qa alerts (effective) - pakistan international airlines · 50 65 certification of b777 & atr...

QA ALERTS (EFFECTIVE)

S/N ALERT No.

SUBJECT DATE (dd-mm-yy)

01 01 USE OF BMS 13-13 ELECTRIC WIRE PENDING PROCUREMENT OF BMS 13-15

01-02-88

02 02 PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FLEXIBLE WIRE ROPE MATERIAL SPECIFICATION MIL –W-83420 TYPE 1 COMP. B ON FLT CONTROL.

14-06-88

03 04 MISMATCHED STARTERS & STARTER VALVES ON JT9D ENGINES. 10-08-88 04 05 INTRODUCTION OF FORM UMAR -1 (URGENT MAINTENANCE ACTION

REQUIRED). 26-11-88

05 08 AIRCRAFT DOCUMENTIONS 07-12-88 06 09 B747 AIRCRAFT PRE-FLIGHT CHECK. 30-01-89 07 10 PROPER INSTALLATION OF NLG GROUND SAFETY PIN DURING

RETRACTION CHECK WITH A/C ON WHEELS 30-01-89

08 11 CHECKS TO ELIMINATE POSSIBLITY OF INADVERTANT OPENING OF THE LOWER LOBE CARGO DOOR.

06-03-89

09 12 MECHANIC INGESTED INTO NO.1 ENGINE DURING ENGINE RUN OF A/C B737 -200 AIRLPLANES.

18-04-89

10 13 DIGITAL FLT. DATA RECORDER ON B737-300 AIRPLANES. 17-05-89 11 15 ARO’s IN PLACE OF CONTINUATION SHEETS 21-09-92 12 15A USE OF CONTINUATION SHEETS 16-09-91 13 16 REPORTING OF DEFECTS – DELAYS - INCIDENT 06-11-91 14 18 EXTENDED RANGE FLIGHTS A310 – 300 A/C CAA (PAK)

CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 25-05-92

15 19 IMPROPER / INCOMPLETE FILLING OF MAINTENANCE LOG BOOK & WORKSHEETS.

24-05-92

16 22 RELEASE OF AIRXRAFT WITH MULTIPLE MEL ITEMS. 02-07-92 17 23 FDR ON B737-300 AIRCRAFT. 15-12-92 18 26 ENGINE OIL SOAP ANALYSIS 13-05-93 19 27 WHEEL BEARING INSPECTION AND REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME 29-07-93 20 28 LICENSES WITH RESTRICTIONS 14-09-93 21 30 INCOMPLETE PAPERWORK AFTER RELESE OF AIRCRAFT FROM BASE

MAINTENANCE 19-09-93

22 31 FAN THRUST REVERSER LOCK OUT PROCEDURE FOR JT9D-7 ENGINES 26-10-93 23 32 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE INDICATION ON ECAM. 30-12-93 24 33 RELEASE OF A/C FROM LNE STATIONS. 02-01-94 25 34 HYDROSTATIC TESTING OF FIRE EXTINGUISHING CYLINDERS & FA

ORDER NO. 8000.40C. 18-05-94

26 35 MINTENANCE TASKS WITH TOLERANCES. 12-07-94 27 37 FILLING UP OF FUEL INDENT FORM. 31-10-94 28 38 WING BODY OVER-HEAT DEFECT ON B737 A/C. 08-11-94 29 39 DART ENGINE OIL DIP RECORDING IN TECHNICAL LOG 08-11-94 30 40 ETOPS – A310 OIL CONSUMTION ENGINES & APU. 03-01-95 31 41 CONVERSANCE/POSSESSION OF CURRENT AIRWORTHINESS

REGULATIONS, AIRSAFETY CIRCULARS & AIRNAVIGATION ORDERS. 10-07-95

32 43 FAILURE OF 26 GOODYEAR TYRES DURING LAST 12 MONTHS—IMPOSITION OF TEMPORARY BAN

31-10-95

33 44 TRAFFIC ALERT & COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS (TCAS) AUDIO DIFFICULTIES FAA AD 95-26-15

04-01-96

34 45 AIRCRAFT TYRES- POLICY 08-02-96 35 46 FLIGHT SAFETY HAZARDS -- INSECURED CARGO PALLETS. 15-02-96 36 48 BOEING 747 FAIRING MOUNTED ESCAPE SLIDE SYSTEM

MAINTENANCE 04-06-96

37 49 LACK OF INFORMATION / DATA ON WORK SHEETS / TECH LOG FOR WORK CARRIED OUT ON AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT

25-07-96

38 51 CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS - FAA FINAL RULE /CAA (PAK) MANDATE.

03-09-96

S/N ALERT No.

SUBJECT DATE (dd-mm-yy)

39 53 COMPLIANCE WITH ASC #10 WITH REGARD TO SIGNING THE WORK PERFORMED ON A/C & RELATED EQUIPMENT.

23-05-97

40 54 USE OF TPG TO CHECK TIRE INFLATION PRESSURE 22-07-97 41 55 AIRCRAFT TYRE POLICY 22-07-97 42 56 MISSING OF LOG PAGES 14-01-99 43 57 GRAY WATER DRAIN CLENING. 17-02-99 44 58 LATE SUBMISSION OF AME LICENCE RENEWAL APPLICATIONS. 11-05-00 45 59 ENGINE OIL REFILL / CONSUMPTION RECORD 14-06-00 46 60 AIRCRAFT CABIN EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT 02-04-02 47 61 RESTRICTED USE OF AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) ON GROUND 02-05-02 48 63 BREAKGE OF LOCKING MACHANSIM OF PRESSURE REGULATOR

VALVE FITTED ON CF6-50E2 ENGINES. 22-07-02

49 64 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS DURING USE OF CLEANING SOLENTS. 15-08-06 50 65 CERTIFICATION OF B777 & ATR EQUIPMENT IN OVERHAUL SHOP 25-09-06 51 66 PROTEETIVE PERSONNAL EQUIPMENT USUAGE 26-12-06 52 67 INSURANCE CERTIFICATES ON ALL EU BOUND FLIGHTS. 15-02-07 53 68 INVESIGATION FINDINGS CONFIRMED, COMPONENTS DAMAGED

DURING REPLACEMENT AND SERVICING. 21-06-07

54 69 ATB INCIDENT B737-300 AP-BCD PK-310 DT:22-02-2008 11-04-08 55 70 DELETION OF Q.C. ALERTS 13-06-08 56 71 DEFECTS ENTERED IN CABIN LOG BOOK 06-08-08 57 72 PROPER RECORDING OF MAINTENANCE DETAILS 19-08-08 58 73 MAINTENANCE RELEASE CERTIFICATE 02-03-09 59 74 SAFETY AND HOUSEKEEPING OF AIRCRAFT ON GROUND 08-07-09 60 75 CANNIBALIZATION AT LINE STATIONS 10-09-2009 61 76 WIRE SEAL ON WATER FIRE EXTINGUISHER 24-09-09 62 77 REINFORCEMENT OF AFETY CULTURE IN MAINTENANCE/OVERHAUL

SHOPS 18-11-09

63 78 EASA FORM 1 FORMAT/FILLING PROCEDURE 18-11-09 64 79 PERSONAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS DURING ENGINE GROUND RUN UP 26-02-2010 65 80 RB211 COMBUSTION SECION GAS GENERATOR FAIRING

DETACHMENT 17-03-2010

66 81 INADVERTANT RETRACTION OF NLG OF B737 AIRCRAFT AP-BEH 02-04-2010 67 82 EASA RELEASE OF AIRCRAFT /AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS 29-06-2010 68 83 GUIDELINES TO PREVENT WORKPLACE SLIPS AND FALLS 19-12-2010 69 84 ENGINE OIL AND HYDRAULIC FLUID CONSUMPTION RECORD 17-02-2011 70 85 SAFETY AND PRECAUTIONS ON RAMP AREA 30-05-2011 71 86 AIRCRAFT “ONBOARD DOCUMENTS” 08-08-2011 72 87 RELEASE OF AIRCRAFT WITHOUT REMOVING LANDING GEAR LOCK

PINS 22-08-2011

73 88 SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT (SAFA)

14-09-2011

74 89 CERTIFICATION OF MAINTENANCE WORK BEYOND THE SCOPE OF APPROVAL/LI CENSE

13-09-2012

Q.A. ALERTS(DELETED)

S/No. Alert No. Subject Date

(dd-mm-yy) Reason for

deletion 01 03 NOT ISSUED ----------- ------------ 02 06 ISSUE OF CERTIFICATE OF MAINTENANCE 05-12-88 Change in Regulation 03 07 TRANSIT CHECK OF TWIN OTTER AIRCRAFT 05-12-88 DHC-6-300 Aircraft 04 14 CERTIFICATION OF AIRBUS A-310 A/C AND

EQUIPMENT IN MAINTENANCE AND O/H SHOP 10-09-91 Expired Validation

05 17 CANNIBALIZATION OF PARTS --PROCEDURES & LIMATATION.

02-04-92 B707 Aircraft

06 20 TECHNICAL INCIDENTS OR DELAYS – STANDING COMMITTEE

25-05-92 AWM Procedure

07 21 HIGH SPEED THEORY OF FLIGHT 16-06-92 Not Valid 08 24 REPLACEMENT OF FUEL FILTERS SUBSEQUENT TO

FUEL TANK REPAIR/ MAINTENANCE. 16-02-93 A-300 Aircraft

09 25 AIR SAFETY CIRCULAR NO.34 04-05-93 F-27 and DHC-6-300 Aircraft

10 29 ISSUE / EXTENSION OF AME LICENSE ON F-27 AIRCRAFT

20-09-93 F-27 Aircraft

11 36 AP-BBM PASSENGER SEATS INSTALLATION 10-08-94 A-300 Aircraft 12 42 CANNIBALIZATION FROM B707 AIRCRAFT AP-BBK 21-08-95 B707 Aircraft 13 47 HYDRAULIC FAILURE ON TWIN OTTER WHILE

TAXYING 20-03-96 Twin Otter Aircraft

14 50 PROCESS FOR ETOPS FLIGHT 06-08-96 Procedure is Changed 15 52 LOW TORQUE SWITCH- IN-SERVICE INSPECTION TO

ELIMINATE CURRENTLY UNAPPROVED SWITCHES (ROLLS ROYCE DART SB DA61-13)

24-03-97 F-27 Aircraft

16 62 NOT ISSUED ---------- ----------

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION

REF: CE(QC)/88/88 Dated 14-06-1988

QUALITY CONTROL ALERT # 02

SUBJECT PROHIBITION OF USE OF FLEXIBLE WIRE ROPE MATERIAL SPECIFICATION MIL-W-83420 TYPE I COMP B ON FLT CONTROL

REF. (A) SL 707-SL-6 dated JUNE 8, 1977 REF. (B) Tech DEV/BA 2700/77 dated 22.8.77 DCE TECH DEV letter address to P.E. P&MM REF (C) PPE/A.O./37/83 dated AUG 2,1983 PPE(ACOH) letter addressed to MGR. MAT MANAGEMENT REF (D) PPE(ACOH) letter PPE(AO/20/84 dated 8.2.1984 addressed to MGR. PLANNING AND MAT. MANAGEMENT. REF (E) P.E. (T/S) AEROSPACE Inspection Notice TS/36/88/184 dated 17th April, 1988 REF(B) thru (E) besides recommending Material Specification of flexible wire rope MIL-W-83420 Type I Composition A do not indicate that Composition B should not be used on Flight Control. This is being notified to all concerned that Control cables Composition ‘B’ referred to above should not be used on Flight Control surfaces in PIA Fleet irrespective of type of aircraft. By a copy of this Q.C. Alert Note, stores is requested to withdraw the entire stock and issue only with prior approval of C.E. (Q.C) where in specific permission will be given upon report on the concession form.

TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION

Ref. CE(QC)/88/88 Dated: 10-8-1988

Q .C ALERT NOTE 4

SUB:- MISMATCHED STARTERS & STARTER VALVES ON JT9D ENGINES During a recent analysis, it has been observed that starters and starter valves lave been mismatched on JT9d engines .Failure to properly match starter valves and starters during installation can result in engine starting problem and/or damage. Low gear retie starter and non regulating starter valves are color coded by 0.50 inch white band .High gear ratio starters and regulating starter valves are non color coded. Extreme care must be used to prevent installation of color coded with a non color coded one. LOW GEAR RATIO STARTERS 740179-6, -7, -12, -13

HIGH GEAR RATiO STARTERS 740179-2, -3,-4,-5,-9,-10,-11

NON REG SRART VALVE 726574 - 3, -5, -7

REGULATION START VALVE 726574-2, -4 , -6

COLOR CODED WHITE

NON COLOR CODED

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGINEER (Q.C.) SECTT.

REF. NO. CE(QC)/88/88

Dated: 7th December 88

Q.C.ALERT – 08

Subject: AIRCRAFT DOCUMENTATIONS During Spot Check in the Technical Records on November 29, 1988 by the Field office CAA, a number of discrepancies were noted and referred to PIA. Discrepant documentations are given as under:

i. Signing of C of M on Narrow Bodied Aircraft where Licenses are issued by the CAA ,by one signatory only as applicable to Wide bodies Aircraft.

ii. Some Narrow Bodies Aircraft did not have the C of M signed and instead C of C

was signed either by A & C or by A,C and X ; and there was no C of M issued in Category ‘R’.

iii. Some of the C of M’s issued did not indicate validity period either in Calander

Time or in Flight Hours.

iv. Work-sheets had single signature covering a number of items bracketed together.

v. Release of Aircraft without signing the Departure and / or completion of the work-sheet.

On further scrutiny by the Quality Control into the Technical Records, additional discrepancies were noted. They are non – completion of documents prior to release of Aircraft, not paying any attention to the entries in the MIC sheets, ensuring conformance to the Hard Time requirements and incomplete entries for component replacements such as not entering TSO’s , Release note number and dates. The above constitute violation of Airworthiness Requirements and renders the C of A invalid. An Aircraft Engineer should view these requirements as per-requisites to the release of aircraft; & flights conducted in the manner as discovered during spot checks tantamount to breach of Regulations which may cause endorsements on licenses and / or company Approvals by the authorities. All Engineers are advised to ensure strict conformance to the Aircraft worthiness Requirements or else they would expose themselves to punitive action.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGINEER (Q.C.) ‘s SECTT

REF. NO. CE(QC) / 88 / 88

Dated: 30th JANUARY 89

Q.C. ALERT - 09

SUB : 747 AIRCRAFT PRE FLIGHT CHECK . Confusion exists in the interpretation of the applicability of items 26 to 58 of pre flight check sheets 3,4 and 5. For the information of all concerned, it is clarified that the above items pertain to the “FUSELAGE RH SIDE AND RH WING” only. The corresponding item for “FUSELAGE LH SIDN IN WING “ are covered under the single item No .68 of sheet 6 which reads “Checks are as RH side”. Since items 26 to 58, as mentioned above, cover Airframe, Engine and Radio Trades, they cannot obvicusly be certified by a single individual. Necessary action has been in initiated to revise the work sheets to remove the above ambiguity. In the mean time however ,it is required that certification for IH and RH side be done by marking LH and RH against each individual item No .26 to 58 which will then be certificate by appropriate qualified Engineer and provide coverage to the single signatory of item No.68 of sheet 6.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGINEER (QC) SECTT.

REF. CE(QC)/88/88 Dated 30th JAN 89

Q.C ALERT –10

Sub:- PROPER INSTALLATION OF NLG GROUND SAFETY PIN DURING

RETRACTION CHECK WITH AIRCRAFT ON WHEELS Incidents of un wanted NLG retraction have occurred during Test with aircraft on wheels due to improper installation of the NLG ground safety pin. AIRBUS industry has advised proper procedure for installation of the subject pin and have advised that the visual check of the subject pin installation on the telescopic strut can be notably eased with NLG doors open. The procedure, reproduced below, MUST BE STRICTLY FOOLWED while carrying out a test involving L/G retraction system pressurization. Same procedure will be incorporated in AMM in JULY 1989. Procedure:-

1. select LG door Ground Control Handle Down 2. Open NLG door. 3. Install NLG safety Pin .

a) Ensure Safety Pin flange abuts against the housing of the telescopic strut.

b) Visually check that the fork type lever of the Ground Locking system has totally rotated.

4. Pressurize Green Hydraulic system. 5. Close NLG doors. 6. Carry out test.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGINEER (QC) SECTT


Dated : 6th March 89

Q.C.ALERT NO.11 In a recent incident, A B747 aircraft suffered a sudden decompression and loss of thrust on No.3 engine. After a safe landing inspection revealed loss of fwd cargo door and large hole directly above the cargo door. Possibility of inadvertent opening of the lower lobe cargo doors exists in case of damage to lock sectors whereby master lock handle may be closed and secured with latches not fully closed. Boeing issued SB 52A2206 and SB 52A2209 to address this situation Terminating action as per above SB’s has been incorporated on effected aircraft except AP-BAT. However as a measure of precaution in the interim period before Boeing/FAA come out with their final recommendations, it has been decided that the following checks will be carried out prior to each departure by Maintenance Engineers at all stations manned by PIA.

1) Close, latch and lock door. 2) Push master latch lock handle release trigger. Observe that handle and

pressure relief doors spring open fully. CAUTION: A) Do not force handle open.

B) If handle does not open freely rotate latches manually towards closed until stop is reached.

3) Move handle towards closed position while observing that pressure relief

doors close 4) Push handle release trigger flush whit handle. 5) Cargo doors fully closed must be confirmed by maintenance personnel to

flight crew

At stations where PIA Engineers are not available, the Flight Engineer will confirm correct locking of cargo doors. NOTE: an Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring confirmation of lock position through viewing window is expected shortly for which NPRM Ref .ATA AD write no.3/2/89AD has already been issued. Preparatory work to make confirmation of lock position through viewing window has already been initiated in maintenance.

Introduction of this check is expected to cancel the requirement to recycle Master Latch Lock Handle at every cargo door closing operation.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION

REF. NO. CE(QC)/88/89 Dated 18th April, 89


SUBJECT MECHANIC INGESTED INTO NO.1 ENGINE DURING ENGINE RUN OF AIRCRAFT 737-200

Recently two cases of Mechanic ingestion have occurred while performing run up of JT8D engine fitted on Boeing 737-200 A/C. The purpose of this Q.C. Alert is to remind all Maintenance personnel of the importance of Safety procedure during Aircraft Maintenance. The recent incident report of an operation is as follows:- “The operator was accomplishing an Engine Trim Operation on the number 1 engine of a 737-200 airplane with the cowls open and engine running at approximately 1.65-1.7 EPR. Weather condition was day light and sunny with a slight wind. While working under the open engine cowls with a Head Set ON and walking close to the Engine Inlet, the mechanic slipped and was drawn into the Engine intake. The cockpit crew heard the engine stall and immediately shut down the engine”. All concerned are advised to follow the safety precautions as specified in Maint. Manual of each type of aircraft to know the hazard area to avoid accident or personnal injury.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CHIEF ENGR (QC) SECTT


Dated 17th MAY, 1989

QUALITY CONTROL ALERT NO. 13. SUB:- DIGITAL FLIGHT DATA RECORDER (DFDR) 0N B737-300 AIRPLANES All concerned to note that on Boeing 737-300 airplanes only FAIRCHILD DFDR P/N 17M800-00A be installed. Installation of SUNDSTR DFDR P/N 981-6009-001/010/014 on Boeing 737-300 airplane poses difficulties in its reliable Readout / Print out due non availability of its approved software with PIA. In case of dire emergency, when FATRCHILD DFDR is not available, SUNDSTRAND DFDR may be installed provided prior permission is obtained from CE (QC) on internal Concession form. During night time, permission may be obtained on telephones, followed by written permission on the subsequent working day. All concerned to note and comply with.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION QUALITY CONTROL DIVISION

Ref: CE(QC)/88/91

Dated: 16-9-91 QUALITY CONTROL ALERT #15 SUBJECT: USE OF CONTINUATION SHEETS Quality Control Advisories on above subject were issued vide Quality Control Advisories NO. 79, 86.However, poor response has been noted. It is an Airworthiness requirement that all work carried out on an aircraft be properly recorded in a coherent, legible manner. A breach of instruction in this regard can not be allowed. The status of Quality Control Advisory NO .86,quoted below is hereby raised to the level of Quality Control Alert. QUOTE. 1. a) whenever a defect is reported in the aircraft Tech log for which detailed work is to be carried out and /or different components /system have to be checked, these steps are to be recorded in chronological order in the continuation sheet. The continuation sheets themselves should be serially numbered giving aircraft registration number and date clearly. b) The log slip number with date, PK number, and aircraft registration containing the original defect must be clearly mentioned in the continuation sheets against each entry as a reference. c) Each entry is to be signed by appropriate personnel, both the technician and appropriately qualified engineer in the designated columns prior to release of the aircraft. d) In case continuation sheets attached to scheduled work sheets are inadequate extra sheets may be used with continuing pages numbered and aircraft registration mark with date 2) Rectification in tech log should contain brief description including all references to other log slips and for continuation sheets. All component changes / swapping to be carefully recorded in tech. log slips mentioning part number, serial number , R/N. Number, TSOs and position installed.

3) Each entry in the tech log slip and continuation sheets is to be signed by appropriately qualified engineer. 4) All above steps shall be followed in case of engineer’s inspection defects also. 5) The extra continuation sheets should be securely attached with schedule check sheets. In case of short turn around where no scheduled work sheets are raised, continuation sheets should still be raised and yellow pages of Technical Log Book be attached with them. Each continuation sheet should bear the aircraft tail number and date. UN-QUOTE. All concerned are to note and comply.

QUALITY CONTROL DIVISION ENGINEERING AND MAINTENANCE

REF: CE(QC)/88/92 MAY 24, 1992


SUBJECT: IMPROPER / INCOMPLETE FILLING OF MAINTENANCE LOG BOOKS AND WORKSHEETS

It is an Airworthiness requirement that all entries relating to work performed on the aircraft , details of components installed / removed (Part numbers, Serial numbers, Position on the Aircraft, Release Note Number), continuation log page number, Engineer’s Authority number are properly and completely filled out by the Aircraft Maintenance Engineer in the Aircraft Maintenance Logbooks, worksheets and unserviceable component tags. Several instances have come to the notice of Quality Control where serious negligence has been shown by Aircraft Engineers in this area. The result of this negligence is that Computer Entries relating to Component Installation / Removal cannot be made which causes Erroneous Component History to be built up. The T.S.O., T.S.I., T.S.N., T.S.C., information also gets corrupted, resulting in a poor component Quality Control. A Summary of such Instances is given below. The date refers to the date on which these instances were conveyed to the concerned Managers through letters from Planning and Projects. DATE # DATE # DATE # DATE # DATE # 16/04/92 05 16/04/92 07 16/04/92 07 16/04/92 08 16/04/92 05 24/03/92 09 24/03/92 10 24/03/92 19 24/03/92 20 24/03/92 08 13/02/92 03 13/02/92 12 13/02/92 08 13/02/92 28 13/02/92 04 14/01/92 16 14/01/92 07 14/01/92 16 14/01/92 13 14/01/92 01 08/12/91 11 08/12/91 03 08/12/91 05 08/12/91 12 08/12/91 03 07/11/91 04 07/11/91 04 07/11/91 09 07/11/91 17 07/11/91 00 13/10/91 08 13/10/91 04 13/10/91 08 13/10/91 16 13/10/91 03 12/09/91 08 12/09/91 098 12/09/91 07 12/09/91 16 12/09/91 03 15/08/91 11 15/08/91 00 15/08/91 23 15/08/91 16 15/08/91 06 31/07/91 04 31/07/91 06 31/07/91 09 31/07/91 19 31/07/91 00 30/06/91 05 30/06/91 07 30/06/91 08 30/06/91 05 30/06/91 00 05/06/91 01 05/06/91 04 05/06/91 09 05/06/91 00 05/06/91 00 21/05/91 10 21/05/91 03 21/05/91 06 21/05/91 07 21/05/91 00 28/04/91 11 29/04/91 08 28/04/91 10 28/04/91 08 28/04/91 00 10/03/91 04 10/03/91 04 10/03/91 11 10/03/91 07 10/03/91 03 26/02/91 10 26/02/91 04 26/02/91 12 26/02/91 13 26/02/91 05 All A.M.E.s are advised through this circular to maintain discipline in all paper work relating to Aircraft Maintenance and diligently fill all information on Aircraft Maintenance Log Books and Worksheets. Negligence in this area can result in the concerned Engineer receiving an endorsement on his A.M.E. license/Class I Approval, and, in a serious case, may even result in the suspension /cancellation of his Authority.

BOEING 737 THRUST REVERSER OPERATION CHECK

MAINTENANCE TASKS WITH TOLERANCES

Several Maintenance Tasks performed at various levels of checks entail measurements of tolerances and certification that these are within limits given in the applicable Maintenance Manual. A few examples are given below to elaborate the point:

(i) Boeing 737 thrust reverser operation check vide Maintenance Manual ch:78-31-00, page 511 , 514 gives timings within which the thrust reverser sleeve should travel from full stow to fully deployed position using various sources for hydraulic pressure.

(ii) Fokker F-27 DART M.M. ch: 77-2-1 pages 207 & 208A thru 208D

shows values of resistance and its tolerances of the TGT system.

(iii) Boeing 747 M.M. ch:34-11-00 page 501 to 518 gives tolerances while testing pitot static systems leaks.

All above and innumerable other maintenance tasks are performed during maintenance. In most cases, the task card simply requires the operator to check the applicable system as per Maintenance Manual and gives reference of relevant pages. The card does not spell out the system limits and tolerances. This is not an omission, but is intentional. The reason is that for certain systems the limits may be revised by the manufacturer or the vendor. These revised approved limits/tolerances are included in revisions of the Maintenance Manual. However, the task cards are not revised regularly at short intervals. It is therefore expected that the Maintenance Engineer certifying such a system check on these task cards has consulted the currently revised Maintenance Manual and has found the system within tolerances given therein.

All Engineers certifying such tasks are REQUIRED TO RECORD THE OBSERVED LIMITS DURING THE CHECK ON THE TASK CARD. Besides verification at a latter date this record when subsequently compared with limits recorded during previous check will be a measure of rate of deterioration of system and may help forecast an impending failre as well. Strict compliance is desired hence forth.

WING BODY OVER-HEAT DEFECT ON B737 AIRCRAFT

Wing body over-heat defect has been observed repeatedly on B-737 aircraft. Refer earlier incident of stabilizer cables jamming due hot air leak from APU duct in the aft compartment. It must be ensured that if left wing body over-heat light comes on, tail compartment area i.e. aft of aft pressure bulk-head must also be inspected for APU air leak between sta 1016-1088 for possible discrepancies. For details, refer check ‘C’ card No. 7-255-M-GVC.

DART ENGINE OIL DIP RECORDING IN TECHNICAL LOG An audit inspection was carried out by Technical Services regarding Dart Engine Oil Dip recording in Technical log. It is found that though engine oil dip is being taken, but no entries are made in respective columns in the aircraft technical log. An average of 120 U.S. Gallons of Turbo Oil 274 is being consumed / issued per month at Karachi base only, whereas by oil added calculations the consumption record shows 20 Gallons /month only. Al concerned Engineers may please note that engine oil consumptions be monitored and should be recorded. Severe action will be taken against defaulters.

LACK OF INFORMATION / DATA ON WORK SHEETS / TECH LOG FOR WORK CARRIED OUT ON AIRCRAFT / EQUIPMENT

Many a times, during investigation, it has come to light that the investigation officers get bogged down due to lack of information/ data on the previous work done on Work Sheets / Tech Log. This leads to formulation of theories and guessing what might have been done. In some cases lack of documentation and recording brings about a situation where actual work done on the aircraft / equipment can not be traced out and decisions can not be taken as to who was responsible for substandard job/repair on the aircraft / equipment. All Engineers and approved inspectors are advised to ensure raising of work sheets and / or recording on the Tech Log for all maintenance tasks done on the aircraft / equipment, failure of which may lead to endorsement of their licences / approvals.

Q.A. ALERT

No: 70 Issue: I Date: 13-06-08 Page: 1 of 1

QUALITY ASSURANCE DIVISION

SUBJECT: DELETION OF Q.C. ALERTS It has been observed that a number of Quality Alerts are related to either phased-out aircraft type or obsolete company procedures. Following is the list of Quality alerts that fall in above categories and are being deleted with immediate effect: S/No. Advisory

No. Subject Issue Date (dd-mm-yy)

Reason for deletion

1 06 Issue of Certificate of Maintenance 05-12-88 Change in Regulation 2 07 Transit Check Of Twin Otter Aircraft 05-12-88 DHC-6-300 Aircraft 3 14 Certification of Airbus A-310 and equipment in

Maintenance and O/H Shop 10-09-91 Expired Validation

4 17 Cannibalization Of Parts --Procedures & Limitation. 02-04-92 B707 Aircraft 5 20 Standing Committee to resolve technical related

incidents 25-05-92 AWM Procedure

6 21 High Speed Theory of Flight 16-06-92 Not Valid 7 24 Replacement of Fuel Filters subsequent o fuel tank

repairs/Maint. 16-02-93 A-300 Aircraft

8 25 Airsafety Circular No.34 4-05-93 F-27 and DHC-6-300 Aircraft

9 29 Issue / Extension of AME License on F-27 Aircraft 20-09-93 F-27 Aircraft 10 36 AP-BBM Passenger Seats Installation 10-08-94 A-300 Aircraft 11 42 Cannibalization from B707 Aircraft AP-BBK 21-08-95 B707 Aircraft 12 47 Hydraulic Failure on Twin Otter While Taxying 20-03-96 DHC-6-300 Aircraft 13 50 Process for ETOPS Flight 6-08-96 Procedure is Changed 14 52 Low Torque Switch (ROLLS ROYCE DART SB Da61-

13) 24-03-97 F-27 Aircraft

QUALITY ALERT

No: 71 Issue: I Date: 06-08-08 Page 1 of 1

ENGINEERING QUALITY ASSURANCE

BACK GROUND 1. Reference is made to the recent incident on AP-BCF with regards to Aircraft pressurization which was followed by the suspension of AME licenses of eleven Aircraft Engineers by CAA (Pakistan) 2. CAA (Pakistan) has shown immense concern on the subject and were likely to take harsh action against the AMEs who failed to address the problem properly. 3. CAA, authority under Civil Aviation Rules is quoted below : Rule No. 4; Duties and Powers of the Director General.- …………… (2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub rule (1) for the purpose of exercising his powers, or implementing these rules, the Director-General may: (e) ……………. at any time conduct or direct such examination or test of the holder of a license as may be considered necessary to establish the continued medical fitness or the proficiency of the license holder in the capacity authorized by the license (Delegated to all Airworthiness Officers) 4. The undersigned pleaded the case of our AMEs and have made following commitment to satisfy CAA for positive prevention of such cases in future, and requested to provide another chance to the concerned AMEs. ACTION REQUIRED: Following Commitment has been made by the undersigned on behalf of PIA Engineering & Maintenance, to ensure prevention of such occurrences in future:

1. The deputed AME will thoroughly review / attend the aircraft defects without any external influence.

2. Aircraft Engineer releasing the Aircraft must ensure that each technical defect affecting

airworthiness reported in Cabin Logbook is transferred to Aircraft Technical Log and is attended, before the release of Aircraft.

3. Each Deputy Chief Engineer (Aircraft Maintenance) will ensure that 100% certifying staff under

him is briefed on the subject of handling Technical Logbook and Cabin Logbook , with appropriate records.

4. PIA Engineering and Maintenance will pursue to raise the Maintenance Ground time at Karachi

Note: DCE (Concerned) shall ensure compliance on regular basis and deviations must be reported to the undersigned within 24 hours of such occurrence. As a mandatory clause to this Alert, disciplinary actions forwarded by the Engineering Quality Assurance to the Management shall be solicited on must basis.

Babar Kamal Mumtaz Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)

QUALITY ALERT No: 72 Issue: I Date: 19-08-08 Page 1 of 1


Quality Audit conducted by the Quality Manager of our Customer Airline revealed a number

of discrepancies especially related to Maintenance records. These discrepancies are not novice

and have been highlighted time and again locally and by Competent Authorities.

It is once again emphasized that proper recording of details of maintenance must be carried out

especially

a) Maintenance Manual Reference

b) Part Number / Serial Number on ARO

c) Date when maintenance performed

d) In case of Customer Aircraft requiring EASA Release to Service, PIA EASA Approval

Number EASA 145.0004 should be mentioned in Customer’s Aircraft Tech Log.

Furthermore, the U/S component tag must indicate reason of removal. Refer Quality Advisory

No. 313/GEN – 33 Dated 24/04/2008. Record completion must be ensured by the respective

Certifying Staff and no blanks shall be allowed.

Such omissions in records shall be dealt with disciplinary actions in future.

Babar Kamal Mumtaz Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)

ENGINEERING QUALITY ASSURANCE No: 73 Issue: I

P a k i i n mematonal QUALITY ALERT Date: 02-03-09 Page 1 of 1

MAINTENANCE RELEASE CERTIFICATE

BACKGROUND:

This is in reference to the Operator Non-Conformance Report (ONCR) raised by Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (PCAA) with respect to "Maintenance Release". This certificate is required to be signed after performing Check-A or higher on PIA Aircraft.

DETAILS:

It was highlighted by PCAA auditor that "Maintenance Release" attached required to be signed by certifying staff on check-A or higher was not found in use. This certificate is given in AN0 92.0001 issue4 dated loth July 2004 at Appendix 'K'.

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. This "Maintenance Release" is in addition to "Aircraft Certificate of Release to Service" (Form No.EM/SD&D/I 20A).

2. Duly filled certificate of Maintenance Release copy attached will be provided to production on every Check-A or higher by concerned planning section.

3. The "Maintenance Release'' shall be issued, by production unit, in duplicate after every Check-A or higher as applicable in accordance with approved Maintenance schedule.

4. One copy of Maintenance Release shall be placed in front pocket of aircraft technical log book and the other shall be kept1 archived at Technical Record section.

5. Certifying staff, qualified to issue "Aircraft Certificate of Release to Service" is also authorized to issue "Maintenance Release".

REMARKS:

Organizational procedures and responsibilities shall be amended in next revisions of applicable documents to include the actions desired by this Alert.

This pcocess is effective from the issuance date of this Alert.

&BAR KA-*KTAZ CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)

Form No: EM/MP&R/GEN192

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE RELEASE

Aircraft Type: ________________ Registration Mark: ________________ Aircraft Hours: _______________ Maintenance Check: ______________ We hereby certify that all maintenance work on the above mentioned aircraft has been completed satisfactory and in accordance with the approved maintenance schedule. The aircraft is fully airworthy and meets all the safety / Airworthiness standards. We are fully conversant with relevant rules given in CAR 94, ANOs and Airworthiness Notices.

CATEGORY NAME & SIGNATURE AME LICENSE/ APPROVAL NO

DATE

A&C (Airframe & Engine)

X (Electrical & Instrument)

R (Radio & Radar)

The maintenance Release (MR) is valid until _____________ (dates) or upon completion of _________ flying hours from the date of certification whichever is earlier. Note: (Refer ANO 92.0001 / Appendix ‘K’)

1. The Maintenance Release shall be issued at time specified in the relevant approved maintenance schedule.

2. The Maintenance Release shall be issued in duplicate; one copy shall be carried on board the aircraft and the other shall be kept at station where Maintenance Release is issued or at Base Station of the aircraft.

3. The Maintenance Release does not replace Aircraft certificate of release to service.

QUALITY ALERT



SAFETY AND HOUSEKEEPING OF AIRCRAFT ON GROUND BACKGROUND: This is in reference to the investigation report of Safety Investigation Board (SIB) Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (PCAA) regarding A310 Aircraft AP-BDZ. The Aircraft was grounded for detailed investigation by Airbus experts after incident of both autopilots disengagement and erroneous airspeed indication. DETAILS: SIB (PCAA) highlighted the poor safety and house keeping standards in PIA Engineering and Maintenance. The cockpit was found fully covered with dust and interior full of pigeon manure, showing that birds have been eating and living in the aircraft. Furthermore Pitot probes were found blocked with sand / mud and insects. The presence of foreign material inside the probes was one of the causes of abnormal airspeed indication. INSTRUCTIONS: To ensure strict adherence to safety and housekeeping standards, following actions are required to be religiously followed by all engineering personnel on all PIA fleet grounded for maintenance, investigation, preservation etc.

1. Cockpit windows, Cabin entry doors and cargo doors must be kept closed if no maintenance is being performed in relevant areas on grounded aircraft. Large openings due to removal of doors / windows / panels shall be blanked using appropriate means of sustainable strength.

2. Pitot /static probes and alternate probes must be covered properly to avoid any

ingress of foreign material. Refer Aircraft Maintenance Manual Chapter 10. 3. During storage of airspeed indicators and altimeters, proper blanks on the

openings must be ensured. This also applies to all other aircraft components. Refer Quality Advisory No. 168 dated 31-08-94.

Deputy Chief Engineer production (concerned) shall be responsible for the compliance of these instructions.

Engr. Muhammad Aslam Tariq CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)

QUALITY ALERT



SUBJECT: CANNIBALIZATION AT LINE STATIONS

BACKGROUND: During a recent delay of an A310 Aircraft held up at Lahore due hydraulic leak, Lahore maintenance attempted cannibalization of similar Hydraulic lines from another A310 aircraft also grounded at Lahore due Engine Blade replacement with the intent to isolate hydraulic leakage and to avoid extensive delay on the first aircraft. Due difficult access to the leakage area incorrect hydraulic lines were identified as suspected leaking and removed from the aircraft. Similar hydraulic lines were cannibalized from another aircraft to service the aircraft with hydraulic leak, however, the problem could not be resolved firstly due to difficulty in installation of cannibalized hydraulic lines on the affected aircraft and secondly due to identification of incorrect hydraulic line. Such cannibalization attempts can cause extended delays at outstations. RECOMMENDATIONS: PIA engineering management has shown its great concern and as a policy, the management has decided that at out stations No cannibalization of aircraft parts will be attempted without prior permission of Chief Engineer (LM). All concerned are hereby required to ensure strict compliance.

ENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TARIQ Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)

QUALITY ALERT



WIRE SEAL ON WATER FIRE EXTINGUISHER BACKGROUND: Recently a B777 aircraft was delayed at Karachi due Cabin Crew reported that one Water Fire extinguisher was having broken seal. The bottle provided in replacement was wire locked instead of wire sealed due to which it had to be replaced again eventually causing a delay of 40 minutes. DISCUSSION: Water Fire Extinguishers are installed on each aircraft as per applicable emergency chart and its inspection is included in “Daily Check Sheet”. As per AMM, it should be wire sealed instead of wire locked. For example B777 Aircraft daily check sheet Item D-1, Page 8 of 18 dated June 06, 2007 states “Perform a general visual inspection of all cabin emergency equipment for presence, validity dates, condition and proper stowage according to approved emergency chart installed in the cabin.” Consequentially applicable AMM procedure 26-26-02 on water fire extinguisher calls for verification of wire seal during inspection. INSTRUCTIONS: It should be ensured by Maintenance staff performing Daily Check of Cabin Emergency Equipment that Water Fire Extinguisher wire seal is intact and that it is not wire locked. Strict compliance to the above is required for all PIA Aircraft.

Engineer Muhammad Aslam Tariq CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)

QUALITY ALERT



SUB: REINFORCEMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE IN MAINTENANCE / OVERHAUL SHOPS

BACKGROUND: In the wake of recent safety issues coming up in Maintenance that relate directly to personnel safety all concerned are reminded to the fact that safe maintenance practice is to be ensured by all levels. DISCUSSSION: Maintenance/shops personnel must remain vigilant and alert to their own safety and safety of their colleagues at all times while performing maintenance on the aircraft/ aircraft components. Inculcation of Safety culture can be achieved through constant interaction of maintenance supervisors/management with maintenance personnel on safety. Recurrent training sessions should specifically highlight safety issues in maintenance. Also, maintenance personnel are to be encouraged to provide feedback to management so that issues are identified and addressed. INSTRUCTIONS: In this concern all shift in charges, Deputy Chief Engineers in maintenance/shop areas are advised to increase their supervision activities on the aircraft and in shops with specific concentration on safe usage of facilities such as docks, trestle, scaffolding, overhead cranes, slings and other ground equipment by maintenance personnel. It is strongly recommended that routine safety talk sessions are conducted at all shift levels in maintenance to impress safe working culture upon those involved with aircraft/component maintenance. With the arrival of several new inductees into PIA Maintenance/shops, safety talk at every shift level conducted by senior shift personnel is even more desirable to ensure personnel safety. Shift in charges/ Deputy Chief Engineers are suggested to plan this activity at the start or preferably in the early part of the shift. Stringent Spot checks by Quality Assurance (Maintenance) inspectors are to be carried out to gauge the level of efforts placed by supervisors to improve the overall safety awareness in maintenance. QA inspectors would also spot check recurrent training sessions in maintenance to sample safety related information being disseminated during such sessions. All are required to strictly adhere to this QA Alert.


QUALITY ALERT



SUB: EASA FORM 1 FORMAT/FILLING PROCEDURE

BACKGROUND: This is in reference to the recent internal quality audit, where an observation was made concerning Blocks 22 and 23 of EASA Form 1. Block 22 was found printed as `Name of certifying person with authorization stamp` instead of `Name`. In Block 23, date format was found not in accordance with the filling instructions as given in AMP. DISCUSSION: EASA Form 1 (Refer AMP 2-3 for sample) is specifically called as ‘Authorized Release Certificate’ and must be printed / filled according to the format and filling procedure as given in AMP 2-3. INSTRUCTIONS: To ensure strict adherence to MOE/AMP procedure regarding EASA Form 1, following actions are required to be followed to the letter and spirit by all concerned on issuance of EASA Form 1. 1. In overhaul shops, recurrent training sessions on EASA Form 1

format / filling procedures are required to be conducted for certifying staff alongwith planning personnel.

2. Planning section (concerned) to review EASA Form 1 for all entries

before handing over to EBD. 3. EBD to cross check the relevance of EASA Form 1 with the

customer wok order. 4. Technical Services Engineering (concerned) to review completed

work package as per their check list before issuance of Form 1.



Q.A. ALERT QUALITY ASSURANCE DIVISION

PERSONAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS DURING ENGINE GROUND RUN UP OCCURANCE: Recently an Aircraft Engineer, working for a private local airline, was ingested into JT8D Engine fitted on B737-200 aircraft during a high power run-up at Karachi Airport. The Engineer was trouble shooting engine high oil consumption defect and had approached the engine for oil leak check violating relevant AMM procedures and safety precautions. The incident resulted in serious injuries to the Aircraft Engineer. RECOMMENDATIONS: Refer previous QC ALERT # 12 dated 18-04-1989 and QC ADVISORY # 159 dated 19-04-1994 covering the subject matter regarding similar occurrences/incidents in the past. Purpose of this QA Alert is to reiterate the importance of Strict Safety measures to be taken by maintenance personnel while performing run up of Engines. Importance of such measures is not to be undermined at any stage and the following rules are to be strictly adhered to during all engine ground run-ups.

• Follow all relevant Maintenance Manual procedures and Safety Precautions (Ch 71-00-00) before doing any maintenance task.

• Engine Inlet / Exhaust Hazard areas are to be clearly understood by persons positioned near power plant during Run-Up. These danger areas are never to be violated under any circumstances.

• Strict watch is required and communication is to be maintained between cockpit and ground throughout the run-up procedure.

• The following warnings are reproduced from AMM for easy reference;

1. ALL PERSONS MUST STAY OUT OF THE DANGEROUS AREAS THAT ARE FORWARD OF THE AIR INLET, AND THE SIDES OF THE AIR INLET. ALL PERSONS MUST STAY AWAY FROM THE ENGINE SAFETY BARRIER WHEN THE ENGINE IS OPERATED. DURING THE ENGINE OPERATION, THERE IS SUFFICIENT SUCTION AT THE AIR INLET TO PULL A PERSON INTO THE INLET. A FATAL INJURY COULD OCCUR.

2. THE QUANTITY OF THE ENGINE SUCTION DOES NOT INCREASE SLOWLY AND CONTINEOUSLY WHEN YOU GO NEAR THE INLET. THE SUCTION IS SMALL UNTILL YOU GET NEAR THE INLET, WHERE THE SUCTION INCREASES SUDDENLY.

Strict compliance is required by all.


Q.A. ALERT

No: 80

Issue: I

Date: 17-03-2010

Page 1 of 1


Sub: RB-211 Combustion Section Gas Generator Fairing Detachment

BACKGROUND:

Boeing 747-300 Aircraft AP-BFU night stopped at Jeddah due damaged combustion section gas generator fairing of No.2 Engine. Flight Crew reported that No.2 Engine Shut Down with T/REV in deployed position. No.2 Engine T/REV failed to stow. During inspection the combustion fairing was found detached and reverser was found stuck in deployed position. Combustor fairing removed as found damaged and unable to reinstall.

DETAILS:

During review of maintenance records of AP-BFU, it was observed that maintenance action on ignition system of No.2 engine was performed prior to this flight. Igniter plug of No.2 engine was replaced as per AMM 74-21-02 due weak audible check. Technical log entry was not made for removal and installation of combustion section gas generator fairing. This could be a probable cause of this incident. Due to absence of technical log book entry, the inspection of combustion section gas generator fairing by concern qualified certifying staff was overlooked. Following instructions are issued to avoid reoccurrence in future:

INSTRUCTIONS:

1- In any case, the maintenance activity on the aircraft will ONLY be performed after making legible log entry with appropriate AMM references in aircraft technical log book. All Certifying staff are advised to be vigilant for legible maintenance record.

2- Whenever combustion section gas generator fairing of RB211-524C2

Engine will be installed, the duplicate inspection has to be performed after installation. The duplicate inspection will be performed by appropriate qualified Certifying Staff. Inspection will be performed as per AMM 72-03-00 Page 406 item 10 to 15. A separate log entry in aircraft technical log book is required to be made for duplicate inspection.

Strict compliance is required by all concerned. Incase of noncompliance disciplinary action will be initiated.

ENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TARIQENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TARIQENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TARIQENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TARIQ Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)

Q.A. ALERT

No: 81

Issue: I

Date: 02-04-2010

Page 1 of 1


Sub: INADVERTANT RETRACTION OF NLG OF B737 AIRCRAFT INADVERTANT RETRACTION OF NLG OF B737 AIRCRAFT INADVERTANT RETRACTION OF NLG OF B737 AIRCRAFT INADVERTANT RETRACTION OF NLG OF B737 AIRCRAFT APAPAPAP----BEHBEHBEHBEH

INCIDENT.

B737 aircraft APB737 aircraft APB737 aircraft APB737 aircraft AP----BEH Nose Landing Gear partially retracted while the aircraft was operating PK BEH Nose Landing Gear partially retracted while the aircraft was operating PK BEH Nose Landing Gear partially retracted while the aircraft was operating PK BEH Nose Landing Gear partially retracted while the aircraft was operating PK ----201 and was under maintenance at DAMMAM. Aircraft sustained201 and was under maintenance at DAMMAM. Aircraft sustained201 and was under maintenance at DAMMAM. Aircraft sustained201 and was under maintenance at DAMMAM. Aircraft sustained structural damage and was held structural damage and was held structural damage and was held structural damage and was held up at Dammam for a considerable period of time.up at Dammam for a considerable period of time.up at Dammam for a considerable period of time.up at Dammam for a considerable period of time.

BACKGROUND Low hydraulic quantity defect was reported at Dammam. Hydraulic hose of R/H up lock actuator Low hydraulic quantity defect was reported at Dammam. Hydraulic hose of R/H up lock actuator Low hydraulic quantity defect was reported at Dammam. Hydraulic hose of R/H up lock actuator Low hydraulic quantity defect was reported at Dammam. Hydraulic hose of R/H up lock actuator was found leaking and the same was replaced. Relevant AMM procedure cawas found leaking and the same was replaced. Relevant AMM procedure cawas found leaking and the same was replaced. Relevant AMM procedure cawas found leaking and the same was replaced. Relevant AMM procedure called for bleeding/leak lled for bleeding/leak lled for bleeding/leak lled for bleeding/leak check of the up lock actuator by cycling the L/G selector lever (Refer AMM 32check of the up lock actuator by cycling the L/G selector lever (Refer AMM 32check of the up lock actuator by cycling the L/G selector lever (Refer AMM 32check of the up lock actuator by cycling the L/G selector lever (Refer AMM 32----32323232----41414141----404404404404----006). As 006). As 006). As 006). As soon as the lever was selected from DOWN to OFF the nose landing gear retracted partially and soon as the lever was selected from DOWN to OFF the nose landing gear retracted partially and soon as the lever was selected from DOWN to OFF the nose landing gear retracted partially and soon as the lever was selected from DOWN to OFF the nose landing gear retracted partially and the aircraft FWD side dropped and rested othe aircraft FWD side dropped and rested othe aircraft FWD side dropped and rested othe aircraft FWD side dropped and rested on towbarless Tug. The aircraft was damaged with no n towbarless Tug. The aircraft was damaged with no n towbarless Tug. The aircraft was damaged with no n towbarless Tug. The aircraft was damaged with no personnel injury reported. Subsequently after detailed inspections the aircraft was FERRIED to personnel injury reported. Subsequently after detailed inspections the aircraft was FERRIED to personnel injury reported. Subsequently after detailed inspections the aircraft was FERRIED to personnel injury reported. Subsequently after detailed inspections the aircraft was FERRIED to Karachi for further maintenance actions.Karachi for further maintenance actions.Karachi for further maintenance actions.Karachi for further maintenance actions.

DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

AMM specifically requires Landing gear AMM specifically requires Landing gear AMM specifically requires Landing gear AMM specifically requires Landing gear Safeties be done while performing the above explained Safeties be done while performing the above explained Safeties be done while performing the above explained Safeties be done while performing the above explained maintenance task. In this case the certifying Engineer inadvertently overlooked placing of maintenance task. In this case the certifying Engineer inadvertently overlooked placing of maintenance task. In this case the certifying Engineer inadvertently overlooked placing of maintenance task. In this case the certifying Engineer inadvertently overlooked placing of locking pins in all the three Landing gears that resulted in an extremely unsafe condition of the locking pins in all the three Landing gears that resulted in an extremely unsafe condition of the locking pins in all the three Landing gears that resulted in an extremely unsafe condition of the locking pins in all the three Landing gears that resulted in an extremely unsafe condition of the aircraft. Baircraft. Baircraft. Baircraft. Boeing was informed of this incident and regarding placing of safety pins in Landing oeing was informed of this incident and regarding placing of safety pins in Landing oeing was informed of this incident and regarding placing of safety pins in Landing oeing was informed of this incident and regarding placing of safety pins in Landing gears Boeing has further emphasized the following.gears Boeing has further emphasized the following.gears Boeing has further emphasized the following.gears Boeing has further emphasized the following.

1.1.1.1. Installation of lock pins is RECOMMENDED if the airplane is being towed to perform Installation of lock pins is RECOMMENDED if the airplane is being towed to perform Installation of lock pins is RECOMMENDED if the airplane is being towed to perform Installation of lock pins is RECOMMENDED if the airplane is being towed to perform maintenance. This will provide additimaintenance. This will provide additimaintenance. This will provide additimaintenance. This will provide additional safety if the airplane is subsequently jacked or if onal safety if the airplane is subsequently jacked or if onal safety if the airplane is subsequently jacked or if onal safety if the airplane is subsequently jacked or if the hydraulic system is turned ON while the L/G lever is in UP position.the hydraulic system is turned ON while the L/G lever is in UP position.the hydraulic system is turned ON while the L/G lever is in UP position.the hydraulic system is turned ON while the L/G lever is in UP position.

2.2.2.2. Installation of lock pins is OPTIONAL when the airplane is stationary with its weight resting Installation of lock pins is OPTIONAL when the airplane is stationary with its weight resting Installation of lock pins is OPTIONAL when the airplane is stationary with its weight resting Installation of lock pins is OPTIONAL when the airplane is stationary with its weight resting on the Landing Gear and maintenaon the Landing Gear and maintenaon the Landing Gear and maintenaon the Landing Gear and maintenance is not being accomplished.nce is not being accomplished.nce is not being accomplished.nce is not being accomplished.

3.3.3.3. Ground Lock pins SHOULD be installed during prolonged parking, such as during Ground Lock pins SHOULD be installed during prolonged parking, such as during Ground Lock pins SHOULD be installed during prolonged parking, such as during Ground Lock pins SHOULD be installed during prolonged parking, such as during “overnights”.“overnights”.“overnights”.“overnights”.

4.4.4.4. Lock pins MUST be installed when maintenance is being accomplished on the airplane.Lock pins MUST be installed when maintenance is being accomplished on the airplane.Lock pins MUST be installed when maintenance is being accomplished on the airplane.Lock pins MUST be installed when maintenance is being accomplished on the airplane.

5.5.5.5. Lock pins MUST be installed when the airplane weiLock pins MUST be installed when the airplane weiLock pins MUST be installed when the airplane weiLock pins MUST be installed when the airplane weight is removed from the gear during ght is removed from the gear during ght is removed from the gear during ght is removed from the gear during jacking to preclude possible inadvertent gear retraction, resulting in injury to personnel.jacking to preclude possible inadvertent gear retraction, resulting in injury to personnel.jacking to preclude possible inadvertent gear retraction, resulting in injury to personnel.jacking to preclude possible inadvertent gear retraction, resulting in injury to personnel.

Refer our previous QC ALERT Refer our previous QC ALERT Refer our previous QC ALERT Refer our previous QC ALERT ----10 dated 30 JAN 1989 regarding the similar incidents in the past. 10 dated 30 JAN 1989 regarding the similar incidents in the past. 10 dated 30 JAN 1989 regarding the similar incidents in the past. 10 dated 30 JAN 1989 regarding the similar incidents in the past. Not Installing Lock pins on LandNot Installing Lock pins on LandNot Installing Lock pins on LandNot Installing Lock pins on Landing Gears can result is a serious incidents and all are strictly ing Gears can result is a serious incidents and all are strictly ing Gears can result is a serious incidents and all are strictly ing Gears can result is a serious incidents and all are strictly warned to ensure compliance with all “WARNINGS”, “CAUTIONS” and “RECOMMENMDATIONS” warned to ensure compliance with all “WARNINGS”, “CAUTIONS” and “RECOMMENMDATIONS” warned to ensure compliance with all “WARNINGS”, “CAUTIONS” and “RECOMMENMDATIONS” warned to ensure compliance with all “WARNINGS”, “CAUTIONS” and “RECOMMENMDATIONS” as stated is relevant maintenance/ PIA Quality documents in this regard. as stated is relevant maintenance/ PIA Quality documents in this regard. as stated is relevant maintenance/ PIA Quality documents in this regard. as stated is relevant maintenance/ PIA Quality documents in this regard.

ENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TAENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TAENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TAENGR: MUHAMMAD ASLAM TARIQRIQRIQRIQ Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)Chief Engineer (Quality Assurance)

Q.A. ALERT

No: 82

Issue: I

Date: 29-06-2010

Page 1 of 1


EASA Release of Aircraft /Aircraft components

BACKGROUND:

EASA has performed Desktop Audit on EASA release certificates of aircraft /

aircraft components. During the audit, EASA has pointed out different anomalies

as under:

1. In Block 19, appropriate box was not 'ticked' to validate the release on

EASA Form 1.

2. Block 18 was found blank in aircraft certificate of release to service.

INTRUCTIONS:

To ensure strict adherence to MOE/AMP procedure regarding EASA release on

aircraft/aircraft components, following actions are required to be followed in letter

and spirit by all concerned.

1. In each production area, recurrent training sessions on EASA release/ filling

procedure are required to be conducted for certifying staff along with

planning personnel. Recurrent training record shall be submitted to

HR&Training with intimation to Quality Audit section. This action must be

accomplished at earliest but not later than 31st July 2010.

2. No column shall be left blank. All unused column shall be marked as ‘None’.

3. Planning section (concerned) to review EASA release (Form 1 /Aircraft

CRS) for completeness of all entries before its dispatch to EBD.

4. Furthermore AMP 2-3 ‘EASA Form 1 filling procedure ‘must be followed with

due respect.

Strict compliance shall be observed.

ENGINEER MUHAMMAD ASLAM TARIQ

CHIEF ENGINEER (QUALITY ASSURANCE)

4,NIAQUAIJTTY ASSI'RA!{CE DTVTSION

Q.A. ATERT

BACKGROUND:

During recent years, hydraulic leakage incidents occurred on different aircrafts such as

l . A i r c r a f t A P - B G P , o p e r a t i n g P K - 2 8 3 d a t e d 2 2 - N o v - 2 0 l 0 w a s d e l a y e d f o r 5 h o u r s a tPeshawar .Reasonofde |aywas# lgreenEDPlowpressure | igh t .

2. Aircraft AP-BGS, operating PK-7s|dated 17-Nov-2010 was delayed for 4 hours at oSLO'

Reason of delay was blue hydraulic leakage'

Likewise, oir consumption recording and monitoring of engines rrerps in engine health monitoring,

and is a primary contributing factor in *iniri.in6 in-flight shutdowns. According to Technical

performance and Reliability reports, total 06 engin6 in-flight shutdowns were recorded in the year

2010 same as in the Year 2009.

DISCUSSION:

It is sometimes observed that engine oil and hydraulic fluid, kept in tool stores, are drawn without

making proper record at tool store. Moreover, oit I rtydt"rtic fluid quantity used on aircraft are not

properly recorded in technical logbooks. lmproper record of engine / APU oil and hydraulic

consumption may result in an occurrence'

Hydraulic fluid recording will help in finding hydraulic consumption on.a particular aircraft and thus

to find out high consumption of the sarJ. tnir r"y help to find out any hydraulic leakage and

subsequently corrective actions may be taken at earlier stage' Quality Advisory No' 262 was

already issued on the same subject.

Engine and ApU oil recording is a mandatory requirement. Quality Alerts No. 59 was already

issued regarding Engine and APU oil recording'

To regularize Hydraulic fluid / Oil consumption record and monitoring, following instructions are

required to be followed religiously.

INTRUGTIONS:

1. Engine oit and hydraulic f luid issue and receipt register shall be maintained at all tool

stores including Base Maintenance tool stores'

Z. The register shall contain date, aircraft registration, quantity issued / received back, name

& staff number.

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QUALTTY TSSURAI{CE DTVISION

Q.A. ALERT

3. All engineers shall record oil consumption in technical log and also on check sheets / task

cards where required.

4. lf hydraulic fluid is replenished, entry in technical log book is required in rectification

column with hydraulic quantity used'

Technical record section shall enter oil and hydraulic replenishment record in PAMMIS'

Technical services Engineering (Line Maintenance) Aerospace shall monitor engine / APU

oil consumption, to .rlitt "nditi"

/ APU health monitoring function and take necessary

actions accordinglY.

7. Technical Services Engineering (Line Maintenance) Aerospace shall also monitor

hydraulic consumption entries in PAMMIS, in simiiar fashion as repeated defects

monitoring.

Strict compliance shall be observed.

J"

MUMTAZ N ZUBAIRIActg. CI-l lEF ENGINEEIt (QUALITY ASSURANCE)

5.

6.

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QA Alert #84 l'1022011

#lYIAQUAIJITY AggURAl{CE DrVISION

Q.A. ALERT

sutl.f ECT' AIRCRAFT '3ONBOFTID DOCUMENTS"

PIA A3{0 aircraft was recently delayed at Karachi due missing

.ronboard Documents" folder from the aircraft. The aircraft was on

transit check and the folder was reported missing after the concerned

A/E had released the aircraft for flight. The folder was missing from its

defined location on the aircraft and on immediate basis i t could not be

found.

At| Aircraft Engineers are required to refer PIA Company Exposition

Manual Ghapter 4-{ .,Aircraft GertifiCate Gontrol Procedure" issue dated

Novembes 2OQf.. The company policy requires Gertifying staff issuing

Gertificate of Release to Service (GRS) for Aircraft in Line Maintenance

shatt verify all Gertificates on board

The above requirement is also covered and thoroughly discussed

during Init ial/Recurrent Training sessions on organizational Procedures

cohducted at PTC for PIA Gertifying $taff'

Aircraft Engineers are reminded that they must ensure positive

compliance with the above requirement while releasing al l PIA aircraft

to Service. This includes ensuring that the r 'Documents on Boardt '

folder is placed on the aircraft as per i ts defined location and al l

certificates are updated and properly placed inside the folder

according to the index.

To avoid any future issues that relate to Documents on Board strict

compliance with the CEM procedure is required'

Engr. MUHAMMAD ASLAM TARIQChief Enqineer (Quality Assurance)

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l4-09-2KllI of IQUAT.TTY ASSIIR;AIICE DMSION

QUALITY ALERT

SUBJECT: SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN AIRGRAFT(SAFA}

PIA aircraft are being .ontinuouiy subjected to SAFA (SAFETY ASSESSMENT OFFOREIGN AIRCRAFT) Ramp inspection by European Regulatory bodies at EuropeanAirports. After resumption of PIA A3 l0 aircraft flights back to Europe (post lifting ofoperating limitations) the European authorities have constantly monitored-these aircraftand a complete database of inspection findings is being maintained. This database ismaintained for all operators, including European, and for all type of aircraft beingoperated into European Airspace. This is a standard SAFA requirement and not anycompany specific.

Similarly PIA F^777 aircraft are also being inspected with the same intensity. RecentlyFrench DGAC, during SAFA inspection of a PIA ,A,3l0 aircraft highlighted a number ofsignificant and major discrepancies and'required conective actions prior to flight out ofParis. This resulted in the aircraft being held up at Paris for a number of days beforebeing allowed to depart for Karachi on a ferry flight.

As the inspections are now getting more frequent and more intensive. it is extremelyimportant for all maintenance staff to have a good understanding of SAFA RampInspection process, their categorization and handling of inspection findings, dnd eventualconsequence that the operator may have to face when the required SAFA standards arenot met.

It is also important to understand the kind of defects on the aircraft that would beclassified as Category 2 &3. Categories and significance of defects is defined below. Asarrnexure, a listing of those defects is being attached with this QA Alert for all to have agood familiarization and understanding.

For each inspection item a category is marked by the SAFA Inspector. Followingcategories are assigned;

Category l: Finding having minor influence on Safety.

Proof of Inspection will be handed over to the operating captain or CompanyRepresentative by SAFA Inspector, findings to be rectified at Base with information toEuropean Regulatory Authority.

- .Fu#:, i , r , . .e.

Q Aled SAFA Saf'ety Assessrnenl ofForeign Aircrafl Rarnp Inspection l5092KI I

Cont 'd Pase . . . . . 02

. . . 0 2 . . . . . .

Category 2: Finding having significani influence on Safety.

Proof of Inspection will be handed over to the operating captain or CompanyRepresentative by SAFA Inspector. Category 2 findings will be communicated in writingto the operator and the state of oversight. Communication would aiso include repetitivefindings, high number of findings, and evidence of poor standards demonstrated by the toperator. The same commufllcation may seek proper rectificatiois, a pieventive action+'qplan from the operator and a certain level of assurance from the state'of oversight thatmeasures are being taken by the operator to avoid recurrence. In most cases therectification would not be required, however in case of multiple Category 2 findingsthe category may be raised to Category 3 with corrective actions being requiredprior to release of aircraft.

Category 3: Finding having major influence on Safety. This Category is furthersubdivided into C$pa, Cat 3b,.6at 3c and Cat3d.

Category 3a: Restriction on Aircraft Flight Operation.

Category 3b: Corrective actions before Flight.

Category 3c: Aircraft detained by inspecting National Aviation Authority.

Category 3d: Immediate operating ban. This may be on the operator or an aircraft.

All out efforts are required to ensure that findings by SAFA inspectors remain as "NIL"or at Category I at the most. We must all know the fact that according to SAFAregulations increasing number of Cat 2 findings on PIA aircraft would result in anincrease in SAFA Ramp inspections on PIA aircraft all over Europe.

Category 3 findings would place the airline under scrutiny by European Authoritiesthat may eventually place the airline under certain operating limitations or under acomplete ban.

It is necessary for all to have good understanding on SAFA categorization / severity ofdefects. The attached document is an attempt to give maintenance personnel such aninsight.

All are required to review, understand and apply the information.

AN ZUBAIRI

Q Alert SAFA Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft Rarnp lnspection 15092K I I

ANISEXSAFA DEFECT CATEGORIZATION

A . FLIGHT DECK

all aeroplanes which are equipped with a fl ight crew compartment door this door shall be capable ofand means shall be provided bv whiCh cabin crew can discreetlvnotify the flight crew in the event

activity or security breaches in the cabin.rey notfgercn systeT iJiS

area monl not avarlable from either pilot's station or U/S (outside MEL limits

Insoection ltem lnspections ltem TitleA02 Emerqencv Exit

]at. r re -descr ibed F ind inq\ccess to emerqency exit impededmereencv exits U/S

J mergency facil i t ies unserviceable (outside MEL)J f applicable, f l ight deck escape facil i t ies (ropes, hatches, harnesses) not available or not secured

Insoection ltem Inspections ltem TitleA03 Equipment

lat. ) re -descr ibed F ind inq\CAS ll N/A or U/S (outside MEL limits)r,lo serviceable FDR/CVR (outside MEL limits)3PWS with forward looking terrain avoidance function not installed or unserviceable (outside MEL limits)ladro channel spacinq does not meet the airsoace requirements for the f i led f l iqht olanlequired naviqation equipment N/A or U/S

Insoection ltem Insoections ltem TitleA07 Minimum EquiDment L is t

Cat. tre-described FindinqVIEL does not reflect aircraft confiquration or the operations soecificationsMEL lacking.(M) andior (O) procedures when required (no deferred defect requirino such procedure)MEL lackinq (M) and/or (O) orocedures when reouired (with deferred defect reouirino such orocedure)VIEL less restrictive than the MMEL (with deferred defects affected by the lower restrictions)

z VIEL less restrictive than the MMEL (without deferred defects affected bv the lower restrictions)2 VIEL not avai lable (no deferred defects)2 iome MEL items not fully customised (but no defects affectinq those items)2 dMEL instead of MEL

jome MEL items not fullv customized (with defects affectinq those items)3 , /EL not avai lable (with deferred defects)

Insoection ltem. lnspections ltem TitleA08 Certificate of Reqistration

Cat. tre-described Findinqa {o f lreproof identi f icat ion plate near the main entrancea vl ismatch of data on C of R and identi f icat ion olateI {ot on board or cannot be shown bv crew

Insoection ltem Inspections ltem TitleA10 A(JU Or equrvalent

Cat. tre-described Findinqz ntormation in the operations specifications not in accordance with Annex 6a nformation on AOC not in accordance with Annex 6z {o Enqlish translat ion

lommercial Air Transport operations not in accordance with the ooerations specificationslommercial Air Transport operations without a val id AOCtlo oriqinal nor copv of the AOC.&/or of the ooerations soecif icatrons on board or cannot be shown bv the crer,r

I

I r .,. ' t, ; Inspection ltem Inspections ltem Title. . . ' ; l : , i , . ' i . i . i : , : . A11 ; , . j . r RaiiioTiaAnce'

Cat. tre-described Findingz ,lot gn board or cannot be produced 6y crew

i ' ' ir ':.? Inspectlon ltem Inspections ltem Title-:--r:i t' : 412 " , (;ertatacate of Airworthlness

Cat. tre-described Findingz t lo English translation

I of A not issued nor rendered vatiO Ey tfre Slate of registry? lqglggd C of A without permission of then State of inspection? , lo valid C of A on board.

Inspection ltem lnspections ltem Title4 1 4 Weight and Balance sheet

Cat. Jre-descrilred Finding

zn c o r r e c t m a s s a n d / o r b a l a n c e c a | c u | a t i o n s ' w i t h i n a / c | i m i t s , a n d h - v i n @;alculations.

? ncolle9t rla,sg a.nd/or balalce calculations, within a/c l imits, but affecting the performance calculationsnsunrcrent ctata to enable the crew to check the Mass & balance calculalionsz

? Vlass & balance outside operational l imits{o mass and balance calculations oerformed, lo completed mass and balance sheet on board

Inspection ltem Inspections ltem TitleA 1 5 Hand Fire Extinquishers

Cat. rre-described Findir lgz -{FE not at indicated location2 !tE not marked with the appropriate operatino instrucrrons

:xlinguisher gmpty, unserviceable or missing? :xt inguisher not accessible

Inspection ltem Inspections ltem Title4 1 6 Life jackets/fl otation device

Gat. tre-described Findinqz -ife jackets/flqlation devices not easily accessible wheffiJ nsuf f ic ientnum!erof | i fe jackets/ f lo tat iondevicesavai |ab|eandreqf f i

Inspection ltem lnspections ltem Title. , " 4 1 7 Harness

Cat. tre-described Finding2 rilot harness does not incorporate an automatic restraining devicez

\o or unserviceable safety harness for a fl igfit crew seat other than the pilot seats (e gJarge crev;onfigurations),,lo or unserviceable safety harness for each pilot seat (outside lvtEt_ i imitsl

fnspecl ionl tem | " @A 1 8 Oxygen equipment

Cat. ' re-described FindingJxygen equipment not readily accessible and required for the type of i irqhl

I nsufficient number of serviceable quick donnino rnasks available? lsufficient oxygen and/or serviceable oxygen masks

Jnserviceable oxygen system

Ingpection ltem Inspections ltem Title: . . l .23 I

Gat. Fre-described FindingDefect notification and rectification (incl. Tech Log)

z )eferred defect closed after the deadlinez (nown defect not reported/assessedz {o evidence of identif ication nor monitoring of visible damageJ )eferred defect open while the MEL rectif ication interval has expired

l-echnical logbook entry not understood by the fl iqht crew membersz

l ec l i f i ca t ion in te rva |se t in theATLBexceed ing therec t i f i ca t ion in te rv -he MEL recti f icat ion interval)

B - AIRCRAFT CABIN, j '-i lnspection

ltem Inspections ltem Title" , . . \ t s01 (jenerel tnternat (.;onornon

Cat. ,re-described Findinq

2 labin interior layout obviously not furnished in accordance with certif ied design specifications concernin<lammable materials

? -oose carpet hinderinq cabin crew in their duties)amaged floor panels hinderinq cabin crew in their duties

,l -avatorv(s) not equiooed with smoke detection svstemisposal receptacles not equiooed with a built- in f ire extinquisher svstem

lrew carry-on baqqaqe not adeauatelv and securelv stowed-oose heavy obiects in the cabin/qallevs

nt not properly securedstoraqe of luoqaqe in the torlets

smoke detection obstructed-avatory inoperative (and not identif ied as such and not confirmed with MEL restrictions rf anv)

z ial ley/lavatory waste receptacle access door cover not sprinq-loaded closed)efective brakes of food/beveraqe cart(s)lovers damaqed/missinq exoosino sharo edoes and/or cables and wiresfvdrhead bins unserviceable (and not identi f ied as such)

Inspection ltem - Inspections ltem TitlelJUZ Gabin Attendant's Station/Crew Rest Area

Cat. )re-described Findinq2 labin Crew seat(s) not equioped with safetv harness (onlv seat belt)

)abin Crew life iackets (when required) not easily accessiblelabin Crew seat(s) unserviceableabin crew harness/seat belt not avai lable or unserviceable

labin Crew seat(s) obviouslv not installed correctlv (more than 15 deqrees from the lonqitudinal axis)bin Crew seats not correctlv located

omfnunication unserv iceable (outs ide MEL l imi ts)

Inspection ltem Inspections ltem TitleB03 First Aid Kit / Emerqency Medical Kit

Cat. re-described Flontents of the Emerqencv medical ki t past expirat ion date

2 vledical supplies not stored in a secured locationa v' ledical suoolies not identi f ied as such

'/ ledical supplies not avai lable or not accessible durinq f l iqht

Inspection ltem Inspecuons ltem I tt leE|04 Hancl Fire extlnquishers

Cat. re-described F2 not at indicated location2 iFE not marked with the appropriate operatinq instructions

xtinguisher empty, unseryiceable or missinq (outside MEL limits)xtinquisher not correctlv securedxtinquisher not readi ly accessible

Inspection ltem Inspections ltem Title805 Life iackets / Flotation devices

Cat. tre-described Findinq2 - i fe iackets / Flotat ion devices not easi ly accessible and required for the type of f l ight

nsuff icient number of serviceable Life iackets/Flotat ion devices avai lable & required for the tvpe of f l iqhl

Insoection ltem Inspections ltem TitleE|06 seat belt and seat conclitaon

Cat. tre-described Findinq{o extension belts available on board and reouired

z i trap or buckle worn out or damaoed $

{o servrceable seat belt available for each oassenqer on board;eat(s) unserviceable and not identif ied as suchlaby berth(s) used without restraininq belts

Inspection ltem lnsDections ltem TitleEmeroencv exit. l iohtino and markinq. Torches

Cat. )re-described Findinqmerqencv exit siqn(s) out of order (outsrde MEL limits)

\ , lo or inappropriate system for i l luminatinq the escape paths2 merqencv exit(s) not marked with the appropriate operatinq instruct ions

lone of the cabin crew members has an electr ic torch readi lv accessrbleJ mereencv facil i t ies unserviceable (outside MEL)

3

it

I l 'Inspections ltem Title

. " . . , _ ' _ , B O E . t Slides/Life-Rafts (as requlred), ELTCat. )re-described Findinq2 , lo equipment for makino the ovrotechnical distress siqnals when required for lonq-range over water f l ights? nsufficient number of rafts and required for lonq-ranqe over water fliqhts

3 \ircraft not equipped with at least one serviceable automatic ELT or 2 serviceable ELTS of any type (a/(ruthorised to carry more than '19 pax, f irst CofA issued at or before 1 July 2008)

3 \ircraft not equipped with at least 2 serviceable ELTs, one of which is an automatic ELT (a/c authorised t<)arry more than '19 pax. first CofA issued after 1 Julv 2008)

? \ iroraft not equipped with at least one serviceable ELT of any type,(a/c authorised to carry 19 or less pax, fars)ofA issued at or before.l Julv 2008)

,1 \ ircraft not equipped with at least one serviceable automalic ELT (a/c authorised to carry 19 or less pax, f irslofA issued after 1 Julv 2008)

? LT(s) not capable of simultaneouslv transmittinq on 406 MHz and 121 .5 MHZ)orlable ELT not at indicated location

Inspection ltem lnspections ltem TitleOxvqen Supplv.

Cat. rre-described Findinqz )ortable breathinq equipment not al indicaled locationz )xvoen suoolv not readilv accessible and reouired for the tvoe of f l iqht

z\eroplane not equipped with an automatic deployable oxygen system (individual CofA issued on or after !{ovember 1998)

zlhe number of serviceable oxygen dispensing units does not meet the minimum number requtrementsindividual CofA issued on or afler 9 November '1998)

z )xvoen equioment not adequatelv marked with its ooeratinq instructions3 nsuf f ic ientoxvoenmasksfora l l cabincrewand 10%of passenqers(andreqUiredfor thetypeof f l ight )

\utomatic oxygen deploying system unserviceable (damaged/taped drop-out panels) and no other meanslvailable to supplv oxyqen

J)xygen dispensing equipment unserviceable (low pressure, clearly overdue, damaged) and not identif ied at;uch and required for the type of f l iqht)xvqen masks not avai lable for al l occupants (f l iqht above FL 130)nsufficient oxvoen and/or serviceable oxyqen masks and required for the type of f l ight

2 xvqen bottles not correctly secured

lnspection ltem Inspections ltem Tltle8 1 0 Safetv lnstructions

Cat. ,re-described Findinqz nstructions cards contain inaccurate informationz asten seat belt ' siqn(s) unserviceablez Return to Seat' signs in lavatory unserviceable? ' lo means to convev safetv instructions to the passenqers3 'lo safetv instructions on board? \ircraft briefino cards not for the correct aircraft tvpe

Inspection ltem lnspections ltem TitleEf1 Access to emerqency exats

Cat. )re-described FindinqJ :loor/carpet in poor condition affectinq the rapid evacuationz )amaged wall panel in the vicinity of emergency exit possibly obstructing the exit? l ' rav table latches can be opened in the direct ion of evacuation (not recessed or special one-way lock)a \ccess to emerqencv exits imoeded bv baqoaqe or carqo? \ccess to emerqencv exits impeded bv seats (total rows)? )abin crew seat does not retract automaticallv impeding the access to emergency exil3 \ccess to emergency exits impeded by seats (oversized seat cushions)J I-rav table locks can be ooened in the direction of evacuation whilst certif icated with special locks

Jiray table locks fail to maintain the tables in upright position in case of deceleration, shocks (for seats adjaceno emeioencv exits.

z jmerqency exit not marked with the appropriate operating instructions

]

lnspection ltem Inspections ltem TitleE ' I J Safetv of Dassenqer baqqage

Cat. tre-described Findinq? Jard or heavy baqqaqe stored in open hat-racks? aooaoe stowed in unserviceable overhead bins (althouqh marked as unserviceable)? )versized baqqaqe transported in the cabin? laqoaqe not stowed securelv3 )verhead bins loaded in excess of the placarded weight l i 'mitation

C . AIRCRAFT EXTERIOR

n d i nwrres oroKen or outs ide l im i ts )

outside MEUAMM/CDL limitsl ic leak outs ide l imi ts

d ischaroer (s )controls unserviceable3 : F

Inspection ltem Inspections ltom Title: C01 .General external condition

Cat )re-described Finding3 \ntenna(s) missinq or damaqed outside AMM/MEUCDL limitsz lreak-in point markinqs (if applied) faded or incorrectlv markedz rarnt damage with exposed compositea )oor condition of de-icinq systema1 iafety markings not applied or unreadableJ i tatic discharqer(s) missinq or damaqed outside MEUAMM/CDL limits2 lignificant corrosion

\ircraft l ights unserviceable for niqht operations (outside MEL limits)J asteners or rivets loose or rnissino outside SP.!\4/Ai!!!tr4 lirni+s

ce or other contamination not removeci lrefore take off3 {o appropriate de/anti-icing treatment with oround icinq conditions

rressure port(s) damaqed or contaminatedatl skid wear outside AMM limits

Mindshield delamination outside AMM limits

Inspection ltem Inspections ltem Titlecoz Doors and hatches

Cat. tre-described Findinq3onding wires broken or misslnq (outside AMM limits)/) loor handle(s) , leve(s) , access oanel(s) not f lush

2 Joor operation instructtons missinq or unclear3 lCargo door lock inspection qlasses bl ind and no other mean to veri fv lockinq posit ion(s)3 loor seal damaqed outside AMM/CDL limits3 loor(s) unservrceable and not recorded as such

subseouent lv to be w i th in l im i ts

Inspection ltem lnspections ltem Titlec04 Wheels, tyres and brakes

CaL ) re-descr ibed F ind inqa lrake worn beyond limits but dispatch allowed accordinq to AMM (not assessed nor recorded)z )amaged wheel (wrthin l imits) but not assessed and recordeda tyre(s) worn beyond limits but dispatch allowed according to AMM (not assessed nor recorded)

lrake(s) unserviceable and not recorded)amaged or missing parts ( i .e. bolts, heat sensors)

3 -eak'nq hydraul ic brakinq svstem (outside l imits), lose landing gear snubbers worn outside l imitsyre pressure obviouslv outside l imits

lyre(s) unserviceable (worn or damaqed) and not recordedtVheel damaqed outside of l imits

Inspection ltem Inspections ltem Titlec05 Undercarriaqe. skids/fl oats

Cat. tre-described Findinqtrater/debris deflectors damaqed or missinq outside AMM/CDL

1 - ines, hoses electr ical wi i inq chafednot or unreadable

2 Seepaqe/leakaqe, within l imits but not assessed and not recordeda I corrosron

ieepage/leakaqe outsrde l imrtsi trut pressure outside l imrt

Inspection ltem lnspections ltem Titlec06 Wheelwel l

Cat. )re-described Findino-and inq qear door (s ) damaqed

a )bvious lack of lubrication of hinqe(s), actuato(s)3ond ing w i res broken or missrnq (ou ts ide l im i ts )

corrosron-andrng gear emerqency sprinq lock(s) broken/unserviceable

outs ide l im i t

5

hspection ltem' Inspections ltem Title, i r . , I C O Z Powerplant and pvlon

Cat. , re-descr ibed Findinoz iafety markings not applied or unreadableI i ignificant wear and tear in the intake and exhaust area

)amaqe (dents, nicks. cracks) outside l imits? nlake acoustic l iners damaqed outside AMM limitsJ -eakage (oil, fuel) outside AMM limitsI )anels/fairinos/cowlinqs/handles misalioned or not f lushed and not assesses for correct closure3 icrews/rivets loose or missinq. outside l imits? hrust reverser/blocker doors not fullv stowed

Inspection ltem lnsoections ltem Titlec08 Fan blades

Cat. t re -descr ibed F ind inq3 ran blade(s) damaoed bevond AMM l imit? lepairs obviously not carried out in accordance with the AMM/SRM

lnspection ltem Inspections ltem Titlec09 Propellers, rotors (main/tail)

Cat. t re -descr ibed F ind inqz )e-ice boot(s) damaoedJ )ropeller de-icing system unserviceable (outside MEL/AMM limits)J lepairs obviouslv not carried out in accordance with the AMM/SRMJ ) damaqed bevond AMM l imits

lnSpection ltem lnspections ltem Titlec10

ffi- Obvious repairs

z , lo information about temoorarv reoairsz )revious repair in poor conditionz iervicing doorsipanels secured with speed tape

leoairs obviouslv not carried out in accordance with tne aoolicable AMM/SRM

Inspection ltem lnspections ltem Titlect1 Obvious unreoaired damaqe

Cat. t re -descr ibed F ind inqi tructural damage affectinq the airuvorthiness of the aircraft

lnspection ltem lnspections ltem Titlec12 Leakaqe

Cat. ) re -descr ibed F ind inq-eakaoe outside l imitsiervicinq doors/panels, drains blocked bv ice

D - AIRCRAFT CARGOInspection ltem lnspections ltem Title

D01 General condition of carqo compartmentCat. re-described Findino

z )efective l ightsz iafety markinqs not appl ied or unreadable

)arqo bav smoke detection test fail or outside MEL limits Il l ow-out pane ls pushed, damaqed or miss inq (ou ts ide AMM/MEL l im i ts )

3 Jnserviceable fire extinouishino svstemJ : loor locks unserviceable outside MEL limits (with caroo)

{o or unserviceable required barrier net' lo smoke barrier/curtain (if applicable)itructural or f loor damaqe outside AMM/SRM limits

3 - larqo comDartment (s) not eouiooed with f ire suDoression svstems

Inspection ltem lnspections ltem TitleD03 Safetv of carqo on board

Cat. t re -descr ibed F ind ingncomplete equipment l ike lashinq, t ie- down equipment, pallets, lock assemblies and/or containers

J )arqo Area not used in accordance with classif icat ion)argo not correctly secured and restrained in all directions

? vlajor damage to lashing, t ie-down equipment, pal l€rts , lock assemblies and/or containers bffecl ing the;tructural inteqri ty and their intended function . I

3 ) ividing net or protection nel damaged.beyond AMM l imitst ion/load l imit and/or height) exceeded

$HIACERTIFICATION OF MAINTENANCE WORK BEYOND THE SCOPE OF APPROVAL /

L ICENSE


QUALITY ALERT

BACKGROUND:

During recent days, Qual i ty Assurance and Pakistan Civi l Aviat ionhave observed some cases of maintenance work, speci f ical ly atperformed beyond the scope of certifying staff approval / l icensecase, one t ime approval was sought af ter performing the subject task.

No: 8!)l ssue : Il ) r t t e : l : i - 0 9 - 2 0 l 2l ' a g e I o l ' l

Authority (PCAA)outstat ions, beingAl though, in each

This is a v iolat ion of company procedure and appl icable regulatory requirements. Thislate informat ion / approval also incurred delays, bad reputat ion and f inancial impact onPIA

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Aircraf t Engineer shal l not cert i fy any task beyond the scope of his / her approval/ l icense and cert i f icat ion author izat ion.

2. l f cert i f icat ion is required beyond the scope, ' due to any unavoidablecircumstances, pr ior approval f rom the of f ice of Chief Engineer Qual i tyAssurance shal l be sought before commencing the maintenance work.

Technical log book must only be cert i f ied by appropr iately qual i f ied maintenanceengineer.

Maintenance jobs requir ing special ized services, such as BSl, structure repairjobs, NDT etc. f rom overhaul shops, shal l be recorded through supplementals ignatures on technical log book or through fract ional work orders in case of basem a intena nce.

5. Procedures, def ined in Company Exposi t ion Manual, shal l be fol lowed in t ruespir i t to avoid any unpleasant s i tuat ion.

Str ict Compl iance is required by al l concerned.

MUMTAZ A

4 .

UBAIR IQUALITY ASSURANCECHIEF ENGIN