F. Term LimitsSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30057 January 31, 1984

BRUNO O. APARRI,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY, the latter in substitution for REMEDIOS O. FORTICH, as Chairman, ANGELINO M. BANZON, RAFAEL B. HILAO, VALERIANO PLANTILLA and SEVERO YAP, as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA),respondents.

Enrique D. Tayag for petitioner.

Magno B. Pablo and Cipriano A. Tan for respondent Land Authority.

MAKASIAR,J.:This petition for certiorari seeks to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court under BP 129) dated September 24, 1968, affirming the decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court insofar as it decrees the dismissal of the present petition for mandamus is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs (p. 50, rec.).

The facts of the case are as follows:

On January 15, 1960, private respondents (as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration created under Republic Act No. 1160, approved June 18, 1954 NARRA) approved the following resolution:

RESOLUTION NO. 13(Series of 1960)

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to appoint Mr. Bruno 0. Aparri, as General Manager of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) with all the rights, prerogatives and compensation appurtenant thereto to take effect on January 16, 1960);

RESOLVED FURTHER, as it is hereby resolved, to inform the President of the Philippines of the above appointment of Mr. Aparri (p. 2, rec.).

Pursuant thereto, private respondent Remedies O. Fortich, in her capacity as Chairman of the NARRA Board, appointed petitioner Bruno O. Aparri as reflected in the following letter:

Manila, January 22, 1960

Mr. Bruno O. Aparri c/o NARRA, Manila

SIR:

You are hereby appointed as GENERAL MANAGER in the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) with compensation at the rate of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS per annum the appointment to take effect January 16,1960 . . . . REINSTATEMENT ... (p. 2, rec.).

The power of the Board of Directors of the NARRA to appoint the general manager is provided for in paragraph (2),Section 8, Republic Act No. 1160 (approved June 18, 1954), to wit:

Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall have the following powers and duties: ...

2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager ..., subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines, ....The Board, by a majority vote of all members, may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and with the approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).

On March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved the following resolution:

RESOLUTION NO. 24(Series of 1962)

WHEREAS, the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors thedesire of the Office of the President Malacanang, Manila, to fix the term of officeof the incumbent General Manager up to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962, in accordance with the provision of Section 8, sub-section 2 of R.A. No. 1160;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Board of Directors hereby fix, as it is hereby fixed, the term of office of the incumbent General Manager of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to March 31, 1962 (pp. 6-7, rec., emphasis supplied).

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with the then Court of First Instance of Manila on March 29, 1962. The petition prayed to annul the resolution of the NARRA Board dated March 15, 1962, to command the Board to allow petitioner to continue in office as General Manager until he vacates said office in accordance with law and to sentence the private respondents jointly and severally to pay the petitioner actual damages in the sum of P95,000.00, plus costs.

On August 8, 1963, when the case was still pending decision in the lower court, Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, took effect. The said law abolished the NARRA (Sec. 73, R.A. 3844) and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority. On October 21, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, finding "that this case has become academic by reason of the approval of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) and thereby dismissing the instant petition without pronouncement as to costs" (p. 5, rec.).

On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal speaking through then Mr. Justice Antonio C. Lucero, affirmed the decision of the lower court. in dismissing the petition for mandamus. Pertinent provisions of the decision are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

In the light of the foregoing facts, it is evident that Bruno O. Aparri accepted the position of General Manager without fixed term and his appointment is, in essence, terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power which, in this case, is the Board of Directors. Where, as in the case at bar, the appointing officer, that is, the Board of Directors, had fixed the term of office of the incumbent Manager to end on March 31, 1962, the replacement of Bruno O. Aparri is not removal but by reason of the term of his office which is one of the recognized modes of terminating official relations.Considering that the term of office of the General Manager of the NARRA is not fixed by law nor has it been fixed by the Board of Directors at the time of his appointment although it had the power to do so, it is obvious that the term of office of herein petitioner Bruno O. Aparri expired on March 31, 1962and his right to hold the said office was thereby extinguished. In other words,Bruno O. Aparri cessation from office invokes no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office which was within the power of the Board of Directors to fix. Hence, Bruno O. Aparri continues only for so long as the term of his office has not ended (Alba vs. Hon. Jose N. Evangelists, 100 Phil. 683) [Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 48-49, rec., emphasis supplied].

The motion for reconsideration by petitioner in the then Court of Appeals was denied on January 10, 1969.

On January 20, 1969, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1968 (pp. 1-41, rec.). The same was initially denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated January 27, 1969 (p. 55, rec.); but on motion for reconsideration filed on February 11, 1969, the petition was given due course (p. 66, rec.).

The only legal issue sought to be reviewed is whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.

WE affirm. WE hold that the term of office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,]Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) was created under Republic Act No. 1160 (approved June 18,1954), which provides that:

Sec. 2. NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION ... there is hereby created a corporation to be known as National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration hereafter referred to as "NARRA" to perform under the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, through the Office of Economic Coordinator all the duties and functions of the Bureau of Lands as provided for in Commonwealth Act numbered Six Hundred and Ninety-one, as amended, and such other duties as are hereinafter specified in this Act.It shall be headed by a General Manager and an Assistant Manager who shall be appointed as hereinafter provided(emphasis supplied).

Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160 expressly gives to the Board of Directors of the NARRA the power "to appoint and fix the term of office of the general manager ...subject to the recommendation of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines" (emphasis supplied).

By "appointment" is meant the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office (Mechem op. cit., Sec. 102). When the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmationof some other officer or body is required, the Commission can issue or the appointment is complete only when such assent or condition is obtained (People vs. Bissell, 49 Cal. 407). To constitute an "appointment" to office, there must be some open, unequivocal act of appointment on the part of the appointing authority empowered to make it, and it may be said thatan appointment to office is made and is complete when the last act required of the appointing authority has been performed(Molnar vs. City of Aurora, 348 N.E. 2d 262, 38 III App. 3d 580). In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed (State vs. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76, 55 Am. Rep. 65).

The petitioner was appointed as general manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13 (series of 1960 approved on January 15, 1960) of the Board of Directors. A careful perusal of the resolution points out the fact that the appointment is by itself incomplete because of the lack of approval of the President of the Philippines to such appointment. Thus, We note that Resolution No. 13 states:

xxx xxx xxx

... RESOLVED FURTHER, as it is hereby resolved, to inform the President of the Philippines of the above appointment of Mr. Aparri (p. 2, rec.).

Presumably, the Board of Directors of the NARRA expected that such appointment be given approval by the then President. Lacking such approval by the President as required by the law (par. 2, Sec. 8 of R.A. 1160), the appointment of petitioner was not complete. The petitioner can, at best, be classified as ade factoofficer because he assumed office "under color of a known appointment or election, void because the officer was not eligible or because there was a want of power in the electing body, or by reasons of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public" (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9Am. Rep. 409).

However, such appointment was made complete upon approval of Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962-approved March 15, 1962) wherein the President submitted to the Board his "desire" tofix the term of officeof the petitioner up to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962. The questioned resolution corrected whatever requisite lacking in the earlier Resolution No. 13 of the respondent Board. Resolution No. 24, approved by the respondent Board and pursuant to "the desire of the President" legally fixed the term of office of petitioner as mandated by paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160.

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office (Sueppel vs. City Council of Iowa City, 136 N.W. 2D 523, quoting 67 CJS OFFICERS, secs. 42, 54[1]). According to Mochem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon the expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties and authority as a pubic officer mustipso factocease (Mechem, op. cit., Secs. 396-397). In the law on Public Officers, the most natural and frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term for which he was elected or appointed. The question of when this event has occurred depends upon a number of considerations, the most prominent of which, perhaps, are whether he was originally elected or appointed for a definite term orfor a termdependent upon some act or event ... (Mechem op. cit., Sec. 384).

It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the purview of statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination (Barber vs. Blue, 417 P.2D 401, 51 Cal. Rptr. 865, 65 C.2d N5). In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is vested in the Board of Directorssubjectto the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrase of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 51). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Hondoras vs. Soto, 8 Am. St., Rep. 744). The reason for the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute (50 Am. Jur. p. 212).

Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 50 O.G. 2515). The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term. Rather, his right to hold the office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term to hold such office.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. WITHOUT COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147927.February 4, 2002]

RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR.,respondents.D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING,J.:

Before us is a petition forcertiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to nullify and set aside the resolution dated May 9, 2001 of public respondent Commission on Elections in Comelec SPA No. 01-055, which granted the motion for reconsideration and declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., qualified to run for Mayor in Lucena City for the May 14, 2001 election.Petitioner prays that votes cast in private respondents favor should not be counted; and should it happen that private respondent had been already proclaimed the winner, his proclamation should be declared null and void.

The uncontroverted facts are as follows:

Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor ofLucenaCityin theMay 14, 2001elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor.

Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election ofMay 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao untilJune 30, 2001.

On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

OnMarch 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms.He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. Respondent added that his service fromMay 12, 2001untilJune 30, 2001for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of the law and the Constitution.He citesLonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), as authority to the effect that to apply disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur, to wit: (a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

OnApril 20, 2001, the COMELEC, through the First Division, found private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled.

OnApril 27, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that three (3) consecutive terms means continuous service for nine (9) years and that the two (2) years service from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao who defeated him in the election of 1998 prevented him from having three consecutive years of service. He added that Tagaraos tenure from 1998 to 2000 could not be considered as a continuation of his mayorship.He further alleged that the recall election was not a regular election, but a separate special election specifically to remove incompetent local officials.

OnMay 3, 2001, petitioner filed his Opposition to private respondents Motion for Reconsideration stating therein that serving the unexpired term of office is considered as one (1) term.[1]Petitioner further contended that Article 8 of the Constitution speaks of term and does not mention tenure.The fact that private respondent was not elected in the May 1998 election to start a term that began on June 30, 1998 was of no moment, according to petitioner, and what matters is that respondent was elected to an unexpired term in the recall election which should be considered one full term from June 30, 1998 to June 30, 2001.

OnMay 9, 2001, the COMELECen bancruled in favor of private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr..It reversed the First Divisions ruling and held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.

OnMay 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.

Petitioner is now before this Court, raising the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 9, 2001, DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR MAYOR IN LUCENA CITY FOR THE MAY 14, 2001 ELECTIONS.[2]Stated differently, was private respondent disqualified to run for mayor ofLucenaCityin theMay 14, 2001elections?[3]This issue hinges on whether, as provided by the Constitution, he had already served three consecutive terms in that office.

Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified to run for city mayor by reason of the three-term rule because the unexpired portion of the term of office he served after winning a recall election, covering the period May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is considered a full term. He posits that to interpret otherwise, private respondent would be serving four (4) consecutive terms of 10 years, in violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987 Constitution[4]and Section 43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the Local Government Code.

Section 43.Term of Office.

x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive.He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and betweenJune 30, 1998toMay 12, 2000, during Tagaraos incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

In its comment, the COMELEC restated its position that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms having lost his third bid in theMay 11, 1998elections, said defeat is an interruption in the continuity of service as city mayor of Lucena.

The issue before us was already addressed inBorja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held,

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to theright to be electedas well asthe right to serve in the same elective position.Consequently, it is not enough that an individual hasservedthree consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have beenelectedto the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.This point can be made clearer by considering the following case or situation:

x x x

Case No. 2.SupposeBis elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year.If he is twice reelected after that, can he run forone moreterm in the next election?

Yes, becausehe has served only two full terms successively.

x x x

To considerCas eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

Likewise, in the case ofLonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we said,

This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld.For nearly two years he was a private citizen.The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Patently untenable is petitioners contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution.[5]To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.[6]As pointed out by the COMELECen banc, Fr. Bernas comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress.[7]Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. InLonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:

The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of officefor any length of timeshall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.[8]WHEREFORE,the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections datedMay 9, 2001, in Comelec SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135150.July 28, 1999]ROMEO LONZANIDA,petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI,repondents.D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES,J.:

This petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the resolutions issued by the COMELEC First Division dated May 21, 1998 and by the COMELEC En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190 entitled, In the matter of the Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales.Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo Lonzanida, respondent.The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner Romeo Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted and if he has been proclaimed winner the said proclamation is declared null and void.Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections.In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner.He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof.His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections.The court ruled:PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the results of the election for the office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May 8, 1995 as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.

Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby declared vacant.

Both parties appealed to the COMELEC.On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida.On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio.On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time.The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.The finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998.Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him disqualified to run for mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections.He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections as evidenced by the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC no. 6-97 entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida, Protestee-Appellant, wherein the COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.Petitioner also argues that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper remedy is a petition forquo warrantowith the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court to sustain the questioned resolutions of the COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification.The private respondent states that the petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 mayoral elections.Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the COMELEC before the elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be disqualified may still be herd and decided by the COMELEC after the election and proclamation of the said party without distinction as to the alleged ground for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an election offense or for ineligibility.Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the merits of the petition for disqualification were issued within the commissions jurisdiction.As regards the merits of the case, the private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent COMELEC praying for the dismissal of the petition.The Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of the Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter I of the Local Government Code which bar a local government official from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position speaks of service of a term and so the rule should be examined in this light.The public respondent contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he was later unseated, because he served as mayor for the greater part of the term.The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as ade jureorde factomayor for the 1995-1998 term is inconsequential in the application of the three term limit because the prohibition speaks of service of a term which was intended by the framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt to monopolize political power.It is likewise argued by the respondent that a petition forquo warrantowith the regional trial court is proper when the petition for disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant petition for disqualification which was filed before the elections may be resolved by the COMELEC thereafter regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.The petitioner filed Reply to the comment.It is maintained that the petitioner could not have served a valid term from 1995 to 1998 although he assumed office as mayor for that period because he was no t lawfully elected to the said office.Moreover, the petitioner was unseated before the expiration of the term and so his service for the period cannot be considered as one full term.As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction to hear the election protest after the petitioners proclamation.The petition has merit.Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:Sec. 8.The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:Sec. 43.Term of Office.

(b)No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms.The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office.The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years.The mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty.[1]The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from.As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive terms.After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.[2]The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials with the exception of barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr.,vs. COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr.[3]where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit.This court pointed out that from the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded from the premise that the officials assumption of office is by reason of election.This Court stated:[4]Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission.The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office.The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.

It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI sections 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:

MR. GASCON.I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term.We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he canrunagain?

MR. DAVIDE.That is correct.

MR. GASCON.And the question that we left behind before-if the Gentlemen will remember-was:How long will that period of rest be?Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?

MR. DAVIDE.If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during theelectionfollowing the expiration of the first 12 years, whether suchelectionwill be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, his particular member of the Senate canrun.So it is not really a period of hibernation for six years.That was the Committees stand.

xxxxxxxxxxxxSecond, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election.The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms.The second sentence, in explaining when an elective official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which the the official concerned was elected. The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve.

This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.It stated:To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.Consequently, it is not enough that an individual hasservedthree consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have beenelectedto the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections.In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner.He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio.Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent.First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void.His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation.It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all[5]and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.[6]Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms.The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of officefor any length of timeshall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term porvided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.In sum, the petitioner wasnotthe duly elected mayor and that he didnothold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit.The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected.We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner.There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office.Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC.Such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.The petitioners contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit.The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioners proclamation.It was held in the case of Sungavs. COMELEC and Trinidad[7]that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:Sec. 6.Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered.The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.The court stated:Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon.The word shall signified that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced.Theimplication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election.Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election,Silvestre vs. Duavitin effect disallows what R. A. No. 6646 imperatively requires.This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority.Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect.By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited.Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress.Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of theSilvestreruling is not difficult to forsee.A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of thedisqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified.All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election.This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case.In Aguam v. COMELECthis Court held-

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power.It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation.Since private respondents petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected.From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted.The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.SO ORDEREDEN BANCFRANCIS G. ONG, G.R. No. 163295Petitioner,Present:PANGANIBAN,C.J.PUNO,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,- versus -CARPIOAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,CALLEJO, SR.,AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO, andGARCIA,JJ.JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE andPromulgated:COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondents.January 23, 2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xROMMEL G. ONG,Petitioner,-versus - G.R. No. 163354JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE andCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NGARCIA,J.:Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)en banc.The first, docketed asG.R. No. 163295,is a petition forcertiorariwith petitioner Francis G. Ong impugning the COMELECen bancresolution[1]dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated March 31, 2004[2]of the COMELECs First Division.The second,G.R. No. 163354,is forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for injunctive relief, filed by petitioner Rommel Ong, brother of Francis, seeking, among other things, to stop the COMELEC from enforcing and implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004en bancresolution in SPA Case No. 04-048 pending the outcome of the petition inG.R. No. 163295.Per itsen bancResolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of these petitions.The recourse stemmed from the following essential and undisputed factual backdrop:Private respondentJoseph Stanley Alegre(Alegre) and petitionerFrancis Ong(Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in theMay 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office aPetitionto Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy[3]of Francis. Docketed asSPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest,[4]albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution[5]dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing as follows:We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to those obtaining in the sample situations addressed by the Highest Court in the Borja case. Herein, one of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is not present. Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Stanley Alegre was thelegally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte.This disposition had become final after the [COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by Ong, the case having become moot and academic.xxx xxx xxxOn the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in the Lonzanida case and applicable in the case at bench, Ong could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as a presumptive winner; which presumption was later overturned when [the RTC] decided with finality that [he] lost in the May 1998 elections. (Words in bracket and emphasis in the original).Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration, contending, in the main, that there was a misapplication of the three-term rule, as applied in the cited cases ofBorja vs. ComelecandLonzanida vs. Comelec,infra.On May 7, 2004, the COMELECen bancissued, in SPA No. 04-048, a resolution[6]reversing the March 31, 2004 resolution of the COMELECs First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francisas disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of the aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him posthaste to seek the assistance of his political party, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, which immediately nominated his older brother,Rommel Ong(Rommel), as substitute candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis.The following undisputed events then transpired:1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed aPetition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificateof Rommel Ong.2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed a letter[7]to Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Camarines Norte Liza Z. Cario and Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia in which he appealed that, owing to the COMELECs inaction on Alegre's petition to cancel Rommels certificate of candidacy, the nameRommel Ongbe included in the official certified list of candidates for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by the PES Carino.3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote[8]to then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV and V, seeking clarification on the legality of the action thus taken by the PES Cario. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano issued a Memorandum under date May 10, 2004[9]addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cario, ordering her to implement the resolution of the COMELECen bancin SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004.[10]Said Memorandum partly stated:The undersignedADOPTSthe recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig [Director IV, Law Department], which he quote your stand,"that substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied due course. In the Resolution of the Commission En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of Francis Ong was denied due course," and elaborated further that:"x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to include the name of a substitute candidate in the certified list of candidates unless the substitution is approved by the Commission.In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be denied due course; and 2) the election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates."The above position of the Commission was in line with the pronouncement of Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA 617) which states:"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy."In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the said Resolution of the Commission En Banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added].4.Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would seem that the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that Board.[11]5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the winning candidate for the mayoralty post in San Vicente, Camarines Norte.[12]On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition forcertiorari, presently docketed asG.R. No. 163295.His brother Rommels petition inG.R. No. 163354followed barely a week after.In ouren bancresolution dated June 1, 2004,G.R. No. 163295andG.R. No. 163354were consolidated.[13]Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order dismissing private respondent AlegresPetition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being moot and academic.[14]The issues for resolution of the Court are:InG.R. No. 163295,whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing itsen bancresolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections and consequently ordering the deletion of his name from the official list of candidates so that any vote cast in his favor shall be considered stray.InG.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommels certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that, while he indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-elect in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated July 4, 2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citingLonzanida vs. Comelec[15],that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a protested proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the final outcome of the election protest.The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:Sec. 43. Term of Office.xxx xxx xxx(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.[16]With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or notFranciss assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis,service for the full term, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions,supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850,[17]that it was Francis opponent (Alegre) whowonin the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.

Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Courts ruling in,Lonzanida vs. Comelec,[18]citingBorja vs. Comelec[19].InLonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually granted. There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact vacated] his post before the expiration of the term.

The difference between the case at bench andLonzanidais at once apparent. For one, inLonzanida,the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason offailure of election, and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.

On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.

The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELECen bancwhen it disqualified Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente and denying due course to his certificate of candidacy by force of the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local elective official cannot be sustained. What the COMELECen bancsaid in its May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution commends itself for concurrence:

As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying the ruling in theBorjaandLonzanidacases in the instant petition will be erroneous because the factual milieu in those cases is different from the one obtaining here. Explicitly, the three-term limit was not made applicable in the cases ofBorjaandLonzanidabecause there was an interruption in the continuity of service of the three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have served continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full term from 1998 to 2001 could not be simply discounted on the basis that he was not duly elected thereto on account of void proclamation because it would have iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified and repudiated loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added; emphasis in the original)

Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not then Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano overstepped his discretion when he issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004 COMELECen bancresolution even before its finality[20]is now of little moment and need not detain us any longer.Just as unmeritorious as Francis petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he (Rommel) challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his name as a substitute candidate in the official list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing COMELEC policy[21]provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the certified list of candidates pending approval of the substitution.Not to be overlooked is the Courts holding inMiranda vs. Abaya,[22]that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the former, thus:

While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.xxx xxx xxxA person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.xxx xxx xxxAfter having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.

In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were alreadypass, Rommel Ongs petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot and academic.WHEREFORE, the instant petitions areDISMISSEDand the assaileden bancResolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.EN BANC

[G.R. No. 154829.December 10, 2003]

ARSENIO A. LATASA,petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA,J.:

This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to challenge the resolution issued by the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated April 27, 2001 in SPA Case No. 01-059 entitled,Romeo M. Sunga, petitioner, versus Arsenio A. Latasa, respondent, and the Resolution of the COMELECen bancdenying herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.The assailed Resolution denied due course to the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, declaring him disqualified to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao del Sur Province in the May 14, 2001 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted, and if he has been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation null and void.

The facts are fairly simple.

Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of theMunicipalityofDigos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.During petitioners third term, theMunicipalityofDigoswas declared a component city, to be known as the City ofDigos.A plebiscite conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled,An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be known as the City of Digosor the Charter of the City of Digos.This event also marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of theMunicipalityofDigos.However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of thenew Cityof Digos.Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.

OnFebruary 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for theMay 14, 2001elections.He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

OnMarch 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification[1]against petitioner Latasa.Respondent Sunga alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor ofDigosCitysince petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.

OnMarch 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer,[2]arguing that he did not make any false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of theMunicipalityofDigosfor three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for theMay 14, 2001elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

Both parties submitted their position papers onMarch 19, 2001.[3]OnApril 27, 2001, respondent COMELECs First Division issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the respondents certificate of candidacy should be cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.[4]Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration datedMay 4, 2001,[5]which remained unacted upon until the day of the elections,May 14, 2001.On May 16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers From Canvassing or Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins the Elections.[6]Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner onMay 17, 2001, having garnered the most number of votes. Consequently, private respondent Sunga filed, onMay 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion[7]which essentially sought the annulment of petitioners proclamation and the suspension of its effects.

OnJuly 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected mayor ofDigosCity.It was only onAugust 27, 2002that the COMELECen bancissued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held inMamba-Perez v. COMELEC

HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/dec2003/154829.htm" \l "_ftn8"[8]that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications.An opposing partys remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition forquo warrantowithin ten days after the proclamation.

On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that its very heart is something which this Court considers of paramount interest.This Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was already entertaining some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible to run for city mayor in theMay 14, 2001elections.In his certificate of candidacy, after the phrase I am eligible, petitioner inserted a footnote and indicated:

*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor.[9]Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.[10]The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of procedural rules.

The present case raises a novel issue with respect to an explicit Constitutional mandate: whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City ofDigosimmediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of theMunicipalityofDigos.

As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them.Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.

Section 8.The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

An examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power.In fact, they rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there should be no further re-election for local and legislative officials.[11]The members, instead, adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term:

MR. MONSOD:Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in this draft Constitution, we are recognizing peoples power.We have said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino.And yet at the same time, we are prescreening candidates among whom they will choose.We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are barred from running for the same position.

The argument is that there may be other positions.But there are some people who are very skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be Senators.They may be perfectly honest, perfectly competent and with integrity.They get voted into office at the age of 25, which is the age we provide for Congressmen.And at 34 years old we put them into pasture.

Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people.We are talking here only of congressional or senatorial seats.We want to broaden the peoples choice but we are making prejudgment today because we exclude a certain number of people.We are, in effect, putting an additional qualification for office that the officials must have not have served a total of more than a number of years in their lifetime.

Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of statesmen, but the future participation of these statesmen is limited.Their skills may be only in some areas, but we are saying that they are going to be barred from running for the same position.

Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-to-day honing of his skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in concern and contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is going to be barred from the same kind of public service.

I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous decision with respect to many of our countrymen in the future who may have a lot more years ahead of them in the service of their country.

If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will perpetuate them, then let us give them this rest period of three years or whatever it is.Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree should not run.But let us not bar them for life after serving the public for number of years.[12]The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms.As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the deliberations:

x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent re-elections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate these powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. x x x[13]An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.[14]In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities.Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code.He does not deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post.

For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code provides:

SECTION 450.Requisites for Creation. -(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i)a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or,

(ii)a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.

Provided,That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.The requirement on land are shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more island.The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c)The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.[15]Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city.For one, there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well.[16]It is precisely for this reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion of a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such creation or conversion is based on verified indicators:

Section 7.Creation and Conversion.--- As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a)Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;

(b)Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and

(c)Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).[17]On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City ofDigosprovides:

Section 2.The City ofDigos--- TheMunicipalityofDigosshall be converted into a component city to be known as the City ofDigos, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of theMunicipalityofDigos, Davao del Sur Province.