Promoting Responsible Forest Practices in the Global Era: Reflecting on the Past to Promote Strategic Pathways

Keynote presentation to

Looking back – looking forward:A conference recognising 30 years of Tasmania’s forest practice system, Hobart,

Tasmania, Nov 20, 2017

Ben Cashore

Professor, Environmental Governance and Political Science

Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies

Yale Macmillan Center for International and Area Studies

• Can forest practices codes play a durable role in addressing domestic and global environmental challenges?

• What is the role for public versus private regulation?

TWO QUESTIONS

• Identify key environmental forest challenges

• Compare forest practices codes approach to global innovations

• Reflect on their direct and interacting effects

• Strategic implication for fostering problem solving future

APROACH

• Red represents decrease in forest cover (greater

than .5% per year)

• Green represents increases in forest cover (greater

than .5% per year)

Land Use Change/Deforestation

Source: Global Forest Watch

Land Use Change/Deforestation

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Perc

en

tag

e C

han

ge C

rop

Pro

du

cti

on

Area f

ro

m 2

011 B

ase

lin

e

Year

Increase in Total Land Devoted to Soy, Palm Oil, and Cocoa Production 2011-2015

Soy in Brazil

Palm Oil in Indonesia

Cocoa in Cote d'Ivoire

Source: under review, More Eco-Labels but Fewer Forests:Lessons from Non-State Market Driven Governance in the Soy, Palm Oil, and Cocoa Sectors

Hamish van der Ven, Catherine Rothacker, and Benjamin Cashore

Forest Degradation

Illegal Logging

Climate and Forests

Poverty alleviation/Livelihoods

Sources: Wil de Jong, photo

Red = Top Tropical Log Trade

Purple = Top Furniture Trade (McDermott et al)

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

• Tasmania’s Forest Practice Code

• Part of a larger global trend

•Increases in domestic practices regulations

•Protected Areas

• British Columbia from 6-13%

• US PNW most old growth removed from harvesting

• Tasmania now over 58% of land

• increase of 18% since 2011, 80% over 20 years

FOREST PRACTICES CODES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

FOREST PRACTICES CODES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

FOREST PRACTICES CODES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

•Emergence of global policy interventions

• Failed global forest convention 1992

• Eco-labeling forest certification programs 1993

• Global forest legality verification 2000

• Tasmania’s Forest Practice Code

• Part of a larger global trend

•Increases in domestic practices regulations

•Protected Areas

• British Columbia from 6-13%

• US PNW most old growth removed from harvesting

• Tasmania now over 50%

Key Features of Legality, Certification and Domestic

Forest Practices Regulations

Forest Legality

Verification

Forest Certification

(NSMD)

Domestic “Forest

Practices”

Role of

Government

Sovereign

governments

decides rules

Sovereign

governments do

not require

adherence to rules

Sovereign

governments

decide rules

Policy Scope Limited Broad Broad

Assurance Verification

required

Verification

required (Third

Party Auditing)

Variable

(developed and

developing)

Role of Markets Tracking along

supply chain

Tracking along

supply chain

Demand for

products

Economic

Incentives

Weeding out

supply increases

prices

Demand from

customers

Possible reduction

in domestic conflict

Photo: BC Ministry of Forests & Range

Roads

Riparian

zone

Clearcut

area

Reforestation

AAC

Global Environmental Policies: McDermott, Cashore and Kanowski

Summary of 5 Policy Criteria

Prescriptiveness Scale: 0 (least) to 10 (most)

Prescriptiveness

Rating (1-10)Case Study

Prescriptiveness

Rating (1-10)Case Study

Prescriptiveness

Rating (1-10)Case Study

10 Victoria (public) 6 Chile 1.5 Arkansas

9 Alberta New Zealand Georgia

British Columbia 5 Bavaria Montana

California Brazilian Amazon Portugal

Russia DRC South Carolina

Tasmania Idaho 1 Texas

USFS Madhya Pradesh North Carolina

Victoria (private) South Africa Mississippi

8 Ontario Sweden Alabama

China 4 Alaska

Quebec Finland

Washington Japan

7 Indonesia 2 Louisiana

Latvia Virginia

Mexico

New South Wales

Oregon

Poland

Enforcement

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Fin

land

Swed

enG

erm

any

Can

ada

US

Aus

tralia

Japa

nChi

lePol

and

Por

tuga

lS A

frica

Latv

iaBra

zil

Chi

naM

exic

oIn

done

sia

Indi

aRus

sia

Source: Esty and Porter (2002: Chapter 3)

Environmental Regulatory Regime Index

• Differing capacities

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivzjL0c1GFM

Global Certification: FSC and PEFC

Global Certification: FSC and PEFC

Tasmania Certification: FSC and PEFC

10,100,000

900,000

400,0000

2,000,000

4,000,000

6,000,000

8,000,000

10,000,000

12,000,000

FSC AFS Certified Both

Area(ha) of land certified under Forest StewardshipCouncil (FSC) and Australian Forest Standard(AFS)

Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (last reviewed 2015)

• US Lacey Act, Europe EUTR, VPAs, Australia

• China

• Africa and Southeast Asia

Forest Legality Verification

• What can we say about forest practices codes to address problems?

• Interaction with certification and legality verification?

Effects

• The Whack-a-Mole effect

•https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D0n8N98mpes

THREE EFFECTS

• Tasmania: environmental protection and production

• US Pacific northwest: environmental regulations and timber harvest

Whack-a-mole ExamplesTable 1.0: Timber Harvest in US Pacific Northwest on

Private and Federal Lands

1965-2000

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Year

mil

lio

n b

oard

feet

Private

Federal

m

• Companies and capital flock to less regulated jurisdictions

•Limited forest practices on the books

•Or weak enforcement/capacity

Delaware Effect

• Environmental group and companies form coalitions

•To champion increased rules on less regulated competitors

•Works to reverses Delaware effect

• Rewards jurisdictions with high domestic standards

California Effect

\

Number and Size of Steps

Few, large Many, small

Durability

Durable Change

(A new “equilibrium” is

established

Non-durable Change

(Change is temporary, goes back to original

position)

Faux paradigmatic

Classic paradigmatic

Progressive incremental

Classic incremental

Durable Policy Change

✕✔

Great but

rarely happens

✕

• Whether domestic forest practices codes play durable role in addressing environmental is not preordained

• Depends on strategic choices made by

• Environmental, business and government agencies

• As history unfolds

• Not only in championing domestic forest practices codes

• But their interaction with private governance

• Whether they are consistent with the California effect

• Three strategies emerge

THE ARGUMENT

• Focus global forest certification standards on rewarding, not punishing, firms operating in jurisdictions with relatively high domestic forest practices codes, enforcement regimes

• If standards out of line with market demand, might knee cap system

• Largest impact: creating market signals

• California effect: pressure companies in less regulated jurisdictions to come up to these standards

#1: REWARD THE TOP

• Target forest legality verification on weeding out worst players

• Illegal harvesting, management plans, taxes

• As longs as costs of compliance are less than increase in rents

• Should expect a broad coalition of environmental groups, businesses and governments

#2: WEED OUT THE BOTTOM

• Consumers needs a simpler labeling system

• Confusing within forestry, other commodities

• The competition among programs has kneecapped ability of consumers to make a difference

#3: CREATE A BETTER WORLD

• Influence of forest practices code not preordained

• Strategic choices will provide the answer

• Whether they might lead to

• ‘ratcheting down’ through capital flight, rewarding jurisdictions with least regulations

• ‘ratchet up’ forest practices, progressive incrementally to address critical problems

• Requires not only nurturing of policy instruments

• But the coalitions upon which their progressive incremental growth depends

Take-home:

Stop here

Number of hectares under different certification standards

Source: Prepared by Devin Judge-Lord, http://ic.fsc.org/facts-figures.19.htm accessed 12/11/2012http://www.pefc.org/images/stories/documents/Global_Stats/2011-08_PEFC_Global_Certificates.pdf, http://www.sfiprogram.org/newsroom/index.php, http://www.certificationcanada.org/english/status_intentions/status.php, accessed 08/17/2011

0

50

100

150

200

250

Asia NorthAmerica

Russia Europe(exludingRussia)

Africa Central/SouthAmerica &Caribbean

Are

a C

ert

ifie

d (

1,0

00

,00

0 h

ecta

res)

Forest Certification by Region

US Case

US Example, FSC and SFI “Prescriptiveness”

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

40

44

48

FSC-US SFI

Nu

mb

er

of

Ke

y I

ssu

es

Prescriptiveness

most prescriptive

equallyprescriptive

• Reforestation• Forest Law• Aesthetics

• Environmental Services• GMOs

• Carbon

• Utilization• Education• Training

• Improvement• Research

All other key issues (37)

Example: Riparian Buffer Zones

https://ic.fsc.org/facts-figures.19.htm

Forest Area Certified in the United States

Rate of Change in Prescriptiveness relative to 2008 levels

1) Reward the top

Set standards at a level that rewards, rather than punishes, participating firms

If standards are out of line with market demand

Might inadvertently “knee-cap” systems before they had a chance to grow and evolve

2) Create a better world

Consumers need a simpler labeling system

Emergence of multiple certification systems laudable

But need simpler approach in market place

To tap into current demand,

Could help generate new norms

Strategic Implications: Direct

Recognition

•Tom Lyon, Kira Matas and Ruth Norris, and other members of “Steering committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and certification” which produced Final report Towards Sustainability: The Roles and Limitations of Certification produced by

•Resolve www.resolv.org/certificationassessment

•Especially chapter six on pathways

Three other non-direct paths

NSMD standards diffuse to government authority

NSMD certification is thus a “learning laboratory”

Stakeholders learn what standards work

Make “mistakes” governments can avoid

Render standards politically feasible

Examples?

USGBC Green building certification

Many municipalities are adopting green standards

Strategic lessons?

The conundrum of direct approach goes away

Can start with, and maintain, relatively high standards

Only needs a niche market to generate learning

Indirect: Government Supersedes

This pathway occurs when certification systems and government approaches remain distinct

But they benefit from each other’s existence

Enhance legitimacy, problem solving and effectiveness

Examples?

The Clean Development Mechanism’s Gold Standard Certification

addressed asserted gaps in CDM (Non-carbon values Social concerns)

Without having to open up hard fought intergovernmental agreement

Gold standard certification facilitates CDM projects, and likewise CDM facilitated gold standard

Strategic lessons?

Ask if there a gaps NSMD certification could fill in public policies, rather than covering everything

Symbiotic: NSMD and Government Need Each Other

Covers bulk of CCSI attention?

Limitless possibilities

Governments create standards, but certification systems oversee implementation

Certification systems create standards but government ensures compliance

Industry sets standards, but third parties undertake audits

One example

Legality verification labeling along global supply chains

Governments maintain policy authority

Legality verification by third party auditors

Helps meet demand of EU and US legislation

In this case certification of legality can work to reinforce government laws, not replace them

Hybrid: “Divvy up” Policy Functions

Broad Strategy

Reflect carefully about what public or private authority best suited to address different policy functions

Causal Influence Logics

Dependent on specific form: cannot generalize across different types

Legality verification:

Very different from ‘high standard’ NSMD certifciation

Instead emphasis on ‘illegal timber’ - weeding out bottom

Generate coalitions of Bootleggers and Baptists (business and NGOs)

Requires that compliance costs must be less than increases in rents from removing illegal timber

Emphasize supply chain tracking (during emergence phase)

Hybrid: Strategic Lessons

NSMD Influence and Systemic Change

• NSMD systems can help foster systemic change

• IF Strategists and scholars

• Deliberate over which pathways is potentially most influential

•Cannot travel all of them at same time

•Strategies are different

• Develop ‘causal influence logics’ to guide strategy

• Incorporate problem definition and pathways

•NSMD forest certification

• Direct: responsible forest practices? deforestation?

• Superseding: Climate crisis?

• Engage means-oriented policy learning

•collective strategies across sectors

US Example, FSC and SFI “Prescriptiveness”

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

40

44

48

FSC-US SFI

Nu

mb

er

of

Ke

y I

ssu

es

Prescriptiveness

most prescriptive

equallyprescriptive

• Reforestation• Forest Law• Aesthetics

• Environmental Services• GMOs

• Carbon

• Utilization• Education• Training

• Improvement• Research

All other key issues (37)

US Example, FSC and SFI “Prescriptiveness”

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

40

44

48

FSC-US SFI

Nu

mb

er

of

Ke

y I

ssu

es

Prescriptiveness

most prescriptive

equallyprescriptive

• Reforestation• Forest Law• Aesthetics

• Environmental Services• GMOs

• Carbon

• Utilization• Education• Training

• Improvement• Research

All other key issues (37)

• Methodology #2 - classification of “policy style” (1 - least, 4 = most, prescriptive)

Discretionary Non-discretionary

Procedural

(systems-based)

1.

Procedural,

flexible

3.

Procedural,

inflexible

Substantive

(performance-based)

2.

Policy specification,

flexible

4.

Policy specification,

inflexible

Results (some indicative examples)

• Results - Riparian Zone Protection (30 m, 30% slope, fish-bearing stream)

• non-discretionary, substantive in > 50% of cases

• discretionary only in Portugal & SE USA

• specific dimensions vary substantially

• Results:Riparian Zone Protection - single stream class

Results (some indicative examples)

• Results: silvicultural systems - maximum clearcut size

• c. 50% non-discretionary

• no specified limits in much of Europe, SE USA

Example of results – policy approaches

Level of

prescription

Jurisdiction Riparian Roads Clearcut Reforestation AAC

10 Victoria

(public)

Non

discretion,

substantive

9 N Brunswick

(public)

Mixed

8 China

(public)

Non-disc,

procedural

6 NZ

(private)

Discretion

5 Sweden

(private)

No rules

Bavaria

(private)

4 Finland

(private)

Japan

(private)

1.5 Portugal

(private)

Sub-national variation - Australasian systems

Native Plantation Auditing

Jurisdiction Public Private Public Private Ntv Plt

ACT na na na na Most

prescriptive

NSW

NT

Qld Voluntary

SA na na na Absent

Tas

Vic

WA

New Zealand na

Forest practices governance, by forest type & tenure

Example of results – plantation practices

Jurisdiction Plantation

extent (M ha)

Different from

native forest

Principally

voluntary

Limits to NF

conversion

Prohibition of

NF harvest

China - pub 31 Yes

SE USA – pvt 17 No

Russia - pub 17 Effectively

Brazil - pvt 5.5

Indonesia - pub 3.5

Chile - pvt 2.5

N Zealand - both 2

Australia - both 2

S Africa - pvt 1.5

Portugal - pvt 1

Hypotheses we might explore:

Three common themes from environmental & resource management scholarship:

• Role of tenure

• Public prescriptive

• Role of economic development

• More developed more prescriptive

• Good governance

• Higher expectations brake on prescriptiveness

Aggregate prescriptiveness by category

Average prescriptiveness, thresholds & enforcement:by “development” & tenure (Scale 0-10)

Category Public Private All Thresholds Enforcement

Developing 6.7 6.0 6.6 High Low

Developed 8.8 3.4 6.1 Mod (pvt)

–

high (pub)

Mod (pvt)

–

high (pub)

All 7.9 3.5 5.6

“developed”: GDP per capita > US$10K, HDI in top 33

Patterns … prescriptiveness

• Most prescriptive – some public forests(Australia, Canada, Russia, USA)

• Least prescriptive – some private forests(Canada, Portugal, USA

• 70% of cases – public & private differ

• Some relationship with context evident …