Projections from the Heartland

TASHKENT, Uzbekistan October 25, 1997

By Adam Smith Albion

TAMERLANE VS. VASCO DA GAMA

At the turn of this century, two authoritative yet diametrically opposed theo-ries were proposed relating geography to power. More specifically, they set outto compare the relative advantages of seapower and landpower. U.S. AdmiralAlfred Thayer Mahan was the eloquent apostle of the former. With his eye firmlyon the Empire-building role of the British Royal Navy, he propounded in 1900 histhesis that whoever controlled the sea lanes could command the world. Naviesmoved more swiftly than armies; they could project their power farther. Theycould dominate commercial shipping and strangle a country’s trade at will. Thesewere obvious conclusions to draw at a time when maps showed three-quartersof the globe under Britannia’s sway. To be sure, Mahan pointed out that seapowerwas meaningless unless complementedby strategic bases on land, but landpowerwas only a means: naval supremacy was the goal. Mahan’s ideas were not lost onFirst Sea LordsJohn Arbuthnot Fisher (1904-10) and Winston Churchill (1911-15)or on Admiral Alfred yon Tirpitz (1897-1916), whose competition to buildDreadnought super-battleships helped precipitate the First World War.

A striking counter-argument to Mahan’s came out of Oxford four years later,when the geographer Sir Halford MacKinder put forth his concept of a global"pivotal area." This was later known as the theory of the "heartland," which hesituated in the Eurasian steppes (i.e. modern-day Central Asia). Here, he con-tended, the core area of world power was to be sought and found. With no ma-jor navigable rivers and no outlets to the oceans, the heartland was impenetrableto sea power. Moreover, its extreme isolation rendered it attack-proofby land. Itwas, in a word, an impregnable fortress. (Air-bombing from balloons did notseem a feasible proposition in 1904.) Rich in resources, free to develop its strengthin total security, the heartland was the world’s greatest geostrategic prize: an in-vulnerable spot kom which to dominate the Eurasian landmass- and conse-quently the world. The "World Island," he called it.

Thus two starkly contrasting theories set out the cases for seapower versuslandpower. It must be admitted, MacKinder’s heartland theory sounds ratherextravagant today. His identification of poor, neglected Central Asia as the piv-otal spot on the planet may warm the hearts of area specialists and enthusiastssuch as myself, but is no longer taken very seriously by students of geostrategy.In contrast, Mahan’s notions still enjoy wide currency among military-security

As Research Associate in Security at the Institute of EastWest Studies in Prague (1991-94)attended conferences where Mahan’s concepts were frequently invoked, whether to

discuss deployment of the US Sixth Fleet, modernization of the Royal Navy, or even thetouchy subject of possible missions for a Japanese navy. Incidentally, the originalpopularization of Mahan’s ideas owed a lot to the vocal advocacy of a certain ProfessorRobert Albion, in his day a well-known naval historian at Harvard- a relative of mine.

experts as one of the starting-points for thinking aboutnaval power in the modern age.

Sir Halford’s insights need not be dismissed wholly outof hand, however. The word "heartland" has passed intocommon usage because of him. He provides a conceptualtool for analyzing the strengths of the Mongol andTimurid empires their realms were heartland powerspar excellence although the theory is less useful whenwe seek the reasons for their decline and fragmentation.If we turn to contemporary history, the Soviet Union’s"defensive depth" certainly did play an important role inits victory in World War II. Because of its isolation fromthe front, Central Asian factories could continue to churnout armaments and supplies after the German armieshad decimated the USSR’s industrial base in the west.Hundreds of thousands of Russians, Byelorussians andUkrainians were evacuated to an unvanquishable Soviet"heartland" from which to carry on the war effort. (Manyof them and their descendents live in Central Asia still.)

And in a sense, MacKinder’s thesis that world powerwouldbe the prerogative of a rich landmass secure fromattack and plunder has been borne out. Although no ter-ritory can be considered impregnable in the age of rock-ets, North America is relatively invulnerable. Certainly itconforms more closely to MacKinder’s description of anunstormable fortress than does Central Asia.

The preceding paragraphs have been introduced as aprelude to discussing the geopolitics [see below] of Cen-tral Asia’s newly independent states. The glory days ofthe Silk Route, when Eurasia’s major trade routes passedthrough their territories, are long gone. If Tamerlane isthe hero who made Central Asia (temporarily) the cyno-sure of the world, his contemporary Vasco da Gama is thevillain responsible for its decline. By circumnavigatingAfrica, the Portugeuse seaman demonstrated the feasibil-ity of trading with India and, by extension, Chinaby ship; the long, cumbersome land routes became obso-lete. From the sixteenth century on, Central Asia becameless of a heartland and more of a backwater, paceMacKinder.

Central Asia will remain a backwater if it fails to finesseits geographical disadvantages. Ironically, MacKinderthrows them into sharp relief, although his intention wasto tout the region’s strong points, especially from a defen-sive perspective: its distance from other centers of mili-tary-industrial power; its dearth of navigable rivers; itslack of access to the ocean. We may add to this catalogueofwoes: vertiginous mountains to the east and south (theTien-Shan and Pamir ranges); deserts to the west; vastempty steppes to the north and northwest; and two in-land seas, the Caspian and the Aral, which must be eithercrossed or circumvented. While these facts of geographymay be desirable in areas where the inhabitants are tra-ditionally committed to avoiding contact with the out-side world (Tibet or Bhutan come to mind), such terrificisolation is not particularly splendid for the new sover-

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eign countries of Central Asia with ambitions to do theopposite.

Sir Halford did consider these problems, albeit by por-ing over maps in his Oxford study rather than surveyingthe terrain first-hand. He recognized that the heartlandwould wield no power if it were merely a superb defen-sive citadel. It would require the ability to project itselfoutward in ways that could counterbalance the mobilityand long-distance striking power of ships. He found hisanswer in railroads. These, he maintained, would shiftthe balance of power back to land. The speed and effi-ciency of trains would more than compensate for the his-torical advantages of sea-borne forces.

Power, as the word has been employed so far, has im-plicitly referred to military power, but the argument willserve just as well if we think in terms of projecting nottroops but commodities across large distances. CentralAsia’s biggest headache today is not how to conquer theworld, but how to launch its goods onto the world mar-ket. The region is landlocked: in fact Uzbekistan is theonly country on earth both landlocked and sharing all itsborders with landlocked neighbors. How to overcomesuch unfortunate geography? How to redress the balanceagainst economic competitors who enjoy easy access tothe sea? These are problems of the greatest strategic im-port for Central Asia. Can the region’s land-based re-sources be mobilized efficiently enough to pose a seriouschallenge to those conveyed by sea? Cast in economicterms, the question is closely allied to the equations ofpower that Mahan and MacKinder set out to solve.

MacKinder believed that landpower would come tohave the upper hand in Eurasia because of the expansionof the railway network. Although he was making a nor-mative statement about the superior potential of rail-roads from a military-logistical point of view, we canrecast it as a prediction about infrastructure develop-ment. As I proposed above, let us imagine MacKinderwas talking about moving the sort of bulky goods thatCentral Asia has to sell instead of soldiers and equip-ment. How do the economics of land transport acrossEurasia compare with the journey by sea? (Air cargo isomitted from this discussion on the grounds that it ac-counts for a relatively small portion of Central Asia’s ex-ports.) and is impractical for transporting inconvenientlybulky cargoes like cotton, or petroleum.

The recent connection of the Lanzou-Urumqi railwayto the Turkestan-Siberian line has made it possible to con-vey freight along the whole length of the "World Island"by train--ten thousand kilometers from Lianyungan onthe Yellow Sea to Rotterdam. Transit takes 30 days (tendays through China alone), with two days lost for thechange ofbogies (wheel-sets) at the USSR’s borders, sinceSoviet gauges are incompatible with all other countries’gauges except Finland’s. Meanwhile, average shippingtime from Lianyungan to Rotterdam (both are ports aswell as rail termini) is 43 days. Thus ships take longer,

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BUT the cost of cargo works out much cheaper per kilo-gram. As a result, it makes economic sense to move alllow-value commodities not requiring speed by ship.Trains are faster BUT more expensive. They are bestsuited to carrying decomposable products, or else veryhigh-value ones that the sender needs to deliverpromptly because a large sum of money is tied up inthem.

My comparison of land versus sea routes is admittedlyunnuanced, but it helps bring Central Asia’s fundamen-tal transport problems into focus. The region exports low-value replaceable commodities, primarily cotton, thatshould go by ship in an economically perfect world butare forcedby geography to go more expensivelyby train.As a result, profits must be sacrificed to make prices at-tractive to consumers. At the same time, the region facescompetitors with no such difficulties: it will be recalledthat the Mississippi river, a fitting symbol for the region’smain cotton rival, debouches directly into the Gulf ofMexico. Labor costs in Central Asia are low, it is true, butnot lower than in Southeast Asia, which can turn outclothes and machine parts more cheaply- and which,too, enjoys the advantage of proximity to the ocean. Onceagain, Central Asia’s low-value goods have to be soldeven less expensively in order to compete on worldmarkets.

One solution would be to cut the costs of the railwaysthemselves. Railroads in Central Asia are nationalized, ofcourse, poorly maintainedby all accounts, and with highoverheads (more precisely, fixed terminal costs, as atransport economist would say). All the states, barringwar-tom Tajikistan, are talking about converting thosesections of the networkunder their control from diesel toelectrified rail. Although the switch would save money inthe long run, the initial investments are too steep for theircash-strapped governments to afford without help. Ac-cordingly, the European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment is considering implementing a $150 millionloan to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in or-der to help improve the lines, repair rolling stock (espe-dally dry-cargo cars for cotton) and upgrade passengercars. This loan, however, has not yet been approved infull, although at time of writing the bank looks set to goahead with at least initial two tranches of $30 millioneach.

Central Asia’s remoteness from the sea is also makingit difficult to capitalize on its most lucrative export, oil.Most pipelines presently carrying Kazakh crude to theWest transit Russia and the route is of course subject totariffs, not to mention an undesirable measure of politi-cal control by Russia. Some oil gets transported by ship

across the Caspian from Aktau to Baku in Azerbaijan,from where it may have to cross (depending on routes;new pipelines have to be built) the territories of two morecountries before reaching the Mediterranean throughTurkey. How complicated and expensive! Compare theeasy circumstances in which the Gulf States find them-selves. Kuwait or Saudi Arabia are situated on the sea;they load their oil directly onto tankers with an ease thatmakes the Kazakhs green with envy. The Uzbeks are in aneven worse fix: plans to shunt their oil (reserves are mod-est compared to Kazakhstan’s) through a pipeline fromTurkmenistan to Pakistan are on hold as long as the routeis blockedby conflict in Afghanistan. Turkmen hydrocar-bon resources are similarly blocked to the south.Turmenistan’s gas, though, is scheduled to begin flowingthis year westwards through Iran, and its oil may follow[see below]. Central Asia is really singularly ill-fated. Inaddition to the geographical obstacles with which it mustcontend, Providence has chosen to endow it with cottonand oil. Fortune’s gift to the region’s new nations is prov-ing a mixed blessing. While better than nothing, thesehappen to be commodities that competitors can pick orpump almost as cheaply, transport more effectively andsell more profitably.

DEEP FORCES VS. THE VIEW FROM THESURFACE

Nowadays we regardgeographical knowledge as an essen-tial part ofknowledge in general. By the aid ofgeography,and in no othm" way, do we understand the action ofgreatnaturalforces, the distribution ofpopulation, the growthofcommerce, the expansion of’ontiers, the developmentof States, the splendid achievements ofhuman energy inits various manifestations.

We recognize geography as the handmaid of history...Geography, too, is a sister science to economics andpolitics...

Thus Lord Curzon, addressing the Geographical Soci-ety in London in his capacity as the society’s president. Ifthe claims he makes for the utility of geographic knowl-edge are a little too sweeping to be wholly truthful (isthere really no otherway of appreciating human achieve-ments save through geography?) one should rememberhe was preaching to the converted. Yet he was on otosomething. The concept he was casting around to de-scribe in 1912 has been formalized today into the disci-pline-bolder voices than mine would say the science--of geopolitics. A definition of geopolitics is the influenceofgeography on the political character of states, their his-tory, institutions, and especially relations with otherstates. Although Lord Curzon would not have recog-

The Uzbeks have made a start.The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a series of resolutions in 1993-94 "On a General Program ofElectrifying the Central Asian Railroad," calling for conversion of 3,000 kilometers of track; to date 540 km have been electrified(Pravda vostoka,3 September 1997.

George Nathanial Curzon, Subjects of the Day: Being a Selection of Speeches and Writings (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915),pp.155-6.

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nized himself as such (doubtless the crusty aristocratwould have found modern academic jargon ghastly), hewas in fact one of Central Asia’s original geopoliticians.

Writers since Aristotle and Strabo have tried to demon-strate that differences between communities could beaccounted for by studying their geography. Since this in-sight is the starting-point for the study of geopolitics,they deserve to be classed as the first two geopoliticians,although they and too many of their successors pro-pounded a kind of naive geographical determinism.Clearly it is unjustifiable to believe that the developmentofhuman polities is conditioned exclusivelyby their sur-roundin;s. It is ec[ually futile to inore the role playedbsrgeographical factors altogether, for sometimes their rolecan be significant indeed. In exceptional circumstances,such as extreme climates, the necessity to adapt to one’senvironment can become a paramount consideration,witness the Lapps or the Kalahari bushmen. Ifwe widenour perspectives from those of the anthropologist to thoseof the geopolitician, it becomes apparent that geographycan put severe limitations on the choices available towhole countries.

A case in point is Central Asia. I have already sketchedthe geographical difficulties the region must overcome toreach the outside world. To surmount those obstacles isthe single greatest challenge the region faces. ThereforeI do not believe I am falling into the determinist trap if Isay that the physical geography of Central Asia is su-.premely important for an understanding of its futurepolitical, economic and social development.

I should advise any reader who accepted the last sen-tence as a truism couched in rather broad terms to readit again. I am expressing an opinion about the future ofthe region that flies in the face of almost every study ofcontemporary Central Asia that I have seen. Other writ-ers consistently make prognostications using a very dif-ferent kind of reasoning. The scholarly analyses I have inmind rely on less tangible factors than steppes, moun-tains or the lack of rivers. Rather, they display a profoundknowledge offorces, trends, movements and influences op-erant in Central Asia. On closer examination these forcesand trends often turn out to be not facts per se, but sophis-ticated theoretical constructs derivedfrom facts, elaborated

at an impressive level of abstraction. They are "models"that are applied to delve beneath the surface of eventsand elucidate their real import.

I acknowledge that many analysts are asking them-selves different questions than I am, so they use moreabstract forms of reasoning to frame their answers. Yet Iwonder nonetheless whether my colleagues are not fall-ing prey to a pernicious trap. Intellectuals since Platohave been seduced time and time againby the convictionthat there simply must be underlying ideas and histori-cal forces whose direction determines the fates ofhumancommunities. "Our thirst for world-historical romanceor deep theories about deep causes o social chane," ishow Richard Rorty once put it. The most egregious re-cent example of this sort of thinking is the "Clash of Civi-lizations" thesis that has gained a large following sincethe end of the Cold War. It identifies three blocs of civili-zations, Christian, Muslim and Buddhist, as the new or-ganizing principles of global society that are likely tocome into conflict in the future. Its scope is as wide as itis deep; it posits a model for interpreting socio-culturo-political forces across the whole planet.

The questions that Central Asia scholars tend to askabout the region seem to me to fall under the "world-his-torical romance" heading. They are shot through with theassumption that developments have deep meanings.Here are some examples: Underwhat sphere ofinfluenceis Central Asia predisposed to fall? Extrapolating fromthe area’s histor what principles of development canwediscern or postulate? Are the ideas and forces latent in theregion driving it toward Turkey’s "secular model" orIran’s "Islamic model"? Will ties of blood and languagedraw its disparate peoples into a pan-Turkic collective?Or will the stirrings of age-old ethnic rivalries prove ir-resistible? What trajectories, most likely violent ones,will the various countries trace under the impetus of na-tionalism? Is the region destined to veer towards thedemocratic West or the Muslim East? "Islam or Nation-alism?" m"Marx or Muhammad?" ask two recent au-thoritative books on Central Asia.

It is not my intention to turn this newsletter into a po-lemic. None of these questions can be dealt with in sum-mary fashion, but I can at least allude to the reasons for

See Richard Rorty, "The Intellectuals at the End of Socialism," The Yale Review (Spring, 1992).

hope am not being too uncharitable if note that scholars have a vested interest in Deep Meanings, since only they are fullyqualified to explain them. The result is a kind of epistemological circle: by monopolizing the accredited knowledge required toanswer their own questions, they confirm their authority and relevance.

Since the Balkans disaster, ethnicity has become a favorite lens for analysts sleuthing the causes of conflicts everywhere fromEastern Europe to East Asia. But one of the clearest lessons to emerge from the war in ex-Yugoslavia is that our commentators’harping on "age-old ethnic rivalries," supposedly making conflict inevitable, was off the mark. Post-mortems of the warbelatedlysuggest that other, more prosaic factors political ambition, political miscalculation, personal jealousies, monstrous greed-played crucial roles in precipitating it, and it was not inevitable. See the booklet wrote for the Woodrow Wilson Center, TheEconomic Roots of Ethnic Conflict (Washington DC, 1994).Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (Zed Books: London, 1995); and Dilip Hiro, Between Marx

and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia (HarperCollins: London 1994).

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my frustration with them. At first, when I arrived in Cen-tral Asia two years ago, I tried to orient myself by look-ing out for the issues emphasized in the books andarticles purporting to describe what I would find. Myagenda reflected the preoccupations of the specialists.But where was the evidence of Turkish influence in itsmuch-vaunted role as big brother to the fledgling Turkicstates? Barely discernible, then as now. Where was thefeverish explosion of strong Islamic identification? I re-cently advised an Istanbul-based journalist, eager to re-port on resurgent fundamentalism in Central Asia, not tobother coming. Where was the movement for a unitedTurkestan? A damp squib that never had a hope of ignit-ing among the disparate peoples of the region. Wherewere the ethnic hatreds and jealousies roiling throughCentral Asia? Yes, they exist. But they are considerablyless virulent than in France, Canada or Rwanda; they arealmost always a secondary or tertiary phenomenon hing-ing on something else, and they are regularly projectedby Western observers who are lookingfor ethnic tensionsbut are usually looking at something else.

Around Osh in the Ferghana valle3 for example, sup-posedly a hotbed of fundamentalism and nationalism,what is most on people’s minds are not ethnic tensionsbut problems of land distribution. Do works on CentralAsia mention this? The biggest bone of contention be-tween Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is NOT the rights ofethnic Uzbeks across the border- a subject invariablydiscussed in the literature--but the amount of water theKyrgyz are releasing from the Toktogul dam for Uzbekirrigation purposes. It is a conceivable casus belli. Doesanyone mention this? While analysts are fixated onRussia’s role in Central Asia, the dragon is stirring on itseastern borders. The markets of Osh and Almaty areawash in Chinese goods, and Kazakhstan is doing pipe-line deals with Beijing. China is set to be more importantto the region than Europe or the United States. Does any-one mention this? And the list goes on. The town halls inSamarkand and Bukhara are less worried about Tajikrevanchist claims on their cities than the lack of textbooksfor their schools. The local ethnic Tajik populations, in allmy dealings with them, have struck me as largely indif-ferent to resounding nationalist appeals; their daily livesare filled with more banal concerns. Nevertheless, one ofCentral Asia’s astutest observers claims otherwise: "areawakening of Tajik national and cultural consciousnesscould have posed [a threat] to Uzbekistan’s territorial in-tegrity and regional ambitions.., this development wouldhave frustrated Uzbekistan’s project of recreatingTurkistan

Commentators on Central Asian current affairs seem tohave a clearer strategic vision of "where Central Asia isgoing" than the people of the region themselves. Ofcourse, prognosticators by definition must be ahead ofthe curve; their task is to extrapolate from today to tomor-

row. But I think the search for trends and forces definingdevelopments in the region has gone astraybecause Cen-tral Asia is not predisposed to go in any particular direction.This is not to say that its countries are tabulae rasae. I meanthat it is unproven that any of them (again, Tajikistan’scivil war makes it a special case) haw6 yet plotted coursesthat intersect with the conceptual frameworks that schol-ars have imagined for them. One looks in vain for domi-nant social movements, strong public opinions, guidingstate ideologies, notions of historical mission or states-men with firm principles. Instead one finds: opportunis-tic leaders willing to make any alliances that will securethem in power; apathetic populations hungrier forbreadthan for big ideas; widespread ignorance of the region’shistory and culture, supposedly important factors condi-tioning people’s thinking today; widespread curiosityabout religion, counterbalanced by a general lack ofknowledge of even the basic tenets of Islam.

If there is a dominant concern detectable among thecountries of Central Asia, it is to improve their economicsituation. The reason for the all-pervading fascinationwith America, gripping the masses from the Tashkentsophisticate to the Turkmen camel-herder, is that it isrich.91 have encountered very few, save the nouveauxriches, who prefer the glory of living in sovereign statesto the relative affluence they enjoyed under the USSR.Despite the governments’ paeans of praise to themselves,independence for most represents a necessary evil thatwould happily be traded for a return to the economicallysecure Brezhnev days. A more appropriate slogan than"Marx or Muhammad?" to capture the mood of the re-gion would be "Marx and Money."

In a way, this picture is depressing. I can sympathizewith the wish of Western specialists’ to believe that theregion is animated by ideas more intellectually excitingthan the craving for a car and sausages. One hopes thesewill emerge in time. For the present, Central Asians arelooking to their leaders to make them richer. By compari-son, the fanfare about independence, the celebrationscommemorating ancient cities, the erection ofnew muse-ums, the publication of Korans and the works of nation-alistic writers suppressed by the Soviet regime, therecasting of textbooks, the proclamation ofnew languagepolicies- these are giddy sideshows. So are the confer-ences where Central Asian deep thinkers swap ideas withour deep thinkers about history and teleology, with anafternoon break to take a turn in the bazaar and anevening program of traditional folk music. Local intellec-tuals are utterly marginalized at the moment. Intellectualand cultural life in the main is not flourishing. It is tooimpoverished and waits on the success or failure of thedrive for prosperity.

The preeminent illustration of a "big idea" sacrificed onthe altar of economic expediency was the "sell-out" of the

Shireen T. Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence (Praeger: Westport, 1996), pp. 97-98.

discuss local perceptions of America in ASA-21, "Talk of the Town," 1 November 1996.

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Uighurs in Shanghai on 26 April 1996, when the CentralAsian countries signed a good-neighborly treaty withChina. In exchange for the promise of trade agreements,each ofthe region’s presidents in turn committed to standfirm against any threats to China’s territorial integrityand fight separatist movements (Kazakhstan "supportsall measures taken by the Chinese government for main-taining national unity," said President NursultanNazarbayev). Implicitly, they pledged to help quashUighur nationalist aspirations in Western China, puttingpaid to the fiction that Turkic unity rooted in shared faith,blood and histor could ever outweigh economic exigen-cies.1 Nazarbayev’s reward came in September 1997,when China signed agreements worth $9.5 billion to pur-chase Kazakh oil and help to build a 3,000-kilometerpipeline into Xingjiang province.

Nazarbayev’s "betrayal" of the Uighurs was a hard-headed, economically-motivated and immensely profit-able decision based on geopolitical calculations. Itunambiguously highlights the twin pillars supportingCentral Asia’s Realpolitik: economics and geography.Policy is shapedu and there is no reason to think thisshould change in the forseeable future free from thesort of considerations that muddy the waters in theUnited States, where debate canbe highly partisan, aboutthe desirability of trading with pariah nations that sup-port terrorism or countries with poor human rights re-cords (a category into which the Central Asian states fallthemselves). These states will cooperate they mustwith anyone who will aid them in their goal to overcometheir landlocked isolation. In sum, the business of CentralAsia is business, to paraphrase Calvin Coolidge. Ethnic,religious, nationalistic, historical and moral factors aretrampled under Central Asia’s hell-bent drive to get itscommodities to hard-currency markets.

Can we not eliminate the notion of "deep forces" im-pelling these countries in mysterious directions, likeships under the action of underwater currents? Once theimplications of Central Asia’s economic imperatives aregrasped, its surface geography stands out as the surestpointer to gauge its future orientation. Geography is al-ready shaping choices far more decisively than ethnic orhistorical factors. A century ago Turkmen tribesmen ter-rorized Iran’s outlying districts, flooding the market inBukhara with Persian slaves. Today Turkmenistan haswarm bilateral relations with Iran, on which it relies as

the export conduit for its estimated 21 trillion cubicmeters of natural gas. Turkmen President SaparmuradNiyazov cut the deal in a way that almost deliberatelysnubbed the ethnic big-brother, Turkey.ll The rest of Cen-tral Asia’s leaders are equally pragmatic, free of "world-historical romance" when it comes to seizing the mainchance.2 Russia alone, as the ex-colonial power, provokessuspicion and mistrust, but all the countries still rely onits infrastructure to one degree or another and conse-quently have remained cordial. (But their interests inmaintaining cordial relations diminish proportionatelyas they open new routes that circumvent Russia, espe-cially to the south and west. Nazarbayev is reported to be"increasingly assertive" toward Moscow in the wake ofthe pipeline deal with China.).3

UzbekPresident Islam A. Karimov has masterfully ma-nipulated a credulous West (especially the United States,unfortunately, with its knee-jerk reaction to the word"fundamentalism"), justifying his repressive domesticpolicies and his interventions in the wars in Tajikistanand Afghanistan on the grounds that he is battling Is-lamic extremism at home and abroad. Yet this concernhas not prevented him from making friendly diplomaticdemarches towards Iran, which is Uzbekistan’s gatewayto the Persian Gulf. In all likelihood Karimov will coop-erate just as happily with whatever governments emergefrom the wreckage in Tajikistan and Afghanistan-- war-lords, nationalists, Pushtun moderates, the Taliban or anyother brand of Muslim militants if they can guaranteelawandorder.Aslongasthe territories southofUzbekistanareinturmoil, its commerce/communications corridor to Paki-stan, India and the Arabian Sea is blocked.

Turkmen officials forthrightly admit they will workwith anyone who can bring political stability to the area.Peace is a moral good in itself, of course, and the govern-ment in Ashgabat likes to present itself as the region’speacemaker, having hosted a number of internationalconferences addressing the region’s intractable civilwars.14 Lurking beneath the humanitarian do-gooding,however, are solid geopolitical motivations. Peace in Af-ghanistan would give the green light to an ambitiousproject, developed by the U.S. company Unocal andSaudi Arabia’sDelta Oil, that wouldbring Turkmenistanrevenue and jobs. The consortium plans to build a pipe-line from the Dauletabad gas field near Mary 1400 kilo-meters across Afghanistan to reach consumers in

10 For a fuller account, see ASA-18 "The Warriors for Uighurstans," 31 August 1996.

1 For a description of the meeting, see ASA-4, "Playing Geopolitics in Central Asia: The Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey Gas PipelineProject," 27 January 1997.

Their opportunism is hardly surprising when one considers that they all climbed to the top as communist party secretariessave Kyrgyzstan’s President Akayev, who was nevertheless an important party member,3 The Economist, 11 October 1997.4 Interviews at the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, Ashgabat, September 1997. A typical comment from a Turkmen newspaper:"Embodying, in its own way, the movement for peace common to all humankind, [Turkmenistan] aims to be a new peacemakingcenter, so crucial in our disturbed Asia, and has already succeeded in doing a lot towards regulating regional conflicts" NeutralTurkmenistan, 24 September 1997. spoke to one official who opined, "Our president deserves the Nobel Prize."

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Pakistan, withapossible extensiontoNewDelhi.Anoilpipe-linefomCharjouhasalsobeentabled (Turkmenistan has anestimated 6.8 billion tons of oil), through which Uzbekand even Siberian crude could travel to a new port termi-nal near Karachi. And on the table these projects will re-main, until that unlikely day when the Afghans sink theirdifferences and order is established.TM

Turkmenistan is Central Asia’s most avowedly unprin-cipled country, in the sense of eschewing any principlesguiding state policybeyond economic opportunism. Thestate doctrine is enshrined in the non-doctrine of "perma-nent neutrality" (originally "positive neutrality," butupgraded to "permanent" by a special resolution of theUN General Assembly inDecember 1995). Despite beingrepeated like a mantra in President Niyazov’s speechesand faithfully echoed by government officials, no one istoo sure what the phrase means. With the disappearanceof military blocs, and Austria a likely contender forNATO membership, neutrality has become a conceptdrained ofmeaning, a Cold War anachronism. One mightunderstand Turkmenistan’s neutrality as a pledge to re-main "non-aligned." In reality, it gives the country a freehand to be aligned with anybody who can further its in-terests, its relations unencumbered by considerationsbeyond the bottom line.

The most signal achievement to date of the TurkmenForeign Ministry- situated, appropriately, on NeutralTurkmenistan Street in Ashgabat- has been its rap-prochement with Iran. During the Soviet days, Turkmenhad no direct access to Iran; all relations were conductedthrough Moscow and the border was fixmly sealed. Nowcrowds of Turkmen women besiege the foreignministry’s visa department daily, seeking permission to

conduct their "suitcase trade" across the border, usuallyby bus.TM While the United States slaps sanctions on Iran,and thunders at the Old World immorality of Europeanswho do business there anyway, Turkmenistan cloaks it-self in "permanent neutrality" and forges ties. Iran isprobably the country’s closest ally on the world stage to-day, politically and economically.

A new railway costing $216 million was opened in May1996, linking Tejen (in Turkmenistan) to Mashad (in Iran)via the frontier town of Sarakhs, which has the status ofa free-trade zone. Cotton that used to travelby train to theCaspian port ofTurkmenbashi thenceby ferry to Baku,thence by train across the Caucasus to the Black Sea,thence by cargo ship now is transported directly to theport ofBandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. In the oppositedirection come consumer goods from Iran or Dubai, aswell as Korean and Japanese cargoes heading for WesternRussia (previously these were loaded at Nakhodka, aport in Russia’s Far East, and had to make the wholejour-ney by train).

The railway has been trumpeted by Ashgabat as thenew Iron Silk Road, and even billed it as the panacea tothe country’s woes. In fact, the line suffers from a num-ber of drawbacks. As Iran’s rail gauge is not compatiblewith Turkmenistan’s, expensive new cranes had to be in-stalled at Sarakhs for changing the bogies. Moreover, therailway on the Iranian side does not lead straight to theseabut makes a long detour via Tehran. Nevertheless, therail connection represents Turkmenistan’s most signifi-cant infrastructual advance to date. Together with the gaspipeline to Turke)6 it reflects Turkmenistan’s dependenceon Iran if the country is to escape its geographical isola-tion and hook into a wider economic network.

15 Geopolitically-minded journalists in Central Asia like to speculate, over a bottle of vodka, that Pakistan’s support for theTaliban- military (training and supplies) and diplomatic (Pakistan has officially recognized their government in Afghanistan)

is linked to Islamabad’s interest in Central Asia’s oil and gas. The Taliban until recently appeared the likely victors in the war.Toward the bottom of the second bottle of vodka, the conspiracy theories begin to arrive, postulating CIA covert assistance to theTaliban on behalf of Unocal, an American hydrocarbon giant. Washington’s open endorsement of the fundamentalist Talibanwould be politically embarrassing, doubtless, but to my knowledge CIA support of the Taliban remains an unproven rumor.16 The traders are 90 percent women, interestingly. asked one group why their menfolk, often unemployed, don’t participate."Because Turkmen males are laz3" was told,. "They rely on us to do everything." Another, anti-intutive reason is that singlewomen can travel more safely than men. They are less subject to attack by bands of thieves and to shake-downs by customsofficials. "We can charm them," one lady said. "We remind them of their mothers."

8 ASAo25

AAbdullakhan 23.5, 23.7Afghanistan 25.4, 25.7agama 24.10agate 24.6Agro-Forest Amelioration Station 24.8Aktau 25.4Alma-Ata (Almaty) 23.4, 25.6Arabian Sea 25.7Aral Sea 22.4, 22.8, 22.9, 24.7, 25.2archeology 23.5Aristotle 25.5arkhar (Bukharan mountain sheep)

24.7Ashgabat 24.1, 24.2, 24.3, 24.6, 24.7,

25.7, 25.8Azerbaijan 24.2, 25.4

BBaku 24.2, 25.4, 25.8Baliqchi-ota 23.7Bandar Abbas 25.8barkhan 24.5, 24.6barley 23.9basmachi rebellion 23.6Beethoven 22.4Beg, Ulug 23.7Bekobod 22.7Bishkek 23.4Black Sands Desert 22.7black saxaul 24.6Black Sea 25.8Bog’-i-zag’an (Garden of Ravens/Black

Kites) 23.8Bukhara 22.1, 22.7, 22.8, 23.5, 23.9,

24.2, 25.6

Ccamel meat 24.9camel-thorn 24.6camels 24.5, 24.8, 24.9Caspian Sea 24.6, 25.2Central Mionqol canal 23.8chal 24.9Chan-Chun 22.7Charjou 24.5, 24.6, 24.9, 25.8Chimkent 23.4China 25.6, 25.7chiy 23.2, 23.6Chopin 22.4civilization 22.5"Clash of Civilizations" thesis 25.5commodities 25.2, 25.7communism 22.6, 22.8cotton 22.8, 23.2, 25.4, 25.8Lord Curzon 25.4

Dda Gama, Vasco 25.2dancing barkhans 24.6Dargom canal 23.7Darvaza 24.6

Dauletabad gas field 25.7Debussy 22.4"defensive depth" 25.2Delta Oil 25.7desertification 24.7Dobrangeldi Madirayimov 24.7dry agriculture 23.9Dubai 25.8Dubyanskii, Vladimir 24.5, 24.6dutar 22.4

EEgypt 22.5empires

Mongol 25.2Sumerian 22.9Timurid 25.2

endangered species 24.7environment 22.4, 22.8, 24.7Ersari tribe 24.8European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development 25.4excessive wood-cutting 24.7

FFarhad 22.7, 22.8Farhad and Shirin 22.7Ferghana Canal 22.6Ferghana valley 22.6, 23.7, 24.1, 25.6flax 23.9fundamentalism 25.6, 25.7

GGalaba 23.5G’allaorol (Grain-Island) 23.9gas pipeline 25.8Geographical Society 25.4geography 25.2, 25.4geopolitics 25.2, 25.4, 25.7geothermal energy 24.8global "pivotal area" 25.1Gokdepe 24.2government 22.5, 22.6Gulf States 25.4gumbaz (cupola) 23.7

HHalt no. 54 24.4Harappans 22.9hashar 22.6, 22.9, 23.6, 23.10Heyerdahl, Thor 24.10Hippodrome market 23.2history 22.9Hungry Steppe 22.8, 23.2, 23.5hunting 24.7hydrology 22.5Hydyr 24.9

India 25.7Indus valley 22.9infrastructure development 25.2

Institute of Water Problems 24.7Iran 25.7, 25.8Iron Gate 23.5, 23.7, 23.10irrigation 22.2, 22.4, 22.5, 22.8, 23.1Islam 22.3Islamic extremism 25.7

JJetysai region 23.4Jizzak 23.2, 23.4, 23.7Jizzak steppe 22.8, 23.7Jomboy 23.8

KKalahari 25.5Kal’tepe caravansarai 23.5Kamaliddin Binay 23.8Karachi 25.8Karakalpakistan 22.4, 22.9Karakalpaks 22.8Karakul sheep 23.9Karakum Canal 24.7, 24.8Karakum desert 24.2, 24.5, 24.6, 24.10Karamet-Niyaz 24.8Karimov, Islam A. 25.7Karshi 22.2, 23.9Karshi Land Development Project

23.2, 23.10Karshi steppe 23.2, 23.7, 23.9Kashi Main Canal 22.8Kazakhstan 22.8, 23.4, 23.5, 25.4Kazanjik 24.7Kerki 24.6Khiva 22.7, 22.8Khokand 22.7Khorgos pass 23.5Khusro, Shah of Persia 23.2Konye-Urgench 24.6koshmas (Turkmen rugs) 24.9Koson 23.9, 23.10Krasnovodsk 24.1Kugitang Nature Reserve 24.6Kumli 24.10, 24.11Kushans 23.7Kuwait 25.4Kuz’menko, Vladimir 24.7Kyrgyzstan 23.4, 23.5, 25.6KyzyI-Orda 22.8

LLabi-Hauz 22.4, 23.10Lake Tuzkan 23.5Lanzou-Urumqi railway 25.2Lapps 25.5Lebap district 24.8Lenin 22.8Lianyungan 25.2life expectancy 22.8lifestyles 22.1, 23.2, 24.3

MMacKinder, Sir Halford 25.1, 25.2

Institute of Current World Affairs 9

Mahan, Alfred Thayer 25.1Mahsidi 23.5marinki 23.7, 23.10Marjonbulok gold mines 23.9markhur (wild rams) 24.7Marxism 22.4, 22.6Mary 23.5, 24.2, 24.7, 24.8, 25.7Mashad 25.8Masson, M. E. 23.6medicine and health 22.2Mediterranean Sea 25.4Merv 23.5Mesopotamia 22.5, 22.9Ministry of the Environment 24.7Mirza-Rabat canal 23.5mountainsCaucasus 25.8Molguzar 23.7Nurota 23.5Pamirs 25.2Tien-Shan 25.2

Murgab oasis 24.7music 22.4

NNadir Divanbegi madrasa 22.5Nakhodka 25.8natural gas 25.4, 25.7naval supremacy 25.1Navoi 23.8Navoi, Alisher 22.7Nazarbayev, Nursultan 25.7Nebitdag 24.8New Delhi 25.8Niyazov, Saparmurad 25.7, 25.8Nizomov, Asror 22.2, 23.1"non-aligned" 25.8

Ooil 25.4, 25.7, 25.8Omonqo’tan (Safe Sheep-Pen) 23.9onyx 24.6oqsoqol 23.7Oriental Despotism 22.5Osh 25.6overgrazing 24.7Ovid, Epistles 1.3 24.5

PP-1 highway 24.6Pakistan 25.4, 25.7, 25.8Pauli, Wolfgang 22.4"permanent neutrality" 25.8Persian Gulf 24.6, 25.7, 25.8Petra 22.9phytomelioration 24.6pipeline 25.7poems and poetry 22.7population 24.7Princess Shirin 23.2

Q

Qaydarko’l 23.9Qo’riz-quduq 23.7quduqchi 23.6

Rrailroad 24.2, 25.2, 25.4railway 25.8Rakhmanov, Jora 24.5, 24.7, 24.8, 24.9Red Book 24.7Red Sands Desert 22.7Repetek 24.3, 24.4, 24.6, 24.7Repetek Sand-Desert Research Station

24.5rhubarb 24.4riversAmu Darya 22.8, 22.9, 23.8, 24.6,

24.7Black 23.8Chirchik 23.2Euphrates 22.5Jaxartes 23.2Mississippi 25.4Sangzor 23.7Sokh 22.7Syr Darya

22.6, 22.7, 22.8, 22.9, 23.2White 23.8Zarafshon 23.7, 23.8

Rombonis opimus 24.10Rorty, Richard 25.5Rotterdam 25.2

SSahel 22.9salinization 24.8Samarkand 22.7, 23.5, 23.7, 23.8, 23.9,

24.1, 25.6Samarkandskii gidrouzel 23.8sand acacias (Ammondendron Conollyl)

24.6Saqqara step pyramid 23.10Sarakhs 25.8sardoba(s) 22.2, 23.5, 23.6, 23.7, 23.8,

23.10Saudi Arabia 25.4, 25.7saxaul bushes 24.5, 24.6, 24.10Scylla 24.4selin (A ristida pennata) 24.6shaduk 22.5Shaybaniy-nama (The Book of

Shaybaniy) 23.8sheep 24.8shuvoq 23.9, 23.10Silk Route 23.2, 23.4, 23.5, 23.9slaves 25.7snakes 24.3

cobra 24.5efa 24.5shitomorknik 24.5yurza 24.5

soil salinization 24.7Soviet irrigation programs 23.6sphere of influence 25.5Sredazgiprovodkhlopok 22.8Stalin 23.4Strabo 25.5Strauss, Richard 22.4subsurface water 24.6"suitcase trade" 25.8

Ttaganak 23.6Tajik 22.5Tajikistan 25.4, 25.6, 25.7takyric soil 24.6Taliban 25.7, 25.8Tamerlane 23.7, 23.8, 25.2Tashkent 22.7, 23.2, 23.4, 23.5, 24.2Tashkent University 22.2Tehran 25.8Tejen 24.3, 25.8Tejen oasis 24.7, 24.8Teotihuacan 22.9theory of the "heartland" 25.1Tohir and Zuhra 23.9Toktogul dam 25.6Torugart pass 23.5To’sinsoi dam 22.7tradition 22.3trains 24.1Trans-Caspian Railroad 24.1, 24.6Trans-Caspian railway 24.7, 24.10Tsurikov, Gennadii 22.8turanga trees (P. diversifolia) 24.6Turkestan 25.6Turkestan-Siberian line 25.2Turkey 25.4, 25.7, 25.8Turkic states 25.6Turkmen 24.2Turkmen Foreign Ministry 25.8Turkmen tribes 24.1Turkmenbashi 24.1, 24.2, 24.6, 25.8Turkmenistan 23.4, 23.5, 24.2, 24.6,

24.7, 25.4, 25.7, 25.8Tu’ya Tortar 23.7

UUAZ-469 general-purpose vehicle 24.9Uchajy 24.6Uighurs 25.7Ulysses 24.4UNESCO Biosphere Reserve 24.7Unocal 25.7Ur 22.9Uzbekistan 23.2, 23.6, 25.2, 25.4, 25.6,

25.7

VVargsar 23.7

Wwater 22.7

management 22.4, 22.5, 23.1pollution 22.8

water table 23.9watermelons 23.2, 23.9wells 24.8wheat 23.2, 23.9, 24.8Wittfogel, Karl 22.5’World Island" 25.1, 25.2

XXingjiang province 25.7

YYakka Quduq 23.9yantoq 23.9Yellow Sea 25.2

10 ASA-25

Institute of CurrentWorld Affairs

Fellows and their Activities

Institute of Current World Affairs 11

Institute of Current World AffairsFOUR WEST WHEELOCK STREETHANOVER, NEW HAMPSHIRE 03755

ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED

Chosen on the basis of character, previous experience and promise, Institute Fellows are young professionals funded to spend aminimum of two years carrying out self-designed programs of study and writing outside the United States. The Fellows are requiredto report their findings and experiences from the field once a month. They can write on any subject, as formally or informally as theywish. The result is a unique form of reporting, analysis and periodic assessment of international events and issues.

Author: Albion, Adam SmithTitle: ICWA Letters Europe/RussiaISSN: 1083-4273

Imprint: Institute of Current WorldAffairs, Hanover, NH

Material Type: Serial ’-> CLanguage: English "’Frequency: Monthly

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