qr 38, 2/13/07 rationality and expected utility i. rationality ii. expected utility iii. sets and...

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QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

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Page 1: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

QR 38, 2/13/07Rationality and Expected Utility

I. Rationality

II. Expected utility

III. Sets and probabilities

Page 2: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

I. Rationality

• Rationality one of the major assumptions of game theory.

• All players are assumed rational; all know that all the others are rational; etc.

• Definition: rationality means that actors are goal-oriented and calculating.

• That is, each player in a game tries to achieve the highest possible payoff for himself.

Page 3: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Rationality

• More precisely: Each actor has a consistent set of rankings, called values or payoffs. They are consistent in that if outcome A is preferred to outcome B, and B to C, then A is preferred to C (transitive).

• Each player then calculates the strategy that best serves these interests. They assess the value of alternative courses of action and compare them.

Page 4: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

What rationality does not mean

• Selfish

• Short-run

• Sharing the same value system as other players or “ethical people”

• No particular content

• No assumption about ranking of outcomes except that they’re consistent

Page 5: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Is rationality a good assumption?

Potential problems:

• What is the unit behaving rationally? State; individual leaders (BdM)?

• The rationality assumption may be harder to accept for corporate or aggregate actors

Page 6: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Is rationality a good assumption?

• Individuals may lack the ability to make the complex calculations required by game theory:– May be “boundedly rational” and use

shortcuts– May make mistakes in calculations– May act on the basis of emotion rather than

calculating expected values

Page 7: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

How can we justify the rationality assumption?

• Experimental evidence

• General idea of being motivated by goals and trying to do as well as possible seem reasonable.

• Will be thinking of players as implicitly choosing optimal strategies, even if they do not go through the actual process of calculation that game theory assumes.

Page 8: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

II. Expected utilityDefinition: expected utility is the anticipated

payoff to any particular policy choice.• Rational decisionmakers calculate the

expected utility associated with each strategy, and choose the one that gives them the highest expected utility.

• The expected utility (or expected value) of any particular strategy is calculated by considering the probability of each outcome and the value attached to that outcome.

Page 9: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Expected utility example

Columbus game: Begin by considering Spain’s expected utility for each of the options Columbus presented.

• Success = gaining the power associated with Asian trade

• Spain cared about the probability of success.

Page 10: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Calculating expected utility

1. Identify the options available (choices of action)

For Spain, four options: east, west, overland, and doing nothing.

Page 11: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Calculating expected utility

2. Identify the probability associated with each option

Probability of success for each route: pe, pw, po, pn

Ferdinand believed that the probability of success for each route was about the same, very small. The probability of success if he did nothing was zero.

pe=pw=po>pn=0

Page 12: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Calculating expected utility

3. Identify the value of each option. We need to calculate the net benefits: benefits minus costs.

Assume that the gross benefits of doing nothing are equivalent to the benefits associated with the failure of other options, i.e., the status quo prevails.

Identify the benefits of success: be=bw=bo>bn

Page 13: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Calculating expected utility

Costs: the cost of doing nothing is zero, cn=0.

For Ferdinand, the cost of the west route was lower than the cost of the east or overland route: cn<cw<ce, co

Net benefits for each route are b-c

Page 14: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Calculating expected utility

4. Calculate the expected value of each option: what each is expected to yield. This is the expected utility: p(b-c)

General formula:

EU=p1(b1-c1) + p2(b2-c2) + … + px(bx-cx)

The set of all possible outcomes is {1, 2, …, x}

Page 15: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Calculating expected utility

Applying this formula to Ferdinand, for each option:

EUe = pe(be-ce) + (1-pe)(bn-ce)Have to consider the possible outcomes for

each option: here, success and failure. The probability of failure is 1-(probability of

success)

Net benefits of failure are bn-costs of that option (remember above)

Page 16: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Calculating expected utility

EUw = pw(bw-cw) + (1-pw)(bn-cw)

EUo = po(bo-co) + (1-po)(bn-co)

EUn = pn(bn-cn) + (1-pn)(bn-cn)

Page 17: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Comparing expected utilities

To identify the best choice, compare the expected utility of each option; choose the one with the highest expected utility.

cw < ce, co. All other terms are equal.

So, EUw>EUe, EUw>EUo.

Page 18: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Comparing expected utilities

Is EUw>EUn? EUn=0

EUw = pw(bw-cw) + (1-pw)(bn-cw)

= pw(bw-cw) + (1-pw)(-cw)

= pwbw – pwcw – cw + pwcw

= pwbw – cw

Since the benefits of success are very large, and the costs of the west route small, even a small probability of success gives EUw>EUn.

Page 19: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Calculating expected utilities

Could apply same analysis to Portugal (see BdM). Difference is that Portugal’s estimates of probabilities and costs was different because it knew about the eastern route; so this turns out to have the highest EU.

Page 20: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Expected value

D&S use the term “expected value” interchangeably with “expected utility”; could also use the term expected payoffs.

D&S formula (p. 228) same as that in BdM, just different notation.

Think of probabilities as the weights that you put on each outcome.

Page 21: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Expected value

D&S denote the value of the outcome by X (think of X=b-c, to compare to BdM).

The payoff can take n possible values, X1, X2, …, Xn.

The respective probabilities are p1, p2, …, pn.

EU=p1X1+p2X2+…+pnXn

Page 22: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

III. Sets and probabilities

To fully understand expected utilities and work with them, you need to know something about sets and probabilities.

Page 23: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Sets

Sets: will come up in a number of contexts as we begin to study game theory.

Sets of:

• outcomes

• strategies

Page 24: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Sets

• Definition: a set is a collection of elements.

• The set of all elements is called the universal set; U.

• If element x belongs to set S, x is a member of S; xS.

• The set containing no elements is called the empty or null set; .

Page 25: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Sets

• If all members of S1 are also members of S2, we say that S1 is a subset of S2 and that S2 contains S1; S2S1.

• Sets are disjoint if they have no members in common.

Page 26: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Sets

• There are 3 basic operations in set theory:– The union of S1 and S2, S1S2, is the set of all

elements that are members of both.– The intersection is all elements that are

members of both; S1S2.

– The complement is the set of all elements that are not members of S1; S1

c.

Page 27: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Examples of manipulating sets

• S1={a, b, c}, S2={d, e, f}, S3={c}

• S1 and S2 are disjoint

• S1S2={a, b, c, d, e, f}

• S1S3={a, b, c}

• S1S2=

• S1S3={c}

• S1c={d, e, f}

Page 28: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Probabilities

• Consider the set of events X in which you are interested; these might be all the possible outcomes of a game.

• Divide this set into some number of subsets Y, Z, …, none of which overlap; which are disjoint.

• The probabilities of each subset occurring must sum to the probability of the full set of events. If that set of events includes all the possible outcomes, its probability is 1.

Page 29: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Probabilities

• A probability is a number between (and including) 0 and 1.

• Put another way: if the occurrence of X requires the occurrence of any one of several disjoint Y, Z, …, then the probability of X is the sum of the separate probabilities of Y, Z, …

Page 30: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Probabilities

• Addition rule: p(X) = p(Y)+p(Z)+…, if Y, Z, … are disjoint (mutually exclusive) and exhaustive.

• p()=0

• Conditional probabilities: the probability of Z given Y is written p(Z|Y).

Page 31: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Probability example

• Consider a game where the possible outcomes are win, lose, or tie (W, L, T)

• P(no T) = p(W) + P(L)

• So, if P(W)=.5, P(L)=.4, then P(no T)=.9

Page 32: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Expectations

• The expectation of X, E(X), is the sum of the possible values of X multiplied by the probability that each occurs

• E(X)=xi(p(xi)), for i=1 to n.

• This is a generalization of the equation for expected utility discussed earlier.

Page 33: QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities

Probabilities

Summary:

• Outcomes are the elements of sets.

• The probability of any outcome or event is between 0 and 1.

• The set of outcomes is exhaustive and mutually exclusive; one (and only one) outcome must occur.