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EN BANCG.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA,Petitioner, vs.CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT,Respondents.Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.chanrobles virtual law libraryMakabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.SARMIENTO,J.:The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryYou are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."chanrobles virtual law library6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present:1. Sali, Salicchanrobles virtual law library2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)chanrobles virtual law library3. Dagalangit, Rakilchanrobles virtual law library4. Dela Fuente, Antoniochanrobles virtual law library5. Mangelen, Contechanrobles virtual law library6. Ortiz, Jesuschanrobles virtual law library7. Palomares, Diegochanrobles virtual law library8. Sinsuat, Bimbochanrobles virtual law library9. Tomawis, Acmadchanrobles virtual law library10. Tomawis, JerryAfter declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present:1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officerchanrobles virtual law library2. Ali Salicchanrobles virtual law library3. Ali Salindatuchanrobles virtual law library4. Aratuc, Malikchanrobles virtual law library5. Cajelo, Renechanrobles virtual law library6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)chanrobles virtual law library7. Dagalangit, Rakilchanrobles virtual law library8. Dela Fuente, Antoniochanrobles virtual law library9. Ortiz, Jesuschanroble10 Palomares, Diegochanrobles virtual law library11. Quijano, Jesuschanrobles virtual law library12. Sinsuat, Bimbochanrobles virtual law library13. Tomawis, Acmadchanrobles virtual law library14. Tomawis, JerryAn excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:chanrobles virtual law libraryHON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of theSpeaker Pro Temporeas the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryHON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryPRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryTwelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against.1Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-chanrobles virtual law library(a) This Petition be given due course;chanrobles virtual law library(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;chanrobles virtual law library(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;chanrobles virtual law library(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, andchanrobles virtual law library(e) Making the injunction permanent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryPetitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.2Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"3on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ."4and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,"5that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic],"6and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly,"7for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic".8 chanrobles virtual law libraryThe first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWe do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryOn the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook."9"To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City,"10but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled."11Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWhile we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard,12it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIn the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people"13an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution,14and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWe therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?chanrobles virtual law libraryThe autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 161815promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy"16in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,"17with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities18specified therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions,"19except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government,"20"which include, but are not limited to, the following:(1) National defense and security;chanrobles virtual law library(2) Foreign relations;chanrobles virtual law library(3) Foreign trade;chanrobles virtual law library(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing,chanrobles virtual law library(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;chanrobles virtual law library(6) Air and sea transportchanrobles virtual law library(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;chanrobles virtual law library(8) Customs and quarantine;chanrobles virtual law library(9) Immigration and deportation;chanrobles virtual law library(10) Citizenship and naturalization;chanrobles virtual law library(11) National economic, social and educational planning; andchanrobles virtual law library(12) General auditing.21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..."22chanrobles virtual law libraryNow, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"23"and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."24At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"25over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."26He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.27chanrobles virtual law libraryDecentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.28chanrobles virtual law libraryBut the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryUnder the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.29chanrobles virtual law librarySec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.30xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law librarySee. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.31An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government).32If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that theinternalacts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."33In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:chanrobles virtual law library(1) Organization of regional administrative system;chanrobles virtual law library(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;chanrobles virtual law library(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;chanrobles virtual law library(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;chanrobles virtual law library(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;chanrobles virtual law library(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;chanrobles virtual law library(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;chanrobles virtual law library(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities;chanrobles virtual law library(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; andchanrobles virtual law library(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.34chanrobles Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryBriefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryUpon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,"35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals."36Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity.37The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules.38Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.cnroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIn holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him acarte blancheto order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryNeither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them.39chanrobles virtual law libraryIn view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.cSO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),respondent.H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.PARAS,J.:pA TV ad proudly announces:"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7,Rollo)In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21,Rollo).The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez,supra).InVictoriano v.Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the . . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W.2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W.2nd660, 663; 59 SCRA 66;seealsoe.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta,supra)It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed thatno state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities,or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland,supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other chargessubject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be anintra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be animperiuminimperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.Asgamblingis usually anoffense against the State,legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact,ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82,Rollo).We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)The equal protection clause of the 14thAmendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec,supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.As this Court held inCitizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v.Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the President and the Congress.Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling.Gambling may have been the antecedent,but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

KIDA V SENATE

OnJune 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections fromthe 8thof August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court.These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual AntecedentsThe State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and theCordilleras.Section 15 states:Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in theCordillerasconsisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of thePhilippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.A plebiscite was held onNovember 6, 1990as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).The initially assenting provinces were Lanaodel Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed.This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1]- onJune 22, 2001.This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, toNovember 26, 2001.It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later thanAugust 15, 2001.RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held onAugust 14, 2001.

TheprovinceofBasilanandMarawiCityvoted to join ARMM on the same date.RA No. 9333[2]was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled onAugust 8, 2011. OnMarch 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), onJune 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. OnJune 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and onJune 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R.No. 196271[3]-assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity ofRA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner BasariMapupuno inG.R. No. 196305filed another petition[4]also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:a)Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition[5]filed by Rep. EdcelLagman as a member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197221;b)Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6]filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197282;c)Petition forCertiorariand Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7]filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed asG.R. No. 197392; andd)Petition forCertiorariand Mandamus[8]filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197454.

Petitioners AlamarimCentiTillah and DatuCasanConding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the PartidoDemokratiko Pilipino Lakasng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus[9]against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their ownMotion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention datedJuly 18, 2011. OnJuly 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held onAugust 9, 2011andAugust 16, 2011.Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.

OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.

The ArgumentsThe petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

The IssuesFrom the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:I.Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of electionsII.Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 ConstitutionIII.Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebisciteA.Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?B.Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?C.Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?IV.Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMMV.Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:A.Section 15, Article X of the 1987 ConstitutionB.Section 16, Article X of the 1987 ConstitutionC.Section 18, Article X of the 1987 ConstitutionVI.Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.OUR RULINGWe resolve toDISMISSthe petitions and therebyUPHOLDthe constitutionality of RA No. 10153in toto.I.Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandateThe respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitutionshall serve untilnoonofJune 30, 1992.Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.Xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.We agree with this position.While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,[10]which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. InOsmea v. Commission on Elections,[14]we explainedIt is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x xxrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.As this Court explained inPeople v. Derilo,[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled Local Government.Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of thePhilippinesare the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and theCordillerasas hereinafter provided.Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated bythe Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious.We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

II.The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153The petitioners inG.R. No. 197280also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitutionwhich provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment.

The Court, inTolentino v. Secretary of Finance,explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.Xxx

That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.Following ourTolentinoruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling inTolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ ofhabeas corpusor declaration of martial law Art.VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard.Butthe factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.[Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review.

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action.Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them.Specifically,the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.III.A.RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of thefirstARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections.A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of thesubsequentARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.To recall,RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections.The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections,leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,RA No. 8176,[RA No. 8746,[RA No. 8753,and RA No. 9012were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections.Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140[30]to reset the date of the ARMM elections.Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054),the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333,which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

III. B.Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.The Courts pronouncement inCity of Davao v. GSIS[33]on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxiousanathema to democratic principlesfor a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers.Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.xxxA state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law.This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility.III. C.Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act.As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35]questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required foreverystatutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation ofautonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system,i.e., thespecialcourtswithpersonal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36]

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.

IV.The synchronization issueAs we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections.On this point, an existing law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional elections.Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception of barangayandSanggunianKabataanelections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition.[37]

To achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;[38](2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V.The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153A.Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood.Thefirstis the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; thesecondis the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and thethirdis on the concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[39]The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[40]Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[41]Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3).Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law

The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parame