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SUPREME COURT 2013 SEP I I MANILA

AM 8: 43

EN BANC

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. No. 180016

OF THE

Respondent.

(Re: Resolution dated July 16, 2013)

The Office of the Solicitor General, in compliance with the irective of this Honorable Court dated July 16, 2013, by way

?fa Comment, 1 respectfully states:

NATURE OF THE PETITION

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals' Decision ·,dated March 22, 2007, affirming with modification the Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, 'Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding peitioner Lito Corpuz

: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as well as the Resolution dated September 5, 2007, denying

.· .. petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND ANTECEDENTS

In the July 16, 2013 Resolution, this Honorable Court invited the respective parties along with other amici curiae to

1 Received by the OSG on July 29, 2013.

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'Hdress the conflicting views stated therein by way of filing a hhiment as to the imposition of the penalty imposed for \vindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS

Sometime in 1990, Danilo Tangcoy met petitioner at the ;dmiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City. Both were employed $collection agents of JBL Incorporated, a loan and financing

dompany. Aside from being an agent, Tangcoy was also :'ii.gaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry.

1:.',

On May 2, 1991, petitioner inquired from Tangcoy if he ad any jewelry for sale. At the time, Tangcoy had with him

·everal pieces of jewelry which he bought in Thailand: (1) an .. 8k diamond men's ring worth P45,000.00; (2) a 2-baht 22k ·~dies' bracelet worth P12,000.00; (3) a 3-baht 22k men's bracelets worth P25,000.00; and (4) a 2-baht 22k men's bracelets worth Pl6,000.00. The total value of the jewelry was 98,000.00. I

Petitioner told Tangcoy that he was interested to sell the jewelry. They agreed that petitioner will sell the jewelry on commission within sixty (60) days. Upon the lapse of such period, petitioner shall remit the sale proceeds to Tangcoy or ,return the jewelry, if unsold.

. On July 5, 1991, after the lapse of the 60-day period, fTangcoy waited for petitioner to remit the sale proceeds or return the jewelry but petitioner failed to do so.

After constantly searching for petitioner for two (2) /months, Tangcoy finally located him. Petitioner promised to .·pay for the jewelry but failed to do so.

Petitioner was then charged before the Regional Trial . Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City with the crime of estafa, in an Information which reads:

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Comment Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one men's diamond ring, 18k worth P45,000.00; one (1) three baht men's bracelet, 22k worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht men's necklace, 22k worth P16,000.00; and one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety Eight Thousand Pesos (98,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the express obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, but said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00) Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

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Upon arraignment, with assistance of counsel, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On July 30, 2004, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered Judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentencing him to suffer the

(;omment CQrpuz vs. People G;R. No. 180016

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'.penalty of imprisonment for four (4) years and two (2) months as minimum to fourteenth (14) years and eight (8) months as

.. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of ''Appeals. On March 22, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a ;Decision affirming the trial court's judgment however modifying the penalty to four (4) years and two (2) months of ;prision correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus incremental penalty of one year for each additional Php 10,000.00 for total maximum of 15 years . .Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision, but the .\motion was denied in a Resolution dated September 5, 2007.

Hence, the present Petition for Review.

On July 16, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a . Resolution requiring the OSG to file its Comment and Answers . to the issues set forth by the Court within twenty (20) days

ISSUES

Thus, the following issues and questions were presented:

I. Whether or not the penalty imposed on Corpuz should be modified by considering the present value of the thing subject to his offense adjusted to the 1932 prices, considering that the legislature decided the amounts subject to these penalties in 1932; and

II. Whether or not that portion of Article 315 that imposes a maximum penalty based on the amount of the fraud

2 An Motion for Extension of time to file the supplemental comment was filed on August 14, 2013 asking an additional 10 days or until August 28, 2013.


exceeding P 22, 000 should be declared unconstitutional and void for being disproportionate and excessively harsh in view of the decline of the value of money since 1932.

III. Procedurally, may the Court exercise the power of judicial review even when the, petition fails to raise any constitutional challenge? Under what circumstances (if any) can such exercise be done?

IV. May a mode or duration of penalty violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Unusual Punishment Clause? If yes, what standards must be met before a penal law or parts of it can be declared unconstitutional on either of those two grounds?

V. Applying such standards, does Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Unusual Punishment Clause?3

DISCUSSION

, I. THE PENALTY IMPOSED TO PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE

·MODIFIED.

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Interpretation by the courts is not necessary where the ··• law is clear and categorical. The only duty of the court is to

apply the law.

3 Page 3, Resolution dated July 16, 2013.

···.·comment Corpuz vs. People

':o.R. No. 1soo16

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The view of modifying the penalty imposed by paragraph . l, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by way of ad justing the value of the thing subject of the offense to the prices based in

! the year 1932 wherein the Code was enacted and took effect is . now put to judicial scrutiny.

In other words, an attempt to interpret the subject penal clause is being sought regardless of its clarity and certainty 'following legal and statutory construction principles.

Under the 1987 Constitution the powers of the judiciary

Section 1 ... Judicial power includes the duty of the court's of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

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Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

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(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,


proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation is in question.

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( d) All criminal cases In which the penalty imposed IS reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

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Holding that the duty of the courts in cases where the provision of a law is clear and unambiguous, the Supreme Court explained that the judiciary is merely limited in its

·. interpretation, thusly:

It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply

CQmment Corpuz vs. People

. G.R. No. 180016

the law. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA-708 [1968]).

Where the law 1s clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [ 1985]; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [ 1969]; Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 [ 1970]).

Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true intent. 4

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Such pronouncement adheres to the salutary doctrine of separation of powers guaranteed by no less than our Constitution, its main purpose, to prevent a concentration of power to only one person, tribunal, or group of persons. The

4 RCBC v. IAC, G.R. No. 74851, December 9, 1999

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, principle of separation of powers is designed by its originators . to secure action and at the same time to fore stall overaction .,which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, }and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition5 .

Again, as established by the Supreme Court:

It is axiomatic that the Philippine Legislature was provided to make the law, the office of the Governor-General to execute the law, and the judiciary to construe the law. What is legislative, an executive, or a judicial act, as distinguished one from the other, is not always easy to ascertain. A precise classification is difficult. Negatively speaking, it has been well said that "The legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." (citing U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho)6

In imposing the penalty for estafa to petitioner, Article 315 admits of no other interpretation that would justify modifying the penalty imposed by the court.

Neither does it contain any clause or prov1s1on which would otherwise reveal a legislative intent to fix the amount of the thing involved to the prices in 1932.

Said prov1s1on is clear and categorical and does not require further construction from the court. To modify the penalty by pegging the amount of the thing subject of Estafa to

s PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 47065 ,June 26, 1940. 6 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs.MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS~ and ANSELMO HILARIO, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927,

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its pnce 1n 1932 would not only result in an absurd interpretation of an otherwise clear and unambiguous

· provision of the law but would likewise result to a judicial interpretation akin to judicial legislation.

When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex. 7

II. THE PENAL CLAUSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 IS NEITHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL NOR DISPROPORTIONATEALUE BY REASON OF THE DECLINE OF THE VALUE OF MONEY SINCE 1932

The courts cannot speculate on the value of the Philippine currency.

The issue presented by the Honorable Court's "opposing view," as provided by the Resolution dated July 16, 2013, states that the penalty imposed under paragraph 1 of Article 315 must be declared unconstitutional and void "for being disproportionate and excessively harsh in view of the decline of the value of money since 1932."8

Anent today's value of money, this Honorable Court in the same Resolution takes into account the value of the Philippine Peso:

xxx

... the value of the peso has enormously deteriorated since 1932 when the

7ARLIN B. OBIASCA, vs. JEANE 0. BASALLOTE, G.R. No. 176707, February 17, 2010. 8 p. 3, Corpuz v. People, SC En Banc, Resolution dated July 16, 2013

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·comment Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016

legislature pegged the penalty for estafa on the prevailing value of money at that time. Figures from the National Statistics Office show that a peso in 195 7 (when the first official statistics were taken) is equivalent to (Php) 95.83 today. It may be assumed from this, that the (Php) 1 in 1932 cannot have a value lower than (Php) 100 today. Since Corpuz may be deemed to have defrauded Tangcoy of the equivalent of only (Php) 980 based on the value that the legislature contemplated in 1932, rather than the (Php) 98,000 charged in the information ...

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Moreover, in the same Resolution, an adjustment of the value of money in relation to the provisions of the penal nature

' , of the Revised Penal Code would result on varying >· .. consequences:

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... (a) on the other crimes punished by the Revised Penal Code where the penalty is dependent on the value of the property, which are also valued at 1932 prices and (b) on the penalty of Fine, which is dependent on the value of the subject matter of the crime.9

xxx

Paragraph 1 of Article 315 imposes a prison sentence , based solely on the amount of the fraudulent transaction

constructed on a law that was enacted in 1930 by the Philippine Legislature that took effect in January 1, 1932. Petitioner herein was found guilty of estafa of jewelries worth

9 p. 2, Ibid.

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. Php 98,000 pesos 1n a criminal act committed way back 1n · ... 1991.

Said penal provision explicitly states, to wit:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -

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1st. The penalty of pnston correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22, 000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

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Anent the imposition of the penalty under Article 315 of Revised Penal Code, it is respectfully submitted that the

courts cannot take judicial notice of the change of the value of the Philippine peso.

To do so would not only be highly speculative on the part of the courts, it would also amount to judicial legislation. The Revised Penal Code is a penal statute wherein the penalties

, that are described and imposed with monetary values, like in ;'::'paragraph one of Article 315, are clear and unambiguous,

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leaving no doubts as to its interpretation. It is also part of the .· •. Judge's duty to apply the corresponding penalty for the crime \offense and impose judgment based thereon. ,,

A liberal construction in favor of the petitioner thereto cannot be applied since the application of the penalties, sans the present value of money, is clear and unambiguous. A penal statute defines a criminal offense and prescribes its

' corresponding fine, penalty, or punishment. It is a statute that calls for a penalty as opposed to one providing for a remedy for a wronged party. To a certain degree, court decisions, judgments and resolutions cannot also be a basis for determining or interpreting the present value of money insofar

·as penal statutes are concerned since they merely explain the ''application of the law. Outside penal statutes, if a law or a

.. statute desires the actual or current value of money, an implementing rule and regulation must be promulgated as a

/"filling in the details" mechanism to arrive at the policy of the ··••law it seeks to implement. Such must hold also in penal statutes.

However, public respondent agrees on this Honorable Court's opposite view on the adjustment of monetary values on account of inflation amounts.

Said adjustment would then alter the legislative intent that was clearly expressed in the Revised Penal Code, which is a penal statute to start with. As correctly pointed out by this

. Honorable Court in the same Resolution, any issue on the severity of the penalty imposed under the law should be left to the legislature to decide.

It is also respectfully submitted that the penalty imposed therein is not excessive, insofar as what the policy of the law it sought to protect is concerned.

In our jurisdiction, mere severity relating to the term of imprisonment does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Swindling is classified as a crime against property. Hence, the value of the property involved would be

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;',inimical in determining the imposition of the punishment. ~There is nothing oppressive in the penal clause of Article 315 ''since what the law against swindling seeks to punish are the criminal elements of deceit and the act of defrauding an

/innocent resulting in his damage and prejudice. 10 In fact, the '::damage caused by the deceit is not limited to the material 'damage since any disturbance or prejudice is constitutive of damage under the said provision. i 1

A penalty against a penal act or omission is not excessive it seeks to sanction the said act or omission for the

! protection of the public at large. Penal laws (and those of public security and safety) are also obligatory upon the public 'at large. 12 The dictates of public policy are being advocated by

,'imposing a higher penalty for deceitful swindlers. Also, the \xeason behind the enactment of the sanctions is solely '',addressed to the legislature. By analogy, such premise is ! explained in the case of Lozano v. Martinez:

Previous efforts to deal with the problem of bouncing checks within the ambit of the law on estafa did not evoke any constitutional challenge. In contrast, BP 22 was challenged promptly.

Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: ... (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers;

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The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest

10 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil 647, August 27, 1953. 11 People v. Benemerito, 264 SCRA 667 (1996) 12 Article 14, Civil Code of the Philippines, R.A. 386

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and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government."

As we enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government, we need not be reminded of the timehonored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that we approach our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution we should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute.

Moreover, the divisible nature of penalties prescribed in Book I of the Revised Penal Code provides a legal basis for the

: courts for the imposition of the penalties under the penal , provisions of the felonies described in Book IJ.13

Consequently, a referral to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code is not in order since a mere recommendation for pardon by the courts to the Executive Department of the accused may only be bestowed as provided by the said code.

In case the subject penalty herein is not excessive in accordance with law and jurisprudence but pragmatically disproportionate to the criminal act sought to be punished and sanctioned by the state, a submission of such view to the legislature would now be timely and warranted. In effect, a curative statute would be in order.

13 Application of penalties which contains three periods under Article 64 and the graduated scales for penalties under 71 of the RPC.

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Nonetheless, a curative statute must not violate any constitutional provisions, nor destroy vested rights of third persons as well as affect a judgment that has become final. 14

Anent the issue presented by this Honorable Court on whether the penalty based on the value of the property in relation to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is

''Unconstitutional for being excessively harsh and >:disproportionate to the present value of the Philippine Peso .

. III. COURTS CANNOT EXERCISE ,.THE POWER OF JUDICIAL :REVIEW IN THE ABSENCE OF A · .. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE.

Although the court is endowed with the judicial power to nullify a law for being unconstitutional, such power is not ~without limitation. ,•.:,

The exercise of the Supreme Courts power of judicial .review involves the determination of whether or not there has

.'been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ·. of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.1s

In Angara v. Electoral Commission23 the Supreme Court ' discoursed:

... The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended, it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,

14 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, Aetna v. O'malley, (Mo.) 118 S.S. (2nd) 3 15 Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

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for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from Section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.

Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial eview or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or "xecutive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,

ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional :rial courts. 16

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice o. settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally emandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not here has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

, · r excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or . nstrumentality of the Government.11

However, even then, this power of judicial review is imited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after ull opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited urther to the constitutional question raised or the very lis ota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to

'dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this

::manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of ,wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.

Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to ''legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is

resumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the dudiciary 1n the determination of actual cases and

)lo Planters Products Inc., vs. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008. ;}

7 Juan Antonio, et al. vs. Hon. Factoran, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993.

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ontroversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people expressed through their representatives in the executive

· d legislative departments of the government.

Moreover, as ruled in Francisco Jr. vs. House of epresentative18, citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, the

ourts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers GOnferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, "amely:

( 1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

xxx

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is

18 G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.

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in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

The aforecited limitation prevents the Court to raise the •. issue of constitutionality on its own. The constitutionality of the penal statute is not the lis mo ta of the case.

Admittedly, the issue on the constitutionality of Article of the Revised Penal Code or portion thereof was not

·raised before the appellate court by any party. Without raising such issue, a discussion on the constitutionality of the said

. penal statute is rendered completely unnecessary.

Lis mota or "the cause of the suit or action" as the last , requisite of judicial review is simply an offshoot of the

presumption of validity accorded to the executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers.

·.·.·.Given the presumed validity of an executive act, the petitioner ' who claims otherwise has the burden of showing first that the

case cannot be resolved unless the constitutional question he raised is determined by the Court. 19

Failure by any party to raise the issue of the •.constitutionality of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code

means there is no actual case or controversy that merits · discussion on the issue.

19 Francisco vs. House of Representative, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003.

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The power of judicial review can only be exercised in ;connection with a bona fide controversy involving a statute, its /'implementation or a government action. Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory 'opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical i'or moot questions. The limitation on the power of judicial 'review to actual cases and controversies defines the role f:assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to 'assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to

·,:the other branches of government.20

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue (a,ssailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be /avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. \Commission on Elections, 21 this Honorable Court held:

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It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.

Thus, based on prevailing jurisprudence, this Honorable Court cannot exercise the power of judicial review to rule on the constitutionality of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

20 Francisco vs. TRB, G.R. 166910, October 19, 2010. , 2176 Phil 516 (1946).

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Although majority may believe that the penalty imposed by the subject penal statute might be obsolete, harsh and not in tune with modern times, ruling its nullification on the said

.'grounds might be seen as overstepping its authority and be ,construed as judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an

'' act of Congress. If public interest demands a revision of the said penal statute, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

& V. THE MODE OR :.DURATION OF PENALTY AS WELL AS ARTICLE 315 OF THE RPC DO NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OR THE UNUSUAL

·PUNISHMENT CLAUSE.

Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states: "Nor . shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

The equal protection clause requires that all persons or ··things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 22 It is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of statutes and

;/,regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons

,:. under similar circumstances would be accorded the same ;;:'treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities

In a catena of cases, this Honorable Court laid down the principle of a valid classification in arriving at a conclusion

22 City of Manila, et al. vs. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. et al., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005. 23 Teodoro Regala, et al. vs. the Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996 citing Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971].

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'that a law or an act does not violate the Equal Protection 'Clause, thereby upholding its constitutionality.

A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, , that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a, wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of


; G.R. No. 180016

evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.24

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The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.25

'To be reasonable, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, viz:

( 1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.26

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code meets the ··.·reasonable classification in so far as the penalties for the criminal act sought to be sanctioned is concerned.

Anent the first requisite, Art. 315 is based upon substantial distinctions. The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the

' classes treated differently.21

It is suggested that since estafa is a crime against property and supposedly not as "heinous" as crimes

24 Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004. 25Mendoza vs. PeopleofthePhilippines, G.R. No. 183891, October 19, 2011. 26 Quinto and Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1,

.r 2009. 27 Ibid.


against persons or chastity, such as murder or rape, it should not be equated with the latter felonies in justifying the denial of bail to the accused. From the preceding disquisition, the obvious riposte is that this is a matter which should properly be addressed to the legislature. It is not for this Court, by judicial legislation, to amend the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code, much less the Constitution. Nor is it for us to intrude into the policy considerations, absent blatant abuse of legislative power or capricious exercise thereof, which impelled the legislative categorization of an offense as being so abominable or execrable as to call for a denial of the right to bail. On this score, we can take judicial notice that multimillion or large-scale estafa cases and inveterate or professional swindlers have inflicted untold damages and misery not only on one or two but on countless victims in this country.2s (Emphasis supplied)

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Second, it is germane to the purposes of the law. The State has the authority, under its police power, to define and

:'punish crimes and to lay down, the rules of criminal :>"procedure. States, as part of their police power, have a large :1.:measure of discretion in creating and defining criminal !offenses.29

The purpose of Article 315 is to punish the off enders and prosecute them in accordance with the mandate of the

. legislature. To bolster the penalty imposed in the crime of :estafa, the Court has held that:

28 People of the Philippines vs. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 101127-31, August 7, 1992. · 29 p.2, Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law, 16th Edition, 2006, citing

the case of People vs. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120, 124.

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From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the legislative criteria for the imposition of reclusion perpetua in said offenses took into account not only the inherent odious or outrageous nature of the crime, such as the taking of a life or an assault against chastity, but also either the moral depravity or criminal perversity shown by the acts of the accused, or the necessity for protection of property in the governmental, financial or economic interests of the country. The objectives of Presidential Decree No. 818 are indubitably within the ambit of the same legislative intendment and the foregoing justifications for the imposition of higher penalties and the consequent denial of bail to the malefactor. 30

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Third, it is not limited to existing conditions only. The application of the Revised Penal Code, in general, is prospective in nature. Criminal laws should always be given prospective application; otherwise, they become expostfacto.31

Lastly, it applies equally to all members of the class. Clearly, Article 315 applies to all offenders of the same.

It is fundamental that all reasonable doubts should be , .resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of ·· .. the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be

within constitutional limitations. To justify any nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.32

Equally untenable is the claim that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code violates the unusual punishment clause.

30 People of the Philippines vs. Reyes, supra. 31 Morales, et al. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 144047, July 26, 2002 .

. 32 Central Bank (now Banglco Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary, supra.

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Section 19(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. It bears noting that the Constitution refers rimarily to physical punishment.33

/ A look at the origin of the clause is enlightening. The case ()f United States vs. Jacinto Borromeo, et al. 34 provides a very ~~ucidating background, to wit:

The prohibition in the Philippine Bill against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon safeguard against governmental oppression of the subject, which made its first appearance in the reign of William and Mary of England in "An Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject and settling the succession of the crown," passed in the year 1689. It has been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States and into most of the constitutions or the various States in substantially the same language as that used in the original statute. The exact language of the Constitution of the United States is used in the Philippine Bill. It fallows that punishments provided in legislation enacted by the farmer sovereign of these Islands must be considered according to the standard obtaining in the United States in order to determine whether they are cruel and unusual.

As also observed by this Honorable Court in its Resolution, a review of American jurisprudence reveals that there are two schools of thought with respect to cruel and unusual punishment clause.

33 p. 975, Hector S. De Leon and Hector M. De Leon, Jr., Philippine Constitutional law: · Principles and Cases, Fifth Edition, 2012.

34 G.R. No. L-7150, October 16, 1912.


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According to the first view, "the test to be applied in determining whether a penalty is in violation of this constitutional provision is not the proportion between the offense and the punishment, but the character of the punishment and its mode of infliction, and that the legislative discretion in determining the severity of the punishment for

.· crime is not to be interfered with by the courts, so long as all ' forms of torture are avoided." The other view alternatively holds that "this constitutional provision is broad enough to

\ ... confer upon the courts the power to review legislative · discretion concerning the adequacy of the punishment in very

extreme cases; where the punishment proposed is so severe and out of proportion to the offense as to shock public

.•·sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people."35

... Turning now to Philippine jurisprudence, this jurisdiction characterizes punishment as cruel and/ or inhuman when it involves torture or lingering death such as burning alive, mutilation, starvation and other barbarous punishments. 3 6

{Thus, it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 37

The form of punishment contemplated by the Philippine Constitution is consistent with the purpose of guarantee as

.... stated in McElvaine vs. Brush, 38 i.e. to eliminate many of the ·barbarous and uncivilized punishments formerly known the infliction of which would barbarize present civilization. Prescinding from this purpose, it can be said that the prohibition is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity or harshness in respect of

·duration or amount. It looks only to the form or nature of the

35 United States vs. Jacinto Borromeo, et al., supra. citing Weems vs. United States (21 7 U.S., 349, 54 L. ed., 793), People ex rel. Kemmler vs. Durston (119 N.Y., 569), Ely vs. Thompson (3 A. K. Marsh (Reu.), 70), Railroad Co. vs. People, Ex rel. Koerner, (67 Ill., 11, 27, 16 Am. Rep., 599, 611), Robinson vs. Miner and Haug (68 Mich. 549, 563). 36 Leo Echegaray vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998. 37 Lim vs. People, 390 SCRA 194 (2002).

·, 38 McElvaine vs. Brush, 142 U.S. 155.

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penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the <;rime. 39

In estafa, it is essential that damage or prejudice capable cjf pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or 'third person. This is because the amount of damage is the basis for the penalty. The pertinent portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applicable to the case at bar provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). -Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by · statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock

·.the moral sense of the community. To reiterate, it takes more . than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe ·'for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this

, 39People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 [1953].


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,;;principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of ithe defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment :authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading. 40

The case of People v. Estoista41 clearly explains what an unusual punishment is, to wit:

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar case, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience.

It 1s well-settled that as far as the constitutional , prohibition dictates, it is not so much the extent as to the ·.·nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 42 Furthermore, under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law affirms that the

40 Lim v. People, supra. 41 Supra. 42 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 121917, March 12, 1997 citing Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., 202 SCRA 405, 417.

• I

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primary function of punishment is the protection of the society against actual and potential wrong doers. 4 3

The case of People v. Dacuycuy44 expounds on the matter:

The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.'

The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the cnme.

The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs. Estoista, where an "excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a recommendation for executive clemency, thus:

.. .If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present

43 Vergara v. People, G.R. No. 160328, February 4, 2005. 44Q.R. No. L-45127, May 5, 1989.

'c9mment Corpuz vs. People G . .R. No. 180016

case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty ...

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It must be noted that there is a difference between the i"cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Constitution ,and "clearly excessive" under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as opined by Joaquin Bernas:45

Thus, to be "Cruel and unusual" or excessive within the meaning of the Constitution, the penalty must be flagrantly disproportionate to the offense no matter what circumstances the offense may be committed; but to be "clearly excessive" under Article 5, it need only be disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender. In the former, the punishment imposed by the legislature has exceeded the limits of discreti.onary power, and the court steps in to apply the constitutional brake; in the latter, the Legislature has acted within the limits of its power, but an unforeseen situation occurs which calls for clemency and the court can merely recommend clemency because in the

45 Pp. 553-554, Bernas, Joaquin S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 Edition.

:,;;¢omment ,Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016

constitutional scheme it has the power only to apply the law.

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Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and .the public interest at stake, the graduated penalties set by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code nor the indeterminate ;·penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as •minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum, plus incremental penalty of 1 year for each additional Phpl0,000

.for a maximum of 15 years, imposed by the Court of Appeals >in the case at bar cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, parbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to

·public conscience.

.. That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is Yan insufficient basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make

·it cruel or unusual.

In addition, what degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await

.. appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of 'our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a ·.penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive."46

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Petition dated November 5, 2007 be denied.

46 G.R. No. L-45127, May 5, 1989.

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