encyclopedia.of

religion and war

GabrielPa Imer- Fe rn and ezEditor

Religion & SocietyA Berkshire Reference Wark

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Daoism, Modern

ern Oaoist scriptures among both Asian and Westernaudiences.

Since the late 1800s, approximately fifty transla­tions of Laozi (also known as Tao Te Ching or Daodejing,

c. third century BCE), an important early Oaoist text,have appeared in English alone, and new editions ap­pear every year. In fact, Laozi is second only to the Biblein the number of translations available worldwide.

Perhaps more significantly, books sometimes only tan­gentially related to Oaoism (examples include The Tao

of Leadership, Christ the Eternal Tao, and The Tao ofClean­

ing) have proved to be extraordinarily popular in anincreasingly unpredictable publishing market.

The questions of whether and how the interests of"nightstand Oaoists," who engage the tradition largelyor exclusively through reading and reflecting on texts,constitute evidence of a nascent Western Oaoism arelikely to be hotly debated in the decades to come.Nonetheless, it is clear that at least some Western Oao­

ists espouse a pacifism which, if not directly drawnfrom Oaoist sources, is seen by them as part and parcelof what it means to be a Oaoist today.

Modern Asian interest in Oaoist scriptures gener­ally has tended in a more serious direction, drawingstrength for contemporary philosophical and politicalprojects from ancient texts. One example is the workof the Korean peace activist Sok Hon Ham (1901-1989),who claimed that the legendary Laozi (after whom theclassical text isnamed) was the first pacifist and wholocated a basis for contemporary resistance to war inclassical Oaoist texts. It must be noted, however, thatSok borrowed as heavily from Christian traditions asfrom Oaoist traditions, and that he refused to identifyhimself exclusively with any single religious tradition.Moreover, many scholars of early Oaoist scripturesargue that, far from being blueprints for pacifist para­dises, texts such as Laozi actually aim to provide tacticalmilitary advice to ancient Chinese rulers and generals.

Finally, other contemporary Asian thinkers whohave appropriated ancient sources for their construc­tive ethical projects have tended to adopt Confucian,rather than Oaoist, concepts. Perhaps this is because,as Henry Rosemont, Jr., has pointed out, "If Confucian­ism was the most socially and politically oriented ofChinese philosophies, Oaoism was the least" (Rose­mont 1997, 180).

Prospects for Modern Daoism as EthicalResource

Modern Oaoism, as a resource for thinking about warand violence, appears to be terribly impoverished. The

110

aspects of the tradition that are most alive today arethose that are least concerned with matters such as pol­itics, social morality, and ethics in general. Conversely,the ethical legacy of the tradition is most forceful todaythrough the popularity of ancient texts, with few ifany links between an armchair readership and livingcommunities of spiritual practice. Yet the voices ofthe classical texts, while subject to strenuous debateand interpretation, echo on, and the quiet sounds ofcontemporary Oaoist practice, which owe much to apeaceful vision of life, have not been silenced.

Jeffrey L. Richey

See also Oaoism, Classical; Oaoism, Huang-Lao

Further Reading

Ames, R. T. (1997). Contemporary Chinese philosophy.In E. Deutsch & R. Bontekoe (Eds.), A companion to

world philosophies (pp. 517-522). Oxford, UK:BlackwellPublishers.

Kim, S. S. (1994). Sok Hon Ham and Taoism. Retrieved 3April 2003,from http://www2.gol.com/users/quak­ers/T &QhamTao.htm

Kohn, L. (Ed.). (2000).Daoism Handbook. Leiden, Nether­lands: Brill.

MacInnis, D. E. (1989).Religion in China today: Policy and

practice. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.Robinet,1. (1997).Taoism: Growth of a religion (P. Brooks,

Trans.). Stanford, CA: S'tanford University Press.Rosemont, H., Jr. (1997).Chinese socia-political ideals. In

E. Deutsch & R. Bontekoe (Eds.), A companion to world

philosophies (pp. 174-184). Oxford, UK: BlackwellPub­lishers.

Schipper, K. (1993).The Taoist body (K. C. Duval, Trans.).Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress.

Deobandism

Oeobandism is an ideology of the orthodox Sunnibranch of Islam (approximately 90 percent of theworld's Muslims are Sunni Muslims). It emphasizesthe enforcement of strict shari'a rule (that is, rule ac­cording to Islamic law) in Muslim societies, promotesglobal jihad against non-Muslims, and is intolerant ofother Islamic beliefs, especially Shi'ite beliefs. (Shi'itebeliefs are those held by adherents of Shi'a Islam, ap-

proximately 10 percent of the world's Muslims.) Itsfollowers include the Jamiyat Ulema-e-Islam aUI) inPakistan, the Taliban in Afghanistan and a number ofextremist Islamic groups in South Asia, Southeast Asia,and Central Asia.

Based on the Hanafi legal school of thought (oneof the four major Sunni juridical schools), Deobandismoriginated in British-ruled India during the mid­nineteenth century as a reformist ideology that aimedto regenerate Muslim society in the context of life incolonized state. Given its roots, its radicalization at theend of the twentieth century was quite ironic.

Roots

Deobandism takes its name from the Indian Himala­

yan town of Deoband, the location of an influentialmadrasaJz (religious school) called Darul uloom Deo­band. The religious school was established in 1867 byMaulana Mohammad Qasim Nanauti, who was a stu­dent with Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), thefounder of Aligarh Muslim University. Even thoughthe two men were taught by the same teachers, theymoved in different directions.

Darul uloom Deoband was established after the

failed uprising of Indian Muslims against the Britishin 1857. Maulana Nanauti wanted to educate the de­moralized Muslims in accordance with Islamic tradi­

tions, whereas Sir Sayyid wanted them to have a mod­ern secular education. Consequently, while AligarhUniversity campaigned for Muslim accommodation tothe British, Darul uloom Deoband preached"confronta­tion with the British colonial rulers. In the 1920s, Mau­lana Ubaid Ullah Sind hi, a Deobandi scholar whofounded the Jamiat al-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), joinedMohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi and the Indian NationalCongress in the Khilafat movement in support of theOttoman caliphate, an early indication of Deoband­ism's anticolonial and anti-Western stance.

Partition and After

Most conservative Deobandis opposed the creation ofPakistan. They instead envisioned life in a mixedHindu and Muslim unified postcolonial state. Manysaw Pakistan as an idea put forward by WesternizedMuslims like Muhammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), theleader of the All-India Muslim League and the founderof Pakistan. The JUH, therefore, remained a major rivalof the Muslim League. However, those Deobandis whohad founded the Jamiyat Ulema-e-Islam in 1945 sup­ported the formation of Pakistan.

Deobandism

In 1947, when India and Pakistan were separatedfrom each other, the JUH stayed in India and the JUIshifted to Pakistan. In India, the followers of JUH anda faction of the Jama'at-e-Islami aI), an Islamic partyestablished by Maulana Mawdudi in 1941, have ad­hered to the reformist tradition of original Deoband­ism, despite Hindu nationalist violence against IndianMuslims, such as the December 1992destruction of theBabri mosque, which fanned Muslim anger.

In Pakistan, the JI has dominated Islamic politics,though in the 1990s the JUI began to gain appeal whenit adopted a neo-Deobandi ideology based on a rigid,militant, anti-American and anti-non-Muslim stance.The 1990s saw the emergence of two radical JUI off­shoots, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e­Jhangvi, which became notorious for their acts of vio­lence against Shi'ites. Pakistan's conservative tribalPashtun region bordering Afghanistan has constitutedthe traditional power base of the JUI. In October 2002,the JUI for the first time won seats in Pakistan's parlia­mentary elections.

The Taliban Connection

The Taliban grew out of a radical fringe of Deoband­ism. Their anomalous interpretation of Islam emergedfrom an extreme and perverse interpretation of Deo­bandism, preached by JUI mullahs at madrasahs in Af­ghan refugee camps in Pakistan's Pashtun region dur­ing and after the Afghan struggle against the Sovietsduring the 1980s. These madrasalls were run by barelyliterate mullahs untutored in the original reformistDeobandi agenda. They had little knowledge or appre­ciation of the classical Islamic tradition or for currents

of Islamic thought in the broader Muslim world. "Theyespoused a myopic, self-contained, militant world viewin which Islam is used to legitimate their primitivePushtun tribal customs and preferences. The classicalIslamic belief in jihad as a defense of Islam and theMuslim community against aggression was trans­formed into a militant jihad culture and worldviewthat targets unbelievers, including Muslims and non­Muslims alike" (Esposito 2002, 16).

Many of these madrasaJzs were supported by Saudifunding that brought with it the influence of ultracon­servative Wahhabi Islam (the denomination of Islampracticed in Saudi Arabia). Students received free edu­cation, and religious, ideological, and military training.Deoband teachings, like those of the Wahhabis, are pu­ritanical in tone: They seek to purge Islam of Westernand modernist influences and institutions and to estab-

111

Deobandism

lish the Qur'an and hadith (canonical Islamic tradi­tions) as the sole guiding lights for Islamic thought.When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in1996, they turned over many of their training campsto JUI militants, who in turn trained thousands of Paki­

stani and Arab militants as well as fighters from South­east and Central Asia.

The Future

The Taliban fell in Afghanistan early in 2002, but theradicalized version of Deobandism continues to hauntSouth, Southeast, and Central Asia. For instance, in­

spired by Deobandism, Kashmiri militant groupssuch as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed,Lashkar-e-Tayyiba-all included in the US. govern­ment's list of international terrorist organizations­continue to terrorize non-Muslims in the region in thename of jihad.

In Pakistan, Shi'ite-Sunni sectarianism has receded

since the nation's military regime outlawed the twomilitant factions of JUI in August 2002. However, theDeobandi party's recent electoral success may notaugur well for a politically stable Islamic Pakistan.Maulana Fazalur Rehman, the current leader of the JUI,issued a declaration of jihad against the United Statesin 1998, and JUI protested violently against the US.war in Afghanistan. Whether JUI will use its new cloutin Pakistan's parliamentary politics to exercise its neo­Deobandi jihadist vision regionally and internationally

112

in the violent manner of Deobandism' s extremist fringeelements remains to be seen.

Ishtiaq Ahmad

See also Islam, Shi'a; Islam, Sunni; Jihad; Kashmir; Tali­ban; Wahhabism

Further Reading

Ahmed, 1.(1991). The concept of an Islamic state in Pakistan.

Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books.Ali, T. (2002). The clash of fundamentalisms: Crusades, jihads

and modernity. London: Verso.Desker, B.,& Ramakrishna, K. (2002). Forging an indirect

strategy in South-East Asia. The Washington Quarterly,

25(2),161-176.

Esposito, J. (2002). Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam.

New York: Oxford University Press.Gohari, M.J. (2000). The Taliban ascent to power. New York:

Oxford University Press.Jones, O. (2002). Pakistan: Eye of the storm. New Haven,

CT: Yale University Press.Minault, G. (1999). The Khilafat movement: Religious symbol­

ism and political mobilizatioll in India. New York:OxfordUniversity Press.

Nojumi, N. (2002). The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan:

Mass mobilization, civil war, and the future of the region.

New York: Palgrave.Rashid, A (1999). The Taliban: Exporting extremism. For­

eign Affairs, 78(6),22-35.Rashid, A. (2000). Taliban: Islam, oil and the new Great Game

in Central Asia. London: 1.B.Tauris.