic decentralization component promoted by the Berger administration. Beginning in 2004, first MAGA, later DIGEPA, transferred resources to School Committees, while PRONADE transferred funds to COEDUCA’s.

In general, School Food Programs carried out by MAGA were put in place to respond to different conditions in municipalities with higher degrees of vulnerability as relates to malnutrition. Distribution of the fortified beverage, for example, is not meant to serve as a substitute for extending MINEDUC’s School Feeding Program coverage to schools that do not receive food resources. Yet 35% of schools enjoyed double the benefits, while approximately 25% of schools did not benefit from any coverage.

As can be observed from Chart 11, only 35 of the 93 municipalities that were served in 2005 were located in high risk departments. This translates to 21.5% of total number of beneficiary students. In 2006, the number of students served in high risk areas diminished to 12%. The


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number of students served in lower risk areas for both years is near 60%, although in 2006, there was an important increase in the number of beneficiaries in high risk situations.

Chart 11

Distribution of the Fortified Beverage 2005 – 2006

Municipalities served Beneficiary students

Degree of Vulnerability

2005 2006 2005 2006 HUEHUETENANGO Very high 3 3,328SAN MARCOS Very high 12 9 34,716 23,432SOLOLA Very high 11 3 20,534 18,214TOTONICAPAN Very high 4 6 7,170 22,245CHIMALTENANGO Very high 8 29,948

Sum 35 21 92,368 67,219 ALTA VERAPAZ High 1 4 4,179 65,503BAJA VERAPAZ High 2 7,263JUTIAPA High 8 20,093QUETZALTENANGO High 13 12 37,003 66,507RETALHULEU High 9 5 25,583 20,449

Sum 23 31 66,765 179,815 ESCUINTLA Moderate 5 34,393JALAPA Moderate 7 32,558PETEN Moderate 12 8 95,739 76,526ZACAPA Moderate 6 20,062

Sum 12 26 95,739 163,539 GUATEMALA Low 10 7 135,581 113,697SANTA ROSA Low 6 16,429SUCHITEPEQUEZ Low 13 14 39,099 27,990

Sum 23 27 174,680 158,116 Total 93 105 429,551 568,689

Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA.


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d) School Glass of Milk Program (Vaso de Leche Escolar, VLE)19 The Glass of Milk program was officially announced as part of government social strategies in response to the issue of food insecurity affecting the school population. This program services the most vulnerable sector and contributes to improving the quality of life of children and their nutritional status by delivering a glass of fortified liquid milk daily. The program is also meant to complement, support and develop the production of milk in Guatemala. The following are some of the objectives for this program:

General Objetive Provide a daily glass of fortified milk to school-aged students in areas characterized as high risk for Food Insecurity.

Specific Objectives Contribute to improving the nutritional state of students in Pre-primary and Primary

levels in areas categorized as high risk for Food Insecurity.

Provide support to the milk sector in areas located near populations being served in order to guarantee the delivery of liquid milk.

Develop organizational mechanisms for consumers and producers in order to create effective logistics in the personnel service and delivery of the glass of milk.

The School Glass of Milk Program (VLE) was introduced as an initiative from the National Dairy Chain, part of the Chamber of Milk Producers (Cadena Láctea Nacional integrada por la Cámara de Productores de Leche), the group of dairy and ice cream producers of Guatemala, and the Chamber of Commerce—all of which sought to re-activate the national dairy industry, pushing for investments in farms and cold chains, commercialization and distribution of its products with international competition in mind.20 The program started as a pilot project in 2005, reaching 1,108 schools in 35 municipalities of 5 departments and two zones in the capital city. In 2006, the program was formally established. That year, the program expanded its services to 92 municipalities in 16 departments, plus two zones in the capital city—all in all, serving 3,253 schools. In 2007, the program extended its services to include 100 municipalities and including the two zones of the capital, it served a total of 3,525 schools.

Chart 12 Implementation of the School Glass of Milk (VLE) Pilot Project 2005

Departament Municipalities Beneficiary schools

School population served

Alta Verapaz 6 284 29,351Baja Verapaz 6 331 34,713Guatemala 10 197 49,764Jutiapa 8 120 14,056Jalapa 5 152 14,114Zonas 6 and 17, Capital city 2 24 7,583 35 1,108 149,581

Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA.

19 The information compiled in this report was taken from official report from VISAN on Glass of Milk expenditures from September 28, 2006 to June 8, 2007. Although it does not include full data for the year, one can draw general observations with regard to coverage and focuses based on conditions of vulnerability and program costs. 20 Document from the Vice-Ministry of Feeding (Vice Ministerio de Alimentación), VISAN, MAGA 2006.


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As can be observed from Chart 13 and Figures 3 and 4 below, there is inconsistency between the needs of the program’s recipients and the achievements of the program itself. The success of the School Glass of Milk Program is hindered by the availability of contracted transportation services, delaying meeting the needs of the most vulnerable children. Rations provided to departments considered highly vulnerable amount to only 8.88% of the total. In contrast, rations given to departments considered low risk amount to 33.16%.

It is necessary to note that in spite of efforts to help situations of food vulnerability and poverty, these findings have not been taken into account as refrence to define this policy.

Chart 13

Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Distribution National levels by order of malnutrition vulnerability

2007

Schools School Population Rations provided Department

Quantity % Quantity % Quantity %

Very High Risk Departments Huehuetenango 149 4.22 18,775 4.18 241,000 0.81Chimaltenango 0 0 0 0 0 0El Quiché 118 3.34 13,691 3.05 63,910 0.22Sololá 180 5.10 24,654 5.49 1,136,871 3.84Totonicapán 41 1.16 7,666 1.71 412,593 1.39San Marcos 65 1.84 9,401 2.09 774,113 2.62

High Risk Departments Alta Verapaz 315 8.93 37,760 8.41 3,063,809 10.36Baja Verapaz 350 9.92 39,530 8.81 2,710,024 9.16Chiquimula 372 10.54 23,176 5.16 1,574,053 5.32Jalapa 219 6.21 20,856 4.65 1,820,369 6.15Quetzaltenango 48 1.36 7,665 1.71 431,419 1.46Suchitepéquez 210 5.95 31,026 6.91 2,177,313 7.36

Moderate Risk Departments Petén 164 4.65 24,014 5.35 1,805,249 6.10Izabal 0 0 0 0 0 0Retalhuleu 266 7.54 28,098 6.26 2,296,115 7.76Sacatepéquez 0 0 0 0 0 0Santa Rosa 161 4.56 14,745 3.28 1,273,206 4.30

Low Risk Departments El Progreso 0 0 0 0 0 0Escuintla 158 4.48 19,874 4.43 1,676,096 5.67Jutiapa 276 7.82 27,664 6.16 2,233,153 7.55Zacapa 143 4.05 10,011 2.23 773,951 2.62Guatemala 293 8.30 90,282 20.11 5,123,029 17.32

Total 3,528 100 448,888 100 29,586,273 100.00 Source: Area of Information for Food Security (Área de Información de Seguridad Alimentaria), MAGA.


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Figure 3 Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Coverage

Guatemala 2007

Figure 4 Prevalence of Chronic Malnutrition

Guatemala 2001


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Chart 14 Implementation of School Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) through September 28, 2006

By Departments

Department Municipality Schools served Rations Investment

(Quetzales) Alta Verapaz 7 315 4,324,128 9,012,126Baja Verapaz 6 348 4,084,710 8,207,560Chiquimula 4 360 2,943,202 6,348,450Escuintla 5 158 2,841,784 5,171,254Guatemala 13 289 11,545,474 18,053,712Jalapa 5 221 3,024,527 5,731,479Jutiapa 9 276 4,003,682 7,586,978Peten 4 165 3,112,739 7,439,447Quetzaltenango 10 48 939,088 1,493,148Retalhuleu 4 266 3,975,472 7,772,048San Marcos 2 65 965,339 1,969,291Santa Rosa 2 161 2,241,875 4,248,354Sololá 10 180 2,567,339 4,653,862Suchitepéquez 6 210 3,301,618 6,240,057Totonicapán 3 41 962,864 1,530,953Zacapa 2 143 1,441,210 2,947,274

92 3,246 52,275,051 98,405,993 Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA.

Chart 15

Implementation of School Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) through June 8, 2007 By Departments

Department Municipality Schools served Rations Investment

(Quetzales) Alta Verapaz 7 315 3,414,836 7,541,222Baja Verapaz 6 350 2,710,024 5,906,312Chiquimula 4 372 1,574,053 3,895,782Escuintla 5 158 1,677,096 3,769,642Guatemala 13 290 5,123,029 8,479,471Huehuetenango 5 149 241,000 521,361Jalapa 5 219 1,784,369 3,622,535Jutiapa 9 276 2,233,153 4,443,973Petén 4 164 1,805,255 6,083,338Quetzaltenango 10 48 431,421 664,385Quiché 3 118 63,910 105,452Retalhuleu 4 266 2,296,115 4,713,924San Marcos 2 65 774,113 1,722,401Santa Rosa 2 161 1,273,206 2,533,680Sololá 10 180 1,136,871 1,875,415Suchitepéquez 6 210 2,177,313 4,692,109Totonicapán 3 41 412,593 635,394Zacapa 2 143 773,951 1,661,673

100 3,525 29,902,308 62,868,069 Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA

It is worth noting the significant differences in SICOIN’s reporting of expenditures for the program, from the start. For 2006, MAGA reported expenditures of 61.0 million Quetzales; yet 102.2 million had been allocated for the program. Up until September 28 of that year, 98.4 million Quetzales were reported as expenditures. In 2007, 107.0 million Quetzales were reported


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as expenses, of which 61.4 milllion Quetzales had been spent through June 8—yet 120.5 million Quetzales had been earmarked.

These inconsistencies raise questions and doubts about the management of this program and how funds were accounted for. To this, one can also add the lack of transparency with regard to undeclared figures.

It is important to highlight the financial share of the School Glass of Milk Program within the School Feeding Programs, accounting for 22.3% of total investments in 2006 and 24.2% in 2007 (excluding PRONADE). With the aggregate of data available for 2007, PRONADE invested 18.2% of the total, while the School Glass of Milk Program only comprised 19.8% of total investment.

With regard to the efficiency of the program itself, the cost of rations under the School Glass of Milk Program (Vaso de Leche Escolar) is clearly higher than the amount of money that DIGEPA and PRONADE transferred to School Committees. According to information we collected, the average cost per serving of 200cc of liquid milk served under this program rose from 1.88 Quetzales in 2006 to 2.10 Quetzales in 2007. These figures are relatively higher than what DIGEPA and PRONADE transferred to School Committees in 2007, for example: 1.30 and 1.32 Quetzales respectively to rural areas, and 1.08 to urban settings—estimated for a full 180-day school year. In addition, while the Ministry of Education’s (MINEDUC) programs provided coverage to nearly 2 million boys and girls, the School Glass of Milk Program only benefitted roughly 450,000 children.

The unequal nature of the program is further evidenced by analyzing costs and number of days in which the glass of milk was provided in schools. In 2006, the price per serving varied significantly throughout the country—from 2.39 Quetzales in Petén to 1.59 Quetzales in the majority of municipalities in Quetzaltenango, Totonicapán and Guatemala. The number of days in which the glass of milk was served, on the other hand, also varies considerably—157 days in San Manuel Chaparrón in Jalapa at a unit cost of 1.89 Quetzales, to 73 days in Tamahú at a cost of 1.99 Quetzales per serving.

Chart 16 Coverage, cost and frequency of the School Glass of Milk (VLE) 2006

Department Municipalities Existing schools

Schools served Rations Investment

(Q) Average cost

/ ration

Average days

served Alta Verapaz 7 886 315 4,324,128 9,012,126 2.08 113 Baja Verapaz 6 666 348 4,084,710 8,207,560 2.01 104 Chiquimula 4 448 360 2,943,202 6,348,450 2.16 129 Escuintla 5 338 158 2,841,784 5,171,254 1.82 143 Guatemala 13 558 289 11,545,474 18,053,712 1.56 130 Jalapa 5 339 221 3,024,527 5,731,479 1.90 147 Jutiapa 9 500 276 4,003,682 7,586,978 1.90 145 Petén 4 179 165 3,112,739 7,439,447 2.39 130 Quetzaltenango 10 437 48 939,088 1,493,148 1.59 124 Retalhuleu 4 336 266 3,975,472 7,772,048 1.96 141 San Marcos 2 87 65 965,339 1,969,291 2.04 105 Santa Rosa 2 205 161 2,241,875 4,248,354 1.90 150 Sololá 10 203 180 2,567,339 4,653,862 1.81 107 Suchitepéquez 6 303 210 3,301,618 6,240,057 1.89 116 Totonicapán 3 190 41 962,864 1,530,953 1.59 127 Zacapa 2 182 143 1,441,210 2,947,274 2.04 144 92 5,857 3,246 52,275,051 98,405,993 1.88 127 Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA


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From Chart 16, we can observe discrepancies in terms of the lack of efficiency and equality that characterize the program. Information available for 2007 does not allow us to draw the same observations since data is only available for half of that year. We can note, furthermore, that the extension of services to 8 municipalities in Huehuetenango and Quiché started behind schedule.

Aside from rising costs associated with the program (i.e. production, storage and distribution of the product), there are noticeable disparities in the costs of service between each municipality and the increase in such costs. These disparities show that accessibility to schools is a limiting factor in the coverage of students. Last, one should keep in mind that the individual capacities of each school to store and preserve the product is a conditional factor, as well as the problems sorrunding waste management that each school has to address.

Chart 17

Cost Evolution

2006 2007

Rations Investment

(Qutzales) Cost per

ration Rations Investment (Quetzales)

Average cost/ ration

Alta Verapaz 4,324,128 9,012,126 2.08 3,414,836 7,541,222 2.21

Baja Verapaz 4,084,710 8,207,560 2.01 2,710,024 5,906,312 2.18

Chiquimula 2,943,202 6,348,450 2.16 1,574,053 3,895,782 2.48

Escuintla 2,841,784 5,171,254 1.82 1,677,096 3,769,642 2.25

Guatemala 11,545,474 18,053,712 1.56 5,123,029 8,479,471 1.66

Jalapa 3,024,527 5,731,479 1.90 1,784,369 3,622,535 2.03

Jutiapa 4,003,682 7,586,978 1.90 2,233,153 4,443,973 1.99

Petén 3,112,739 7,439,447 2.39 1,805,255 4,648,516 2.57

Quetzaltenango 939,088 1,493,148 1.59 431,421 664,385 1.54

Retalhuleu 3,975,472 7,772,048 1.96 2,296,115 4,713,924 2.05

San Marcos 2,241,875 4,248,354 2.04 1,273,206 2,533,680 2.22

Santa Rosa 2,241,875 4,248,354 1.90 1,273,206 2,533,680 1.99

Sololá 2,567,339 4,653,862 1.81 1,136,871 1,875,415 1.65

Suchitepéquez 3,301,618 6,240,057 1.81 2,177,313 4,692,109 2.15

Totonicapán 962,864 1,530,953 1.59 412,593 635,394 1.54

Zacapa 1,441,210 2,947,274 2.04 773,951 1,661,673 2.15

Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA


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e) Perception of the School Glass of Milk Program´s Performance

Chart 18 Synthesis of General Perceptions of the School Glass of Milk Program

Critical Assessments Sufficiency Achievements Limitations

Areas of improvement

Func

tiona

ries

“The number of beneficiary students is not sufficient in comparison to the total number of boys and girls, and their nutritional needs” VLE is a complement to the PAE.

Promotes staying in schools. “Existence of logistical infrastructure within MAGA and participating institutions.”

Limited budget At times there have been problems with the quality of milk.

“The VLE has improved as a result of the increase in population served, as well as the presentation, distribution, management and preparation and increase in production in the national dairy industry”

Gru

po B

enef

icia

rio

I

• The school beverage needs to be complemented in 3 areas: VLE; PAE; Voluntary support by students’ parents

Girls like the beverage. Serves as supplement because School Feeding Programs do not suffice. Good reception of the chocolate flavored milk.

It doesn´t require preparation or additional costs.

Milk does not reach schools when companies take “non- official” vacations on days that schools are in session and awaiting the milk. Companies do not assume responsibility for waste management. It is, each time frequent that milk comes in packages with holes or is spoiled and/or expired. The company does not replace these lost portions.

Milk should be provided each school day and should not stop being delivered on days when transportation companies decided to take “unofficial” vacation

MAGA should provide support to companies so that they take responsibility in waste management.

Gro

up o

f Ben

efic

iari

es II

None of the contributions are sufficient, but “going from nothing to something, something is better” “There is never enough for people with hunger.” • The school beverage

needs to be complemented in 3 areas: VLE; PAE; Voluntary support by students’ parents

Contributes to students staying in school.21 It doesn´t require preparation or additional costs.

Milk does not reach schools when companies take “unofficial” vacation on days that schools are in session and awaiting the milk. At times, milk comes in packages with holes, milk is spoiled and/or expired. The company does not replace these lost portions.

Resources should be used to a maximum for people in real need: girls and boys going to schools.

21 According to the Director, retention in schools has not been measured, but can be observed.


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In the interviews with the operative public officials of the VLE, three people participated, each with a diverse perspective about the program. The interview was planned with the programs General Coordinator, for which he had answers prepared ahead of time. He invited the Quality, “Harmlessness” and Socialization Coordinator as well as the Region III Technician to respond any other question presented for the investigation. In addition, the coordinator ordered these two employees to contact and accompany the two interviews with the schools beneficiaries to the program. The three employees evaluated in a very positive manner the VLE in terms of its adequacy and the public’s reception of the same. According to the coordinator, “The teachers, parents, and children, confirm the nutritional benefits, decrease in school desertion, improves learning, complements the different school feeding programs, benefits the family economy, and for these reasons they request its continuity and amplification.”

In the first beneficiary school interview, besides the school principle, two representatives of the school snack comity participated. According to the principle, the two representatives are the people who have the most knowledge about the VLE in the school. The principle said he was aware of how fortunate the school is to be beneficiary of the VLE and the PAE, considering that there are many schools that are not beneficiaries to either program. Much of the discussion was centered on the problems surrounding the PAE, primarily, the limited quantity of 30 to 48 cents of a Quetzal per girl per day, which is not enough to be able to provide breakfast every day. What they receive from the PAE, they have to compliment with a voluntary contribution given by the parents, and even with this it is still not enough money to be able to feed the girls on a daily basis. On the days on which breakfast is not given, it is supplemented with the glass of milk. According to the two women interviewed, the reception of the milk on behalf of the girls is good, primarily with those that arrive to school without breakfast. Never the less, this acceptance varies according to the flavor distributed. According to one of the interviewed, the strawberry and vanilla flavored milks do not have a good acceptance with many girls who even prefer to give it away rather than having to drink it. On the contrary, the chocolate flavored milk seems to have the highest degree of approval. Although, the women did point out that if the milk was going bad it gets sour. In order to know that the milk is sour, in many cases the students, as well as the teachers, have to taste the decomposing milk in order to find out that it is in fact decomposed. One of the comity representatives stated that she and student had “gotten very sick with diarrhea just from tasting a bit of milk to confirm that it was in fact going bad”.

In the second beneficiary school, in difference to the first, there was no trusting atmosphere, reason for which no other people besides the principle participated in the interview. The answers were direct and precise. It is important to point out that the presence of the two VLE employees, conditioned the atmosphere during the interview. Even so, there were a lot of consistencies between both interviews. Some of these consistencies include the boys and girls preference of the chocolate flavored milk. This interview focused on one general idea: “There is never enough for people with hunger”… but... “From nothing to something, something is better.”

This idea surrounding the insufficiency of the VLE was backed up at all the levels interviewed. In terms of its coverage and as a nutritional source for children in school, it is recognized that the VLE is insufficient or lacking. Even so, at all levels it is recognized that the glass of milk dose contributes to children staying in school. The Principle from the school in Mixco22, clarified this by stating that “the permanence of children in school has not been measured to back this up but it is observable”. This is the main achievement of the VLE pointed out by the people interviewed. The other achievement of most relevance mentioned was the preference for the glass of milk as opposed to other food programs, primarily because it comes already prepared and packaged. One of the principles interviewed pointed out that even though there are other

22 Translator´s note: Mixco is a municipality in the department of Guatemala.


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things that could be more nutritious and less expensive, other foods require that the schools pay someone to prepare it or it implies that a teacher must invest time on the preparation instead of teaching. According to the government employees, milk is the best nutritional option, but they do admit that it is only a COMPLEMENT for other school feeding programs that may already exist in the schools. According to the beneficiaries, it is not necessarily the most nutritious option but it contributes to what little they can give to the students. At all levels, it is recognized that the glass of milk is a complement to other nutrition sources, and yet at all levels it is evidenced that there is no coordination with the School Feeding Programs.

Both schools coincided on the main problems facing the VLE. In both, there are cases of the handing out of bad quality milk and bags of milk that have burst. In the School from Mixco, the principle pointed out that these were rare cases, while in the first school, it was stated that these cases become each time more frequent. The general coordinator of the VLE indicated that “…Very rarely there have been problems with the milk´s quality, and when this happens, the company is in charge of withdrawing from each of the schools the corresponding lot and returning the same quantity of milk to the school, that is why a monthly control is done of the lots of milk in each of the companies and schools.” Despite this, the school snack commission perceives that each time there are less quality verifications done. The perception is based on the fact that besides the expired milks, there are also rotten milks with dates on the labeling that indicate that it has not yet expired. As a response to this problem, the MAGA employee ordered the schools to store samples of the milk. Upon this request, the commission highlighted, how unhygienic this was for them, considering they have no way to store the spilt milk from the bags that have burst, or a place to store expired milk that releases bad odors and provokes the inflated bags to burst. In addition to this, in reality the companies do not replace the portions, for boys and girls who are then left without their glass of milk.

The lack of compliance of other responsibilities on behalf of the supplier company stands out among the problems of most relevance mentioned in the interviews with the beneficiary groups. This includes the absence of milk and waste management plans, even though in 2006, corrections were made to the delivery contracts, in which it was stated that the dairy companies had to formulate some programs within the schools for the handling of milk and waste management. According to the program coordinator “…the milk and waste management plan is elaborated and executed by the dairy industry”. In one of the two schools, they state that they did not receive a plan but they did receive training session about the handling of milk, while in the other school they received neither. Waste management represents a serious problem for the schools, considering that the supplier company Chibolac, refuses to give them garbage bags or receive the garbage produced form the bags of milk, because they say they have no recycling plant. The garbage collection implies an additional cost for the schools that must then deduct this cost from what little they receive from other budgets. Regarding this problem, the company has offered to pay half of the cost for garbage collection, but has never done so. This problem has been mentioned to high level MAGA personnel, who have offered to solve the problem, yet to this date, there has been no answer to it.23

As a measure to improve the program, beneficiary groups have indicated the necessity for the MAGA to demand of the companies to fulfill the obligations established regarding the quality of milk, waste management and additionally, the delivery of milk on all school days that are not official holidays.24 And yet, with the contradictions found between the conditions established in

23 The claim was made on the “International Glass of Milk Day” celebrated at the “Ernestina Mena Viuda de Reitz” School for Girls Number 57. 24 Translators Note: In Guatemala, it is a common custom for government offices and private companies to establish what is called a “bridge day”. When a holiday arrives on a Tuesday or Thursday, in order to elongate the holiday for


39

the contracts and what really goes on in the schools regarding these topics, it is clear that there is very little communication between the schools and the VLE employees. With respect to these obligations, the program representatives appears to be completely unaware, if they are fulfilled or not. In general, the assessments made by the representatives of both beneficiary schools regarding the improvement of the VLE, and in general for all the PAE, are centered on the utilization of the resources granted, in the best possible way so that it is the school children who are benefited.

more than one day, until the weekend comes, a “bridge day” is enforced for the Monday or Friday. On those “bridge” days, children go to school, but the companies do not deliver the milk.


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IV.2 Access to Land:

Box 6.

Guideline 8: Access to resources and assets

Guideline 8B. Land

“8.10 States should take measures to promote and protect the security of land tenure, especially with respect to women, poor and disadvantaged segments of society, through legislation that protects the full and equal right to own land and other property, including the right to inherit. As appropriate, States should consider establishing legal and other policy mechanisms, consistent with their international human rights obligations and in accordance with the rule of law, that advance land reform to enhance access for the poor and women. Such mechanisms should also promote conservation and sustainable use of land. Special consideration should be given to the situation of indigenous communities.”

The Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food address the promotion of actions to enable the population to acquire resources to develop their productive capacities. They emphasize the thematic areas of Labour, Land, Water, Genetic resources for food and agriculture, Sustainability and Services.

With regard to Guatemala, access to land has substantial importance, especially because the country has historically relied on agriculture for its social and economic development. The direct relationship between the agrarian thematic and realization of the Right to Food is justified in two senses: the land is a means of work, directly or indirectly, for more than half of the Guatemalan population; and the land is the means of producing food for all of the Guatemalan population. It is also necessary to mention the strong cultural link that groups of Mayan origen have to land. In this sense the Land in Guatemala is at the root of strong historical pressures and demands by the peasant population, and land holding is an indicator of national economic power. At the same time, the Guatemalan peasantry suffered a prolonged process of expulsion from their land, a process which has deepened in the last decade due to the introduction of large-scale agriculture aiming at export of agricultural products.25

Currently land concentration in Guatemala is considered to be among the highest in the world. For 2003 it is estimated that 93% of the farms of less than 10 manzanas (7 hectares) encompass 21.8% of the land, while the 1.9% of farms larger than one caballería (45 hectares) occupy 56.6% of the remaining land. While there exist 47 farms larger than 3,700 hectares, 90% of producers survive on less than 1 hectare.26

Currently, the Gini Index on the concentration of landholding is 0.84, one of the highest in the World, with 1 signifying total inequality. By the same token, 78.7% of the cultivable land is not being worked, which means that the country, in spite of having the possibility of fulfilling the land needs of the peasant population, is not taking the appropriate steps to do so. It is notable that the forces necessary to challenge such concentration of land are insufficient.

25 Solís, Fernando. El nuevo campo. El quiebre estructural y relaciones sociales de producción en el agro guatemalteco. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2008. 26 CNOC/ CONGCOOP. Propuesta de Reforma Agraria Integral. Serie Cuadernos de Guatemala, número 2. Guatemala, 2004. With information from the Agriculture and Livestock census 2003.


41

Chart 19 Structure of land tenancy

Agriculture and Livestock Census 2003

Category Number of producers

% of producers

Area (Mz=0.7 hectares)

% of the

land

Average area of the farm

(Mz) Less than subsistence

(less than 1 Mz) 375,708 45.2% 172,412.75 3.2% 0.46

Subsistence (1- 10 Mz) 388,976 46.8% 989,790.71 18.6% 2.5

Above subsistence (10 – 64 Mz) 50,528 6.1% 1,145,318.00 21.6% 22.7

Commercial (larger than 64 Mz) 15,472 1.9% 3,008,316.31 56.6% 194.4

Total 830,684 100% 5,315,838.37 100% 6.4 Source: Informe alternativo sobre el cumplimiento del Derecho a la Alimentación en Guatemala.

CIIDH. Guatemala, 2005.

Given that the thematic of access to land is not included in the PSAN, the latter takes on a special significance for the realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala, given that more than half the Guatemalan population is devoted to small farming or to activities on the farm. Moreover, half the population belongs to one of the national indignous groups who have a strong cultural tie to the land. In this sense the inclusion of the theme of access to Land in the PSAN constitutes a challenge which needs to be addressed, especially because it is already addressed through the Land Fund.

a) The Land Fund: The Land Fund (FONTIERRAS) was created through Decree 24-99, on 13 May 1999, growing out of the Agreement on Socioeconomic Aspects of and Agrarian Situation (ASESA), and the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AIDPI). It emphasizes that “large segments of the Guatemalan population, particularly the indigenous peoples, are landless peasants or peasants with insufficient areas of land, which makes it difficult for them to access better living conditions, in liberty, justice, security, and peace for their full development”. In this sense, it promotes access to land for the peasant population, through the purchase and lease of land.

ASESA decrees that a Firm and Durable Peace ought to be founded on the basis of a socioeconomic development oriented to the common good, that responds to the needs of all the population, with the goal of overcoming situations of poverty, extreme poverty, discrimination and social marginalization. Also, it decrees that it is necessary in the rural areas that there be a successful integral strategy that facilitates access to land and other productive resources, one that offers legal security and favors the resolution of conflicts.27

The agreement states that resolution of the agrarian problem and rural development are fundamental and inescapable if the country is to respond to the situation of the majority of the population that lives in rural areas (…). Transforming the structure of landholding and land use ought to have as its objective the incorporation of the rural population into economic, social and political development, so that land would constitute, for those who work it, the basis of their economic stability, the foundation of their progressive social well-being, and the guarantee of their liberty and dignity.28

27 ASESA. Paragraph 1, México, 6 May 1996. 28 ASESA. Chapter III, numeral 27.


42

The said agreement establishes, in the part on Access to Land and Productive Resources, the creation of a land trust within a participatory banking institution for credit assistance and to encourage savings, directed primarily to micro, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. Furthermore, it says that: the Land Fund will focus the power of public finance on the acquisition of land, favor the establishment of a transparent market in land, and facilitate the development of plans for land redistribution. The adjudication policy of the fund will prioritize the award of land to peasants who organize for that purpose, keeping in mind the criteria of economic and environmental sustainability.29

This is how the Peace Accords provided a minimum standard for addressing causes of agrarian conflict. Among the efforts that have been made to realize the Accords is the Joint Commission on Land-related Rights of Indigenous Peoples (COPART), which suceeded in 1999 in getting the Land Fund Law approved. The Land Fund is an institution that, as is described below, will be responsable to design and implement public policy on access to credit for buying productive land, and for the regularization of land ownership in the country, taking over the functions previously held by the Nacional Institute of Agrarian Transformation (INTA). In addition to FONTIERRAS, it succeeded in creating an agrarian institution30 that has supported and pursued the demands for land by peasant and indigenous groups.31 At the present time the Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs handles cases of agrarian conflict which grow out of the weak legal structure supporting possession of land and pressure from peasant movements so that the State responds to these demands.

Box 7. Objectives of the Land Fund. Article 3.

a. To design and implement public policy related to access to land, in coordination with the State’s rural development policy.

b. To administer public finance programs directed to facilitate various forms of access to productive land for peasants, either in individual or organizacional form, who are without land or have insufficient land.

c. To facilitate access to land ownership by peasants in individual or organizationial form through adequate financial mechanisms, as well as through the use of the natural resources of such lands, in line with the criteria of economic and environmental sustainability.

d. To promote the accessibility of resources for financing the purchase of land by beneficiary groups, ensuring that this permits the financial sustainability of the Land Fund and of the productive projects of the beneficiaries.

e. To coordinate with other State institutions the development of investments complementary to those related to access to land, in order to guarantee the attainment of integral projects related to agriculture and livestock industry, forestry and aquaculture.

f. To define the policy and promote programs to facilitate access of women to credit for buying land and for productive projects related to the same.

29 ASESA. Chapter III, clause B. 30 The Institutional Commission for the Development and Strengthening of Land Ownership (PROTIERRA) was created on 9 April 1997 (Governmental Agreement 307-97). The following institutions are part of it: the IUSI Unit of the Ministry of Public Finance (MINFIN); the National Geographic Institute; the Registry and Cadastre section of the MINFIN; the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food (MAGA); the Secretariat of Peace (SEPAZ); FONATIERRA and the Presidential Commission of Legal Aid and Resolution of Land Conflicts (CONTIERRA) (now Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs) and the General Ownership Registry. 31 Center of Studies and Projects for Development and Peace (CEIDEPAZ). Proposal on the Regularization of Communal Indigenous Land registered in the name of Municipalities. Guatemala, 2006.


43

FONTIERRAS, for the purposes of the beneficiary groups, is divided into two programs: Regularization of Land and Access to Land. Regularization is a program through which, as FONTIERRA defines it, legal certainty with regard to land awarded by the State, will be executed for those having possession. The program of Access to Land is divided into three areas: Access to Collective Land, Access to Individual Land, and Leasing. The first two respond respectively to the collective or individual purchase of small farms. The third was created in 2004 and called the Land Leasing Trust. For the purpose of synthesizing the interviews presented in Box 23, and respecting the terminologies used in those interviews, “access” refers to the Access to Collective Land and Access to Individual Land programs, and “leasing” to the Land Leasing Trust.

FONTIERRAS began its activities not only through its legal creation, but through the GTPE 5446 project, with an amount of US$23million, which was the first phase of a three phase/successive projects program supporting instruments of land access to the poor in rural areas of Guatemala as defined in the Peace Accords and the Land Fund Law. This first project sought to support the government of Guatemala to:

Establish a program to facilitate access to land by the beneficiaries

Support access by the beneficiaries to technical and financial assistance for productive sub-projects

Improve the legal and institucional standard for land markets to enable them to develop into more efficient forms.32

However, there currently exists a general consensus that FONTIERRAS, with the conditions and resources with which it has developed its institutional task, is not successful in promoting access for peasant or indigenous population that is without land or with insufficient land. With information up to 2005, FONTIERRAS had an accumulation of 421 dossiers in process, 502 dossiers that were inactive or not followed up by the petitioners, and only 214 fully processed dossiers.33

Added to this administrative incapacity to give the attention to peasant groups without land, is the onerousness of the debt assumed by these groups. In the majority of cases, the debt for the purchase of land is not repayable. This, in addition to putting into place a situation of high risk for the beneficiary groups, seriously compromises the financial sustainability of the Land Fund, which in principle, according to article 26 of the FONTIERRAS Law, will cease to receive annual allocations from the State as of 2008.34

As for the establishment of a Guarantee Fund, it is decreed that: Additionally, the Government of the Republic, with the objective of facilitating alternative mechanisms of finance for land purchase, via the Ministry of Public Finance and in coordination with the Bank of Guatemala, will establish a Guarantee Fund via an amount of three hundred million Quetzals, which will constitute a complementary guarantee to the approved credit entities which extend credit to qualified peasants through FONTIERRAS, during the stipulated period (…) which includes 1999 to 2008.35

Various organizations that represent groups of peasants that have been FONTIERRAS beneficiary groups have requested through the Central Government from that account forgiveness of the agrarian debts these groups have acquired. Added to that, FONTIERRAS has 32 Gauster, Susana and Byron Garoz. Balance de la Aplicación de la Política agraria del Banco Mundial en Guatemala. 1996-2005. CONGCOOP. Guatemala, 2005. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Article 27 de Guarantee Fund.


44

seen its budget allocation decreased, since the Government realized that it is not managing to reach the objectives planned in the law which gave it life. FONTIERRAS in the period from 2000 to 2004, was allocated only 53.5% of what it requested, received only an average of 84.2% of the approved amount, and in the same period used only 90% of that amount.36

Thus, the budget allocation was seriously decreased until in 2005 the allocation was Q 217.5 millon. Last year the allocation was only Q 99.3 millon, amounting to a reduction of Q 118.2 millons, which in relative terms is a 54.3% reduction.

Chart 20

Allocations for FONTIERRAS 2005-2008

(In millions of quetzals)

Description Approved 2005 Approved 2006Readjusted

2007 Actual 2007 Approved 2008Land Fund 217.5 180.4 180.4 99.3 141.4Support to the Cadastre, Regulation and Registry 0.0 194.4 194.4 111.1 158.5Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs 2.0 8.2 12.8 13.8 5.8CONTIERRAS 0.0 37.6 37.2 33.5 14.6

Total 219.5 420.6 424.8 257.6 320.4% of GNP 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.11

GNP 207,723.5 229,406.3 285,046Source: own analysis of SICOIN data

256,536

For 2008 the allocation provided in the budget approved by the Congress in November 2007 came to Q 141.4 millon, which would increase the FONTIERRAS budget. However, that would still be much less than the approved budget for the 2005-2007 period. It must be emphasized that even though this amount was approved last year, it can be modified in the course of the year, just as happened in 2007 when the amount allocated was Q 180.4 million, but this was later reduced to Q 81.1 million, weakening still further the share of the Fund.

In summary, the total of the budget allocations for FONTIERRA, Support for Cadastre, Regulation and Registry, the Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs and CONTIERRA, represent on average 0.13% of the Gross National Product (GNP) during the 2005-2008 period. Such a budget throws doubt on the capacity of the Guatemalan State to solve the grave crisis that land is going through, which, in turn, jeans there is a high risk that the right to food is systematically violated by the Guatemalan State.

36 Ibid.


45

Chart 21 The share of FONTIERRAS’ expenditures relative to total expenditures

2004-2008 In percentage

291.7 217.5 180.4 180.4 141.828,825.6 32,385.2 37,704.0 40,198.2 42,535.5

1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3% of the total expenditures

Description 2,004 2005

FONTIERRAGeneral expenditure

2006 2007 2008

Source: Own análisis of SICOIN data

For its part, in analyzing FONTIERRAS’ budget, we can see that its share in relation to total expenditures for the 2004-2008 period represents on average 0.5% of the total. It starts at the highest point in 2004 as 1% of total expenditures, and continues to decline, with the lowest percentage being in the current year, where it is only 0.3% of total expenditures.

Chart 22

MAGA-FONTIERRAS Report on fiscal and financial situation

Component of access to land January to December 2007

Approved Executed % advance ApprovedActual to

Dec. Executed % advance Men Women

Trust for the purchase of land (groups) 7 7 100 18 18 14.09 78 377 36Subsidy for work capital, food assistance (groups) 500 413 83 17.38 17.38 14.36 83 377 36

Subsidy for technical assistance (groups) 8 6.231 98 9.93 7 7 100 5475 756Trust for leasing land (individual) 12.023 8.56 100 24.04 17.13 17.13 100 4031 4538Trust for purchase of land(individual) 800 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0

Subsidy for work capital, food assistance (individual) 800 0 0 27.81 0 0 0 0 0

Subsidy for technical assistance (individual) 800 0 0 7.77 0 0 0 0 0

Components and products

Fiscal situation Financial situation Beneficiaries

Source: Own analysis on the basis of fiscal and financial situation data, Unit on Follow-up and Evaluation. Land Fund.

Looking at only 2007, what is evident is FONTIERRAS’ very limited administrative capacity to adequately implement the scarce resources that are allocated to it. In Box 22 you can see that out of all of the components, only three succeeded in achieving 100% implementation, whereas others, such as subsidies for work capital and food assistance to individuals did not manage to spend anything in 2007.

As for the rest of the components, the Trust for the Purchase of Land spent Q14.09 million out of Q18 million allocated to it for 2007, while the Subsidy for Work Capital and Food Assistance


46

was allocated Q17.38 million, but spent only Q14.36 million.

With respect to the beneficiary population in 2007, it is evident that of the 15,626 beneficiaries, 65.6% were men, while the remaining 34.4% were women, denoting gender inequality and inequity.

As far as the design of its annual budget, article 34 of the Regulation of the FONTIERRAS law indicates that the General Management should present the first draft of the budget (revenue and expenditures) for the following year by 31 May. Then the Directive Council should approve the draft before 10 June, in order to present it to the Ministry of Finance.

In 2000 the UN Verification Mission for Guatemala (MINUGUA) had already noted that FONTIERRAS’ performance was limited, mostly for financial reasons. “One of the principal obstacles confronting FONTIERRAS is the scarce financing for fiscal year 2000. The commitment, signed October 12th 1998 by members of the Paritaria Commission on Rights relative to Land of the Indigenous Peoples, to allocate to the Fund a minimum of Q300 million annually in the fiscal years 1999 and 2000 has not be kept. The actual allocation as of April 2000 was barely Q103 million. This limited budgetary allocation creates a very grave situation, particularly in light of the magnitude of the demand. Given the average price of land, this reduces the possibility that the Fund will be able to benefit any significant number of families. 37

Moreover, there was reference to the insufficiency of the funds intended for purchase of land: “According to calculations derived from the experience of the Fund and other similar institutions, if you take away the operation costs, technical assistance and social compensation, there will remain no more than Q80 million to buy land. Given the average price of land, with this one could acquire a maximum of 6.700 hectares (See para. 21). Assuming an average of 5 hectares per family, a calculation which is very optimistic given the poor quality of land on offer, it will be possible to acquire land for less than 1,500 families. That is to say, less than 5% of the already registered demand.” (…)38

37 Report of MINUGUA on the State of fulfillment of the Peace Accord in the matter of Land. Guatemala, 2000. Numeral 19. 38 Ídem. Numeral 20.


47

b) Perceptions of FONTIERRAS’ performance

Chart 23 Synthesis of General Perceptions of the Land Fund

Critical Assessments Sufficiency

Achievements Limitations Areas of improvement

Publ

ic O

ffic

ial The land

problems are too great for FONTIERRAS to be able to handle

Positive advantage for the beneficiaries in the area of land leasing, with positive changes in their lives as a result of increased production.

Low budgets as a result of lack of implementation, bureaucratic processes in this and other institutions.

Response to only 51% of leasing requests because of budget limitations.

The lack of legal certainty impedes the legalization of land.

Make implementation processes more agile in order to meet objectives.

Education for the population, including business principles for generating funds to become self-sustaining and independent of the program.

Mem

ber

of th

e D

irec

tive

Cou

ncil

(DC

)

The leasing subsidies are sufficient, but without access to land and without legal certainty, the program is insufficient.

51 % of the beneficiaries of the leasing program are women. The 2 cuerdas given for leasing allow 1 to be used to respond to the food security needs of the woman and her family, and 1 for sale.

Very limited implementation of the budget as a result of slow, bureaucratic processes in this and other institutions

Exclusion of women, including in the policy

Only 1 woman on the DC. Without rural women on the DC, their struggle cannot be fought.

Many people are in debt, and stay outside the program because they think that the credit is money given.

Slow process of land measurement

Clarification of the law: define the policy, make it more precise and accessible to everyone working in all the institutions involved in the process of land acquisition.

Sensitize people on the payment of credits.

Gro

up o

f Ben

efic

iari

es

There isn’t sufficient support offered to enable women to get access to land

The leasing program permits an improvement in terms of family capital, but without access to land there is nothing for the future. The interest rates are better than those of the banks.

Exclusion of women With only leasing, there is no legal certainty, and it gives no benefit to future generations.

There is no security for production affected by climate factors.

Payment of credits does not coincide with times when payments are needed for leasing or harvesting.

That there should always be women peasants represented in the DC, because they always have to struggle for access to land

The public official from FONTIERRAS, who was interviewed, is currently the Director of Leasing Subsidy. As a general assessment to the program he said that “the Leasing Program is flexible in its response to the population that is vulnerable, multilingual, pluricultural, without land or with insufficient land”. However, the same person confirmed that the lack of advancements in the Access Program and the lack of implementation of the budget, limit the fulfillment of FONTIERRA´s goals. This was the focal point of the interview, considering that the majority of assessments presented are directly related to the low budget that with each passing year decreases through low implementation.

In the same manner as with the government employee, the interview with the representative of the Directive Council was centered on issues surrounding the lack of advancements and


48

implementation of the Access Program. As the only women official representative39 on the FONTIERRA Directive Council, she highlighted how all obstacles presented in FONTIERRA are that much more substantial for women. As a result, she focused in the interview on the necessity of clarification of the law and policy of FONTIERRAS to make access to land more flexible, particularly for women in rural areas. It is important to point out that she herself was the contact for the interview with the beneficiary group.

The interview with the FONTIERRAS beneficiary group was a collective interview which took place in the house of one of the members of the association, which currently functions as the association headquarters. The Hope and Faith Integral Women’s Association (Asociación Integral de Mujeres Fe y Esperanza) began as an initiative of 30 women who wanted to learn how to read. With the growth of the association, the creation of a directive board became necessary in order to be legally recognized and so be able to be beneficiaries of different projects. Currently, they are benefited by two: The first is an artisans’ project with the Indigenous Development Fund, (FODIGUA), and the second, is one they call “Productive Agriculture for Food Security”. The food security project is carried out on the plots of land they lease individually through FONTIERRA. The project consists primarily of taking one of the two cuerdas40 leased to grow crops (primarily corn and beans) for family consumption, and using the other cuerda to produce crops to sell. In addition, some people work with animals, raising them for consumption and for sale. They initiated this project in 2003, year in which their relationship with the fund begins with 80 beneficiaries.41

According to the association representatives present during the interview, the main problems of their communities relate to the exclusion of the women, a problem which they consider engraved culturally in the Mayan worldview. The problems are focused on the restricted right to ownership of land, specifically for women living in rural areas. At an individual level, they say that each woman faces such problems by demanding and defending her rights within the family, even though having to face, in some case, domestic violence. At the collective level, along with strengthening the partners on issues such as self-esteem, one of the mechanisms has been the fight in FONTIERRAS to be able to access land and have ownership rights. In spite of a slow and limited process, as they themselves describe it, one of the fruits of the struggle has been having, for the first time, an indigenous woman as an official representative on the Directive Council of FONTIERRAS. In spite of advances made in the Area of Land Leasing, in the Area of Access to Land, they have seen no improvements. The interview was centered on this theme. For them, land leasing is a good program for the short term, for now, but in the long term, to really begin to address the problems of land tenure, FONTIERRAS ought to make more flexible the processes for access to land, with legal certainty for the women peasant population—programs in which there are still no responses for the peasantry, and much less for the women peasants.

It is in this failure to really address the agrarian issue, to which the Access Program ought to respond, that at a general level the beneficiary group, the representative of the Directive Council and the public official agree that what FONTIERRAS is doing is not sufficient.

In their critical assessments, all the participants have indicated that the major achievements of the Fund have been reached in the Leasing Program. The achievements pointed out by government official are centered on an improvement in the lives of the beneficiaries through 39 There is one other women on the council, with the difference that she is a substitute. 40 Translator’s Note: A cuerda, is a measurement unit of area used Guatemala. It varies in size according to different regions in the country. For these particular communities, 1 cuerda is equal to 0.6987squred meters. 41 Currently, the association has 80 associates from 7 communities from Patzún Chimaltenango: Patzún, Merced, Chatzan Alto, Chatzan Bajo, Chipiacul, Panibaj, El Sitio and Chinimachicaj. In addition, the association lends support to 220 non- associated women from these same communities and other surrounding ones.


49

augmenting the production of basic grains. According to him, the addition could be from approximately 15kg of basic grains per family per year to 25 or 30 kg/family/year. The representative of the Directive Council, as well as the beneficiary group, support this idea, indicating that there has been an improvement in family capital, via the division of the leased plots of land to produce crops for consumption and for sale. The women stress, that if there are no advancements in the Access Program, the achievements in the Leasing Program are not sufficient.

Parallel with these assessments, all of the major limitations point to deficiencies in the access programs, centered on the low implementation of the budget and the exclusion of women. According to the beneficiary group and the Directive Council representative, the FONTIERRA policy promotes the exclusion of women. Beginning with the selection profile, there are basis for such exclusions. The criteria, as the official indicated are: To be a farmer; to be the head of the family (proven with birth certificates of dependants); only one person per family; preferably from a rural area. This profile provokes two main obstacles. The first is with the “prerequisite” of being a “farmer”. In many municipalities or town councils, women are automatically registered as “housewives” or as being dedicated to “domestic care”, thus creating a motive for rejection as a beneficiary because in their Identification Cards they are not recognized as “farmers”. The second obstacle is with the prerequisite of being “the head of the family” as the only beneficiary per family. The limitation comes when, as the women indicated, that the Fund, like any other institution that lends support in the agrarian issues, given the option to choose a man or a woman as the official beneficiary, always selects the man.

The other main limitation, the low implementation of the budget, appears to be directly linked to the bureaucratic land acquisition process. According to all the people interviewed, this slow process begins from within the FONTIERRA and through all the institutions that the procedure must pass. The beneficiary group indicated that the administrative personnel of the FONTIERRA make the process even more difficult, considering that they do not even inform people if there is data missing when they hand in their paperwork. This implies that many people must travel constantly to the city to verify where and why the process has been brought to a standstill. According to the official and the Directive Council member, these obstacles in the Access Program, limit the implementation of the global budget as well as the response to only 51 % of the applications made to the Leasing Area. Because of this low response to applications, there is also a limited quantity of technical personnel.

The personnel of the Fund´s technical team, was motive for criticism by the people interviewed. The director, indicated that despite the fact that the technicians do not go to the villages, they are well received42, considering that “the people are conscience that the technicians do all that they can”. According to the director and all the other people interviewed, the main function of the technicians is to supervise the fulfillment of the credit payments. And yet, according to one of the beneficiaries, “the debts occur because of the technicians”. The women from the beneficiary group, as well as the Directive Council representative, indicated that the technicians are never really supervised in what they do. According to them, the technicians and their supervisors agree on what days they will have a supervised visit, because generally they do not go all the way to the communities. On a positive aspect, the women stated that in the Leasing Program, all the technicians and Regional Coordinators are Indigenous and speak the local language. Considering that most of the beneficiaries in this program are women that do not speak Spanish or speak it limitedly, this strengthens women´s participation in the Leasing Program. On the

42 According to the Director of Leasing Subsidy Director, when they decided to rotate the technicians, the beneficiaries requested that the previous technicians return. This, according to the director, indicates that there is a good reception of the technicians in their areas of work.


50

contrary, in the Access Area, the technicians are ladinos43 because the contact is generally with beneficiary men who speak Spanish, whether they are indigenous or ladinos, promoting in this manner even more so the exclusion of indigenous rural women from that program.

For the improvement of FONTIERRA, the one thing constant with all the people interviewed was the need for the improvement of the process for the implementation of the Access Program. All expressed, that they considered that the Fund, in order to really be able to reach its goals of making access to land possible for the peasant population, has to improve the process in the Access Program, all with different opinions on how to do so. The official expressed emphasis on education for the population in order to be self sustainable. The Directive Council representative emphasized the way by means of the clarification of the law and its policy as well as the disclosure of that policy to the general population. The beneficiaries highlighted the importance of the representation of women within the Council, who is at the forefront for women’s right to land access, because they consider that there is no answer for the right to food of the most vulnerable population if there is no judicial certainty of land for women.

43 Translator’s Note: Ladino is a term used in Guatemala generally referring to the non indigenous population.

Conclusions: 1. In spite of the Peace Accords that implied the opening and redefinition of social policies

in the sense of overcoming discriminatory and repressive actions by the State, social inequality has deepened, while social indicators denote profound differences within the population, which particularly affect the indigenous and peasant populations.

2. ENCOVI 2006 evidenced that the small advances in reduction of poverty in focused populations seem diminished in the context of a strong growth in poverty in non-priority zones. In this sense the levels of poverty change geographically while the populations most affected continue to be the indigenous and peasant populations. The most important conclusion to draw from ENCOVI 2006 is that a minimum decrease in general poverty appears to be accompanied by the maintenance of extreme poverty.

3. Although the State has succeeded in making institutionally visible some of its commitments related to the Right to Food, most of the means through which this right could be realized are lacking. The recent nature of the installation of the institutionalization that operates PSAN could explain the existence of certain technical and political “gaps” to effectively realize all of the implications of the Right to Food. However, in general terms, it is possible to observe that efforts to make PSAN adequate in the sense of the Right to Food are not being realized.

4. The implementation of the school feeding programs of MINEDUC and MAGA are insufficient to mitigate malnutrition and to close the historical gaps in social inequality prevailing in Guatemala. The financial investment to acquire sufficient quantities of food to satisfy the caloric needs of the students is still far from what is necessary. The coverage of the programs is partial, leaving almost a quarter of the school establishments without service. The conditions of inequality with which the PAE programs are currently developing add a factor of injustice and vulnerability to the universal right to food.

5. Coverage by municipalities demonstrates that, in the design of the VLE, priority was not given to the population most vulnerable to malnutrition. VLE has been created with distinct intentions then to solve the situation of malnutrition affecting students. Therefore, it does not pay attention to food planning criteria, which have been traditionally directed by a concern to identify mechanisms that reduce costs and widen coverage.

6. In 2006 little more than a quarter of the municipalities assisted by VLE (25 out of 92) were in the High Risk category. At the same time, more than 57% of the schools and beneficiary population live in 56 municipalities at moderate or low risk, and 66% of the resources were directed to them. Really, only 35% of VLE’s program was directed to the zones in the country that were at higher food risk, giving partial coverage to students and schools in those assisted municipalities (450,000 students out of an estimated 630,000 and only 2,893 schools from a total of 5,320).

7. FONTIERRAS has practically failed in the political objective for which it was created. We are able to observe this not only from the steep budgetary decreases which year after year have been undermining its investment possibilities, which contravenes the sense of the laws which created it, but also through the weak results of its programming. The objectives of FONTIERRAS have also suffered from an important turn towards prioritizing actions directed towards the leasing of land rather than actions directed towards access to land.

8. The fact that FONTIERRAS is the only state policy for access to land for the peasant population demonstrates the weakness which this issue has acquired for the State of


52

Guatemala. For 2008 it is assumed that resources will no longer be directed towards it, without any announcement up until this point of proposals for follow-up. On the other hand, agrarian conflicts continue to grow, which indicates a virtual abandonment of the needs of the peasant population.

9. Finally we can affirm that despite the existence of political channels that could make possible the Right to Food of the Guatemala population, the actual policy of the last governments has indicated a progressive retrogression in support for the two entities that have been studied. This situation becomes especially counterproductive in the context of the world food crisis, which could mean greater retrogression and growth in the vulnerable population. In this sense it is evident that the Guatemalan State still violates the Right to Food of its population despite two instruments which could constitute an important link in the fight against Hunger and Malnutrition.


53

Bibliografía:

Banco Mundial. La Pobreza en Guatemala. Un estudio del Banco Mundial sobre países. Washington, 2003.

COSAN/ COPRE/ MINEDUC. Segundo Censo Nacional de Talla de Escolares de Primer Grado Primaria de la República de Guatemala. Informe Final. Guatemala, 2002.

CNOC/ CONGCOOP. Propuesta de Reforma Agraria Integral. Serie Cuadernos de Guatemala, número 2. Guatemala, 2004.

FAO. Directrices Voluntarias en apoyo de la realización progresiva del derecho a una alimentación adecuada, en el contexto de la seguridad alimentaria nacional. Roma, 2005.

Gauster, Susana y Byron Garoz. FONTIERRAS: El modelo de mercado y el acceso a la tierra en Guatemala. CONGCOOP/CNOC Guatemala, 2002.

Gauster, Susana y Byron Garoz. Balance de la Aplicación de la Política agraria del Banco Mundial en Guatemala. 1996-2005. CONGCOOP. Guatemala, 2005.

INE. Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida, 2006. Información preliminar, Guatemala, 2007.

ONU. Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. Misión a Guatemala. Informe del Relator Especial del Derecho a la Alimentación, Jean Ziegler. Enero de 2006.

ONU. Observación General 12. El Derecho a una Alimentación Adecuada. Artículo 11 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. Estados Unidos, 1999.

Santos; Jorge y José Pedro Mata. Manual de auditoría presupuestaria. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2008.

SESAN. Política Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional; Ley del Sistema de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional; Reglamento de la Ley de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional. Guatemala, 2006.

Solís, Fernando. El nuevo campo. El quiebre estructural y relaciones sociales de producción en el agro guatemalteco. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2008.

Zepeda, Ricardo y Nadia Sandoval. Alimentación, derecho desnutrido. Análisis de la Política de Seguridad Alimentaria en Guatemala. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2006.

Zepeda, Ricardo; Nadia Sandoval y Orlando Blanco. Misión Guatemala: combatir el hambre. Informe de seguimiento a las Recomendaciones del Relator Especial para el Derecho a la Alimentación en Guatemala, Jean Ziegler. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2007.

Zepeda, Ricardo y Martín Wolpold-Bosien. Avances en la Promoción del Derecho a la Alimentación en Guatemala. Iniciativa América Latina y Caribe sin Hambre. FAO/ FIAN/ CIIDH. Santiago de Chile. 2007.


54

Annexes:

Annex 1 Interviewees

Program Level of the interview Name of participants Role of participants

Vice Ministry Of Food Security

(VISAN) Key informant Danilo Cardona Advisor to the Vice-minister of Food

Security

Operative Public Official Bernardo Vásquez Director of Leasing Subsidy

Political Public Official Elena Cocón

Official representative of MAGA´s Agriculture and Livestock National Council Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Agropecuario (CONADEA), del MAGA on the Directivo Council of FONTIERRA.

Land Fund (FONTIERRAS)

Beneficiary group I 7 representatives Members of de la Asociación Integral de

Mujeres Fe y Esperanza. Gelbert Adalberto Flores

Revolorio General Coordinator

Lourdes Olivet España Quality, INOCOUS and Socialization and Coordinator

Operative Public Officials

Alex Patal Región III Tecnitian Juan Salvador Borges

Reinoso Principal at the “Ernestina Mena Viuda de Reitz” School for girls No. 57. Beneficiary

group I 2 representantes44 Members of the Snack comisión at the “Ernestina Mena Viuda de Reitz” School for girls No. 57.

School Glass of Milk Program

(VLE)

Beneficiary group II Salvador Castallenada Principal at the “José de San Martin”

Federation School.

Annex 2

Areas of collective interviews with Beneficiary Groups

Program Level of interview Participant group Location

FONTIERRA Beneficiary group I

Asociación Integral de Mujeres Fe y Esperanza.

Patzun, Chimaltenango

Beneficiary group I

“Ernestina Mena Viuda de Reitz” School for Girls No. 57.

Zona 6, Guatemala, Guatemala

PVLE Beneficiary

Group II “José de San Martin” Federation School Mixco, Guatemala

44 The 2 people representatives of the feeding commiityLas 2 personas representantes del comité de alimentación de la escuela no dieron sus nombres en la entrevista.


55

Annex 3 Coverage and implementation of VLE 2006

Department / MUNICIPALITY

School Services

Number of Existing Schools.

Schoools assisted Rations Days served Investment

(Q)

ALTA VERAPAZ COBAN 6,333 385 36 870,564 137 1,732,422

SAN CRISTOBAL VERAPAZ 7,473 100 50 892,652 119 1,776,198

SAN MIGUEL TUCURU 2,212 94 26 270,646 122 538,586

SANTA CRUZ VERAPAZ 3,945 51 27 493,624 125 982,312

SANTA MARIA CAHABON 12,570 165 140 1,304,985 104 2,988,416

TACTIC 2,824 51 15 315,895 112 644,426

TAMAHU 2,403 40 21 175,762 73 349,766

BAJA VERAPAZ CUBULCO 9,605 158 100 825,186 86 1,683,379

PURULHA 6,229 143 73 754,574 121 1,539,331

RABINAL 7,958 106 52 949,835 119 1,890,172

SALAMA 6,906 147 61 767,572 111 1,527,468

SAN MIGUEL CHICAJ 6,212 67 35 636,356 102 1,266,348

SANTA CRUZ EL CHOL 1,839 45 27 151,187 82 300,862

CHIQUIMULA CAMOTAN 8,274 148 118 1,102,651 133 2,249,408

JOCOTAN 7,902 147 128 1,065,494 135 2,397,362

OLOPA 4,069 87 70 482,254 119 1,104,362

SAN JUAN LA ERMITA 2,230 66 44 292,803 131 597,318

ESCUINTLA IZTAPA 1,481 25 12 212,528 144 402,741

LA GOMERA 4,331 57 26 618,090 143 1,171,281

NUEVA CONCEPCIÓN 8,871 147 90 1,260,737 142 2,164,741

PUEBLO NUEVO TIQUISATE 1,213 52 7 173,799 143 339,777

PUERTO SAN JOSÉ 3,978 57 23 576,630 145 1,092,714

GUATEMALA CHINAUTLA 11,987 52 21 1,570,756 131 2,418,964

CHUARRANCHO 1,709 19 12 225,367 132 358,334

FRAIJANES 3,393 35 12 459,919 136 731,271

MIXCO 18,471 123 46 2,328,829 126 3,586,397

PALENCIA 8,259 85 47 1,085,137 131 1,725,368

SAN JOSE DEL GOLFO 1,091 16 12 147,762 135 234,942

SAN JOSÉ PINULA 7,361 52 31 925,873 126 1,472,138

SAN PEDRO AYAMPUC 8,030 42 24 1,039,078 129 1,652,134

SAN PEDRO SACATEPÉQUEZ 6,442 31 15 848,460 132 1,349,051

SAN RAYMUNDO 5,605 43 27 742,039 132 1,179,842

SANTA CATARINA PINULA 8,676 36 18 1,094,543 126 1,685,596

Zone 17 5,180 16 16 667,333 129 1,027,693

Zone 6 3,141 8 8 410,378 131 631,982


56

JALAPA MATAQUESCUINTLA 5,184 85 56 735,740 142 1,394,227

MONJAS 2,491 63 24 366,513 147 694,542

SAN LUIS JILOTEPEQUE 3,037 57 46 440,814 145 835,343

SAN MANUEL CHAPARRON 776 32 16 121,704 157 230,629

SAN PEDRO PINULA 9,522 102 79 1,359,756 143 2,576,738

JUTIAPA ASUNCIÓN MITA 4,644 101 59 680,076 146 1,288,744

ATESCATEMPA 1,182 44 14 171,911 145 325,771

COMAPA 5,969 74 53 827,599 139 1,568,300

CONGUACO 3,443 58 33 494,217 144 936,541

EL ADELANTO 520 12 4 77,400 149 146,673

MOYUTA 8,060 108 80 1,151,995 143 2,183,031

SAN JOSÉ ACATEMPA 673 17 3 99,459 148 188,475

SANTA CATARINA MITA 2,328 57 19 338,830 146 642,083

YUPILTEPEQUE 1,145 29 11 162,195 142 307,360

PETEN FLORES 8,749 64 59 1,013,591 116 2,422,483

SAN BENITO 8,930 48 43 1,328,387 149 3,174,845

SAN JOSE 1,329 11 11 180,802 136 432,117

SANTA ANA 5,021 56 52 589,959 117 1,410,002

QUETZALTENANGO ALMOLONGA 186 11 1 25,334 136 40,281

CANTEL 1,853 52 13 238,660 129 379,469

LA ESPERANZA 752 15 4 87,272 116 138,762

OLINTEPEQUE 1,609 29 7 189,006 117 300,520

QUETZALTENANGO 813 110 3 101,402 125 161,229

SALCAJÁ 348 25 2 40,880 117 64,999

SAN CARLOS SIJA 96 92 2 12,234 127 19,452

SAN JUAN OSTUNCALCO 272 72 4 32,526 120 51,716

SAN MIGUEL SIGUILA 687 12 2 79,894 116 127,031

ZUNIL 995 19 10 131,880 133 209,689

RETALHULEU CHAMPERICO 5,957 72 58 819,517 138 1,602,156

RETALHULEU 11,333 131 99 1,594,168 141 3,116,598

SAN ANDRÉS VILLASECA 8,147 101 89 1,163,048 143 2,273,759

SAN FELIPE 2,753 32 20 398,739 145 779,535

SAN MARCOS AYUTLA 3,234 40 24 357,687 111 729,681

OCOS 6,167 47 41 607,652 99 1,239,610

SANTA ROSA CHIQUIMULILLA 9,474 134 104 1,453,119 153 2,753,661

TAXISCO 5,345 71 57 788,756 148 1,494,693

SOLOLA PANAJACHEL 2,165 12 10 254,972 118 407,955

SAN ANTONIO PALOPÓ 2,949 31 30 287,822 98 572,766

SAN JUAN LA LAGUNA 2,040 19 16 221,505 109 354,408


57

SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN 4,761 41 34 447,482 94 890,489

SAN MARCOS LA LAGUNA 704 4 5 80,278 114 128,445

SAN PABLO LA LAGUNA 1,814 8 6 209,566 116 335,306

SAN PEDRO LA LAGUNA 1,412 12 10 170,097 120 272,155

SANTA CATARINA PALOPÓ 933 10 10 103,948 111 166,317

SANTA CRUZ LA LAGUNA 1,375 13 13 126,668 92 202,669

SANTIAGO ATITLÁN 6,590 53 46 665,001 101 1,323,352

SUCHITEPEQUEZ CHICACAO 8,087 64 40 826,365 102 1,561,830

CUYOTENANGO 8,807 83 63 893,422 101 1,688,568

PATULUL 3,257 34 17 398,260 122 752,711

SAN JOSE EL IDOLO 1,527 22 16 189,557 124 358,262

SANTO DOMINGO SUCHITEPEQUEZ 8,255 81 63 836,005 101 1,580,049

ZUNILITO 1,093 19 11 158,009 145 298,637

TOTONICAPAN SAN ANDRES XECUL 2,723 48 14 341,468 125 542,934

SAN CRISTOBAL TOTONICAPAN 4,572 53 25 573,358 125 911,639

SAN FRANCISCO EL ALTO 371 89 2 48,038 129 76,380

ZACAPA GUALAN 5,315 122 95 786,825 148 1,609,057

LA UNION 4,696 60 48 654,385 139 1,338,217

414,673 5,857 3,246 52,275,051 98,405,993


58

Annex 4

Coverage and implementation of VLE 2007

Department/MUNICIPALITY Students

served

No. of existing schools

Schools assisted Rations Days

served Investment (Q)

ALTA VERAPAZ

COBAN 6,333 385 36 545,034 86 1,174,548

SAN CRISTOBAL VERAPAZ 7,473 100 50 657,452 88 1,416,810

SAN MIGUEL TUCURU 2,212 94 26 172,509 78 383,833

SANTA CRUZ VERAPAZ 3,945 51 27 319,155 81 687,779

SANTA MARIA CAHABON 12,570 165 140 1,304,985 104 2,988,416

TACTIC 2,824 51 15 236,442 84 509,533

TAMAHU 2,403 40 21 179,259 75 380,303

BAJA VERAPAZ

CUBULCO 9,605 158 100 573,525 60 1,276,093

PURULHA 6,229 143 73 372,353 60 828,485

RABINAL 8,710 106 54 645,838 74 1,391,781

SALAMA 6,918 147 61 508,892 74 1,096,662

SAN MIGUEL CHICAJ 6,212 67 35 471,097 76 1,015,214

SANTA CRUZ EL CHOL 1,839 45 27 138,319 75 298,077

CHIQUIMULA

CAMOTAN 8,274 148 118 562,994 68 1,393,410

JOCOTAN 7,902 147 128 534,909 68 1,323,900

OLOPA 4,069 87 70 262,991 65 650,903

SAN JUAN LA ERMITA 2,931 66 56 213,159 73 527,569

ESCUINTLA

IZTAPA 1,481 25 12 132,355 89 263,386

LA GOMERA 4,331 57 26 341,662 79 679,907

NUEVA CONCEPCIÓN 8,871 147 90 748,613 84 1,536,902

PUEBLO NUEVO TIQUISATE 1,213 52 7 96,827 80 196,733

PUERTO SAN JOSÉ 3,978 57 23 357,639 90 1,092,714

GUATEMALA

CHINAUTLA 11,987 52 21 668,441 56 1,069,506

CHUARRANCHO 1,709 19 12 91,665 54 157,205

FRAIJANES 3,393 35 12 201,448 59 345,483

MIXCO 19,391 123 46 1,035,681 53 1,657,090

PALENCIA 8,259 85 47 497,590 60 853,367

SAN JOSE DEL GOLFO 1,106 16 12 63,106 57 108,227

SAN JOSÉ PINULA 7,361 52 31 430,786 59 738,798

SAN PEDRO AYAMPUC 8,030 42 25 459,309 57 787,715

SAN PEDRO SACATEPÉQUEZ 6,442 31 15 395,783 61 678,768

SAN RAYMUNDO 5,605 43 27 317,923 57 545,238

SANTA CATARINA PINULA 8,676 36 18 497,259 57 795,614

Zona 17 5,180 16 16 297,804 57 476,486

Zona 6 3,141 8 8 166,234 53 265,974

HUEHUETENANGO

SAN JUAN ATITAN 2,781 25 20 28,684 10 63,095

SAN RAFAEL PETZAL 1,871 32 14 17,077 9 36,271

SAN SEBASTIAN HUEHUETENANGO 5,757 57 50 60,880 11 130,220

SANTA BARBARA 7,225 60 50 123,183 17 267,346

SANTIAGO CHIMALTENANGO 1,141 20 15 11,176 10 24,429


59

JALAPA

MATAQUESCUINTLA 5,184 85 56 415,806 80 827,454

MONJAS 2,491 63 24 224,806 90 447,364

SAN LUIS JILOTEPEQUE 3,012 57 45 269,010 89 535,330

SAN MANUEL CHAPARRON 776 32 16 69,840 90 138,982

SAN PEDRO PINULA 9,393 102 78 804,907 86 1,673,405

JUTIAPA

ASUNCIÓN MITA 4,644 101 59 404,485 87 804,925

ATESCATEMPA 1,182 44 14 106,380 90 211,696

COMAPA 5,969 74 53 447,851 75 891,223

CONGUACO 3,443 58 33 271,997 79 541,274

EL ADELANTO 520 12 4 41,110 79 81,809

MOYUTA 8,060 108 80 636,640 79 1,266,914

SAN JOSÉ ACATEMPA 673 17 3 53,167 79 105,802

SANTA CATARINA MITA 2,328 57 19 181,068 78 360,325

YUPILTEPEQUE 1,145 29 11 90,455 79 180,005

PETEN

FLORES 8,749 64 59 655,983 75 1,689,156

SAN BENITO 8,930 48 43 675,737 76 3,174,845

SAN JOSE 1,329 11 11 99,926 75 257,309

SANTA ANA 5,006 56 51 373,609 75 962,028

QUETZALTENANGO

ALMOLONGA 186 11 1 11,160 60 17,186

CANTEL 1,871 52 13 104,337 56 160,679

LA ESPERANZA 752 15 4 42,342 56 65,207

OLINTEPEQUE 1,609 29 7 90,484 56 139,345

QUETZALTENANGO 813 110 3 43,932 54 67,655

SALCAJÁ 384 25 2 22,834 59 35,164

SAN CARLOS SIJA 96 92 2 6,144 64 9,462

SAN JUAN OSTUNCALCO 272 72 4 15,288 56 23,544

SAN MIGUEL SIGUILA 687 12 2 32,978 48 50,783

ZUNIL 995 19 10 61,922 62 95,360

QUICHÉ

CHICHE 6,285 62 57 25,340 4 41,811

PATZITE 1,670 15 16 8,218 5 13,560

SAN ANTONIO ILOTENANGO 5,736 48 45 30,352 5 50,081

RETALHULEU

CHAMPERICO 5,866 72 58 472,412 81 969,862

RETALHULEU 11,333 131 99 938,064 83 1,925,845

SAN ANDRÉS VILLASECA 8,147 101 89 665,633 82 1,366,545

SAN FELIPE 2,753 32 20 220,006 80 451,672

SAN MARCOS

AYUTLA 3,234 40 24 265,188 82 590,043

OCOS 6,167 47 41 508,925 83 1,132,358

SANTA ROSA

CHIQUIMULILLA 9,400 134 104 792,156 84 1,576,390

TAXISCO 5,345 71 57 481,050 90 957,290

SOLOLA

PANAJACHEL 2,165 12 10 97,087 45 153,397

SAN ANTONIO PALOPÓ 2,949 31 30 135,431 46 213,981

SAN JUAN LA LAGUNA 2,040 19 16 79,264 39 125,235


60

SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN 4,761 41 34 245,159 51 421,673

SAN MARCOS LA LAGUNA 704 4 5 34,218 49 54,064

SAN PABLO LA LAGUNA 1,814 8 6 88,405 49 139,680

SAN PEDRO LA LAGUNA 1,412 12 10 61,198 43 96,693

SANTA CATARINA PALOPÓ 933 10 10 38,990 42 61,604

SANTA CRUZ LA LAGUNA 1,286 13 13 36,839 29 58,206

SANTIAGO ATITLÁN 6,590 53 46 320,280 49 550,882

SUCHITEPEQUEZ

CHICACAO 8,087 64 40 619,852 77 1,335,781

CUYOTENANGO 8,807 83 63 568,607 65 1,225,348

PATULUL 3,257 34 17 208,598 64 449,529

SAN JOSE EL IDOLO 1,527 22 16 107,963 71 232,660

SANTO DOMINGO SUCHITEPEQUEZ 8,255 81 63 578,318 70 1,246,275

ZUNILITO 1,093 19 11 93,975 86 202,516

TOTONICAPAN

SAN ANDRES XECUL 2,723 48 14 143,688 53 221,280

SAN CRISTOBAL TOTONICAPAN 4,572 53 25 247,448 54 381,070

SAN FRANCISCO EL ALTO 371 89 2 21,457 58 33,044

ZACAPA

GUALAN 5,315 122 95 459,926 87 987,461

LA UNION 4,696 60 48 314,025 67 674,212

449,170 6,176 3,525 29,902,308 62,868,069


61

Annex 5 Implementation of VLE 2006 by groups at risk

MUNICIPALITY Students served

No. of schools

Schools assisted Rations Investment

(Q) Days

served Grade of

risk

SAN CRISTOBAL VERAPAZ 7,473 100 50 892,652 1,776,198 119 Very high TACTIC 2,824 51 15 315,895 644,426 112 Very high TAMAHU 2,403 40 21 175,762 349,766 73 Very high RABINAL 7,958 106 52 949,835 1,890,172 119 Very high CAMOTAN 8,274 148 118 1,102,651 2,249,408 133 Very high JOCOTAN 7,902 147 128 1,065,494 2,397,362 135 Very high OLOPA 4,069 87 70 482,254 1,104,362 119 Very high SAN JUAN LA ERMITA 2,230 66 44 292,803 597,318 131 Very high SAN PEDRO PINULA 9,522 102 79 1,359,756 2,576,738 143 Very high ALMOLONGA 186 11 1 25,334 40,281 136 Very high CANTEL 1,853 52 13 238,660 379,469 129 Very high SAN MIGUEL SIGUILA 687 12 2 79,894 127,031 116 Very high ZUNIL 995 19 10 131,880 209,689 133 Very high SAN ANTONIO PALOPÓ 2,949 31 30 287,822 572,766 98 Very high SAN JUAN LA LAGUNA 2,040 19 16 221,505 354,408 109 Very high SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN 4,761 41 34 447,482 890,489 94 Very high SAN MARCOS LA LAGUNA 704 4 5 80,278 128,445 114 Very high SAN PABLO LA LAGUNA 1,814 8 6 209,566 335,306 116 Very high SANTA CATARINA PALOPÓ 933 10 10 103,948 166,317 111 Very high SANTA CRUZ LA LAGUNA 1,375 13 13 126,668 202,669 92 Very high SANTIAGO ATITLÁN 6,590 53 46 665,001 1,323,352 101 Very high ZUNILITO 1,093 19 11 158,009 298,637 145 Very high SAN ANDRES XECUL 2,723 48 14 341,468 542,934 125 Very high SAN CRISTOBAL TOTONICAPAN 4,572 53 25 573,358 911,639 125 Very high SAN FRANCISCO EL ALTO 371 89 2 48,038 76,380 129 Very high

86,301 1,329 815 10,376,013 20,145,562 118

SAN MIGUEL TUCURU 2,212 94 26 270,646 538,586 122 High SANTA CRUZ VERAPAZ 3,945 51 27 493,624 982,312 125 High SANTA MARIA CAHABON 12,570 165 140 1,304,985 2,988,416 104 High CUBULCO 9,605 158 100 825,186 1,683,379 86 High PURULHA 6,229 143 73 754,574 1,539,331 121 High SAN MIGUEL CHICAJ 6,212 67 35 636,356 1,266,348 102 High COMAPA 5,969 74 53 827,599 1,568,300 139 High OLINTEPEQUE 1,609 29 7 189,006 300,520 117 High CHICACAO 8,087 64 40 826,365 1,561,830 102 High SAN JOSE EL IDOLO 1,527 22 16 189,557 358,262 124 High LA UNION 4,696 60 48 654,385 1,338,217 139 High

62,661 927 565 6,972,283 14,125,501 117

COBAN 6,333 385 36 870,564 1,732,422 137 Moderate SALAMA 6,906 147 61 767,572 1,527,468 111 Moderate SANTA CRUZ EL CHOL 1,839 45 27 151,187 300,862 82 Moderate CHINAUTLA 11,987 52 21 1,570,756 2,418,964 131 Moderate CHUARRANCHO 1,709 19 12 225,367 358,334 132 Moderate PALENCIA 8,259 85 47 1,085,137 1,725,368 131 Moderate SAN JOSÉ PINULA 7,361 52 31 925,873 1,472,138 126 Moderate SAN PEDRO SACATEPÉQUEZ 6,442 31 15 848,460 1,349,051 132 Moderate SAN RAYMUNDO 5,605 43 27 742,039 1,179,842 132 Moderate MATAQUESCUINTLA 5,184 85 56 735,740 1,394,227 142 Moderate MONJAS 2,491 63 24 366,513 694,542 147 Moderate SAN LUIS JILOTEPEQUE 3,037 57 46 440,814 835,343 145 Moderate CONGUACO 3,443 58 33 494,217 936,541 144 Moderate


62

EL ADELANTO 520 12 4 77,400 146,673 149 Moderate SAN JOSÉ ACATEMPA 673 17 3 99,459 188,475 148 Moderate YUPILTEPEQUE 1,145 29 11 162,195 307,360 142 Moderate SAN JOSE 1,329 11 11 180,802 432,117 136 Moderate SANTA ANA 5,021 56 52 589,959 1,410,002 117 Moderate QUETZALTENANGO 813 110 3 101,402 161,229 125 Moderate SALCAJÁ 348 25 2 40,880 64,999 117 Moderate SAN CARLOS SIJA 96 92 2 12,234 19,452 127 Moderate SAN ANDRÉS VILLASECA 8,147 101 89 1,163,048 2,273,759 143 Moderate SAN FELIPE 2,753 32 20 398,739 779,535 145 Moderate PANAJACHEL 2,165 12 10 254,972 407,955 118 Moderate SAN PEDRO LA LAGUNA 1,412 12 10 170,097 272,155 120 Moderate CUYOTENANGO 8,807 83 63 893,422 1,688,568 101 Moderate PATULUL 3,257 34 17 398,260 752,711 122 Moderate SANTO DOMINGO SUCHITEPEQUEZ 8,255 81 63 836,005 1,580,049 101 Moderate

115,337 1,829 796 14,603,113 26,410,141 129

IZTAPA 1,481 25 12 212,528 402,741 144 Low LA GOMERA 4,331 57 26 618,090 1,171,281 143 Low NUEVA CONCEPCIÓN 8,871 147 90 1,260,737 2,164,741 142 Low PUEBLO NUEVO TIQUISATE 1,213 52 7 173,799 339,777 143 Low PUERTO SAN JOSÉ 3,978 57 23 576,630 1,092,714 145 Low FRAIJANES 3,393 35 12 459,919 731,271 136 Low MIXCO 18,471 123 46 2,328,829 3,586,397 126 Low SAN JOSE DEL GOLFO 1,091 16 12 147,762 234,942 135 Low SAN PEDRO AYAMPUC 8,030 42 24 1,039,078 1,652,134 129 Low SANTA CATARINA PINULA 8,676 36 18 1,094,543 1,685,596 126 Low SAN MANUEL CHAPARRON 776 32 16 121,704 230,629 157 Low ASUNCIÓN MITA 4,644 101 59 680,076 1,288,744 146 Low ATESCATEMPA 1,182 44 14 171,911 325,771 145 Low MOYUTA 8,060 108 80 1,151,995 2,183,031 143 Low SANTA CATARINA MITA 2,328 57 19 338,830 642,083 146 Low FLORES 8,749 64 59 1,013,591 2,422,483 116 Low SAN BENITO 8,930 48 43 1,328,387 3,174,845 149 Low LA ESPERANZA 752 15 4 87,272 138,762 116 Low SAN JUAN OSTUNCALCO 272 72 4 32,526 51,716 120 Low CHAMPERICO 5,957 72 58 819,517 1,602,156 138 Low RETALHULEU 11,333 131 99 1,594,168 3,116,598 141 Low AYUTLA 3,234 40 24 357,687 729,681 111 Low OCOS 6,167 47 41 607,652 1,239,610 99 Low CHIQUIMULILLA 9,474 134 104 1,453,119 2,753,661 153 Low TAXISCO 5,345 71 57 788,756 1,494,693 148 Low GUALAN 5,315 122 95 786,825 1,609,057 148 Low Zona 17 5,180 16 16 667,333 1,027,693 129 Low Zona 6 3,141 8 8 410,378 631,982 131 Low

150,374 1,772 1,070 20,323,642 37,724,789 136


63

Annex 6 Implementation of VLE 2007 by groups at risk

MUNICIPALITY Students served

No. of schools

Schools assisted Rations Investment

(Q) Days

served Grade of risk

SAN CRISTOBAL VERAPAZ 7,473 100 50 657,452 1,416,810 88 Very high

TACTIC 2,824 51 15 236,442 509,533 84 Very high

TAMAHU 2,403 40 21 179,259 380,303 75 Very high

RABINAL 8,710 106 54 645,838 1,391,781 74 Very high

CAMOTAN 8,274 148 118 562,994 1,393,410 68 Very high

JOCOTAN 7,902 147 128 534,909 1,323,900 68 Very high

OLOPA 4,069 87 70 262,991 650,903 65 Very high

SAN JUAN LA ERMITA 2,931 66 56 213,159 527,569 73 Very high

SAN JUAN ATITAN 2,781 25 20 28,684 63,095 10 Very high

SAN RAFAEL PETZAL 1,871 32 14 17,077 36,271 9 Very high

SAN SEBASTIAN HUEHUETENANGO 5,757 57 50 60,880 130,220 11 Very high

SANTA BARBARA 7,225 60 50 123,183 267,346 17 Very high

SANTIAGO CHIMALTENANGO 1,141 20 15 11,176 24,429 10 Very high

SAN PEDRO PINULA 9,393 102 78 804,907 1,673,405 86 Very high

ALMOLONGA 186 11 1 11,160 17,186 60 Very high

CANTEL 1,871 52 13 104,337 160,679 56 Very high

SAN MIGUEL SIGUILA 687 12 2 32,978 50,783 48 Very high

ZUNIL 995 19 10 61,922 95,360 62 Very high

CHICHE 6,285 62 57 25,340 41,811 4 Very high

SAN ANTONIO ILOTENANGO 5,736 48 45 30,352 50,081 5 Very high

SAN ANTONIO PALOPÓ 2,949 31 30 135,431 213,981 46 Very high

SAN JUAN LA LAGUNA 2,040 19 16 79,264 125,235 39 Very high

SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN 4,761 41 34 245,159 421,673 51 Very high

SAN MARCOS LA LAGUNA 704 4 5 34,218 54,064 49 Very high

SAN PABLO LA LAGUNA 1,814 8 6 88,405 139,680 49 Very high

SANTA CATARINA PALOPÓ 933 10 10 38,990 61,604 42 Very high

SANTA CRUZ LA LAGUNA 1,286 13 13 36,839 58,206 29 Very high

SANTIAGO ATITLÁN 6,590 53 46 320,280 550,882 49 Very high

ZUNILITO 1,093 19 11 93,975 202,516 86 Very high

SAN ANDRES XECUL 2,723 48 14 143,688 221,280 53 Very high

SAN CRISTOBAL TOTONICAPAN 4,572 53 25 247,448 381,070 54 Very high

SAN FRANCISCO EL ALTO 371 89 2 21,457 33,044 58 Very high

118,350 1,633 1,079 6,090,194 12,668,110 49

SAN MIGUEL TUCURU 2,212 94 26 172,509 383,833 78 High

SANTA CRUZ VERAPAZ 3,945 51 27 319,155 687,779 81 High

SANTA MARIA CAHABON 12,570 165 140 1,304,985 2,988,416 104 High

CUBULCO 9,605 158 100 573,525 1,276,093 60 High

PURULHA 6,229 143 73 372,353 828,485 60 High

SAN MIGUEL CHICAJ 6,212 67 35 471,097 1,015,214 76 High

COMAPA 5,969 74 53 447,851 891,223 75 High


64

OLINTEPEQUE 1,609 29 7 90,484 139,345 56 High

CHICACAO 8,087 64 40 619,852 1,335,781 77 High

SAN JOSE EL IDOLO 1,527 22 16 107,963 232,660 71 High

LA UNION 4,696 60 48 314,025 674,212 67 High

62,661 927 565 4,793,799 10,453,041 73

COBAN 6,333 385 36 545,034 1,174,548 86 Moderate

SALAMA 6,918 147 61 508,892 1,096,662 74 Moderate

SANTA CRUZ EL CHOL 1,839 45 27 138,319 298,077 75 Moderate

CHINAUTLA 11,987 52 21 668,441 1,069,506 56 Moderate

CHUARRANCHO 1,709 19 12 91,665 157,205 54 Moderate

PALENCIA 8,259 85 47 497,590 853,367 60 Moderate

SAN JOSÉ PINULA 7,361 52 31 430,786 738,798 59 Moderate

SAN PEDRO SACATEPÉQUEZ 6,442 31 15 395,783 678,768 61 Moderate

SAN RAYMUNDO 5,605 43 27 317,923 545,238 57 Moderate

MATAQUESCUINTLA 5,184 85 56 415,806 827,454 80 Moderate

MONJAS 2,491 63 24 224,806 447,364 90 Moderate

SAN LUIS JILOTEPEQUE 3,012 57 45 269,010 535,330 89 Moderate

CONGUACO 3,443 58 33 271,997 541,274 79 Moderate

EL ADELANTO 520 12 4 41,110 81,809 79 Moderate

SAN JOSÉ ACATEMPA 673 17 3 53,167 105,802 79 Moderate

YUPILTEPEQUE 1,145 29 11 90,455 180,005 79 Moderate

SAN JOSE 1,329 11 11 99,926 257,309 75 Moderate

SANTA ANA 5,006 56 51 373,609 962,028 75 Moderate

QUETZALTENANGO 813 110 3 43,932 67,655 54 Moderate

SALCAJÁ 384 25 2 22,834 35,164 59 Moderate

SAN CARLOS SIJA 96 92 2 6,144 9,462 64 Moderate

SAN ANDRÉS VILLASECA 8,147 101 89 665,633 1,366,545 82 Moderate

SAN FELIPE 2,753 32 20 220,006 451,672 80 Moderate

PANAJACHEL 2,165 12 10 97,087 153,397 45 Moderate

SAN PEDRO LA LAGUNA 1,412 12 10 61,198 96,693 43 Moderate

CUYOTENANGO 8,807 83 63 568,607 1,225,348 65 Moderate

PATULUL 3,257 34 17 208,598 449,529 64 Moderate

SANTO DOMINGO SUCHITEPEQUEZ 8,255 81 63 578,318 1,246,275 70 Moderate

115,345 1,829 794 7,906,676 15,652,284 69

IZTAPA 1,481 25 12 132,355 263,386 89 Low

LA GOMERA 4,331 57 26 341,662 679,907 79 Low

NUEVA CONCEPCIÓN 8,871 147 90 748,613 1,536,902 84 Low

PUEBLO NUEVO TIQUISATE 1,213 52 7 96,827 196,733 80 Low

PUERTO SAN JOSÉ 3,978 57 23 357,639 1,092,714 90 Low

FRAIJANES 3,393 35 12 201,448 345,483 59 Low

MIXCO 19,391 123 46 1,035,681 1,657,090 53 Low

SAN JOSE DEL GOLFO 1,106 16 12 63,106 108,227 57 Low

SAN PEDRO AYAMPUC 8,030 42 25 459,309 787,715 57 Low


65

SANTA CATARINA PINULA 8,676 36 18 497,259 795,614 57 Low

Zona 17 5,180 16 16 297,804 476,486 57 Low

Zona 6 3,141 8 8 166,234 265,974 53 Low

SAN MANUEL CHAPARRON 776 32 16 69,840 138,982 90 Low

ASUNCIÓN MITA 4,644 101 59 404,485 804,925 87 Low

ATESCATEMPA 1,182 44 14 106,380 211,696 90 Low

MOYUTA 8,060 108 80 636,640 1,266,914 79 Low

SANTA CATARINA MITA 2,328 57 19 181,068 360,325 78 Low

FLORES 8,749 64 59 655,983 1,689,156 75 Low

SAN BENITO 8,930 48 43 675,737 3,174,845 76 Low

LA ESPERANZA 752 15 4 42,342 65,207 56 Low

SAN JUAN OSTUNCALCO 272 72 4 15,288 23,544 56 Low

PATZITE 1,670 15 16 8,218 13,560 5 Low

CHAMPERICO 5,866 72 58 472,412 969,862 81 Low

RETALHULEU 11,333 131 99 938,064 1,925,845 83 Low

AYUTLA 3,234 40 24 265,188 590,043 82 Low

OCOS 6,167 47 41 508,925 1,132,358 83 Low

CHIQUIMULILLA 9,400 134 104 792,156 1,576,390 84 Low

TAXISCO 5,345 71 57 481,050 957,290 90 Low

GUALAN 5,315 122 95 459,926 987,461 87 Low

152,814 1,787 1,087 11,111,639 24,094,634 72

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