regulating non-government schools: explaining success and failure

Regulating non-government schools:Explaining success and failure

Amos ZehaviDepartment of public policy, Department of political science, Tel Aviv University

AbstractThe challenge faced by governments in the regulation of powerful private actors has allegedly

intensified in recent years. This study explores the means at the disposal of governments, and their

effectiveness, with respect to the regulation of private actors that demonstrate considerable inde-

pendence and political efficacy. It is argued that a modified ‘Contextual Interaction Theory’ (CIT),

which focuses on the interaction between generic policy instruments (carrots, sticks, and sermons)

and target group attributes (motivation, information, and power), and is augmented by a consid-

eration of a separate institutional dimension, offers a useful analytical framework for understand-

ing both the challenge faced by governments and the options for dealing with it. This framework

is applied to a study of the introduction of ‘new accountability’ to Australian and Israeli non-

government schools. The use of the standard CIT lenses helps explain Australian success and Israeli

government failure in the introduction of new accountability. Australian success is attributable to

a judicious mix of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ instruments that favorably impacted target group information

and motivation. In Israel, in contrast, policy instrument mixes failed to alter the main target group’s

oppositional stance. Institutional engineering, however, could provide a promising way for Israeli

policymakers to enhance policy instrument effectiveness, by influencing target group power and

motivation.

Keywords: policy instruments, governance, non-government schools, Israel, Australia.

1. Introduction

In 2008, the Australian Commonwealth parliament enacted the Schools Assistance Act2008 that, for the first time, clearly conditioned public aid to non-government schools ontheir compliance with highly detailed accountability requirements (2009 AdministrativeGuidelines: Schools Assistance Act 2008). In the same year, the Israeli parliament passeda law that exempted secondary level ultra-orthodox schools from having to fulfil anycurricular requirements as a prerequisite for receiving public aid (Knesset 2008). This lawstifled prior efforts to subject non-government schools in Israel to greater accountabilityand state regulation. Governments in both countries started from a similar baseline ofvery little non-government school accountability, yet their efforts to expand accountabil-ity and regulation of non-government schools ended in contrasting results.

Correspondence: Amos Zehavi, Department of political science, Ramat Aviv, 69978. Email:[email protected]

Accepted for publication 16 May 2011.

Regulation & Governance (2011) 5, 446–464 doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01112.x

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

The Australian success was by no means inevitable and it invites the question of howdid Australian governments bring about this desired result, especially given what initiallyappeared to be a powerful and intransigent non-government school constituency. Con-versely, the Israeli case not only requires an explanation of policy failure but also invokesthe question of what could be done to promote accountability under what are clearlychallenging political circumstances. This study also speaks to a more general interest thatgoes beyond non-government school regulation: the effective use of policy instruments.An exploration of the Australian and Israeli non-government school cases provides anempirical foundation for an inquiry into the effectiveness of different mixes of genericpolicy instruments under unfavorable political and administrative circumstances.1

The questions regarding non-government school accountability and the broaderconcern with the choice of effective policy instruments are addressed within a modified“Contextual Interaction Theory” (CIT) analytical framework (Bressers 2004). The mainadvantage of CIT is that it focuses attention on three properties of the target groups ofregulation: motivation, information, and power. These properties capture in a parsimo-nious manner much of what is relevant about the political environment of instrumentchoice and implementation. Indeed, it is argued below that the different outcomes in thetwo countries should be attributed primarily to differences in target group properties thatenabled effective use of policy instruments in Australia, but not in Israel. The articleemploys Vedung’s generic trichotomy of policy instruments – sticks, carrots, and sermons– to illustrate how the interaction of a combination of these policy instruments withtarget group power, motivation, and information explains policy outcomes in Australiaand Israel (1998). While careful use of policy instruments in Australia produced thegovernment’s desired outcome, target group power and motivation in Israel combined tothwart effective policy instrument use – however configured.

The analysis presented here departs from the original CIT in one important way.Institutional organization is not considered merely as a factor that influences targetpopulations but is presented as a separate dimension through which policymakers couldshape outcomes. The choice of effective policy instruments could be viewed as a two stageprocess. In the first stage, policymakers choose an instrument mix given what they knowabout the general characteristics of the policy instruments and how they believe theseinstruments would interact with the three target group properties. The second stage islikely to take place only if policymakers have failed to effect the desired results in the firststage. Policymakers partake in institutional reconfiguration in an effort to create a morefavorable environment for “policy instrument – target group” interaction. The second“institutional” stage provides a possible option for policymakers who find that standardpolicy instruments are rendered ineffective because of powerful target group opposition.2

The main contribution of this article is in providing a manageable framework by whichto assess instrument choice under circumstances in which the government faces powerfulprivate actors. While this study recognizes the prevalence of policy instrument mixes,unlike much of the instrument literature, this work does not shy away from a discussion ofspecific generic policy instrument traits because knowledge of individual instrumentsadvantages and limitations is necessary for understanding how different instrumentscould usefully complement each other and how they interact with target group properties.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the meaning of newaccountability and why governments have applied it to non-government schools. This isfollowed by a description of the modified CIT framework and its relation to classifica-

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© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 447

tions of policy instruments. An explanation of case selection is followed by narrativedescriptions of the introduction of new accountability in the two countries. The twosubsequent sections are dedicated, first, to the analysis of the cases from the CIT perspec-tive and, second, to a consideration of the institutional “second step” in the Israeli case.

2. The goal: new accountability

In the field of education, The New Public Management-inspired emphasis on account-ability has been manifested in the rise of the new accountability movement. Beingpublically accountable implies an obligation to inform the state/public of certain actionsand also being subject to public control (and sanctions) (Schedler 1999). The newaccountability movement, seeking to enhance the information component of account-ability, has called for clear and well specified educational standards and targets – oftendetailed in an authoritative school curriculum – that are to be meticulously measured andreported at both the school and education system levels (Hess 2002). New accounta-bility’s emphasis on outcomes may overshadow the procedure-focused traditionalaccountability system; however, the latter rarely disappears.

The potential for public–private conflict is clear: non-government schools that havejealously guarded their independence in the past might oppose the application of newaccountability as unwarranted government intrusion. Nevertheless, it is widely recog-nized that there exists a public interest in state regulation of non-government schools.State intervention could be motivated by a desire to guarantee that non-governmentschool graduates have received the educational foundation that would enable them tocontribute to the democratic polity and also to the economy. Furthermore, the case forpublic oversight grows stronger when non-government schools are recipients of publicaid. The public, at the bare minimum, the argument goes, has a right to know what isdone with its money and perhaps should also have some say over how it is spent.

3. Generic policy instruments and the CIT framework

Different approaches to the classification of policy instruments exist (Hood 2007). Thisstudy employs a generic approach intended to produce a parsimonious classification thatcould be applied across all policy environments. While parsimony is an attractiveattribute, there is a danger that its price is a lack of attention to the circumstances thatlargely determine the effectiveness of policy instruments – especially political circum-stances. The CIT framework helps address this weakness.

Bressers (2004), in studies of environmental regulation, argued that a good theory ofpolicy instrument effectiveness must recognize the different circumstances that impactpolicy instrument effectiveness without overly complicating analysis. Bresser’s CIT ispredicated on the assumption that:

[t]he course and outcomes of the policy process depend not only on inputs (in this casethe characteristics of the policy instruments), but more crucially on the characteristicsof the actors involved, particularly their motivation, information, and power. All otherfactors that influence the process do so because, and in so far as, they influence thecharacteristics of the actors involved. (Bressers 2004, p. 209)

Bressers contends that regulation depends primarily on the interaction betweenpolicy instruments – usually a mix of these – and these three target group properties. For

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example, it is likely to be easier to induce a school to accept state accountability measuresif school leaders are committed to transparency (motivation), do not have the politicalclout to stand up to government officials (power), and are actually aware of regulationrequirements (information), than if one or more of the above do not apply. An emphasison these three properties offers a useful way of theorizing the political environment thatto a great extent determines how practicable and effective a specific policy instrumentwould be. CIT helps situate generic policy instruments in a political context.

This study employs the parsimonious generic tripartite classification of sticks, carrots,and sermons devised by Vedung (1998). Sticks are associated with the state’s authorityand the use of its coercive powers. Governments use sticks when they legally mandate, orprohibit, specific actions. Carrots correspond to incentives. The state does not legallymandate or prohibit an action through use of carrots. Instead, it encourages it throughthe creation of incentives (e.g. subsidies) or discourages it through disincentives (e.g.speed bumps). Finally, sermons operate through communication. The state communi-cates messages to different actors, in the form of information, deliberation, and argu-ment, in an effort to shape their behavior.

How does government apply policy instruments in an environment increasinglypopulated by highly independent private actors? A common view is that command andexercise of coercive authority become impractical because of the breakdown of hierarchy.Instead, government is forced to resort to less coercive tools primarily relying on persua-sion of, and negotiation with, private actors but also the careful structure of incentives(Stoker 1998; Salamon 2002). This study, however, counter-argues that not only do “soft”and “hard” policy instruments coexist (Jordan et al. 2005), but that success in reformdepends on the interplay of different types of instruments and the way in which theyinfluence target groups’ information, motivation, and power. In the following paragraphsa limited number of relevant propositions will be discussed in relation to the threegeneric policy instruments.

Carrots, especially in the form of subsidies, could be used by government to encour-age a desired behavior – say science instruction. Such use of carrots appears appropriatein a policy setting populated by powerful target groups because government inducesprivate behavior without resort to coercion. Leeuw, however, warns that carrots are oftenextended despite the fact that government requirements are not fully met (1998). Thisimplies that carrots might have a damned-if-you-do-dammed-if-you-don’t quality:Without proper enforcement of requirements carrots are likely to be an ineffective, andcostly, policy instrument, but enforcement of carrot requirements might come across asan imposition on private actors. Under circumstances in which the latter occurs, thedistinction between carrots and sticks is blurred from the target group’s perspective.

Sticks have fallen into disrepute in recent years. Sticks’ coercive nature tends toprovoke resistance and given government’s allegedly increasing dependence on privateactors, sticks might be difficult to implement. Van der Doelen argues that oppositionintensity explains why governments are increasingly turning to less restrictive forms ofauthoritative regulation such as government–private sector covenants (1998). Yet even ifwe accept the argument that the use of unilateral authoritative regulation is on the retreat(an argument contested by Jordan et al. 2005), this does not mean that sticks havedisappeared. First, even policy instruments that are voluntarily adopted by private actorscould be legally binding and therefore count as sticks. This is no semantic quibble:non-government schools, for instance, that violate a covenant can be penalized, regardless



of the fact that it was adopted voluntarily. Second, the implicit threat of stick enforcementcould induce cooperation with government in the implementation of policy through theuse of other tools (Van der Doelen 1998). Sticks appear to be effective but hard toimplement. Under such circumstances, less restrictive forms of sticks (e.g. covenants) orreserving sticks as an implicit threat (the “shadow of hierarchy”) could prove to be moreeffective than the direct use of orders and prohibitions.

Finally, sermons are the softest policy instrument therefore the most appropriate forgovernment interaction with powerful target groups. The absence of coercion, however,creates both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side of the ledger, becausesermons do not involve coercion, they are generally viewed as inoffensive by privateactors. The main drawback, however, is that without coercion, or incentives, it wouldseem that sermons provide at best weak motivation for private actor action (or inaction).Nonetheless, the power of persuasion is not entirely ineffective. Through sermons, gov-ernments might be able to influence target group information and convince private actorsthat government and private interests coincide. Sermons in the form of dialogue have thepotential to establish trust in government intentions and thus make the use of morecoercive government tools acceptable to private actors.

What does the above review imply for non-government school regulation? Waysforward for effective government application of accountability depend on several factors.First, target group power is likely to influence government choices. The stronger theopposition to accountability, the more likely is the government to leave coercive instru-ments – primarily unilateral use of sticks – as a backup option. Second, the use ofsermons is likely to be quite pervasive because of their low economic and political cost.The immediate goal of sermons is to alter target group information. Sermons might beeffectively employed as a trust-building mechanism ahead of, or concurrently with, otherpolicy instruments. They are effective when they ultimately align target group and gov-ernment motivations. Third, carrots, and more specifically public aid to non-governmentschools, might prove to be ineffective if governments fail to rigorously enforce account-ability requirements, which are formal prerequisites for public aid. In terms of therelationship between instrument type and target group properties, it appears that sticksprimarily interact with power, carrots with motivation, and sermons with information(Bressers 2004).3 The propositions above provide a theoretical starting point for anexploration of policy instrument use and effectiveness.

4. An institutional dimension

How should institutions be conceptualized in relation to policy instruments? ChristopherHood presents a generic typology that differs from the one presented here by the inclu-sion of a fourth policy instrument – “organization” – which refers to direct state action(2007). This conceptualization makes an important contribution by focusing attentionon institutions. However, contrary to what Hood argues, this tool cannot be analyticallyseparated from the other three. “Organization” speaks to the institutional site in whichgeneric instruments are utilized. Hence, it is best theorized as part of a distinct institu-tional dimension that encompasses diverse private and public organizational forms fromwhich generic instruments could be employed.4

The institutional context in which policy instruments are used is likely to impact theireffectiveness. The literature dedicated to institutions, especially historical institutional-



ism, stresses institutional continuity and conversely emphasizes the difficulty of institu-tional reconfiguration (Streeck & Thelen 2005). It is therefore likely that policymakerswould first consider how to apply the policy instruments at their disposal, given targetgroup characteristics, to achieve policy goals without restructuring the institutionallandscape. Yet the extant institutional framework could limit effectiveness considerably.Landry and Varone present this situation as a policymaker’s dilemma between selectionof policy instruments that are compatible with extant institutional design but do notallow movement away from the status quo and choosing policy instruments that inprinciple could affect change but are impracticable because of political friction (2005).

Despite the complexity of institutional reengineering, this study argues that from apolicymaker’s perspective, institutional design is an important option which meritsconsideration as a separate dimension alongside the policy instrument one. If within acertain institutional organization policy instruments fail to exert the desired effect, poli-cymakers might consider an institutional reorganization that could impact target groupproperties in a way that would make policy instruments more effective. In other words,the difficult step of institutional reorganization should be thought of as “if-all-else-fails”option. In what follows, it will be argued that while in Australia the judicious applicationof generic policy instruments to the main target groups proved sufficient, in Israel thereis little choice but to move down the path of institutional restructuring.

5. From funding to accountability? Two case studies

The non-government school systems in the two selected countries, Australia and Israel,share three properties that make them “difficult” cases for the use of policy instrumentsand therefore appropriate case studies for effective instrument use in a challenging targetgroup setting. First, the majority of non-government schools in both countries arereligious and traditionally jealous of their independence. Hence, it is anticipated thatnon-government schools’ initial stance would be belligerent. Second, non-governmentschools in Australia and Israel have been traditionally free of oversight yet have receivedgenerous public aid. Therefore efforts of coaxing non-government schools to acceptaccountability in return for public aid are complicated by the fact that public aid alreadyexists independent of accountability. Finally, the non-government school sector constitu-ency in both countries has been politically mobilized in the past and has registeredimpressive accomplishments indicating its considerable power. Governments in bothcountries face similar daunting challenges to the introduction of new accountability: theymust contend with a highly independent non-government school sector that has a provenrecord of successful political mobilization and all this with one hand tied behind theirbacks because of a legacy of unconditional public aid.

The empirical foundation of this research has been derived from government docu-ment analysis and data sources, a LexisNexis newspaper review that covered all relevantarticles from Australia dating back to 1980, and a review of relevant articles in two Israelinewspapers dating back to the late 1980s. Most importantly, over 40 interviews wereconducted in both countries with key actors in the public and private sectors involvedwith non-government education and accountability initiatives. Most interviewees wereselected because they played key roles, during the 1990s or 2000s, in the new account-ability effort (e.g. Israeli and Australian former ministers of education, directors general,or private school leaders). Interviews were semi-structured based on a list of questions



intended to probe both the actions and views of public and private actors. Interviewanalysis took the form of narrative structuring with an emphasis on information cor-roboration through informant triangulation (Kvale 1996).

5.1. AustraliaOne in three Australian students attend a non-government school (about 20 percent inCatholic schools). Overall growth of the private sector enrollment share from the late1970s until 2007 was an added 12 percent of Australian school children. Such growthwould not have occurred without the benefit of public aid. In general, public funding fornon-government schools exceeds 50 percent of funding for public sector schools, whileCatholic schools specifically receive 70 percent of their funding from public sources(Senate Report, Australia 2004; Independent Schools Council of Australia 2008).

Despite the high level of public aid, until the 1990s, non-government schools acrossAustralia were subject to very little public scrutiny. Non-government schools had toregister with the different states in order to operate. However, in most states, there waslittle oversight beyond an initial prerequisite inspection for mandatory school registra-tion (phone interview with David Gurr, education expert 9 and 16 January 2008).

The Australian Labour Party (ALP) federal government that institutionalized publicaid in the mid-1970s (pressured by the electoral leverage of the non-government schoolsector) did not intend subsidies to be unconditional and proposed the establishment ofan accountability mechanism for non-government schools. This initiative, however, wasdefeated. In part, the reason for this was political: the Catholic Church, which createda lobby and mobilized its constituency in support of public aid to non-governmentschools, also succeeded in blocking attempts aimed at making non-government schoolspublicly accountable (Sherman 1982). In addition, at the time that significantpublic aid was first granted to non-government schools, public school accountabilitysystems were also very much undeveloped (Cuttance et al. 1998). Only in the 1990s, didpublic accountability systems, which featured authoritative state curricula, begin toemerge.

In the 1990s, the new accountability movement became a central influence oneducation policy. Commonwealth and state governments showed a growing interest insetting clear standards for educational attainment and construction of measures forassessing performance. New accountability faced formidable foes in public sector unionsand education administrators (Cuttance et al. 1998; Gurr 2007).

Although the accountability drive was primarily targeted at public schools, non-government schools were not left out. Governments could hardly justify accountabilityexemptions to supported non-government schools in the context of the increasedemphasis on accountability for public schools (phone interview with D Kemp, formerCommonwealth Minister for Education 11 February 2010). The rise of the accountabilitymovement appeared to set state governments – the primary authorities on most educa-tion issues – and non-government schools on a collision course. The considerable growthof the non-government school constituency yields the expectation that unwelcome statedemands for accountability would meet stiff private sector-based political resistance thatwould be even more effective than that which blocked Commonwealth accountabilitydemands in the mid-1970s. This, however, was not the case. Public authorities managed,over the last 10 to 15 years, to gradually incorporate non-government schools into newaccountability type systems.



This unanticipated success is due both to a judicious mix of policy tools and achange in target group – and government – motivation. The importance of thesefactors could be illustrated by the case of accountability reforms in Victoria. Victoriaproceeded further than most other Australian states in the establishment of an account-ability system (Gurr 2007). The conservative Kennett government, elected in 1992,moved swiftly to establish a “new accountability” system: the Curriculum and Stan-dards Framework (CSF). The twin pillars of the CSF were the formulation of a state-wide curriculum and the institutionalization of standardized tests that providedcomparable information on student performance. The Kennett government enjoyed thecollaboration of the Catholic Education Commission of Victoria (CECV) which wasresponsible for school policy in the Catholic sector. The director of the CECV, Mon-signor Doyle, decided to embrace the reform for both political and financial reasons.Doyle reasoned that the reform was inevitable so it would be better to accept it vol-untarily and in doing so have a greater say over the policy and also have the govern-ment subsidize accountability-related costs. Doyle’s assistant, and eventual successor,Susan Pascoe, also supported the reform but for different reasons: she believed thatstandards would provide good longitudinal data for the system and more informationfor parents (phone interview with Susan Pascoe, former Director of Education for theCatholic Education Commission of Victoria 1 July 2008). According to governmentinitiated focus group studies, 75 percent of parents were supportive of standardizedassessment, Catholic parents withstanding. Undoubtedly, government promotion of thereforms played a role in the cultivation of favorable public attitudes (Richards 1995;phone interview with Susan Pascoe, former Director of Education for the CatholicEducation Commission of Victoria 1 July 2008). Nevertheless, the majority of Catholicschools and teachers were hostile to the new accountability system. The CECV workedhard to persuade the schools to administer the tests without any external interferenceby the state (phone interview with Susan Pascoe, former Director of Education for theCatholic Education Commission of Victoria 1 July 2008). Ultimately all Catholicschools taught the curriculum (which was not far removed from the ex ante Catholiccurricula) and participated in the tests.

The Association of Independent Schools Victoria (AISV), the non-Catholic indepen-dent schools representative body, was even more apprehensive about the CSF than theCECV. The government decided not to force the issue, perhaps because the task wouldhave involved significant political costs (phone interview with Dennis Muller, formerEducation Editor of The Age 10 July 2008). However, in 2004, the state Labor governmentwas intent on introducing a new accountability system – Victoria Essential LearningStandards (VELS) – and the education ministry conducted extensive and cordial consul-tations with the AISV. It was agreed that the curriculum under VELS would be flexiblealthough independent schools were unconditionally required to teach core subjects. TheAISV consented to standardized tests that are now administered by all non-governmentschools (phone interview, Michelle Green, Chief Executive Association of IndependentSchools of Victoria 14 April 2008).

In Victoria, non-government sector education leaders were not necessarily opposedto accountability, and even those that were understood that parents would not be easilymobilized against it. Moreover, the government – quite unlike its approach to publicschools – refrained from imposing accountability measures unilaterally. Accountabilityarrangements were established on the basis of dialogue with Catholic and independent



school representatives and allowed for considerable leeway in implementation. Apartfrom the fact that the final result was generally acceptable to non-government schoolleaders, interviewees pointed to another advantage of this course of action: it establisheda significant level of trust and understanding between the education ministry and non-government schools that did not necessarily exist before. Non-government school leadersfound it easier to accept accountability because the government–private sector dialoguedispelled concerns that accountability was merely a ploy by the public sector to under-mine non-government schools. Dialogue provided new information for target groupswhich in turn reshaped the motivation of pivotal private actors moving them from anoppositional to a cooperative stance.

On the federal level, the Commonwealth Government moved to establish nationalstandards towards the end of the 1990s (phone interview with D Kemp, former Com-monwealth Minister for Education 11 February 2010): efforts which accelerated in recentyears (Tomazin & Harrison 2008; phone interview with Bill Daniels, Executive DirectorIndependent Schools Councils of Australia 8 February 2010). The Social Assistance Act of2008 requires schools to make an effort to meet performance targets and undergo evalu-ation based on performance measures, which involves standardized testing, in return forpublic aid (School Assistance Act 2008).

As was true for Victoria, progress on the national level was facilitated by the notunfavorable views of parents in non-government schools concerning accountability andby the government’s conscious effort to advance accountability in a consensual manner.First, non-government school parents were generally agreeable to the government’s cam-paign in favor of new accountability measures: something that limits opportunities formobilizing opposition. Catholic and independent school parents appear, in general, towelcome accountability and standards (McInnes 2002; Patty 2009).

Second, the Commonwealth Government had made a conscious effort of engagingnon-government school leaders in the process of establishing a full-fledged account-ability system. The Rudd ALP government, for example, had included representatives ofboth the Catholic and independent school sectors on the board of the newly establishedAustralian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority. The Authority wasassigned the task of devising a national curriculum and national standards that wouldapply to all schools. Non-government schools, under this arrangement, enjoyed someflexibility in adapting content to their system (Manzo 2007). The government’s par-ticipatory approach facilitated the acceptance of the new accountability regime amongindependent schools. As the Executive Director of the Independent Schools Councils ofAustralia stated regarding the introduction of new accountability: “No doubt there hasbeen a shift in independent sector opinion. If this would have happened ten years agowe would be thumping the drums. (. . .) What helps is that every time we have aconcern and approach government, the response is quite positive” (phone interviewwith Bill Daniels, Executive Director Independent Schools Councils of Australia 8February 2010).

The participatory approach, which allows for a good measure of flexibility, shouldnot, however, obscure the fact that the end result involves authoritative regulation thatcould invoke the use of penalties. For example, a Montessori school, which failed toreport on performance standards, was forced to plead to keep its government funding(Stewart 2009). As a former Commonwealth education minister noted, the use of fundingas leverage is central to achieving accountability (phone interview with D Kemp, former



Commonwealth Minister for Education 11 February 2010). Sticks and carrots thereforeplay an important role in enhancing target group motivation to cooperate. Nevertheless,it was government sermons’ prior impact on target group information that enabled thesubsequent effective use of the other instruments. It is the combination of sermons (i.e.dialogue with non-government school representatives), carrots (i.e. non-governmentschool dependency on state aid), and sticks (i.e. state oversight), in interaction withtarget group information and motivation, that has produced the new accountabilityregime.

5.2. IsraelOn the face of it, public funding for non-government schools in Israel is specificallytailored to ensure a close link between level of aid and accountability. Different fundinglevels apply to non-government schools and funding varies with the degree to which aschool is committed to teaching the public curriculum (Vurgan 2007). The vast majorityof non-government school students are ultra-orthodox and their share in the primarylevel student population is 17 percent and growing. Most of these students study inschools that receive between 75 percent and 100 percent of per pupil public funding(Table 8.15 of Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). However, the traditional procedure-based accountability system generally failed to hold these schools accountable despitegenerous public funding (Schwartz 2000).

The accountability system for public schools gradually started to change in the 1990s.The new accountability regime (which complemented rather than supplanted theprocedure-focused system) is predicated on a clear statement of what schools are obli-gated to teach – hence the importance of a national core curriculum – and on standard-ized tests for different grade levels that provide a tool for the measurement ofperformance. Standardized tests, for public schools, were introduced in the 2000s byleading figures within the education ministry who emulated the American performance-based accountability model (interview with G Shield, former Head of the IsraeliMeasurement and Evaluation Unit – Department of Education 27 January 2008). Thetests were administered to both public and non-government recognized schools. Testresults are not made public.

The education ministry entered negotiations with ultra-orthodox education leadersto reach an agreement that would allow the administration of standardized tests inultra-orthodox schools. Testing on a range of topics implies that schools are expectedto teach their students the subjects on which they are tested. In different interviews,numerous former education ministers and directors general singled out the state’sinterest in assuring that non-government school students, specifically ultra-orthodoxones, acquire a minimal level of marketable skills as the main motivation for the min-istry initiatives.

The reason for this special concern has to do with the unique labor market anddemographic characteristics of the ultra-orthodox community. Circa 2004, the officiallabor market participation rate for ultra-orthodox men was 37 percent: considerably lessthan the national average for men, which was 68 percent (Gottlieb 2007). This astonish-ingly low participation rate is attributable to ultra-orthodox preference for Jewish studiesover work, relative lack of marketable skills that weakens their incentive to enter the laborforce, and targeted benefits that make such a lifestyle affordable. The nature of ultra-orthodox education for boys is the direct cause for the skills deficit. Currently, ultra-



orthodox primary schools for boys dedicate far more attention to religious studies thanto lay subjects and on the secondary level the focus is exclusively on religious subjects.Given that the ultra-orthodox community comprises approximately 10 percent of thecountry’s population, and its natural growth rate is more than twice that of thenon-orthodox, this situation is widely recognized as a severe problem (Gurovich &Cohen-Kastro 2004). To counter the growth of an undereducated and underemployedworkforce, governments emphasized the cultivation of marketable skills in ultra-orthodox schools. The Israeli state has pursued this goal primarily by the introduction ofa mandatory curriculum for non-government schools that focuses on “practical” areas ofinstruction.5

In terms of policy instruments, the Israeli state employed carrots, sermons, and sticksbut not necessarily in a coordinated fashion. The use of carrots, in the form of the allegedmatching of funding to accountability levels has already been mentioned. Sermons,however, are the main instrument associated with the promotion of accountability inultra-orthodox schools. Based on interviews with former education ministers and otherhigh ranking officials, dialogue with ultra-orthodox education leaders is an ongoing affairand whatever new arrangements had been established were invariably arrived at throughdeliberation and consensual compliance. A central example of this is the introduction ofpartial standardized testing of students in most ultra-orthodox primary schools in theearly 2000s, which was preceded by lengthy discussions between ultra-orthodox leadersand education ministry personnel (interview with G Shield, former Head of the IsraeliMeasurement and Evaluation Unit – Department of Education 27 January 2008). Finally,sticks have also been employed. The High Court of Justice (HCJ) ruled in two separatedecisions that the education ministry was to introduce and implement a core curriculumfor all recognized primary (HCJ 2751/99 2000) and secondary (10296/02 2004; 4805/072007) schools as a prerequisite for funding. The 2000 ruling regarding primary schoolsspurred the education ministry into action. The ministry initiated talks with ultra-orthodox leaders, which culminated in the formulation of a core curriculum for primaryschools. The HCJ allowed the education department three years to implement a corecurriculum for secondary schools (Yoaz et al. 2004).

It might appear that, not unlike the Australian case, new accountability measures weresuccessfully applied to non-government schools in Israel. A closer inspection of policyoutcomes, however, leads to a different conclusion. The introduction of both a corecurriculum and standardized testing has been applied in a partial manner. First, althoughrecognized non-government primary schools are required to teach at least 75 percent ofthe general core curriculum, in practice this requirement is rarely enforced. The officialposition of the education ministry is that the vast majority of non-government schoolscomply with this requirement and follow the core curriculum (Chromchenko 2004),however, there is evidence to suggest that this is a misleading representation. A recentundercover investigation conducted by an Israeli television show documented howprimary-level ultra-orthodox schools neglected to teach compulsory non-religiousclasses (Hamakor 2010). Education ministry figures are based on school self-reporting oron the report of ultra-orthodox inspectors: both sources are suspected of positive bias.One senior education ministry official claimed that he had yet to come across a case inwhich the ministry sanctioned an ultra-orthodox school for not following ministryacademic directives (interview with Education Ministry official 20 October 2010). Inother words, sticks are not employed.



Second, as far as standardized tests are concerned, many ultra-orthodox primaryschools quietly discontinued their participation. To begin with, ultra-orthodox leadersagreed to only a truncated version of the standardized tests that included only primaryschool students and did not include questions concerning English and science subjects.Since the 2006/7 school year, schools from the largest ultra-orthodox school systemceased to administer external exams (Rama 2009). As a result, most primary ultra-orthodox students are no longer subject to standardized tests whether truncated or not.

Third, the HCJ ruling regarding a core curriculum for secondary schools was neverimplemented. Education ministry negotiations with the ultra-orthodox sector wentnowhere: ultra-orthodox leaders were adamant that secondary level institutions for boyswould follow a strictly religious curriculum. Then in 2008, the Israeli parliamentapproved a law that explicitly enabled ultra-orthodox secondary schools to receive 60percent of public school funding without having to meet any curricular requirements(Sela 2008). In essence, this law voided the 2004 HCJ ruling. The ultra-orthodox schoolsector, whether formally (i.e. all upper secondary schools since the passing of the 2008law) or informally (schools that ignore regulations due to lax oversight) has, by and large,successfully avoided state accountability.

Why were state efforts at advancing the new accountability for non-governmentschools ultimately a failure? Both target group power and motivation contribute to theexplanation, but unlike the Australian case, information did not play a significant role inexplaining the (negative) outcome. With respect to political power, the ultra-orthodoxschool sector relies on the support of ultra-orthodox parties that are essential buildingblocks of Israeli coalition governments. As part of coalition formation negotiations, thelarge secular parties have little choice but to commit to unconditional support for ultra-orthodox education in return for ultra-orthodox political support. Thus, in 2006, as partof the coalition agreement, the Prime Minister committed to the support of legislationintended to prevent the imposition of a state-approved curriculum on ultra-orthodoxschools. The enactment of the 2008 law, mentioned before, accomplished this. As formotivation, not only do ultra-orthodox leaders view state aid for their education systemas their top priority, they also set a high premium on the complete autonomy of theirschools. In interviews and in public statements, ultra-orthodox leaders have been quiteforthright: they say that they are willing to give up funding before surrendering any oftheir independence.6 In contrast to the Australian case, sermons had little effect in Israel:education authorities were unable to persuade the ultra-orthodox leadership to embracenew accountability reforms (i.e. alter leadership motivation).

To conclude, government and court efforts to prod non-government – predominantlyultra-orthodox – schools to accept a core curriculum, standards, and testing have gener-ally failed. It would be a mistake, however, to pin the blame on new accountabilitymeasures as such: traditional measures fared no better in large part because of thepolitically pivotal position of the ultra-orthodox parties.

6. Divergence, preferences, and policy instruments

Australia and Israel are very different countries in terms of political structure, religion,and history. Nevertheless, for the latter quarter of the twentieth century their educationsystems converged on the exceptional mix of generous public aid for non-governmentschools combined with little public regulation and control. The main reason for the



emergence of this similar “aid-accountability” discrepancy has to do with the politicalpower of the main non-government target group. In Australia, Catholics mobilized togain public aid and their electoral significance was sufficient to secure both public aid andto avoid effective state oversight. In Israel, it was the ultra-orthodox political parties thatmanaged to obtain public aid sans accountability and state control. The “low account-ability” side of the funding–accountability equation was challenged in both countries,especially since the 1990s, by the new accountability movement.

The non-government school sector response to new accountability is where the twoeducation systems part ways. In Australia, new accountability measures for non-government schools have made impressive headway on both the state and Common-wealth levels and are set to proceed even further. In Israel, new accountability reforms inultra-orthodox schools have failed.

What explains the different trajectories? One possibility points to discrepancies inadministrative power wielded by the Israeli and Australian states. Considering its imple-mentation problems, it could be argued that in Israel the state lacks the autonomy toenforce its rules, vis-à-vis a strong social group, while the Australian state does not sufferfrom the same problem (see Migdal 1988 for a theorization of state–society relations).There is much to commend this explanation, nevertheless, it should be noted thatlegislation was no less an obstacle than implementation. Both obstacle types – legislationand implementation – can be traced back to target group power, vis-à-vis the state, andmotivation as discussed below.

The divergence between the Australian and Israeli trajectories is best explained withreference to the motivation component within the CIT framework and how it is shapedby social distance (i.e. distance between the core private constituency and society’sdominant group). The Israeli ultra-orthodox leadership perceives state accountabilityand control in a far more negative way than its Australian Catholic counterpart. Generallyspeaking, the ultra-orthodox leadership views secular society with contempt and seculareducation with deep apprehension because it could serve as a tool of social contamina-tion. Australian Catholics, in contrast, despite a long history of sectarianism, have sociallyassimilated (i.e. social distance between Catholics and others has diminished) and oneexpression of this process is popular acceptance of mainstream educational principles. Asa result, the non-government school leadership cannot mobilize its constituency tooppose new mechanisms of public accountability. Moreover, parts of the leadership weresupportive of adopting new accountability. To be clear, this constituency is still a powerfulpolitical force. Despite the difficulties involved in mobilizing in fragmented politicalsystems, the Catholic school establishment successfully mobilized Catholics in support ofpublic aid in the 1970s. Moreover, mobilization of the non-government school constitu-ency contributed to the ALP’s defeat in 2004 on the backdrop of a party platform thatcalled for state aid cuts to wealthy non-government schools (Green 2004). It is doubtfulthat the troops are there, however, for mobilization intended to stifle accountabilityinitiatives (phone interview with Bill Daniels, Executive Director Independent SchoolsCouncils of Australia 11 February 2010).

Differences between the two communities in terms of social distance are also mani-fested in school curricula prior to accountability reforms. In the majority of Australiannon-government schools, the curriculum was not dramatically different from that ofstate schools in contrast to the de facto ultra-orthodox curriculum that mostly leaves outnon-religious subjects. This difference clearly impacts motivation: new accountability



measures require deep changes in ultra-orthodox curricula, which invariably contributesto ultra-orthodox reluctance to accept a state curriculum.

The private school constituency in both countries is politically powerful. Constitu-ency motivation to preserve full autonomy, however, is different across the countries andhelps explain diverging results. To understand why the Australian non-governmentschool constituency did not adopt a strict oppositional stance it is necessary to acknowl-edge the effectiveness of the policy instrument mix in influencing target group informa-tion, beliefs, and – consequentially – motivation. In Australia, all three policy instrumentshave been used and combined. Sermons, in the form of public–private deliberation thatprecedes the institutionalization of formal accountability mechanisms, have been preva-lent. Sermons have often been criticized as “too weak” (Vedung & van der Doelen 1998).This makes the successful application of new accountability measures to highly indepen-dent non-government schools in Australia all the more surprising. A major reason forsermon success in Australia is that public and private stands with respect to new account-ability were not far apart to begin with. As demonstrated in the Victoria case, at least somenon-government school leaders, and most parents, appreciated the added informationthat standardized testing provided about school and system performance. The value ofdeliberation in the context of coinciding interests was in building trust where little of itexisted before. Once a certain level of mutual trust had been established, non-governmentschools were more likely to accept accountability because they no longer feared thataccountability was merely a stepping stone on the road to government takeover. From atheoretical standpoint, the implication of this is that the use of a generic policy instru-ment (i.e. sermons) facilitated reform through its influence on actor beliefs (informationor information interpretation). Changes in leadership information brought about anamendment of preferences (motivation). No less importantly, government’s successfulpublic campaign for new accountability measures also created a positive attitude amongCatholic parents that undermined the power of the opposition within the Catholicleadership. In the original CIT framework specific instruments are matched with certainproperties (e.g. sermons impact information). The Australian case, however, demon-strates how sermons not only influence target group information directly but also moti-vation and power in an indirect manner.

An emphasis on sermons, however, runs the risk of distracting from the importance ofother – “harder” – policy instruments. Indeed, sermon effectiveness could be ascribed, atleast in part, to the implicit threat of sticks. Thus in Victoria one of the main reasons thatthe CECV decided to cooperate with government on new accountability was that itsleadership feared that the alternative to cooperation was unilateral imposition of account-ability. The threat of sticks weakens the motivation of parts of the target group to opposeaccountability. Sticks not only facilitate the use of sermons: they are also its product.Public–private deliberation culminated in covenants that despite their voluntary accep-tance by non-government schools, were legally binding nonetheless. Furthermore, schoolfailure to meet agreed upon standards also has implications for carrots: public aid could beslashed. Carrots, or incentives, have a hard edge to them – the withdrawal of the carrot ifrequirements are not met – that is essential for their proper function. Sermons in Australiaachieved their goal when combined with sticks and carrots. The establishment of non-government school accountability constitutes a double victory for Australian government:an important policy goal was achieved and it was done with very little use of coercion. Asa consequence, the non-government school constituency was not alienated.



In Israel all three generic policy tools were deployed. The use of court orders (i.e.sticks) set the stage for deliberation (i.e. sermons) concerning an authoritative curricu-lum. Sticks motivated the target group to enter negotiations although not to comply.Parliament, however, enacted legislation that superseded the court orders. Carrots, in theform of accountability-linked funding levels – links that in practice were weak at best –were institutionalized well before the rise of the new accountability movement.

A short exploration of the different policy instruments failure in Israel helps illustratethe general limits of policy instrument effectiveness. Sticks, in the form of court ordersrequiring a curriculum were conducive for deliberation with the ultra-orthodox sector inthe case of primary schools but ended in new counter-legislation that voided the courtorder in relation to secondary schools’ core curriculum. This failure illustrates whygovernments faced with powerful social groups are likely to prefer non-coercive means.In fact, it should be noted that the court orders were not supported by the executive. Theeducation minister at the time argued that although she supported the goal of non-government school accountability, she thought that the use of coercion was counter-productive because of the political clout of the ultra-orthodox non-government schools(interview with Yuli Tamir, former Israeli Education Minister 6 January 2010). In general,powerful private constituencies are capable of undermining effective implementation ofgovernment orders if they are motivated to do so.

Carrots in Israel have been ineffective. It is one thing to formally tie grants torequirements, but quite another to actually enforce these requirements. When there arefive inspectors for over 200,000 students, and they belong to the same insular social groupas those inspected, it should surprise no one that school accountability, in practice, doesnot meet formal requirements. More fundamentally, slashing subsidies to private ultra-orthodox schools is a politically hazardous venture. Once funding has been granted at acertain level it is politically difficult to take it away.

Finally, sermons have been less effective in Israel than in Australia. The appeal ofdeliberation in an environment in which government officials have no practical leverageover ultra-orthodox schools is clear. The fundamental problem, however, is that in Israelthe main obstacle is not so much target group distrust of government intentions thatcould be dispelled with deliberation and new information, but that the main targetgroup’s goal is to retain full autonomy regardless of government intentions. Hence, theend result of negotiations is little more than empty gestures. The depressing conclusion,from the government’s perspective, is that given the vast differences in motivationbetween non-government schools and public authorities, and the powerful politicalposition of the ultra-orthodox, the effectiveness of policy instruments is expected to bevery limited in the foreseeable future. Israeli policymakers did not fail in the creation ofa successful policy mix: under existing circumstances they could not succeed.

7. The next step: new institutions

The Israeli predicament is a very real challenge for policymakers that stare at their generictool box – carrots, sticks, and sermons – and are likely to conclude that given theinauspicious target group terrain, the tools at their disposal are too blunt to do the job. Asargued earlier, this is the stage in which policymakers might be forced to consider actionon the institutional dimension. Policymakers could operate on this dimension to increasethe effectiveness of their generic policy instruments primarily by creating an institutional



environment in which target group power and/or its motivation to oppose policy isweaker than in the present setting.

How could policymakers reconfigure institutions in a way that would align public andprivate motivation and avoid political roadblocks? In the specific case of ultra-orthodoxschools, there appears to be little that policymakers can do under current politicalcircumstances to subject these schools to effective public (“new” or “old”) accountability.Nevertheless, this does not mean that the overarching goal of teaching ultra-orthodoxyouth marketable skills is unattainable. Policymakers could, for example, carry out “insti-tutional layering”, a practice by which governments establish new institutions that aredesigned to serve government ends alongside older institutions that for different reasonsgovernment cannot satisfactorily control (Streeck & Thelen 2005).

Indeed, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor has recently declared its intentionto launch new programs that would offer graduates of ultra-orthodox schools the oppor-tunity to study “practical” studies in designated institutions following their graduation(2010). Under this plan, carrots are offered (i.e. state funding for further education) butunder a wholly separate arrangement. Policymakers hope that they will be able to exercisemore control over these programs than over non-government schools. This could be thecase because in the new institutional environment the main target group would be bothless belligerent and less powerful. Ultra-orthodox leaders, for instance, might not assignthese institutions the same symbolic significance as schools, thus weakening oppositionmotivation. Furthermore, the establishment of a new institution should also weakeninsider opposition power (i.e. uncooperative ultra-orthodox principals, inspectors, etc.).In general, the use of instruments – primarily carrots – would be more effective in thenew institution than in traditional schools because the target group would have lessinsider power to oppose government plans and also less motivation to do so. It should bestressed, however, that there is no guarantee that institutional engineering would succeedand even if successful, it does not address all educational deficiencies (e.g. civic educa-tion), and it requires both time and considerable resources. Nevertheless, if implemen-tation does succeed, it would indicate a way forward for policymakers.

8. Conclusion

The CIT framework focuses attention on the interaction of policy instruments withtarget group power, information and motivation. Analysis of distinct policy instrumenttraits is valuable because it indicates general advantages and weaknesses of a giveninstrument, which help explain why policy mixes are likely to be more successful thanexclusive use of instruments. Studies of policy instrument success could benefit fromsuch a dual emphasis on both policy instruments and target groups, and their interactiveeffects.

The main difference between the Australian and Israeli cases, which helps explaintheir divergent trajectories, is related to disparate target group motivations, which in turnare influenced by social distance. The ultra-orthodox community, which constitutes thecore of the Israeli non-government school sector, purposefully insulates itself from therest of society and accordingly views government accountability as intrusion. Givenultra-orthodox power and motivation, no conceivable policy instrument mix would havesucceeded. Catholic assimilation in Australia, quite differently, helps explain the relativelyfavorable constituency attitudes toward collaboration with government on accountabil-



ity. Nevertheless, diminished social distance in Australia was hardly a sufficient conditionfor the successful introduction of new accountability. A judicious deployment of policyinstruments also contributed to a change in non-government actor motivation and to thesuccess of the process. Related to this are two points of broader analytical significance.First, sermons impact information, and consequentially beliefs and this in turn couldreshape both target group power and motivation. The importance of sermons as persua-sion should not be discounted. Second, sticks can play an important role in affectingtarget group motivation to participate in dialogue with government. In other words,sometimes the threat of sticks helps to get actors to start listening to governmentsermons. The combination of soft and hard policy instruments makes for more effectiveregulation.

Finally, this study goes beyond CIT in proposing a second avenue for impacting targetgroup properties alongside policy instruments. From both practical and theoretical per-spectives of policymaking, it makes sense to view institutions separately from policyinstruments. Within the framework of a new institution, target group motivation tooppose regulation and the power to do so are likely to be weaker than in the traditionalinstitutional setting. Institutional design offers policymakers a policy option that mightimprove generic policy instrument effectiveness, especially following failure of conven-tional means.

Notes

1 To clarify, differences in government use of policy instruments cannot explain on their own

divergence in outcomes. Consideration must be given to target group properties as will be

discussed below.

2 Institutional engineering is presented here as a possible method for enhancing policy instru-

ment effectiveness, not as an explanation of the different outcomes in Australia and Israel. For

the latter purpose, the standard CIT framework suffices.

3 Nevertheless, as the analysis of the case studies will demonstrate this simple one-to-one match-

ing of instruments and target group properties is an oversimplification.

4 In fact, policy instruments require an organizational framework for their utilization. Institu-

tions therefore have ontological precedence over policy instruments. As argued below, however,

policy reformers will first look to manipulate instruments and only then move to change

institutions.

5 When asked about the introduction of civics education, most former education ministers and

directors general either ranked it as a secondary goal or even viewed it as an obstacle to the

introduction of practical studies because it generates opposition among the ultra-orthodox to

a state curriculum.

6 Ultra-orthodox schools are not made of a single cloth and some sectors within this diverse

society demonstrate some willingness to expand the teaching of lay studies and adopt a core

curriculum. In addition, girls regularly study secular subjects on all levels. Nevertheless, hos-

tility to the adoption of a state-approved core curriculum is generally the norm.

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regulating non-government schools: explaining success and failure

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