residing at the Kwa-Madala Hostel. Fish was also injured in the attack, although the circumstances under which he was injured are unknown to me.

On the 15th March 1992, an attack took place at Chief's Place Tavern in Sharpville. It was reported to me that two women had been killed and that several had been injured. I was further informed that one of the perpetrators of the attack had also been injured and was in the Sebokeng Hospital.

We visited the victims and the injured perpetrator, at the Sebokeng Hospital.

I am aware that the perpetrator, Mr. X, agreed to submit an affidavit and give evidence to this Commission.

I refer the Commission to his affidavit, wherein he states that he and three other residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel (who formed part of a "unit" and whom had been trained in the use of weapons) were given arms and were sent out to attack Chief's Place and Philadelphia Tavern. He further states that arts and

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32.

ammunition arrive at the hostel on a regular basis and are stored there.

On the 16th April 1992 at the Trevcr Building, Voortrekker Street, Vereeniging, where the offices of the S.A.C.C. are situated, a number of people attending at other offices in the building were assaulted by members of the Inkatha Freedom Party.

I telephoned the offices of the Inkatha Freedom Party and discussed the matter with a Mr. Nhlapo at their offices. He undertook to make an inquiry.

Shortly thereafter, two young girls arrived at our offices, asking for protection as they had narrowly escaped kidnapping outside the Mark Park Shopping Centre in Voortrekker Street, adjacent to our offices.I again telephoned Mr. Nhlapo who acknowledged that his ■eMbers were harassing people in the Trevor Building and the vicinity.

The victims of the assaults and these two young women reported to me that their assailants are known to them to be residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel.

On Friday the 17th April 1992, two young men, Paul Mthimkulu and Oupa Yika were kidnapped in Zone 7, Sebokeng. Two eye-witnesses to the kidnapping recognised two of the kidnappers who are known to then, namely, Khetisi Victor Kheswa and Makhahleni. Khetisi Kheswa was in custody until sometime in April. Prior to his arrest, it was known that he resided at the Kwa-Madala Hostel.

The bodies of the two young men who were kidnapped were identified by their families at the Vereeniging Mortuary on the 19th April 1992.

A docket has been opened at the Sebokeng Police Station. The Commission is referred to the affidavits of Mzwakhe Nhlapo and P. M. who witnessed the kidnapping. Mr. Nhlapo has subsequently been killed by the police.

In the early hours of the 19th April 1992, eight members of the Lefeidi family of 8023 Vergenoeg, Sharpville, were killed by gunmen who forcefully entered the house. The men armed with AK47's, raped two of the women in the house before killing them and six other family members.

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34.

35.

Edith Hloadi, a Std. 9 pupil, was also raped by one ofthe gunmen. She is the only survivor. She believesshe was not killed because the assailants thought shewas dead as the blood of her mother had splattered all over her.

The Commission is referred to the affidavit of Edith Hloadi wherein she states that she did not know the assailants but she thought they came from the Kwa-Madala Hostel because they had stated when questioning the family members and asking for money that, "There was no food at the Kwa-Madala Hostel".

On the 19th April 1992, a member of Inkatha was

attacked and killed outside the Lefeidi home. I am not aware who was responsible for this attack.

We are of the view that the Kwa-Madala Hostel iscentral to the reign of violence in the Vaal area. Werequest that the Commission inquire into the assertionmade by Mr. X that the Hostel is organised and run as amilitary style camp from where violent -missions1' are launched.

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36 .

37,

38.

Myself and my colleagues at the S.A.C.C. believe thatthe steps to be taken to prevent further violence isthe closure of the Kwa-Madala Hostel. We request thatthe Commission inquire into the process and mechanismfor such a closure. We understand that the processwill require extensive discussions with the respective parties.

We also request the Commission to assist in ensuring that the perpetrators of the violence be charged and brought to trial. This is particularly urgent in relation to perpetrators who have been identified as having been involved repeatedly in attacks.

We also request the Commission to inquire into whetherthe police are empowered to conduct raids of the hostelon receipt of information regarding unlawful activitiesof residents of the hostel and to advise the police inrelation thereto. Should the Commission find that interms of current Legislation the police are not soempowered, we request that the Commission recommend tothe State President that Legislation be passedempowering the police to conduct such raids of the hostels.

t ’ ► * '4 .

39' Tt is “y N e r v a t i o n that since the massacre of theLefeidi family, the level of tension and anger has risen dramatically in the area.

I believe that residents of Sharpville, Sebokeng andBoipatong have been looking to the Commission for a

q remedy for the end of the violence, since our initialrequest to the Commission in March 1992. I am fearfulthat any further delay will result in the loss of more lives.

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THUS DONE, SIGNED AND SWORN to before me at this the dav Dfa m ^ ^ a s ^ o r r erSt?ndS cin£entse£ nS i s haVin9this oath*binding on h i s ^ n s c i e n c e " 9 °ath a”d considers

COMMISSIONER OF OATHS FULL NAMES :ADDRESS :

DU-

V A A L C O U N C IL OF C H U R C H E SP.O. Box 3630VEREENIGING1930Tel: 22-0*

22-3005

Room^Ol Trevor Building 22 Voortrekker Street

t/ereemgiog 1935

i* ax 2 ' i - ‘+h26

24 S E P T E M B E R 1

TO I S C O R MANAGEMENT

M _ E _ M _ 0 _ R A N D U M

The V A A L C O U N C I L OF C H U R C H E S is a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of d i f f e r e n t c h u r c h e s a c r o s s d e n o m i n a t i o n s , m a k e s an e a r n e s t a p p e a l to the I s c o r m a n a g e m e n t to b e c o m e g e n u i n e a b o u t the t a l k s c o n c e r n i n g the K w a - M a d a l a p r o b l e m . We a p p e a l t h a t we must w o r k c o l l e c t i v e l y to n o r m a l i s e the s i t u a t i o n in our r e g i o n of the V a a l . We like all of us to l o o k f o r w a r d w i t h c o n f i d e n t to the day w h e n all w h o w o r k for g o o d - w i l l will be one w i t h no t h o u g h t to t h e i r s e p a r a t e n e s s as W h i t e s and B l a c k s , or an y o t h e r d i s t i n a t i o n s .This w i l l be the day w h e n we b r i n g i n t o full r e a l i z a t i o n of thep r e s e n t S o u t h A f r i c a n d r e a m of the e n v i s a g e d ........ " Ne w S o u t hA f r i c a " a d r e a m as y e t u n f u l f i l l e d . A d r e a m w h e r e e v e r y man will r e s p e c t the d i g n i t y a n d w o r t h of the h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y .T h a t is a dream. . . .

We l i k e to b r i n g a w a r e n e s s to I s c o r m a n a g e m e n t t h a t the C h u r c h e s , p e o p l e ar e v e r y c r o s s e d w i t h the w a y the m a n a g e m e n t h a v e d e a l t w i t h the K w a - M a d a l a m a t t e r . A n d t h u s r e f l e c t s t h a t the m a n a g e m e n t is or has n e v e r b e e n s e r i o u s a b o u t th e m a t t e r . The true r e f l e c t i o n of this c o n c e r n s is the c o m p a n y r e c e n t p u b l i s h e d o v e r n i g h t p o l i c y d o c u m e n t t h a t a l m o s t j u s t i f i e s the l e g a l and ° f f i c i a 1 ise stay of i n m a t e s at K w a - M a d a l a old c o m p o u n d .

We l i k e to r e m i n d the m a n a g e m e n t t h a t t h e r e h a v e b e e n s o m e e l e m e n t s of h i p o c r a c y in the p a s t t a l k s b e t w e e n t h e m a n d our d e l e g a t i o n b e c a u s e all t h a t is c u r r e n t l y m e n t i o n e d in the p o l i c y p a p e r is e x t r e m e l y in c o n t r a s t w i t h w h a t they s a i d d u r i n g our D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 0 ta l k s . " T h e y said, t h e y d i s c u s s e d the m a t t e r w i t h t h e i r h e a d o f f i c e in P r e t o r i a a n d c e r t a i n l y the c o m p l e x

wi 11 be c l o s e d as it was not r e o p e n e d o f f i c i a l l y by the m a n a g e m e n t . T h ese p e o p l e h a v e o c c u p i e d the s t r u c t u r e i l l e g a l l y ana o f f i c i a l l y . The c o m p l e x is r e c o r d e d been c l o s e d " . W h e n did y o u o f f i c i a l l y a f t e r t h e s e m e e t i n g s o p e n e d t h e s e c o m p l e x as p l a c e of r e s i d e n c e ?

To a a a on this, you s w e a t e d that t h e r e are no s t r a n g e r s l i v i n gin the c o m p o u n d , but w h a t is the s i t u a t i o n t h e r e ? We r e m i n dyou once m o r e t h a t . . . y o u r u l t i m a t e m e a s u r e s h o u l d n o t be w h e r eyou s t a n d in m o m e n t s of c o n f o r t and c o n v e n i e n c e as it is y o u rcase p r e s e n t l y , but w h e r e y o u will s t a n d at times of c h a l l e g e a n dc o n t r o v e r s y . D u r i n g the time we w e r e p r e s e n t i n g the m e m o r a n d u mon 1 5 / 0 7 / 9 2 the c o m p a n y m a n a g e m e n t Mr. J. V i l j o e n r e f l e c t e d h i se n t i r e w i l l i n g n e s s to r e s o l v e the p r o b l e m a m i c a b l y as a m a t t e rof u r g e n c y . We w e r e d i s g u s t e d to r e c e i v e a n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s e ,f a xed to our o f f i c e s t a t i n g that o u r c o n c e r n e s as a C h u r c h are u n f o u n d e d and u n t r u e .

We h a v e w i t n e s s e d t e r r i b l e t h i n g s in ou r area, B o i p a t o n g , a n d _ S e b o k e n g and its h o s t e l c o m p l e x , d e a r l i v e s w e r e l o s t and f a m i l i e s l o s t t h e i r m e m b e r s , c h i l d r e n b e c a m e o r p h a n s a n d l e f t d e s t i t u t e d f o r life. T h i s m u s t s t o p as a m a t t e r of f a c t and u r g e n c y . As m u c h as we can d e p l o r e v i o l e n c e , but t h e r e is on e evil t h a t is w o r s e t h a n v i o l e n c e i t s e l f , an d that is c o w a r d i c e , the c o w a r d i c e that m i g h t or c e r t a i n l y h a v e c o u g h t up w i t h you, b e c a u s e y o u s e e m e d to be a f r a i d to do j u s t i c e to t h i s p r o b l e m .The f a c t r e m a i n s now, that, we are n o w f a c e d w i t h the f i e r c e u r g e n c y of now. In t h i s u n f o l d i n g c o n u n d r u m of l i f e t h e r e is s u c h a t h i n g as b e i n g l a te. We ask y o u to act b e f o r e is too late.

A p e a c e t r e a t y was s i g n e d r e c e n t l y a n d we h o p e that y o u will n o tbe a p a r t y to d e s t r o y it. We a p p e a l to y o u r c o m p a n y ’ n o t tobe a p a s s i v e o b j e c t fo r m a n u p u l a t i o n but. to be an a g e n t of ou r h i s t o r y .

3 / W e .

M flUHRHT H B M I K S TO THfi TERMS C- BBrKRfiwrE

1. a . On the night of the 17th June 1992 a group of persons (variously estimated as numbering between 100 to 500 people) attacked the township of Boipatong in the Vaal Triangle.

b. The attack was sudden, was carried out with tremendous ferocity, savagery, ruthlessness and lasted for approximately 3/4 hour - lhr.

c. The attackers left in their wake more than 4 0 people dead, many people injured, some seriously azd more than 300 houses damaged. The attack was carried out with spears, pangas, firearms, knives, kieries and was directed at random at the residents of Boipatong and of the adjacent squatter camp Slovo Park.

d. The attackers killed men, women and children indiscriminately and stole various items cf property from many of the houses in particular, television sets, clothing, other household goods and food.

e. It is common cause that the attackers camefrom the KwaMadala Hostel situated to the West of Boipatong and that they had walked from the hostel to the township entering from the Southern side and

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thereafter dividing into various groups which marauded through the township and into Slovo Park attacking houses and, in many instances, people in the houses, before leaving the township on the Western side, crossing Frikkie Meyer Boulevard in order to return to the hostel.

f. The precise time of the attack has not teen established but it probably commenced shortly before 22h00 and ended between 22h30 and 22h45. The group of attackers was seen to have re-crossed Frikkie Meyer Boulevard at approximately 23h00 or shortly before that time.

g. It is also common cause that the residents of Boipatong and Slovo Park comprise mainly pro-ANC or ANC orientated people while the residents of the KwaMadala Hostel are mainly Zulu speaking and are supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party.

a. Immediately after the massacre the Goldstone Commissionwas charged with the task of inquiring into the eventsof the 17th June 1992 and pursuant thereto a Commissionwas set up under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice R.Goldstone.

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The Conmirsion, in consultation with the legal representatives of the various interested parties who were to take part in the Commission, determined the scope anc ambit of the inquiry to be conducted by the Commission and agreed upon its terms of reference which are set cut on pages 1 to 2 of Volume 1 of the Record. They are the following : -

i. The identity of the persons directly responsible for the massacre;

ii. The cause of the massacre, the nature, time and place of planning of the massacre and the persons responsible for the massacre and the planning thereof;

iii. The action taken by members of the SADF who were in The vicinity of the KwaMadala Hostel immediately after the massacre;

iv. Whether any steps could or should have been taken by the SAP to prevent or avert the massacre;

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v. The nature and efficiency of the investigation by the SAP after the massacre;

vi. Steps which would be taker, to prevent or avert any recurrence of such acts of public violence.

Priot to commencing its sitting the chairman requestedthe assistance of Dr.P.A.J.Waddington Director CriminalJustice Study University of Reiding England to reportto the Commission in regard to all aspects of thepolice response to the event of the 17th June 1992, andpursuant to this request Ir. Waddington and twoassistants from the London Metropolitan Police came toSouth Africa, attended the iritial hearing of theCommission and thereupon conducted an investigation andreported back to the Commission on the 2 0th July 1992.This comprises a comprehensive report of 48 pages andan "executive Summary" containing Dr. Waddington'ssummary of his factual inquiry and evaluation flowing therefrom.

In response to the Waddington report the SAP initially

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submitted a 16 page document joining issue with Dr.Waddington in respect cf many of the criticisms levelled by him against the police conduct on the nicht in question and generally. The response does however also acknowledge certain shortcomings in the organisation, manpower, equipment, control and methods of operation of the South African Police in the Vaal Triangle generally and it deals with matters which were to receive attention. The South African Police have now (on 27 October 1992) submitted a lengthy progress report - "in respect of the policing events in Boipatong on 17 June 1992". We will address the Commission in regard to relevant aspect os these reports and will submit that in considering end evaluating them the Commission must do so in the light of the evidence which has been placed before the Commission relating to the conduct of the South African Police.

This portion of the argument will deal specifically with the terms of reference numbered (iv) , (v) and at the end of the argument as a whole we will make submissions relating to the 6th term of reference.

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"CQULD OR SHOULD STEPS BEEN TAKEN EY THE SAP TO PREVENT OR AVERT THE MASSACRE"

1. a. The events of the 17th June 1992 and the conduct cf the South African Police can only be evaluated, understood and dealt with against the background and history of the Vaal Triangle generally and the ongoing tensions, conflicts and history of violence between the KwaKadala Hostel and the residents of Boipatong in particular.

b. As part of its opening statement the ANC/Vaal Council of Churches, pplaced before the Commission various documents as evidence of this history and of the ongoing complaints about the KwaMadala Hostel, vhich had, for some time, been a festering sore and which had been the cause of a great deal of violence.

c. The authorities and in particular the SAP, were well aware of the inflammable situation in the Vaal Triangle generally, and the uneasy relationship between the Kva-Madala hostel and Boipatong township in particular.

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They were well aware of the fact that the conflict was rooted primarily in the political differences between the residents of Boipatong (ANC) and of the F.vaMadala Hostel (IFP) and that frequent outbreaks of violence (as set out in the memorandum) had ensued.

Accordingly the SAP knew that trouble could erupt at any time between the residents of KwaMadala and the township residents and they must also have been aware of attacks on township residents which had taken place certain parts of the country by the residents of Inkatha based hostels e .g.Swanieville and Bruntville in Natal also the Madala Hostel in Alexandra Township.

We make the submission that in the light of and with knowledge of this background, the SAP could have taken steps to avert an attack of this nature. We submit that the degree of surveillance, monitoring, patrolling and vigilance on the part of the SAP in this area was totally inadequate and that their response to the emergency which arose that night was completely ineffective and failed to provide any protection to the residents of Boipatong. An examination of the conduct of the SAP on the night in question provides ample evidence for these submissions.

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f. It is submitted that there is a reasonable probability that vith adequate patrolling and monitoring of the area and the operation of an early warning system, eg. by maintaining a police presence outside the hostel throughout the night, the attackers could either have been prevented from leaving the hostel or, having left could have been stopped or diverted and that, in any event the residents of Boipatong could have been alerted and could themselves had taken defensive action to avoid or minimise the impact of any attack which may have ensued. As it was, they were caught completely unawares. When they were at their most vulnerable and were unprotected and unable to defend themselves.

g. It is clear that until 22h00 when the first reports of trouble in Boipatong began to reach the police radio, no reports had been received that an attack was to take place in Boipatong that night. The report by Rev.Paul Verryn to Col.Gouws earlier that evening had been of a general nature appeared to Col.Gouws to relate more specifically to Sebokeng. No mention had been made by Verryn of Boipatong.

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The report did however alert Gouws to the fact that trouble was expected "somewhere" in the Vaal Triangle that night end should have, at the very least, have caused him to convey that message to all the police units in the Vaal Triangle so as to place them on general alert should trouble erupt in any of the areas falling within their jurisdiction. This he did not do and the Comnission may consider that Col. Gouws failed in his duty in not doing so.

h. As far as the ISU/Vanderbijlpark/ Vereeniging Police units were concerned, the first indications of an attack came when reports began to be received at approximately 22h00. It must, at that stage had been apparent to the police that these reports indicated something mere serious than the norxal outbreak of violence in the township; something of major proportions was obviously happening and required instant and drastic response. What the police knew at +/- 22h00 was : -

i. that by about 22h00 various reports had been received that a group of Inkatha nembers was busy damaging property in Boipatong;

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ii. that there had been various shooting incidents in Dangen and Playfair Boulevard and that shots had been coining inter alia from Eoipatong and reports of shooting from the vicinity of Cape Gate.;

ii. that Wilkins and De Jager had been unable to get to their work at Cape Gate because of a large group of men crossing Frikkie Meyer Boulevard in the direction of Boipatong.

i. Uncontroverted evidence was also given by the garage attendant Meshack Theoane and the security guard David Lengana that at approximately 22h00 they had seen a large group of people coming from the direction of KwaMadala and proceeding towards Boipatong Township. They had sounded the alarm which was linked directly to the Vanderbijlpark Police Station and had been visited by a yellow police van in which there were two policemen to whom they made a report. The van then drove off to the direction of Vanderbi j lpark seemingly unresponsive to their report and there is no record as to whether the police ever responded to this report.

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2. a. Upor receipt of the various reports of trouble in Boipatong which were radioed through to the radio control roon at the ISU at 22'zlO Sgt.Kruger, who was in command at the unit that night (since Capt.Roos, the comnanding officer had gone off duty at 16h00 and was at tome the whole evening) sent Sgt. Schlebusch and 5 men in a Casspir to investigate. Schlebusch took about 20 minutes to get to Boipatong and according to him his arrival at the township coincided with the arrival of the municipal Casspir which case from Boipatong Police Starion. (The evidence given by the Municipal Casspir driver Kanye contradicts the evidence of Schlebusch in this regard).

b. Kruger himself did not leave for Boipatong until about2 0 minutes later since he was, according to Schlebusch, attending to "administrative work" at the office. The result is that in response to the urgent reports of violence in Boipatong, the ISJ dispatched one Casspir manned by six men to investigate. Kruger arrived some time later (at approximately 22h4 5) in a Nyala armoured vehicle with 5 men.

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c. ^he ISU's response, by any standards, was thus hopelessly inadequate both in respect of the manpower dispatched and the time that it took for them to reach the scene.

d. It is significant that according to Schlebusch when he arrived at house 761 Elubi Street, where he met Abednego Mabuza, he was told by Mabuza that the attackers had "just been there" and that the attack on house 761 had only just taken place. Instead of giving chase in order to apprehend them Schelbusch's response was to drive along Hlubi Street to investigate danage to houses and then having travelled a distance in Hlubi Street he reversed his Casspir into the yard of house 7 61 and proceeded to investigate the attack at this house and thereafter, at house 765. It must have been apparent to him at that stage that a large scale attack had occured.

He concedes that at no stage did he follow after of attempt to give chase to the attackers or to ascertain who they were or where they came from. He stated, as did Kruger, that his function as a member of the ISU

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was simply to "stabilise" the area and not to pursue criminals who had not committed offences in his presence or whom he could not see or immediately apprehend; this was the xxxxxxxx of the investigating team.

According to Major.Davidson, in his opening statement, the Internal Stability Division stationed at Poverville Vereeniging is responsible for "attending to all unrest related incidents in the Vaal Triangle". It is submitted that this function must surely involve more than merely "stabilising the area". It must have been within the jurisdiction and powers of the ISU to engage in hot pursuit of these attackers, particularly having received a report that they had only just left the scene of the attach.

Sgt.Kruger confirmed the evidence of Schlebusch relating to the functions of the ISU and also did nothing that night to attempt to follow up or apprehend any of the attackers and he gave no instructions to Schlebusch to do so. Instead he directed his attention to stablising the area by preventing the Boipatong residents from attacking Kwa-Madala.

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Having regard to the apparently extensive radio communications network which existed in the area and in the light of the reports which were been received from2 2h00 onwards, it is submitted that the SAP (in particular the ISU) should have : -

i. Alerted all the police stations in the area (e.g.Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Sebokeng, Boipatong, Sharpeville) and requested tfcem to send all available manpower and armoured vehicles to the area; and

ii. alerted the SADF i.e. Vaal Commando and Group 17. This would have been an obvious and a simple procedure having regard to the fact that the SADF have a man stationed in the ISU radio control room to monitor incoming reports for the SADF and he would therefore have been in a position immediately to radio SADF units;

iii. Called up and placed more personnel and vehicles from ISU on alert to deal with what must have appeared to him to be an extraordinary and serious situation.

Even if it was not immediately apparent to the people in the radio control room and to Sergeant Kruger as the person in command, that an attack of major proportions was taking place, Kruger should have been sufficiently sensitive to the situation and to reading and interpreting the incoming messages, and he should have adopted a much more urgent and active response than the casual and relatively unconcerned attitude which he in fact adopted. After all he had been in the ISU and in a riot control unit for 8 years and was therefore very experienced in dealing with unrest and emergency situations.

At the very least the manner in which the police responsed that night indicates a total lack of co-ordination and an insensitivity and lack of concern which falls far short of that expected of the police in these circumstances.

The actions of Capt. Roos and the situation he was placed by his subordinates is a further indication of this. He was at home and less able to follov on his radio the progress of the events

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that evening. He spoke to acd received reports from both Schlebusch and Kruger on his radio, he did not consider it necessary either to go to the scene himself or to mobilise ar.y additional forces to do so.

He simply regarded this as a normal outbreak of violence which had to be and in fact was brought under control and which therefore required no further attention from him. Accordingly at 24h4 5 he went off the air and had no further communication with his unit that night.

Even if it was not initially apparent it certainly became apparent to Kruger and ttose in the radio control room within a few hours ttat a massacre had taken place and that something more drastic than normal police action was required; yet nofcody took any steps to communicate with the Commanding Officer Captain Roos (which could have been done by telephone) to advise him that an attack of major proportions had taken place in his area of jurisdiction. He might not, himself, have been able to add anything to the situation at that late

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stage but it does suggest either extreme indifference or grcss incompetence and the failure to notify the Commanding Officer of the massacre that night seems to characterize the attitude and conduct of the SAP in relation to the massacre.

4. a. Sergeant Schlebusch acted strictly within the parameters of what he considered to be his functions but m-st surely be faulted for having failed to follow the attackers, at least to ascertain, if possible, who they were and where they came from, even if, with the manpower at his disposal, he wculd not have been able to effect arrests.

b. His conduct thereafter in leaving the township and going to the Trek Garage where he remained for about an hour and half monitoring the situation was simply carried out under orders from F.oos and Kruger. This was, however, a completely useless and unproductive exercise in the circumstances; instead of worrying about whether the Boipatong residents were going to attack Kwa-Madala, he should have been instructed to assist in investigating the crire.

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c. Kruger comes in for severe criticism in a number cf respects : -

i. His failure to respond more rapidly ar.i effectively to the reports which were being received at the ISU;

ii. For thedecision which he took at Kwa-Madala not to attempt to enter the hostel or to try and apprehend any of the attackers or, at least, to obtain evidence relating to the attack.

His suggestion that it would have been dangerous for him, with only 5 men at his disposal, to attempt to enter the hostel that night, is not, with respect, a tenable one. The fact is that he never even made proper enquiries as to whether and when the attackers had returned to the hostel; he simply accepted the vord of the gateman thct everyone was inside and that everything was under control. He made no attempt to get together a team of all the security forces in the area, namely, the SADF, other police units, Iscor

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security or reinforcements which had been called for, to enter the hostel that night.

iii. It was surely any essential part of the investigation that evidence be obtained and secured before it could be destroyed or disposed off by the attackers. In this regard one has in mind firearms, (and the ballistics evidence which could have been conclusive) bloodstained spears knives, pangas, bloodstained clothing and goods stolen by the attackers which might have been found in the hostel. Such evidence, even if it could not have been linked to any particular person, would at least have established the fact that the attackers came from the hostel and would have laid the basis for further investigation.

d. It cannot be an answer for Kruger to be heard to say that that was a matter for the "investigating team" which had been called to the scene and that he as a member of the ISU was not concerned with that aspect but was merely concerned with "stabilising the area".

In fact, the primary concern of Capt.roos and Sgt.Kruger seems to have been to prevent the persons in Boipatong who were threatening to attack the hostel from crossing FrikJ_i.e Meyer Boulevard and going to the hostel; this appears to have been more important to the SAP that night than to have apprehended the attackers or some of them or to have obtained vital evidence.

It is small wonder that the residents of Boipatong would have had the perception that the police were not interested in protecting them from an attack of this nature but that they vere more concerned with protecting the residents of KwaMadala who vere then attackers.

Furthermore, there appears to have been no consultation between the police and the leaders of the group or groups in Boipatong who seened to be bent upon a "revenge" attack on KwaMadala whereas subsequently the police negotiated with and spoke quite freely to the representatives of the hostel dwellers before taking any action against them.

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h. The perception of the township residents was further heightened by the fact that : -

i. A number of of them had seen Casspirs in thetownship at the time that the attack was taking place. Some believe that they saw Casspirs assisting the attackers and that they had dropped off or picked up some attackers. A witnesshad also observed the SADF Buffels which were parked across Frikkie Meyer Boulevard allow the the attackers who were returning from Boipatong to kwaMadala to cross the road;.

ii. Add to this the fact that in the past township residents had the distinct impression that the police always shoed a distinct bias towards the followers of Inkatha and against the followers of the ANC.

5. a. Our broad submission in regard to this issue then, is that even though the security forces may have been outnumbered had they attempted to stop the march on

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Boipatong end divert the attackers, they were in armoured vehicles and were obviously better armed and equipped. They could, by using flares to light up the area, tearsroke and if necessary fire=rms with rubber bullets or rear live ammunition, have prevented a group of several hundred men armed as they were, from entering Boipatong. The danger to the residents of Boipatong which would thereby have been averted surely justified the most drastic steps on the part of the security forces even if it meant that they would have had to make use of live ammunition after firing warning shots to disperse them.

b. This situation never of course arose because the SAP were not on hand to take such action. It is submitted that had they been alerted in time and had they been able to mobilise the necessary manpower and vehicles in time, they could have prevented the massacre or at least stopped it if it had already started and they would thereby have provided some degree of provided some form of protection to the township residents who were, in the event, at the mercy of their attackers.

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c. Furthermore it is an issue which has been extensively covered in the Waddington Report and by the SAP in their initial response thereto. Oral submissions will be made to the Commission in this regard and inference will also be made to the latest report placed before the Commission on 28 October 1992.

MEMORANDUMEVENTS OF THE BOIPATONG MASSACRE

Police Actions in Boipatong preceding the Massacre

1.1 Between approximately 19:00 and 21:00 the SAP moved around the township dispersing youths who were on patrol as part of the Self Defence Units.

1.2 Police in Nyala 18 shot birdshot at youths in a Self Defence Unit at the North East end of the township, near Slovo Park.NAKEDI and QOBA

1.3 Police also fired birdshot to disperse groups of youths patrolling at the corner of Seeiso and Tugela Streets and at the corner of Batswana and Mthembu Streets on the West end of the Township.MZOTHO

1.4 Police in an armoured vehicles used teargas to disperse groups of youths patrolling

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outside the shops at the corner of Lekoa and Bapedi Streets and at the corner of Lekoa and Bafokeng Streets.OOBA. NYOKONG

1.5 Armoured vehicles dispersed other group of youths at the corner of Baralong and Thaba Bosiu Street and on Mzimvubu Street.MOLEFE KOOB MOKOEKA. NYOKONG

1.6 A witness returning to his home in Thabo Bosiu Street from Slovo Park after 19:00 heard gunshots and smelt teargas. Fearing the police presence in the township he decided not to join the Self Defence Units on patrol on that night.MEREHLE

2 - Prior Warning on the Massacre (to be filled outsubstantially by Karel)

2.1 At approximately 6 p.m. on the night of 17June 1992 Watch Mathibedi received a

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telephone call warning of an impending attack on Sebokeng from Kwa-Madala Hostel. He telephoned Col. du Pont's office in Vereeniging. Col. du Pont was not in so Mathibedi reported the warning of an attack to a sergeant on duty.MATHIBEDI

2.2 Between 19:14 and 19:44 on the night of 17 June 1992, the Rev. Paul Verryn received two phone calls from residents of Zone 11, Sebokeng and of Bophelong warning that there was going to be violence in the Vaal that night.VERRYN

2.3 At 19:44 Rev. Verryn spoke to Col. Gouws in Johannesbrg. He reported the warnings to Col. Gouws and indicated that they had come from opposite ends of the Vaal. Col. Gouws assured him that the police would attend to the matter.VERRYN

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2.4 At 21:00 on the night of 17 June 1992, Meshack Theoane started his shift at the Trek filling station at the corner of Noble and Frikkie Meyer Boulevards. With him at the filling station was a security guard. Approximately thirty minutes later he saw groups of armed men crossing Frikkie Meyer Boulevard from the direction of Kwa-Madala Hostel, approximately 100 metres south of the intersection with Noble.THEOANE

2.5 Theoane rang the alarm at the filling station which is connected to SAP Vanderbijlpark. Shortly thereafter, two white policemen arrived at the filling station in a van and asked Theoane why he had rung the alarm. He explained that there was a group of armed men entering the township from Kwa-Madala, but they seemed uninterested in this information and left the area.THEOANE

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2.6 The security guard then radioed his employersto report the movement of the armed men. Two white security men arrived at the filling station a few minutes later and apparently called the police on their radios. A different two white policemen then arrived at the filling station and spoke to the white security men. The security men then said that the police had instructed them to take Theoane and the security guard away from the filling station because it was not safe. THEOANE

2.8 ADD THE MOSIA, MEMANE AND MONOKOANE ADVANCENOTICE STORIES IF WE CAN TRACK DOWN THEIR ORIGINAL SOURCE ABOUT THE AMBULANCES

3. General Description of the Attackers

3.1 The following paragraphs record details whichare confirmed by numerous witnesses and which will probably turn out to be common cause. Accordingly, we have not referred these observations to specific witnesses.

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3.2 The attackers consisted primarily of black men speaking Zulu and chanting Zulu slogans (eg "Usuthu"). They wore overcoats and white headbands. They carried a range of weapons, including spears, shields, kieries, axes and guns.

3.3 The attackers smashed windows at almost every house they passed. They entered some houses, assaulting and murdering residents.

The attack was indiscriminating and extraordinarily violent. An overwhelming majority of the murder victims (25 of the 39 we have identified) were women and children. Included in this number were a pregnant woman, nine month old babies, a 4 year old child and 4 women over the age of 60. Most victims received multiple stab and axe or panga wounds. Some were also shot.

3.5 There was large scale looting of the townshipand mindless destruction of property. Television sets, music systems, videos,

3.4

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blankets, watches, jewelry and cash were stolen. Mirrors, crockery, cupboards, doors, tables and chairs were smashed with sticks, spears and axes. There are instances of stoves, television sets and videos being destroyed with spears and axes.

3.6 There is no apparent explanation whichaccounts for the identities of the victims. They were for the most part politically unaffiliated, and included Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa and Venda speakers.

4• The Arrival of the Attackers at the Southern end of Boipatong

4.1 A large group of the attackers appear to haveentered Boipatong on Lekoa Street at the southern entrance to the township at the intersection with Moshoeshoe.

4.2 From the intersection, the attackers split into two groups, one going up Lekoa Street in

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a Northern Direction, the other going East along Moshoeshoe Street.APRIL DLAMINI and NTSHUMAYELO

4.3 The attackers killed Samuel (23 and Benjamin (51) Motsoetsa of 660 Moshoeshoe Street. They killed 70 year old Paulina Dlamini and her 21 year old granddaughter Maria Dlamini at 1110 Lekoa Street. Maria Dlamini was stabbed to death with an assegai as she lay on the ground trying to protect her two month old baby.

APRIL___ DLAMLNI,___ FLORINA DLAMINI. MARIA MflTSQETSA, ELIZA MOTSOETSA. HLELETHE

4.4 There were some white men seen among the attackers, and a white man participated in the murderous attack on 660 Moshoeshoe Street.

MARIA MOTSOETSA,__ ELIZA MOTSOETSA. HLELETHE.NTSHPMAYELO

4.5 A witness saw the attackers emerge from

armoured SAP vehicles at the corner of Lekoa and Moshoeshoe Streets.

HLELEIHE

4.6 Another witness saw armoured SAP vehiclesmove off with the attackers up Lekoa and down Moshoeshoe Streets.N T S H U M A Y E L O

4.7 Other witnesses saw SAP vehicles moving nearthe intersection of Lekoa and Moshoeshoe Streets approximately fifteen minutes after the attack had taken place.APRIL DIAMINI and FLORINA DLAMINA

The Rampage along Moshoeshoe, Majola and Bapedi Streets to Slovo Park

5.1 By charting the houses with broken windowsand the eyewitness accounts in our statements, it appears that one group of attackers travelled to Slovo Park, moving East along Moshoeshoe Street. Another group travelled North along Lekoa Street, turning

Eas-t into Bapedi Street, then North into Senqu Street and East into Batswana Street before entering Slovo Park along the corridor behind the AME Church or turning North up Sekhukhune Street and back towards Kwa-Madala along Bafokeng and Tugela Streets.

(It must be stressed that the preceding paragraphs and subsequent paragraphs describing the routes of the attackers record only the apparent major routes of the attackers. Almost every houses on these routes was attacked in some way or another. There are, however, several houses not on these routes which were also attacked. It appears that smaller groups of attackers made isolated sorties off the major routes before rejoining their fellow attackers).

At 666 Moshoeshoe Street Anna (48) and Percival (28) Sabatai were murdered. Anna was stabbed repeatedly in her shoulder, arm and spine; Percival received multiple stab wounds and had half of his face blasted away

by a shotgun fired from close range.SALLY SEALY MEMORANDUM

Just across Moshoeshoe Street at 1187 the attackers murdered a 63 year old woman, Nellie Yuba. She was stabbed repeatedly in the upper thighs and shot three times. 22 year old Dorothy Yuba received multiple panga wounds in her back, neck and hand, but surved the attack.SALLY SEALY MEMORANDUM

62 year old Belina Leroban of 45 Majola Street died after receiving multiple stab wounds and being shot four times in the neck. The attackers left the house with a VCR after destroying a television set, music system, telephone, clock and some crockery.SALLY SEALY MEMORANDUM

^•6 Violet (39), Michael (15), Sibusiso (7) andRonnica (15) Msibi were hacked to death at 625 Bapedi Street. The latter, a fifteen year old girl, was stabbed in the chest with

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5.5

5.4

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an assegai which went right chrough her back. SALLY SEALY MEMORANDUM

At 194 Senqu Street the attackers looted the house of Mrs. Maria Letsoko while she hid under her bed, and hacked to death her son, Andries (30), her daughter, Anna (28) and her son-in-law, Richard Jim (35).

Witnesses report the presence of police vehicles in close proximity to the attackers at the intersection of Thaba Bosiu and Batswana Streets, along Majola Street, along Bapedi Street (an armoured vehicle with "T2" on the back door), and at the intersection of Thabo Bosiu and Bapedi Streets.MEREHLE. XABA. NTHOMBENI. QOBA

Shortly after 10, while the attackers were in Bapedi Street, the police in Vanderbijlpark and Sebokeng were called to report the attack.

fiQPQLI (Hearsay, but we may be able to confirm with the friend).

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5.10 Armed white men were seen assisting theattackers on Bapedi Street.MAKABELA (PEACE ACTION)

6. The Blovo Park Massacre

It is somewhat difficult to ascertain where the attackers entered Slovo Park and their subsequent movement as the police map with the shack numbers has not been made available to us. The numbers of the shacks are also completely arbitrary and in fact on occasion we have found two shacks with the same number. It will be necessary in this regard to go back to the persons from whom we took statements to get a clearer idea of exactly where and from what direction people came.

THE START OF THE ATTACK

6.1 Three hippos were seen off-loading people inthe road behind the shacks. The first group goes towards Bakwena Street and the other two go towards the beerhall. Time is stated as approximately 8:30. (ISAAC MODIKA).

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6.2 Caspirs were seen in the south east of Slovo Park who shot teargas at youths gathered there. (DAIMOND LATA).

6.3 Many men are seen getting out of caspirs, including whites at the south end of Slovo Park at sometime after 9:00. (DAIMOND LATA).

6.4 A group of men is off-loaded from mini buses in Bakwena Street (NDANDWE).

6.5 At about 10 o'clock 2 caspirs, a yellow one and a camouflage one are seen moving towards Slovo Park, along Amatola Street. It stops to pick up a group of armed men and proceeds in the direction of Slovo (JOSEPH SELLO).

BHITES PARTICIPATING IN THE ATTACK

6.6 It is interesting to note that it is really only in Slovo Park and in Moshoeshoe Street that residents place whites participating in the attack. In the other areas, caspirs are

Collection Number: AK2672 Goldstone Commission BOIPATONG ENQUIRY Records 1990-1999 PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:- Johannesburg ©2012

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