public reason - volume 1, number 2, june 2009

8/14/2019 Public Reason - Volume 1, Number 2, June 2009

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PUBLIC REASON

Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy

Public Reason is a peer-reviewed journal o poliical and moral philosophy. Public Reason publishesaricles, book reviews, as well as discussion noes rom all he elds o poliical philosophy and ehics, in-cluding poliical heory, applied ehics, and legal philosophy. Te Journal encourages he debae aroundraionaliy in poliics and ehics in he larger conex o he discussion concerning raionaliy as a philo-sophical problem.Public Reason is commited o a pluralisic approach, promoing inerdisciplinary andoriginal perspecives as long as he ideal o criical argu ing and clariy is respeced. Te journal is inendedor he inernaional philosophical communiy, as well as or a broader public ineresed in poliical andmoral philosophy. I aims o promoe philosophical exchanges wih a special emphasis on issues in, anddiscussions on he Easern European space.Public Reason publishes hree issues per year in February, June,

and November. A leas one issue per year is devoed o a paricular heme.Public Reason is an open accesse-journal, bu i is also available in prin.

Public Reason is available online a htp://publicreason.roISSN 2065-7285EISSN 2065-8958Prin version published byEdiuraUniversiii din Bucurei orPublic Reason. 2009 by Public Reason

EdiorsEdior in ChieRomulus Brancoveanu, University o Bucharest

Associae EdiorTomas Pogge, Yale University

Ediorial eamAssisan EdiorMircea obosaru , University o Bucharest

Laureniu Gheorghe, University o BucharestDorina Parunsu, University o Bucharest

Ediorial BoardOvidiu Caraiani, University Politehnica o BucharestLuigi Carani, University o Catania

Radu Dudau, University o BucharestMircea Dumiru, University o Bucharest

Adrian - Paul Iliescu, University o BucharestFerda Keskin, Istanbul Bilgi University

Valenin Muresan, University o BucharestMihail - R adu Solcan, University o BucharestConsanin Soenescu, University o BucharestIon Vezeanu, University o Grenoble

Advisory BoardSorin Baiasu, Keele UniversityRadu J. Bogdan, ulane UniversityPaula Casal, University o ReadingFred DAgosino, University o QueenslandCecile Fabre, University o Edinburgh

Rainer Fors, Goethe University, Frankurt am MainGerald Gaus, University o Arizona

Axel Gosseries Ramalho, Catholic University oLouvain

Alan Hamlin, University o ManchesterJohn Horon, Keele UniversityJanos Kis, Central European University, BudapestJean-Chrisophe Merle, University o bingenAdrian Miroiu, SNSPA Bucharest

Adrian W. Moore, University o OxordPhilippe Van Parijs, Catholic University o LouvainMark immons, University o Arizona


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PUBLIC REASON

Journal of Political and Moral PhilosophyVol. 1, No. 2, November 2009

ARTICLES

Joseph D. Lewandowski

E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d C o n s t r a i n t s 1Stean Bird-Pollan

Rawls: Construction and Justication 12Christopher Jay

Keeping ruth Sae From Democracy 31Mariam Talos & Chrisoula Andreou

O Human Bonding: An Essay on the Natural History o Agency 45Roman Altshuler

Political Realism and Political Idealism: Te Diference that Evil Makes 73Peter Shiu-Hwa su

How the Ceteris Paribus Principles o Morality Lie 88

BOOK REV IEWS

Adriana Cavarero Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence 9 4Reviewed by Carlo Salzani

Jan-Werner Mller Constitutional Patriotism 9 9Reviewed by Kevin William GrayMeena Dhanda (ed) Reservations or Women, India: Issues in Contemporary

Indian Feminism, v. 6 103Reviewed by Diana Constantinescu

BOOK NOTES


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Public Reason 1 (2): 1-11 2009 by Public Reason

Enlighenmen and Consrains

Joseph D. Lewandowski

Te University of Central Missouri

Absrac. Drawing on recen work in social philosophy and raional choice heory, in hispaper I argue ha he core hemaic o Kans Wha is Enlighenmen? is he relaionship

beween reason and consrains. I discuss in some deail Kans deniion o and disincionbeween privae and public uses o reason. Mos generally, I mainain ha while Kans senseo he privae use o reason is oo narrowly conceived, his cosmopolian noion o he publicuse o reason is ar oo broad. As a more robus alernaive, I propose an accoun o consiuiveconsrains and characerize more ully wha i means or individuals o make reexive use oreason vis--vis such consrains.

Key words: consrains, Enlighenmen, reedom, reason, reexiviy.

Te explici concern o Kans Wha is Enlighenmen? is inarguably ha o hepower o he public use o reason. Ye here is, or so I wan o claim, an even more unda-menal quesion a issue here, namely, ha o he relaionship beween reason and con-srains. In ac, hroughou Wha is Enlighenmen?, originally published in he 1784ediion o heBerlinische Monatsschri, reasons role in asceraining he enabling and limi-ing condiions o cerain kinds o consrains is crucial o Kans argumen. Early on in

he ex Kan asks: Bu which sor o consrain (Einschrnkung) hinders enlighenmen?And which, insead o hindering i, can in ac enhance i? (55).1 Kans well-known an-swer is ha while ighly consraining he privae use o reason enables civil order and agovernmens procuremen o public ends (56), he public use o reason mus always beunconsrained, and i alone can bring enlighenmen o he human condiion (55). Inpursing his l ine o inquiry i is perhaps no surprising ha Kan concludes his reecions

by noing he way in which a lesser degree o civil reedom can acually ensure ever-greaer degrees o inellecual reedom and, over ime, he opporuniy and capaciy o

ac reely (59).Te issue Kan wresles wih here, commonly known as he paradox o choice, is ha

less is oen imes, bu no always, more. In ac, o pu i somewha crudely, I hink hahe challenge laid ou in Wha is Enlighenmen? is o use reason o deermine whenless is more and when i is no. Or, o describe he mater in erms o be elaboraed here,he criical ask o enlighenmen in Kans sense is o make reexive use o reason o op-imize consrains. Wih he phrase reexive use o reason I mean simply he embeddedand embodied capaciy o human beings o make explici and aler he condiions ha

enable and limi hough and acion. By opimize consrains I mean modiying and/or creaing he kinds o rules and norms ha maximize human reedoms o hough andacion. O course I shall endeavor o clariy and provide examples o wha is mean by

1] ransla ion modied, as are all subsequen ciaions o he English ediion (1970) o Kans Whais Enlighenmen? cied here.


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Enlightenment and Constraints2

hese erms in wha ollows. Bu o sae my hesis briey: he purpose o he reexive useo reason is o ge he various consrains o sociey righ. Indeed, i he ulimae objeciveo enlighenmen is reedom, as Kan suggess, hen he proper moto o enlighenmen is,

opimize consrains!2Now, he conemporary philosophical landscape oers several dieren pahs or

re-hinking Kans concerns in Wha is Enlighenmen?. Bu wo pahs in paricularprovide a useul conras or raming he argumen o be developed here. Te rs, blazed

by Niezsche bu exensively widened by Niezschean-inspired pos-moderniss, ispursued in a decidedly skepical and un-Kanian way. Here appeals o he use o reason,however concepualized and operaionalized in various hisorical momens, are viewedas inherenly masking relaions o dominaion and he will o power. Hisory, poliics,

science, knowledge, moraliy all hese are consrued as raionalizing processes o hu-man subjugaion in which coningen consrains o he dominan evenually harden inosrucures and sysems ha esablish he un-ree order o hings. Consequenly, in he

words o Foucaul, i is only in an hisorical onology o ourselves (1984, 45) ha heenlighenmens criical engagemen wih consrains can be redeemed. In such a pos-modern onology wha is sough is an hisorical analysis o he limis ha are imposed onus and an experimen wih he possibiliy o going beyond hem (1984, 50). 3 In place ohe use o reason, his pah o exisenial experimenaion, where Niezsche and Foucaul

are joined by Baaille (1985; 1993), Heidegger (1991), and Derrida (1978; 1985), seeks anaesthetic rapporta soi where inernalized limis may be ransgressed in wha Foucaul oncecrypically described as echniques o managemen (1983, 18) o he sel.

By conras, here is a well-esablished second roue ha does no enail a skepicalpoin o deparure rom Kan. Insead, i seeks o provide a posiive accoun o he condi-ions needed o realize he projec o enlighenmen in a undamenally Kanian way. Inac, his approach, developed mos prominenly by Rawls (1971; 1999) and Habermas(1991), aims o reconsruc he emergence o an acually exising public sphere and de-

end a normaive accoun o he use o reason in such a sphere. Wih heir demands haindividuals deach hemselves rom he social milieu, subsanive ideniies, and hisoricalexperiences ha shape hem, he conemporary heirs o Kans ormulaion o he publicuse o reason aim o creae he necessary condiions or democraic inclusion. Hence orneo-Kanians such as Rawls and Habermas, raional deliberaion consiues he norma-ive medium o he public use o reason, while social absracion remains he precondiionor he empirical realizaion o such reasoning in acual public space.

In my discussion here I should like o consider he relaionship beween reason and

consrains rom a somewha dieren angle. Raher han draw on he curren work inneo-Kanian philosophy or pursue srong pos-modern criiques o ha line o hinking,

2] For a relaed rea men o Kan, see Brandom 1979.

3] For a criical analysis o Foucauls accoun o power and agency, see especially Habermas 1987;1989.


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Joseph D. Lewandowski 3

I shall inroduce recen work in social philosophy and raional choice heory o oulinean accoun o consiuive consrains, and hen connec ha accoun o he reexive useo reason aimed a consrain opimizaion. Te overarching purpose o pursuing such a

discussion is wo-old. On he one hand, I wan o clariy and characerize more ully heconsiuive naure and uncion o consrains in Kans hinking. On he oher hand, I

wan o propose an orienaion oward hose consrains ha is neiher over-deermined by relaions o power nor under-deermined by absrac appeals o wha Kan calls apublic o world-readers (55). On my accoun, enlighened agens are bes undersoodas highly reexive consrain-opimizers who are no more reducible o eecs o powerhan hey are inaable o ree-oaing members o a world public. Along wih a gain inconcepual clariy, he virue o such an accoun is ha i engages Kans hinking abou

enlighenmen in a way ha does no require a heoreical descripion or empirical real-izaion o he public.

Consequenly i mus be emphasized a he ouse ha he goal here is no o reha-biliae a neo-Kanian accoun o he public use o reason. Nor, however, is i my inen-ion o conribue o he general skepicism ha clouds he prospec o he use o publicreason in conemporary lie.4 Raher, my principle aim is o give more precise deniiono a concepion o consrains ha is implici bu under-developed in Kans ex, and heno characerize wha i means o adop a reexive orienaion oward hose consrains.

My argumen, in sum, is ha i is no publiciy bu raher an accoun o reexiviy hais decisive or scruinizing he relaionship beween reason and consrains. Indeed, as Ihope o show, he public use o reason in Kans sense is bes undersood as a disinclyreexive use o reason.

Le me begin, hen, wih a brie summary o Kans atemp o disinguishsharply beween privae and public uses o reason. wo examples oered in Wha isEnlighenmen?, alhough no alogeher analogous, as we shall see, are paricularly il-lusraive o he imporance o he relaionship beween reason and consrains in Kans

hinking here. Te rs is ha o he privae use o reason deployed by a miliary ofcer.As a member o a miliary organizaion, such an individual nds himsel siuaed in a rig-idly consrained marix o chain-o-command ype rules and codes o conduc. In hisconex, as Kan argues, i would be very harmul i an ofcer receiving an order rom hissuperiors were o quibble openly, while on duy, abou he appropriaeness or useulnesso he order in quesion. He mus simply obey(56).

Ye he privae use o reason is crucial no simply o mainain obedience and order. Isuse is also essenial because i is precisely in he ongoing accepance o and adherence o

he shared consrains (rules and codes) o a miliarys organizaional scheme ha cerainindividuals can be dened and coun as ofcers. For being an ofcer consiss in hinkingand acing (i.e., aking and execuing orders) in sric accordance wih he joinly shared

4] Bu or wo insighul discussions o he decis o curren heories o public reason, see especiallyFraser 1997 and, more recenly, Hrubec 2008.


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rules and codes ha dene and make possible a miliary organizaion. In he absence osuch consrains, i is no only difcul o see how an individual could be considered anofcer bu also how a miliary could exis a all. I is precisely shared enabling consrains

(rules and conduc codes) ha, a leas a one basic level, constitute a miliary.Kans example o he clergyman should be similarly consrued. Te clergy, oo,

nds himsel in a conex raher narrowly dened and ye enabled by a joinly shared seo consrains hough hose consrains are perhaps beter hough o as associaional

belies and norms raher han rules and codes, as in he case o he miliary. In he courseo his daily labors, he clergyman is bound by he enabling consrains ha dene andmake possible his posiion and he religious group o which he belongs. Accordingly orKan, he mus make privae use o reason in his work. For wha i means o coun as a

clergy wihin a paricular religious associaion is primarily o represen and disseminaehe esablished belies and norms ha dene ha associaion. In he presence o his con-gregaion, hereore, he clergyman is, as Kan says, obliged o say: Our church eacheshis or ha, and hese are he argumens i uses (56). In oher words, or Kan he narrowask o he clergy qua clergy, like ha o he ofcer qua ofcer, is o embody and expresshe dening-enabling consrains o he associaion, and no o make explici or call inoquesion hose consrains rom wihin he narrow connes o wha Kan characerizes ashe purely privae space o a domesic gahering (57).

In his accoun o he privae use o reason in miliary and religious conexs Kanhas hus idenied he way in which less can indeed be more he way, ha is o say, hacerain sors o consrains dene and enable he exisence o socieal organizaions andassociaions. Ye Kan also realizes ha while necessary, such a use o reason vis--vis en-abling consrains is no sufcien in an enlighened sociey. For while individuals musaccep and adhere o he consrains o he various organizaions and associaions in

which hey are embedded as rule- and code-ollowers or belie- and norm-applicaors hey neverheless require a sandpoin rom which o address emergen siuaions when

less is notmore. Wha is needed, in oher words, is an orienaion rom which o criticizeconsrains when hey become sub-opimal and no longer enable in ways ha hey could,should or were designed o do. In his discussion o he clergy Kan sresses he need oallow or such a criical orienaion when he insiss ha i is absoluely impermissible oagree, even or a single lieime, o a permanen religious consiuion which no one mighpublicly quesion (58). Now or Kan, as we k now, such public quesioning mus be dis-embedded rom socieal consrains, wherein only he privae use o reason is allowed.Indeed, Kan ormulaes he genuinely public (entliche) use o reason precisely as aree or an unconsrained way in which individuals may orien hemselves oward andgain criical purchase on various organizaional or associaional consrains. In makingpublic use o heir reason, ofcers and clergy are hough o be able o socially unbindhemselves and ener ino a real public (57) as men o learning (56), scholars (57) andworld-ciizens (56) limied only by a raional respec or personal value and or he duyo all men o hink or hemselves (55). Tus, he ofcers and clergy shed heir privae


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ideniies and speak in heir own person (56) as scholar[s] addressing he real public(57) regarding he errors in miliary service or he beter arrangemen o religious andecclesiasical aairs (56) . In shor, when more is or has become less, Kan proposes he

public use o reason.Tere are our iner-relaed issues raised by Kans disincion beween he uses o

reason and sense o consrains ha I should like o consider here. o begin wih, i musbe poined ou ha Kans use o he erm privae use (Privatgebrauch) is concepuallyconusing. Clearly wha he means and wha all o his examples illusrae is somehingdecidedlyun-private. Miliary organizaions and religious associaions as well as bureau-cracies and he various venues o civil sociey inhabied by Kans oher example o ax-paying ciizens aresocialsies. By social sies wha is mean here is simply hose collec-ive locaions or conexs where he acions, belies, atiudes and ideniies o individualsare in various ways inerlocking and inerdependen where, ha is o say, a sense o wecreaes plural subjecs, o borrow Margare Gilbers (1989) useul concepion. Miliaryorganizaions and religious associaions are plural subjec phenomena insoar as hey arecomprised o individuals whose individual menal saes necessarily include he sharedconsciousness o a uniy and commimen o underake join acions with others. Teconcepual poin o be claried is ha individual ofcers and clergy don merely make

privae use o reason in he respecive conexs o heir daily work; raher, hey coun asofcers and clergy precisely because hey mus individually reason in ways ha reexivelyadop and incorporae he consrains shared byother individuals who exis wihin heirorganizaional or associaional we. Hence he privae use o reason in Kans sense isreally one o he reexive uses o reason vis--vis socieal consrains I shall reurn o hispoin below.

Second, in Wha is Enlighenmen? socieal consrains have, as we have seen, adisinc uncion o which Kan alludes bu does no adequaely develop. Specically,

he uncion o such consrains is o dene and enable: ha is, hey creae and mainainhe possibiliy o cerain shared ways o hinking and acing. In oher words, sociealconsrains are constitutive consrains. Unlike hard consrains (such as ha o graviy orechnical limis such as hose ha once limied lm-making o silen movies), consiuiveconsrains are hose so bounds ha boh consiue and are inenionally consiued bycerain plural subjec eniies.5

Te deniion o consiuive consrains I wan o ariculae here may also be un-dersood by way o John Searles disincion beween regulaive and consiuive rules. 6 In

his work on he consrucion o social realiy, Searle (1995) argues ha:

5] In an exended discussion o Durkheim and Gilber, I have sough o explain how consrains undersood as social acs can be boh objecively given o and subjec ively made by human acors.See Lewandowski 2002 .

6] A relaed bu much earlier discussion o his disincion al ready appears in Rawls 1955.


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Some rules regulae anecedenly exising aciviies. For example, he rule drive on herigh-hand side o he road regulaes driving; bu driving can exis prior o he exisence oha rule. However, some rules do no merely regulae, hey also creae he very possibili y ocerain aciviies. Tus he rules o chess do no regulae an anecedenly exising aciviyRaher, he rules o chess creae he very possibili y o playing chess. Te rules are constitutiveo chess in he sense ha playing chess is consiued in par by acing in accord wih he rules.(27-28)

Wha I have been calling socieal consrains (or wha in Kans examples mighmore accuraely be designaed organizaional and associaional consrains) are consiu-ive in much he same way ha Searles consiuive rules are: in boh cases such consiu-ing limis do no merely regulae bu also creae wha couns as playing chess or being an

ofcer or clergy. Indeed, as we have seen, wha Kan misleadingly calls he privae use oreason can exis only wihin a sysem o shared consiuive consrains.Tird, he exisence and ongoing mainenance o consiuive consrains akes

place in conesed elds o hough and acion, and hus he so-called privae use o rea-son is much more sociologically complex han Kans accoun suggess. Pu simply, wheresocieal consrains are presen, less is almos always more or some, and no or ohers.7Or, o pu he poin in Searlean erms: while he consiuive rules o chess can be saido be equally enabling and consraining or all players, he same canno be said or he

consiuive consrains o socieal organizaions and associaions. In ac, while consiu-ive socieal consrains are by deniion joinly shared, hey can and oen do uncion inprooundly sraiying ways o creae wha Pierre Bourdieu (1977) calls a habius.8 Tais o say ha such consrains characerisically engender posiions o privilege amongsome o hose who share hem, as well as condiions o exclusion or many o hose ousideo hem. In he consiuive consrains o many miliary organizaions and religious as-sociaions hroughou he world, or example, women simply canno coun as ofcers orclergy.

Moreover, hose individuals who are able o achieve posiions o ascendancy wihinexclusionary miliary organizaions and religious associaions do so a leas in par be-cause o heir more or less successul atemps o navigae and gain conrol over he vari-ous maerial and symbolic goods available wihin hose consrains. Indeed, among oheracors, becoming an ofcer or clergy involves acquiring a eel or maneuvering wihinand ou-maneuvering ohers in sruggles or power wihin paricular organizaional andassociaional consrains. I is precisely in his way ha, or example, he sense o we o a

7] Numerous everyday ex amples spring o mind. o elaborae jus one: i is a sae be ha mos iner-naional airl ine ravelers would preer one pre-deermined gourme meal o he prevail ing in-igh choicebeween chicken and vegeable pasa. Bu i I am member o a vegan cu lure and he pre-seleced meal is,say, seak au poivre, hen clearly less is no more or me in his case.

8] Specically, Bourdieu denes habius as he durably insal led generaive principle o regulaedimprovisaions (1977, 78). I have elsewhere discussed he relaive srenghs and weaknesses o Bourdieusaccoun o habius a nd heory o pracice (Lewandowski 200 0).


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miliar y organizaion consiued largely by hierarchical command chains oen becomesso sraied ha he ofcers sense o we does no include he men hey command.

Finally, Kan appears o over-reach in his characerizaion o he public use o rea-

son as a kind o cosmopolianism ouside oallconsiuive consrains. o reurn or amomen o he example o he miliary ofcer alluded o above: imagine ha such an o-cer waned o address he problem o sraicaion wihin his miliary organizaion. Asalready noed, while some degree o organizaional sraicaion may be necessary or heuncioning o a miliar y, oo much sraicaion is clearly sub-opimal, and hreaens hekind o plural subjechood required or he successul execuion o operaions in he eld.On Kans accoun, an ofcer who sensed ha exising consrains no longer sufcienlyenabled is enjoined o adop an orienaion enirely ouside o he consiuive consrains

ha dene him as an ofcer or member o a naion-sae and speak simply as a man olearning o a world public.

Ye while i is obvious ha an ofcer should be ree o reason in a way oher hanwha Kan misakenly calls privae, appealing o a specically public use o reason isunwarraned. Indeed, i is difcul o see how or why a miliary ofcer would shed hemany layers o his social skin, as i were, and address somehing like a world-public. Tepoin o be made is no ha ofcers canno or should no reason rom a perspecive oherhan ha o members o a paricular branch o he miliary or specic naion-sae. Raher,

wha mus be admited is ha heir raional dialog and criique will ineviably be inormedby he consiuive consrains ha creae he condiions o possibiliy o heir ideniies,roles and experiences as acual men o learning. Ta is o say ha ofcers are ofcers;clergy are clergy. And heir publics are wha he social has made hem ou o be, as Kanhimsel ambiguously acknowledges when he says ha an ofcer canno be banned romsubmiting his judgmens abou errors in he miliary o his public ( seinem Publikum)(my emphasis, 56).9

O course ofcers are no only ofcers, and clergy are no only clergy. Inasmuch as

hey are also enlighened agens, hey are all reexive paricipans andobservers in hevarious organizaions, associaions and diverse lie-worlds hey inhabi. Bu i is preciselyor his reason ha disincly privae and public uses o reason nd no place in suchagens ways o reasoning. Te choice enlighenmen presens is no beween making pri-

vae or public use o reason, bu raher among various reexive uses o reason vis--visshared consrains, as I shall ry o make explici below.

In shor, he reexive relaionship beween reason and consrains is no adequaelyelaboraed in Wha is Enlighenmen? Te sources o his shorcoming should by now

be apparen: Kan misleadingly speaks o a privae use o reason, places oo heavy anemphasis on he deniion o and disincion beween he privae and public uses o rea-

9] o complicae maters urher: wha consiues a miliary mans public is no a all obvious. Forexample, in his sudy o W W II A merican and Germa n soldiers, Shils (1951) demonsraes ha i is primar-ily he consiuive consrains o small g roups ha dene and enable he we o an eecive mil iary.


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son, and does no sufcienly characerize he consiuive naure o socieal consrains.Neverheless, in Wha is Enlighenmen? Kan does righly emphasize he imporanceo scruinizing consiuive consrains. Ye i is no in ranscending such consrains in

he name o publiciy bu raher in he reexive use o reason vis--vis consrains haKans claims abou enlighenmen are bes undersood.

In he previous porions o his paper I have hus sough o clariy he consiuivenaure o such consrains, and o highligh some o he ways in which consiuive con-srains are enabling and limiing. In he remainder o my discussion I should like o saya bi more abou wha is mean by he erm reexiviy.10 As I undersand and use i, heerm reexiviy characerizes he relaionship beween reason and consrains implied in

boh o Kans uses o reason. Te use o reason is reexive o he exen ha i seeks o op-

imize consiuive consrains a various momens and in various ways. Such reexiviycan be paradigmaically ound in one o hree orms: choice o consrains; inerrogaiono consrains; and he creaion o new consrains.

In is mos basic orm, a reexive orienaion owards consrains can be ound in heeveryday exercise o raional choice. As we have seen, in one undamenal sense ofcersand clergy are simply hose who have eleced o adhere o one se o shared consrainsraher han anoher. O course i hardly needs o be said ha human acors choices, andhe pahs available o realize hose choices, are never unlimied. As Jon Elser argues, all

human choices are he resul o wo successive lering devices:Te rs is dened by he se o srucural consrains which cus down he se o absraclypossible courses o acion and reduces i o a vasly smaller subse o easible acions. Te sec-ond lering process is he mechanism ha singles ou which member o he easible se shall

be realized. (1984, 113)

Or, o pu he argumen in he erms used here, while all everyday raional choicesvis--vis consiuive consrains are pre-lered by srucural consrains, here is never-heless a kind o cogniive eedback mechanism ha moniors and inorms which o he

available consiuive consrains is o be adoped a various imes and in various conexs.On my accoun, ha mechanism is reexiviy. In his way reexiviy complicaes anysimple or sraighorward causal assumpion abou how he pre-lering eec o sruc-ural consrains migh deermine individual choice o consiuive consrains. Iniially,srucural pre-consrains merely reduce he relaive range o possible choices human ac-ors may reexively op o pursue. Indeed, despie he srucural pre-consrains ha havenarrowed heir opions, raional acors can and do reexively orien (and coninuouslyre-orien) hemselves owards he consiuive consrains ha remain open o hem as

hey seek o realize heir changing preerences and goals in diverse conexs. Tus, or ex-ample, while povery may be a raher severe srucural pre-consrain on an individualseasible se o consiuive consrains, i is no causally deermining o a single human

10] My d iscussion o reexiviy here is in par inormed by Bogdan 2000 and Bourdieu & Wacquan1992. Bu see also Lewandowski 200 0.


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choice, uure course o acion, or expression o values: a poor mans choice o religion orarmed service is no in any necessary way a mere expression o his economic limiaions.11

Addiionally, and o paraphrase Elser (2000), along wih he everyday reexive

choice o consrains comes a disinc kind o inerrogaive reexiviy wihin consrains.Kan, as I have argued, mischaracerizes hese wo reexive uses o raional choice as dis-incly privae and public, or, even more problemaically, as he dierence beween being acog in a machine (56) or a cosmopolian member o he world a large (57). Pace Kan,however, i is no a quesion o mechanisic obedience or a view rom nowhere. Insead,in inerrogaive reexiviy, agens can and do scruinize heir consiuive consrainsin he course o heir exisence as socially embedded reasoners. For as elecive raionalparicipans in he consiuive consrains ha dene heir acions and ideniies, hey

are also always already observers. A cerain imes and in cerain places, such paricipan-observer reexiviy akes menal noe or acively minds he sub-opimal naure andeecs o a given se o consiuive consrains.12 While a oher imes and in oher placeshe reexive use o reason hemaizes and makes explici hose sub-opimal elemens orohers o see.

In boh cases, however, i is as paricipans in and observers o exising consiuiveconsrains ha agens adop an inerrogaive sance and communicae heir raional cri-iques o oher individuals. As we know, his later use o reexiviy is wha Kan calls he

public use o reason. Ye my argumen here is ha in such cases wha is enailed is no heuse o reason ouside o consiuive consrains bu raher he reexive use o reason wihregard o such consrains. Indeed, when less is no more, i is inerrogaive reexiviy hacalls ino quesion sub-opimal bounds. I is precisely in his way ha reexive parici-pan-observer criiques o sub-opimal consrains can and do lead o he ransormaiono exising consrains. Criical discussions abou miliary hierarchies, or example, canoser relaed conversaions abou he larger uncion and purpose o such organizaions(and perhaps war in general), or o he miliarys sub-opimal use o labor in is exclusion

o women, ban on homosexuals, and so on. In sum, opimizing he organizaional con-srains o a miliary or he associaional consrains o a religious order is ineviably de-penden upon he exen o which individuals make reexive use o reason vis--vis suchconsrains.

Now o be sure, consiuive consrains are no simply raionally chosen or iner-rogaed. Tere are also unique periods and conexs o human hough and acion whenenirely new ses o consiuive consrains mus be ashioned. In ac, in he presen

11] Nor is a limi on his moneary resources causally deermining o his everyday choice o some-hing even as basic as ransporaion. A poor man in Deroi wih only wo US dollars in his pocke mayno be able o aord a axi and m igh hereore appear o be srucurally preconsrained o ravel by pub-lic ransporaion o mee a r iend. Bu ha oucome is no pre-deermined in a ny singular way. One canimagine ha i his ma n is in relaively good healh he may reasonably op o keep he money o buy oodor clohing and walk o his desina ion.

12] See Bogdan 2000.


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conex one needs look no arher han he revoluions and ransiions o pos-socialismundergone in he preceding decades in Cenral Europe o see his kind o creaive reex-iviy a work. For while i migh righly be said ha revoluions aim o desroy exising

consiuive consrains, successul ransiions ypically demand he creaion o new so-cieal consrains.

Indeed, creaing democraic insiuions and marke economies, however complexand conesed, is a is core a consiuive consrain-making endeavor or series o endeav-ors.13 Te goal o such a highly innovaive underaking is o creae wha Elser (2000) callsan opimal ighness o bounds: markes and democracies mus be consrained enougho enable efciency and airness, ye loose enough o ensure a maximum amoun o liberyand innovaion. In creaing marke-based democracies, he reexive use o reason aims o

design and engender condiions in which coninued reexive orienaions owards consi-uive consrains are possible.

Le me conclude wih a brie summary o my posiion. Kans Wha isEnlighenmen? sands as an atemp o consider he relaionship beween reason andconsrains, and, moreover, as an argumen abou how such a relaionship should beconsrued in an enlighened sociey. Ulimaely, as we have seen, Kans characerizaiono he relaionship beween reason and consrains depends upon a core disincion be-ween privae and public uses o reason. Bu as I have argued, such a disincion is boh

misleading and unwarraned. On my accoun, boh uses o reason oulined in Wha isEnlighenmen? should be undersood as enailing reexive orienaions vis--vis con-siuive consrains: where privae reason enails reexive choice o and provisionaladherence o consiuive consrains, public reason involves he reexive choice wihinconsrains o adop an inerrogaive sance when hose consrains become sub-opimal.In his way my posiion shares wih Kan he cenral insigh ha when less is no more,aking up a criical orienaion wih regard o socieal consrains is imperaive or enligh-enmen. Ye such a criical paricipan-observer orienaion, I have mainained, canno be

locaed in he eher o cosmopolianism. On he conrary, i is in he reexive use o reasonvis--vis consiuive consrains and no in he public use o reason beyond such con-srains ha enlighenmen resides.

[email protected]

REFERENCES

Baaille, Georges. 1985. Visions o Excess: Selected Writings 1927-1939 , rans. Allan Soekl.Minneapolis: Universiy o Minnesoa Press.

. 1993. Te Accursed Share: Vols 2 & 3, rans. Rober Hurley. New York: Zone Books.Bogdan, Radu. 2000. Minding Minds: Evolving a Refexive Mind by Interpreting Others.

Cambridge, MA: MI Press.

13] As eviden in Elser e al. 1998.


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Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline o a Teory o Practice, rans. R . Nice. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversiy Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loic Wacquan. 1992. An Invitation to Refexive Sociology. Chicago:

Universiy o Chicago Press.Brandom, Rober. 1979. Freedom and Consrain by Norms. American PhilosophicalQuarterly 16 (3): 187-196.

Derrida, Jacques. 1978. Writing and Dierence , rans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Universiy oChicago Press.

. 1985.Margins o Philosophy. rans. Alan Bass. Chicago: Universiy o Chicago Press.Elser, Jon. 1984. Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press.

. 2000. Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints.Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press.

Elser, Jon, Claus Ofe, and Ulrich Preuss. 1998. Institutional Design in Post-Communist

Countries: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press.Foucaul, Michel. 1983. Aerword. In Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics , Huber

Dreyus and Paul Rabinow. Chicago: Universiy o Chicago Press.. 1984. Wha is Enlighenmen?. In Te Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow. New York:

Panheon.Fraser, Nancy. 1997. Rehinking he Public Sphere. A Conribuion o he Criique o Acually

Exising Democracy. In Justice Interruptus: Critical Refections on the Post-socialistCondition, Nancy Fraser. London: Rouledge.

Gilber, Margare. 1989. On Social Facts. Princeon, NJ: Princeon Universiy Press. Habermas,

Jrgen. 1987.Te Philosophical Discourse o Modernity: welve Lectures

, rans.Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: M I Press.. 1989. Te New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians Debate, rans.

Shierry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge, M A: M I Press.. 1991. Te Structural ransormation o the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a

Category o Bourgeois Society. rans. Tomas Burger. Cambridge, MA: MI Press.Heidegger, Marin. 1991. Poetry, Language, Tought. rans. Alber Hosader. New York:

Harper Collins.Hrubec, Marek. 2008. On Condiions o Paricipaion: Te Decis o Public Reason. Human

Aairs 18: 81-91.

Kan, Immanuel. 1970. An Answer o he Quesion: Wha is Enlighenmen?. In Kant:Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press.

Lewandowski, Joseph. 2000. Temaizing Embeddedness: Reexive Sociology as Inerpreaion.Philosophy o the Social Sciences 30 (1): 49-66.

. 2002. Wha Makes a Fac Social? On he Embeddedness o Social Acion.Existentia:An International Journal o Philosophy 12 (3-4): 281-293.

Rawls, John. 1955. wo Conceps o Rules.Philosophical Review 64: 3-32.. 1971.A Teory o Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universiy Press. 1999. Te Law o Peoples; with the Idea o Public Reason Revisited. Cambridge,

M A: Harvard Universiy Press.Searle, John. 1995. Te Construction o Social Reality. New York: Free Press.Shils, Edward. 1951. Te Sudy o he Primary Group. In Te Policy Sciences, ed. Daniel Lerner

and Harold D.Laswell. Sanord: Sanord Universiy Press.


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Public Reason 1 (2): 12-30 2009 by Public Reason

Rawls: Consrucion and Jusicaion

Stefan Bird-Pollan

Harvard University

Absrac. I examine Rawls indebedness o Kan inA Teory o Jusice, Kanian Consrucivismand in Temes rom Kans Philosophy. I argue ha he way Rawls develop he jusicaiono A Teory o Jusice relies heavily on Kans claims ha raionaliy requires reciprociy andha raionaliy is o be undersood as moral raher han as insrumenal. Rawls hus revealssomehing new in Kans heory namely ha or Kan he hypoheical imperaive is acuallysubordinae o he caegorical imperaive. However, Rawls eschews Kans atemp a provingha we are raional and hus commited o reaing each oher wih respec, hence Rawls argu-men ails o show ha we do, in ac, share he inuiions abou jusice as airness ha underlieRawls heory.

Key words: Rawls, K an, moraliy, consrucivism, jusicaion.

Te meaphysical problems ha plagued Kans deducion o moraliy in heGroundwork III have seemed, o many wenieh cenury philosophers who waned oreain much o Kans moral philosophy, so grea ha hese conemporary hinkers haveabandoned he atemp o ground pure pracical reason alogeher. Te quesion I meano pursue in his paper is wheher a cerain ype o Kanian moral philosophy can ge by

wihou such a grounding. In Rawls one nds a wrier who believes ha much o Kansehical heory can be salvaged i one sideseps he quesion o a meaphysical jusicaionor moraliy and concenraes on he proceduralism necessary or jusice.

Te quesion, o pu i anoher way, is wheher he Kanian ramework ha Rawlsadops, lends isel o a non-meaphysical use. By his I mean ha Kans sysem may bemeaphysical hrough and hrough and as such require he discharging o cerain as-sumpions in is nal orm. Tis ulimae meaphysical assumpion, I will argue, is hahere is, in ac, no jus a shared bu a universal moraliy. Te aim o his paper is hus o

reconsruc he parallels beween Rawls argumen and Kans own, drawing ou jus howheavily Rawls leans on Kan o consruc his heory. Wih his parallel in place, i will hen

be possible o deermine wheher, given he srong parallels I argue exis, Rawls heorycan sil l claim o be valid wihou working hrough he meaphysical assumpions Rawlsexplicily rejecs.1

Rawlsian consrucivism is, as I hope o show, a worhy successor o Kan in hesense ha i seeks o avoid he problems ha have plagued generaions o Kan inerpre-ers o nd some way o making he caegorical imperaive work. Rawls sraegy, by

conras, is o concenrae on he caegorical imperaive as a way o hinking abou morallaws immanenly, ha is, as consanly ariculaed and enaced by he individual agen. For

1] I is ineresing o noe ha several o Rawls sudens have reurned o he pah o a meaphysicso sors in order o ground he universaliy o moraliy. See, or insance, ONeill 1996, 194, Herman 1993,198 and i n par icular Korsgaard, 1996, 15; 200 9, 189.


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Stean Bird-Pollan 13

Rawls, he caegorical imperaive is jus he menal process we engage in when we hinkabou how o be jus o oher human beings. Rawls hus emphasizes respec or personsover moral psychology. Respec or persons enails ha we rea ohers jus as we wan

o be reaed by ohers and his simply means, no seeking special reamen or onesel.Respec, Rawls argues, should (and generally does) eners ino every hough abou oh-ers. Tis ype o hinking is modeled in boh o Rawls jusicaions or he liberal poliicalsociey: he original posiion and he reecive equilibrium. Te caegorical imperaive isa way o hinking which enables such respec or ohers.

I will argue, however, ha, compelling hough Rawls inerpreaion o Kans ehi-cal heory is, is aim o presening a non-meaphysical inerpreaion is only parially suc-cessul. Rawls is successul in giving a non-meaphysical accoun o reecion hrough

he reecive equilibrium a process in which each agen reecs on her considered be-lies and also akes ino accoun he belies o ohers. Absen a universal (and hereoremeaphysical) noion o pracical reason which underlies such reecion, however, hereis no way o showing ha he conclusions o individual reecion cohere in any sociallymeaningul way. Indeed, his absence o cohesion is he resul o Rawls ailure o akeconcree suering ino accoun. By building his heory on he possibiliy o coherence

beween individuals, Rawls has, I will argue, sidesepped he problem o he perspeciveo jusice alogeher.

A urher way o raming he issue is o see Rawls and Kans heories as objecionso he egois who believes ha all she is commited o is aking he means o her ends,

bu no o anyhing urher. In believing his, he egois essenially resiss he idea hahe hypoheical imperaive is ramed by he caegorical imperaive or ha he raionalis ramed by he reasonable. o reue he egois one mus, however, make precisely hismove. And his move relies on he meaphysical assumpion o our membership in a com-muniy which shares he same undamenal commimen o universal jusice.

In reconsrucing Rawls hough, I will presen he argumen regressively, saring

rom Rawls concepion o auonomy and working backwards, always asking or a jusi-caion or he previous level o argumen, unil a las we arrive a he reecive equi-librium which is supposed o underwrie he whole concepion o jusice. Te regressivereconsrucion ollows he argumen Rawls gives in Kanian Consrucivism in MoralTeory, i no inA Teory o Justice, and underlines he acknowledged deb Rawls owes oKan. Te regressive argumen also afrms ha, aer all, Rawls wishes o give a Kaniansyle grounding o his projec since he regressive argumen is isel a device used by Kanin order o arrive a a ranscendenal argumen, and argumen, I will argue, Rawls ails o

deliver.

I. THE R ATIONAL AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

In he ineres o space, I will no spend much ime on Rawls win conceps, heoriginal posiion and he veil o ignorance. Tey boh model wha Rawls will call he ra-


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Rawls: Construction and Justifcation14

ional in Kanian Consrucivism. Sufce i o say ha or Rawls, he original posiionis a regulaive principle and hus a way o adjudicaing beween conicing desires andinclinaions.2 Te agen in he original posiion mus be boh auonomous and moivaed

by her reecion. She akes he means o her ends. Ta is o say, he original posiion musyield universally accepable principles (as in he hypoheical imperaive which, or Kan,is analyic) and i mus ensure ha hese principles are accepable o all.3 Te ormer con-diion is modeled in he original posiion by bargaining and he later is modeled by he

veil o ignorance.Le us look a auonomy rs. Rawls inroduces he veil o ignorance o hide he par-

ies paricular social and naural circumsances. Te paries are asked o design a socieywihou he knowledge abou where hey will be placed in he sociey, or which belies,

moral, poliical or religious hey wil l have.4 All paricipans undersand he basics o po-liical aairs and economics and possess general knowledge. Tus hey choose principlesunder which hey are prepared o live, wherever hey end up in sociey. Te general socialsrucure is jus bu blind o he paricular inclinaions o he agens. Under he veil oignorance, jus as in Kanian auonomy, we have no personal or paricular sense o hegood. We seek only jusice, he abiliy o enjoy our paricular noion o he good once wedeermine wha ha is.

Rawls also argues ha here is a parallel beween raional choice heory and he ca-

egorical imperaive. Rawls says ha he original posiion is in he radiion o social con-rac heory. Like he caegorical imperaive, i provides a way o responding o a pracicalproblem: wha ough I do? Rawls wo principles o jusice are simply he moral law underhe condiions o a modern liberal sociey, yielding more specic versions o he universalprescripive o respec as saed in he caegorical imperaive.

We should noe wo poins beore we go on. In he model o he original posiion,Rawls has moved moral reecion rom he rs person perspecive o public deliberaion;rom he I o he we. A leas prima acie, he original posiion is no supposed o be all

in he mind o one individual. Te second poin ollows rom he rs. By changing heperspecive o reecion rom he rs person o he hird person, Rawls has also changedhe moral psychology involved in acceping he oucome o deliberaion. I is no clear haacceping he oucome o public deliberaion has he same normaive orce as accepinghe oucome o my own deliberaion on he auhoriy o he moral law. 5

2] R awls himsel does no believe ha Kans caegorical imperaive acually provides a paricula rlygood way o deermining a conen o he moral law. Tis is wha his own heory o jusice is supposed oprovide (2007, 31).

3] Many have argued ha a hypoheical agreemen does no consiue a jusicaion or he woprinciples chosen in he original posiion. See Nagel 1975, 114.

4] Tere has been considerable objecion o he supposed neuraliy made possible hrough he veilo ignorance. Onora ONeill, or insance, noes ha Rawls does no assume d isineres a all imes dur inghe original posiion process, bu permis i wih reerence o he ae o uure generaions (1998, 121).

5] I n a way, his is he problem Rawls wil l have o address inPoliical Liberalism where he will have o


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Indeed, he cenral argumen or he universaliy o moraliy hangs on his moverom subjecively acceped norms o universally acceped norms. How is i, one migh ask,ha norms I develop or mysel in my ineracions wih he world should be accepable o

all ohers? o pu i anoher way, wha is Rawls argumen agains he egois who believesha reasons are essenially privae. Rawls seeks o address his issue in wha ollows.

II. THE RE ASONABLE AND THE R ATIONAL

Rawls agues ha underlying he original posiion and he applicaion o he ca-egorical imperaive here is a concepion o he moral characer o he acors who reecand hus abide by he moral law. In Temes in Kans Moral Philosophy Rawls inerpres

hese agens as boh reasonable and raional. Rawls uses hese erms as a ranslaion orKans vernnig , which includes boh senses. Te wo erms mark he disincion Kanmakes beween he wo ypes o pracical reason, pure and empirical pracical reason.Te ormer is ound in he caegorical imperaive while he later is exemplied by hehypoheical imperaive. Rawls noes ha Kans concepion o a person also marks heac ha, or him, he hypoheical imperaive (empirical pracical reason) is absoluelysubjugaed by he caegorical imperaive (pure pracical reason) (1999a, 112). Tis is osay ha he person who engages in moral reecion subjugaes his raionally conceived

maxims o he moral law.Rawls characerizes his projec in Kanian Consrucivism as he atemp o:

esablish a suiable connecion beween a paricular concepion o he person and hers principle o jusice, by means o he procedure o consrucion (37). Tis means haRawls atemps o consruc a philosophically coheren sory abou how he idealizedconcepion o he person as reasonable and raional, can lead o a se o public insiuionso jusice we all can endorse. Beore we examine wha Rawls means by consrucivism, wemus undersand wha he means more exacly by he reasonable and he raional.

In poliical erms his means:[W]henever a sufcien basis or agreemen among ciizens is no presenly known, or rec-ognized, he ask o jusiy a concepion o jusice becomes: how can people setle on a con-cepion o jusice, o serve his social role [o admissible social insiuions], ha is (mos)reasonable or hem in virue o how hey conceive o heir persons and consrue he generaleaures o social cooperaion among persons so regarded? (1999b, 305)

o pu he issue slighly dierenly han Rawls does, we could say ha he hypo-heical imperaives each person a he bargaining able wishes o realize are limied by

he recogniion ha each o he bargainers is equal and ha i is hus unreasonable orone member o insis ha he group agree o make an excepion or ha member. Tushe reasonable which models he demands o universaliy in he caegorical imperaive

show ha we accep he resuls o he original posiion or reasons ha are in a sense pure or moral raherhan prudenial. For a classic ormulaion o he objecion o his move see Williams 1985, 205, ch. 4.


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rames he debae abou which paricular hypoheical imperaives can be realized. Tenoion o universaliy, which Rawls inerpres as equaliy, rames and resrics he par-icular raional plan o any acor. Tis urns classical liberal negaive reedom ino a more

communal posiive reedom. Tus when Rawls says ha he original posiion is morallyneural, he means ha here is no concepion o he good involved in decision makingisel. Moraliy, however, is in play in he sense ha reedom and equaliy have a paricularmoral perspecive, which is ha he reasonable rames he raional.

Bu in order or he raionaliy o he original posiion o yield more han prudenialagreemen or a modus vivendi, Rawls mus show ha having a hin heory o he goodallows each agen o move o a hick heory o he good. Tis is he poin o inroducinghe disincion beween he raional and he reasonable. 6 Rawls wans o show ha insru-

menal reason as employed in he original posiion can be seen as an ehical capaciy roma dieren perspecive. Tis leads o a reinerpreaion o he original posiion in KanianConsrucivism, which relies more heavily on he noion o equaliy han is predecessorinA Teory o Justice did.

Te movemen rom hird person perspecive o rs person perspecive occurs inhree sages. I sars rom raional auonomy (bargaining proper), moving o ull auono-my (bargaining wih reasonable or moral consrains) and nally ending up wih he read-ers o Rawls heory hemselves (which nds is jusicaion in he reecive equilibrium).

Wha Rawls calls he raional or raional auonomy is modeled in pure procedural jusice.7A he second sage, o ull auonomy, Rawls adds o he concepion o he person as reeand equal wo moral powers and wo higher-order ineress. Te rs power is ha o hav-ing an eecive sense o jusice, he second is he power o orm and revise and raionallypurse a concepion o he good. Corresponding o hese are he higher-order ineress orealizing and exercising hese powers (1999b, 312).

Te move o ull auonomy and he reasonable, Rawls wries, is expressed by heramework o consrains wihin which he deliberaions o he paries (as raionally au-

onomous agens o consrucion) akes place (1999b, 317). Tis ramework is he rea-sonable ideal o air cooperaion. Te ramework, by which Rawls means he addiion ohe wo moral concepions o he person, reciprociy and muualiy, ensure ha he plano he good each person ariculaes or him or hersel also includes he good o ohers. Tisis he docrine o respec or persons as i is expressed in Kans second ormulaion o hecaegorical imperaive, he ormula o humaniy.8 Here people are conceived o as an endsin hemselves. Tus he wo moral powers overlay he process o raional deliberaion,ransorming he insrumenal deliberaive process in he original posiion ino a process

o muual recogniion and air cooperaion. Rawls elaboraes: In jusice as airness, he

6] See Rawls 1993a, 503-4, and 1999b, 316. Also Baynes 1992, 122.

7] T is means ha he oucome is jusied by i he means o arrivi ng a i were jus.

8] Ac so ha you use humaniy in your own person or in he person o any oher, always a he sameime as an end, never merely as a means. (Kan 1996, 58, Ak 4:429)


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Reasonable rames he Raional and is derived rom a concepion o moral persons as reeand equal. Once his is undersood, he consrains o he original posiion are no longerexernal. (1999b, 319). I ake his o mean ha only he device o he original posiion

(which models insrumenal reason) imposes he consrain o air cooperaion on hepeople. For he people in he original posiion, social cooperaion is no inuiive. Bu iis so or ully auonomous people who live in he insiuions which he wo principles o

jusice have helped o creae. For hey see hemselves as possessing he wo moral powersand hus resric heir pursui o he good in he name o somehing more han he maxi-

mizaion o heir maerial gain.Te movemen o he wo sages so ar rades on he disincion beween dieren

perspecives. I we move back a litle, we migh recall ha he purpose o he original posi-ion is o develop principles o jusice ou o our presupposiions abou moral characer.Ta is, wha kind o laws would ree and equal people come up wih i le o heir owndevices? Wha Rawls does is o draw ou rs wha ree or raional individuals would do

and hen o overlay his wih wha people who are boh ree and reasonable would do.Raional people seek o maximize heir bene while reasonable people seek o maximizeheir bene wih he concerns o ohers in mind. Tis parallels exacly he srucure ha

Kan argues or as well: we are raional beings insoar as we ry o realize our ends byadoping he means o do so, bu we are moral insoar as we adop only hose ends whichwe can will ohers o adop as well.

Tus Rawls can say: Te uniy o pracical reason is expressed by dening heReasonable o rame he Raional and o subordinae i absoluely; ha is, he principles o

jusice ha are agreed o are lexically prior o heir applicaion in a well-ordered sociey oclaims o he good. (1999b, 319).

Te lexical ordering o he reasonable over he raional also parallels Kans divi-

sion o pracical reason ino empirical pracical reason and pure pracical reason. Whileempirical pracical reason he hypoheical imperaive means acing according o anypracical principle, pure pracical reason he caegorical imperaive means acing ac-cording o he principle o he moral law.

However, here are sill wo elemens missing rom his argumen. Te rs, o which we will now urn, is he quesion o how we ge rom he presupposed characer o he

agen as reasonable and raional o he conen o he principle o jusice, which so ar has

been described only ormally. Te second quesion, which we will come o aer ha, iswha jusies he assumpion o people as reasonable and raional in he sense o beingree o se heir own goals. Te second quesion comes down o wha grounds Rawls as-sumpion ha we are, in ac, reasonable (or moral) and hence ha I se my goals wihoher peoples goals in mind.


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III. CONSTRUCTIV ISM

Consrucivism is mean o be he way o ge rom a cerain concepion o he person

(here, ree and equal) o he appropriae principles o acion or such a person. Tis meansha consrucivism seeks o draw ou he conen o he concepion o he agen and oormalize i. Ta is, i he CI-procedure is he appropriae orm o a raional principle,

wha is he appropriae maerial? Te answer is he ree and equal agen.9 I is he answer ohe quesion: wha should we do when we ac under he moral law or use our pure praci-cal reason (which amouns o he same hing)?

In Kanian erms his means ha: he oaliy o paricular caegorical imperaives( . . . ) ha pass he es o he CI-procedure are seen as consruced by a procedure o

consrucion worked hrough byrationalagens subjec o various reasonable consrains.(Rawls 1999c, 513-14). Each ime we reec and deermine a law or ourselves we con-sruc an elemen in a universal se o rules which can hen be absraced and urned inoa general duy. Rawls wo principles o jusice are a version o wha migh be arrived a insuch an absracion. Te poin, hough, is ha he maxims o conduc permited or en-

joined by raional reecion are no heoreical speculaions; hey are responses o acualneeds or claricaion o he permissibiliy o inended acion.10

We can hus say ha consrucivism is he idea ha he conen o our highes moral

principles sems rom he raional and reasonable reecion upon our conceps as ree andequal agens. Consrucivism models auonomy in he sense ha i consiues he morallaw or principle o jusice rom wihin is own raional and reasonable reecion. Nohingcan coun as a law or me wihou my having deermined i or mysel. Tis srongly echoesKans claim ha here is nohing good in isel excep he good will.11

Now, as beore, here is here an emphasis on he rs person perspecive. Ta is,consrucivism is jus he CI-procedure insoar as i perains o deermining he coneno he moral law. Te conen o he moral law has he conen i has because I have (raio-

nally) reeced upon i and have deermined ha i has his conen. We mus, however,keep open he possibiliy ha when his rs person perspecive is swiched o a hird per-son perspecive, as i is in raional choice, we loose normaiviy alogeher. We will reurno his issue.

Consrucion hus has wo elemens. Firs, i is a process inernal o he agen and assuch i is rom a rs person perspecive. No one can reec or me. Second, i is pracical.Since reecion on he permissibiliy o perorming an acion sems rom an inceniveor acion, he resul o my reecion can only ever be maniesed in my acion isel. Te

9] For his way o puting he problem see Korsgaard 1996, 123.

10] ONeil l noes ha he consrucivis posiion is ani-realis because i denies ha moral acs arediscoverable in heoreical erms. Consruciv iss believe ha ehical principles are consruced by humanagens, ha hese principles are pracical and ha hey are objecive. See ONeill 2003,. and also Korsgaard1996, 124.

11] See Groundwork, Ak 4:393.


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resul o my reecion can only ever be wha I acually do, ha is, wha moivaes me. I Isay I ough o give $100 o chariy and do no, I have acually decided o keep he $100. Apracical consrucivism hus relies on a noion o pure pracical reason, ha is, he idea

ha we are capable o reecing on our ends by he use o he moral law or he wo prin-ciples o jusice.

Le us ake a sep back again and see where he argumen has goten us so ar.Consrucivism was inroduced o provide a link beween he concepion o persons asree and equal (or as reasonable and raional) and he conen o he principles o jusice.Rawls conenion was ha hrough he process o consrucion, or hrough auonomousreecion, hese ideal agens would deermine a se o principles which are able o governhe agens who have developed hem in air cooperaion. Consrucion was hen he way

o bring ou he conen o he basic idea o he reasonable and raional agen wihou in-roducing any alien concepions o how he world is or ough o be. Te only ool availableo he reasonable and raional agen in deermining wha he principles o jusice are isreason. We also ound ha his consrucivism proceeds rom a pracical poin o view,

which canno be jusied in heoreical erms. Jusice is immanenly consiued as doingha o which all involved have agreed.

Tus hree o he our elemens o Rawls argumen are in place. Te original po-siion has been esablished as yielding a universal principle. Te presupposiions abou

he moral characer (reedom and equaliy, reasonable and raional) o he agens whoparicipae in he original posiion have been examined. And lasly, consrucivism haspresened a way or us o move rom hese presupposiions o moral characer o he acualconen o he ormal characerisics o he moral law: he principles o jusice.

Te only elemen ha is sill missing is he jusicaion o why we should hink hawe are acually hose people in he original posiion who rame he raional by he reason-able. Ta is, wha makes me hink ha I can assume ha oher people share he concernI have hem. Where, in oher worlds, does he universaliy or he reciprociy o he reason-

able and raional ramework lie. Tis is, o be clear, he basic assumpion abou moraliyha Kan was unable o provide in he Groundwork and an assumpion which Rawls musmake good on i he original posion, he reasonable as raming he raion and consruc-ivism are o make sense.

IV. EXCURSUS: RAWLS AND KANT, PARALLEL ARGUMENTS

I have argued ha Rawls has roughly ollowed he srucure o he Groundwork. He

has developed he caegorical imperaive in erms o he universaliy o he wo principleso jusice, corresponding o he rs ormulaion o he caegorical imperaive.12 TenRawls has swiched perspecives and has argued ha he presupposiion or such a law

12] I ough never o ac in such a way ha I could also w ill ha my maxi m should become a univer-sal law. (Groundwork, Ak 4:402)


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is ha people respec heir humaniy and, nally, Rawls has conended ha in order oac under he moral law, we mus imagine ourselves as insaniaing he wo principles o

jusice. For Kan his is he kingdom o ends. Le us examine hese parallels in a litle more

deail.Rawls wries: In he rs ormulaion [o he caegorical imperaive], which is he

sric mehod, we look a our maxim rom our poin o view. ( . . . ) We are o regard our-selves as subjec o he moral law and we wan o know wha i requires o us. (1999c,505). Tis, I wan o argue, is similar o he original posiion in which we wan o knowhe ormal srucure a principle o jusice would have.In he second ormulaion, however,

we are o consider our maxim rom he poin o view o our humaniy as he undamenalelemen in our person demanding our respec, or rom he poin o view o oher persons

who will be aeced by our acions. Humaniy boh in ourselves and in ohers is regardedaspassive: as ha which will be aeced by wha we do (1999c, 505).

As I have already indicaed above, I ake his o be he perspecive o drawing ou hepresupposiions abou agens in he original posiion. o rame he raional by he reason-able means o see ourselves as passive in he ace o he hypoheical imperaive and o ryo avoid damage o our humaniy by resricing is scope. Our humaniy is he maerial orhe applicaion o he CI-procedure in he sense ha his is he purpose or ha procedure.Rawls adds: Te poin is simply ha all persons aeced [by my will] mus apply [he CI-

procedure] in he same way boh o accep and o rejec he same maxims. Tis ensures auniversal agreemen which prepares he way or he hird ormulaion. (1999c, 505)In [he hird] ormulaion we come back again o he agens poin o view, bu his

ime we no longer regard ourselves as someone who is subjec o he moral law bu assomeone who makes he law. Te CI-procedure is seen as he procedure adherence o

which, wih a ull grasp o is meaning, enables us o regard ourselves as legislaors ashose who make universal public law or a possible moral communiy. (1999c, 506) Tislas ormulaion is clearly analogous o consrucivism in he sense ha in consrucivism

we develop posiive law ou o our concepion o ourselves as ree and equal.I provide his juxaposiion o he srucure o Rawls and Kans argumens no onlyo suppor Rawls claim haA Teory o Justice is largely Kanian in orienaion bu o showhaA Teory o Justice brings ou cenral eaures o consrucivism which mus be seen asno jus incidenal bu subsanive conribuions o Kan scholarship (40). I urher wisho argue ha by ying his heory o Kan so closely, Rawls heory is subjec o many o hesame difculies as Kans work. Tese difculies have mainly o do wih he problem o

jusicaion. For insance, he ailure o Kans deducion o moraliy has le Kan wihou

a ooing rom which o say ha humans are indeed able o inerac respecully wih oneanoher. Because Rawls avoids his push oward immanence and says a wha migh becalled he common sense level, he also lacks a philosophically rigorous concepion oinersubjeciviy. Rawls rejecion o meaphysics, as I have said beore, leaves him wihouan answer o he quesion o how people can acually be relied upon o rea each oher

wih respec.


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V. JUSTIFICATION AN D THE REFLECTI VE EQUILIBRI UM

I he heory o consrucion is he jusicaion or he wo principles o jusice, hen

wha jusies consrucion? Rawls answer, like Kans answer o he problem o why hu-mans should consider hemselves ree, is quie simply ha consrucivism is no jusiedin a heoreical way, bu is given is auhenicaion hrough cohesion ino he perspeciveo exising humans who nd ha hey agree wih i. Jusicaion is given hrough acion.Tis noion o coherence is he nal sep in he hree par developmen o auhenicaionpresened in Kanian Consrucivism.

Finally, Rawls comes o consider he las perspecive, ha o ourselves you and me who are examining jusice as airness as a basis or a concepion o jusice ha may yield

a suiable undersanding o reedom and equaliy (or our own pracical use) (320-21).Rawls coninues:

Here [in he hird perspecive] he es is ha o general and wide reecive equilibrium, hais, how well he view as a whole meshes wih and ariculaes our more rm considered con-

vicions. ( . . . ) A docrine ha mees his crierion is he docrine ha, so ar as we can nowascerain, is he mos reasonable or us. (1999b, 321)

A his hird perspecive hen, we have arrived a he crierion or a nal jusicaiono Rawls heory. Te problem or Rawls, as or Kan, is ha we canno prove ha people

believe hemselves o be hose ideal agens. Rawls is quie convinced ha he ailure oKans deducion o he moral law is sufcien o show ha such an idealized heory ap-proach makes no sense. So, according o he hird perspecive, he jusicaion or auhen-icaion comes down o wha Rawls calls he reecive equilibrium.

Le us now examine wha he reecive equilibrium is in more deail. As KennehBaynes pus i: reecive equilibrium reers o a condiion in which an individuals con-cree moral judgmens have been brough ino harmony wih her higher-order moral prin-ciples (1992, 69). Tis harmonizaion occurs rs hrough a narrow process o reecive

equilibrium in which one moves back and orh beween concree judgmens (in, say, hemanner o he caegorical imperaive in which he subjec decides on a maxim and, usinghe caegorical imperaive procedure, deermines wheher i can be aced upon i no, anew maxim mus be creaed and esed) and hen hrough he wide process o reeciveequilibrium in which ones own judgmens are bough ino harmony wih general socialnorms, shared by mos readers oA Teory o Justice.13

Le us now urn o Rawls own characerizaion o he process beore urning ocriicisms and deenses o his mehod. Rawls holds ha his heory o jusice describes

our own sense o jusice (1999a, 35). Te jusicaions o his heory o jusice, modeled byhe original posiion and background condiions, are al l reecions o our own considered

13] Rawls already characerizes he discussion abou Jusice as Fairness as aking place wihin abounded sociey, one ha endorses liberal democracy. Readers coming rom ouside his realm, may noagree wih him.


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judgmens. Te need o wrieA Teory o Justice in he rs place, however, mus have beengeneraed by he knowledge ha, on he ace o i, no everyone currenlydoes in ac shareRawls concepion o jusice. Te ask o jusiying he heory o jusice hus mus occur

hough a process o eshing ou hose belies we acually all hold.14Te process o achieving reecive equilibrium sysemaizes our belies.15 Wha we

do in he narrow reecive equilibrium is hus similar o wha we do in he CI-procedure.We ake a pracical problem which, admitedly, is more absrac han our everyday praci-cal concerns, and reec on i. For wha is sysemaizing bu bringing disparae concepsunder a general principle o pracical reason.

Tere is hus a posiive and a normaive side o he reecive equilibrium, or, asTomas Scanlon pu i, a descripive and a deliberaive side. As a mehod o arriving a

an accurae porrai o jusice, we mus dig wihin ourselves o nd normaive noions weendorse (2003, 113). Boh sides seem o be included in he ollowing saemen by Rawls:we do no undersand our sense o jusice unil we know in some sysemaic way coveringa wide range o cases wha hese principles are. (1999a, 41). Indeed, in his saemen ohe purpose o he reecive equilibrium i is no possible o separae he wo senses. Since,however, he process o he reecive equilibrium is a heoreical underaking o which wesubjec our considered judgmens, i seems appropriae o call i a mehod o deliberaion.

Te mehod isel is no explained in grea deail in A Teory o Justice.16 I will hus

cie only he wo main passages rom his work in which Rawls describes he reeciveequilibrium process as i perains o original posiion:

By going back and orh, someimes alering he condiion o he conracual circumsances[in he original posiion], a ohers wihdrawing our judgmens and conorming hem oprinciples, I assume ha evenually we shall nd a descripion o he iniial siuaion ha

boh expresses reasonable condiions and yields principles which mach our consideredjudgmens duly pruned and adjused. (18)

A concepion o jusice canno be deduced rom sel-eviden premises or condiions

on principle; insead, is jusicaion is a mehod o he muual suppor o many consider-aions, o everyhing ting ogeher ino one coheren view. (19)Te reecive equilibrium begins wih our considered opinions which mus be

made under condiions avorable o deliberaion and judgmen in general. (40) A cen-

14] Who exacly he we is, has been he subjec o much debae. See, or insance, Okrin 1994, 125

15] See Rawls ormulaion abou he origi nal posiion: Te condiions embodied in he descrip-ion o he original posiion are ones ha we do in ac accep. Or, i we do no, hen perhaps we can bepersuaded o do so by philosophica l reecion. (1999a, 19)

16] Rawls idea o he reecive equilibrium has been aken up in he elds o moral philosophyand he philosophy o science. See, or insance, he more rigorous ormulaion James Blanchowicz gives(which is no based sricly on R awls accoun). Likening he reecive equil ibrium process o repairing aship a sea, Blanchowicz wries: I is no jus he ac ha one is resing on a dry par o he ship in oneseors o repair a leak ing par and ha one may laer res on he repaired (ormerly leaking) par o repair anew leaking (ormerly dry) par ha esablishes genuine reecive equilibrium, bu raher he ac ha hewayin which one ress on hese respecive pars is dieren in each case ( . . . ). (1997, 126)


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ral eaure o hese condiions, and one which will be relevan o criicism o he reec-ive equilibrium discussed below, is ha he process o he reecive equilibrium is alwayssubjec-dependen. Ta is, i is always my judgmen ha comes in or consideraion. In

his sense, judgmens are judgmens only when hey come wih my reasons or he judg-mens atached.17 Tey are hus no comparable o observaional daa.18

As a coherenis sraegy, convergence in reecive equilibrium is only evidenceo how much agreemen we already have. I is no normaive, in he sense ha i mighconvince one who does no hold wha I hold o change his or her mind. I is purely in-rospecive. Tis is because, as Norman Daniels argues, coherenism in he orm o hereecive equilibrium remains agnosic abou wheher here is any ruh which i mighapproximae. Tis agrees wih he poin abou ani-realism raised earlier according o

which consrucivism develops all ruhs hrough reecion isel.

VI. PROBLEMS WITH THE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM

As we saw above, he mehod o he reecive equilibrium is a way o becoming clearabou ones own ehical convicions. We examine our houghs and our principles aremeasured agains wha we migh have read or discussed wih ohers. Te imporan poino keep in mind is ha we are now ourselves, comprehensive subjecs wih commimens

o noions o he good. Tis means ha each o us reecs rom a dieren perspecive.19A his poin we mus, however, make a disincion which I menioned earlier, name-

ly he disincion beween he conen o he heory and is very possibiliy. For here is anambiguiy in he charge ha we reec rom dieren perspecives as real ex ising agens.Te charge migh mean ha, since we are dieren, we are no sure wheher we will comeo he same conclusions as Rawls does. Bu i migh also mean ha we would have com-pleely dieren concepions o moraliy or ha moraliy migh be denied alogeher. Teormer poin is addressed by he bulk o Rawls argumen while he later poin reers o a

problem Rawls does no have much o say abou.20

17] Tis is perhaps he place o noe ha Rawls never develops an adequae jusica ion o he reec-ive equil ibrium rom he rs person perspecive, and hus ulimaely leaves himsel open o criicism romKanians and ohers who regard he subjec as he primar y uniy o eh ical coherence. See he discussiono Chrisine Korsgaard and Onora ONeill below. Boh seek o remedy his deciency in Rawls accounhrough heir respecive heories o pracical reason.

18] See Daniels 1979, 12: 167-72. See also Brand 1990, 128

19] Tis is wha Sandel has in mi nd when he argues ha he R awlsian deonological subjec is in-

capable o normaive commimens because he or she has been cleansed o al l coningency which wouldnecessiae normaiviy in he orm o judgmen. In order o make he R awlsian subjec capable o norma-iviy, normaiv iy mus be inroduced a a laer sage bu his is impossible given he hi nness o he subjecas i is conceived in he original posiion (Sandel 1982).

20] Rawls addresses his issue inPoliical Liberalism where he alks abou commimen o he liberalsae as opposed o he modus vivendi, a emporary commimen which, in cerain exreme cases, mighseeks o overhrow he whole sysem.


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Te problem o dieren saring poins or reecion brings wih i a hos o prob-lems or Rawls. For insance, here is no longer any compelling connecion beween heperspecives o he dieren subjecs being asked o endorse Jusice as Fairness. Te poin

is pu nicely by Baynes who argues ha here seems o be no reason or me o accep heresuls o he reecive equilibrium unless I am he one who has undergone he processmysel. Tis, presumably, is wha Rawls means when he wries ha each person has inhimsel he whole orm o a moral concepion (1999a, 44). Here, whole mus mean com-plee or me and no, as in Kan, universal. Tus, here does no seem o be any reason whyI should be swayed by a subjecive process o reasoning no my own.21 We are hus back ahe quesion o who he we who endorses he considered moral judgmens is and wheh-er here is any connecion among he individuals which make up he we. In A Teory o

Justice and in Kanian Consrucivism, his we seems no o have been heorized a allwhere possible jusicaion is concerned. Tis leaves open he possibiliy o egoism andhence he possibiliy ha we do no, in ac, deliberae ogeher as Rawls believes we do.

Scanlon, similar o Baynes, argues ha he reecive equilibrium process is nor-maively underdeermined. Tis charge saes simply ha no conclusive evidence or oragains Rawls heory can be goten rom a coherenis jusicaion. 22 Since he reeciveequilibrium does no oer a deerminae process by which one migh arrive a ehical con-clusions, i is quie possible or wo people o sar rom he same premises and, using he

reecive equilibrium mehod, sill arrive a dieren conclusions. Rawls acknowledgeshis poin when he says ha his heory o jusice is jus a heory o jusice (1999a, 43-44).23Bu as a heory o jusice i mus include he claim ha somehing is normaive or us even i

we canno agree enirely on wha i is. Te problem is hus ha a coherenis heory whichseeks is jusicaion in he reecive equilibrium is oo weak o bind people o dieringperspecives ogeher because i canno on is own overcome he dierences ha people

wih previous normaive commimens bring o bear on heir reecions. Coherenism, inoher words, seems no o be able o provide consensus where here is none o begin wih.

Tere is anoher, deeper objecion here, however. Scanlon has argued ha some-ones employmen o he reecive equilibrium commis he evaluaor o he argumenwho underakes i o nohing a all.24Tis quesion delves deeper since i asks he more

21] See Baynes 1992, 74.

22] Brand argues, or insance, ha Rawls argumen comes o a conclusion no more orceul hanha: A coheren se o belies can be made more convincing han anoher se even i here is nohing whichcan conrm or reue i. (1990, 272-73)

23] Concerning he inersubjeciviy o he reecive equilibrium process, Rawls wries ha he

quesion mus remain open: I shall no even ask wheher he principles ha characerize one personsconsidered judgmens are he same as hose ha characerize anohers. I shall ake or graned ha heseprinciples are eiher approximaely he same or persons whose judgmens are in reecive equilibrium,or i no, ha heir judgmens divide a ew main lines represened by he amily o radiional [moral] doc-rines ( . . . ).. Rawls adds, reerring o himsel, ha: i we can characerize one (educaed) persons sense o

jusice, we migh have a good beginning oward a heory o jusice. (1999a, 44)

24] See Scanlon 2003, 152 and ONeill 1998b, 206-7.


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undamenal quesion o wheher moraliy exiss a all and hus lays bare he assumpionRawls has so ar been making abou he reecive equilibrium, namely ha i is he pureemploymen o pracical reason. I he reecive equilibrium is, in ac, he pure employ-

men o pracical reason, here will be no problem wih coherence beyond he merelyechnical problem o he correc assessmen o he acs. We hus need some urher argu-men abou why he reecive equilibrium is, in ac, he employmen o pure pracicalreason and no some oher principle. Tis goes o he more undamenal quesion o hepossibiliy o moraliy and hus relaes quie clearly o Kans own ailed atemp a prov-ing inersubjeciviy.

Te problem I am here insising on is ha he answer o he problem o he jusica-ion o he wo principles o jusice in he reecive equilibrium canno be goten hrough

an analysis o he coherence o he wo principles o jusice wih our own perspecive asreaders o poliical heory hrough he reecive equilibrium. Te deeper problem sug-gesed here urns on he quesion abou he possibiliy o moraliy in general, which can-no be answered by coherenism precisely because i is a quesion o rs principles ormeaphysics, i you will. Indeed, coherenism can only give an evaluaion o he righnessor jusice o wo principles o jusice i i is assumed ha coherence is really an expressiono moraliy or pracical reason.

Beore aking up his nal issue, we mus look a litle more closely a wha he role

o pure pracical reason is in Rawls heory. And his crucially depends on he perspeciveemployed in he philosophical reasoning oA Teory o Justice.

VII. PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE FIRST PERSON PERSPECTIVE

We have now seen all our elemens o Rawls heory so I now wan o ake sock ohe argumen as a whole and make good on he promises or elaboraion I made duringhe reconsrucion o he argumen. I will hus discuss wha I see as he real problem in

Rawls ulimae jusicaion o his heory, by which I mean he posiion o pure pracicalreason. In boh he original posiion and he reecive equilibrium Rawls presens us wiha concepion o normaiviy, hrough bargaining and he inerpreaion o social norms,

which seems o wan o sidesep he quesion o he need or a jusicaion o his claimor our abiliy o employ pure pracical reason. I will argue, however, ha a noion o purepracical reason mus underlie boh concepions. I will hen reurn o he issue o wheherpure pracical reason receives a oundaion in Rawls work.

Te rs problem I menioned was he problem o wha I argued was he subsiuion

o he original posiion or he caegorical imperaive in A Teory o Justice. I noed hain his move Rawls replaced a rs person perspecive wih a hird person perspecive.He seemed o be arguing ha he process o deliberaion under he veil o ignorance was

jus as good a leading o he wo principles o jusice as soliary reecion. Indeed, hesubsiuion raher suggess ha Rawls hinks raional choice is a beter model or ehicalhough han soliary reecion.


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From a Kanian perspecive, however, his move seems highly suspec. For whagives rise o normaiviy in Kan is ha I make he law or mysel, ha I am an auonomousacor. As is clear rom he reading I gave above, Rawls also considers his o be he case

wih he agens in he original posiion behind he veil o ignorance. Bu raional reec-ion, as Kan sees i, operaes only rom he rs person perspecive. Ta is, somehingis normaive or me because I choose o adop i as a principle. No one else can make meadop as my end somehing I do no reely choose as an end. You may orce me o do i, bui will no be my end.

Tis is jus he amiliar poin ha pracical reason canno be given a heoreicalexplanaion. No one can convince me by argumen ha I should adop heir reasons. Imus convince mysel. So, i deliberaion in he original posiion is really a compromise

as Rawls saes, hen he agreemen reached in i is no normaive or anyone since i doesno represen a principle anyone acually endorses. Te principle ha has arisen hroughhe compromise migh, o course, sill be adoped, bu Rawls has no given us any argu-men or why hose in he original posiion should adop he principles hey have reachedin negoiaion (1999a, 104-5).

Tere is a way ou o his argumen, o course. I is essenially ha he original posi-ion wih is muliple paries is jus a way o represening wha goes on in raional reec-ion in he CI-procedure. Te move rom he CI-procedure o he original posiion is jus

heurisic.25 Ta his is so becomes quie clear, I hink, when one examines he noion oconsrucivism, which is mean o connec he wo principles o jusice o he original po-siion. Consrucivism seeks o draw ou he consequences o our presupposiions abouhe agens negoiaing in he original posiion. Bu in order or us o be able o draw ouanyhing abou hem, we mus assume ha hey have somehing in common, namely heconceps o reedom and equaliy. Tis is why Rawls reers o hese agens as idealized.In order or he process o consrucion o yield anyhing a all, idealized mus meanha hey are a leas generally he same. I his is so, hen he move rom ree and equal

individuals hrough consrucion o he wo principles o jusice merely mirrors Kansmovemen rom he vernnigindividual hough raional reecion o he moral law.

As such, i is no mysery ha he agens in he original posiion can come o a com-promise which is normaive or all. Te compromise is no compromise, i is really he pre-supposiion o he moral heory underlying he make up o he agens jusice as airness.Tere has hus been no shi rom he rs person perspecive which admis o he use opracical reason o he hird person perspecive. Tere is also hus no issue o convincinganyone o he righness o he wo principles o jusice.

So, as I hink I have shown, he problem o normaiviy o he wo principles o jus-ice does no arise a he level o he original posiion since, undamenally, he original po-siion models he use o pure pracical reason by an auonomous sel. Tis does no mean,however, ha he problem o normaiviy has been laid o res. Te normaiviy o he wo

25] See Dworkin 1975, 129


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principles o jusice is simply moved back o he reecive equilibrium and o he quesiono is accepance by comprehensive subjecs. I also does no mean ha he problem o hers person o hird person swich and he problems his enails has gone away.

According o he argumens I have jus given, we mus conclude ha Rawls atempo build greaer sabiliy or his sysem, hrough boh he noion o bargaining in he origi-nal posiion and hrough he idea o wide reecive equilibrium which ulimaely rely ona noion o public reason, is really reducible o he employmen o pure pracical reason

by each individual. And he exisence o pure pracical reason in nie human beings is, ocourse, wha Kan was unable o show in he deducion in Groundwork III.

VIII. THE PROBLEM OF NOR MATI VIT Y AND THE N ECESSITY OF ITS JUSTIFICATION

Te ac ha I have agued ha he social anchoring ha Rawls wans o give hisheory by embedding i in broad social views is inconsisen does no mean, however, hahe heory mus be rejeced or even ha is seps are incoheren. I have merely shown haRawls acually sicks ar closer o Kans general argumenaion han is usually supposed.wo heoreical moves have been rejeced bu as long as we inerpre hese moves as mere-ly heurisic, he general heory remains inac. I is hus ime o come o he quesion o he

nal jusicaion o he reecive equilibrium, in oher words, wheher here is an accouno pure pracical reason in Rawls heory.

And here we come o he cenral problem o Rawls jusicaion. Kan saw his heoryas hinging on he proo or auhenicaion o he necessiy o reedom and moraliy boh inhe deducion and in he ac o reason docrine. Rawls does no hink his heory requiressuch a grounding.

Tis brings us again o he problem o he rs person and hird person perspecive o

pracical reason. I argued rs ha he agens in he original posiion, as auonomous andidealized, mus share he same concepion o reedom and equaliy, and ha his meansha hey are really no subsanially disinc in a way ha would necessiae a compromisein deermining he wo principles o jusice. Ten I argued ha he reecive equilibriumprocess which we mus all engage in, in order o deermine wheher we acually believeourselves o be similar enough o he idealized agens in he original posiion o endorsehe wo principles o jusice hey deermine, also had o sem rom a rs-person reec-ion. Tus he claim and is auhenicaion boh sem rom a rs-person perspecive.

Wihou a proo or he necessary ideniy beween he resuls o he original posi-ion and he resuls o our own reecion, he mos ha can be said o he wo principles o

jusice is ha hey cohere. And his is all Rawls wans o say. Rawls reuses Kans deduc-ion o moraliy in avor o Kans ac o reason. And Rawls inerpres he ac o reason asa coherenis jusicaion or he wo principles o jusice.


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Tus Rawls wries:

Pure pracical reason is auhenicaed nally by assuming primacy over speculaive reasonand by cohering ino, and wha is more, bycompletinghe consrucion o reason as one uni-

ed body o principles: his makes reason sel -auhenicaing as a whole. (1999c, 523)

Te idea here is ha since here can be no heoreical proo o reedom and moraliy,he only jusicaion or moraliy ha can be given is ha we recognize ourselves as moral

beings, ha is, we recognize ourselves as he agens who paricipae in he original posi-ion.26 Tis means, as we saw, ha he speculaive par o

public reason - volume 1, number 2, june 2009

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