THE FEATURES & MERITS OF PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS WITH

SERVICE CONTRACTS FROM THE VIEW POINT OF AN IOC

Valentine Ataka†

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

……………………………………………………………………………….………….1

ABSTRACT

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…. 2

0.0 INTRODUCTION ..

…………………………………………………………………………….………....2

1.0 KEY FEATURES OF PSCs AND SCs…………………………………….……………………….4

1.1 Production Sharing Contracts..…………………………………………….………….…..…………..4

1.2 The Service Contract …………………………………………………..………….………….……..…….7

2.0 COMPARING PSCs AND SCs ……………………………………………………......

………...8

2.1 Similarities …………………………………..………………………………………………….

……………....9

2.2 Differences ….………………………………………………………………………………….

………..…….10

2.3 Merits & Demerits ….……..………………………………………....……………….…….

…………...11

2.3.1 The Advantages of PSCs over SCs ………………………………………….

………………. 11

2.3.2 Disadvantages of a PSC to an IOC ………………………………………..

………………… 12

2.3.3 Advantages of the SC …………………………………………………………………….

………….13

0

3.0 CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………….

……………..….13

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………………………..

……………..15

† The author is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya and an LLM candidate in Oil and Gas Law (RGU 2013). He is also the Executive Director of the African Centre for Rights and Governance.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSE&P – Exploration and Production

HG - Host Government

IOC – International Oil Corporation

JMC- Joint Management Committee

MEO- minimum Expenditure Obligation

MWO- Minimum Work Obligation

NOC- National Oil Corporation

PSC - Production Sharing Contract

SC- Service Contract

TSC- Technical Service Contract

1

ABSTRACT

This paper is intended to guide the investment decision of IOCs in electing the country in which to set up E&P operations on the basis of the country’s oil and gas contractual regime; In particular when deciding whether to invest in a country with a Production Sharing Contracts regime and/or another with Service Contracts regime.

The paper starts with an introduction that presents a general conceptual background to features of E&P Contracts i.e. the underlying interests of parties in such contracts. This is necessary to help the company understand the reasoning behind the HGs election of either of the two forms of contracting.

In part one, the paper embarks on a specific analysis of the key features of the two forms of E&P contracting. The analysis will include expositions on the rationale for the provisions that define the character of the two types of contracts and also give illustrations from model contracts in use by various countries. Part two of the brief will present a juxtaposition of the two forms of contracting with a view to highlighting their similarities, differences and merits from the perspective of an IOC. The brief will conclude with an opinion not only on which of the two forms of contracting is more beneficial to an IOC, but also a proposal on a criterion for arriving at that choice.

0.0 INTRODUCTION

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The features of upstream oil and gas contracts are influenced by the underlying interests of the Host Government (HG) and the Contractor (IOC).1 On the one hand the HG is motivated primarily by the need to attract risk capital and modern E&P technology and secure socio-economic national interest2. The IOC on the other hand is driven by the desire to make a sufficient return on investment. The provisions in an E&P contract, be it a PSC or a SC, are therefore a reflection of an attempt to reconcile these competing interests.

1.0 KEY FEATURES OF PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS (PSCs) AND SERVICE CONTRACTS (Cs)

1.1 Production Sharing Contracts

A PSC can be widely defined as ‘a private3 contract between one or more IOC and a NOC pursuant to legislation which vests a license or a general exclusive authorisation in the NOC to explore for, exploit and produce hydrocarbons’4

1.1.1 The key Features Parties – the contract will often be entered into with the NOC or relevant Ministers on behalf of the government. In the Ethiopian5 and Indian6 Model PSCs the contract is executed by the Ministers in charge of Mines and Minister for Petroleum and

1 King & Spalding ‘An Introduction to Upstream Government Petroleum Contracts: Their Evolution and Current Use’, OGEL, January 2005http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=1730 accessed on 14th February 2013

2 Jenik Radon, ‘The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts: License-Concession Agreements, Joint Ventures, and Production-sharing Agreements’ in Tsalik S & A. Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporters Guide to Energy and Development’ (Open Society, 2005) http://openoil.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Chapter-3-reading-material1.pdf pg 61-993 There however remains a debate on whether a contract entered into by a government can be termed ‘private’

4, Stephenson Harwood ‘Production Sharing Contracts: An Analysis of Comparative Practice in Certain African Jurisdictions’ (11th Oil and Gas, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade and Finance Conference, Nairobi, 23rd -25th May- 2007)http://www.unctadxi.org/Sections/DITC/Finance_Energy/docs/11thAfrican/11thAfrican_Marc%20Hammerson.pdf accessed on 15th February 2013

5 Ethiopian Ministry of Mines, ‘Model Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement’, http://www.mom.gov.et/upload/Model%20Petroleum%20Production%20Sharing%20Agrement(MPPSA).pdf accessed on 22nd February 2013

6 Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Government of India Production Sharing Contracts http://petroleum.nic.in/nelp3.pdf accessed on 21st February 2013

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Natural Gas respectively. In Tanzania7, the Tanzanian Petroleum Development Corporation is a party.

Term of Contract – the length of the period over which the contract is to subsist is usually prescribed depending on the country and other factors affecting the speed of E&P.8 The length of the term is therefore negotiable. Indeed the statutorily drafted Model Contracts usually do not fix a term period. An example is the Kenyan Model9 which provides as follows at Clause 2:-

‘The contractor is authorized to conduct exploration operations within the contract area during an initial exploration period of [………….] contract years from the effective date’

RelinquishmentA relinquishment Clause obligates the IOC to release portions of the contractual area in phases. It is a measure intended to promote speedy and efficient exploration10. It is a clause that works in benefit of both parties11.

An example of a Relinquishment Clause is Clause 7 of the Kurdistan’s Model PSC12 which provides as follows:

‘The CONTRACTOR shall surrender portions of the Contract Area as follows:(a) Twenty five percent 25% of the initial Contract Area, excluding any

Production Areas, at the end of the first sub-period of the Exploration Period.

(b) An additional twenty five percent 25% of the initial Contract Area, excluding any Production Areas, at the end of the second sub-period of the Exploration Period.

7 Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, Model Production Sharing Agreement (2008) http://www.tpdc-tz.com/MPSA%20_2008.pdf accessed 20th February 2013

8 Harwood , (above n5)

9National Oil Corporation of Kenya, Sample Production Sharing Contract http://nationaloil.co.ke/upstream/?flag=upstream accessed on 1st February 2013 Radon, (above n3)

10Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), Host Government Contract Handbook For The International Petroleum Industry (AIPN, 1999) http://www.fmc-law.com/upload/en/publications/2007/hgc_handbook_vol_11.pdf accessed on 20th February 2013

11 Ibid, pg 63

12 Kurdistan Regional Government, Model Production Sharing Contract For Exploration And Production In Kurdistan (2007)http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/KRG%20Model%20PSC__2007_09_06_h14m3s46.pdf

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(c) An additional 25% of the initial Contract Area, excluding any Production Areas, at the end of the third sub-period of the Exploration Period.

(d) The entirety of the Contract Area, excluding any Production Areas, at the end of the fourth sub-period of the Exploration Period (including any extensions thereof’.

National Interest provisionsSuch provisions are aimed at enhancing and protecting national socio-economic well being of the host country.13 They may require local content14, technology transfer15 or capacity building.16

Carry provisionThis connotes the IOC bearing the contributory obligation of the HG towards the production costs to be recovered as a cost17. However the NOC is under no obligation to indemnify or reimburse the NOC in the event that there is no return on production. This strict approach has been incorporated into the laws of some HGs such as Tunisia.18However some countries such as India19 are more lenient and permit apportionment of costs incurred by the IOC irrespective of discovery.

Cost recovery oil This provision in a PSC enables the IOC to recover its costs from the resulting oil or gas before the profit is shared out20. Recoverable costs are usually defined by the Contract.

The Kurdistan Model provides for cost recovery at Article 25.3 in part as follows;

Subject to the provisions of the Accounting Procedure and this Contract, from the outset of production in the Contract Area, the CONTRACTOR shall at any

13 Harwood, (above n5)

14 See Article 23 of the Indian Model PSC, Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Govt of India Production Sharing Contracts http://petroleum.nic.in/nelp3.pdf accessed on 21st February 2013

15 See Article 19 of the Tanzanian Model

16 See Clause 13 of the Kenyan Model PSC

17 Harwood (above n5)

18 Hydrocarbons Code under Law No. 99-93 (Tunisia) 2003, Translation http://www.etap.com.tn/uploads/telechargement/code_hydrocarbures.pdf accessed 23rd February 2013

19 Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Government of India, (above n7)

20 Marcia Ashong, ‘Cost Recovery In Production Sharing Contracts: Opportunity For Striking It Rich Or Just Another Risk Not Worth Bearing’ (Dundee, CEPLMP, 2009)

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time be entitled to recover any Petroleum Costs incurred under this Contract…..

Profit OilThis constitutes the return on exploration left after the IOC has recovered its costs. It is usually shared between the parties on a ‘sliding scale: the host government’s allocation will rise with increased production or contractor’s economic return’21 An example is the Ethiopian Model22 which at Article 7.2.1 provides as follows:

The balance of Crude Oil remaining in any Calendar Year after deduction of the royalty payments under Section 11.2 and after recoverable Petroleum Operations Costs have been satisfied to the extent and in the manner aforesaid in Section 7.1, shall be referred to as ʺProfit Oilʺ and shall be shared, taken and disposed of between the Government and the Contractor according to the following incremental scale

Minimum Work/Expenditure Obligation Clauses Such clauses oblige the IOC to have completed a measure of operations (e.g. number of wells sunk) or spent a stipulated sum on the operation over a prescribed period.

For example Article 4(b) the Tanzanian Model23 provides as follows

“Description of Work: Undertake geological and Geophysical surveys and related activities as deemed necessary by the Company; shoot [_________] kms of seismic; and drill [____] Exploration Wells.

Minimum Expenditure for this period: US[______] million”

Joint Management Body

21 Harwood (above n5)

22 Ethiopian Ministry of Mines, (above n6)

23 Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, Model Production Sharing Agreement (2008) http://www.tpdc-tz.com/MPSA%20_2008.pdf accessed 20th February 2013

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The PSC usually provides for the formation and composition of a semi-autonomous body to manage the operations. The body usually referred to as the Joint Management Committee (JMC) is made up of representatives seconded by the NOC and the IOC. The crucial role of the JMC is to help resolve the potential competition of interests between the HG and the IOC.

The Indian Model requires the constitution of a Management Committee24, the Ethiopian Model provides for a Gas Development Advisory Committee25 while the Kenyan Model provides for an Operating Committee.26

1.2 The Service Contract (SC) Junseog defines a SC as a contract where ‘a private company agrees to perform certain specified services for the government ….in return for fixed payment….’27 Depending on the nature and level of E&O work involved and the form of payment SCs may be classified as28;

Buy-Back Service Contracts- the IOC has a priority to purchase a portion of the resulting oil and a pre-agreed discounted rate

Technical Service Contracts, - the IOC is retained purely for its technical expertise and technical resources

Pure Risk Service Contracts- IOC is retained to gather and provide information necessary for development of the resources

1.2.1 The General Features of Service Contracts

The Role of the IOC is essentially to provide the HG and the NOC with services and information to help the country develop its own oil resources e.g. the viability of a given field.29 Once the existence of petroleum reserves is suspected, the company is obligated to develop the reservoir. The IOC may also be engaged to provide equipment and training employees to operate the petroleum facilities.

24 Article 6 of the Model

25 Clause 13.1.3 of the Model

26 Clause 4 of the Model

27 Yi Junseog, ‘Merits and Demerits of the Different types of Petroleum Contracts’ www.knoc.co.kr/servlet/Download?num=6&fno=6. Accessed on 15th February 2013

28 Ernest E. Smith, John S. Dzienkowski, ‘A Fifty-Year Perspective of World Petroleum Arrangements’ [1989] 24 Texas International Law Journal 13

29 Ibid

7

The IOC in this kind of arrangement has been described as a ‘contractor’ or ‘hired hand’ working for ‘wages’30

An example is the Iraqi Technical Service Contract in respect of the Rumaila Oil Field. Article 2 is succinct on the role of the IOCs and the scope of the contract. It states that

This Contract is a Technical Service Contract for the rehabilitation of improved production and enhanced recovery of Petroleum from the Rumaila Oil Field in accordance with the provisions herein31

Risk Assumption: despite the company solely investing its own money in the exploration it is entitled to no payment or compensation unless a viable find is made32.

Ownership& Control: the government retains ownership of the resources and at the end of the operations the ownership of the field and the assets therein are transferred to the HG33. In some jurisdictions for example Iraq the HG takes over control of the operations34.

Consideration: where the Company has made a successful find and production is undertaken it is entitled to a taxable fixed fee for the service rendered. In cases of buy-back service contracts, the IOC is given priority to buy the first tranche of petroleum produced at a reduced rate35.

2.0 COMPARING PSCs AND SCs In this part, the brief highlights the general similarities and differences between a PSC and a SC. The comparison will also point out the advantages and disadvantages of the two forms of contracting.

30 Peter Cameron, ‘Managing the politics of oil reforms: Lessons from Iraq’ (Keynote Address at the Oil and Gas in Federal Systems, March 4 2010, Washington DC )

31Fuel on the Fire, Technical Service Contract For The Rumaila Oil Field Between South Oil Company Of The Republic Of Iraq (SOC) And Bp Iraq NV And Petrochina Company Limited And Oil Marketing Company Of the Republic Of Iraq (SOMO) http://www.fuelonthefire.com/uploads/files/BP-CNPC-Rumaila-contract-8Oct09.pdf

32 Ernest E. Smith, John S. Dzienkowski, (above n29) pg 40

33 Frank C. Alexander, ‘Production Sharing Contracts and Other Host Government Contract’ OGEL Vol. 3 - issue 1 March 2005

34 Ibid

35 Ernest E. Smith, John S. Dzienkowski, (above n29) pg 41

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2.1 Similarities The SC is often described as a form of PSC.36 This is informed by the fact that most of the basic Sate-IOC features in a PSC are also found in a SC. Taking the example of the draft Technical Service Contract (TSC) between the Iraqi Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) and BP Iraq (NV) et al37 as compared to the Kurdistan Model Production Sharing Contract (PSC)38 it is apparent that the following provisions are common to the two forms of contract.

In both, the NOC is a party representing the HG – in the TSC the NOC is SOMO defined as ‘the Iraqi state entity’ at Article 1.8 while in the PSC it is signed on behalf of the government

Both contracts have relinquishment provisions –Article 5 in the TSC grants a within six (6) Years relinquishment period from the approval date of the Enhanced Redevelopment Plan, while Article 7 in the PSC grants a three phase relinquishment of 25% threshold each.

In both, the term of the contract is stipulated – at Article 6 of the PSC grants a 7 year period broken down into two phases of 3 and 4 years respectively while under Article 3 of the TSC the contract is to last 20 years.

Both contracts have provisions securing national interest- Article 23.1 of the PSC requires the Contractor to give employment and training priority to Kurdistan and Iraqi personnel to the extent that they have the qualifications. Article 26.1 of the TSC on its part requires the Contractor and operator (to the maximum extent possible), to employ, and require Sub-Contractors to employ, Iraqi nationals having the requisite qualifications

Both contracts have Minimum work obligations – Article 10 of the PSC stipulates the minimum expenditure sums in each sub-period. Similarly Article 6.2 of the TSC sets a minimum sum of USD 300,000,000 which ought to have been spent in the course of specified work obligation.

Diagram 1 below presents the converging features of PSCs and SCs (grey area).

36

37Technical Service Contract For The Rumaila Oil Field Between South Oil Company Of The Republic Of Iraq (SOC) And Bp Iraq Nv And Petrochina Company Limited And Oil Marketing Company Of the Republic Of Iraq (SOMO) http://www.fuelonthefire.com/uploads/files/BP-CNPC-Rumaila-contract-8Oct09.pdf

38 Kurdistan Regional Government, (above n12)

9

Diagram 1 (By Author)

2.2 Differences It is apparent from the illustrated Models above that the difference between a SC and a PSC is mainly founded on

- ownership of the resulting oil resources, - extent of HG control on the operations and - the nature of remuneration of the IOC.

While in a PSC the IOC is more of a partner in the venture and shares in the resulting oil as well as control of the operations, the HG through the NOC has absolute ownership of the oil in a SC arrangement and has massive control over the operations. Besides, in a SC regime, the IOC is more or of a service contractor retained for its services and paid a fixed fee. In some cases the IOC’s payment is in the form of a priority to purchase the resulting oil at a discounted rate. Remuneration is different in a PSC arrangement; the IOC is entitled to a share of the Profit Oil

Another key feature that sets SCs apart is the level of risk assumed by the IOC. The IOC is the sole bearer of the financial risk of the operation. In the event that no viable deposit is established out of the exploration, the IOC will recover no costs. In a PSC on the other hand the HG either contributes to the costs through its NOC or by virtue of a ‘carrying clause’ has the IOC bear its costs to be recovered as part of cost oil.

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While in a PSC arrangement the IOC pays royalties to the government in a service contract, the IOC only pays income tax on the Fee if earned.

Table 1 below summarizes the key differences between a PSC and a SC

Nature Of Contract

Ownership of Resulting Oil

Control of Operations

Role of IOC Payment to IOC

Operation Risks/Costs

Payment to HG

Production Sharing Contracts

HG & IOC HG & IOC Partner Share in the resulting profit oil

Shared or borne by IOC (recoverable from HG)

Royalties & Income Tax

Service Contracts

HG HG Service Contractor

Fixed Fee or buy back priority

Fully and solely borne by IOC

Income Tax on fees

Table 1 (By Author)

2.3 Merits and Demerits

From a perspective of an IOC seeking a viable and sustainable investment framework, the PSC is supported by more merits making it the better option of the two regimes. In this sub-part therefore the brief highlights the advantages that a PSC has over the SC. For the benefit and awareness of NE however, the brief also points out some of the known demerits of PSC and the few merits that the SC may have.

2.3.1 The advantages of PSCs over SCs

- Under a PSC, the IOC has an enhanced control over the operation either directly or through a joint operation body (e.g. committee) to which it has representation as stipulated under the contract. This is likely to minimize government interference and reduce conflicts in the parties’ interest in the operations. On the other hand in an SC arrangement the IOC has little or no control over its own operation thereby jeopardizing its technical integrity.

- Whilst both regimes run a degree of risk since return is dependent on viable discovery, in a PSC arrangement, the risk is shared between the IOC and the HG. The HG may contribute directly to the venture or in the alternative; the IOC may carry the costs and recover them from cost oil. This is a safer

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investment than in a SC arrangement where the IOC bears all the risk with no fall back for recovery in the event that the venture does not yield a profit.

- Payment to the IOC on the basis of its share in the profit oil under a PSC is a more secure mode of payment compared to payment on the basis of a fixed fee. Since the IOC has no say on the disposal of the resulting oil, if at the time of production and sale, the market prices of oil are favourable, the HG would unduly benefit at the expense of the IOC. In any event, buy back incentive would only be beneficial if the market prices at the time of such purchase are relatively high. Given the volatility of world petroleum prices, this may not be a secure method of payment.39

- The fact that an IOC has a stake in the outcome of the PSC venture both in recovery on cost oil and share on profit oil is itself an incentive for optimal operations. Coupled with the liberty of control ensures that the IOC puts in the best efforts to achieve success in the venture. This is likely to result in better return. On the other hand the position of the IOC in SC as a mere service contractor with no equity in the resulting oil is itself a disincentive to innovation and optimal effort towards success of the operation.

- At the closure of the PSC term, the IOC may negotiate the terms of reinvesting its operation assets in the Host State. This leverage lacks in a typical service contract where the entire operation reverts to the HG at the end of the contract term.

2.3.2 Disadvantages of a PSC to an IOC Despite its strengths a PSC has a couple of demerits including

- The IOC is obligated not only to pay royalties but it is also subject to pay income tax on its share of the profit oil. A SC on the other hand only obliges the IOC to pay income tax on the fee earned.

- PSC are often viewed as unfavourable to the Host Governments in comparison to the IOCs. This may pose a problem in the event of political regime change whereby a new government may seek to alter what it deems as unfair terms of contract. A PSC is therefore more vulnerable to political instability.

- Besides a PSC also shares a number of demerits with an SC. These include the insistence by HGs on local content and the dependency on the viability of the operation to set off costs

39 Cameron, (above n30)

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2.3.3 Advantages of a SC Despite its many shortcomings as an investment option for an IOC, the SC regime

- Offers stability in the fixed service fee40. - is beneficial for specialized IOCs with interest only in the service sector due to

its specificity

With such negative traits SCs have been unpopular with IOCs as reflected in recent events in Iraq upon introduction of its TSCs. In 2009 it was reported that some oil majors including Exxonmobil had rejected the Iraqi contract on Rumaila field due to its stringent requirements.41 Only BP and China’s CNPC accepted the contract; but even so BP has been recently reported to be seeking an amendment of the contract.42

3.0 CONCLUSION

From the issues highlighted above pertaining the features and merits of the two forms of contracting, the following are apparent:

In making the decision on the more beneficial contracting regime, an IOC needs to be aware that both contracts are used by HGs seeking to attract technology and skill but lack the resources to carry out O&E operations. This explains the striking similarity in several of their basic provisions. However, SCs are preferred by HGs that are keen on asserting closer control of their resources and investment activities43. A SC is similar to a PSC in many ways especially on the common provisions such as minimum work obligation, relinquishment and national interest protection among others. However the administrative requirements under an SC widely distinguish it from a PSC. Key among these is the extent of control of the operation, ownership of the resulting oil and nature of payment to the IOC.

40 Helmut A Merklein, ‘Iraq Contract options’ Middle East Economic Survey VOL. LII, No 10, 9-Mar-200941

BBC, ‘Oil companies reject Iraq's Terms’ 3Oth June 2009

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8125731.stm accessed 19th February 2013

42 Financial Times, Guy Chazan London ‘BP Seeks Contract Revamp on Iraqi Oil Field’ December 16th 2012 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a56efc2-478d-11e2-a899-00144feab49a.html#axzz2MFaZWG00 accessed 19th February 2013

43 Michael Lickosky, ‘Contracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industries’ http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/19067/original/Contracting_and_regulatory_issues_oil-gas_metalic_minerals_industries.pdf?1349970112 accessed on 21st February 2013

13

Be that as it may, by its very nature, the PSC appears to portend more benefit to an IOC such as NE. Compared to an SC, the merits of a PSC outweighs its demerits; at least from the perspective of an IOC. The demerits of the PSC and merits of a SC, however few, have also been pointed out.

An IOC is therefore more likely to invest in a country with a PSC regime as it is likely to benefit from

- An assurance of control in the operations- An equitable share in the resulting oil- A leverage to negotiate re-investment into the HG - Security of return on investment from profit oil- Less risk on investment - Internal incentive for innovation due to less government

interference in operations

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Statutes

Hydrocarbons Code under Law No. 99-93 (Tunisia) 2003, Translation http://www.etap.com.tn/uploads/telechargement/code_hydrocarbures.pdf accessed 23rd February 2013

Petroleum (Exploration & production) Act Cap 308 (Kenya)

14

Books

AIPN, Host Government Contract Handbook For The International Petroleum Industry (AIPN, 1999) http://www.fmc-law.com/upload/en/publications/2007/hgc_handbook_vol_11.pdf

John S Lowe, Oil & Gas Law in a Nutshell (West Publishing, 1994)

Tsalik S & A. Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporters Guide to Energy and Development’ (Open Society, 2005)

Governments Publications

Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Government of India Production Sharing Contracts http://petroleum.nic.in/nelp3.pdf

Ethiopian Ministry of Mines, ‘Model Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement’, http://www.mom.gov.et/upload/Model%20Petroleum%20Production%20Sharing%20Agrement(MPPSA).pdf

Kurdistan Regional Government, Model Production Sharing Contract For Exploration And Production In Kurdistan (2007)http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/KRG%20Model%20PSC__2007_09_06_h14m3s46.pdf

National Oil Corporation of Kenya, Model Production Sharing Contract http://nationaloil.co.ke/upstream/?flag=upstream

Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, Model Production Sharing Agreement (2008) http://www.tpdc-tz.com/MPSA%20_2008.pdf accessed 20th February 2013

Articles

15

Frank C. Alexander, ‘Production Sharing Contracts and Other Host Government Contract’ OGEL Vol. 3 - issue 1 March 2005

Helmut A Merklein, ‘Iraq Contract options’ Middle East Economic Survey VOL. LII, No 10, 9-Mar-2009

Jenik Radon, ‘The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts: License-Concession Agreements, Joint Ventures, and Production-sharing Agreements’ in Tsalik S & A. Schiffrin (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporters Guide to Energy and Development’ (Open Society, 2005)

King & Spalding ‘An Introduction to Upstream Government Petroleum Contracts: Their Evolution and Current Use’, OGEL, January 2005http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=1730

Marcia Ashong, ‘Cost Recovery In Production Sharing Contracts: Opportunity For Striking It Rich Or Just Another Risk Not Worth Bearing’ (Dundee, CEPLMP, 2009)

Michael Lickosky, ‘Contracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industries’ http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/19067/original/Contracting_and_regulatory_issues_oil-gas_metalic_minerals_industries.pdf?1349970112

Yi Junseog, ‘Merits and Demerits of the Different types of Petroleum Contracts’ www.knoc.co.kr/servlet/Download?num=6&fno=6.

Others

BBC, ‘Oil companies reject Iraq's Terms’ 3Oth June 2009

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8125731.stm accessed 19th February 2013

Financial Times, Guy Chazan London ‘BP Seeks Contract Revamp on Iraqi Oil Field’ December 16th 2012 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a56efc2-478d-11e2-a899-00144feab49a.html#axzz2MFaZWG00

16

Fuel on the Fire, Technical Service Contract For The Rumaila Oil Field Between South Oil Company Of The Republic Of Iraq (SOC) And Bp Iraq NV And Petrochina Company Limited And Oil Marketing Company Of the Republic Of Iraq (SOMO) http://www.fuelonthefire.com/uploads/files/BP-CNPC-Rumaila-contract-8Oct09.pdf

Peter Cameron, ‘Managing the politics of oil reforms: Lessons from Iraq’ (Keynote Address at the Oil and Gas in Federal Systems, March 4 2010, Washington DC )

Stephenson Harwood ‘Production Sharing Contracts: An Analysis of Comparative Practice in Certain African Jurisdictions’ (11th Oil and Gas, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade and Finance Conference, Nairobi, 23rd -25th May- 2007)

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