Title V — POSSESSIONChapter 1POSSESSION AND THE KINDS THEREOFArt. 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.

Etymologically, the wordpossession is derived from the Latin terms pos and sedere which mean “to settle or to be settled.” In our Civil Code, however, possession is defi

ned as “the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.”3 From this defi nition, it is clear that the concept of possession extends to both corporeal and incorporeal things — the former being represented by the term “thing” and the latter by theterm “right” in Article 523 of the New Civil Code. possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment

of a right with the intentionto possess in one’s own right.

Viewpoints of Possession (a) Right TO possession (jus possidendi) — This is a right or incident of ownership. (Example: I own a house; therefore I am entitled to posses it.) (b) Right OF possession (jus possessionis) — This is an independent right of itself, independent of ownership. (Example: I am renting a house from X.

Although I am not the owner, still by virtue of the lease agreement, I am entitled to possess the house for the period of the lease.)

ART. 523 presumes fromthe fact of possession the intention to process Ownership V. PossessionO: when a thing pertaining

to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by lawand consistent with the rights

of othersP: literally, to possess

means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right

P: may be had in one of 2 ways: possession of an ownerand possession of a holder a person may be declaredowner but he may not be entitled to possession a judgment for ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary

incident just as possession is a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership

Elements of Possession1. There must be a holding or control of a thing or right; occupancy, apprehension or taking except in 2 cases mentioned in Art 537, possession always

implies the element of corpus or occupation (531) whether in one's own name or in that of another (524) but is is necessary that there should be such occupancy or there is no possession

2. holding or control must be with intention to posses animus possidendi Animus possidendi, it has been held, is a state of mind, the presence and

determination of which is largely dependent on the circumstances obtaining in each case. the animus possidendi may be contradicted and rebutted by evidence whichtends to prove that the person under whose power or control the thing in question appears to be, does not in fact exercise thepower or control and does not intend to do so

3. it must be in one's own

right- Possession may be held by aperson in his own name or in that of another (524) in his own name or by an agent

Forms or degrees of possession. They may be as follows: (1) Possession without any title whatever. —This is mere holding or possession without any right or title at all, such as that of athief or squatter; (2) Possession with a juridical

title. — The possession is predicated on a juridical relation existing between the possessor and the owner (or one acting in his behalf) of the thing but not in the concept of owner such as thatof a lessee, usufructuary, depositary, agent, pledgee, and trustee; (3) Possession with a just title. — The possession of an adverse claimant whose title is sufficient to transfer ownership but is defective

such as when the seller is not the true owner or could not transmit his rights thereto to the possessor who acted in good faith; and (4) Possession with a title in fee simple. — Possession derivedfrom the right of dominion orpossession of an owner. This is the highest degree of possession.

Nature of possession. Possession may be viewed as

an act, as a fact or condition, or as a right. (1) As an act. —It is simply the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right with the intention to possess in one’s own right. (2) As a fact. — When there is holding or enjoyment, then possession exists as a fact. It is the state or condition of a person having property underhis control, with or without right. (3) As a right. — It refers to the right of a person to that holding or enjoyment

to the exclusion of all others having better right than the possessor. (Art. 533.) It may be:(a) Jus possidendi or right to possession which is incidental to and included in the right of ownership; or (b) Jus possessionis or right of possession independent of and apart from the right of ownership. Sometimes, possession is used to refer to the thing possessed — that which one owns, occupies, or

controls.

Extent of possession. Possession may also be actualor constructive. (1) Actual possession is occupancy in fact of the whole or at least substantially the whole. With reference to land, it consists in the manifestation of acts ofdominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his property. (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175

[1918].) Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without a right. (2) Constructive possession, on the other hand, is occupancy of part in the name of the whole under such circumstances that the law extends the occupancy to the possession of the whole.

Constructive PossessionPossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man

has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he isin possession.

Classifi cation of Possession under the Civil Code The Civil Code classifi es possession, as follows: (1) Possession in one’s own name and possession in the name of another; 524 (2) Possession in the concept of an owner and possession in the concept of a holder; 525

and (3) Possession in good faith and possession in bad faith. 526

Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one’s own name or in that of another.

- Names Under Which Possession May Be Exercised(a) one’s own name (b) name of another Possession in Another’s Name (a) Voluntary — as

when an agent possesses for the principal (by virtue of agreement). (b) Necessary — as when a mother possesses for a child still in the maternal womb. [NOTE: Here the mother does not possess the child; she possesses FOR him.]. (c) Unauthorized — (This will become the principal’s possession only after there has been a ratifi cation without prejudice to the effects of negotiorum gestio.)

Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had inone of two concepts: either inthe concept of owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person. Concept, as contemplated in the provision, does not mean the opinion, attitude or belief of the possessor but of others, generally formed

in view of the circumstances which precede and accompany thepossession. Thus, possession in the concept of owner is distinguished from possession in good faith. (Art. 526.) This kind of possession is also referred to as adverse possession that may ripen into ownership under Article 540. Possession may be had inone of two concepts. (1)

Possession in the concept of owner. — This takes place when the possessor of a thing or right, by his actions, is considered or is believed by other people asthe owner, regardless of thegood or bad faith of the possessor. It is possession under a claim of ownershipor title (en concepto de dueño) by one who is the owner himself or one who is not the owner but claims to be and acts as the owner

(2) Possession in the concept of holder. — This takes place when the possessor of a thingor right holds it merely to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person. It is possession not under a claim of ownership (or not in the concept of owner), the possessor acknowledging in another a superior right which he believes to be of ownership, whether this be true or not (see 3 Manresa

87-89.) or his belief be right or wrong. (Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 329 SCRA 78 [2000]; Carlos v. Republic, 468 SCRA 709 [2005].) Thus,the usufructuary, depositary, lessee, pledgee, and the bailee in commodatum possesses with respect to the thing in the concept of holderor non-owner. Possession in concept of both owner and holder or inneither. (1) It is possible that a person may exercise

possession both in the concept of owner and in theconcept of holder. A distinction must be borne in mind between possession of the thing itself and possession of the right to keep or enjoy the thing. Rights are possessed in the concept of owner. Thus, the lessee possesses the thing leased in the concept of holder, and the right of lease in the conceptof owner. If the thing is

sub-leased, the sub-lessee possesses the right in the concept of holder.

(2) The agent, parent, guardian, administrator, and other legal representatives possess neither in the conceptof owner nor in the concept of holder. They possess in thename of another. (Art. 524.) Specifi c Examples of Possession in the Concept of Holder (a) that of the tenant; (b) that of the usufructuary; (c) that of the

depositary; (d) that of the bailee in commodatum. [NOTE: The possession is of the property concerned. Regarding their respective rights (the lease right, the usufruct, the right to safeguard the thing, the right to use the thing), all are possessed by them, respectively, in the concept of owner. HENCE, we distinguish between: 1) possession of the THING itself. 2) possession of the

RIGHT TO ENJOY the thing (or benefi t from it).].

Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any fl aw which invalidates it. He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing. Mistake upon a doubtful or diffi cult question of law maybe the basis of good faith.

‘Possessor in Good Faith’ Defi ned One who is not aware that there exists in his TITLE or MODE of acquisition any fl aw whichinvalidates it. (DBP v. CA, 316 SCRA 650 [1999]). A possessor in good faithis one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. (see Arts. 1127-1128.) ‘Possessor in Bad Faith’

(mala fi de) Defi ned One who is not in good faith. (Hence, if circumstances exist that require a prudent man to investigate, he will be in bad faith if he does not investigate.) A possessor in bad faith is one who possesses in anycase contrary to the foregoing, i.e., he is aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition a flaw which invalidates it. Possession, depending on

the manner it has been acquired, may be either in good faith (buena fe) or in bad faith (mala fe). Article 526 presupposes that there exists a flaw in the title or mode of acquisition (see Art. 712.) of the possessor who is either aware or not aware of it. If there is no flaw, there can be no issue regarding good or bad faith. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on

the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. When distinction important. — The distinction between the twokinds of possession is of importance principally in connection with the receipt of fruits and the payment ofexpenses and improvements (Arts. 544-553.) and the acquisition ofownership by prescription under Article 1127. In this connection, the meaning of

good faith for purposes of prescription only is given in Article 1127. On the other hand, good faith for purposes of possession requires the existence of title or mode of acquisition which undoubtedly refers to the law on acquisition in general. When distinction immaterial. — The distinction between possession in good faith and possession in bad faith

is immaterial in the exercise of the right to recover under Article 539 which speaks of every possessor. Where possession in name of another. — The good or bad faith is necessarily personal to the possessor (see Art. 534.) but in the case of a principal and any person represented by another, the good or bad faith of the agent or legal

representative will benefit or prejudice him for whom he acts. Requisites for possessionin good faith or in bad faith. They are the following: (1) The possessor has a title or mode of acquisition (see Art. 712.); (2) There is a flaw or defect in said title or mode; and (3) The possessor is unaware or aware of the flaw or defect or believes that the thing

belongs or does not belong to him. Query If a person is aware of the defects of his predecessor’s title, should he be considered in good faith or in bad faith? ANS.: Although Manresa says he should be considered in good faith because after all,the law speaks of his title, not that of the predecessor, still the fact remains that heis not allowed to get from aperson who is not the

owner. Therefore, we should consider him in bad faith unless of course he has valid reasons to believethat his own title is good. Bad Faith Is Personal Just because a person is in bad faith (knows of the defect or fl aw in his title) does not necessarily mean that his successors-in-interest are also in bad faith. As a matter of fact, a child or heir may even be presumed in good faith,

notwithstanding the father’s bad faith. (See Art. 534; see also Sotto v. Enage, [CA] 43 O.G. 5057) The essence of bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absenceof intention to overreach another (Negrete v. Court of First Instance of Marinduque, 48 SCRA 113[1972].), or to defraud or to

seek an unconscionable advantage. Good faith mustrest on a colorable right in the possessor beyond a mere stubborn belief in one’s title. (see Baltazar v. Caridad, 17 SCRA 460 [1966].) Applied to possession, one is considered a possessor in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. (Art. 526.)'

In the sample cases that follow, after considering the facts and surrounding circumstances, possession was held to be in bad faith. (1) Where the defendant had always believed that the land in question did notbelong to them. (Javier v. Javier, 6 Phil. 493 [1906].)

(2) Where the defendant was present when her husband entered into the lease contractand was not ignorant of the defect in her husband’s

alleged prescriptive title when she pretended to take possession thereunder. (Lerma v. De la Cruz, 7 Phil. 581 [1907].) (3) Where the petitioner acquired his interest in the land aware thata litigation concerning the land was still pending. (Rivera v. Moran, 48 Phil. 836 [1926].) (4) Where a purchaser believed that the seller was the owner of the land sold, which land was owned by another as

evidenced by the latter’s Torrens title thereto, in view of the presumptive knowledge of the Torrens title. (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.v. Mumar, 25 SCRA 405 [1968].) (5) Where the lessee continues to occupy the premises after the period of the lease contract has already expired as he becomes a usurper with no right to legitimately continue in the use and enjoyment thereof. (Republic v. Diaz, 92 SCRA

535 [1979].) (6) Where the purchaser of land has learned of another person’s open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same, as he is aware of sufficient fact to warrant an inquiry into the status of the title to the land. (Manacop, Jr. v. Cansino, 1 SCRA 572 [1961]; Salvoro v. TaÒega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 331 [1981].) Where the land sold is in the possession of a

person other than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyondthe certificate of title and make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor. Failing in this, the purchaser cannot invoke the light of purchaser in good faith and cannot acquire a better right than his predecessor-in-interest. (Heirs of T. de Leon Vda. De Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 422 SCRA 101 [2004].) But the fact mere that a land is

peaceably possessed by a person other than the seller does not make the buyer one in bad faith where he relied ingood faith for value upon the certificate of title of the seller.(Benin v. Tuazon, 57 SCRA 531 [1974].) (7) Where the purchaser of land has notice that it is subject to right of repurchase from his vendor (the vendee a retro in the previous sale) although such right has already lapsed but the title has not yet been

cleared of the encumbrance. (Conde v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 245 [1982].) (8) Where one purchaseda land, on the certificate of title of which an adverse claim was previously annotated. (Gardner v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 585 [1984].) If an existing claim or encumbrance is not annotated in the title, the sale must be given effect for the settled doctrine is

that the purchaser in good faith for value of property covered by a clear certificate of title can rest assured that his title is perfect and uncontrovertible. (Benin v. Tuazon, supra; see Carreonv. Agcaoili, 1 SCRA 521 [1961].) Article 526 speaks of “mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law,’’ which may be the basis of good faith.

The phrase refers to honest error in the application of the law or interpretation of doubtful or conflicting legal provisions or doctrines. It is different from “ignorance of the law’’ which “excuses no one from compliance therewith.’’ (Art. 3.) So, one who acquires property by a deed or proceeding which is absolutely void because it is in violation of prohibitory laws such as the purchaser of property in defiance of the

provisions of Article 1491 (e.g., guardian with respect toproperty of ward, judge with respect to property in litigation) cannot allege good faith because no one is permitted to plead ignorance of the law as a valid excuse for its violation.

Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests

the burden of proof.

Presumption of Good Faith Reason: The presumption of innocence is given because every person should be presumedhonest till the contrary is proved. This presumption is just, because possession is the outward sign of ownership.It is to be presumed that theright of the possessor is well-founded. This

appearance of lawful possession must be accepted even though it be in reality nothing more than a disguise for bad faith, because this can not be known with certainty until proved, and because every person is presumed to be honest until the contrary is shown. For this reason, protection is given to the possessor against all other persons, whoever they may be, and hence, the

precept of Article 527 demands proof of bad faith.

Art. 528. Possession acquiredin good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession which begins in good faith is presumed to continue in good faith until the possessor acquires

knowledge of facts showing a defect or weakness in his title. Commencement of bad faith. — Bad faith begins or good faith is interrupted from the time the possessorbecomes aware “that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully,’’not from the time possession was acquired. For instance, if the possessor learned from the true owner himself the

grounds in support of the latter’s adverse claim and he becomes aware that his title is not valid or at least doubtful, he is deemed to have taken possession in bad faith only from that time with all the legal consequences arising from such possession. (see Art. 552 Interruption of good faith. — In the absence of other facts showing the possessor’s knowledge of

defect in his title, good faith is interrupted from thereceipt or service of judicial summons. A possessor in good faithis entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons. (Arts. 544, 1123.)

Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be

enjoyed in the same characterin which it was acquired, until the contrary is proven.

Presumptions Regarding Possession (a) GOOD FAITH— “Good faith is always presumed.’’ (Art. 527). (b) CONTINUITY OF CHARACTER OF POSSESSION (whether in good faith or bad faith — “It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in thesame character in which it

was acquired, until the contrary is proved.’’ (Art. 529). (c) NON-INTERRUPTION OF POSSESSION — “The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption, and from the moment of the deathof the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have possessed the same.”

(Art. 533).(d) PRESUMPTION OF JUST TITLE — “A possessorin the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesseswith just title, and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.’’ (Art. 541). (e) NON-INTERRUPTION OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY UNJUSTLY LOST BUT LEGALLY RECOVERED — “One who recovers, according to law,

possession unjustly lost, shallbe deemed for all purposes which may redound to his benefi t, to have enjoyed it without interruption.” (Art. 561). (f) POSSESSION DURING INTERVENING PERIOD — “It is presumed, that the present possessor who was also the possessor atprevious time, has continued to be in possession during theintervening time, unless thereis proof to the contrary.” (Art.1138[2]). (g) POSSESSION

OF MOVABLES WITH REAL PROPERTY — “The possession of real property presumes that of the movables therein, so long as it is not shown or proved that they should be excluded.” (Art. 542). (h) EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF COMMON PROPERTY — “Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in common shall be deemed to have exclusively possessed the part which may be

allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the entireperiod during which the co-possession lasted.” (Art. 543). The rule enunciated in Article 529 embodies a principle in Roman Law which is that no one can, by his sole will nor by the mere lapse of time, change the cause of his possession There are other presumptions aside from

Articles 527 and 529 affecting possession, namely: (1) uninterrupted possession of hereditary property (Art. 533, par. 1.); (2) possession with just title (Art. 541.); (3) possession of movables with real property (Art. 542.);

(4) exclusive possession of common property (Art. 543.);(5) continuous possession (Art. 554.); (6) uninterrupted possession (Art. 561.); and

(7) possession during intervening period. (Art. 1138[2].)

Art. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession. What May or May Not Be Possessed? Only those things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated (hence, only PROPERTY may be the object of possession).

Res nullius (abandoned or ownerless property) maybe possessed, but cannot beacquired by prescription. Reason: prescription presupposes prior ownership in another. However, said “res nullius”may be acquired by occupation.

Chapter 2 ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material

occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

Chapter 2 ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the

action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

To be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of a thing at all times. There are three waysof acquiring possession, namely: (1) By the materialoccupation or exercise of a right; (2) By the subjection of the thing or right to our

will; and (3) By proper actsand legal formalities established for acquiring such right of possession. The modes of acquiring ownership are provided in Article 712.

By material occupation (detention) of a thing or the exercise of a right (quasi-possession). (This also includes constitutum possessorium or traditio brevimanu.) (b) By subjection to

our will (this includes traditiolonga manu — by mere agreement; or by the delivery of keys — traditio simbolica) (clearly, this does not require actual physical detention or seizure). (c) By constructive possession or proper acts and legal formalities (such as succession, donation, execution of public instruments; or thru the possession by a sheriff by virtue of a court order.)

(1) Constitutum

possessorium exists when a person who possessed property as an owner, now possesses it in some other capacity, as that of lessee or depositary.

-tradicion constitutum possessorium which happens when the owner continues in possession of the property alienated not as owner but in some other capacity, such as that of lessee, pledgee, or depositary. (see Art. 1500.)

Thus, delivery of the thing to the vendee and then back to the vendor are deemed by lawto have taken place by mere consent or agreement of the parties.

(2) (2) Traditio brevi manu — (the opposite of constitutum possessorium) — this exists when a person who possessed property not as an owner (like a lessee), now possesses it as

owner.-(1) tradicion brevi manu which takes place when one already in possession of a thing by a title other than ownership continues to possess the same under a newtitle, that of ownership. (see Art. 499.) Thus, a lessee who buys the land leased need not turn over the land to the lessor so that the latter may, in turn, deliver it, all these being considered as done by fiction of law; and

(3) (3) Traditio longa manu (delivery by the long hand) — delivery by consent or mere pointing. (See 4 Manresa 148-149).].

In the absence of stipulation of the parties that the ownership of a thing sold shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the stipulated price, the execution of the sale thru a public instrument shall be

equivalent to the delivery of the thing. The fact that the parties have agreed thatthe balance shall be paid upon approval of a particular loan does not evidence a contrary intention If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser CANNOT have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and

make use of it himself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has NOT been effected. Symbolic delivery holds true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of thevendee. Material occupation or exercise of right. (1) With respect to things. — The

law requires material occupation as one of the modes of acquiring possession. Occupation, as used in Article 531, does not have the juridical and technical sense that it has under Article 712, et seq., for purposes of acquiring ownership but in its generaland material sense or usual and common meaning. (4 Manresa 14.) It is possession as a fact. (2) With respect to rights. —

Since rights are intangible and cannot logically be occupied, what is acquired is the exercise of a right. For example, possession of a servitude of way, which is a right, is acquired by theexercise of the right, i.e., by passing over the servient land. Under Article1501, relative to the thing sold, delivery with respect to incorporeal property may be effected by allowing the vendee to use

his rights as new owner with the consent of the vendor. This is a mode of tradition or delivery knownas quasi-tradicion, a kind ofconstructive delivery. (see Art. 712.) Material occupation by delivery. The material occupation of a thing as a means of acquiring possession may take place not only by actual delivery but also by “constructive delivery.’’ The latter is a

general term comprehending all those acts which, although not conferring physical possession of the thing, have been held equivalent to acts of actual delivery. It includes:

Subject to the action of will. This second method of acquisition is so broad inscope that it practically covers all means of

acquiring possession. Thus,occupation has the effect ofsubjecting things to the action of the possessor’s will. The same is true of proper acts and legal formalities. What the law contemplates is a distinct cause of acquiring possession and not merely an effect. It refers more to the right of possession thanto possession as a fact. It finds examples in two otherkinds of constructive

delivery, namely: (1) tradicion longa manu, which is effected by the mere consent or agreement of the parties, as when the vendor merely points to thething sold which shall thereafter be at the control and disposal of the vendee (see Art. 1499.); and (2) tradicion simbolica, which is effected by delivering an object such as a key where the thing sold is stored or kept, symbolizing the

placing of the thing under the control of the vendee. (see Art. 1498.)

Proper acts and legal formalities. This last method of acquiring possession refers to acquisition by virtue of a just title such as when property is transmitted by succession, donation, contract, or execution of a public instrument (see Art. 1498.); or when possession

is given by the sheriff to the purchaser at public auction (Muyco v. Montilla, 7 Phil. 498 [1907].), or pursuant to a writ of execution or a writ of possession. When a writ of possession is proper as aremedy is discussed under Article 428.

Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by his

legal representative, by his agent, or by any person without any power whatever; but in the last case, the possession shall not be considered as acquired until the person in whose name theact of possession was executed has ratified the same, without prejudice to the juridical consequences of negotiorum gestio in a propercase

Acquisition of

Possession from the Viewpoint of Who Possesses (a) personal (b) thru authorized person (agent or legal representative) (c) thru UNAUTHORIZED person (but only if subsequently RATIFIED). Essential Requisites (a) for personal acquisition 1) intent to possess 2) capacity to possess 3) object must be capable of being possessed (b) thru an

authorized person 1) intent to possess for principal (notfor agent) 2) authority or capacity to possess (for another) 3) principal has intent and capacity to possess (c) thru an unauthorized person (as in negotiorum gestio) 1) intent to possess for another (the “principal) 2) capacity of “principal” to possess3) ratifi cation by “principal” (The possessionalthough cured only by the

express or implied ratifi cation should be regarded as having a RETROACTIVE effect.) (See by analogy Art. 1396).[NOTE: If the stranger (gestor) had possessed it in his own name, it is he who had possession, and not theso-called “principal.”]. Negotiorum Gestio Negotiorum gestio is referred to in Art. 2144, et seq. of the Civil Code. Art. 2144. Whoever voluntarily

takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another without any power from the latter, is obliged tocontinue the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so. This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances: (a) When the

property or business is not neglected or abandoned; (b) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner. In the fi rst case, the provisions of Articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall govern. In the second case, the rules on agency inTitle X of this Book shall be applicable. The doctrine of constructive possession

applies when the possession is under title calling for the whole.83 As a rule, the possession and cultivation of a portion of atract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.84 Stated otherwise, the actual possession of part of the property is deemed to extend to the whole

because possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that heis in possession.85 For this doctrine to apply the following requisites must be present: (1) the alleged possessor must be in actual possession of a portion or part of the property; (2) he is claiming ownership of the whole area; (3) the

remainder of the area must not be in the adverse possession of another person; and (4) the area claimed must be reasonable.

Art. 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemedtransmitted to the heir without interruption and fromthe moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.One who validly renounces

an inheritance is deemed never to have possessed the same. Acquisition of Possession thru Succession Mortis Causa Time of Acquisition of Possession (a) If heir accepts — from the moment of death since there is no interruption. (Moreover, the possession of the deceased should be added to the possession of the heir). (Art. 1138, No.

1). [It should be understood however that the estate of the deceased has more assets than liabilities (the inheritance thus consisting of the remaining estate), otherwise there will be no property to be possessed. (See Centenera v. Sotto, 44 O.G. 3782).]. (b) If heir refuses (or is incapacitated to inherit) — he is deemed NEVER to have possessed the same

The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (Art.777.) From that moment, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to that portion which might be adjudicatedto him. The inheritance may be accepted or repudiated. (Art. 1041.) The effects of the acceptance or

repudiation retroact to the moment of death of the decedent. (Art. 1042.) There is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration, subject to the result of said administration. (see Art. 493.) Art. 534. One who succeeds by hereditary titleshall not suffer the consequences of the

wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of the fl aws affecting it; but the effects of possession in good faith shall not benefi thim except from the date ofdeath of the decedent. Some Effects of Acquisition of Possession, thru Succession If the father or decedent was in bad faith, it does not necessarily mean that the son was also in bad faith.

The son is presumed to be in GOOD FAITH. (Arriola v. De la Serna, 14 Phil. 627). However, since the father was in BAD FAITH, the consequences of the GOOD FAITH of the son should be counted only from the date of the decedent’s death. [NOTE: The use of the words “suffer” and “wrongful possession.” Note also that if the father had been in GOOD FAITH, the article

is not applicable, for the son would not ‘‘suffer.” In such a case, the possession of the father in GOOD FAITH is added to the possession of the son in GOOD FAITH, and we cannot say that the effects of possession in good faith shall commence only from the decedent’s death. But the effects of her good faith should be counted only from the date of her husband’s death.

By way of illustration: Suppose, H, husband, died on July 1, 2003 after possessing in bad faith a land for six (6) years, and W, wife, harvested fruits valued at P20,000 at the time of H’s death, and fruits valued at P30,000 on December 1, 2003 when T, true owner, brought action to recover the property. W must reimburse the P20,000 (see Art. 549.) minus the necessary

expenses (see Art. 564.) because H was in bad faith;but W is not liable for damages which T could have recovered from H. W does not have to reimburse the P30,000 since she was a possessor in good faith. (see Art. 544, par. 1.) Now, since the effects of W’s possession in good faith shall benefit her only from the date of the death of H, and immovable property is acquired by

ordinary prescription through possession (in good faith) in ten (10) years (see Art. 1134.) and by extraordinary prescription for thirty (30) years (see Art. 1137.), only two (2) years, equivalent to10/30 of six (6) years, shallbe added to the possession of W for purposes of prescription. So, if the action to recover the land isbrought by T after eight (8)years from the death of H,

the action shall not prosper.

Art. 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the possession of things; but they need the assistance of their legal representatives in order to exercise the rights which from the possession arise in their favor. Persons Referred to in the Article (a) unemancipated minors (b) minors emancipated by

parental concession or by marriage (in certain cases, like possession of real property) (c) other incapacitated persons like 1) the insane 2) the prodigal or spendthrift 3) those under civil interdiction ) deaf-mutes (in certain cases) — (in general, those laboring under restrictions on capacity to act). (See Regarding “acquisition of possession,” it is clear

that possession by them is allowed only in those matters where they have capacity to act (as in the case of physical seizure of res nullius or donation of personal property simultaneously delivered tothem) and NOT possession where juridical acts are imperative like the possession of land the ownership of which he desires to test in court (See 2 Castan 45-46 citing

Morrell; see also 4 Manresa 189), for in such acase, and in similar ones, the intervention of the legalrepresentatives or guardians is needed. Minors and other incapacitated persons may acquire property or rights by prescription, either personally or thru their parents, guardians, or legal representatives. (Art. 1107).

Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessorwho objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holdershould refuse to deliver the thing.

- The above principle of law which is embodied in Article

536 applies to one who believes himself the owner ofreal property. If he takes justice into his own hands, heis a mere intruder; and he canbe compelled to return the property in an action for forcible entry and must sufferthe necessary and natural consequences of his lawlessness. - Modes Thru Which Possession Cannot Be Acquired (Force, Tolerance, Secrecy) Possession cannot

be acquired: (a) thru FORCE or INTIMIDATION (as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto). (Impliedly, ifat fi rst there was objection but later on such objection ceases, the possession begun by force or intimidation may be acquired. Objection may be made by suit of forcible entry within a year from the dispossession, otherwise, the possession de facto is lost.) (b) thru mere TOLERANCE (permission). (Example: If I

willingly permit X to occupy my land, that is not really his possession, for the possessioncontinues to be mine.) Mere inaction or mere failure to bring an action is NOT the tolerance referred to in the law.) (See Art. 537; see also Manresa). (c) thru clandestine, secret possession(or possession without knowledge — for this would be possession by stealth, and not open or public. (See Art. 537). Clandestine possession

by itself is hidden or disguised possession and maybe with or without the owner’s knowledge. Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession.

Possession of another by mere tolerance is not adverse and, therefore, no

matter how long continued,cannot ripen to ownership by prescription. (see Arts. 1118, 1119; see Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781 [1918].) The mere silence or failure to take any actionwill not be construed as abandonment of rights on the part of the real possessor. It is, of course, for the courts to decide in each case whether there hasbeen an abandonment or not.

Possession by forbearance, permission, ortolerance is lawful but this becomes illegal when, upon demand to vacate by the legal owner, the possessor refuses to comply with such demand. In the absence of any contract between them, the possessor is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which the proper remedy is a

summary action for ejectment against him. The one-year period for filing an action for unlawful detainer is counted from the date of such demand, and when several demands are made, from the last letter of demand. Possession by Force or Violence (a) Force may be proved expressly or by implication. “The act of entering into the premises and excluding the lawful

possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property.’’ (Mañalac v. Olegario, et al., [CA] 43 O.G. 2169). (b) The force may be: 1) actual or merelythreatened; 2) done by possessor himself or by his agent; 3) done against the owner or against any other possessor (See 4 Manresa 200-201) or against the owner’s representative, such as a capataz (Mediran

v. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752); 4) done to oust possessor; or if occupied during the latter’s absence, done to prevent his getting back the premises. (See Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of San Jose, 27 Phil. 571). Meaning of “Acts ... do not affect possession” (Art.537) (a) The intruder does not acquire any right to possession (NO LEGAL POSSESSION). (b) The

legal possessor, even if physically ousted, is still the possessor and therefore — 1) still entitled to the benefi ts of prescription; 2) still entitled to the fruits; 3)still entitled as possessor for all purposes favorable to his possession. (See Ayala de Roxas v. Maglonso, 8 Phil. 745; 4 Manresa 201-202). (c) The intruder cannot acquire the property by prescription.

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the case of co-possession. Shoulda question arise regarding the fact of possession, the presentpossessor shall be preferred, if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal thething shall be placed in

judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

- Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities. Exceptions to General Rule: (a) co-possessors (since here, there is no confl ict of interest, bothof them acting as co-owners, as in the case of property owned or possessed in

common) (b) possession in different concepts or differentdegrees (Example: Both owner and tenant are possessors as a fact at the same time; the fi rst, in the concept of owner; the second,in the concept of holder; other examples: principal andagent; depositor and depositary; owner and administrator.) Rules or Criteria to be Used in Case of Confl ict or

Dispute Regarding Possession (BAR) (a) presentpossessor shall be preferred (b) if both are present, the one longer in possession (c) ifboth began to possess at the same time, the one who present (or has) a title (d) if both present a title, the Court will determine. (Meantime, the thing shall be judicially deposited.) The word “personalities,’’ as used

above, is not synonymous to “persons.’’ For example, in co-ownership, there are two or more persons, but there is only one personality Preference of possession.Article 538 applies whetherthe property is real or personal.2 In case a disputearises regarding the fact of possession, the order of preference is as follows: (1) The present or actual possessor shall be

preferred; (2) If there are two possessors, the longer in possession; (3) If the dates of possession are the same, the possessor with a title, i.e., right or documentevidencing his right to support his possession; and(4) If all the above are equal, the fact of possession shall be judicially determined, and in the meantime, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit. (see Arts. 2005-

2009.) Art. 538 applies to preference of POSSESSION (whether real or personal property is involved). It also applies whether the possession waslonger or shorter than one year). (See 4 Manresa 207-208). Art. 1544 applies to preference of OWNERSHIP in case of DOUBLE SALE (Art. 1544) or a DOUBLE

DONATION. (Art. 744). (a) MOVABLE property —Preference in ownership is given to the person who fi rst possessed it in good faith. (Art. 1544, par. 1). (b) IMMOVABLE property— Preference in ownership is given 1) to thefi rst who registered his right in good faith in the Registry of Property. 2) if there was no registration, to the person who fi rst possessed in

good faith. 3) if there was no possession, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided that the title had been acquired in good faith.

Cases Illustrative of Art. 1544 (Double Sale)Po Sun Tun v. Price 54 Phil. 192 FACTS: A sold and delivered his land to B. Later,A sold the same land to C. But C, not knowing that B had previously bought the

land, registered said land in his (C’s) name. Who should be considered the owner? HELD: C should be considered the owner since he was the fi rst one to register the land, and he was in good faith. [NOTE: But is it not true that one cannot sellwhat he does not own anymore? ANS.: Yes, but Art.1544 precisely constitutes theexception to the aforementioned rule. Art. 1544 is based on public

convenience. Moreover, sinceB’s right is not registered, it does not bind innocent third persons, as to whom A is still the owner. (See Hernandez v. Katigbak Vda. de Salas, 69 Phil. 744 stating that the contrary doctrine in Lanci v. Yangco, 52 Phil. 563 has been abandoned.) There is no doubt however that for breach of the warranty against eviction, A should indemnify B.].

Chapter 3 EFFECTS OF POSSESSIONArt. 539. Every possessor hasa right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days from the fi ling of the

complaint present a motion tosecure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the fi ling thereof.

Right to be Respected in Possession — General Nature This article speaks of three important things:

(a) right of a person to be respected in his possession (fi rst effect of possession). (b) protection in said right or restoration to said possession thru legal means. [See discussion under Art. 428 which speaks of the right of an owner (and also a possessor) to recover the property from whoever is holding the same.]. (c) the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

; the right to secure from a competent court in an action for forcible entry the proper writ to restore him in his possession. (see Art. 428.) [NOTE: An adverse possession of property by another is not an encumbrance in law, and does not contradict the condition that the property be free from encumbrance. Likewise, the adverse possession is not a lien for a lien signifi es a security

for a claim The mere possession of athing is sufficient to insure respect to the possessor while no other person appears to show and prove a better right Reasons for protection. “Why should the law protect possession as such, even though it may have been seized unlawfully? Would it not be sufficient to protect only ownership or at least a possession that

is lawfully justifiable? There are three reasons given for the protection of possession.’’ (1) As aid to criminal law. — “Firstly, it aids the criminal law by preserving the peace. Interference with possession almost inevitably leads to violence, not only in primitive times but even in the more civilized world of today. Order is best securedby protecting a possessor

and leaving the true owner to seek his remedy in a court of law.’’ (2) As part ofthe law of tort. — “Secondly, possession is protected as part of the law of tort. These rights of action are given in respect of the immediate and present violation of the rights of the possessor independently of his rights of property — they are an extension of that protectionwhich the law throws

around the person. (3) As part of the law of property. — “Finally, possession is protected as part of the law of property. The law does not always know that the possession in question is unlawful. In times when proof of title is difficult andtransfers of property require intricate formalities, it would be unjust to cast on every manwhose possession is disturbed the burden of

proving a flawless title.’’ (Paton, Jurisprudence, p. 422.)

Legal Means for Restoration to Possession (a) Reasons for requiring legal means; 1) to prevent spoliation or a disregard of public order (Roxas v. Mijares, 9 Phil. 520); 2) to prevent deprivation of property without due process of law; 3) to prevent a person from

taking the law into his own hands. (Yuson v. Guzman, 42 Phil. 22).

Art. 540. Only the possessionacquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve asa title for acquiring dominion If a person possesses en concepto de dueño — he may eventually become theowner by prescription. Thus, a possessor merelyin the concept of holder cannot acquire property by

acquisitive prescription. (This is because here the possession, far from being adverse, recognizes right ofownership in others. [See Corporacion v. Lozaro, 42 Phil. 119].). One cannot recognize the right of another and at the same time claim adverse possession which can ripento ownership through acquisitive prescription. For prescription to set in, the possession must be

adverse, public and to the exclusion of all Tax declarations, assessment, or payment of tax as indicia of ownership/possession. (1) Mere tax declarations of ownership do not vest or prove ownership of the property in the declarant (Province of Camarines Surv. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 613 [1937].) nor are even sufficient to sustain a claim for possession over a

land (Director of Forestry v. Villareal, 170 SCRA 598[1989].), in the absence of actual possession of the same (De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992].) They are merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. (Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 183 SCRA 102 [1990].) Nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner

The following cannot therefore acquire ownership by prescription (as long as they remain such — mere possessors in the concept of holder): lessees trustees -[These include: 1) parents over the properties of their unemancipated minor children or insane children (Art. 1109); 2) husband and wife over each other’s properties,

as long as the marriage lasts, and even if there be a separation of property which had been agreed upon in a marriage settlement or by judicial decree. (Art. 1109).]. Antichretic creditors. Agents attorneys (regarding their client's prop) depositaries co-owners—unless co-ownership is repudiated

Art. 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obligedto show or prove it. There are two requirements under this article to raise the disputable presumption of ownership (of a thing or a right): (a) One must be in possession (actual or constructive). (b) The

possession must be in the concept of owner (not mereholder). (A tenant cannot avail himself of the presumption of just title because he is not a possessor in the concept of owner). (See Laureto v. Mauricio, 37 O.G. 1287). Thus, in a general way, we may say that: POSSESSION IS PRESUMED OWNERSHIP. (3 Sanchez Roman 439). The Supreme

Court has ruled that actual possession of the property under claim of ownership raises the disputable presumption of ownership; the true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. (Chan v. Court of Appeals, L27488, June 30, 1970). Just title, as used in Article 541, does not always mean a document or a written instrument. The possessor may prove

his title by witnesses. Thus,an oral contract of sale is just as much a title as a written contract of sale. The words “or prove’’ wereinserted by the Code Commission after “show’’ to cover cases of oral contracts. Actual or constructive possession under claim of ownership raises the disputable presumption of ownership. (Art. 433.) In other words, a possession is

presumed ownership until the contrary is shown (3 Sanchez Roman 439.); or a possessor is presumed to have a just title, and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. (Olego v. Rebueno, 75 SCRA 446 [1975].) The reason for the presumption is to protect the owner of property from inconvenience; otherwise, he will always have to carry his titles under his arms to show them anytime

to whosoever may ask for itand who, with or without reason, may bring a suit. Different kinds of title. (1) The just title presumed by the provision is title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership without need of possessing the property for the period necessary for acquiring titleby prescription. It is title that is true and valid (titulo verdadero y valido). (Art. 1130.) The presumption of

just title does not apply in acquisitive prescription. The adverse possessor mustprove his just title. (Art. 1131.) (2) For the purposes of prescription, there is justtitle (titulo justo) when the adverse claimant came intopossession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership orother real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any

right (Art. 1129.); and also for the purposes of prescription, just title must be proved; it is never presumed. (Art. 1130.) (3) A colorable title (titulo colorado) is one which a person has when he buys a thing in good faith, from one who is not the owner but whom he believes to bethe owner. The just title required for acquisitive prescription is not titulo verdadero y valido but only

titulo colorado. (Solis v. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 678 [1989]; De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 307 [1993]; see Arts. 1106, 1129, 1131, infra.) (4) A colorable title is to be distinguished from putative title (titulo putativo), being one which a person believes he has but in fact he has not because there was no modeof acquiring ownership, as when one is in possession

of a thing in the mistaken belief that it had been bequeathed to him. (see Doliendo v. Biarnesa, 7 Phil. 232 [1906].) Reasons for the Presumption (a) presumption that one is in good faith — or that one is innocent of wrong. (b) inconvenience of carrying proofs of ownership around. (See 4 Manresa 248).

The Kinds of Titles (‘Titulos’) (a) True and Valid Title (Titulo Verdadero y Valido) — Here, there was a mode of transferring ownership and the grantor was the owner. It is defi ned as a title which by itself is suffi cientto transfer ownership without the necessity of letting the prescriptive period elapse. (See Doliendo v. Biarnesa, 7 Phil. 232). Example: B

bought a Ford Expedition Limited from S, the owner thereof. Then S delivered the car to B. B now has a true and valid title. [NOTE: This is the just title referred to in Art. 541. Thus, if B possesses the vehicle and drives it aroundas an owner, other people cannot compel him to prove his ownership over the same.]. (b) Colorable Title (Titulo Colorado) — That title where, although

there was a mode of transferring ownership, stillsomething is wrong, because the grantor is NOTthe owner. Example: B bought a BMW car from S.S then delivered the car to B. But it turns out that S never owned the car, and that somebody else was its owner. Whether B was in good faith or in bad faith is immaterial in deciding if he(B) is the owner; what is important is that he is not

the owner because he did not acquire or purchase the property from the owner, his title being merely “colorado’’ or colorable. [NOTE: Titulo colorado is what is meant by “just title’’ in the law of prescription, and not titulo verdadero y valido, for if it were the latter, there wouldbe no necessity of still acquiring ownership thru prescription, the grantee being already the owner.].

[NOTE: It must be remembered that: 1) Ordinary prescription needs good faith and just title, hence in the example given, if B is in good faith, he may become owner of the car by prescription after4 years (the car being personal property). 2) Extraordinary prescription does not need either good faith or just title, hence in the example given, if B is in bad faith, although there

may be just title (titulo colorado), B may get ownership by prescription only after 8 years.]. [NOTE: In case of real properties, the prescriptive periods are 10 years and 30years respectively for ordinary and extraordinary prescription.]. (c) Putative Title (Titulo Putativo) That title where although a person believes himself to be the owner, he nonetheless is not, because

there was no mode of acquiring ownership. Example: A is in possession of a piece of property in the mistaken belief that it had been inherited by him from Y. [NOTE: In the example given, there was really no mode, no succession as when Y, for example, is still alive. (See Viso, Derecho Civil Parte Segunda, p. 541, cited in Doliendo v. Biarnesa, 7

Phil. 232).].

Art. 542. The possession of real property presumes that ofthe movables therein, so long as it is not shown or proved that they should be excluded Applicability of the Article (a) whether the possessor be in good faith or bad faith (b) whether thepossession be in one’s own name or in another’s (c) whether the possession be in concepto de dueno or in

the concept of holder. Thus,the lessee of a building is presumed to be the possessor of the movables found therein, for he who needs them is supposed to have been the one who introduced the movables into the building. (4 Manresa 250). 3) Rights Are Not Included Within the Scope of the Presumption By “real property’’ and “movables’’ we mean only

real or personal THINGS, not rights. (4 Manresa 250).

Art. 543. Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in common shall be deemed to have exclusively possessed the partwhich may be allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the entire period during which the co-possession lasted. Interruption in the possession of the whole or a part of a thing possessed in

common shall be to the prejudice of all the possessors. However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules of Court shall apply

The article speaks of co-possession of a thing, not of co-ownership. (Art. 484.) Nevertheless, its principle is applicable to copossession of a real right.The object of a co-ownership as well as co-possession may be a thing

or a right such as usufruct. The rule enunciated in the first part of Article 543 is derived from Article 493, and by considering inherited property as a thing owned in common, confirms the principle laid down in Article 1091.1 (4 Manresa 255.) It was held applicable with respect to property held in common by co-heirs. All participants of a thingpossessed in common

constitute only one personality and the personality ceases when there is a partition. (see Art.538.) From that moment of cessation, the personality of each participant begins. By fiction of law, each copossessor is deemed (notmerely presumed) to have possessed exclusively and continuously during the period of co-possession thepart assigned to him in the division. Stated another

way, the effects of the division retroact to the commencement of the copossession. But the division shall be without prejudice to the rights of creditors. (see Art. 493.) Suppose X, Y, and Z have been co-possessors in the concept of owners of a fifteen (15) hectare parcel of land until they divided the property equally on the 8th year. If on the 4th year, after the division, T claims

ownership of the portion alloted to X, the latter can assert title by acquisitive (ordinary) prescription through possession of ten (10), for he is deemed to have possessed his portion exclusively and continuously for a period of twelve (12) years Meaning of ‘Shall be Deem

ed’ This does not establish a mere presumption. It gives a right.

Both the benefits and theprejudices that might have taken place during the co-possession shall attach to each of the co-participants. Thus, prescription obtainedby a co-possessor or coowner shall benefit the others. (Art. 1111.) Interruption in the possession of the whole or part of a thing shall be to the prejudice of all the possessors. (Art. 543.) Possession is interrupted

for purposes of prescriptioneither naturally, i.e., when through any cause it shouldcease for more than one (1)year; or civilly, i.e., when the interruption is producedby judicial summons to the possessor. (Arts. 1120, 1121, 1123.) In civil interruption, only those possessors served with judicial summons are affected. In the same example above, if X, Y, and Z lose

possession of the whole land after five (5) years, then their possession shall be reduced by three (3) years. The possession of X,Y, and Z may have been exercised by themselves or through an agent who takescharge of the cultivation of the property for them. Now, if for some reason theagent lost possession of three (3) hectares (1/5) of the land at the end of the 5th year, possession of the

remaining twelve (12) hectares (4/5) continues without interruption. If they have equal shares in the co-possession, their shares in the remaining portion and the area lost shall also be in equal shares; if their shares or interests are unequal then they share in the same proportion. The interruption prejudices all but not that they should share equally the portion

lost. Note that the interruption, according to Article 543, must refer to the whole thing itself or part of it and not to a part or right of a co-possessor. In a co-possession, there is only one thing and many possessors. If the right of a co-possessor is contested, he alone shall be prejudiced. With respect to the thing, the prejudice shall be against all. The

reason behind this is that the thing being undivided, it would be unjust to make the injury to fall on only one co-possessor although only the possession of a part of the thing may have been interrupted. Art. 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted. Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from

the time they are gathered or severed. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily andbelong to the possessor in good faith in that proportion. Right of a Possessor in Good Faith to Fruits Already Received First Paragraph: “A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted.’’ (a) Reason forthe law: Justice demands

that the fruits be retained by the possessor who thought that he was really the owner of the property, and who, because of such thought had regulated his daily life, income, and expenses by virtue of such fruits. Moreover, the possessor should be rewarded for having contributed to the INDUSTRIAL WEALTH, unlike the owner, who by his presumed negligence,

had virtually discarded his property (SALVAT) (b) Fruits refer to natural,industrial, and civil fruits, not to other things. (If no actual fruits are produced, reasonable rents — civil fruits — must be given.) (See Antonio v. Gonzales, [CA] O.G., July, 1943, p. 687). (c) Legal interruptionhappens when a complaint is fi led against him and he receives the proper judicial summons. (See Art. 1123).

All fruits accrued and received since said date must be turned over to the winner, that is, either the owner or the lawful possessor adjudged as suchby the court. (See Tacas v. Tabon, 53 Phil. 356). Before legal interruption, the fruits received are his own. (Nacoco v. Geronimo,L-2899, Apr. 29, 1949). After the receipt of the judicial summons, the rightto get the fruits not yet

gathered ceases. (MindanaoAcademy, Inc., et al. v. Ildefonso D. Yap, L-17681-82, Feb. 26, 1965). (d) The reason why fruits should bereturned from the TIME of legal interruption is that it is ordinarily only from saiddate that the possessor should be considered in BAD FAITH. Therefore, should there be proof that BAD FAITH had not set in even BEFORE legal interruption, fruits should

be returned from that date of CONVERSION into badfaith. This is because possessors in bad faith are not entitled to the fruits. Asa matter of fact, the law provides that “the possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor (orowner) could have received.” (Art. 549). This is true whether the possession in BAD faith

was legally interrupted or not. (See 3 Sanchez Roman442-443). It is understood of course that he is entitled to the fruits received BEFORE the conversion into BAD FAITH, for then,he would still be in good faith. Second Paragraph: “Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from the time theyare gathered or severed.” (a) If at the time of legal

interruption, the crops are still growing, the rule on pending crops, not that on gathered crops, should apply. (See Art. 545). (b) If at the time of legal interruption, the crops havealready been gathered, but are sold only after such interruption, the sale is immaterial, for the law requires only a gathering orseverance, so Art. 544 applies. ) When Civil Fruits Are

Deemed to Accrue Third Paragraph: “Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily andbelong to the possessor in good faith in that proportion.’’ (a) If civil fruits (like rents) are accrued daily, Art. 545 does not apply. (b) Actual receipt of the rents is immaterial; hence, even if received only, for example,on the 30th of a month, all rents accrued before the 21st of the month (date for

example of legal interruption) should belongto the possessor in good faith. (See by analogy Waite v. Williams, Chandler and Co., 5 Phil. 571).

Art. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or industrial fruits, the possessorshall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net

harvest, both in proportion to the time of the possession. The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two possessors. The owner of the thing may, should he so desires, give the possessor in good faith the right to fi nish the cultivation and gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity for his part of the expenses of cultivation and the net proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any reason whatever

should refuse to accept this concession, shall lose the right to be indemnifi ed in any other manner. This article applies to PENDING fruits, natural orindustrial.