public with confidential annex

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT-04-74-T

Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Presiding Judge Arpad Prandler Judge Stefan Trechsel Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua Registrar: Mr. John Hocking Date filed: 09 August 2010

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

JADRANKO PRLI Ć BRUNO STOJIĆ

SLOBODAN PRALJAK MILIVOJ PETKOVI Ć

VALENTIN ĆORIĆ BERISLAV PUŠIĆ

PUBLIC WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

JADRANKO PRLI Ć’S MOTION TO DISALLOW EVIDENCE GENERATED BY AND/OR ASSOCIATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH UN CI VIL

AFFAIRS ADVISOR IN BIH VIKTOR ANDREEV OR IN THE ALT ERNATIVE FIND THAT SAID EVIDENCE SHALL BE PRESUMED UNRELIABL E

BEARING NO PROBATIVE VALUE &

REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC HEARING

Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Kenneth Scott Mr. Douglas Stringer Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Michael G. Karnavas and Ms. Suzana Tomanović for Jadranko Prli ć Ms. Senka Nožica and Mr. Karim A. A. Khan for Bruno Stojić Mr. Božidar Kova čić and Ms. Nika Pinter for Slobodan Praljak Ms. Vesna Alaburić and Mr. Nicholas Stewart for Milivoj Petković Ms. Dijana Tomašegović-Tomić and Mr. Dražen Plavec for Valentin Ćorić Mr. Fahrudin Ibrišimovi ć and Mr. Roger Sahota for Berislav Pušić

61791IT-04-74-TD61791 - D6175809 August 2010 SF

IT-04-74-T 09 August 2010 1

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

CASE NO. IT-04-74-T

PROSECUTOR v. JADRANKO PRLIĆ ET AL

PUBLIC WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

JADRANKO PRLI Ć’S MOTION TO DISALLOW EVIDENCE GENERATED BY AND/OR ASSOCIATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH UN CI VIL

AFFAIRS ADVISOR IN BIH VIKTOR ANDREEV OR IN THE ALT ERNATIVE FIND THAT SAID EVIDENCE SHALL BE PRESUMED UNRELIABL E

BEARING NO PROBATIVE VALUE &

REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC HEARING

Jadranko Prlić, through his Counsel, respectfully moves to disallow any evidence

generated by and/or associated directly or indirectly with UN Civil Affairs Advisor in

BiH, Viktor Andreev, or in the alternative, for the Trial Chamber to find that said

evidence is presumed unreliable bearing no probative value. This motion is made

necessary because entries from the Mladić diary show that Viktor Andreev was providing

the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership with inside information, thus

negatively influencing the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the negotiating

process led by the internationals. Given Andreev’s position and actions, the accuracy and

reliability of many of the UN documents, and in particular UNPROFOR documents, are

called into question, as well as the testimony of witnesses who were associated with

Andreev or relied on any information or reports by and through Andreev (together

“questioned evidence”). This motion is respectfully submitted in keeping with the due

diligence obligations imposed on the parties in order to ensure Dr. Prlić a fair trial as

enshrined in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute.1 In order to transparently develop all

relevant facts and arguments a public hearing is requested.

1 Article 11 of the ICTY Code of Professional Conduct by Counsel, requires Counsel to represent his “client diligently and promptly in order to protect the client’s best interests.” See Prosecutor v. Mučić et al. (Čelebići case), IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001, para. 631, where the Appeals Chamber reiterated the importance of the obligation to act diligently: “[f]ailure of counsel to object will usually indicate that counsel formed the view at the time that the matters to which the judge was inattentive were not of such significance to his case that the proceedings could not continue without attention being called thereto.” See also JUDGE RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

EVIDENCE 306 (Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002), discussing Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-A,

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I. BACKGROUND

1. On 22 June 2006, the Prosecution introduced UN documents in which the name of

Viktor Andreev, UN Civil Affairs Advisor in BiH, appeared for the first time.2

2. On 14 January 2008, Cedric Thornberry, a former Assistant-Secretary-General of

the United Nations, Director of Civil Affairs for the United Nations Protection

Force (UNPROFOR) and Deputy Chief of Mission for UNPROFOR until March

1994, testified. When questioned about Andreev, Thornberry, who was

responsible for UNPROFOR’s political, civil, legal and police activities,3 noted:

“Andreev was one of our best, most experienced reporters… rapporteur I

mean.” 4

3. On 8 March 2010, while testifying Accused Petković remarked that Andreev

played “games”5:

Your Honour, Mr. Viktor Andreev was informed by me and others regarding the position of Croats in Travnik, Kakanj, Fojnica, and he never reacted in this way. But he said, as did others, that many Croats had left. So you cannot accept, when he says with respect to such events which had happened before Vares, that the Croats had left, and he didn't take any steps. We asked him to go to Catici. There was a thermal power-plant in Kakanj. There were 200-odd Croats there, and Mr. Viktor Andreev did not want to go to Catici to see what was happening to those Croats. Therefore, I have the right to conclude that Mr. Andreev has a double standard.6

4. On 14 April 2010, the Prosecution disclosed to the Defence the Mladić diary, a

composite of notebooks. Numerous entries reveal meetings between Andreev

and the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership. Andreev appears to be

providing sensitive UN / UNPROFOR inside information, undermining his UN

Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, 15 October 1998, wherein Judge May notes that the purpose of according the accused certain rights under the ICTY Statute “was that the accused should exercise due diligence in utilizing them.”1 2 Trial Transcript, 22 June 2006, pp. 3727 – 3728 discussing Exh. P02108. The first document where Andreev’s title is mentioned is Exh. P01353, 29 January 1993, “CAC BiH Command Kiseljak” (UNPROFOR HQ Kiseljak) discussed with Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, pp. 26174-26176. 3 Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26167; Exh. P10041, para. 4. 4 Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26176. 5 Trial Transcript, 8 March 2010, pp. 50599 – 50601. 6 Id., at p. 50600.

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superiors and colleagues at UNPROFOR, providing advice on how to deal, inter

alia, with the UN and international negotiators. He also appears to play “games”

with his interlocutors, thus, invariably, influencing UNPROFOR through his

reports. The following entries from the Mladić diary are telling examples of

some of Andreev’s discussions with the Bosnian Serb political and military

leadership:7

- the Muslims want Sarajevo to remain blocked.8

- Unfortunately they are not in favour of a [demilitarization]. We have applied considerable pressure on them... 9 - the [VOPP] plan is dead, but it should not be referred to as that, we will stick to that until we get something new.10 - Muslims will try to scare the Serbs with the creation of a union with H, a union is not possible, it's a political game, because F.Tuñman proposed an option and Alija another.11 - The political UN leadership is against bombing the Serbs while the military leadership is in favour of bombing.12 - the Muslims don't want a cease fire across the entire territory.13 - if you ask for the civilian police at once, we do not have a mandate,

and we are approaching the UN and this gives you some time.14

II. ARGUMENT

A. Evidence generated by and/or associated directly or indirectly with Viktor Andreev should be disallowed

7 For a more comprehensive showing of Andreev’s “games” see Annex I. 8 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, p. 109. 9 Id., at 111. 10 Id., at 114. 11 Mladić’s Notebook No. 35, p. 9. 12 Id., at 10. 13 Mladić’s Notebook No.31, p. 8. 14 Mladić’s Notebook No.36, pp. 110-11.

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5. As an UN Civil Affairs Advisor in BiH, Viktor Andreev’s functions included,

inter alia, reporting to his superior, Cedric Thornberry, the Director of Civil

Affairs for the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and Deputy Chief

of Mission for UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR’s mission was, inter alia, to “secure

delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other parts of BiH and the

establishment of the security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its Airport. Later

[the] mandate was expanded.15 Thornberry’s testimony shows that he valued

Andreev as one of the “best, most experienced reporters”16 of UNPROFOR’s

Civil Affairs.

6. Evidence adduced throughout the proceedings shows that reports from the field

went upwards and sideways;17 i.e. reports or selective portions found their way

into reports such as those prepared by Tadeusz Mazowiecki,18 while also

distributed to regional field offices and other organizations, who, in turn, used the

information - without attribution at times – to pass it on as if the information was

the product of first-hand knowledge.19 Indeed, such was the reporting system

used by the various organizations, that an error at the initially reporting stage was

likely to be copied, repeated and disseminated all the way to the highest levels.20

7. If the Mladić diary is to be accepted as authentic (as in being the real diary),

reliable (as in not having been tampered with) and accurate (as in what is

reported), Andreev - armed with UN-inside information - used his position to

back-channel advice and influence to Mladić, Karadžić and other Bosnian Serb

military and political leaders. Effectively, Andreev was covertly collaborating

with one of the parties of the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs, in order to give them an

advantage in the field and for purposes of circumventing the international

negotiating process to which the UN and the European Community (EC) /

15 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, pp. 26184 – 26185; Exh. P10041, para. 38; Exh. P00487. 16 Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26176 (emphasis added). 17 See e.g. Exh. P07887, where the distribution list among others shows: COS, G1-5, Chief UNMO, UNCHR, LO, ECMM. See also Confidential Annex II. 18See Confidential Annex II, para. 2. 19 Id., para. 3. 20 Witness Roger Philip Watkins, Trial Transcript, 22 May 2007, pp. 18927-18928. See also Confidential Annex II, para. 3.

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European Union (EU) were committed. As such, it is submitted that Andreev’s

reporting to his superiors and colleagues, as well as the reports generated by him

relied upon by UNPROFOR, the UN in general and by others, are highly suspect

and unreliable, thus calling into question their probative value.

8. It is submitted that based on the ICTY Statue, Rules and jurisprudence, the Trial

Chamber is well within its rights and authority to disallow the questioned

evidence. Pursuant to Rule 89(B), the Trial Chamber “shall apply rules of

evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and

are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.” In

Delalić the Appeals Chamber held that: [a] pre-requisite for admission of

evidence must be compliance by the moving party with any relevant safeguards

and procedural protections and […] it must be shown that the relevant evidence is

reliable.21 In Kordić & Čerkez, a case not directly on point but instructive

nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber held that Rule 89(C) statements (unsworn and

not subject to confrontation), in the absence of indicia of reliability lack probative

value and thus should be excluded from admission.22 Rule 89(D) requires the

exclusion of evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

need to ensure a fair trial,” whereas Rule 95 requires the exclusion of evidence “if

its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the

proceedings.”

9. It is submitted that it is virtually impossible to fully identify and isolate the

evidence contaminated by Andreev’s deleterious actions. Given Andreev’s

“games”, the Trial Chamber cannot but pause and wonder about what sort of

information Andreev was feeding his superiors and subordinates / colleagues, and

how his information, misinformation and disinformation colored the perception of

UNPROFOR, ultimately impacting on some of the parties - such as how the

Croats were perceived by the internationals (UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ECMM,

etc.) and reported upon. Based on Musema, where it was held that “the probative

21 See Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T, Appeal Judgement, 20 February 2001, para. 533 (emphasis added). 22 See Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, Decision on Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, 21 July 2000, para. 28.

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value of evidence is based upon an assessment of its reliability,”23 the Trial

Chamber, after finding the questioned evidence to be unreliable, should find that

the probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure Dr. Prlić a

fair trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute. Thus, the Trial Chamber

should simply exclude the questioned evidence.

B. In the alternative evidence generated by and/or associated, directly or

indirectly with Viktor Andreev should be presumed unreliable bearing no

probative value

10. In the alternative, should the Trial Chamber be disinclined to exclude the question

evidence, it is submitted that absent a showing of strong and reliable independent

indicia, a presumption of unreliability with no probative value should be afforded

to it. The mere admission of a document into evidence does not ipso facto signify

that the statements contained therein are necessarily an accurate portrayal of the

facts.24

11. “[E]vidence which is both relevant and probative must also enjoy some

component of reliability.25 Indeed, reliability is the invisible golden thread which

runs through all the components of admissibility.26 Consequently, the Trial

Chamber must consider all questioned evidence with great circumspection and

23 See Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para. 40. 24 See Draft Guidelines for the Admissibility of Evidence and to Ensure Efficient Conduct of the Proceedings, 1 March 2006. Although the language of the Guidelines were ultimately adopted by the Trial Chamber do not reflect the exact language of the Draft Guidelines, the evidentiary principle is nonetheless instructive. As noted by the Prlić Defence in its Submissions to the Trial Chamber’s Draft Guidelines for the Admissibility of Evidence and to Ensure Efficient Conduct of the Proceedings, 15 March 206, p. 9, para. b:

The Defence fully endorses the guiding principle that the mere admission of a document into evidence does not axiomatically make the document accurate or trustworthy. In light of the voluminous documents anticipated in this trial, the Defence submits that if certain documents are admitted and seem to be suspect on their face, a judicial hint to the parties might be appropriate. Such a judicial hint would not be a prejudgment on the probative value of the documents, but could serve to alert the parties that, barring additional independent indicia of reliability, the Trial Chamber may be inclined to give little or no weight to this documentary evidence. “

25Id., at para. 35; see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay, IT-94-1-T (5 August 1996). 26 Id., at para. 37.

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suspicion. In the interest of justice, the Trial Chamber should find that the

questioned evidence is presumed to be unreliable; the onus being on the

Prosecution, through reliable independent evidence - to rebut said presumption.

C. A hearing is necessary to thoroughly ventilate these issues in a transparent manner

12. A public hearing is warranted: the importance of the issues involved require

transparency and public scrutiny. Given that the issues raised herein deal with the

UN, its personnel, its activities in BiH relevant to the period of the Indictment,

and the fact that the Trial Chamber is being called upon to accept, evaluate and

give weight to UN documents connected directly or indirectly with Andreev and

others, the need for total transparency is paramount.

13. As an institution the UN should not be sheltered from necessary and valid

transparent scrutiny, as was most recently noted by the outgoing director of the

Office of Internal Oversight Services, Ms. Inga-Britt Ahlenius. In her 16 July

2010 internal end-of-assignment report that at the UN (at least with respect to

rooting out financial corruption) “There is no transparency; there is a lack of

accountability.”27 While Andreev is not being accused of the sort of corruption

that the Office of Internal Oversight Services is generally involved with, such as

financial malfeasance, Andreev’s conduct does have the scent of deceit and

connivance, which, if not thoroughly exposed and vetted, could seriously

undermine the fair-trial rights of Dr. Prlić. There are no justifiable reasons why

all relevant facts and arguments concerning this Motion should not be thoroughly

vetted by the Parties thought a public hearing. Moreover, such a hearing would

be significantly beneficial to the Trial Chamber in making its findings of facts and

conclusions of law.

27 See Annex III. NEIL MACFARQUHAR, U.N. approves new anti-corruption chief, International Herald Tribune, 30 July 2010, p. 3.

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III. RELIEF SOUGHT

WHEREFORE , for all the reasons stated herein, the Prlić Defence respectfully requests

the Trial Chamber to:

GRANT this Motion and disallow evidence generated by and/or associated with

Viktor Andreev; or in the alternative,

FIND the questioned evidence shall be presumed unreliable bearing no probative

value; and

GRANT a public hearing.

Dated: 09 August 2010 Respectfully submitted, The Hague, The Netherlands ______________________

Michael G. Karnavas Counsel for Jadranko Prlić

Word Count: 2497

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IT-04-74-T 1 Annex I

ANNEX I

Background

The name Viktor Andreev, UN Civil Affairs Advisor in BiH, first surfaced during the

trial proceedings when the Prosecution introduced UN documents.1 Andreev’s name was

first invoked during viva voce testimony when Cedric Thornberry was questioned by the

Prosecution. According to Thornberry, a former Assistant-Secretary-General of the

United Nations, Director of Civil Affairs for the United Nation Protection Force

(UNPROFOR) and Deputy Chief of Mission for UNPROFOR until March 1994,

responsible for UNPROFOR’s political, civil, legal and police activities,2 “Andreev was

one of our best, most experienced reporters… rapporteur I mean.”3 The last time

Andreev’s name surfaced was during the testimony of General Petković, prompting

Judge Prandler to pose the following question:

“ I would like to only to ask Mr. Petkovic about the following: It happened to me

that I knew Mr. Andreev from the United Nations work and from New York, so

when you said that, No, I do not accept what he wrote, and then you continued,

“Those are his assessments and his games,” end of quotation, I would like to ask

you if you have anything – a kind of opinion or concrete events which you base

your position on him, as far as when you say that those are his assessments and

his games, and what do you mean by “games?’’ 4

It bears highlighting – for contextual purposes - UNPROFOR’s mission which, inter alia,

was “to secure delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other parts of BiH and the

establishment of the security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its Airport (Security

1 Witness BJ, Trial Transcript, 22 June 2006, pp. 3727 – 3728 discussing Exh. P02108. First document where his title is mentioned is Exh. P01353 29 January 1993, “CAC BiH Command Kiseljak” (UNPROFOR HQ Kiseljak) discussed with Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, pp. 26174-26176. 2 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26167; Exh. P10041, para. 4. 3 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26176 (emphasis added). 4 Witness Milivoj Petković, Trial Transcript, 8 March 2010, pp. 50599 – 50601.

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IT-04-74-T Annex I 2

Council Resolution 757, 30 May 1992). Later, [the] mandate was expanded.”5 Thus, it is

against this backdrop that the Mladić entries concerning Andreev must be examined.

Revealingly, Andreev seems to have gone rogue, as he used his position, background

(Russian and fellow Orthodox/Slav) and UN-inside information to back-channel his

advice and influence to Mladić, Karadžić and other Bosnian Serb military and political

leaders.

It is difficult to fathom how a high level UN representative from a permanent member-

state of the Security Council can be considered objective and even-handed when he is

surreptitiously providing inside information and advice to one of the parties of the

conflict – particularly when the information and advice is provided for the sake of giving

that party (the Bosnian Serbs) an advantage in the field and for the purpose of

circumventing the international negotiating process to which the UN and the European

Community (EC) / European Union (EU) are committed. Query whether this is the work

of an operative skilled in the dark art of intelligence or that of a naïve and sentimental

fool who, despite his shortcomings, found himself in a position well beyond his

capabilities. Given his UN experience, as Judge Prandler seems to have eluded to in his

question to General Petković, it would appear that Andreev, if anything, was not some

neophyte, some babe in the woods, clueless as to what he was doing or to what extent the

likes of Mladić and Karadžić would rely and act on his observations and advice.

1 May 1992

Context

The conflict in BiH had officially begun on 18 September 1991,6 though the events in

Croatia had been ongoing for some months.7 Andreev is there – in theory – as an honest

broker, since he is a representative of the UN.

5 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, pp. 26184 – 26185; Exh. P10041, para. 38; Exh. P00487. 6 As recognized by the benefits offered to veterans of the war. See Exh. 3D03226, Sn Fed-2, Regulation on the Criteria, Way and Procedure of the Recognition on Time, Spent in Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Pension Seniority as Special Seniority, Article 2, 19 May 2005. 7 Witness Stjepan Kljujić, Trial Transcript, 26 June 2006, p. 3848; Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 6 May 2008, pp. 27618-27625.

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To fully appreciate the nature of Andreev’s exchange it is important to note that Croatia

is under attack by the JNA, with some of its territory occupied, while other parts, such as

the Dalmatian coast, under extreme threat.8 The Muslims were not the only ones who

coveted a slice of the Croatian coast;9 the Serbs had similar desires and designs.10 It is

also relevant that at this point in time, Mladić is still a JNA officer.11 As such, Andreev

is in fact meeting with a representative of the JNA/FRY and the UN. This is relevant

because even after Mladić leaves the JNA to take up the post of the Head of the VRS

(Bosnian Serb armed forces) Main Staff, he continues to press for Croatian coastal

territory. This in turn is relevant in appreciating the context related to the HV (Croatian

armed forces) being just over the Croatian- BiH border.12

While the Prosecution would have the Trial Chamber find that the HV forces across the

Croatian-BiH border supports that there was an act of aggression by Croatia against BiH,

in actuality, the HV was there to protect against the JNA naked aggression.13 The text in

the UN Security Council Resolutions concerning HV troops in BiH was the handiworks

8 Witness Nicholas Miller, Trial Transcript, 25 September 2007, pp. 22766-22767; Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 6 May 2008, pp. 27631-27635 and 7 May 2008, pp. 27710-27711; Witness Damir Zorić, Trial Transcript, 15 May 2008, p. 28072. 9 Witness Peter Galbraith, Trial Transcript, 12 September 2006, pp. 6445-6450 discussing Exh. P09498; Witness Philip Roger Watkins, Trial Transcript, 22 May 2007, pp. 18914-18915 discussing Exh. P07290; Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 16 January 2008, p. 26302 discussing Exh. P05033, para. 11; Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 8 May 2008, p. 27786 discussing Exh. 1D02896. See also Mladić’s Notebook No. 35, 18 January 1994 entry, p. 27 (0668-2198), Mladić records Andreev to have said: “On the issue of access to the sea Muslims are asking for 10km on Peljesac and the Croats are saying that they will lease it out, the Muslims say give us Peljesac and we’ll give you Neum.” 10 Witness Peter Galbraith, Trial Transcript, 12 September 2006, pp. 6445-6450 discussing Exh. P09498. 11 See Report of UN Secretary-General, of 30 May 1992 (Exh. P00233), where in para. 2 it is noted that the on 13 May 1992, “authorities of the so-called ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ announced their decision to form their own army, which would be composed of units of the former JNA based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and appointed General Ratko Mladic as Commander of that Army.” 12 Witness Klaus Johann Nissen, Trial Transcript, 27 June 2007, pp. 20592-20594; Witness Josip Praljak, Trial Transcript, 13 May 2009, pp. 40016-40017; 28 May 2009, p. 40945 discussing Exh. 3D02469; 4 June 2009, pp. 41241-41245 discussing Exh. P00466; 14 July 2009, pp. 43031-43037, discussing Exh. P03886; Witness Milivoj Petković, Trial Transcript, 1 March 2010, pp. 50130-50138, discussing Exh. IC01190. 13 See testimony of Prlić Defence Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 6 May 2008, pp. 27621-27627, where he discusses in general the situation in and around Dubrovnik as it was being attacked by the JNA. Specifically, Žužul observed: “anyone in their right state of mind could only draw the following conclusion. The only way to defend Dubrovnik was by defending the part of the coast that actually belonged to Bosnia and Herzegovina. There simply was no other way to defend Dubrovnik or, indeed, to stop the aggression from spreading and more territory from being seized.” (p. 27625). Žužul also noted the significance of Neum which is sandwiched along the Croatian Adriatic coast and the “hours and hours [that] were spent in friendly negotiations between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina about Neum.” (p. 27626).

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of the Serbs. The most poignant proof of this comes from General Morillon’s mouth14 in

the presence of Andreev as recorded by Mladić’s hands: “The SB15 has taken into

consideration your request to withdraw the HV/Croatian Army/ from BH territory.”16

Andreev is unquestionably advising the JNA/FRY (Serbs) on geopolitical strategy – in

particular how to galvanize support within the UN Security Council, presumably to

reverse or alter the Vance Plan.17 He is specifically urging the Serbs to travel to Moscow

and China for support “because these things are done in a coordinated fashion and in the

right way.”18 The Serbs are also counselled to write to UN Secretary General Boutros

Boutros Ghali and to try to meet with him and Vance. The point being:

There must be [a] country which will immediately request an extraordinary session of the Security Council. It is still not late. You have time. In that case, he can be certain that the proposal or some of them will be accepted. After this plan there can only be compromises. If you do this then you might get it.19

While one would have to read between the proverbial tea leaves to fully grasp the

meaning of these pithy entries, it is clear that Andreev is acting in a highly biased

manner: favoring the Serbs, as he coaches them on strategy and tactics in dealing with the

UN and its member states. Whether he is acting in accordance with the instructions from

his Russian government (known to be sympathetic to the Serbs / fellow Slavs, bonded by

their common confessional – the Christian Orthodox faith) or whether he is acting

independently, is unclear. However, what is clear is the fact that from this and other

Mladić entries, Andreev’s reporting to his superiors and colleagues, as well as the reports

generated by him relied upon by UNPROFOR, the UN in general and by others, are

called into question. To what extent can anything reported by Andreev, bearing the

imprimatur of the UN, be trusted to be objective, accurate and trustworthy?

14 See the following section devoted to General Morillon as featured in Mladić’s notes. 15 SB stands for “Savjet Bezbjednosti,” which is the Security Coucil. 16 Mladić’s Notebook No. 46, 27 November 1992 entry, p. 210 (emphasis added). 17 Mladić’s Notebook No. 39, p. 232. 18 Id., at p. 233. 19 Id., at pp. 233-234. See also p. 239, where Andreev gives advice on how to make an effective presentation through the use of photographs and documentary evidence.

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À propos to the advice dispensed by Andreev are two other entries, which, if anything,

validate Andreev’s bona fides as a valued consigliere to the Bosnian Serb political and

military leadership. In his entries of 8 September 1992, Mladić notes that President

Panić is reported to be going to the USSR, China and Japan20 – just as counselled by

Andreev on 1 May 1992. In a subsequent entry, 16 September 1992, it is recorded that

General Gvero, at a “Reporting of organs of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika

Srpska” is noted to have said that there are “Teams of reporters from Russia, China and

Japan are on location.”21 The fruits of Andreev’s counselling can be seen when

considering his advice to the Serbs, President Panić’s trip to those countries

recommended by Andreev, and the results of having journalists from those respective

countries (obviously to influence the public relations / disinformation campaign) arrive at

the scene.22

Andreev, because of his position, would have been privy to confidential, inside

information emanating from or provided to the UN. From other Mladić entries

referenced below, what emerges is that Andreev was clandestinely passing on such inside

information. The purpose is more than obvious: to guide and influence the negotiating

strategies, tactics and decisions of the Serbs vis à vis the other parties to the conflict, the

international negotiators, individual member states of the UN and EU, as well as the UN

and EU.23 The underlying impression seems to be that Andreev is implying to the Serbs

that they can count on Russia for support.24

20 See Mladić’s Notebook No. 37, 8 September 1992 entry, p. 110, of where Ćocić notes: “5. President PANIĆ is going to the USSR, China and Japan.” 21 Mladić’s Notebook No. 33, 16 September 1992 entry, p. 59. 22 The use of propaganda and disinformation was a calculated ploy as can be seen from the 6 August 1992 entry of Mladić’s diary (Notebook No. 37, at p. 29-31). In a meeting with FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) Prime Minister Panić and JNA General Panić, Mladić records General Panić to have said: “From each region a man who should be told that we will be saying one thing and doing another – that is a philosophy and you have to work ‘under the counter’… I proposed that Mladic should be commander of BiH armed Forces (OS BiH) (deputy Muslim and Croat) – rights should be guaranteed to everyone, Croats, Serbs and Muslims.” This is identical to the strategy adopted by Izetbegović: say one thing but do something else, while having a token Croat (and maybe Serb) in the ABiH or the Presidency or the Government to give the impression of multi-ethnicity and legitimacy. See e.g., Witness Christopher Beese, Trial Transcript, 28 August 2006, pp. 5275-5278, discussing Exh. 1D00814; Witness Mile Akmadžić, Trial Transcript, 19 June 2008, pp. 29647-29659. 23 Interestingly, Brendan Simms in his UNFINEST HOUR: BRITAIN AND THE DESTRUCTION OF BOSNIA

(Penguin Books, 2002) [NOT IN EVIDENCE], recounts an initiative by UK Gen. Michael Rose where it would appear that Andreev, much like Shakespeare’s Iago in OTHELO, was behind it as both progenitor

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Andreev’s musings on geopolitics during this meeting are somewhat bizarre.25 They

seem to be akin to coffeehouse political theorizing, though Andreev is obviously trying to

impress and perhaps influence his audience with his views, especially given his

background and position. Andreev’s views concerning “the possibility of a coalition

among the allies in WW2 with possible inclusion of Japan”26 could be interpreted to

mean that Germany, Italy and Turkey will be lending their support to the Croats and

Muslims, so the Serbs will need to look to England, France, the US and Russia for

support. It could be that Andreev is simply rambling on because of his sense of self-

importance and the attention lavished on him by his attentive audience, or that he is

clearly attempting to manipulate the thinking of the Serbs. Whatever the case may be,

Andreev appears to be promoting an agenda that conflicts with his remit as an

UNPROFOR Civil Affairs Advisor.

and midwife. The initiative according to General Rose, the then Commander of UNPROFOR, BiH Command, (1994-1995) called for engineering a situation in which “could legitimately employ NATO air strikes in order to demonstrate a more robust UN approach to peacekeeping. After some discussion with [the Russian] Viktor Andreev, who firmly supported the idea,” was “to launch an air strike against the Croats than the Serbs”. As Simms points out: “The thinking behind this gambit was as follows: ‘The Croats were not central to our main effort, and even if they reacted by closing routes, they could not afford to do this for as long as the sizeable Croatian population in the Lasva Valley was wholly dependent on UN aid. Such an attack would send the right signal to Mladic, who would also understand that NATO was not set on destroying the Serbs and that the use of force was impartial. The attack would indeed have sent a signal to Mladic – a dangerous message that the first UN air strike would have been carried out not against the principle aggressors, the Serbs, but against Croat scavengers.” (pp. 184-185, footnotes omitted). Simms also notes that General Rose’s “closest confidant within the UN civilian bureaucracy was certainly the Russian Viktor Andreev, the same man who had enthusiastically endorsed his plans for a first strike against the Croats.” (p. 204). In General Rose’s own words “The only people I felt at ease with, were my own team and particularly Viktor Andreev, whose familiar cure of iced Vodka and caviar always seemed to make me feel better.” (p. 212, footnotes omitted). 24 See e.g. Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, Mladić’s entry of afternoon 15 May 1993, p. 105, where Andreev informs the following: -The situation is better now.

-Amerika has not reached agreement with Europe. - Chances for an intervention are smaller now. -Russia will not allow an intervention.

See also Mladić’s Notebook No. 30, 14 January 1993 entry, pp. 68-71, concerning his conversations with Russian Colonel Shipilov and Mladić’s Notebook No. 30, 19 January 1993 entry, pp. 73-76, concerning his conversation with Russian Colonel Genadij Sorokin. Whether this is serendipitous or part of a concerted effort to embed themselves into the Bosnian Serb military leadership in order to advance their own or mutual agenda is unknown. These conversations do reveal, however, an underlying theme: Russia is willing and able to assist. To what extent Andreev may have been behind these meetings is speculative, but these and other like coincidences may be more than just that – particularly when viewing Andreev’s modus operandi. 25 See Mladić’s Notebook No. 39, pp. 234-244. 26 Id., at p. 236.

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In this entry there is also a reference about a document having been signed by Austria,

Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia.27 This may be relevant, but without more information it

is impossible to tell.

Andreev’s assessments of the Balkans and “where the interests of the East and West

meet” are interesting in the sense that it resembles the thoughts of Tuñman and are

similar to Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations.28 This is relevant in that it

shows that Tuñman’s thoughts on this issue are hardly novel or dark.

Lastly, Andreev’s answer to Mladić’s question “How do you see the resolution of the

crisis in our country [presumably SFRY],” that “The secession of Bosnia is the biggest

blow”29 is too Delphic to decipher. Given the context, it could give the impression to

Mladić that the Serbs should not simply accept BiH’s secession without taking some

measures, including military action. Query whether Andreev is interposing himself as an

agent provocateur.

3 June 1992

Here Mladić records a meeting he held with Thornberry concerning the Sarajevo airport

and modalities for providing humanitarian aid. Thornberry is holding this meeting

because he was instructed to do so by the Secretary General of the UN,30 and was ordered

to remain there while the negotiations are taking place; “the G/S wants [Thornberry] to

send him a report by tomorrow evening ON A PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT.”31

Relevant to the subject of Andreev are the remarks made by Thornberry to Mladić:

“I have not had the opportunity to 27 Id., at pp. 236-37. 28 See e.g testimony of Prlić Defence Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 8 May 2008, pp. 27778-27781; see also SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATION AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD

ORDER 239, 242 (First Touchstone Edition 1997). 29 Id., at 244. 30 Mladić’s Notebook No. 40, pp. 61-62. 31 Id., at p. 63.

61776


meet the General before, I have only

heard his reputation,

and I have heard from VIKTOR

ANDREYEV that he has

several constructive con-

versations with you.”

As was seen from Thornberry’s testimony, he valued Andreev as one of the “best, most

experienced reporters”32 of UNPROFOR’s Civil Affairs. This entry also confirms that

Andreev did in fact report to his superior, Thornberry, and that his reports /

representations were valued and in all likelihood relied upon.

The significance of Andreev’s representations become eminently clear when considering

the various entries related to Andreev and his discussions with Mladić and other Bosnian

Serb leaders – political and military. Given Andreev’s “games,” the Trial Chamber

cannot but pause and wonder about what sort of information Andreev was feeding his

superiors and subordinates / colleagues, and how his information, misinformation and

disinformation colored the perception of UNPROFOR, ultimately impacting on some of

the parties - such as how the Croats are to be perceived by the internationals

(UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ECMM, etc.) and reported upon.33

15 May 1993

Here is another example of Andreev providing inside information to the Serbs, and in

doing so, influencing the course of events on the ground and the negotiating table.

Before discussing what is attributed to Andreev during his meeting with Mladić, it may

be useful to dwell a bit – for contextual reasons - on what is recorded from an earlier

meeting held that day between General Morrillon and Mladić. It is unclear whether

Andreev was present at this meeting, though it seems that at some point (Mladić’s

32 Supra note 3. 33 Approximately 27 documents authored or received by Andreev have been admitted as exhibits.

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Notebook. No. 36, entry of 1350 hours, p. 102 General Petković joins the meeting. The

entries to the first meeting on this day (1100 hours, p. 100), shows that General Morillon

notes, quite rightly given the UN’s remit: “The idea is to solve the problem between you,

AI [Alija Izetbegović], Boban, with the UNPROFOR support.” Clearly, General

Morillon is impressing on Mladić that it is up to the parties (through their representatives)

to the conflict to identify, accept and implement a mutually agreed solution.

Conversely, we have Andreev in a participatory role for or with the Serbs, as he informs

Mladić that there is no need to fear US intervention: the chances are lower and “Russia

will not allow” it.34 He then goes on to provide information about General Morillon, in

the context of his French background:35

-“It is important that British units have been in the field for 7 months, they have a

record of resolving international conflicts and, of course, the British know how to

work with the civilians, while the French always have a programme of their own.

-General MORILLON is a nice person, but he occasionally does terrible

things; he /?sees himself/ as the saviour of Sarajevo.

-MORILLON always considers that he resolves things well.

- In Srebrenica, he almost caused a catastrophe, but you controlled the

situation beautifully. – You sorted this out well.

-MORILLON is due to go in June, it is very difficult to work with him.

- What you need to know is that whenever there is an important decision, he

[Morillon] should not be involved, but General WAHLGREN should come.

Clearly – setting aside Andreev’s personal assessment about Srebrenica and his

congratulatory remarks about how Mladić handled that situation well, a matter which also

belies Andreev’s wanton character36 - he is explicitly undermining General Morillon’s

authority, who at the time was the Commander of the UN Forces in BiH.

34 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, p. 105 (emphasis added). 35 Id., at 106 (emphasis added). 36 Similarly he notes on p. 107, “The Venezuelan ambassador wants to be president, so he behaved in a very provocative way. Luckily, we managed to water it down. You responded really well by letting the ambassadors into Srebrenica. You did an excellent job with the agreement in Srebrenica, and he wanted to destroy us all.” Id. Andreev is referring to the Agreement between the ABiH and the VRS for the

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It is unclear who the “non-aligned” Andreev was referring to when he remarked: “I do

not like the zone around Sarajevo. This was a proposal by the non-aligned countries,

perhaps they need some sort of war, they can finance it.” Nonetheless this is quite a

remarkable statement.

Andreev makes an observation that has been shared by others concerning Sarajevo and

the Muslims. He notes: “The Muslims are the biggest problem to resolve. As soon as

you say “yes”, they will say “no”. It is in their interest for Sarajevo to remain a

problem.” 37

Mladić asks Andreev what he would do if he were Mladić.38 To this question Andreev

provides a long list of suggestions.39 He begins by suggesting that concerning the

removal of Serb artillery, the Serbs should make it conditional based on the Muslim

infantry retreating, since the Serb “problem” is their [Muslim] infantry. This is

significant when considering that during the VOPP negotiations, Izetbegović used the

removal of the Serb artillery as an excuse for not agreeing to some aspects of the

VOPP.40

demilitarization of Žepa and Srebrenica, brokered by UNPROFOR and signed by Mladić, Halilović and Morillon on 8 May 1993; see Exh. P11192. 37 This virtually mirrors the approach Izetbegović advocated, a negotiating tactic so no agreement could ever be reached. See Exh. 4D00930, Tape recording of the session of Presidency of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on January 14, 1994, where Alija Izetbegović, while Presiding over the meeting advised:

Let us all understand all these talks we had - including republics and 33% etc., nothing of it has been determined. Because Klas warned me, when I talked about some things, he said: "You know Mr. Izetbegović the rule about politics - until we agree on everything we agreed on nothing." So, so far we have not agreed on anything. These are all just preconditions for some agreement. Of course if it suits us we can go back to the beginning. We only have to ask ourselves if we have better solution. But as soon as we see that we are better off, turn everything back to the beginning. Then we have to turn everything back.

See also DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 218-221 (Guernsey Press Co. Ltd, 1996) (“OWEN”), (Exh. 1D01548), where Ganić’s strategy and tactics are revealed by Lord Owen. 38 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, at 108. 39 Id., at 108-11. 40 See e.g. OWEN, at 110-11, where Lord Owen recounts when Izetbegović in 30 January 1993 first agreed to VOPP constitutional principles and the “Bosnian Serbs signed the agreement on cessation of hostilities,” only to have Izetbegović, who had previously agreed, say that “his reservations on heavy weapons precluded him from signing.”

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Andreev provides sage advice to the Serbs on how to win at the public relations game,

since, in Andreev’s words, “this is a TV war”.41 He reiterates that “The Muslims want

Sarajevo to remain blocked”42 and they “know that they are provoking” the Serbs. He

urges the Serbs to “be categorical” with the UN and to insist that “Be decisive – we

cannot withdraw without UN troops in the zone.”43 He also instructs Mladić “If you ask

for the civilian police at once, we do not have a mandate, and we are approaching

the UN and this gives you some time.”44

When asked by Tošo whether “the Muslims agree to some sort of demilitarisation and a

possible withdrawal of forces,” Andreev responds: “Unfortunately they are not in

favour of any demilitarisation. We have applied considerable pressure on them, we

told them that they were prepared to sacrifice their people for an intervention. You

were on the verge of a victory in Srebrenica, and they will not accept this in Sarajevo.”45

41 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, at 106. 42 Id., at 109 (emphasis added). 43 Id.,at 110. 44 Id., at 110-11 (emphasis added). 45 Id., p. 111 (emphasis added). Andreev’s conclusions about the willingness of the Muslim political leadership to sacrifice its people and effective use them as cannon fodder or expendable bargaining chips was also shared by Lord Owen. Two examples from his Balkan Odyssey merit recalling. One example is when Lord Owen asked “why he did not let Muslim children and their mothers leave Sarajevo he retorted that the British would never have let them leave London during the Blitz and seemed genuinely surprised when I told him how Churchill’s government arranged for children to not only leave London but to go as far afield as Canada.”(Exh. 1D01552, at p. 264). Another example concerns Ejup Ganić, commonly referred to and thought of as the “Vice President” of the Presidency of BiH (a title or position which did not exist - at least de jure); a Muslim who actually hailed from Sandžak, Serbia and not BiH. According to Lord Owen:

He [Ganić] has one central policy objective, namely to involve the US army as a combatant in the Bosnian fight to defeat the Serbs. As he sees it, to achieve his aim – of which he makes no secret – he is entitled to use whatever means are necessary. To him the end justifies those means. He orchestrates Bosnian government propaganda, operating at every level in the US – at the White House, on Capitol Hill and on the television screens in American homes. {…} There is a doggedness about his character that shows itself in his readiness to spend much time in Sarajevo and take the risks of its citizens; but the focus of his attention and his travels is on the US. He knows that you have to spend money to be heard in America and is ready therefore to employ media consultants and use all the modern techniques of communications. [...] His message is simple – ‘we are the victims’- and like all good propagandists he does not shrink from repeating the message over and over again. He authorizes publicity to depict Muslims as victims. He fears Sarajevo going off the headlines, for that will mean less pressure on US politicians to intervene. It is a very credible but ruthless strategy from the Muslim point of view and its continuing influence is too often underrated, for Ganić’s message is relayed on by Sacirbej and Silajdžić, both skilled in television and radio. […] I left Sarajevo for Zagreb and Geneva [19 December 1992] hopeful but worried, for I had detected that the strongest resistance to our agreement was coming not from the Bosnian Serbs but

61772


Andreev then advises Mladić that he should write to UNHCR, to Sadako Ogata, the then

UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and provides Mladić with a list of points the letter

should cover.46 Whether this list is a genuine expression of goodwill offered in the spirit

of cooperation or purely for propaganda or obfuscation purposes is unclear. Nonetheless,

when viewed in the context of the discussion held during that meeting, Andreev, yet

again, seems to be using his inside knowledge to advise Mladić and his colleagues on

how best to engage high level members of the UN in order to curry favor or persuade,

while pursuing the Serb political and military agenda.

When asked about Jeremy Braid (believed to have then been the Sarajevo Head of

UNHCR), Andreev reveals that he does not like Owen, that Braid is “an excellent man

but he is part of Owen’s team” and that “Owen is against the Serbs.”47 He then notes that

“ the [VOPP] plan is dead, but it should not be referred to as that, we will stick to

that until we get something new.”48 From this exchange it is rather evident that

Andreev is undermining the peace efforts which are being co-sponsored by the UN along

with the EU. In light of Andreev’s position, it is only reasonable to conclude that these

sorts of representations cannot but influence the way the Serbs will behave at the

negotiations – which, after all, are being conducted in order to find an immediate

resolution to the conflict. Andreev follows up by informing Mladić of the new issues that

are going to be offered at a future meeting in Athens,49 thus giving the Serbs the heads-up

so they can develop their negotiating posture in advance of the negotiations. Andreev

ends by telling Mladić that the conflict between the Muslims and Croats will not stop and

that “Many at the UN don’t like you. They will do everything to po /unclear/”50 Mladić

ends his entries on this meeting by noting “Propaganda is a very powerful thing and it is

strongly against the Serbs.”51

from Ejup Ganić. Demilitarization in Sarajevo would remove the most powerful weapon in his propaganda armoury for involving the US. A quiet Sarajevo was, he almost admitted, not in his interests, and he preferred a continuation of the siege.”

(Exh. 1D01547, at pp. 89-90). 46 Id., at. 113. 47 Id., at 114. 48 Id.(emphasis added). 49 Id. 50 Id., at 115. 51 Id.

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Unquestionably this sort of a remark exposes Andreev’s sentiments toward the Serbs; it

can hardly be viewed as a constructive observation from a high official of UNPROFOR.

If anything, Andreev’s views on this point could easily been construed by Mladić that the

Serb political and military leadership - being the victims of a propaganda campaign

conducted by some internationals - should continue in the same vein since they are on the

right path – or at least the path appreciated and supported by Russia.

18 May 1993

This entry deals with a meeting between Mladić and Morillon in the presence of

Karadžić. Three days before this meeting (see 15 May 1993 entry), Andreev is quoted as

having said that the VOPP is dead. At this meeting with Morrilon, Mladić quotes

Karadžić as saying almost exactly what Andreev had said: “The V/O plan is dead for

us.” Karadžić’s coincidental use of almost the exact language used by Andreev, is

startling. Perhaps it is just a coincidence. But then, it just may be a fine example of how

the inside information being passed on by Andreev to the Bosnian Serb political and

military leadership is being used in their dealings with UNPROFOR representatives and

others, such as the international negotiators.

Relevant to the 15 and the 18 May 1993 Mladić entries, it bears highlighting that the UN,

and in particular the UN Security Council, has been engaged in fostering the peace-

negotiating process. For example, on 7 April 1993, approximately a month prior to

Andreev telling Mladić that the VOPP is dead, the UN Security Council passed

Resolution 820, commanding

the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form agreed to by two of the Bosnian parties and set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March 1993 (S/25479), namely the Agreement on Interim Arrangements (annex I), the nine Constitutional Principles (annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV);52

When considering Mladić’s entries of 15 May and 18 May 1993, it would appear that

Andreev is working at cross-purposes with the UN - the very same organization which is 52 Exh. P01924, section, para. 1.

61770


effectively employing him. Whether within the UN or elsewhere (such as within the US

government) the VOPP is perceived to be or is actually “dead” at this particular time, is

utterly irrelevant. What is relevant, however, is that Andreev, a member of UNPROFOR,

imbued with the influence and authority of the UN, is undermining the peace process.

20 June 1993

Mladić in this entry has Andreev saying:

- OWEN is going, he's out

- STOLTENBERG may be staying.

- The V–O plan is finished

- There will be one Serbian republic in BH,

two Croatian (Mostar and Posavina) and

two Muslim ones (the Cazin Krajina and Central Bosnia)

- Intervention is still possible. -

- They are after ABDIĆ

- Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ is playing a balancing act, GANIĆ

would like the war to go to Serbia and Kosovo

- Muslim access - provocations -53

Here is yet another example of Andreev passing on a heady cocktail of inside information

and observations. Unquestionably, Andreev is offering this information to Mladić in

order to assist him, Karadžić and other Bosnian Serb political and military leaders in their

future course of actions concerning the international negotiations.

6 November 1993

The entries related to the meeting between Mladić and Andreev on 6 November 1993

provide another fine example of Andreev’s questionable behavior. Here are but a few

significant remarks attributed to Andreev:54

53 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, p. 225 (emphasis added). NOTE: a more accurate translation of the last line is believed to be: “Approach of Muslims – a provocation”.

61769


- The Americans want the whole of BH. Izetbegović wanted to sign, but the US

stayed his hand.

- SILAJDŽIĆ is talking to the US Ambassador every day. SILAJDŽIĆ wanted

to set up a meeting between Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and KARADŽIĆ to have

the Serbs reject ABDIĆ. KARADŽIĆ wisely refused to do so.

- BRIQUEMONT is a good man, MORILLON was a fool.

- COT is like MORILLON …

- The Muslims want to replace STOLTENBERG and OWEN. The

international community does not know what to do.

- Ganić is quiet these days, HALILOVIĆ has been detained, he has links to

Sandžak mafia …

Andreev then provides detailed information on the composition of the BiH government,

including personal information concerning every member of the government.55 The

information appears to have details that would not have necessarily been publicly

available. No reason is provided as to why this information is being offered, though

obviously it would have been useful to Mladić.

18 January 1994

Once again Andreev is attributed to have been providing useful inside information to

Mladić. The following excerpts are rather telling.

- they, Muslims, asked for the removal of Owen and they talk of substituting

both, they will take a different approach where the Fed.Secu. would create

new frameworks and resolutions that don’t maintain the current situation.56

- They want to merge the future w/ the SC Resolutions.57

54 Mladić’s Notebook No. 44, p. 15. 55 Id., at 16-18. 56 Mladić’s Notebook No. 35, pp. 8-9. 57 Id., at 9.

61768


- Muslims will try to scare the Serbs with the creation of a union with H, a

union is not possible, it’s a political game, because F. Tuñman proposed on

option and Alija another.58

- Your army is losing its positions, you have no infantry, they are calculating

that you can’t conduct a serious off…59

- Muslims are counting that they have managed the Winter.60

- There was never agreement in the triangle Stoltenberg-Cot-Thornberry …61

- Cot is leaving, since 12:00 o’ clock yesterday he is no longer in command, the

reason is that in the last four months relations between military and political

structures are becoming more complicated.62

- The political UN leadership is against bombing the Serbs while the military

leadership is in favour of bombing.63

- NATO doesn’t have maneuvering space for new requests towards you, they

listen to the Muslims and Americans.64

- It should be emphasized that in a humanitarian sense this airport holds no

significance, and you should point out that convoys enter T every day. You

should say this and help us.65

- Muslims think that if you won’t hand over the airport. This will cause NATO

to strike against you.66

- They want to provoke a NATO attack.67

- There are differences in New York, the SC is removed from reality!68

- Here and in Geneva and New York the positions are the same – against the

use of force and strike, but in the Security Council there are opposing opinions

– and the danger has not yet been removed.69

58 Id. 59 Id. 60 Id. 61 Id. 62 Id., at 10. 63 Id. 64 Id. 65 Id., at 11. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id.

61767


- Airport Tuzla will keep the Muslims from signing an agreement, which is

good.70

- This issue took on a national change in the USA which is creating problems

for us.71

- Your arguments concerning a/T are completely OK you could constantly keep

asking the question regarding guarantees that no one can give, so discussions

are held up with all sides, and we have to have agreement of all sides.72

- This in itself is the essence of peace, there is a conflict between those who are

in favour of the parties and the diplomacy of use of force.73

- The Muslims know that what they get now they will have for history, for the

first time they feel like a nation and have a high level of moral. They shift

their forces to take piece by piece from the Croats.74

- The USA has still not said to the Alija Izetbegović side – this is enough.75

7, 8 & 9 April 1994

To fully appreciate Andreev’s behavior and actions, as well as his ability to influence

those in UNPROFOR with whom he was working with, it warrants observing three

consecutive entries; together, a rather convincing picture emerges that Andreev was not

just advising the Bosnian Serbs as noted above, but that he is also engaged in advancing

the Bosnian Serb agenda.

7 April 1994

Here there is an exchange between General Rose and Mladić in the presence of Andreev.

Mladić records:76

General Rose:

69 Id. 70 Id. 71 Id. 72 Id. (emphasis added). 73 Id. 74 Id., at 14. 75 Id. 76 Mladić’s Notebook No. 31, p. 7.

61766


-As far as I know you were the one to suggest a cease fire in the entire territory …

-The Muslims are asking that you retreat to Goražde to the position you held 9

days ago, and that you remain at the other positions.

-He offered that the issue of Goražde be resolved first and then the global plan.

V. Andrejev:

-Allow us to organize a meeting at the Sarajevo airport – so that we may first

discuss the global plan.

8 April 1994

This entry is titled: NEGOTIATIONS with representatives of UNPROFOR.77

*they are attempting everything possible to give the Muslims an honorable

withdrawal for the situation …

Viktor:

-the Muslims don’t want a cease fire across the entire territory ….

-they want to talk, if you would accept a temporary cease fire and withdrawal at

Goražde…

Gen. Rose:

-the opposite side is sensitive and they are afraid that the country will be like

Cyprus.

9 April 1994

This entry is titled: MEETING with the Muslim delegation.78

*Mr. Rose (R):

-implement a cease fire over the entire territory of BiH

77 Id., at 8. 78 Id., at 9.

61765


[…]

*Andrejev (VA):

-the agreement is ready to be signed.

Mr. Mladić:

*we have submitted our draft of an Agreement on complete and permanent cease

of hostilities …

When all three consecutive entries are viewed, one plausible conclusion emerges:

Andreev has the capacity to influence not just the civilian sector of UNRPOFOR but the

military sector as well. The Bosnian Serb leadership was pressing for a “global plan of a

cease fire in the entire territory. From a strategic and tactical point of view, such an

agreement would have born no fruit, particularly when considering the logistics involved

in maintaining and enforcing such a global plan. Andreev’s retort is that a meeting be

held not to discuss what the Muslims are pressing for, but for the Bosnian Serb proposal,

i.e. for a global plan. The following day, Andreev remarks what is already known, i.e.

“the Muslims don’t want a cease fire across the entire territory,” and we see Rose’s

understanding of the Muslim’s reasoning. Whether the Muslim leadership to simply

content to keep fighting because it is only interested in a situational cease fire for tactical

purposes (such as just around Goražde), is a matter of speculation, though it does seem to

fit within the overall Muslim strategy.79 However, what does seem clear is that on the

third meeting of 9 April 1994 with the Muslim delegation and Mladić, Rose is declaring

that “a cease fire over the entire territory of BiH” (global plan) be implemented, while

Andreev remarks that “the agreement is ready to sign,” which, coincidently, Mladić has

submitted as a draft. The fact that Rose does a sudden about-face in favor of the Bosnian

Serb position seems far too coincidental when considering that Andreev’s machinations

and his behind-the-scene relations with Mladić, Karadžić and others within the Bosnian

Serb leadership.

79 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 16 January 2008, pp. 26300-26301, discussing Exh. 4D00498; Witness Slobodan Praljak, Trial Transcript, 26 May 2009, pp. 40701-40702; Witness Milivoj Petković, Trial Transcript, pp. 49417-49425.

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