Electoral Studies (198s). 4:3, 197-213

Reapportionment: A Study in Comparati ve Government

D,AVID BUTLER

Nuffieid College, Oxford OX1 INF, England

BRUCE E. Cm

Cali/ornia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 9112>, USA

The periodic redrawing of electoral boundaries is a necessity in any equitable single-member representative system. It is approached in very different ways in the United States and in Britain. In America, against a background of continuous intervention by the courts, party politics and legislative fixing are endemic. Britain (and the other established democracies of the Commonwealth) have all turned increasingly to neutral commissions that are in theory (and, on the whole. in practice) blind to considerations of party advantage. This article explores how this contrast has developed. The reasons behind the profound differences in procedure offer unexpectedly rich insights into comparative government.

If a representative system based on single-member constituencies is to preserve a semblance of equity, boundaries must be redrawn from time to time. If seats are not adjusted to changing population patterns, gross anomalies develop. But uncontroversial redistricting is difficult to achieve.’ Changes in constituency boundaries can have far reaching consequences for the interests of local communities and for the careers of politicians; they can also have partisan consequences and, of themselves, decide who takes power after an election.?

The problem has been tackled in different ways in different countries, but it has not been studied comparatively. Yet an examination of the principal exemplars offers insights into important differences between the operation of various electoral systems and underlines the uniqueness of the conventions that seem so normal in the United States. It also has implica- tions for the exportability of institutions from one system to another, and for the general possibilities and limits of a comparative government approach.

The democracies of continental Europe and of Latin America almost all have proportional representation systems and in them the drawing of boundaries makes no vital difference: the same is true of Japan. France stands out as having single-member constituencies. but since it has had no redistricting since the Fifth Republic was formed in 1958 and is now reverting to proportional representation, it hardly offers evidence. Our prime examples of political systems based on single-member constituencies come from the United States on the one- hand and from Britain, Canada, Australia. New Zealand and India on the other. There is a world of difference between the redistricting norms current in America and those current in the Commonwealth. In all the Commonwealth countries, the politicians have in large

0261-3794/85/03/0197-17/%03.00 0 1985 Buttetworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd

198 Reapportionment: A Study in Comparative Government

measure opted out, leaving the process to more or less ‘neutral’ commissions. But in the United States, the problems have been dealt with at the heart of the political arena. with the legislators bargaining over the details, subject only to some limits laid down by the courts. An exploration of why neutral commissions have not been successfully adopted in America

-and why, perhaps, they could never work there-reveals much about the two types of political systems and their contrasting approaches to politics.

Although redistricting practices may vary profoundly between countries, some principles seem to be subscribed to almost universally.3 It is the implementation of these principles and

the relative weight assigned to each of them that varies between countries. The various goals of redistricting inevitably conflict with one another, and force those who draw the boundaries to make choices, often in ways that reflect basic political values. There are at least four broadly agreed goals in reapportionment.

1. Equality o/Numbers

It is very widely accepted today that, in order to make each vote have an equal weight, the numbers in each constituency should be as equal as possible. There are few polities that still accept an explicit rural loading, the once-fashionable practice of allowing far-flung seats to have fewer voters. In Australia a rural loading of up to 20 per cent was reduced to 10 per cent in 1973 and abolished in 1984. In the United States state constitutional provisions that ensured separate representation for individual counties regardless of population inequality were voided by the 1963 judgment in Reynolds v. Sims. This has left the United States with the curious anomaly of equipopulous state senate districts and highly disparate national Senate seats (California’s two Senators represent eighty times as many people as Alaska’s two). In the Commonwealth countries exceptions are still made for special cases, such as Orkney and Shetland off Scotland (where the electorate is 40 per cent of the Scottish average) and the Andaman Isles off India (where the electorate is 5 per cent of the Indian average). The acceptable margin of inequality varies widely between countries. In America. the Supreme Court has insisted on a variance of less than 1 per cent in population between the largest and smallest Congressional seats and a somewhat more flexible population standard for state legislative districts (up to 15 per cent in some instances). In England, the 1983 redistribution produced seats ranging between 46,000 and 94,000.

There is, of course, the crucial fact that equality of numbers is interpreted differently in different countries. It can mean equal numbers of those counted by the census (including illegal and legal aliens in the United States), of eligible voters (nationals above the age of 18). or of officially registered voters. Paradoxically, equality of numbers does not mean equality of electoral influence. If seats are drawn on the basis of equal population, then an individual’s vote in a district with a higher ratio of eligible voters to population will be more diluted than in a district with a lower ratio. Moreover, the levels of participation may vary greatly even when the numbers of eligible or registered voters do not. An individual’s influence is also likely to be greater in a marginal seat, where politicians, realizing that a single vote may be decisive, court each voter more assiduously than in a safe seat.

2. Respect for Comnunilies of Interest

The very name ‘House of Commons’ echoes its medieval origins in the representation of communities. Similarly, the federal structure of the United States constitution was designed to give play to distinctive geographic and regional interests. Although in the twentieth century the representation of numbers has taken precedence over the representation of

D~vln BUTLER AND BRUCE E. CAIN 199

communities, respect for natural communities and administrative borders continues every- where to play some role in the drawing of constituency lines. Indeed, if geographically based

districts make any sense whatsoever. it is because the representation of local community interests is considered important.

But what is a natural community? State and city lines, like rivers and mountains, can sometimes give a clear answer. However, a journey through the middle-class suburban sprawl between Orange county and northern San Diego in California vividly drives home the point that city and county lines can be s&o-economically meaningless. As a result, the lines between constituencies are often arbitrary, separating two sides of a street, dividing parishes, or other bases of association in a seemingly capricious way. As a further complication, communities of interest in the United States have been increasingly defined in ethnic and racial terms since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ,” This has forced

the courts to decide which ethnically or racially homogeneous residential patterns should be respected; it has required legislators to decide when to split traditionally recognized

communities in order to protect the newly recognized ones.

3. Compactness

Ever since the supporters of Governor Elbrige Gerry of Massachusetts delineated a straggling constituency that looked like a salamander, people have been suspicious of oddly shaped constituencies. It is generally assumed that, other things being equal, a constituency should be as compact as possible, not least to reduce the travelling time, both for the repre- sentative-himself and for those engaged in collective constituency activities. Furthermore, many believe that the lack of compactness provides prima facie evidence of a partisan gerrymander. This posture is best described by the statement, ‘I cannot say for certain what a gerrymander is, but I know one when I see one’. Even if this were true (and sometimes it is not), the pursuit of compactness may sometimes be at odds with the pursuit of political or ethnic balance, or with respect for tradition or the legitimate rights (if such there be) of incumbents.’

4. Political Balance

In the ideal situation, a single-member system with fairly drawn boundaries should produce electoral results in which a majority of votes will always secure a majority in seats and in which any given swing from one party to the other means that a matching number of seats changes hands (at least in two-party systems with a closely divided electorate).” But no single-member simple plurality system in fact operates with such perfect regularity. Firstly, party strengths never stay wholly constant; swings, varying unpredictably in different parts of the country, can produce unforeseen effects on the relation between seats and votes.’ Secondly, party support may be so unevenly concentrated that no reasonablelooking drawing of boundaries could treat all parties equal1y.s In Britain, for instance, it was no fault of the Boundary Commissioners that in 1983 28 per cent of the vote secured 209 seats for Labour while 26 per cent secured only 23 for the Alliance; it was the Alliance’s misfortune that its strength was so evenly spread. It was no fault of the Boundary Commissioners that in the 1950s Labour needed 2 per cent more of the vote than the Conservatives to win a majority of seats; the Commissioners could not have prevented Labour ‘wasting’ votes by piling up huge majorities in utterly safe mining seats. In the United States, equal-sized, compact, ungerrymandered districts would probably hurt the Democrats, since they would ‘waste’ votes by piling up huge majorities in inner city ethnic and racial minority seats.”

200 Rrdpportionment: A Study in Compurdr,e Cor,ernment

There is a surprising degree of consensus across single-member systems about these four criteria although there are variations in the relative weight assigned to them. America has. since 1962. made equality of population its most important goal. striving for mathematical equality. Britain has put respect for communities and administrative boundaries on more of a pedestal. But these contrasts are trivial compared to differences in the procedures of redistricting and the political values that are brought to bear on them. It is necessary therefore to describe in detail the way the countries set about doing the job.

The American hIode

The American model occupies one end of the procedural continuum. Unlike the Common- wealth approach. American procedures are highly decentralized and in most cases explicitly political. While the apportionment of Congressional seats to states is determined by the Federal government (though on a mechanical formula that has been applied. unchanged, since 1940”‘), each state has the responsibility of drawing the lines for the seats apportioned to it in the two year period following the decennial census. States can adopt whatever redistricting procedures they prefer. Prior to the Supreme Court’s intervention in Baker v. Carr and the cases that followed that 1962 judgment. states also had considerable leeway in determining which criteria were most important. Nowadays, the states are constrained to place population equality above all else and must take care not to dilute the voting strength of historically disadvantaged minorities. Only then are they free to specify other criteria and their order of importance. I1 A perusal of the redistricting goals mentioned by state constitu-

tions shows wide variation in terms of how frequently these other criteria are mentioned.

Eighteen states designate no explicit criteria other than equal population or county repre- sentation (and the latter has been held unconstitutional). The most commonly mentioned criteria are contiguity (25 states), compactness (18 states), and respect for community/ political sub-unit lines (16 states). A small number mention the observance of previous district lines (2 states), ‘socio-economic communities’ (2 states), or drainage lines and other distinctive geographic features (3 seats).

While it is not unusual for the boundary commissioners in the Commonwealth to divide their task by region or locale, a common procedure is followed by all the regional commissions within each country. By contrast, American procedures vary widely by state.

Most states leave redistricting in the hands of their legislatures. One state (Alaska) empowers its Governor to reapportion its districts and another (Maryland) requires that the Governor draw the lines and then submit them to the legislature. Only nine states use a commission for their state legislature lines. and of these, only two (Montana and Hawaii) use a commission to draw Congressional lines. A handful of other states (e.g., Illinois,

Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas) provide for backup commissions if the legislature is unable to agree on a plan in a prescribed amount of time; and three others employ commissions in an advisory capacity.

The underlying rationale for using commissions more frequently for drawing state legislative rather than Congressional lines is that there is a more obvious conflict of interest when state legislators vote on their own lines than when they vote on Congressional ones. However, state legislators are seldom prohibited from subsequently running for Congress in the very seats they have voted on, and moreover, Congressional incumbents tend to have considerable influence over state legislators through party or old boy ties.

Even when a commission controls the process, the legislature is often represented. Many of the commissions either include legislators themselves or &signis of the legislature. Common Cause and other reform groups have argued the case for commissions that do not

D.AWD BUTLER AND BRUCE E. CAIS 201

include legislators or any elected officials, i2 but thev are usually forced to compromise in order to get any redistricting reforms through the legislature. The states that explicitly exclude elected or appointed officials from the commission are Missouri, Michigan, and

hlontana. The issue of the role of elected officials in redistricting has been hotly debated in California. Of the two commission proposals that have appeared on the California ballot since 198 1. one allowed for representation by elected or appointed officials and the other did not (it would have consisted of retired appellate judges).

The methods of appointing commissioners to their positions are various. They can be briefly classified. There are executive appointed commissions (e.g. Missouri), party appointed commissions (e.g., IMichigan and New Jersey), and legislature appointed commissions (e.g.. Hawaii. Montana and Pennsylvania). in one state (Colorado), the

commission is appointed by all three branches of the government, and in another (Arkansas), it is composed of the three highest ranking elected state officials. As yet, no state has had a redistricting commission appointed by or consisting of members of the judiciary, active or retired. However, a number of states give their state courts original jurisdiction over

contested plans, others give them the power to appoint a tie-breaking member: and still others give them the right to devise a plan if the commission or legislature proves incapable

of the task. All of the United States commissions, except hlontana, draw on political data for the

purpose of assessing the effects of various alternative proposals. None of them employs the elaborate schedule of local hearings used in Britain and Australia. Since most United States commissions consist of individuals appointed by partisan sources (the parties, the governor or the legislature), a great deal of thought goes into the partisan balance of the commissions. Equal representation of the parties can easily lead to an evenly-divided vote. and hence stalemate. As a consequence, the tie-breaking member (also called the odd member) is a controversial appointment. In most cases, the commission itself selects the odd member (e.g., Connecticut, Hawaii, Montana and Pennsylvania), but in some, the tie-breaking member is selected by the state supreme court (Illinois and New Jersey).

A distinctive feature of legislative redistricting is the secrecy of its rules and procedures. No section of the state constitution or enabling legislation describes with any precision how

the legislature should proceed in its redistricting task. Even so, it is possible to glean from a few published accounts some of the characteristic features of a legislative approach to redistricting. ‘3

In the United States (in sharp contrast to Britain) the state legislature must accomplish its redistricting task in a relatively short period of time. However, the process cannot really begin until the census is completed, and if there are delays in the release of the data, as there were in both 1970 and 1980, it adds to the burden of trying to draw new district lines in time for the first elections of the new decade. In the latest redistricting, the Census Bureau released its special redistricting tape (PL-94-17 1) in the spring of 198 1, allowing most states less than a year to complete the job before the filing date for the 1982 elections. PL-94-17 1 contained a general population count by bloc and tract, together with data on race and ethnicity. The rest of the basic census data (e.g., education, nature of tenancy, age) was released in later instalments-in most instances too late to be used in the redistricting negotiations preceding the 1982 elections. The fact that the initial tape contained popula- tion and race/ethnicity data did, of course, reflect the priority the Supreme Court had assigned to these two redistricting goals.

Two major problems arose with the tape, both of which offer some insight into the difficulties and ironies of American redistricting. One is that the population figures on the 1970 tape were based in part on numbers that were negotiated by local communities and the

202 Reupporlronment: A Study rn Compdratice Goternment

Census Bureau. These negotiations typically centred on complaints by local communities that their populations. particularly in minority inner city areas. had been undercounted by the Census Bureau: this was important because government benefits to local communities under various government programmes rested on these figures. Even after the release of PL-94- 17 1 in 1980, the Census Bureau was forced to revise its numbers due to errors and misassignments. For instance, the population of Los Angeles city rose by 2.14 1 as a result of corrections by the Bureau after the release of PL-94- 17 1. This meant that any final plans had to await the release of the negotiated data or risk a court challenge. The errors in the Bureau’s population figures stress the absurdity of an extreme one-man, one-vote doctrine.

The second major difficulty with the census tape points out the intricacy of racial

considerations in redistricting matters. The 1970 tape did not specifically identify persons of Hispanic origin and hence it had been difficult to protect Hispanic communities from vote dilution. The Hispanics protested at their treatment in 1970 and mobilized their political forces in the period between the 1970 and 1980 censuses to make sure that their interests would be better protected in the next redistricting. The 1980 census tape therefore included a category for persons of Hispanic origin for the first time, but in a way that added to confusion and raised deeper questions. The Census Bureau chose to classify Hispanics as an ethnic category and allowed them to place themselves into their preferred racial category. As a consequence, there was no pure measure of white. non-minorities in 1980 (since man) Hispanics classified themselves as racially white) nor of Blacks (for the same reason). In addition, the Bureau arbitrarily restricted the category of disadvantaged minorities by the classifications it provided. Who could be sure that some other group (e.g.. the Chinese. Vietnamese or Koreans) might not feel discriminated against in 1980 as did the Hispanics in

1970?

Since few states have any explicit provision against political data being used in considera- tion of redistricting, the task of preparing a plan did not end with the arrival of the census tape. Most states developed a unified data set with registration figures by party and data from previous contests arranged by census blocs or tracts. In large states, this is an expensive and time-consuming process. since census and political precinct lines are drawn without corres- pondence to one another. The technical work is usually prepared by an outside political consulting firm (usually one that does a lot of direct mail work) or by an in-house staff. The complexity of the data preparation and the intricacies of the line-drawing negotiations place a high premium on experience. Hence, certain individuals and firms who had been prominent in 1970 re-emerged in 1980. But, since the stakes of redistricting were high and the question of trust was central, the controlling legislators took care that their top staff were people who could be counted on.

As is the case with legislation generally, a redistricting plan in a political setting results from negotiation and bargaining between individual members and the leadership. The exact details of these negotiations rarely sufrace in the press. but drawing upon one co-author’s experience in the 1981 California redistricting, we will venture some preliminary observa- tions. One thing that all legislators want from their districts is electoral safety. Incumbency has special importance in a situation where a locality rule is so deeply entrenched. Defacto a legislator has to live within the district he represents-and usually to have had long estab- lished roots therein. Politics, even at the level of most state legislatures, is a profession, and legislators do all that they can to avoid losing their seats through redistricting. The issue of electoral safety comes up in two ways. The most obvious is the underlying partisan disposition of the constituency. While party ties have declined in the United States over the past twenty years, it is still the case that an incumbent’s safety is related to the local level of registration for his party. However, calculation of safety has been made more complex by the

DAVID BUTLER AND BRUCE E. CAIN 203

growing number of independents and ‘disloyal’ voters. This has added to the general

insecurity of incumbents and increased their reluctance to be generous in negotiations. Individual incumbents and party leaders do not have identical interests in these matters.

Incumbents, being risk averse, rarely believe that they are safe enough, and party leaders must bargain hard to create a plan that will maximize their party’s representation.‘”

The other aspect of electoral safety is displacement. Because party ties have weakened and incumbencyperre matters as much as it does, incumbents are reluctant to give up the voters they know for the ones they do not know. Having invested as much time and staff effort as many of them have to cultivating constituents. it is understandable that they do not want to part with this investment. This introduces a considerable degree of inertia into the bargain-

ing process, causing incumbents to resist changes proposed by party leaders. It also explains why reformers, who often want to use redistricting to undermine the incumbency advantage, resist district continuity as a redistricting criterion. To respect historical con- stituency boundaries. as is widely done in Commonwealth countries, would have the effect of benefiting incumbents. At the other extreme, a policy of extreme displacement with no

regard for incumbency might lead to lower levels of information among voters. higher election costs and unnecessary disruptions of party activist ties.

The third and most outrageous kind of incumbent preferences are the idiosyncratic and personal ones. These include requests to keep within the incumbent’s district areas that

contain favourite donors or amusement parks or shopping centres; incumbent legislators will sometimes argue longer and harder for these seemingly trivial items than for greater electoral safety. The legislative leadership must try to reconcile the various and sometimes competing demands of the members in order to build support for the redistricting bill. In the end, what emerges from a legislative reapportionment is a hodge-podge of concessions and trade-offs, tempered by the partisan or bipartisan intentions of the leadership.

In sum, the American approach to redistricting very much reflects the belief expressed by Madison in the Federalist Papers that the drawing of boundaries is a political matter that is best handled by the legislature. Lines are bargained over and voted on in the same manner that legislators deliberate over the budget or other pieces of important legislation. hIany of the commissions are in reality bipartisan subsets of the legislature or of the state parties. No state has as yet attempted to implement a system of ‘neutral’ commissioners appointed by the courts, although many have had to rely on the courts (and their d&signLs) to draw their lines for them when they have been too divided to do so themselvests

The British Model

Since 1944 there have been permanent Boundary Commissions in Britain charged with producing a comprehensive redistribution of parliamentary constituencies at regular intervals. What follows will refer to the Boundary Commission for England, although the separate bodies for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland operate in virtually identical fashion. Since 1958 the routine interval has been every ten to fifteen years; so there were new proposals in 1969 (given effect in 1974) and in 1982 (given effect in 1983).

The Boundary Commission, although nominally chaired by the Speaker of the House of Commons, is effectively run by its Vice-Chairman, a High Court Judge. It has two other members (usually lawyers) and two assessors (the Surveyor-General and the Registrar- General). It has a civil service staff of ten or so, jointly headed by one senior Home Office official.

The legislature has never had much say in the drawing of constituency boundaries in Britain. Even in the nineteenth century, although there was some political input. Boundary

203 Reapportionment: A Study in Comparative Gor’ernment

Commissioners drew up the map and, in the controversies of 1867 and 1884-5 their neutrality was not seriously challenged.

In this century, Parliament. with two exceptions, has never significantly revised the proposals prepared by neutral Boundary Commissioners. The two exceptions were not concerned with specific constituencies. In 1948 a Labour Government, believing that urban areas were under-represented, asked the Commissioners to devise seventeen extra city seats. There were cries of ‘foul’ from the Conservatives, but the seats actually divided 9-8 in the

next election.‘” In 1969 a Labour Government. worried about the seats it would lose under a general redistribution, postponed implementing the Boundary Commission’s proposals on the ground that an impending change of local government boundaries would render them obsolete.

The Commission operates under strict rules. It is required to respect local government boundaries ‘as far as possible’ and it is required to make constituencies ‘as equal as possible’. These two principles are constantly in conflict (and in 1982 the Labour Party brought suit. unsuccessfully, against the Commission for giving too much weight to ‘natural

communities’ and too little weight to ‘equal numbers’).” The Commission establishes a nationwide quota for electorates (in the most recent

instance 65.000) and then allocates the appropriate number of seats to each shire count) (ranging from 4 to 15) and to each metropolitan county (ranging from 15 in hlerseyside, to 90 in London). It accepts county boundaries as inviolable and its initial allocations of number of seats as unchangeable. It then, in the office, draws up a provisional map which is published for objections to be raised.

Local inquiries are held by Assistant Commissioners (who are working barristers. appointed one-off for the job). They listen, in public hearings, to the views of local councils. of local political parties and of private citizens, and then they report to the Boundary Commissioners in London who usually accept, but sometimes reject their recommendation. The reports and the reasons for accepting or rejecting them are made public. If the Commissioners modify their original proposals, there is the possibility of holding a further inquiry.

Neither the Assistant Commissioners nor the Commissioners are supposed to take any account of party political considerations. Compactness. established geographic links, natural and administrative boundaries. and community of interest are the only relevant factors allowing them to prefer one solution to another, or to deviate from the perfect quota.

Parties. therefore, dress up their self-interest in arguments that may or may not be spurious about natural communities; they put together moving evidence of long-established links between particular suburbs or localities for submission to the inquiries.

This whole process of repeated inquiries can be long-winded and unproductive. The Commissioners started work in 1976 and did not produce their final report till 1982. Since they were using 1976 electoral registration figures (Britain has reasonably efficient compulsory registration), there were some substantial anomalies by the time the report was implemented. Although most seats were within 10,000 of the quota, the final range for the United Kingdom was from 22,000 to 94,000.

No one has seriously impugned the neutrality of the Boundary Commissioners, even though. because of population movements, each redistribution has, necessarily, favoured the Conservative Party. and even though some prominent MPs inevitably have seen their seats disappear or lose their safeness.

Al1 this does not mean that the British Boundary Commssions are a readily exportable device. In Britain there is no residence rule and few politicians of stature, redistricted out of one seat, have failed to find another. Local government units are more equal in size and few

D,AVID BUTLER AND BRUCE E. CALU 205

MPs have more than two or three local councils in their area. It is possible to make a large

proportion of constituency boundaries match with local boundaries. Moreover, there are few areas where there could be any question of adapting constituencies to secure ethnic or

minority representation. And, despite a major lawsuit in 1982 (which failed abjectly), the whole issue is not really open to litigation (and Britain, with no Bill of Rights, is a far less litigious place than the United States). ia

Commonwealth Practice

In Australia, boundaries have always been drawn by commissions though in the past they have been more political than in Britain. Incumbent’s interests have sometimes been protected and a rural weighting used to be formally authorized. But the system has been made increasingly ‘fair’. Under a new electoral act in 1984, the new electoral Commis- sioner, Colin Hughes, a former academic who had written widely on electoral systems. presided over a remarkable and total reapportionment. The 125 seats in the Australian Lower House were redrawn into’148, with due judicial process in a mere seven months.

The Commissioners in each state were required to keep seats within two and one-half per cent of that state’s average electorate, as forecast by the census for two and one-half years hence (just half-way through the five-year cycle for redistricting). Proposals were drawn up by the Commissioners without consultation. Public inquiries were then held and in some cases led to modifications. The final outcome nationwide was generally welcomed: it could be shown that if either Labor or the Liberal/National Party coalition won 50.5 per cent of the preferred votes they would almost certainly secure a majority of seats.

At the state level in Australia reapportionment has not always been so uncontroversial. All states work through non-partisan commissioners but Queensland has preserved a heavy rural loading. ‘9

Canadians left their ten yearly Federal redistricting to a Committee of Parliament until 1964 when, consciously drawing on Ausraiian experience, they passed the Electoral Boundaries Adjustment Act. This placed the task firmly in the hands of Electoral Commis- sioners. Parliament reserved the nominal right to reconsider their recommendations and this has led to some delay. There was delay, too, in the 1970s due to the adoption of a new ‘amalgam method’ of allocating seats to provinces.

Variations of up to 29 per cent from provincial quotas are permitted but in successive redistributions electorates have become increasingly uniform in number. However, the guarantees given to a small province, like Prince Edward Island, or to the North West Territory, leads to a few extreme disparities in number.

Most of the provinces have now copied the national procedure and impartial commissions are now an accepted norm of Canadian politics.“’

In New Zealand a Representation Commission has. since 1887, been responsible for redrawing boundaries every five years. Four of its seven voting members are public officials. such as Government Statistician and Director General of Ordnance Survey; their neutrality is unquestioned and they have a majority over the other members: there is one government and one opposition nominee (the minor parties have no representation): the Chairman. at least since 1954, has been a serving or a retired Judge. The Representation Commission is allowed to vary the size of electorates by up to 5 per cent from the national quota and it is supposed to take account of existing boundaries. community of interest, communication links and topography. New Zealand politics have been so evenly balanced (the elections of 1978 and 1981 were virtual ties) that there is great sensitivity about the political effects of redistribution, but, despite some complaints, the Commission’s findings have been accepted

206 Reupportionmcnt: A Strtdv in Comparutice Government

as apolitical. As a quasi-judicial body its decisions are final and are not subject to alteration by Parliament or by appeal to the courts.21

As with Britain, Australia and Canada. New Zealand provide full opportunity for repre- sentations about any proposed changes to be presented to the Commissions.

India has had three general redistrictings since Independence. They have been carried out administratively by a statutory Delimitation Commission which deals with both state and national constituencies. It has tended to respect established local boundaries and to allow a wide tolerance in numbers. Its proposals are not subject to changes by the Lok Sabha and they do not seem to have excited much interest or pressure. In a very political country, it is

surprising that redistricting has been so little a source of political controversy.

Causes of Differences

Why are the American and Commonwealth approaches to redistricting so vastly different? Clearly, the American case is the aberrant one in the sense that all the other countries have adopted the British model. Given the general uniqueness of the American electoral system (the weakness of its parties, the expense of its elections, and the like), one answer is that it would be surprising if the United States did not treat redistricting differently from the other countries. A particular rule, practice or institution is necessarily affected by the other rules. practices and institutions in a country. But does that mean that what works well in one country cannot be exported to another? Can any useful lessons be learned about redistrict- ing, or indeed electoral institutions generally, by studying the experiences of different countries?

These questions are particularly relevant to current debate over redistricting reform in the United States. Some Americans (including a few members of the Supreme Court, if recent decisions are a reliable indication) are dissatisfied with the ‘political’ approach to line- drawing and have pointed to British style commissions as a better alternative. They argue that it is possible to change constituency boundaries more neutrally and that only the self- interest of politicians prevents the United States from adopting reform.” Others in the United States are highly sceptical of ‘neutral’ commissions and fear that any attempt. however well-meaning, to impose neutral commissions on American redistricting will only make matters worse.23 They find it difficult to believe that British redistribution is truly neutral just as the British are shocked by the idea that politics must play so major a role in American redistricting.

Without presuming to close the gulf between these perceptions, it is possible to explain why American and Commonwealth countries have such different methods of redistribution

and to identify the problems that would arise if the Commonwealth approach were exported to the United States. or vice versa.

1. Methods of Legislation

One important difference affecting a country’s approach to redistribution is its method of legislation generally. In a Parliamentary system, backbenchers play a minor legislative role. The Cabinet is responsible for policy initiatives. Backbenchers may, of course, ask questions of Ministers, express their opinions in debate on the Floor and even defy the party whip when their differences with the leadership are irresolvable. To some extent, all of these tactics figure in the calculations of party leaders, but it is still a far cry from the decentralized legislative system in the United States. Specialist Committees in the House of Commons have been upgraded since the late 196Os, but they still lack the power to amend or delay

D.AVID BUTLER AND BRUCE E. CAIN 207

bills. By contrast, specialist committees are extremely powerful in Congress. and representa- tives routinely use their committee positions to defend the interests of their constituents.

The President cannot count on the strength of party ties to get bills through Congress-it is

a process of continuous bargaining. As a consequence, many bills passed by Congress are really conglomerations of specific requests and log-rolled compromises.

In this light, it is not surprising that British redistribution should exclude individual Members from negotiations and that American redistricting should frequently include them. The idea that individual representatives should bargain over any bill, let alone a redistribution plan, would seem inappropriate in Britain. Conversely, the fact that legislators bargain over their seats is not as shocking to Americans, who daily observe Congress bargaining over everything else. The case that reformers in the United States must make is why redistricting should be treated differently from other kinds of legislation. If all bills in the national and state legislatures were shielded from the parochial interests of legislators, it is unlikely that the states would handle redistricting in the highly incumbent-oriented manner that they now do.

2. The Party System

Another major factor explains differences in the two types of redistricting practices- namely, the contrast in party systems. If Britain were to switch to a more political approach to redistricting, it is likely that negotiations would be dominated by party interests to a

greater extent than they are in the United States. This point overlaps with the first, of course, since parliamentary discipline is partly maintained by strong party ties as well as by structural factors such as the hope of advancing to a Cabinet career. However, one need not consider the counterfactual to appreciate the importance of party considerations. Differences

in the current practices also reflect the varying roles that the parties play in the two countries.

Local British party organizations figure more significantly in MP nominations than do

their American counterparts. Campaign money is almost exclusively raised by the parties, and local activists run the election campaign. Representations to the Boundary Commission are therefore usually made by the local party organizations rather than the Members them- selves. The Commission’s emphasis on preserving previous constituency boundaries and communities of interest is compatible with the interests of the local parties, who for obvious reasons prefer minimal disruption to their organizations.

American parties have alnays been weak, and the campaign finance and Presidential reforms of the 1960s and 70s have attenuated their influence even more. United States candidates raise their own money, develop their own campaign organizations and owe far less of their support to normal party loyalty than do British candidates. The impact of redistricting plans on local party organizations is for these reasons a far less important issue in the United States. Rather, the central question in American redistricting is the effect any proposed boundary changes have on the incumbent’s personal contributors and areas of highest support. This gives American redistricting a more idiosyncratic slant, with an inordinate emphasis on shopping centres, fund-raising sites and favourite neighbourhoods.

3. Residence Requirements

Many US State Legislatures have a residence requirement stipulating that a person must reside in the district at the time that he or she files for candidacy. Congress does not have a formal residency requirement. but the informal expectations that a candidate should already

208 Reupportionment: A Study in Comparatwe Gor~ernment

have a residence in the district are so high that it is de&to a requirement. By comparison. the British style systems have no formal residence requirement, and the informal expecra- tion is far less strong. Only a minority of MPs had any long established local connections when they were first selected. Winston Churchill represented Dundee. Manchester. and a London suburb during his career-and never had a house in his constituency: there was

nothing unusual about such carpet-bagging. The effect of this is to make displacement a more important issue in American than it is in

British redistricting. If an incumbent loses his seat in the United States, he cannot hope to run anywhere else in the country except in the immediate vicinity of the old seat. A Congressman from California cannot realistically consider the option of running for a seat in New York-he would be immediately branded as a carpet-bagger. A displaced British hlP need not restrict his options to the old locality and can without prejudice shop around for another constituency. Even when the local activists insist that their candidate should reside in the constituency, this usually means that he should make himself available locally and take up residence if elected.

The residence expectation in the United States, like the weak parties and decentralized legislative system, accentuates the emphasis on incumbency interest in American redistrict- ing. By closing off the option of running in all but a few neighbouring seats. the residence expectation raises the stakes of redistricting for incumbents who want to stay in office and makes them more resistant to changes dictated by demographic trends. If one party controls the process, the answer is usually to place the burden of displacement unequally on the other party. However, when this is not possible or when bipartisan agreement is necessary to pass a redistricting plan, other outlets for displaced legislators must be found-for example. opportunities to run for higher office, judicial appointmeats, and the like.

In Britain, incumbents have expressed distress when their seat is mutilated or destroyed by the Boundary Commissioners. But almost every politician of substance who has suffered

thus has quickly found another seat, perhaps hundreds of miles away.

4. Differences in the Judicial Systems

The American judiciary is much more political in practice and in manner of appointment than the British judiciary. iMany American judicial offices are elected, and even when they are not, the appointment is made by a political official (i.e., the President. Senator or Governor) with an explicit eye towards the appointee’s ‘judicial philosophy’. In addition. judges in some states are subject to recall by statewide ballot.

British judges and barristers are largely removed from political pressure. Although they are in a traditionalist profession with conservative values, they are seldom involved in cases that affect political parties or, indeed, that raise constitutional questions.

The consequence of this difference is that Americans have good reason to be suspicious of those who claim that judges will act neutrally in these matters. The California Republican party had every challenge that it made against the Legislature’s 1981-2 redistricting plan brought before a California Supreme Court that was controlled by Democratic appointees; this indeed spurred a major recall effort against three of the Democratic appointees to the Court. In addition, it is significant that the commission initiative the Republican party sponsored in the 1984 election purposely bypassed members of the state Supreme Court in favour of retired appellate judges (the majority of whom are registered Republicans). What- ever the objective merits of accusations about the California Supreme Court’s political bias, it is an indisputable fact that the perception of partisan judicial bias has figured prominently in California redistricting quarrels. By contrast, none of the British parties has ever

D.-\v~n BUTLER ASD BRUCE E. CAN 209

impugned the integrity or neutrality of the Boundary Commissions even though the results of redistribution have had more adverse consequences for Labour than for the Conserva- tives. In neither of the two substantial cases involving redistrictings that have come before

the High Court has anyone suggested that partisan considerations affected the judges’ verdicts.

The suspicion of judicial partisanship and the willingness of United States courts to rule

on specific cases and standards may also account for another crucial difference between United States and British redistricting practices-the American affinity for concrete and measurable standards. Complex and flexible standards are harder to apply and defend. The Court’s inclination to use simple quantifiable criteria to try to control more imprecise and controversial phenomena-like political gerrymandering-is nicely exemplified by the Karcher decision, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a New Jersey Plan with less than 1 per cent variance in favour of another one with even less variance. The court made it clear that the real object of its concern was gerrymandering. and that it thought that population

equality-easy to measure and universally accepted as a goal-was a standard that it could use against politically unfair lines. This is demonstrably ludicrous. and if the Supreme Court does entertain political gerrymandering cases in the future, it will be forced to a more sophisticated standard.” Even so, it is safe to predict that in searching for such a standard the Supreme Court will be most attracted to simple. concrete tests-for example. compact- ness. or a seats-votes ratio.

5. Demopaphic Dlyferences

It is impossible to understand the relative importance of racial criteria in American redistricting as compared to Britain without taking into account the degree of ethnic diversity in these countries. The United States has substantial disadvantaged minority communities (10 per cent Blacks and 6 per cent Hispanic). In addition, there are numerous less disadvantaged groups, such as Jews and Asians. who watch the consequences of redistrictings very carefully. Britain’s minority community numbers less than 3 per cent of the total population and though concern has been widely expressed at the absence of any black MPs, the idea that the problem could be solved by boundary drawing has not been seriously voiced. There are as yet virtually no areas where it would be possible to carve out a ‘black’ constituency-and even then the divisions between Afro-Caribbeans and the rival groupings from the Indian subcontinent might well frustrate the election of a black IMP.

Even across states within the United States, it is clear that racial gerrymandering of both the positive and negative variety is an issue only in the states that have large concentrations of racial/ethnic minorities. A group must reach some critical size and concentration level before it need worry about the effects redistricting will have on its political influence. Thus, the Japanese-Americans, who are small in numbers and predominantly middle class and who have intermingled widely with the rest of the population have not focused on redistrict- ing strategies whereas the Blacks and Hispanics, whose influence rests heavily on voter mobilization, have. While the size of the minority population determines whether racial gerrymandering will be an issue in a given state, the nature of the issue varies by region. The central question in northern and western states with large minorities has been positive racial gerrymandering-i.e., maximizing minority representation-while the issue in the South remains negative racial gerrymandering-i.e., attempts by the white majority to minimize minority representation. Moreover, it is clear that racial gerrymandering might not have become a judicial matter at all in the absence of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Court’s civil rights decisions in the 1960s involving the 14th and 15th Amendments. Thus

210 RL~~pportionment: A .hd_v in Compdrirtit.e Gowrnment

demographic diversity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for explaining the salience of racial issues. Obviously, historical development and regional factors matter as well. And the inevitable growth of minority populations in Britain and their concentration in certain

city centres may make the creation of minority seats a real problem for the British Boundary Commission when they next report in 1998.

6. Political LVorms and Cdtllrul Slippositions

It is an old and irresolvable problem how far norms and informal expectations support institutional arrangements. and how far they follow from them. No matter which position one prefers on this broad question, most would agree that both institutions and norms are stronger and more stable when they are consistent with one another than when they are not. American institutions are more fragmented, decentralized and permissive of parochial interests. American political norms are more pluralistic. hladisonian and tolerant of particu- larism. Americans on the whole expect different groups to lobby for their interests at all levels of government. Pluralist notions that authority should be fragmented and that coalitions of interests should be fluid but omnipresent are deeply ingrained in the American psyche. Actors in the political system are not expected to be neutral or disinterested because the institutions are designed on the Madisonian premise that they are not. There is a degree of self-fulfilment in this system-people are to some degree at least what they are expected to be. If institutions expect and perhaps even encourage people to be self-interested and parochial, this no doubt dampens public-regarding actions. Political interactions are situations of co-operation, and if one group or individual acts in a public-regarding fashion while others act in a self-regarding fashion. then the former are in danger of being made a ‘sucker’ by the latter.?>

Political commentators have long noted that some segment of the American public periodically recoils from its pluralist, Madisonian roots. The Progressives sought to end

machine politics by city manager reforms, non-partisan ballots and civil service reform. Revisionist historians have pointed out the value that these machines had in integrating immigrant groups into a hostile political environment, and that many of the Progressive

reforms strengthened the power of the middle class over disadvantaged groups. Their modern day equivalents introduced campaign finance laws that were supposed to lessen the influence of money on politics. A decade later, Americans are painfully aware that this goal was not achieved and that instead it encouraged a proliferation of special interest political action committees (PACs). The experience with political reform in the twentieth century has only served to reinforce the cynicism of the American political culture.

The British political culture is less pluralistic and parochial. Burkean notions of repre-

sentative independence and Whig ideas of functional representation. although modified by time. have given the British system a more coherent. ideological and public-regarding cast. With the rise of party discipline and the demise of private member legislation in the nineteenth century. the IMP has had less opportunity and incentive to protect local. parochial interests. Groups-such as unions or industrialists-articulate their interests through a more disciplined and ideological party structure. Coalitions are more stable and appeals are made in a rhetoric that is less blatantly self-regarding.

British experience with institutional reform has been relatively positive. The nineteenth century purification of the civil service and of the electoral system was notably successful. Cynicism about the political process may have grown in recent years. but there is still a remarkable residue of respect for the neutrality and objectivity of the senior figures in law and in administration. It is still possible to allay public anxiety about a problem by referring it

D;\VID BUTLER ;\ND BRUCE E. CAIN 211

to an independent committee drawn from the mandarins of Whitehall, the Inns of Court and the universities.

The point is that the arrangements for redraaing boundaries in Britain and America are consistent with the general norms of the political culture. As a consequence. an American tends to view British redistribution practices as incredibly nai’ve and dangerously trusting. If people were to act in self-regarding ways within the British rules. there would be tremendous latitude for injustice without the many avenues of appeal-court cases, recall and referendums-that exist in the United States. Given that most United States political actors normally act and are encouraged to act in self-regarding ways. there is a strong case that the British system would not work in the United States. Similarly. a British person is likely to be incredulous that America cannot conduct its redistribution in a more rational. disinterested fashion: any attempt to adopt the political style of redistribution would seem

inappropriate and would weaken public respect for the political system.

7. The Sepuration of Potters

The existence of a constitution interpreted by judges and implemented by an executive gives American legislators a freedom that might be unacceptable in a country with no written constitution and a sovereign parliament. Parliament can always override the Courts and the

Courts have no power to disallow any law that Parliament may pass. Americans know that for them the tyranny of a legislative majority will always be

tempered, if not by the executive that carries out its laws, then by the courts which decide whether they are consonant with the Constitution. In Britain, where one party dominates an omnipotent Parliament, it is far more urgent that those who have the power should shon restraint about exercising it in a partisan way.

The basic conflict of interest that arises when MPs are judges in their own cases was recognized in 1870 when the House of Commons transferred jurisdiction over controverted elections to the courts. The collusive deals, the inconsistent decisions that had characterized electoral disputes were done away with. A body of neutral case-law was quickly established and within a generation British elections had been purified to an extraordinary degree. A similar forbearance lies behind the broadly consensual approach to redistribution. In 1948 the Labour Government carried through a redistribution that cost it 30 seats and, by denying it a working majority at the next election, barred the party from office during the affluent 1950s. In 1969 when another Labour Government (with a plausible excuse about impending changes in local government boundaries) postponed implementing a new set of redistribution proposals, they provoked widespread indignation at this unilateral breach of ‘fair play’. Debates on electoral matters in Britain have been characterized more by outrage when anyone is thought to have deviated from the highest standards than by detailed assess- ment of the actual consequences of any given proposal.‘”

The Exportability of Institutions

Americans have long looked to the British example for prospects of reform. The British party system provoked the responsible party movement in the United States. The success of the campaign expenditure laws in Britain helped to inspire the United States campaign finance laws of the mid-1970s. And now British redistribution is touted as the answer to America’s redistricting squabbles.“’ It may be so, but the theme of this analysis is that institutions, like heart transplants, must be compatible with the environment they are moved to. Just as human bodies reject foreign tissue, so institutions can be rejected or

212 Re~p:fpor~:onment. .4 S~U~V in Compurutwe Gor’ernment

transformed beyond recognition if they are not properly modified before they are inserted. The new institution must be compatible with other institutions and the norms of the political culture.

The responsible party movement has floundered because there are too many alternative routes outside the party for would-be candidates to get themselves elected. United States parties do not control nomination, finance or even manpower resources. In order for them to do so. there would have to be massive transformations in the laws governing primaries.

spending and party membership. Campaign finance reform cannot work until the United States is willing to restrict the principle of free speech from covering independent

expenditure and adopt a strict law of agency. And redistricting reform is connected to reform in the other areas. If legislators are not subordinated to strong parties, their individual interests as incumbents will remain strong and will be expressed to commissioners in various nays. If there is no spending reform. attempts to use commissions to foster electoral competition will result in even more expensive elections. If the judiciary is not better insulated from political pressure. the perception of their neutrality will not be fostered. If the commission has open hearings and amends its plans upon public complaint. ever) group from the gays to planned parenthood will plead its case and lawyers in America will acquire yet another avenue of employment.

Lessons can be learned by studyin.? electoral institutions comparatively. but they cannot be taken out of context. The question that must be asked is how far does a particular institution exist independently and how much does it depend on other institutions and norms in the system? Institutional transplants may save the body politic if properly performed. but insufficient care to the surgical procedures can kill the patient.

Notes and References

1. SW. for cx,tmple. Robert G. Dixon jr., Denzocn>tic Representation bind Re~zpportmnment in l,li(‘,~ndPo/iti‘.s. (New York: Oxford University Press. 19OS): Bernard Grofman. ‘Fair and Equal Representation’. l3tllic.r. 91:2. Xpril 198 1 . pp. 477-M: Bruce E. Cain. The Reapportionment f/ls:/e. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1984): Daniel H. Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg. ‘The Quest for Legislative Districtins in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?‘. UCLA LIW Rcl,/erc*. (forthcoming).

2. See. for example. XnJrelv LV. Robertson, ‘American Redistricting in the 1980s: The Effect of the hlid-term Elections‘. i?/:il~L~foni/ Sl/ci/ics. 7:2. August 19S3. pp. 113-X: Bruce Cain. ‘Assessing the Pxtisan Effects of Redistricting’. An?rrisan Politic-CzlSciencc Review. 79:2. June 1985. pp. 320-33: Robert Erikson. ‘The Partisan Impact of Reapportionment’. Afi~west

JonrnaloJ~PolitiralScienc-c. 57: 1971. pp. 57-7 1: Holvard Scarrow, ‘Comments: The Impact of Reapportionment on P,trty Representation in the Stxe of Serv York’, in: B. Grofman. .A. Lijphart. R. hlcKay and H. Scarrow (editors). Reprcsentdtion md Rckstrictinsp Issues in t/w ZWls. (Lexington Books. 1% 1).

3. The vocabulary of this subject differs widely betiveen countries. The basic process of boundary dralving is variously described as redistribution (of seats). reapportionment. redistricting. and delimitation. The units created arc’ variousi]; referred to as seats. constituencies. districts. electorates. and ridings. But. in a confusing subject. this diversity of nomenclature causes little confusion.

4. R. McKay. ‘Affirmative Gerrymandering . ’ in: Representation and Redistricting Issues in the 19XOs. op. cit.: Richard Engstrom. ‘Racial Vote Dilution: Supreme Court Interpretations of Section 5 of the \‘oting Rights Act’. Sontllern Unilvrsit_v L?u Review. 4:‘. Spring 1978. pp. 139-63.

5. Bruce Cain, Tile Rrtrpportinnrnent AK/~, op. cit.. chapter 3. 6. Robert G. Dixon jr.. ‘Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Issues’. in: Repre-

sentation and Redistricting Issues in the 198Os, op. cit. pp. 7-8. 7. John Wildgren and Richard Engstrom. ‘Spatial Distribution of Partisan Support and the Seats/

L’otes Relationship’. Le,pishtit~e Studies Quarter!v. 5:3. 1980. pp. 423-35.

DAVID BUTLER .AND BRUCE E. CAIN ‘13

8. P. J. Taylor and G. Gudgin. ‘The Mvth of Non-Partisan Cartography: A Study of Electoral Biases in the English Boundary Commission’s Redistribution for 1955-70’. in Urbdn Studies. 1976. plus various writings of Johnston: e.g. R. J. Johnston and C. Hughes. ‘Constituency Delimitation and the Unintentional Gerrymander in Brisbane’. Australian Gegprup~icJiStrrdies. 99: 1978.

9. Lowenstein and Steinberg, op. cit. The issue of whether boundaries should be positively: designed to affect party fortunes equally is (Autumn 1985) before the courts in the Indiana case ot Duvis vs. Bandemer.

10. The ‘Huntingdon method’. used since 1940. is only a slight modification of the ‘Webster method’ devised in 1830 and used since 1900.

11. Bernard Grofman and H. Scarrow, ‘Current Issues in Reapportionment’. Lou, 2nd Policy Quarterly. 4: 1985.

12. Common Cause. Tourard a System of Fair and lZi/ectit,e Representation. (1977). 13. See, for example, Leroy Hardy. ‘Considering the Gerrymander’, Pepperdine Lou, Rec,ieu,. 412.

1977. pp. 243-84: Leroy Hardy and Charles Sohner. ‘Constitutional Challenge and Political Response: California Reapportionment, 1965’. Western Political Quarterljl. 2314. December 1970: Bruce Cain, The Reapportionment Puzzle. op. cit.. chapter 5.

14. David Mayhew. ‘Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts‘. in: Nelson Polsby (editor). Reapportionment in the 1970s. (Berkelev: University of California Press. 197 1).

15. The literature on American redistricting is extensive. Perhaps the most helpful works are R. G. Dixon. jr.. Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in .huf and Politics. op. cit.: B. Grofman et al.. Representation and Redistricting Issues in the 19HOs. op. cit.: B. Cain. The Reupportionment Puzle. op. cit.

16. See D. E. Butler. The EiectoralSvstem in Britain since 1918. (Oxford: Oxford University Pres>. 1963). p. 219.

17. See the very interesting judgment of Lord Justice Oliver (The Times. 5 January 19s;) and the confirmation from the Court of Appeal (The Times. 26 January 1983).

18. For the background to British practice see D. E. Butler. The Electoral .$vstem in Brhin since 1918, op. cit. For recent developments see R. J. Wailer. ‘The 1983 Boundary Commission: Policies and Effects’, ElectoralStudies, 2:3, December 1983, pp. 195-206: and G. P. Barnes. ‘The General Review of Parliamentary Constituencies in England( 1976-83)‘. ElectnrJStrtdies. 4:2. Augl~st 1985. pp. 179-81.

19. For a description of Australian practice see the background paper issued by Cohn Hughes. the Australian Electoral Commissioner in July 1984.

20. For a description of Canadian practice see N. Ward, ‘A Century of Constituencies’. Canadian Public Administration, March 1967, pp. 105-22: and J. C. Courtney (editor). ‘Theories Masquerading as Principles: Canadian Electoral Boundary Commissions and the Australian Model’, The Canadian House of Commons: &says in honour 01 Normon Ward, (University of Calgary Press, 1985).

21. For a description of New Zealand practice see A. McRobie, ‘Reflections on Reapportionment: New Zealand and California’ (forthcoming).

22. Common Cause. op. cit. 23. For instance: Arthur Balitzer. The Commission Erpcricncc. (Rose Institute. 1980). 24. Richard G. Niemi. ‘The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in

Political Gerrymandering’. UCLA Lauj Revieuj. (forthcoming). 25. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o,fCooperation, (New York: Basic Books. 1984). 26. One difficultv facing anvone in Britain complaining about the implications of redistribution

proposals lies in the problem of assessing their partisan consequences. The 1872 rules for counting parliamentary votes mean that election figures are only available at the constituency level and not for wards or precincts. Local government data never goes below the ward and is often non-comparable. Therefore estimates of the consequences in 1948 Lvere nolvhere available: even in 1976-82 they were only partial guesstimates.

27. Common Cause. Reuppnrtionment: A Better Wgv. November 1977.