corpuz v people en banc gr 180016 april 29, 2014

8/11/2019 Corpuz v People en Banc GR 180016 April 29, 2014

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EN BANC

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 180016

Present:

SERENO,

CJ

CARPIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,*

- versus -

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,

REYES,

PERLAS-BERNABE,* and

LEONEN, JJ

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, f.

1

p

Respondent.

Apr i

1 2

9

2014

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----x

D E I S I O N

PERALTA

J :

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on

Certiorari,

under Rule

45

of

the Rules

of

Court, dated November

5,

2007,

of

petitioner Lito Corpuz

petitioner),

seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision

1

dated March 22,

2007 and Resolution

2

dated September

5,

2007

of

the Court

of

Appeals

No part.

Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe now a member of the Supreme Comt),

with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin now a member of the Supreme Court),

concurring; rollo, pp. 31-41.

2

Rollo,

p. 43.

/



Decision - 2 - G.R. No. 180016

(CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 ofthe Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the

petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa underArticle 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the AdmiralRoyale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainantwas then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and,upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner

approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell thesaid pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed,and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace andanother men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced

by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private

complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former thathe will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime ofestafa, which reads as follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City ofOlongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy,

one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-bahtmen's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet,22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight ThousandPesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or toreturn the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the saiditems, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse ofconfidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, didthen and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated

demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remitthe amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippinecurrency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in theaforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

3 Id . at 48-52.




On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel,entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lonetestimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented thelone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of AntonioBalajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans toBase employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission.Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 forwhich he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the samereceipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for thesupposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did noteven see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubtof the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of thedecision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyondreasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one(1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinarymitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penaltyof deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the

Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2)MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM,to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion

Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify privatecomplainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actualdamages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal

of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailedJudgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P),Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on theimposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer theindeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as




minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor , as maximum, plus 1 year for eachadditional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decisionstands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filedwith this Court the present petition stating the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED INCONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THELOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS

EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THISVIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMINGTHE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINALINFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVEALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDERARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX APERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, ORTHE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THECRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROMTHE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATECOMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMINGTHE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THESUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THEPROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WASPROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMINGTHE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASEWAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIEDON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER –ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD ANDLOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMANEXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOTAPPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;




4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLYCONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failedto object to their admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficientlyestablished the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of thecrime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive,and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trialcourt, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support inthe records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave

abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred inaffirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Courtraising both procedural and substantive issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of thetrial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked asExhibit “A” and its submarkings, although the same was merely a

photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the recordsshow that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence

at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by privatecomplainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed toraise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer ofevidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The establisheddoctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection toevidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall beconsidered as waived.5

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the

formally defective Information filed against him. He contends that theInformation does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry weresupposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred wasdifferent from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is

4 Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599 (2005).5 Blas v. Angeles- Hutalla, 482 Phil. 485, 501 (2004).




untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information wassubstantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of

form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time onappeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversionof money or property received to the prejudice of the owner 6 and that thetime of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, theexclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, asreflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CAruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states thestatutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutivethereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that acomplaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissionscomplained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the placewherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of thesubject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That thetime of the commission of the offense was stated as “ on or about the fifth(5th) day of July, 1991” is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's causeconsidering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the

precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) ofthe Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion ofmoney or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, asidefrom the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essentialelement of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution tospecify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto

defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within whichaccused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said[pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there wassufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore,

cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of thecharges proferred against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime ofEstafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraudanother by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

x x x x

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal

6 Quinto v. People, 365 Phil. 259, 270 (1999).7 Rollo, p. 37. (Citations omitted.)




property received by the offender in trust or oncommission, or for administration, or under any otherobligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to

return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying havingreceived such money, goods, or other property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a)that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender intrust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligationinvolving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there

be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the

offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriationor conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is ademand made by the offended party on the offender.8

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees.In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate

petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising

to pay them. Thus:

PROS. MARTINEZq Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and thistransaction could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is whathappens (sic) when the deadline came?a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?a I looked for him for a week, sir.q Did you know his residence?a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?a No, sir.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

8 Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332 (2008), citing Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 670,675 (1999).




a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I

asked him where the items are and he promised me that he will pay

these amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect fromhim partially or full?a No, sir.9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word“demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made uponthe person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of themoney [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 Asexpounded in Asejo v. People:13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA thatdemand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. Theappellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form ofdemand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify.Should a written demand be necessary, the law would havestated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should beinterpreted in its general meaning as to include both writtenand oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquiredabout the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query wastantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement. Itso happens only that failure to account, upon demand forfunds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence ofmisappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14

9 TSN, December 17, 1992, pp. 9-10. (Emphasis supplied.)10 Tan v. People, 542 Phil. 188, 201 (2007).11 Id., citing Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250 (2005).12 Id .13 555 Phil. 106 (2007).14 Id . at 114. (Citations omitted.)




In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecutionwas able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private

complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell orreturn the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There wasmisappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those piecesof jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of

jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the privatecomplainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is

questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule thatin assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to theevaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe thedemeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, anopportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records ofthe case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and bindingif not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance ofweight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16

Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality oftheir testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence,

the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division wasdeliberating on this case, the question of the continued validity of imposingon persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislatureapparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of thedivision reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are offirst impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for

consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Amongthose that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, DeanSedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President,and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were laterheard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L.Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the

matter, this Court finds the following:

15 Cosme, Jr. v. People, 538 Phil. 52, 66 (2006), citing People v. Garillo, 446 Phil. 163, 174-175(2003).16 Id., citing Sullon v. People, 500 Phil. 39, 45 (2005) ; People v. Bulan, 498 Phil. 586, 598 (2005).17 Id. at 67, citing People v. Gaspar, 376 Phil. 762, 779 (1999).



Decision - 10 - G.R. No. 180016

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property

committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value ofmoney eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the saidrange of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. Whatthe legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for inthe said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as thatwould be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government.This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. Itcan be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code( RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be

repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive

penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may

deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall

render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,

through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the

court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal

legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,

through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed

proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a

strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the

imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the

degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter,report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons

why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premisehere is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penallegislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of theneed to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second

paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act isalready punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by thecourt as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not tosuspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executivethe reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to informthe Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the

proper penalty.

18 Emphasis supplied.



Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 180016

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 GuillermoB. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report

to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment ormodification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim “nullum crimen, nulla

poena sige lege,” that is, that there can exist no punishable act exceptthose previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does notdeem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, theCourt of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the

execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of

the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty.

All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter

to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or

modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retiredChief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C.

Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,

21

echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts

have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed

by law. “Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon convictionof violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough,are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; butit is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all

cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the

prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment.”A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is

equal to P100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result inuncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must

be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed impositionof the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will notcease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the

19 Third Edition, 1940.20 Id. at 16. (Emphasis supplied)21 1997 Edition.22 Id . at 93, citing United States v. Valera Ang Y , 26 Phil. 598 (1914); People v. Salazar y Gabriel,102 Phil. 1184 (1958); Tiu Ua, 51 O.G. 1863; Limaco, 99 Phil. 35 (1956), and People v. Del Rosario y

Natividad , 62 Phil. 824 (1936). (Emphasis supplied.)



Decision - 12 - G.R. No. 180016

framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same,instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper

to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amendthe subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all weknow, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter thefurther commission of those punishable acts which have increasedtremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, itis apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penallaws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount ofP100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to P50,000,000.00. Inthe same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which theAnti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to

P500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposedimposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions statethat:

Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum andmedium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is morethan 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but ifthe value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribedin this paragraph, and one year for each additional tenthousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may beimposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, andin connection with the accessory penalties which may beimposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this

Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor orreclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its mediumand maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen ismore than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimumand medium periods, if the value of the property stolen ismore than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4.

Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisioncorreccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.



Decision - 13 - G.R. No. 180016

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.

7.

Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, ifthe theft is committed under the circumstances enumeratedin paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value ofthe thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such valueexceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine notexceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen isnot over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted underthe impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a

livelihood for the support of himself or his family.ch

In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, theabove-provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in itsminimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen isP6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium

period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty

imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after theapplication of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, theminimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum

penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 monthsand 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or paroleafter serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation.Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period toarresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too farfrom the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem thatthe present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The sameis also true in the crime of Estafa.23

23 Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the meansmentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor inits minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposedunder the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion

temporal, as the case may be.2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the

amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in

its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos;and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of thefollowing means:



Decision - 14 - G.R. No. 180016

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value ofthe thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of

Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which isthe basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be toowide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the actcommitted and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not changed:

1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 toP2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of

value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, eventhough such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration.

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust oron commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involvingthe duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received suchmoney, goods, or other property.

(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in

blank, and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or of any third person.

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent actsexecuted prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginarytransactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining tohis art or business.

(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended party may deem properto bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by themaximum period of the penalty.

(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of anobligation when the offender therein were not sufficient to cover the amount ofthe check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amountnecessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice fromthe bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lackof insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constitutingfalse pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A. 4885, approved June 17,1967.)]

(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel,inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and the likewithout paying therefor, with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof,or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, orapartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by abandoning orsurreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a hotel, inn, restaurant,

boarding house, lodging house or apartment house after obtaining credit, food,refreshment or accommodation therein without paying for his food, refreshmentor accommodation.

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a

gambling game.(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any

court record, office files, document or any other papers.



Decision - 15 - G.R. No. 180016

medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional

maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24 3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable byarresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1day to 2 years and 4 months).5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable byarresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum toarresto mayor medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the valuewould also be modified but the penalties are not changed, asfollows:

1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 toP2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8

years).25

2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 toP1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2months).26

3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 toP600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision

correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4months).

4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto

mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of ouresteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided underArticle 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is

determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has fourrequisites:

24 May be entitled to Probation.25 May be entitled to Probation if the maximum penalty imposed is 6 years.26 May be entitled to Probation.27 Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 385, 414.



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(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule ( IPR) doesnot rest on substantial distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantialin the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPRwas devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amountswould receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved,

because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty assomeone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second

requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR islimited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,conditions that no longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno anddeclares the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violatingthe equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be appliedin case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceedsP22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than

answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedyis to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent

power to legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares theIPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:

x x x x

JUSTICE PERALTA: Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel andunusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if theamount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare theincremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the voidshould be filled by Congress.

28 People v. Cayat , 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).



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JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at OneHundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excessof Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting anadditional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory

interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording ofthe law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:

....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty asunsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.



Decision - 18 - G.R. No. 180016

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year inexcess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00)Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

x x x x29

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal

Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court hasexpanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibitingcruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just itsform. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decidewhether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare thenature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2)Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction,i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less

serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission ofthe same crime in other jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the presentcase, because in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the

penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into accountthe latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a “noaccount” check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime wouldhave been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless,

respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felonyconvictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the

present controversy.

29 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 192-195.30 463 U.S. 277 (1983)



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With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true thatthe imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for

the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact thatin the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse thetrust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting andallowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting uponsuch person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved onesand properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as towarrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commissionof such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonmentare dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the

proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime ofMalversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the moneymalversed by the public official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of

malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of hisoffice, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate thesame or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, throughabandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such

public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guiltyof the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shallsuffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its mediumand maximum periods, if the amount involved in themisappropriation or malversation does not exceed two

hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum andmedium periods, if the amount involved is more than two

hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum periodto reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amountinvolved is more than six thousand pesos but is less thantwelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium andmaximum periods, if the amount involved is more thantwelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand

pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be

reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also sufferthe penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fineequal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to thetotal value of the property embezzled.



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The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upondemand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie

evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein theGovernment loses money due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus,following the proposal, if the amount malversed is P200.00 (under theexisting law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is

prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 monthsand 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of

embezzlement of P20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by publicofficials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury

31 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officersalready penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer andare hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting aviolation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connectionwith the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commitsuch violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for

himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Governmentand any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity,has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for thehelp given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprisewhich has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after itstermination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private partyany unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicialfunctions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provisionshall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant oflicenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to actwithin a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly orindirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or forthe purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against anyother interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grosslydisadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract ortransaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest inany transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and whichexercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action

of the board, committee, panel or group.Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the

approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group towhich they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mererepresentative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him onaccount of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its



Decision - 21 - G.R. No. 180016

caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary amount,the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law

will now become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime ofmalversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position toembezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with forceupon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thingunlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penaltyimposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty ofimprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.

In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if weincrease the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the

ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing

unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering

the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime ofQualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery

because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium andmaximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not

exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) whereentrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with forceupon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Finedespite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the

penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the

highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium andmaximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of thedamage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of thedamage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable byarresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of thedamaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor ora fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more thanP200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot beestimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00,

authorized release date.The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b)

and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urgingthe divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of thissection shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act andshall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business inany form with the Government.32 R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 9.



Decision - 22 - G.R. No. 180016

which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the existing law willnow become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will now

become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense iscategorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will begrave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same throughCourt decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally andconstitutionally feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC thatmay also be affected by the proposal, such as those that impose

imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damagecaused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library

and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or

usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 ( Altering boundaries or

landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling

a minor ), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of

malicious mischief ) and Article 331 ( Destroying or damaging statues,

public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penaltywill also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public

treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),

Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer ), Article218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the

country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. Itwill also affect crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such asIllegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, asamended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing

timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as andequivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offendershall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for theoffense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest productsinvolved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of

33 Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. — A fine, whether imposed as a single ofas an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than

200 pesos.34 Revised Forestry Code, as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987.35 Taopa v. People, 592 Phil. 341, 345 (2005).36 Art. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher bytwo degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domesticservant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or largecattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond orfishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic erruption, or any othercalamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.



Decision - 23 - G.R. No. 180016

Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so faras the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309

and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness ofthis particular law is not in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the RevisedPenal Code and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these lawsaffected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine itseffectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law thatshould be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude asto the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making

a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times.Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature whichis empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legalluminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not toamend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a newlegislation which will adopt to the times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amendthe Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate

informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in theSenate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposingmuch needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgateddecades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings werefar different from today’s conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law insuch a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make

or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise,amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a constructionwhich is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in amanner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when thelaw is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shyaway from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch ofthe Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of thedoctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate.Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

37 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, p. 167.38 People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, 548 (1996).



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Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime orquasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there mayhave been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earningcapacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs ofthe latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded bythe court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disabilitynot caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of hisdeath;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to thedecedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may

demand support from the person causing the death, for a period notexceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants andascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mentalanguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party asa kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damageor infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only

covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crimewhere a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed tothe offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money asrestitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of thevictim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that isunlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty incertain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civilindemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that wouldsustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article

2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civilindemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus,although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasingthe amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified andincreased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moraldamages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amountof damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended

party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, beadjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for theoffense committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all

39 Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if thecourt should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.



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penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not theyare excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to

lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especiallywhen they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than thatwhich is plainly written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice AntonioCarpio’s opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should bedeclared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penaltycorresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amountinvolved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the

law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course ofcriminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime ofestafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should

be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in thedispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of

Republic Act No. 765940

in December 1993. The said law has beenquestioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruelthan that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposeduntil its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did notimpede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a “cruel

punishment” within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of theConstitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending theimposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via theintervention of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Courtcannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penaltyemanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative ofdue process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were notgiven the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that theconstitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally becauseconstitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more

40 AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES,AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIALPENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.41 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.42 Section 19.

1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishmentinflicted. x x x.43 Gutierrez v. Department of Budget and Management , G.R. No. 153266, 159007, 159029, 170084,172713, 173119, 176477, 177990, A.M. No. 06-4-02-SB, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 1, 25.



Decision - 26 - G.R. No. 180016

so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon theconstitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishmentrather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to

punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, forinstance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at thestake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine andimprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, orsevere for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the

punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel andunusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the

ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "whollydisproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense ofthe community."45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend

the law and adapt it to our modern time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merelyadjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of money

based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors andvariables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, anddeliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properlyadjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed

upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should bemade to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has noresources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings andsponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our RevisedPenal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress.Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:

x x x x

JUSTICE PERALTA:Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the

value of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.

44 People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953); People v. Tongko, 353 Phil. 37, 43 (1998).45 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953); People v. Dionisio, No. L-15513, March 27, 1968, 22SCRA 1299, 1301-1302.



Decision - 27 - G.R. No. 180016

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust,to make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.



Decision - 28 - G.R. No. 180016

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:Thank you.46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense

justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose anobsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposedratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court

has in the past taken into consideration “changed conditions” or “significantchanges in circumstances” in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delvinginto the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different fromthe Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which theCourt had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case ofPeople v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a

presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the ChiefJustice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited

judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussedabove, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, suchimmense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain fromcrossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated

before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party asa kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The

same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are notonly based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further,since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded andonly pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civilindemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of currentconditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CAmodified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate

penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in itsmedium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months ofreclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CAimposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of

46 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 183-185.47 No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.



Decision - 29 - G.R. No. 180016

prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor , asmaximum, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of

seven (7) years.

In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling inCosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the RevisedPenal Code provides:

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person whoshall defraud another by any of the means mentioned

hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in itsmaximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does notexceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the lattersum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall beimposed in its maximum period, adding one year for eachadditional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case,and in connection with the accessory penalties which may

be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions ofthis Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor orreclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two,not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires thedivision of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions oftime included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of thethree portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium andminimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 yearsMedium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months,

20 daysMinimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months,

10 days49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión

correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided intothree equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to formone period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case,

48 Supra note 15.49 Id . at 71-72.50 ART. 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three Periods. – In cases inwhich the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rulescontained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.51 People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 284.



Decision - 30 - G.R. No. 180016

the amount involved is P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, themaximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6

years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 alsostates that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for everyadditional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no caseshall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more thanthe P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additionalP10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the

maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision

correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lowerwould then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywherefrom 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congressand usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may bethe most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous

proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED.

Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution datedSeptember 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed withmodification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonabledoubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph(b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty ofimprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS andELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15)

YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of thisDecision be furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines,through the Department of Justice.



Decision

- 31 -

G R No. 180016

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the

Senate and the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

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MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

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ANTONIOT C

Associate Justice

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LASCO JR.

Ass; ciate Justice •

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Associate Justice Associate Justice

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RSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

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Associate Justice

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Decision

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

- 32 - G R No. 180016

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Associate Justice

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MARVIC

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII

of

the Constitution I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before

the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

hief

Justice

1i

corpuz v people en banc gr 180016 april 29, 2014

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