I?. S. Peters’ Concept of Character and the Criterion of Consistency for Actions

By Dale Kennedy

I n his 1962 article, “Moral Education and the Psychology of Character,”’ R. S. Peters develops an elaborate concept of character as adequately as so few words permit and yet remain readable. The account is constructed with care and promises to be useful for educational purposes. I n this article I intend, first, to give an ac- curate narration, 1 hope, of Peters’ statement, in even fewer words than he himself allowed; and then from this background examine the notion of consistency which is critical to Peters’ concept of character by an analysis of the situational conditions of rule following behavior.

Peters’ account begins by noting that the concept of character is usually intended to pick out what is distinctive about people. But, since persons differ in many ways, it is necessary to determine what sorts of differences are differences in character rather than differences in other sorts of things, such as nature or personality. These distinctions are made as Peters describes what he takes to be the basic constituents or elements of character (the use of the term “elements” is mine for summary purposes).

THE ELtMENTS OF ( ‘ I iARAC‘TER

(i) Character indicates “a manner or style of behaving without any definite

( i i ) Character “does not indicate the sort of goals a man tends to pursue, but the

These two statements allow character to be contrasted with terms such as motive, attitude, sentiment, inclination, desire, need or want, for all of these suggest goals, ends or directions in behaving.‘ Judgments of character and the ascription of particular character traits refer to how, the manner in which a person does a thing, but not what he does. He can be careful, dogged, honest, fair, considerate or ruthless. When considered in the context of attaining some end object, these terms perform an adverbial function. There are, however, many terms in the language which perform this sort of function and which refer more properly to what we call one’s nature, temperament or personality, such as “stupidly,” “nervously,” or “out-going.” Peters’ next step is to provide a basis for distinguishing character-traits from these other sorts of traits. He does so by connecting character to a certain kind of regulation.

(iii) “Character is revealed in what he does about them [needs, desires, goals] in

implication or directedness or aversion.”

manner in which he pursues them.”

the manner in which he regulates or fails to regulate them.”

Dale Kennedy is a graduate student in philosophy of education and educational psychology at the Univer- sity of Nebraska.

I . R. S. Peters, “Moral Education and the Psychology of Character,’’ Philosophy. The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. 37, No. 139 (January 1961). pp. 37-56, and in Israel Scheffler (ed.), Philosophy and Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Inc., 1966). pp. 263-286.

2. Ibid. (1966). p. 265. 3. Ibid. 4. This is not to suggest that character or a certain character trait cannot itself be an object of pursuit

or a goal, for this is precisely the point of explicating character, that we might better understand what we are after when we week to instill character as a function of education. This aspect of character will be taken up later.

5. Peters, op. cir. (1966). p. 266.

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PETLRS’ CONCEPT OF CHARACTER 55

(iv) “Rather he behaves in a certain manner, according to or not according to

(v) “It is largely for his efforts and decisions that a man is praised or blamed

(vi) “Character-traits are shown in the sorts of things a man can decide to be.” Regulation by decision and the execution of decision by means of personal effort

imply rule-following, for to make a choice is to adopt a rule to guide one’s actions. However, not just any rule-following behavior implies character. Some rules may be acquired by external manipulations such as reward or punishment and are internalized without any intentionality on the part of the individual. I f an individual chooses a certain rule to follow, it is reasonable to suppose that he wants to follow it, believes following it will bring certain outcomes he desires, and therefore that he intends to follow it.8 Personal decision allows character to be distinguished from one’s nature and personality. A man is stupid or lacking in vitality by nature; these traits are not the result of decision. lo Furthermore, character is built up by decisions while personality is understood to develop without the suggestion of inner effort or decision.ll

certain rules.”

rather than for his desires and inclinations.”

We may state the elements of character as follows: I ) The manner or style in which one does things as contrasted to the content of

2) Regulation of behavior by decision and rule-following, executed by personal

These elements have obvious functional value; they make the time honored distinction between style and content, and they divide the determination of one’s actions, saving a part for individual decision and will, a favorite distinction of humanists. Individual decision can determine to a degree both the style and content of one’s actions or behavior. Character, as Peters defines it, refers only to the style. Now we sometimes tend to judge an individual’s character by the principal objects of his belief. But this is simply an inference about how that individual will behave given those beliefs. The individual’s character however is not those beliefs but the manner and style in which those beliefs are manifested. Such a clarification is useful when speaking of character as an educational objective. Complication is introduced, however, by the fact that the term “character” can be used in differing ways. To complete his explication of the concept of character, Peters undertakes to disentangle three uses of “character” which he calls: a) the non-committal use, b) types of character, and c) having character.

those things, what they are.

effort.

T H E USES ot T H E T E R M “ C H A R A C T E R “

(a) The non-committal use and (b) types of character The non-committal use of character occurs when we refer to the sum-total of a

man’s character-traits.I2 This may refer to no more than the part of the social code stamped onto the individual, usually by use of authority and drill.13 Given the

6. tbid., p. 265. 7. tbid.. p. 266. 8. Ibid., p. 265. 9. See R. Audi, “Intending,” Journal qf Philosophy. V . 70 (July 19, 1973). pp. 387-403. 10. Peters, op. cit. (1966). 1 I . Ibid.. p. 267. 12. tbid., p. 268. 13. R. S. Peters, “Training Intellect and Character,” in Authority, Responsibility, and Education

(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: Paul S. Erikson, Inc., Revised Edition, 1973). pp. 135-136.

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56 EDtic AT[(>\ AL T ti EOK\

elements of character outlined above, this is actually a misuse of the term “character,” since the stamping-in process has no suggestion of individual determina- tion. On the other hand, when we speak of character types,.we tend to distinguish certain content patterns or certain styles of rule-following exhibited by individuals. For instance, we may distinguish utilitarian or altruistic character types where the content of belief figures strongly in the distinction, or we may distinguish obsessive, rigid character types from flexible, autonomous character types, where the manner in which rules are followed is the primary distinction. There is in these senses some suggestion of individual determination or choice, although several of the examples Peters offers belong to Freudian psycho-genetic theory and, as such, intimate determining factors outside the realm of individual decision.

(c) Having character The above uses of character do not, however, bring out what for Peters is central

to ascribing character to some individual; indeed, they do not even preserve the clarifications defined by the elements of character outlined previously since they do not involve individual decision or mix content and style. Peters intends that the third sense of character, “having character,” be without connotation of any character type whatsoever. To “have character” is to display integrity, consistency, and incorrupti- bility in following rules. Peters considers these attributes as the necessary conditions for “having character.” The conditions describe a style of a man’s rule-following, not the content of the rule: For example, when we say a man is honest, we are saying something distinctive about his behavior, probably his speech, but no more; while to say he has character and he is honest, we imply that we can expect him to be honest whenever he speaks. Presumably, our man operates under some rule to the effect that “Honesty is best”; thus to say he has character is to say that he consistently follows that rule, honesty simply being the particular character trait governed by that rule.

It seems that Peters intends “having character” to be a technically neutral term, for he alludes that it is possible to credit the devil with having character. Apparently the conditions of “having character” may be met without any implication of particular moral posture. Nevertheless, two of the terms Peters chooses to define the conditions of having character, integrity and incorruptibility, are not exactly neutral terms. For integrity in one sense means undivided or whole, but, with the exception of schizophrenics, this trivially true of all persons. Its other senses suggest being incapable of moral corruption or inflexibly just and upright; likewise with incorrupti- bility. These meanings are not morally neutral. There is enough suggestion of moral content in integrity and incorruptibility to merit abandoning them as explicit conditions for “having character.” Since ccmsistency also covers what integrity and incorruptibility mean in their neutral senses, they really contribute nothing to the explication anyway. In the critique section I will deal with consistency alone.

T H E SITUATIONAL CONDITIONS O F KLI.E-FOI.I.OWI\G

To begin with it is important to distinguish rule-following from decisional processes. The distinction is not firmly made in Peters’ exposition, but is nonetheless valid. I will follow Wittgenstein’s confession, “When I obey a‘rule. I do not choose, I obey the rule blindly,” I5 as the basis for distinguishing rule-following from decision.

14. Peters, “Moral Education and the Psychology of Character” (19661, p. 271. IS. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Invesfigufions, trans. by G . E. M. Anscombe (New York:

Macmillan Co.), Third Edition, Remark 219.

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PETERS’ CONCEPT OF CHARACTER 57

TO decide is to choose among alternatives; to obey a rule is to abandon choice and mechanically or faithfully carry out the prescription of the rule. The question arises then: How do I know whether I am following a rule or choosing a rule among several alternative rules? The answer lies in the situation to which the rule is applied. Peters writes:

(vii l) One “follows rules for which he sees some point and modifies them to take

Peters here is concerned in part with following rules and in part with modi- fying rules. As the latter case is the more complex, I will discuss the simpler first; when does one follow a rule and what is the point he sees?

To speak sensibly of rule-following one must be able to describe a situation in which the following of a rule occurs. Following a particular rule presupposes a situational context in which certain conditions suggest the appropriateness of following the rule or a class of rules. A differential equation to be solved would be a situational condition for which the rules of calculus are appropriate but not the rules of arithmetic, chess, or etiquette. The point that an individual sees when applying a rule is then, that given his cognition or understanding of the conditions of the situation, a particular set of rules or some particular rule is chosen for application because the individual believes that the rule or rules are appropriate to the conditions. The choosing of the rule is a decision process and following the rule is a matter of ritual adherence, or, in stronger terms, blind obedience. Consider an illustration from chess. X is playing chess, and the specific conditions indicate that he is one move from checkmating his opponent, but he can do this one of two ways, one with his queen and the other with his knight. Each move is governed by a different rule, but each leads to the same end. Normally such a choice is academic, where one is indifferent between alternatives. One could concoct a preference or toss a coin. But until the choice is obtained, there is a fundamental uncertainty about how the opponent will be checkmated. Once decided, the manner in which the checkmate is secured is beyond doubt. This illustration is quite simple. Before this analysis can be applied to Peters’ explication of character, it must be extended to handle compfex situations. I will do this by dividing rules into two classes.

The first class of rules I will call basic rules, but I will take its meaning in a sense broader than Peters’. Peters regards basic rules as “almost definitions of a society.”1T I regard basic rules as the definitions of the game. They are in effect what constitute a game.’”

account of relevant differences in situations.” l6

16. Peters, “Moral Education and the Psychology of Character’’ (1966). p. 270. 17. R. S . Peters, “Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education,” in W. R. Niblett (ed.),

Moral Education in u Changing Socierr. (London: Faber and Faber. Ltd., 1963), and in Israel Scheffler (ed.), Philosophy and Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1966). p. 250.

18. There is controversy about the status of certain social games. John Serle in Speech Acrs considers the rules of etiquette, not as constitutive but as regulative. But this distinction cannot be hard and fast. The rules which constitute a game also regulate it, and with respect to etiquette, if one asked, “What is etiquette?” a proper response would be. “Doing such-and-such in such-and-such a situation.“ To the hearer such specifications of rules is what constitutes etiquette. I consider Serles’ point to be actually distinguishing well-defined games from ill-defined games. Serles’ distinction is based on the following: the specification of an action which is governed by a constitutive rule also implies something else, such as to Cross the goal-line implies a touchdown. The basic form of the constitutive rule is “X counts as Y.” For a regulative rule, however, a specification of the action, such as “So-and-so mailed out notices two weeks in advance,” prima facie has no such implication. But this I take to be a fault of incomplete definition, for I could invent a name, 4, such that to mail out notices two weeks in advance, X. implies 4. Thus “X counts as 6.” Serles’ other example of regulative rules was Army regulations. But once we add a scoring system, such as merits and demerits. what was at first an ill-defined game becomes well-defined, i.e., “some action X Counts as so many merits, Y .’’

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58 EDUCATIOSAL THEOR\

Basic rules are of two sorts: foundation rules, such as the position of the pieces and topography of the board in chess; and dynamic or transformation rules, which specify how the initial situation, defined by the foundation rules, is modified. The foundation rules of a social situation are similar in meaning’to Peters’ basic rules.

Basic rules are contrasted with strategic rules which involve the ordering of the sequence of transformational rules applied. For example, in chess, the basic rules determine the position of the board and the position and movement of the pieces as well as other items. Knowing the basic rules will permit one to play the game. However, one might also use certain strategic rules to govern one’s play such as play for position, exchange bishops for knights, or employ variations of certain offensive and defensive patterns. One might pick up these types of rules from experience with the game or from instruction. There are fundamental differences between basic rules and strategic rules in the process of their application and their consequences. A basic rule is applied or it is not. Once it is applied, there is no more to it. On the other hand the form a strategic rule takes is built up from the application of the previous basic rules, with a decision intervening between each basic rule application. Each move alters the situation providing a new basis of evaluation with respect to the prospects of the next basic rule application. I t is precisely this process of decision, move, and evaluation, which gives the application of strategic rules their variability. I t is strategic rules that are modified by the relevant differences in the sequence of situations that make up the game. However when Peters writes:

(vii,) “And the point [the point of following rules] to a large extent, is determined by his adherence to higher order principles,”1g and

(viii) “Can have character if their behavior is consistently rule-governed and if they adapt their rules intelligently in the light of their supreme principles,”

it is unclear whether these supreme principles function as basic rules or strategic rules. On the one hand, they appear to be the basis for modifying other rules, perhaps serving to frame some decision. Yet, since considering the interests of others varies as to which others are involved in what situations. the supreme principles themselves require constant modification and intervening decisions.

At present however it is not necessary to define the function of Peters’ supreme principles either as basic rules or strategic rules. Instead I will show that consistency means one thing with respect to basic rules and quite another with respect to strategic rules.

S E S S t S O F CONSISTENC\

In a logical sense consistency refers to the internal connections of a system of rules such that no two rules in that system have contradictory prescriptions. Logical or mathematical systems are supposed to have this sort of consistency. Another sense of consistency refers to the conformity of actions to the prescriptions of rules. This is the sense apropos to Peters’ discussion. I f one regulates one’s behavior by rule-following then we can rightfully speak of the consistency of that person’s rule-following, that is, whether or not his behavior or actions conform to those rules. The question pursued in this section will be: what is meant, if anything, to say someone is consistent with respect to basic rules, and what is meant, if anything, to say someone is consistent with respect to strategic rules?

19. Peters, “Moral Education and the Psychology of Character” (1966). p. 270. 20. ibid.. p. 273.

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PETERS’ CONCEPT OF CHARACTER 59

To ascribe to a person consistency in following basic rules is tautological. Following basic rules implies consistent obedience or we have a right to doubt whether any rule is being followed at all. With respect to basic rules, there is only one style of rule-following. and that is implicit by definition. Take, for instance, computers. A computer operates under a set of program rules which it “follows” automatically. Possibly we might remark how consistent they are. But what happens if it makes a “mistake”? Is the computer inconsistent? When a computer makes a mistake, either the programmer has given incorrect instructions, for which he is guilty of inconsisten- cy, not the computer,” or a circuit has burned out and the “rule” the computer was to follow simply is not there to follow. I t is absurd to say the computer was inconsistent since the rule from which it might be judged consistent or deviant is no longer there.

What then of strategic rules? Consistency with respect to strategic rules is much more complex, and the model of rule-following in the previous section will be useful in clarifying the issue. Let us consider the strategic rule of position in chess. First of all, even in the well-defined situations of the chess game, the criteria of what counts as good position are variable. Generally speaking, however, the manner in which the center four squares are attacked by both players gives some indication of how strong one or the other’s position is. Still, one player’s position may appear strong and yet lose the game or appear weak yet win. Indeed, the whole notion of good position is highly tentative. A good position after seven moves may become disastrous after ten, simply by inadvertent or short-sighted moves. How then do we judge whether one is consistent or not with respect to the strategic rule of “good position”? Only after the fact, after the effects have been gauged. I f we could say apriori that a certain move is consistent or inconsistent with good position, we preclude the later moves which must follow and thereby reduce the strategic rule to a basic rule. We can only judge how “consistent” one move is by subsequent outcomes. Since good position theoretically should win the game if one consistently maintains it, losing the game, barring absent- minded moves, means one has failed to consistently maintain good position. The relationship, therefore, of consistency to strategic rules i s contingent, depending on further decisions. I f it were necessary, as in the case of basic rules, one could never lose once one attained good position.

The contingent relationship is further demonstrated by the fact that at any one time there might be at least two possible moves which, i f played intelligently thereafter, would consistently maintain good position. The decision which takes one or the other is not determined by a rule since both are given by the rule of good position. (There are, of course, other strategic rules which might be brought into play, as in mixed strategies. I will take the strategy in the above example as pure.) Now any -

player with a normal drive to win intends to be consistent with his overall strategy. But if we focus in on his decision points, judgments of consistency or inconsistency are premature. Suppose, for instance, we ask him at a certain decision point, “Are you being consistent?” A legitimate answer would be, “ I don’t know, right now I am adjusting,” i.e., modifying the implementation of strategy. The modification is a decision process. To judge consistency, one must compare products of these processes according to some superordinate criterion; the process itself is not amenable to the consistency criterion. I t is something altogether different. One, of course, might

21. The criterion of consistency from which the programmer has deviated is of the logical type Inasmuch as that the sequential system of rules which compose the program are not consistent with one another.

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60 EDIXATIONAI. THEOR)

employ rules to help frame the decision situation, but the decision itself is not a matter of following rules.22

Consistency then in the regulation of behavior as the following of basic rules has the sense of conformity, that is, the action or behavior conforms to such and such a rule or not. Consistency in the regulation of behavior as decisional processes, as in the case of what I have called strategic rules, has the sense of compatibility of events, that is, that among a succession of actions there is an overall agreement. This agreement need not be some similarity in the actions themselves, but may be an agreement of the actions with some objective. Some actions may appear radically dissimilar on the surface yet may each contribute to the attainment of some intended end object or outcome. There is a deeper question in this and that is, do intentions function as basic rules such that to be consistent with one’s intentions one must conform one’s actions to those intentions: or do intentions operate under decisional processes such that to be consistent with one’s intentions one must act in ways compatible with those intentions? I t seems intentions might be classed in both ways, depending on the nature of the intended end objects. Actions related to one’s character would be especially difficult to assess. since character is reflected in one’s immediate actions as well as in long range sequences of actions. I t is clear that to know which sense of consistency is appropriate is no simple thing. With respect to character building it is vital. for if the instigation of character as part of an educational program is our object, we must know whether we should strive to teach the child to conform his actions to his intentions, and in his failing to do so inform him of his malfeasance; or whether we should teach the child that there is only a contingent relationship between his actions and his intentions, failing at such being only a part of the process of striving to make the two compatible.

THk DEClSlOh TO B F t i A V k I \ A CI-RTAIY WAk

The import of the previous section was that consistency in the regulation of behavior has two senses which should be understood separately and which are appropriate for different kinds of regulation. To complete this analysis of Peters’ concept of character it is necessary to examine what is implied when an individual decides to acquire a particular kind of character trait. The point of this will be to determine whether such an effort requires conforming to a rule or a compatibility of actions over successive situations. Let us consider patience.

We shall assume that patience can be a character trait. Then it follows that: 1 ) one can decide to be patient; 2) one, upon deciding to be patient, adopts a rule to the effect, “be patient,” to

3) one can make an effort, i.e., try to be patient and, if that effort is not wanting,

For the above three conditions to obtain, the following presuppositions are

1) It is possible for any person whatsoever of normal type to acquire patience as a character trait. Evidence to the contrary would support the proposition that patience is not a trait acquired simply by decision and effort.

2) The person deciding to be patient can follow or apply rules and thereby undertake a systematic program ending in the acquisition of patience.

guide his efforts to be patient;

succeed.

necessary:

22. There are decision rules, such as maximize utility, which apply to well-defined conditions, but these function as basic rules so that consistency with respect to them is trivial. One follows or one does not.

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PETERS’ CONCEPT OF CHARACTER 61

3) One knows what it is to be patient, as opposLd to being impatient, or other such things such as tolerant or dogged, etc. Otherwise, how would one know when he has acquired patience, or know how much progress he has made toward his goal or be able to estimate how much effort he must invest to make the acquisition?

The first problem encountered in seeking to acquire a character trait is one of criterion. To acquire patience is a matter of knowing, having some idea of what patience is, to even choose it, Then there must be some definite guide for one’s actions or the personal effort expended will likely go awry. That something which gives direction to action is traditionally understood to be the operation of a rule, whether it can be spoken or not. I f the processes involved are decisional we can consider the intended outcome of those processes to be the instrument guiding one’s actions.

Acquiring a character trait requires some cognition and epistemological method to determine what a character trait is. This requirement of knowledge can be considered a part of the situational conditions of rule-following. It is presupposed by the basic rules. For example, to know how to obey the rules for moving a knight presupposes that one knows which piece is the knight and what pieces are not.

The categoric distinction which differentiates a knight from a rook, however, is universally agreed upon, whereas the criteria by which we distinguish patient behavior from non-patient behsvior are not, and is further complicated by the first person element. The knowledge requirement for acquiring patience is twofold-how do I know when others are being patient, and how do I know when I am being patient? I will show that the third person account is highly variable and that the first person account is pretentious.

There are at least two ways in which we can go about obtaining a public account of patience: ( I ) we can sample a number of people and ask for their attitudes toward patience and how they tell whether a person is patient or not; ( 2 ) we could ask a number of judges to ostensively point out people they consider patient and then observe how those people behave. Probably there will be certain qualities or behaviors with high common agreement, but even these will vary in their several individual situations. I n other words, even the items in common must be generalized from separate individual instances. I t should not be difficult to find controversy as to whether such-and-such behavior under such-and-such situational conditions counts as patience. An individual undertaking the enterprise to acquire patience might even find that according to some criterion he already is patient. If he insists he is not, we have an instance of the basic incompatibility of the first person and public accounts of patience. But, if such an individual declares he is not patient even though he may exhibit patient behavior, we may ask him when will he know when he is patient. He will either keep silent, give us some other behaviors as criteria for patience, or give us Some variation on the theme, “I’ll know when I get it.” I n the first case, we may suspect him of not really knowing or of being irascible. I n the second case, we once again leave the subjective perspective and engage in public argument. I n the last case, we should expect him to pray.

We can consider the opposite case. A man declares or confesses he is a patient man, but his behavior is at best some radical form of patience. You and I might observe his behavior time and time again, and, by our criteria, always conclude he is impatient. But the most we can claim is that his behavior deviates from the form of such-and-such a paradigm of patience/impatience. He can well refute us by simply saying that “impatience of behavior does not always mean an impatience of the soul”-we can take him to mean by soul some vague, indefinite state of his

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62 EDUCATIONAL THEOR\

consciousness not available to our observation, but which he, and he alone, knows intimately. I t would be absurd to argue with him.

The point of all this is that deciding to behave in a certain way, that is, to acquire a character trait as Peters defines it, is not as easy as it might first appear. In addition to the knowledge requirement, one must be capable of the effort necessary to execute the choice and make progress toward the goal. I f anything, deciding to be patient entails a certain competence of achievement. This competence presupposes knowing what patience is so that it might be sought after. Since the criteria of what counts as patience depend on situation, what initially appeared to be a simple basic rule is in actuality a strategic rule, one which must be differentially applied with respect to the relevant differences posed by particular situations. Therefore, deciding to be patient means one must not only have some idea of what it is to be patient in general, but one must also adapt that knowledge to particular situations. In short, being patient is not simply a matter of rule-following, but of continual decision. This is quite consistent with what Peters says about character being built up by decisions. But it also eliminates the role of rule-following in the sense of straightforward basic rules. I f consistency in the conforming sense remains a hard fast condition of having character, we deny those who unfortunately choose wrongly, even with good intentions. I f we loosen it, saying one must be consistent most of the time, where will we draw the line, 80% of the time, 70%?

The rules governing specific character traits, which at first seemed most analogous to basic rules, are actually decisional processes. I f such were conceived of as a basic rule, it would entail continual revision as it is extended to new situations and as each new situation is encountered, the rule would have to be projected in such a fashion as to make conformity contingent upon the situation, which is to say, contingent upon the decisions. The conclusion of all this is that the only appropriate sense of consistency with respect to character is that of the compatibility of actions over time with the behavioral objects of one’s intentions; but judgements of this sort are provisional and contingent upon the situation and not upon any rule.

CONC 1.U DI h Ci R E M A R KS

There are more radical positions to take with respect to Peters’ concept of character. One might dispute the style and content distinction, suggesting that in many cases it is difficult to make, if not untenable. For instance, a trait such as honesty can be viewed as something substantial a man does, as well as how he does. We say both that “a man is honest” as well as “he does X honestly.” Or one could debunk the whole notion of individual regulation of behavior, whether by rule-follow- ing or decisional processes. The legendary radical behaviorist would take such a position. On other grounds, one could argue that what I have called strategic rules are not rules at all and argue that consistency applies only to what I have called basic rules. Then by taking a position that the regulation of behavior is entirely decisional, consistency does not apply to character at all.

Perhaps these positions have their justification and ought to be thoroughly examined, but the effect of such would be, I believe, more counterproductive than constructive. I have not sought to invalidate Peters’ account of character, but rather to advance it. Character as concept in the construction of educational situations can be useful, but first one must have something to work with, if only as a working hypothesis.

On the other hand the implications of the position I have taken may be seen as radical. I am suggesting that, most of the time, the idea of conformity is not

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appropriate in discussion of an individual’s regulation of his own This runs counter to the traditional notions of moral education, which suggest that the task of moral education is somehow to teach the individuals to conform their actions to their knowledge of good and evil, right and wrong, etc. The traditional position is aptly stated by Frankena:

The problem of producing virtue in the next generation is a twofold one: ( I ) that of handing on a “knowledge of good and evil” or “knowing how” to act, and ( 2 ) that of ensuring that our children’s conduct will conform to this “kno~ledge .”~‘

I n light of the arguments of this article, and since the knowledge of ( I ) is commonly admitted to be undergoing decisional modification, the goal of (2) is not conformity but compatibility, the second sense of consistency which I have discussed. This at first glance appears to be a weaker, less definitive aim, indeed one which is more relative than the first. Judging actions strictly by their conformity to rules ought to be clearcut, but in fact it is not. The rules themselves are undergoing reconstruction in each situation in which they are applied. If, after such an application, we feel so assured as to claim that the rule was indeed conformed to we do so by judging the behavior in light of the “rule” and the situation after the fact; in short, we are really making the weaker claim, that the action was compatible with the “rule” and the situation. I f the stronger sense of consistency, conformity, indeed held, we ought to be able to determine apriori what we ought to do, like logico-ethical theorists. But this conception is not compatible with the facts of human nature, and can unnecessarily instill feelings of guilt and lead to false accusations of moral turpitude.

Perhaps at most I have scored a technical point in theory. But there are, I believe, implications for practice which are twofold. First we must change our expectations of the students. Instead of thinking that they ought to be rule-following automatons, paying fastidious attention to details, such as pulling up their pant legs to see if they are wearing socks, or measuring their hem lines, and then treating their deviance punitively, we should look to the general outcomes of their actions, expect them to have goals and to develop a sense of what actions they undertake are compatible with such goals and which are not. It is hard to see how wearing socks has any effect on scholastic achievement. I n changing this expectation, emphasis is shifted from superficial conformity in behavior to the development of individual decisional processes. I would think that this shift would have the sounder adaptive advantages in the long run . Instead of individuals frantically searching for rules to conform to, with which they might program themselves, we would develop individuals who look to their situation and their expectations and structure their actions accordingly. This does not necessarily give license for deviance. Control is not thrown out the window; it simply brings the individual into the process. This, however, requires a change in tact. It requires increased communication between the educator and the student. This is the second implication for practice I have in mind.

The conception of consistency as conformity does not require communication, Just a comparison of actions with the rules presumed to be present in the individual. As I mentioned earlier, this is probably the easiest to do. The conception of

23. This is not to rule out talk of conformity to abstracted norms in a sociological sense. I am arguing

24. William Frankena. “Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education,’’ Harvard Educational Review. against the use in individual cases, hence the psychological sense.

”. X X v I l l (Fall 1958). p. 303.

VOLGME 25, NUMBER I

64 EDUCATIONAL THEORY

consistency as compatibility, on the other hand, if brought into the educational process requires intimate dialogue between the individuals involved. I f the student has no clear ends then he should be initiated into the process of formulating ends or purposes and the job of planning and undertaking actions compatible with those ends or purposes. This is not easy. especially if the student is under the impression that living is nothing more than following road signs already marked out along the way. This, of course, is a delusion. The ways of life and their accompanying “rules,” which brought happiness and the good life in the past do not guarantee the same in the present or the future, even though we might well wish they did. The fact remains however that each individual has different past experiences and different prospects than those of other individuals or generations. This characteristic of human existence suggests that we must teach the young to perceive the relevant differences in their lives; in short we must help insure the development of their decisional processes and their confidence in them. The American ideal of individualism has unfortunately been trampled by the conditions of mass society. I f we are to preserve this ideal we will have to renew our efforts in this direction.

Q S The University of Houston

Victoria Center

invites applications for a fdCUky opening in Philosophy of Education (Instructor or Assistant Professor). This upper level institution, in its second year of opera- tion, seeks A Philosophy of Education Instructor: to teach Philosophy of Educa- tion; Epistomology; Introduction to Logic; History of Philosophy (Ancient- Medieval); History of Philosophy (Reformation- 19th Centuries); Twentieth-Cen- tury philosophies; and must be able to handle both graduate and undergraduate courses and guide master’s theses and doctoral dissertations. A PhD or EdD is required plus two years of teaching experience. Salary is dependent upon qualifications and experience.

Interested applicants should send a resume to: Dr. William 0. Nesbitt. Head Education Department

University of Houston Victoria Center 2708 N. Ben Jordan

Victoria, Texas 77901 (512) 575-4724

Equal Oppor tun i t y Employer

WINTER 1975