UNITED STATES, OF AMERICA

<iongrcssional1Rccordth

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 94 CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

VOLUME 122-PART 11

MAY 6, 1976 TO MAY 13, 1976

(PAGES 12741 TO 14040)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, 1976

13678 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - .:lLJ."lIn. ... L

.. The.select committee would have sub­pena .. power, a staff, and funds tQ keepItself informed so as to equip itself toprovide effective oversight of the intelli­gence community.

Before the committee voted to reportthe substitute amendment It had adoptednumerous perfecting amendments to theresolution as opposed to the form inwhich it was referred to the CommItteeon Rules and Administration.

Some of those perfecting amendmentswere unanimously approved while otherswere agreed to by a bare majority vote.The amendments changed various partsof the resolution while leaving some por­tions thereof unamended although manyof them were not favored by variousmembers of the committee. Hence, whenthere were no further perfecting amend­ments to be offered to the resolution, thequestion was put on agreeing to a com­plete substitute amendment for the reso­lution, Which was agreed to by a vote of5 to 4.

The committee, both in the case ofperfecting amendments to the resolutionand the SUbstitute therefor, proposedthat the intelligence committee not bemade a standing committee, but insteada select committee. The perfectingamendments approved by the committeebefore agreeing to the substitute pro­posed to give the select commIttee se­quential, concurrent jurisdiction over theCentral Intelligence Agency, the intelli­gence activities of all other departmentsand agencies of the Government, theorganization and reorganizatIon plansaffecting intelligence activities wIthinGovernment agencies, as well as author­ization for appropriations for practicallyall such agencies.

The substitute for the resolution re­ported by the committee WOUld. not ex­tend any legislative jurIsdiction to theselect committee. The composition of theselect committee as approved by theCommittee on Rules and Administrationwas virtually the same in both theamended version and the substitutetherefor.

In my opinion, in observing the actiontaken by the Committee on Rules andAdministration, the committee was verymuch concerned with,and emphasizedCongressional oversight of the intel­ligence activities of the Administrationbut at the same time it was particularlYconcerned that national security secretswere not to be leaked or divulged to ourenemies abroad. The Rules Committeewanted to establish a cohunittee fortifiedwith the powers to do a good job withoutdoing harm to the operations of the in­telligence agencies of the Government incarryirilI out their functions and dutiesfor. which they .were created. The com­mittee was particularly concerned totighten up the provisions of the resolu­tion for preventing the leakage of in­formation as well as the provision au­thorizing the committee to make publicclassiftedinfonnation; it was the feel­ing of a majority of the comniittee thatconfidential and secret informationshould not be released by the committeebut that the committee when requestedby the administration or agencies there­of.to keep certain information confIden-

RiblcoffSchwelkerScott,HughStevensonWelckerWilliams

MorganMuskieNelsonPastorePellProxmire

NOT VOTING-8Griflin MontoyaInouye TunneyMcGee

PROPOSED STANDING COMMITrEEON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESThe PRESIDING OFFICER. Under

the previous order, the Senate will nowresume consideration of the unfinishedbusiness, Senate Resolution 400, whichthe clerk will stateo

The second assistant legislative clerkread as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish aStanding Committee of the Senate on In­telligence Activities, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed the considerationof the resolution.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, before Iget to discuss the history and action bythe Committee on Rules and Administra­tion on Senate Resolution 400, I statethat several Senators, including myself,representing groups of Senators holdingvarious points of view have been meet­ing and discussing the possibility ofworking out a compromise version. Whileour resolve might not be completelysatisfactory to all parties, it is the bestpossible compromise we could reach.Later on I propose to offer this substituteas a proposed amendment in the natureof a substitute for the committee SUb­stitute as reported.

Mr. President, the Committee on Rulesand Administration on April 29, 1976,reported Senate Resolution 400, to estab­lish a Standing Committee of the Senateon Intelligence Activities, and for otherpurposes, with an amendment in thenature of a SUbstitute for the resolutionas referred to the committee, and anamendment to the title of the resolution.The title amendment reads "A resolutionestablishing a Select Committee on In­telligence."

The committee substitute would estab­lish a permanent select, not a standingcommittee, on intelligence with oversightjurisdiction over the intelligence com­munity but without legislative jurisdic­tion; it proposes to leave withIn thestanding committees on Armed Services,Foreign Relations, the Judiciary, or anyother committee their existing legislativejurisdiction with respect to intelligenceactivities.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN­ATOR RIDICOFF

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I askunanimous consent that after the Sen­ator from Nevada has completed his re­marks the distinguished Senator fromConnecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) then berecognized.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

So the conference report was agreed to.The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen­

ator from Nevada is recognized.

BakerBrookeChurch

Hart, Philip A.HathawayJavitsKennedyMathiasMcIntyre

MondaleMossNunnPackwoodPearsonPercyRandolphRothScott,

William L.SparkmanStaffordStennisstevensstoneSymingtonTaftTalmadgeThurmondTowerYoung

Bumpers DurkinByrd, Robert C. EagletonCase Glenn

AbourezkBeallBiden

AllenBartlettBayhBellmonBentsenBrockBuckleyBurdickByrd,

Harry F., Jr.CannonChilesClarkCranstonCulverCurtisDoleDomenlclEastlandFanninFongFordGam

beef producers and consumers will befostered by this legislation. I noted thismorning at hearings before the Commit­tee on Agriculture and Forestry that rep­resentatives of the Consumer Federationof America, as well as the major farmorganizations, were present to testify insupport of the Farmers Market Act andsimilar legislation which was introducedlast year by Senator HUMPHREY and my­self. At the hearings, Senator HUDDLE­STON commented to the young lady fromthe Consumer Federation that h~ felt agrowing awareness among consumer ad­vocates of the difficulties faced by thosewho provide food and fiber for theUnited States. I think this is laudable,and absolutely necessary. We owe it notonly to those in agriculture, but alsothose who are served by agriculture, tofind ways in which cooperation and un­derstanding can be developed.

Mr. President, this bill does just that,and I believe if for no other reason, itmerits enactment. I would urge my col­leagues to support the bill with me, forthe benefit of American ranchers andconsumers.

Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I amready to yield back the remainder of mytime.

Mr. ALLEN. I yield back the remainderof my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.STAFFORD) . All time is yielded back. Thequestion is on agreeing to the conferencereport on the Beef Research and Infor­mation Act. The yeas and nays have beenordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce

that the Senator from Idaho (Mr.CHURCH), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr.INOUYE), the Senator from Wyoming(Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Califor­nia (Mr. TuNNEY) and the Senator fromNew Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) are neces­sarily absent.

Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I announce thatthe Senator from Tennessee (Mr.BAKER), the Senator from Massachusetts(Mr. BROOKE) and the Senator fromMichigan (Mr. GRIFFIN) are necessarilyabsent.

The result was announced-yeas 65,nays 27, as follows:

[RollCall Vote No. 175 Leg.)YE.AS-65

GoldwaterGravelHansenHart, GaryHartkeHaskellHatfieldHelmsHollingsHruskaHuddlestonHumphreyJacksonJohnstonLaxaltLeahyLongMagnusonMansfieldMcClellanMcClureMcGovernMetcalf

NAY8-27

May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-·· SENATE 13679tial should vote to report that informa­tion to the Senate in closed session, andthen let the Senate work its will as towhether such information should be re­leased to the public. The committee wasconcerned tha.t the select committeeshould have a competent staff and tbere­fore voted. to eliininate the provisionwhich would restrict the tenure of serv­ice of its employees.

Personally, I am opposed to the provi­sions of the resolution as approved whichrestrict the service of a Senator on theselect committee to a 6-year term. I amalso opposed to the provision which wouldauthorize the select committee to obtainannual reports from the intelligenceagencies on their intelligence activitiesand the intelligence activities of foreigncountries directed at the United Statesor its interests and to direct the selectcommittee to unclassify.these reports in­clUding individuals engaged in intel­ligence activities for the United Statesor the sources of information on whichsuch reports are based.

After the committee voted to report thecommittee substitute for the resolution, Ihave engaged in conversations with Sen­ators representing different points of viewon the resolution and because of the sen­timents expressed, I proceeded to discussthe possibility with other senators ofworking out some kind of a compromiseversion which would be acceptable to theSenate. This substitute I propose to in­troduce is now cosponsored by a greatnumber of other Senators.

In submitting this amendment, theSenate will bl:: given an opportunity tovote on a compromise version betweenthat reported by the Committee on Gov­ernment Operations and the substituteamenclIllents acted on by the Committeeon Rules and Administration.

The compromise would establish a newselect committee to be known as the Se­lect Committee on Intelligence. It wouldbe composed of 17 Senators-as nowdrafted, however, there is some contro­versy as to the size of the committee,which undoubtedly will be considered onthe floor-two each from the Committeeon Appropriations, the Committee onArmed Services, the Committee on For­eign Relations, and the Committee onthe JUdiciary, and 9 members from theSenate who are not members of thesecommittees. No senator would be per­mitted to serve more than 10 years, tobe appointed so as to give them a rotat.;.ing membership with one-third of themembers to the greatest extent possiblebeing appointed at the beginning of eachCongress. All of the members are to beappointed by the President pro temporeon the recommendations of the major­ity and minority leaders, after consulta­tion with the respective committee chair­men. The majority and minority leaderswill be ex officio members but without avote.

The chairman and vice chairman areto be elected at the beginning of eachCongress by the members of their respec­tive political parties. Senators appointedto this committee will be exempt fromthe limitations placed on the number ofcommittee assignments to which a Sena­tor is entitled.

The committee is given investigatorYand oversight authority which would al­low it to study all intelligence activitiesand programs by the Government; itwould also have legislative jurisdictionover matters enumerated in section 3, in­cluding authorizations therefor. Thisjurisdiction would be shared with thestanding committees which already have

. jurisdiction over such subject matter ex­cept in the case of the Central Intelli­gence Agency and the Director of Cen­tral Intelligence, which would fall solelywithin the jurisdiction of the select com­mittee-that is, except for the CentralIntelligence Agency and the Directorthereof, . certain committees would begiven sequential, concurrent jurisdictionover the intelligence community.

The existing committees of the Senatewould in no way be restricted in makingstudies and reviews of matters which fallwithin their jurisdiction, respectively.

Regular and periodic reports to theSenate on the nature and extent of theintelligence activities of the various de­partments and agencies would be re­quired; The committee would be directedto obtain annual reports from agenciesparticipating in intelligence activitiesand make public such unclassified in­formation-I repeat, unclassified infor­mation.

The committee would also be requiredto report on or before March 15 of eachyear to the Committee on the Budget ofthe Senate the views and estimates "de­scribed in section 301(c) of the Congres­sional Budget Act regarding matterswithin its jurisdiction."

The committee would be authorized tomake investigations, armed with subpenapower. It would be authorized a staff andfunds to keep itself informed on the in­telligence activities within its jurisdic­tion to insure effective oversight of theintelligence community.

Effort was made to assure securityagainst divulging unlawful intelligenceactivities and to protect our nationalsecurity. Reports on lawfUl, classlfled in­formation by this group will be made tothe Senate in closed session to determineif such information should be released.The formula for this protection is setforth in sections 6 through 8.

All of the records, files, documents,and other materials held by the SelectCommittee on Government Operationswith Respect to Inte1l1gence Activitieswill be transferred to this committee.

Section 11 expresses the sense of theSenate as to the responsibility of thedepartments and agencies of the Govern­ment to keep the select committee in­formed of all developments in inte1l1­gence activities by the respective depart­ments and agencies.

Subjects to be studied by the selectcommittee and on which the committeeis directed to file a report not later thanJuly I, 1977, are set forth in section 13.These matters include, among otherthings, the question of whether a stand­ing committee should be formed and thequestion of whether a joint committeeshould be formed, such as the JointCommittee on Atomic Energy. A propOSalalready has been made in the House tocreate a Joint committee, between the

House and the Senate, on intelligenceactivities. Funds are authorized in theamount not to exceed $275,000 throughFebruary 28, 1977, paid out of the con­tingent fund of the senate.

I subinit this compromise to the Senatefor its. decision and jUdgment. There isno question in my mind but that all Sen­ators .share with me the desire tostrengthen and to improve the Govern­ment's .role in the intelligence fleld. Inthat spirit, I submit the compromise forthe approval of the Senate. I send to thedesk an amendment in the nature of a.substitute, to be considered as a substi­tute for the committee amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Theamendment will be stated.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, there isone slight modlflcation that has beenagreed upon, and I ask unanimous con­sent to submit it at a later time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

The legislative clerk read as follows:AMENDMENT No. 1643

The senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON)(for himself, Mr. RoBERT C. BYRD, Mr.MANSFIELD, Mr. HUGH SCOTT, Mr. PERCY, Mr.HATFffiLD, Mr. RIBICOFF, Mr. CHURCH, Mr.MONDALE, Mr. BAKER, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr.PHn.li' A. HART, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. MORGAN,Mr. GARY HART, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. SCHWEIKER,Mr. JAVITS, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. DURKIN, Mr.ROTH, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BROOKE, Mr.BROCK, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr.CLARK, and Mr. PELL) proposes an amend­ment In the nature of a SUbstitute: in Heu ofthe language intended to be substituted bythe committee amendment insert the fol­lowing:

That it is the purpose of this resolution toestabHsh a new· select committee of theSenate, to'be known as the select Committeeon Inte1l1gence to oversee and make con­tinuing stUdies of the inte1l1gence actiVitiesand programs of the United States Govern­ment, and to submit to the Senate appro­priate proposals for legislation and reportto the Senate concernlng such inte111genceactivities and programs. In carrying out thispurpose, the Select Committee on Intelli~

gence shall make every effort to assure thatthe appropriate departments and agenciesof the United States provide informed andtimely inte1l1gence necessary for the execu­tive and legislative branches to make sounddecisions aft'ecting the security and vitalinterests of the Nation. It is further the pur­pose of this resolution to provide vigilantlegislative oversight over the intell1genceactivities of the Unlted States to assure thatsuch activities are in conformity with theConstitution and laws of the Unlted States.

SEC. 2. (a) (1) There is hereby establisheda select committee to be known as the selectCommittee on Intelligence (hereinafter inthis resolution referred to as the "selectcommittee"). The select committee shall becomposed of seventeen members appointedas follows:

(A) two members from the Committee onAppropriations;

(B) two members from the Committee onArmed Services;

(C) two members from the Committee onForeign Relations;

(D) two members from the Committee onthe Judiciary; and

(E) nine members from the Senate whoare not members of any of the committeesnamed in clauses (A) through (D).

(2) Members appointed from each com­mittee named in clauses (A) through (D) ofparagraph (1) shall be evenly divided be­tween the two major poUtica1 parties and

13680 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - ~J"J.'.t'L"'~ May 12,1976Ihall be appointed by the Pre8Jdent pro tem­pore of the senate upon the recommenda­tions of the majority and minority leadersof the Senate atter consultation With theirchairman and ranking minority member.Five of the members appointed underclause (E) of paragraph (1) shall be ap­pointed by the President pro tempore of theSenate upon the recommendation of the ma­jority leader of the Senate and four shall beappointed by the President pro tempore ofthe Senate upon the recommendation of theminority leader of the senate.

(3) The majority leader of the senate andthe minOrity leader of the Senate shall beex olficlo members of the select committee,but shall have no vote In the committee andshall not be counted for purposes of deter­mining a quorum.

(b) No senator may serve on the selectcommittee for more than nine years of con­tinuous service, exclusive of service by anysenator on such committee, during theninety-fourth Congress. To the greatest ex­tent practicable, one-third of the Membersof the Senate appointed to the select com­mitt~at the beginning of the ninety-seventhCongress and each Congress thereafter shallbe Members of the Senate who did not serveon such committee during the precedingCongress.

(c) At the beginning of each Congress, theMembers of the senate who are members ofthe majority party of the Senate shall electa chairman for the select committee, andthe Members of the senate who are from theminority party of the Senate shall elect a·vice chairman for such committee. The vicechairman shall act in the place and stead ofthe chairman in the absence of the chair­man. Neither the chairman nor the vicechairman of the select committee shall Ilotthe same time serve as chairman or rankingminority member of any other committeereferred to in paragraph 6(f) of rule XXVof the Standing Rules of the Senate.

(d) For the purposes of paragraph 6(a)of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of thesenate, service of a senator as a member ofthe select committee shall not be taken intoaccount.

SEC. 3. (a) There shall be referred to theselect committee all proposed legislation,messages, petitions, memoriale, and othermatters relating to the folloWing:

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency andthe Director of Central Intelligence.

(2) Intelligence activities of all other de­partments and agencies of the Government,including, but not limited to, the intelligenceactivities of the Defense Intelllgence Agency,the National Security Agency, and otheragencies of the Department of Defense; theDepartment of State; the Department of Jus­tice; and the Department of the Treasury.

(3) The organization or reorganization ofany department or agency of the Governmentto the extent that the organization or reor­ganization relates to a function or actiVityinvolVing intelllgence activities.

(4) Authorizations for appropriations, bothdirect and Indirect, for the following:

(A) The Central Intell1gence Agency andDirector of Central Intell1gence,

(B) The Defense Intel11gence Agency.(C) The National Security Agency.(D) The Intelllgence activities of other

agencies and subdivisions of the Departmentof Defense.

(E) The Intelligence activities of the De­partment of State.

(F) The intelligence activities of the Fed­eral Bureau of Investigation, including allactivities of the Inte111gence Division.

(G) Any department, agency, or subdivi­sion which is the successor to any agencynamed in clause (A), (B), or (C); and theactivities of any department, agency. or sub­division which is the successor to any depart­ment, agency, bureau, or subdivision namedin clause (D), (E), or (F) to the extent that

the activities of such successor department.agency. or subdivision are activities describedin clause (D), (E), or (F).

(b) Any proposed legislation reported bythe select committee, except any legislationinvolving matters spec1tl.ed in clause (1) or(4) (A) of SUbsection (a), containing anymatter otherwise within the jurisdiction ofany standing committee shall, at the requestof the chairman of such standing committee,be referred to such standing committee forits consideration of such matter and be re­ported to the senate by such standing com­mittee within 30 days after the day on whichsuch proposed legislation Is referred to suchstanding committee; and any proposed leg­Islation reported by any committee. otherthan the select committee, which containsany matter within the jurisdiction of theselect committee shall, at the request of thechairman of the select committee, be referredto the select committee for its considerationof such matter and be reported to the sen­ate by the select committee within 30 daysafter the day on which such propoSed leg­islation Is referred to such committee. In anycase in which a committee fails to report anyproposed legislation referred to it within thetime limit preSCribed herein, such commit­tee shall be automatically discharged fromfurther consideration of such proposed legis­lation on the thirtieth day following the dayon which such proposed legislation is re­ferred to such committee unless the SenateprOVides otherwise. In computing any thirty­day period under this paragraph there shallbe excluded from such computation any dayson which the Senate is not In session.

(c) Nothing in this resolution shall beconstrued as prohibiting <ir otherWise re­stricting the authority of any other COllll­mittee to study and review any intel11genceactivity to the extent that such activitydirectly affects a matter otherwise withinthe jurisdiction of such committee.

(d) Nothing in this resolution shall beconstrued as amending, limiting, or other­wise changing the authority of any standingcommittee of the senate to obtain full andprompt access to the product of the intel­ligence activities of any department or agencyof the Government relevant to a matterotherwise within the jurisdiction of suchcommittee.

BEC. 4. (a) The select committee, for thepurposes of accountablllty to the Senate,shall· make regular and periodic reports tothe Senate on the nature and extent of theintelllgence activities of the various depart­ments and agencies of the United States.Such committee shall promptly call to theattention of the Senate or to any otherappropriate committee or committees of theSenate any matters deemed by the selectcommittee to require the immediate atten­tion of the Senate or such other committeeor committees. In making such reports, theselect committee shall proceed in a mannerconsistent with section 8(c) (2) to protectnational security.

(b) The select committee shall obtain anannual report from the Director of the Cen­tral Intelllgence Agency, the Secretary ofDefense, the Secretary of State, and theDirector of the Federal Bureau of Investiga­tion for public dissemination. Such reportsshall review the Intelligence activities of theagency or department concerned and theintelligence actiVities of foreign countriesdirected at the United States or its interests.An unclassified veralon of each report shall bemade available to the public by the selectcommittee. Nothing herein shall be construedas requlring the disclosure in such reportsof the names of individuals engaged in intel­llgence activities for the United States or thesources of information on Which such re­ports are based.

(c) On or before March 15 of each year,the select committee shall submit to theCOIlllm1ttee on the Budget of the Senate the

views and estimates described in section301(C) of the COngressional BUdget Act of1974. regarding matters Within the jurisdic­tion of the select committee.

SEC. 5. (a) For the purposes of this resolu­tion. the select committee is authorized Inits discretion (1) to make investigations intoany matter Within its jurisdiction, (2) tomake expenditures from the contingent fundof the Senate. (3) to employ personnel. (4)to hold hearings, (5) to sit and act at anytime or place during the sessions. recesses.and adjourned periods of the senate, (6) torequire, by SUbpena or otherwise, the attend­ance of Witnesses and the production ofcorrespondence, books, papers. and docu­ments. (7) to take depositions and other tes­timony, (8) to procure thesemce of individ­ual consultants or organizations thereof. inaccordance with the provisions of section202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Actof 1946. and (9) with the prior consent of theGovernment departanent or agency concernedand the Committee on Rules and Adminis­tration, to use on a reimbursable basis theservices of personnel of any such departmentor agency.

(b) The chairman of the select committeeor any member thereof may administer oathsto Witnesses.

(c) SUbpenas authorized by the selectcommittee may be issued over the signatureof the chairman. the vice chairman, or anymember of the select committee designatedby the Chairman, and may be served by anyperson designated by the chairman or anymember algnlng the SUbpena.

SEC. 6. No employee of the select committeeor any person engaged by contract or other­wise to perform servicea for or at the requestof such committee shall be given access toany clasalfied Information by such committeeunless such employee or person has (1)agreed in writing and under oath to be boundby the rules of the Senate (including thejurisdiction of the select Committee onStandards and Conduct) and of such com­mittee as to the security of such Informationduring and after the period of his employ­ment or contractual agreement With suchcOmmittee; and (2) received an appropriatesecurity clearance as determined by suchcommittee in consUltation with the Directorof Central Intell1gence. The type of securityclearance to be required in the case of anysuch employee or person shall, within thedetermination of such committee in con­sultation with the Director of Central Intelli­gence, be commensurate With the sensitivityof the classified information to which suchemployee or person will be given access bysuch committee.

SEC. 7. The select committee shall fonnu­late and carry out such rules and proceduresas it deems necessary to prevent the dis­closure. without the consent of the personor persons concerned. of information in thepossession of such committee which undulyinfringes upon the privacy or which Violatesthe constitutional rights of such person orpersons. Nothing herein shall be construedto prevent such committee from publicly dis­closing any such information in any case Inwhich such committee determines the na­tional Interest in the disclosure of such in­formation clearly outweighs any infringe­ment on the privacy of any person or persons.

SEC. 8. (a) The select committee may. sub­ject to the provisions of this section, disclosepUblicly any Information in the possessionof such committee after a determination bysuch committee that the public interestwould be served by such disclosure. When­ever committee action is required to discloseany information under this section. the com­mittee shall meet to vote on the matterWithin five days after any member of thecommittee requests such a vote. No memberof the select committee shall disclose anyinformation. the disclosure of which requiresa committee vote, prior to a vote by the

il1ay 1.2, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 13681committee on the question of the disclosureof such information or after such vote exceptin accordance with this section.

(b) (1) In any case in which the selectcommittee votes to disclose publicly any in­formation wbich bas been classified underestablisbed security procedures. which hasbeen submitted to it by the executive branch,and which the executive branch requests bekept secret, such committee shall notify thePresident of such "ote.

(2) The select committee may disclosepublicly such information after the expira­tion of a five-day period following the dayon which notice of such vote is transmittedto the President. unless, prior to the expira­tion of such five-day period, the Presidentnotifies the committee that he objects to thedisclosure· of such informatiqn, provides hisreasons therefor, and certifies that the threatto the national interest of the Unitedstates posed by such disclosure is vital andoutweighs any publiC interest in the dis­closure.

(3) If the President notifies the seiectcommittee of his objections to the disclosureof such information as provided in para­graph (2), such committee may, by major­Ity vote. refer the question of the disclosureof such information to the Senate for con­sideration. Such information shall notthereafter be publicly disclosed withoutleave of the Senate.

(4) Whenever the select committee votesto refer the question of disclosure of anyinformation to the Senate under paragraph(3), the chairman shall. not later than thefirst day on which the Senate is in sessionfollOWing the day on which the vote occurs,report the matter to the Senate for its con­sideration.

(5) One hour after the Senate conveneson the fourth day on which the Senate is insession following the day on whIcb any suchmatter is reported to the Senate. or at suchearlIer time as the majority leader and theminority leader of the Senate jointly agreeupon in accordance with section 133 (f) ofthe Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,the Senate shall go into closed session andthe matter shall be the pending business.In considering the matter in closed sessionthe Senate may-

(A) approve the public disclosure of allor any portion of the informtion in ques­tion, in which case the committee shall pub­llcly disclose the information ordered to bediscosed,

(B) disapprove the public disclosure ofall of any portion of the information inquestion, in which case the committee shallnot publicly disclose the information orderednot to be diclosed, or

(C) refer all or any portion of the matterback to the committee, in which case thecommittee shall make the final determi­nation with respect to the publiC disclosureof the information in question.UpO!!! conclusion of the consideration ofsuch matter in closed session, which may notextend beyond the close of the ninth dayon which the Senate is in session follOWingthe day on wbich such matter was reportedto the senate, or the cose of the fifth dayfollowing the day agreed upon jointly by themajority and minority leaders in accordancewith section 133(f} of the Legislative Re­organization Act of 1946 (Whichever thecase may be), the Senate shall immediatelyvote on the disposition of such matter inopen session. without debate, and withoutdivulging the information With respect towhich the vote is being taken. The Senateshall vote to dispose of such matter by oneor more of the means specified in clauses(A). (B). and (C) of tbe second sentenceof this paragraph. Any vote of the Senateto disclose any information pursuant to th1sparagraph shall be SUbject to the right ofa Member of the senate to move for recon-

sideration of the vote Within the time andpursuant to the procedures specified in ruleXIII of the Standing Rules of the Senate.and the disclosure of such information shallbe made consistent with that right.

(c) (1) No information In the possessionof the select committee relating to the lawfUlintell1gence activities of any department oragency of the United States which has beenclassified under established security proce­dures and which the select committee, pur­suant to subsection (a) and (b) of this sec­tion. has determined should not be disciosedshall be made available to any person by aMember. officer, or employee of the Senateexcept in a closed session of the Senate or asprovided in paragraph (2).

(2) The select committee may, under suchregUlations as the committee shall prescribeto protect the confidentiality of such infor­mation. make any information described inparagraph (1) available to any other com­mittee or any other Member of the senate.\Vhenever the select committee makes suchinformation available, the committee shallkeep a written record showing, In the caseof any particular Information, which com­mittee or which Members of the Senate re­ceived such information. No Member of thesenate who. and no committee Which, re­ceives any information under this subsection.shall disclose such information except in aclosed session of the Senate.

(d) It shall be the duty ot the select Com­mittee on Standards and Conduct to investi­gate any alleged disclosure ot Intelligenceinformation by a member, officer, or em­ployee of the Senate in violation of subsec­tion (c) and to report thereon to the Senate.

(e) Upon the request ot any person who isSUbject to any such investigation. the selectCommittee on Standards and Conduct shallrelease to such individual at the conclusionot its investigation a summary of its investi­gation together With its findings. If. at theconclusion ot Its investigation, the selectCommittee on Standards and Conduct deter­mines that there has been a significantbreach ot confidentiality or unauthorizeddisclosure by a Member. officer, or employeeof the senate, it shall report its findings tothe senate and recommend appropriate ac­tion such as censure, removal trom commit­tee membership, or expulsion from the Sen­ate. in the case of Member, or removal fromoffice or employment or punishment lor con·tempt, in the case ot an officer or employee.

SEC. 9. The select commlttee is authorizedto permit any personal representative of thePresident. designated by the President toserve as a l1aison to such committee. to at­tend any closed meeting of such committee.

SEC. 10. Upon expiration of the Select Com­mittee on Government Operations With Re­spect to Intell1gence Activities. establishedby senate Resolution 21. Ninety-tourth Con­gress. all records, files, documents, and othermaterials in the possession, custody. or con­trol ot such committee. under appropriateconditions established by it, shall be trans­ferred to the select committee.

SEC. 11. (a) It is the sense of the Senatethat the head of each department andagency of the United States should keep theselect committee fully and currently in­formed with respect to intelligence actiVities.including any significant anticipated activi­ties, whicb are the responsibility ot or en­gaged in by such department or agency:Provided. That this does not constitute acondition precedent to the tmplementationot any such anticipated intelligence activity.

(b) It is the sense ot the senate that thehead of any department or agency of theUnited States involved in any intell1genceactivities should fUrnish any information ordocument in the possession, custody. or con­trol of the department or agency. or personpaid by such depatrment or agency, when­ever requested by the select committee with

respect to any matter within such commit­tee's jurisdiction.

(c) It is the sense of the Senate that eachdepartment and agency ot the United StatesshOUld report immediately upon discoveryto the select committee any and all intelli­gence activities which constitute Violationsot the constitutional rights of any person,Violations of law. or violations of Executiveorders, Presidential directives, or depart­mental or agency rules or regulations; eachdepartment and agency shOUld further re­port to such committee what actions havebeen taken or are expected to be taken bythe departments or agencies with respect tosuch violations.

SEC. 12. SUbject to the Standing Rules ofthe senate, no funds shall be appropriatedfor any fiscal year beginning after septem­ber 30. 1976. with the exception ot a con­tinuing bill or resolution, or amendmentthereto, or conterence report thereon. to. ortor use ot, any department or agency ot theUnited States to carry out any of the tollow­ing activities. unless such funds shall havebeen preViously authorized by a bill or Jointresolution passed by the Senate during thesame or preceding fiscal year to carry outsuch activity for such fiscal year-

(1) The actiVities ot the Central Inte1l1­gency Agency and the Director of CentralIntell1gence.

(2) The actiVities of the Defense Inte1l1­gence Agency.

(3) The activities ot the National SecurityAgency.

(4) The intelligence activities of otheragencies and subdivisions ot the Departmentof Defense.

(5) The intell1gence actiVities of the De­partment of State.

(6) The intelligence activities of the Fed­eral Bureau of Investigation, including allactivities of the Inte1l1gence Division.

SEC. 13. (a) The select commlttee shallmake a study With respect to the followingmatters, taking into consideration with re­spect to each such matter. all relevant aspectsof the effectiveness of planning. gathering.use, security, and dis>:emlnatlon of intelll­genca-

(I) the quallty ot the analytical capabUi­ties ot United States torelgn inte1l1genceagencies and means for integrating moreclosely analytical intelligence and pollcytormulation;

(2) the extent and nature of the authority'ot the departments and agencies of the ex­ecutive branch to engage in intelligence ac­tivities and the desirabiUty ot developingcharters for each intell1gence agency ordepartment;

(3) the organization ot intelligence activi­ties in the executive branch to maximize theeffectiveness of the conduct. oversight. andaccountabUity ot intell1gence activities; toreduce dupl1cation or overlap; and to improvethe morale ot the personnel ot the foreignIntell1gence agencies;

(4) the conduct of covert and clandestineactivities and the procedures by which Con­gress is informed of such activities;

(5) the desirability of changing any law,senate rule or procedure, or any Executiveorder. :-ule, or regulation to improve the pro­tection ot lntelllgence secrets and provide fordisclosure o! information tor which there 18no compelling reason for secrecy;

(6) tbe desirablllty of estab1ish1ng a stand­'ing committee of the senate on Inteillgenceactivities;

(7) the desirablllty of establishing a jointcommittee ot the senate and the House ofRepresentatiVes on intelligence activities inlieu ot having separate commlttees in eachHouse ot Congress, or ot establishing proce­dures· under which separate committees onintelligence activities of the two Houses ofCongress would receive Joint briefings fromtbe intelligence agencies and coordinate their

\13682 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-.SENATE May 12, 1976pollciell with respect to the safeguarding ofsensitive intell1gence information;

(8) the authorization of funds for the in­.tell1gence activities of the government andwhether disclosure of any of the amounts ofsuch funds is in the pUblic interest; and

(9) the development of a uniform set ofdefinitions for terms to be used in policiesor guideHnes which may be adopted by theexecutive or legislative branches to govern,clarify, and strengthen the operation of intel­ligence activities.

(b) The select committee may, in its dis­cretion, omit from the special study requiredby this section any matter it determines haabeen adequately studIed by the Select Com­mittee to Study Governmental Operationswith Respect to Intelligence Activities, estab­lished by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourthCongress.

(C) The select committee shall report theresults of the study provided for by thIssection to the Senate, together with anyrecommendations for legislatIve or other ac­tions it deems appropriate, no later thanJuly 1, 1977, and from time to time there­after as It deems appropriate.

SEC. 14. (a) As used in this resolutIon, theterm "intelligence activItIes" includes (1)the collectIon, analysIs, production, dissemi­nation or use of lntormation which relatesto any foreIgn country, or any government,polltical group, party, mUltary force, move­ment, or other assocIation In such foreIgncountry, and which relates to the defense,foreign policy, national security, or relatedpollcies of the United states, and other ac­tivity which is in support of such actIvIties;(2) activities taken to counter s1milar ac­tivities directed against the United States;(3) covert or clandestine activities affectingthe relations of the United States with anyforeign government, political group, party,military force, movement or other associa­tIon; (4) the collection, analysis, productIon,dissemination, or use of Information aboutactIvIties of persons within the Unitedstates, its territorIes and possessIons, or na­tionals of the United States abroad whosepolltical and related activities pose, or maybe consIdered by any department, agency,bureau, olfice, divisIon, instrumentality, oremployee. of the UnIted States to pose, athreat to the internal securIty of the UnitedStates, and covert or clandestine actIvitiesdirected against such persons. Such termdoes not include tactical foreIgn military in­tel11gence servIng no national policymakingfunctIon.

(b) As used in thIs resolution, the term"department or agency" includes any or­ganizatIon, committee, councU, establish­ment, or olfice within the Federal Govern­ment.

(c) For purposes of thIs resolution, ref­erence to any department, agency, bureau,or subdivision shall include a reference to'any successor department, agency, bureau, orsubdivision to the extent that such succes­sor engages in intelUgence activities nowconducted by the department, agency,bureau, or subdivisIon referred to in thisresolution.

SEC. 15. For the perIod from the date thisresolution is agreed to through February 28,1977, the expenses of the select committeeunder this resolution shall not exceed $275,­000, of Which amount not to exceed $30,000shall be avaIlable for the procurement ofthe services of individual consUltants, ororganizations thereof, as authorized by sec­tion 202(i) of the LegislatIve ReorganIzationAct of 1946. Expenses of the select commit­tee under this resolution shall be paid fromthe contingent fund of the Senate uponvouchers approved by the chairman of theselect committee. except that vouchers shallnot be required for the disbursement ofsalaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

SEC. 16. NothIng in this resolution shall

be construed as constituting acquiescenceby the Senate in any practice, or in the con­duct of any activity. not otherwise author­Ized by law.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, beforeSenator RmIcOFF speaks. I ask unani­mous consent that Bill Cochran and MissMcPherson, of the committee staff, havethe privilege of the floor during the con­sideration of this matter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I askunanimous consent that the follOWingstaff members have the privilege of thefloor during the debate and voting onSenate Resolution 400: Richard Weg­man, Paul Hoff, Paul Rosenthal, JohnChilders, Andrew Loewi, Claudia Ingram,James Davidson, Tom Dine, Brian Con­boy, Charles Morrison, William Jackson,Carolyn Fuller, Britt Synder, and WalterRiggs.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, beforemaking my statement, I take this op­portunity to pay special tribute to Sen­ator CANNON. Senator ROBERT C. BYRD,Senator PERCY, and Senator CRANSTON­and there are many others--who workedhard to make this legislation possible.

During the entire discussion before theCommittee on Government Operationsand before the Committee on Rules andAdministration, and thereafter. whilethere were differences of opinion, Ifound that Senator CANNON and SenatorROBERT C. BYRD had open minds on allthe problems and controversies thatswirled around this measure.

Senator ROBERT C.BYRD was particu­larly concerned that the Senate act onthis important subject. He was aware ofwhat had transpired and the need for astrong intelligence oversight committee,as well as the implications of trying towork out a compromise that was worthyof the Senate and would not lead to deepdivisions in the Senate and in the Na­tion. I especially take this opportunityto pay tribute to Senator ROBERT C. BYRDand Senator CANNON.

I also want to pay tribute to the dis­tinguished majority leader, SenatorMANSFIELD, and to Senators BAKER,MONDALE, JAVITS, HATFIELD, CLARK,CHURCH and WEICKER for their great helpin working to bring about this compro­mise.

Today, the Senate begins considera­tion of legislation to create a permanentcommittee on intelligence activities.

I strongly suppOrt creation of a newIntelligence committee with full legisla­tive and authorization authority.

At this time, I point out that the firstperson who proposed a committee onintelligence was our majority leader.Senator Mansfield, who, more than 20years ago, suggested that it was ab­solutely essential for us to have a legis­lative committee in the entire field ofIntelligence. Since. then, a number ofstudies have recommended taking thisstep. In 1975 the Commission on CIAActivities headed by Vice PresidentROCKEFELLER recommended creation ofa new committee on intelligence follow-

ingtlleir study of the activities of theCIA in the United States. Most recentlv,the select committee recommended anew committee after a 15-month stUdyof the intelligence community. Creationof the committee can be postponed nolonger.

Mr. President, I believe creation ofa new committee with the necessary au­thorities will be good for the country.good for the intelligence community,and good for the Senate.

A new committee will help protect theconstitutional rights of our citizens andhelp restore the confidence of the Amer­ican people in their intelligence agencies.A recent public opinion poll found thatwhile 78 percent of the public believe itis very important to have the best in­telligence agency in the world, the publicalso believes by a 66-percent to IS-per­cent margin that both Congress and theWhite House should monitor the CIAmore closely. Public confidence in theintelligence community will remain un­certain until the public knows that itselected representatives are effectivelyoverseeing and working with the intelli­gence agencies.

Creation of a permanent new com­mittee with a clear authority to reorga­nize the intelligence community can helpend the uncertainties and distractionsWhich now plague the intelligence agen­cies, thereby making it difficult for theagencies to concentrate on their properjob of providing the intelligence thiscountry needs.

A new committee can help restore asense of comity between the executivebranch and the Senate and help reassertthe proper role of Congress in the con­duct of foreign affairs. A full and frankexchange of views between the Senateand the President will help avoid suchembarrassing situations as Angola andpromote a more unified foreign policy.

Witnesses who testified before theGovernment Operations Committee infavor of a strong new committee in­cluded: Senators MANSFIELD, CHURCH,CRANSTON, HUDDLESTON, and BAKER;Dean Rusk; Nicholas Katzenbach; Wil­liam Colby; McGeorge Bundy; ClarkClifford; Richard Helms; Morton Hal­perin; John McCone; and Henry Kis­singer. Dr. Kissinger testified that crea­tion of such a new committee would bein the interest of national security. Mr.David Phillips, president of the Associa­tion of Retired Intelligence OIDcers, saidthat sa percent of his membership re­sponding to a poll favored creation of anew intelligence committee.

On the basis of those hearings, thecommittee came to the following con­clusions which were in tum embodiedin Senate Resolution 400 as reported bythe committee:

First. There is a need for vigorous con­gressional oversight of the intelligencecommunity. Congress cannot simply pro­ceed in the future as if nothing has hap­pened.

Second, To provide this effective over­sight of the intelligence agencies, a per­manent new Senate committee must beestablished. The present committees havetoo many other important responsibilitiesto permit them to devote the time and re-

May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-< SENATE 13683sources necessary for really effectiveoversight.

Third. Oversight and legislative au­thority over the intelligence communityshould be centered in this new Senatecommittee. The vast majority of wit­nesses who test1fied before the committeestressed the need for centralizing the in­telligence oversight function into as fewcommittees as possible. The presentproliferation of committees increases thechances for unauthorized disclosures ofsensitive information and diffuses over­sight responsibility.

Fourth. Because the Government's in­telllgenceactivities, both here andabroad, are so interrelated, the new com­mittee,s jurisdiction must cover all agen­cies that engage in intelligence activities,including the Central Intelligence Agen­cy and the Departments of State, De­fense, and Justice, including the FBI.

Fifth. The new committee must havethe formal authority and the practicalmeans to obtain access to all the infor­mation it needs.

The abuses of the intelligence commu­nity that have been disclosed in the lastfew years dramatically demonstrate theneed for creating a new intelligence com­mittee with the powers set out in theCannon proposal.

In considering the need for a strongnew committee, we cannot forget theabuses described in the final report ofthe select committee. These include:

The FBI counterintelligence programsdesigned to disrupt political groups inthe United states. Under these programs,the Bureau engaged in hundreds ofburglaries of nonviolent domestic groups.

The wiretapping, bugging, andharassing of Dr. Martin Luther King,Jr. by the FBI. Indeed, on the eve ofDr. King's receipt of the Nobel Prize, theFBI sent him a note suggesting that hecommit suicide.

The CIA's Operation CHAOS, which, inviolation of the agency's chapter, com­piled files on over 300,000 Americancitizens and organizations. Under Oper­ation CHAOS, CIA agents infiltratedantiwar and civil rights groups in anattempt to disrupt them.

Drug testing on unsuspecting citizens.The use of covert relationships with

newspaper reporters and the covert useof American stUdent, labor, and reli­gious groups.

The National Security Agency's "OP­eration Shamrock," which transmittedinternational telegraph traffic to theNSA from 1948 onward.

"Operation Minaret," in which the Na­tional Security Agency gathered infor­mation on antiwar protestors.

The 100,000 files that Army intelli­gence opened on civilians and groupsunaffiliated with the Armed Forces.

The ms "special services staff" whichgathered information on 3,000 domesticorganizations and 8,000 individuals, andthe rns audits on individuals and groupsbecause of their beliefs and political ac­tivities.

The thousands of foreign covert op­erations, inclUding assassination plots,undertaken since 1961.

The Senate cannot simply turn its backon these revelations. Nor can it simply

create a new study committee to stUdyonce more what the Select Committeeon Intelligence and <other committees,commissions, and others have already

.<studied. The excellent work of the se­lect committee has now been done. It isnow time for the Senat-e to begin to acton the over 170 recommendations madeby the select committee in its flnal re­port, <including many recommendationsfor legislation. Legislation must be con­sidered and procedures established thatwill make <it certain that the Govern­ment's intelligence activities are subject,like everything else the Government does,to the rule of law and the will of thepeople. Legislation must be consideredand procedures established to assure thatthe intelligence community is organizedas efficiently as possible to provide ac­curate and timely intelligence at a rea­sonable cost and with a minimum ofduplication.

To do all this, a new committee withbroad legislative authority must becreated in this session of Congress. It isnot enough to say that the abuses willnot happen again, that the present com­mittees will hire more staff, and that thepresent system of oversight .can be madeto work.

Under the present system, at leastthree committees, in addition to theCommittee on Appropriations, have over­sight responsibilities, each for a limitedpart of the intelligence community.Oversight of the Government's intelli­gence activities, although a difficult andtime-consuming task in itself, is in factoIlly a small portion of the full respon­sibilities of these committees. It is smallwonder that none of these committees isable to exercise comprehensive over­sight over the intelligence community.

In the domestic intelligence area, forexample, the Church committee foundthat Congress "has failed to define thescope of domestic intelligence activitiesor intelligence collection techniques, touncove;r excesses, or to propose legislativesolutions. Some Members have failed toobject to improper activities of whichthey were aware and have prodded agen­cies into questionable activities." Selectcommittee report, book II, page 277.

The most important means of over­sight is the power of the purse. Yet Con­gress, as a whole, has never known howmuch the intelligence agencies are spend­ing or how much is spent on intelligenceactivities generally. Select committeereport, book I, page 469.

Nor will it do just to place on top ofthe present inadequate system a newcommittee without legislative and au­thorization authority. It would be equallyunwise to create a committee which mustshare all of its legislative or authoriza­tion jurisdiction with other committees.

Although a number of the Govern­ment's intelligence agencies are part oflarger departments, the President hasrecognized that'the Government's intel­ligence activities are an integral wholethat must be looked at as a single whole.In February, he moved to centralize fur­ther executive branch supervision of allthe Government's intelligence activities,whether they are part of the Departmentof Justice, the Department of Defense,

the Department of State, or the like. TheSenate must do the same.

OIlly a single committee with full leg­islative and authorization authority canassure comprehensive and continuousoversight of the intelligence communityon a permanent basis. Only a single com­mittee with the necessary authority canconsider comprehensive legislation torewrite the charters and structures ofthe 11 or more intelligence agencies scat­tered throughout the Government. Onlya single committee with the necessaryauthority will have the time and abilityto review adequately the expenditures ofall the intelligence community and toapprove annual authorizations.

Mr. President, Senate Resolution 400,as reported by the Government Opera­tions Committee, will give us the meansfor exercising the necessary type of com­prehensive oversight over the intelli­gence community. If there are changesthat may be made to perfect this resolu­tion without changing its essential na­ture, I hope they will be proposed. Butthe Senate cannot allow the jurisdic­tional concerns of its own committees toovershadow the national interest. In thelong run, it is not crucial that one com­mittee or another loses or gains jurisdic­tion. What is crucial in the long run is toestablish a new committee to exert effec­tive congressional control over the intel­ligence community. I strongly urge theSenate to promptly create such a com­mittee.

Mr. President, the need for improvedoversight of the intelligence agencies isapparent. I am pleased that in the lastfew days my colleagues and I have beenable to work out a compromise that willprovide that much-needed oversight. Thecompromise substitute that will be pro­posed will assure that the Senate will as­sume its proper place in our constitu­tional system.

The compromise substitute is the prod­uct of much hard work and a commend­able spirit of compromise and accom­modation. It is a delicately balanced pro­posal that addresses the concerns of theintelligence community, the executivebranch, the Senate, and most important­ly, the public.

It gives the new committee the essen­tial elements and powers which anycommittee must have to do an effectivejob of oversight. The new committee willplay a very important role in oversee­ing and legislating for the intelligencecommunity. At the same time, the com­promise protects the legitimate interestsand concerns of the standing commit­tees. The key elements of the substituteare as follows:

First, the new intelligence committeewould be a select committee with 17members-9 majority members and 8 mi­nority members-appointed by the lead­ership on a 9-year rotating basis. Fourmajority and four minority seats arereserved for members of Armed Services,Foreign Relations, Judiciary, and Ap­propriations.

Second, the new committee would havelegislative and authorization jurisdic­tion over all U.S. intelligence activities,including CIA, FBI, and DOD. The juris-

13684 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD~SENAT:E May 12, 1976

diction is exclusive over the CIA and itsauthorization.

The intelligence committee will haveexclusive legislation and author~tionjurisdiction over the CIA and the Dlrec­tor of Central Intelligence. But if the se­lect committee reports legislation, in­cluding authorization legislation, thataffects agencies other than the CIA orthe Director of Central Intelligence, thelegislation may be sequentially referredfor up to 30 days to the appro~rill:te

standing committee with general JurlS­diction over that agency. Under similar­procedures the intelligence committeechairman could ask for referral to hiscommittee of legislation affecting anyof the intelligence activities of the Gov­ernment which has been report'!d by an­other committee.

The original referral of any legislationwill be to the intelligence committee ifit predominately involves the intelligenceactivities of the Government.

Third, the compromise provides thatthe intelligence community budget willbe annually authorized. Annual authori­zation will constitute a very importantaspect of the committee's oversight ofthe agencies. It should assure a regularreview of each agency's activities, its ef­ficiency, and its priorities. The annualauthorization procedure preserves theSenate's ability to act via the continuingresolution route In an emergency situ­ation.

Fourth, committee has full subpenaand investigative authorities. The in­telligence community is expected to keepthe committee fully and currently in­formed about the Intelligence activItiesit is responsible for, or engages in, in­cluding any significant anticipated ac­tivities. Intelligence agencies must pro­vide all necessary information and doc­uments to the intelligence committee.

Fifth the committee may disclose in­formation where disclosure is in thepublic interest. If the President objectsto committee disclosure of any classifiedInformation the full Senate must decidethe matter of disclosure. The resolutionin noway affects the right of two Sen­ators under rule 35 to ask for a closedsession of the Senate to discuss sensitivematters, including the question ofwhether the Senate should discloseclassified Information.

Committee disclosure of classified in­formation to other Senators is governedby specific provisions, including a re­quirement that there be a written rec­ord of such disclosure.

Mr. President, I want to commend mycolleagues on their hard work and greatconcern for the national interest thatthis substitute embodies. I urge my fel­low Senators to adopt this substitute. BydoIng so we may close the book on anunpleasant past and begin to restore theNation's confidence in the intelligencecommunity, the Senate, and itself.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent to have a section-by-section analy­sis of the Cannon substitute printed inthe RECORD.

There being no objection, the mate­rial was ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as follows:

SENATE REsOLUTION 400 COMPIlOll4:ISE­SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

SECTION I-STATEMENT OF PUKPOSE

This section states that it is the purpose ofthe resolution to create a new select com­mittee of the senate with leg!.slative juris­diction to oversee and make continuing stUd­Ies of the intell1gence activities and pro­grams of the U.S. Government. This sectionobliges the committee to make every eltortto assure that the appropriate departmentsand agencies of the United States provideInformed and timely intell1gence necessaryfor the executive and leglslat1ve branchesto make sound decisions altectlng the secu­rity and vital lnterests of the nation. As thewording of the sectlon suggests, one of thegoals of the new committee should be to as­sure that other members and committees ofthe Senate receive directly from the agenciesall the lntelllgence analysis they need to ful­fill their responsibU1ties. It is further thepurpose of the new committee to provideVigilant oversight of the intel11gence activi­ties of the United States.

SECTION 2--COMMITTEE STilUCTUllE

Subsection (a) establishes the Select Com­mittee on Intell1gence Activities. It providesthat the committee will be composed of 9majority and 8 minority members. Two mem­bers wUl be drawn from each of the follow­ing committees: Appropriations, Armed Serv­Ices. Foreign Relations, and Judiciary Com­mittees. The other 9 members of the newcommittee may not be members of the above­named four committees.

ClaUSe 2 of this subsection provides thatmembers appointed from each of those fournamed committees will be evenly divided be­tween the two major political parties andappointed by the President pro tempore ofthe Senate upon the recommendations of themajority and minority leaders of the senate.respectively. Five of the remaining 9 atlarge members will be appointed by the Pres­ident pro tempore of the Benate upon therecommendation of the majority leader andfour will be appointed by the President protempore upon the recommendation of theminority leader.

The majority leader and minority leaderof the Senate are to be ex olIlcio members ofthe Select Committee but will have no voteon the committee.

Subsection (b) prohibits a Benator fromserving on the committee for more than 9consecutive years. It is expected that in eachCongress approximately one-third of the 17­member committee will be new members.

This section also provides that, at thebeglnning of each Congress, the membersof the full Senate who are members of themajority party w1l1 select a chairman andthe minority members of the full Senatewill select a vice chairman. The resolutionexpressly provides that neither the chair­man nor the vice chairman may serve atthe same time as a chairman or rankingminority member of any other permanentcommittee. The vice chairman is to act inthe place of the chairman in the chairman'sabsence.

Subsection (d) provides that membershipon the new lnte1l1gence committee will notbe taken into account for purposes of deter­mining the number of committees a sena­tor may serve on. A Senator need not giveup a seat on another committee in order toserve on the new intelligence committee.

SECTION 3-JURISDICTION

This section defines the new committee'sJurisdiction. Subsection (a) gives the com­mittee legislative jurisdiction over the Cen­tral Intell1gence Agency and the Director ofCentral Inte1l1gence, as well as over the In­tell1gence activities of all other departmentsand agencies of the Government. These otheragencies and departments inclUde, but are

not 11m1ted to. the lntell1gence activities ofthe Department of Defense. including theDefense Intel11gence Agency, and the Na­tional Security Agency, and the lntelllgenceactivities of the Departments of State, Jus­

.tice, and Treasury. The jurisdiction lncludeslegislation reorgan1z1ng the lntel11gence com­munity.

Subsection 3(a) also specifies that the In­telligence committee w1ll have Jurisdictionover authorizations of bUdget authority forthe chief lntelllgence agencies in the gov­ernment: the Central Intell1gence Agency;the intelllgence activities of the Departmentof Defense (inclUding the Defense Intell1­gence Agency and the National SecurityAgency); the intell1gence activities of theDepartment of State; and the intel11genceactivities of the Federal Bureau of Investi­gatlon. specifically. all actiVities of the Bu­reau's Intell1gence Division. The committeewill continue to have jurisdictlon over theseparts of the Intelligence community even ifthey are transferred to successor agencies.

Subsection (b) provides that the Intel11·gence committee wUl have exclusive legisla­tion and authorization jurisdiction over theCIA and the Director of Central Intelligence.The subsection also prOVides, however. thatIf the select committee reports legislation,including authorization legislation. that af­fects agencies other than the CIA or theDirector of Central Intelllgence. the legisla·tion may be sequentially referred for up to30 days to the appropriate standlng commit­tee with general jurisdiction over thatagency. Under similar procedures the lntell1·gence committee chairman could ask for re­ferral to his committee of legislation affect­Ing any of the intell1gence activities of thegovernment which has been reported byanother committee.

The original referral of any legislation wUlbe to the intelllgence committee if it pre­dominately involves the intelligence activ­ities of the government. If the legislationpredominately lnvolves non-intelligence mat­ters and secondarily intell1gence, the legis­lation will be referred to a standing commit­tee, and then sequentially referred to theinte1l1gence committee.

Subsection (c) rnskes It clear that noth­ing in the resolution prohibits or restrictsthe authority of any other committee tostudy and review any intell1gence activityto the extent that such activity directly af­fects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiC­tion of the committee. Any committee mayconduct oversight hearlngs concerning anagency's lntell1gence activities and the elfectof the intelligence actiVities on the abll1tyof the agency to perform Its overall mission.

Subsection (d) prOVides that nothing inthe resolutlon limits or inhibits any otherSenate committee from continuing to obtainfull and direct access to the product of theintelllgence agencies where that informa­tion is relevant to a matter otherwise withinthe Jurisdiction of such committee. Thisprovision specifically assures the right ofany other committee, such as the ForeignRelations Committee, to receive briefings onthe political situat10n In any part of theWorld.

SECTION 4-coMMrrTEE REPORTS

Subsection (a) requires the new commit­tee to make regUlar and periodic reports tothe Senate on the nature and extent of theGovernment's lntell1gence activities. Thecommittee must call to the attention of theSenate or any other appropriate committeeany matters which require the 1nlmediateattention of the Senate or other committees.If, for example, .the inte1l1gence committeepossesses lnforrnstion on intelllgence activ­ities that may have a significant eltect onforeign polley, the intelligence committeeshould notify the Foreign Relations Com­mittee. Any report the intel11gence commit.

May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 13685tee makes will be subject to the provision Insection 8(c) (2) to protect national security.

Subsection (b) requires the Intelligencecommittee to obtain a report each year fromthe Director of the Central Intell1genceAgency, the secretary of Defense, the Sec­retary of State, and the Director of theFederal Bureau of Investigation for purposesof public dissemination. Each report shouldreview the intel11gence activities of the par­ticular agency or department submitting thereport. Included In this report should be areview of the Intell1gence activities directedagainst the United States or Its Interestsby other countries, The reports by the fourIntelligence agencies and departments are tobe made public in an unclassified form.

Subsection (c) makes it clear that thenew committee must comply, like any othercommittee, with the reporting requirementsof the Budget Act of 1974.

SECTION 5-INCIDENTAL POWERS

Subsection (a) gives the new committeeall the incidental powers It must have tooperate effectively as a committee. The pow­ers spelled out In this sUbsection inclUde thepower to investigate, to issue sUbpoenas andtake depositions, and to exercise the normaladministrative and financial powers of. acommittee. Subsection (b) authorizes thechairman of the committee or any memberthereof to administer oaths. Subsection (c)provides that the chairman, vice chairman,or any other member designated by thecha.irman may Issue a sUbpoena and speci­fies the procedure for serving the SUbpoena.

SECTION 6--COMMITTEE STAFF

This section specifies the security prOVi­sions applicable to committee staff. It re­quires staff to pledge in writing, and underoath, to observe the security rules of theSenate and of'the new committee both whileemployed by the new comm1ttee and after­wards. Staff must receive a security clearanceunder a system directed by the new commit­tee, but developed in conSUltatIon with theDirector of Central Intel11gence.

SECTION 7-INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY

The section requires the committee to for­mulate and carry out rules and proceduresto prevent the disclosure of Informationwhich unnecessarily Infringes upon anyone'spriVacy. The committee may disclose infor­mation If it determines that the nationalInterest in the disclosure of the Informationoutweighs any privacy concerns.

SECTION a-DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

Subsection (a) establishes the basic rulethat the committee may disclose InformatIonwhere disclosure Is In the pUblic interest. Italso establishes basic rules governing thoseInstances. which will certainly not occur Inevery case; where the committee must voteon whether to disclose partICUlar Informationsuch as classified information governed bysubsection (b). In those Instances. the com­mittee must vote on the matter within fivedays If any member requests a meeting forsuch purpose. When such a meeting is nec­essary, a committee member may not pub­licly disclose the Information until the com­mittee votes to do so, and then only Inaccordance with the procedures establlshedby the rest of this sectIon, as well as anyother procedures established by the com­mittee.

Subsection 7(b) governs the public dis­closure of Information which the executIvebranch has classified under established se­Curity procedures. If the committee wishesto dIsclose such cIasslfied information Itmust inform the President and give him fivedays to respond. If the President does notobject, the committee may disclose. If thePresident does object. and certifies that dis­closure would threaten vital national Inter­ests. the committee may determine that dIs­closure should occur despIte the President·sobjections. The committee may then refer

the matter to the full Senate for its deter­mination pursuant to the expedIted proce­dures spelled out in the remainder of theSUbsection.

Under this expedited procedure the com­mittee must refer the matter within a day tothe Senate. After the matter lays over a max­imum of three days. it would then automat­ically become the pending order of businessand the senate would have up to 5 days todiscuss In closed session whether or not thereshould be pUblic disclosure. No later thanthe close of the fifth day after the matter Istaken up the Senate must vote In open ses­sion either to disclose. not to disclose, or torefer the matter back to the committee forits final determination.

Subsection 8(c) governs the disclosure bythe committee to other Senators of informa­tion classified under established securityprovisions relating to the lawful Inte1l1genceactivities of the government which the com­mittee has determined should not be dis­closed.

Any such disclosure may only occur In aclosed seSSion of the senate. or pursuant tothe rules of the committees and the proce­dures described in this SUbsection. Underthese procedures the committee must keepa written record in each case, showing whichcommIttee or member received the Informa­tion. The subsectIon contains a prohIbitionagainst any Member of the Senate, or anycommIttee, which receives the Informationfrom the select committee disclosIng the in­formation to any other person. In additionto these protections. disclosure of such sen­sitive Information w1ll be sUbject to what­ever additional rules the committee adoptson Its own to protect the confidentiality ofsuch information.

Subsection (d) reqUires the select Com­mittee on Standards and Conduct to in­vestigate any alleged disclosure of classifiedinformation in violation of the provisions ofthis section. Subsection (e) states that If theSelect Committee on Standards and Conductdecides at the conclusion of its Investigationsthat any Member, ofilcer, or employee of theSenate has commItted a sIgnificant breachof confidentiality it must report its findingsto the senate and recommend appropriateaction. In the case of a. senator this may becensure, removal from committee member­Ship, or expulsion. In the case of an ofilceror employee, It may be removal from em­ployment or pUnishment for contempt.SECTION 9-PRESIDENTlAL REPRESENTATIVE AT

COMMrrrElI: MEETING

This section authoriZes the commIttee topermit. under rules establ1shed by the com­mittee, a personal representative of the Presi­dent to attend the closed meetings. The pro­vision does not require the new committeeto invite a representative of the executivebranch to attend closed meetings. or estab­lish a presumption that the committee willdo so. It merely makes expllcit the power thatany commIttee has to invite a Presidentialrepresentative to attend committee del!bera­tions If the committee flnds such representa­tion helpful In conducting its duties. Be­cause of the special nature of the new com­mtttee's work, however, It may find this pro­cedure especially useful.SECTION I D-DISPOSttION 01" THE MATERIAL 01"

THE SELECT COMMITI'EE ON INTELLIGENCE

This section provides for the transfer ofdocuments, records. files and other materIalsfrom the Select Committee on GovernmentalOperations with Respect to Inte1l1gence Acti­Vities to the new committee.. Since its Inception, the Church Committeehas reached certain understandings with theCIA and other intelligence agencies concern­Ing the ultimate disposItion of writtenma­terlal provIded to the select committee.Under these agreements, some material pro­vIded to the select committee was to be re­turned to the appropriate agencies. other

materials were not to have been re­turned. This section respects those agree­ments.

The new committee will obtain possessionof all the material the Church Committeehas except in those instances where there isan express agreement tllat the materialshould be returned to the executive branch.

SECTION II--COMMITTEE ACCESS TOINFORMATION

Subsection (a) governs the Informationwhich the Intelligence agencIes must pro­Vide on their own initIative to the new com­mittee. The SUbsection expresses the sense ofthe Senate that the Intelligence agenciesshOUld keep the committee fully and cur­rently Informed about Its activities. This re­quirement does not apply to the myriad de­tails of day-to-day Intelligence operatiOns.but only to information whIch the commit­tee needs to make Informed jUdgments onpolicy questions.

The requirement extends to briefing thecommittee In advance of any significantanticipated actiVities, such as covert opera­tIons, An anticipated activity may be sig­nificant because it is financially costly, orbecause It may affect this country's dip­lomatiC, political, or military relations withother countrIes or groups. The Proviso clausemakes it clear that while the agencies areexpected to brief the Intel1lgence committeeIn advance on proposed covert operations,Implementation of the covert action is notdependent upon the committee in turn ap­proving the proposed activity. Affirmative ac­tion by the committee Is not a conditionprecedent to implementation of the activity.

SUbsection (b) expresses the sense of theSenate that the head of any department oragency of the United States involved In anyIntell1gence activities should make availableto the committee any person paid by theagency to provIde any information the com­mittee requests, and to furnish upon requestany document or Information which the de­partment or agency has In Its possession.custody, or control. Independent of this pro­vision, the committee will, of course, havethe SUbpena power to enforce its requests forinformation.

Subsection (c) expresses the sense of theSenate that each department and agency re­port any Intelligence activity that may Vio­late the constitutional rights of any person,or may Violate any law. Executive order, Pres-.Identlal directive. or departmental or agencyrule or regulation.

Such reports should be made to the Intel­ligence committee immediately upon dis­covery of the wrongdoing. Each departmentor agency shOUld further report to the com­mittee What action Is taken or expected tobe taken by the department or agency withrespect to such violations.

SECTION I2-ANNUAL AUTHORIZATIONS

This section Insures an annual or bian­nual authorization of funds for the intelll­gence agencies over which the new commItteehad jurisdictIon beginning september 30.1976. In the past some of the Intelllgenceactivities have been governed by open-endedauthorizations. The section places clearlyupon the record a decisIon by the Senatethat In the future this will no longer be thecase and that, Instead, there wUl be annualor biannual authorizations. The section rec­ognizes. however. that as In the case of otheragencies, the Intell1gence agencies may haveto be funded In an emergency by contInuingresolutions pending adoption of the authori­zation. It also recognizes that the fundingof the Intell1gence agendes wUl be subjectto the standing rules of the Senate.

Periodic authorizations of the Intelligenceagencies will constitute a very importantaspect of the commIttee's oversight over theagencies. It should assure a regular reviewof each agency's Intell1gence activIties, Itsefilciency, and its priorities.

{lS686 -CONGRESSIONAl. RECdRb-- SENATESECTION -13--eOMMI'I"l'EE STUDIES

This section sets forth important subjectmatter areas Which the new committee would

.. be reqUired to study and report on by July 1.1977 and from time to time thereafter asis deems appropriate. Those study areas areas follows:

(1) the qUality of the analysis of foreignintelllgence information and the use of anal­ysis in policymaking;

(2) the authority of each agency to engagein intelligence activities and the desirabllltyof developing legislative charters for theagencies;

(3) the organization of the executivebranch to maximize oversight. efficiency andmorale;

(4) the conduct of covert and clandestineactivities and the process of informing theCongress of such activities;

(5) the desirablllty of changing laws andrules to protect necessary secrets and to pub­licly disclose information that should bedisclosed;

(6) the desirabl11ty of establishing a stand­ing committee of the senate on intelligenceactivities;

(7) the desirablllty of establishing a jointsenate-House committee on intelligenceactivities;

(8) the procedures under which funds forintelligence activities are authorized andwhether disclosure of the amounts of fund­ing Is in the public interest;

(9) the development of a common set of. terms to be used by the executive and legis­

lative branches in policy statements andguidelines it issues in the intelligence area.

Subsection (b) spec11lcally provides thatthe new committee may omit from its studyany matter Which the committee feels theChurch committee has already adequatelystudied.

SECTION I4-DEFINITIONS

Subsection (a) defines four aspects of theterm "intelligence activities." They are:na­tiona! or foreign intel11gence, counterintel1i­gence, foreign covert or clandestine activi­ties. and domestic intelligence.

National or foreign intelligence coversintelllgence which is relevant to the govern­ment's national decision-making.

The definition of domestic intelllgencedoes not cover the normal investigatorywork that all enforcement agencies engagein as a part of their normal responsibllltiesto enforce the law. The only domestic intel­ligence activities that are covered by theterm intelligence are those activities thatfocus on the political and related activitiesof Americans because of the threat thoseactivities pose. or are alleged to pose, to theinternal security (i.e., fundamental inter­ests) of the United States.

The definition of intel11gence activitiesdoes not include tactical foreign miUtaryintelllgence serving .no national policy­making function.

SECTION IS-FUNDING FOR THE NEWCOMMITTEE

This section authorizes start up funds forthe select committee. It provides up to$275.000 for the period between the time thenew committee is created and February 28.lM~ .

SECTION 16-EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS

Section 16 states that nothing in the reso­lution 18 intended to imply approval by theSenate in any activity or practice not other­wise authorized by law. The section Is in­tended to make it clear. that by assigning thenew committee jurisdiction over a partiCUlaractivity. such as covert or clandestine activ­ities. or the domestic intelligence activitiesof the Federal Bureau of Investigation. theSenate does not thereby intend to expressany view as to the legality of any suchactivity.

Mr. RffiICOFF. Mr. President, 1 wishto make just one inquiry of the distin­guished Senator from Nevada. In settingforth his understanding of the compro­mise proposal. I do not know whetherit was just a slip of the tongue. but hementioned the fact that there would bea limit of 10 years on the terms thatSenators would serve. I have had the un­derstanding that we had agreed on a 9­year term.

Mr. CANNON. Yes. we agreed in ourmeeting on 9 years. In working withthe staff, the suggestion was made on thepart of some of the staff members, andit was. I understand. cleared with staffmembers all around. that it would bebetter if it went either 8 or. 10 sothat it coincided with the terms of a par­ticular Congress and we would not havea change in the middle of a Congress.That was reported back to me as havingbeen cleared by staff members. I did say10 deliberately and put that in the billas a result of that discussion. I have nofeeling for whether it is 8 or 10, but Ithink it makes sense to have it one or theother. rather than the 9-year term whichWe had discussed.

Mr. RffiICOFF. I understand the posi­tion of the senator. The only thing isthat our staff was not informed and Sen­ator PERCY and I heard it here for thefirst time. I am sure that before the billis decided on, we shall have opportunityto discuss this during the next day or soand clarify it. I did want to call atten­tion to the fact that the Senator's de­scription of the bill is accurate, with thatminor discrepancy.

Mr. PERCY. Will the Senator yield tome?

Mr. RIBICOFF. Yes.Mr. PERCY. The senator from Con­

necticut and I have confirmed with theacting majority leader (Mr. ROBERT C.BYRD) that 9 years was the agreement.But the Senator from Dlinoiswould likeSenator CANNON to know that if chang­ing in the middle of a Congress does pre­sent a problem, and it certainly isa fac­tor that we had not considered. the Sen­ator from IllinOis will be very pleased tochange it to 8 years; but not 10. The Sen­ator from Illinois preferred the 6-yearperiod but receded in order to reach thecompromise.

Mr. CANNON. Nine years was the fig­ure we agreed on. It was drafted thatway. But when the suggestions cameback to me from staff, from discussion,after meetings by some staff with boththe majority and minotity Members. thatwe ought to gO to 10 or 8, I felt thatwould pose no problem. I am perfectlywilling to go to 9. It does not pose anyproblem as far as I am concerned. butit may be better to go 8 < or 10 ratherthan 9 because of the. break in Congress.

Mr. RffiICOFF. I just wanted to clar­ify the record and some time tomorrowI am sure we can straighten out that dif­ference.

Mr. PERCY. If the senator will yieldfurther. because the distinguished Sena­tor put in a compromise cOsponsored byso many who attended that meeting, per­haps it would be best to leave that figureat nine, which did represent the 'agree-

mJpt at that tini~. 'I'heriobviously. wecan change it to 8 or 10, as the Senatedesires.

Mr. CANNON. The Senator makes agood point. I thought it had been clearedwith all people.

Mr. President. I ask unanimous con­sent that where the figure 10 is insertedfor the figure 9. it be changed to the fig­ure 9.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is thereobjection? The Chair hears none. With­out objection. it is so ordered.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, before be­ginning my comments, my first thoughtsturn again toward the remarkable work­ings of the U.S. Senate.

Despite the anti-Washington attitudeand the anticongressional feelings ex­pressed by opinion polls, where we arerated relatively low, the observation ofthe Senator from IDinois has been thatwhen a critical issue is faced by the Sen­ate. the Senate generally faces up to thatissue. Whereas we may have had an ex­tended-and T do mean extended-de­bate. and it appeared a iew days ago asthough there would be great disharmonyon this matter. through the diligent ef­fort of a number of my colleagues, wehave now reached a compromise that isincorporated in the amendment offeredby Senator CANNON on behalf of a greatmany of us. I do wish to pay great tributenot only to my own distinguished chair­man (Mr. RIBICOFF) with whom I haveenjoyed working for so many years, but toSenator CANNON, who has contributed somuch to this effort. and Senator ROBERTC. BYRD of the Committee on Rules andAdministration.

Mr. President, I wish to express mydeep appreciation to Senator Sam Ervin.who undertook the chairmanship of theSelect Committee on Watergate. and whodid an absolutely outstanding job. Thatinvestigation, conducted with him aschairman. and my distinguished col­league (Mr. BAKER) as his vice chairman.provided a basis for many years in thefuture. I believe. for the Senate inves­tigating malfeasance in the executivebranch of Government. Certainly. I com­mend Senator BAKER for his work andhelp on Senate Resolution 400.

Compromise would have been impos­sible without the work that has beenundertaken by every Senator who hasworked on this compromise resolution.

Also on the Government OperationsCommittee are Senators MUSKIE. JAVITS.WEICKER. ROTH, and BROCK. who havecontributed greatly, as have other Sena­tors such as Senators MONDALE. CRANS­TON, SCHWEIKER, HATFIELD, CLARK andHUDDLESTON.

I know we are going to benefit tremen­dously by the continuing participation ofthe distinguished Senator from Alabama(Mr. ALLEN), who worked on this matterdiligently in the Rules Committee.

The Government Operations Commit­tee staff-and the Senator from Dlinoisis not qualified to speak of stafi membersfrom other committees-but certainlyDick Wegman. John Childers. Paul Hoff.Claudia Ingram, Charles Morrison. BrianConboy. Ted van Gilder. and JamesDavidson of the Government Operations

May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 13687Committee staff performed a remarkableservice in bringing us to this particularpoint.

Mr. President, today we do face oneof the most vital issues before this bodyIn many. years. It is a· question that in­volves the national security of this coun­try. It is a question that involves thepersonal . rights and freedoms of allAmerican citizens. It is a question .thatinvolves whether or not Congress is will;'Ing to stand up to its constitutional re;'sponsibllities to adequately oversee theoperations of the executive branch.

It Is a question of whe~er Or not weare a nation of laws and constitutionalprocedures or whether we are going toabdicate our· oversight responsibilitiesand. in effect. delegate important powersof this country. to a select, nonelectedgroup in the executive branch. withoutproviding for adequate accountability.

This is not a new question before us,Mr.. President. Ten Congresses ago. in1955, Senator MANSFIELD introduced aresolution which would have establisheda Joint Committee on Central Intelli­gence. The new committee would havehad legislative authority over the agency.and required that, the CIA keep the newcommittee "fl1llyand currently informedwith respect to its current activities."

That resolution was defeated by thefull senate.

There have been other attempts tocreate such a committee in the interven­ing 20 years. All have failed. but now wehave the facts that demonstrate beyonda doubt that such a new committee isneeded.

Investigations ,of the past year and ahalf have shown that the intelligenceagencies of this Government have gonebeyond their charters and committedillegal actions, The CIA. the ,FBI, andNSA have all abused the right of Ameri­can citizens, and· committed illegal ac­tions.

The need for better oversight by Con­gress over the intelligence community isclear. This is not just the feeling of cer­tain Members of the Senate; it is alsothe recommendation of the executivebranch. The Commissionori the Orga­nization of Government for the Conductof Foreign Policy, the so-called MurphyCommission, recommended that Con­gress create a new structure for oversee­ing the intelligence commutilty.

Last year, in June 1975, the President'sCommission on CIA Activities Wit.hin theUnited states recommended that a newintelligence committee be established inorder to improve the operations of theintelligence agencies· and to· preventabuses in the future. This Commissionwas headed by Vice President RoCKE­FELLER.

In adQition to these executive branchrecommendations, the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence has made amajor study of the intelligence com­mWlity and has come forward with rec­ommendations. Certainly in mentioningthat committee, a great many Membersof the Senate worked with great dili­gence, but I should like to particularlypoint out the work of such distinguishedMembers as Senator CHURCH, SenatorTOWER, Senator BAKER, Senator MATHIAS,

and others who have contributed im­mensely to the work of that selectcommittee.

The. resolution before the Senate to­day, Senate Resolution 400, is the prod­uct of all these investigations and rec­ommendations. It contains the recom­mendations of all these investigatorybodies. Senate Resolution 400 is an at­tempt to respond to the need for moreeffective oversight of the intelligencecommunity. Not only would it preventabuse in the future, but I feel it wouldbegin to restore the trust and confidencein' the intelligence community that weall desperately need.

In the hearings the Government Oper­ations Committee held, the call for a newcommittee to oversee the activities of theintelligence community was made clear.Secretary of State Kissinger supportedthe creation of a new committee; formerDirector of' CIA Colby supported a newcommittee; two other former Directorsof the CIA, John McCone and RichardHelms, supported the creation of a newcommittee; Clark Clifford. former Secre­tary of Defense, supported a new com­mittee; Mr. McGeorge Bundy, formerNational Security Adviser to the Presi­dent, supported such a new committee;Mr. David Phillips, president of the As­sociation of Retired Intelligence Officers,supported a new committee. and said that98 percent of the members of his associa­tion. who were retired intelligence offi­cers. favored the creation of a new over­sight committee.

The need for· such a new committeeseems clear to me and I believe it wasmade very clear by the testimony andthe inferences in the testimony of secre­tary Dean Rusk, former Secretary ofState. He made the astounding commentthat he thought as secretary of statehe knew all the major activities beingcarried on by the Central IntelligenceAgency overseas that affected foreignpolicy for which he had direct respon­sibility to the President of the UnitedStates.

He only ~earned subsequently. by read­ing the newspapers and reports thatcame out of Senate committees and othercommittees established for that purpose.that he did not know all that he wassupposed to know and that he thoughthe knew. and I rather imagine he wasshocked to find that.

What we want to prevent is any futureSecretary of State. responsible for carry­ing out foreign policy of this Govern­ment. not even knowing some of theactivities carried on by the Governmentthat affect foreign policy. Nor should webe surprised as a Congress to find thatactivities have been carried. out overwhich we have really not had adequateaccess to the information in some formor other. The question is, what formshould oversight take now?

I would not question at all the inten­tions and desires of the Members of theSenate in the past who have had over­sight responsibility. But the responsi­bility has been fragmented. Many timescommittees have simply not been told.

If they did not ask the right question,the information was not volunteered tothem. There was not an open basis andthere was not a clear ovemll responsibil-

ity in one single central committee forthe operation of the CIA.

So there is no use looking to the past.What we need to do is work together tofind a basis in the future for overcom­ing the deficiencies of the past.

With what has been said, though, whatkind of a committee should we have?Based·on recommendations of the Sen';ate Select Committee on Intelligence,the Government Operations Committeeunanimously reported senate Resolution400. Senate Resolution 400, as original­ly reported, would have created a strongoversight committee with legislative au­thority and 'authorization authority.

As reported by the Senate GovernmentOperations Committee, Senate Resolu­tion 400 would have created a new stand­ing committee of the Senate with legis­lation and authorization authority overthe intelligence community. It wouldhave required the intelligence commun­ity to keep the new committee flll1y andcurrently informed, and would have pro­vided oversight over the intelligence ac­tivities of the United States to assurethat actions taken by the intelligenceagencies were legal.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent to have printed at this point in theRECORD a summary of the provisions ofSenate Resolution 400 as originally in­troduced.

There being no objection, the sum­mary was ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as follows:

SUMMARl'

Specifically. S. Res. 400 provided that:1) The committee would have been com­

posed of 11 members of the Senate. six se­lected from the majority party of the Senateand five members from the minority party ofthe Senate. Members of the new committeewould be selected by their respective cau­cuses.

2) The resolution provided for rota.tingmembership by members of the committee,as well as rotating staff.

3) The new committee would have pro­vided exclusive legislative jUrisdiction overthe intell1gence agencies of the United States·government to ensure consolidated legislativeZlouthority over the intelligence community.

4) Disclosure provisions were written intothe bill so that if the President objected tothe release of any information provided tothe new committee. the new committee couldnot release such information if three mem­bers of the committee objected. In such case,the question of whether or not to disclosewould have to be referred to the full Sen­ate for disposition. Procedures were also writ­ten into the resolution to establish a recordof to whom information was provided by theintelligence committee. Further. sanctionswere written into the b1ll mandating theSelect Committee on Standards and Con­duct to investigate any alleged disclosure ofintelligence information in Violation of theresolution.

5) S. Res. 400 as originally reported reoquired the committee to be kept fully andcurrently informed With respect to intel­ligence activities by executive branch agen­cies. including any significant anticipatedactivities. This did not require and wasnevel: intended to require prior approval bythe committee of intel11gence activities, butdid mandate that the new committee be keptfUlly and currently Informed of the activitiesof the agencies.

6) The new committee was to be providedexclUSive authorization authority over thebUdgets of the lntelllgence agencies. Thiswas considered to be a most vital factor for

13688 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-·SENATEthe new conunlttee to be able to operateproperly and with authority. For the firsttlme,thls would have proVided consolidatedcontrol over the Intelligence commun1tybUdgets.

Mr. PERCY. The basic reason for thecreation of a new committee is to pro­vide a single focal point in the Senate tooversee the intelligence community. Atthe present time, executive branch re­sponsibility for intelligence is spreadamong a number of organizations, somecivilian and some military. No oneagency or department is solely respon­sible for our intelligence program.

Jurisdiction in the Senate over intel­ligence matters and oversight of the in­telligence community is also widespread,and a number of committees have a pieceof the action. There is no single commit­tee at the moment that has overall over­sight of legislative functions for the in­tell1gence community. Responsibility inthe Senate at the present time is spreadamong the Armed Services Committee,the Foreign Relations Committee, theJudiciary Committee, and the Appro­priations Committee. The responsibilityfor oversight for the intelligence com­munity is the prime focus of no singlecommittee in the Senate. In some in­stances now there is not even oversightstatf or there is at best a limited statf tooversee the intelligence community.

Intelligence is so vital and so impor­tant to the secmity of this country that"any effective congressional oversight re­quires that any oversight committeemake the intell1gence community itsprime focus.

I would like to digress, Mr. President,for just a moment on that particularpoint. I have talked to a great manyAmericans in many States, but particu­larly in the State of TIlinois, during theprocess of the inve.-stigation of our intel­ligence activities.

(At this point, Mr. CULVER assumed thechair as Presiding Officer.>

Mr. PERCY. At no time have I everfound any reasonable or rational per­son who in any way questioned for onemoment the need for a strong, powerfulnation that is the leader of the freeworld and that has a tremendous bur­den ofresponsibil1ty on its shoulders tohave an etfective, efficient intelligencecommunity.

That is not subject to question. I thinkanyone who would demagog this issueand point to the abuses that have beencarried out as a means of trying to de­stroy the intelligence community wouldin so doing, destroy the ability of theUnited States to protect its vital inter­ests arid the vital interests of the freeworld. .

I do not think that is really an issue.The people of this country expect us tohave a thorough, ongoing intelligencefacility and capability. I think they ex­pect us to have the finest in the world.

What they do not want is abuse in thename of law enforcement. They do notwant such an agency breaking the law.They do not want people in that agencyto feel that they somehow have a missionin life so important that they are abovethe law. They do not want complicityin that. They do not want Congress to

be in a position where it is going to takefor granted that the executive branrhof Government alone will carry out thisoperation. They do not want to have thefeeling that the material, the function,and the purpose of such an organization,the intelligence community, has to be sosecretive that Members of Congress whohave a resPQnsibil1ty and who are clearedfor toP secret cannot be taken into theconfidence.

But I have resisted mightily every ef­fort to have oversight by the Congressin such a way that Congress would bepart and parcel of the decisionmakingprocess.

How can we exercise oversight ac­tivity, as we should, and be in on theday-by-day decisions for, say, covert op­erations?

Those operations belong in the juris­diction of the executive branch of Gov­ernment, so long as they are committedto writing, so long as there is a top of­ficial responsible, and for a major ac­tivity the President of the United Statesmust be responsible. President Ford hassaid to me, the Senator from DUnois,that he would personally sign in writ­ing the options placed before him, theproblem being faced up to, and the de-cision made. .

The congressional oversight can befully informed, can be kept up to date,but should not be in the position whereit is being asked for prior approval whichmight jeopardize the intelligence activ­ity and which might then put the Con­gress in a position where it truly couldnot perform an oversight function be­cause Members of Congress have beenpart and parcel of the original decision­making process.

The Senator from· TIlinois has beenextraordinarily concerned that the Con­gress, in a reaction to Watergate, toLockheed, to the CIA, FBI, and InternalRevenue revelations, is going to overre­act and, really, in a sense, assume untoitself executive branch responsibility.

Clearly, we must exercise oversight.But clearly, we cannot run the Govern­ment by a committee of 535 people. Thatis why the executive branch of Govern­ment was conceived, to have a chief ex­ecutive officer who could react to all ofthe arguments and had the authority tosay that this is what we are going to door not to do, subject always to our ap­propriation process, subject always toour oversight responsib1l1ties.

I think we have presented to the Con­gress, to the Senate for its consideration,the creation of a new committee thatcan be a single focal point in the Sen­ate to oversee the intelligence commu­nity, and yet an oversight committee or­ganized in such a way that it is clearlydetermined that it is not going to be apart· of the decisionmaking process andthat is not going to usurp the responsi­bilities of the intelligence communityitself.

Intelligence activities are spreadamong a large number of executivebranch organizations today-some civil­ian and some military. No one agency ordepartment is solelY responsible for ourintelligence program.

It was the purpose of the Presidential

reorganization effort to bring these ac­tivities together and have someone whocould be held responsible for the overallactivity. I think we knew that when weconfirmed Mr. George Bush to that po­sition. He has been given that responsi­bility.

The Congress has made it very clear,indeed, that it expects all activities inthe intelligence community to cooperatewith that Presidential direction and re­organization in structure and that wewill, in our oversight responsibilities, doeverything we can to determine thatstructure and organization is being car­ried out as originally conceived.

In no way is Senate Resolution 400 de­signed to mean that Congress actuallyruns the intelligence agencies. Directionand implementation of policy must comefrom the executive branch. However,Congress must exercise consolidatedoversight over the intell1gence commu­nity. If we expect, as we did, the exec­utive branch to reorganize that activityso it could bring its own organization to­gether, we have to, ourselves, then bringourselves together in such a way that wecan operate without duplication, over­lapping inefficiencies, and, we might say.overlooking, because our oversight activ­ity is not properly structured and proper­ly organized.

We have to do so in such a way thatwe do not authorize and appropriatemoney for organizations and then im­pose upon them such a burden so thatthey literally are incapable of carryingout their responsibilities.

The Senator from DUnois was verydisturbed and literally shocked when Mr.Colby testified, in response to a questionfrom the Senator from Dlinois, as towhat proportion of his time as Directorof the CIA he spent preparing for testi­mony before congressional committees,appearing before Congressional commit­tees of the House and Senate, and thenresponding to the work given to him bythe committees before whom he hadappeared.

Mr. Colby thought about it, put a fewfigures on a piece of paper, and has notsince corrected the figure he gave theSenator from TIlinois.

Sixty percent of his time in 3 years asDirector of the CIA was spent beforeCongress. I asked him what he thoughtshould be the proportionate amount oftime. He thought 10 percent-gO percentto direct the activities and do the workand 10 percent to be accountable to Con­gress would be a fair proportionate shareof his time.

r think that possibly might apply tovirtually every member of the executivebranch of Government unless an agencyis in deep trouble. ObviouslY intelligencehas been in some deep trouble for a fewyears now.

But I think our aim ought to be toorganize in such a way that the Directorcan devote a reasonable proportion ofhis time to Congress. but not be on theHill so much that, literally, the Agency'sdirection is being left to SUbordinateswho are not personally directly account­able to the Congress.

We know that inefficiencies in the per­formance of the intelligence community

May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 13689

can really cost billions of dollars. Weknow that, based on studies to date,there are inefiiciencies and duplicationsin the intelligence agencies. But there isno single committee to pull all this in­formation together in the Senate at themoment,

Therefore, I strongly support consoli­dated oversight over the intelligencecommunity. It is time for the Senate totake such action.

Throughout the debate on this issue.my primary goal will be to assure thatwe have strong, effective oversight overthe intelligence community.

Certainly, the Senator from Illinois,and every other Senator, I trust, will bewilling to be flexible. Already, the dis­tinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr.CANNON) has indicated there has comean issue on the tenure of the Senatorsserving on the committee that shouldbe subject to floor discussion. He hasindicated a willingness to be flexible.Certainly, the Senator from Illinois willbe flexible on that issue, as I am suremy distinguished colleague from Con­necticut will be.

We are not saying this compromise isflnal. It is subject to amendment. It issubject to discussion. But it does repre­sent a remarkable effort by a group ofSenators determined to try to resolvesome of the major points of controversyprior to placing the substitute on thefloor.

Senate Resolution 400, as reported byGovernment Operations, is certainly sub­ject to amendment in itself, and has beennow in good conscience amended.

But in good conscience I could notagree, during the course of debate thisweek, to amendments that would emas­culate the proposed new committee; thatwould make it weak; that would make ita toothless watchdog; that would pro­vide no real, effective oversight. That Icannot agree to. Nor ao I feel my col­leagues on the Government OperationsCommittee and the Select Committee onIntelligence or the Committee on Rules,which has heard for so many days hear­ings on this matter, could agree to that.

Certa1D.Iy, after weeks of hearings, ingood conscience none of us could agreeto emasculating amendments thatwould betray the trust placed in us bythe American public, and I think in thisrespect by the executive branch of Gov­ernment. Time after time they have saidthey wanted effective oversight. They areseeking it; they are looking for it. Butthey want it organized in such a waythat it is not disruptive to their ownoperations.

Mr. President, it comes as no surpriseto Members of this body that the preciseform that oversight shDuld take has beenextremely controversial. Some have ad­vocated maintaining the status quo, somehave preferred a new study, while othershave spoken in favor of a strong newcommittee with concentrated authority.

This diversity of view, Mr. President, iswhat makes this institution so great andso representative of the American peo­ple. It is a source of strength rather thanof weakness. Our strength is in ourdiversity. .

Another source of strength, Mr. Presi­dent, is this body's ability to reconcile

these divergent opinions and to reach ageneral consensus that is in the realm ofthe possible and .at the same time iseffective legislation. In a word, tocompromise.

Today we have before us a proposedsubstitute for Senate Resolution 400 thatI cosponsored which can hopefully re­ceive maximum support. It is a productof days of discussion and intense con­sideration of vitally important issues inan attempt to reconcile. divergent views.We hope that the proposed substitute,which blends widely differing points ofview, will accomplish what most of usseek to accomplish.

I am able to offer my wholeheartedsupport to the compromise proposal, andI ask unanimous consent that the sum­mary, as I understand the substitute, beprinted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the summarywas ordered to be printed in the RECORD,as follows:

SUMMAayFollowing are the major points of the sub­

stitute:1) There is establ1shed a Select Committee

to be known as the Select Committee onIntell1gence ActiVities. The Select Commit­tee shall be composed of 17 members-ninemembers selected at large, 2 members fromthe Appropriations Committee, 2 membersfrom the Armed Services Committee, 2 mem­bers from the Foreign Relations Committeeand 2 members from the JUdiciary Commit­tee.

The Majority Leader of the Senate and theMinority Leader shall be ex officio membersof the Committee and shall have no vote.

The members of the Committee shall beappointed by the Majority and MinorityLeaders of the Senate whose choices shall beconfirmed by the respective caucuses.

The Committee w1ll be a bipartisan com­mittee With nine members from the majorityand eight members from the minority. Themajority ~embers of the Senate shall selectthe chairman for the Select Committee andthe minoritY members of the Senate shallselect the vice chairman for the· committee.

Service in the Select Committee shall notcount against a member's service on anyother committee. In other words, this Is anadd-on committee.

2) The members of the Select Committeeshall rotate with the maximum term being 9years of membership on the committee; Va ofthe committee will rotate each 3 years. Thestaff shall be permanent with no rotation.

3) The new committee shall have legisla­tive and authorization authority. In the caseof the CIA, such legislative and authorIza­tion authority shall be exclusive. In the caseof other covered intelligence agencies in thislegislation, the authority shall be shared withthe present standing committee with over­sight responsibUlty. There shall be a processof concurrent sequential referral of legisla­tion and authorizations. Tn other words, inthe case of an agency such as the NSA, boththe Intell1gence Committee and the currentstanding committee would share jurisdiction.In any case where. either the Tntell1genceCommittee or the standing committee re­ported out legislation or an authorization, itwould then be referred to the other com­mittee for a period not to exceed 30 days. Ifthe second committee did not take actionWithin 30 days, the second committee wouldbe automatlcally·dIscharged from responsi­blllty for the legislation snd It would go tothe Senate fioor. A major addition to theSUbstitute was the re-Inclusion of the FBIin the jurisdiction of the Intell1gence Com­mittee.

4) The bUdgets for the covered Intell1­gence agencies shall be annually authorized

by the new Intell1gence Committee. In thecase of the CIA, exclusively: In the case ofother agencies, on the concurrent basis. How­ever, language will be written into the reso­lution to assure that a point of order cannotbe raised against a continuing resolutionshould an authorization not be approvedprior to the appropriations process.

5) On diclosure, if the new Committeevotes to release any information which hasbeen classified and submitted to it by theexecutive branch, the committee shall notifythe President of such vote. The Select Com­mittee may then pub11cly release such Infor­mation after 5 days unless during that inter­vening period of time the President notifiesthe Committee that he objects to the dis­closure of such information. After review ofthe President's objections, If the Committeestill wishes to release the Information it mayrefer the question of disclosure to the fullSenate for consideration. The Senate wlllthen make the final decision in closed ses­sion, and may take anyone of the followingthree courses of action: (I) approve the pub­sion, and may take anyone of the followingthree courses of action: (1) approve the pub­11c disclosure of any or all of the informa­tion in question; or (3) refer any or all of theinformation In question back to the Com­mittee, in which case the Committee shallmake the final determination with respectto the pUblic disclosure of the informationin question.

There Is a provision in the resolution whichrequires that the final vote on the question'If whether or not to release shall not occurlater than the close of the ninth day onwhich the Senate is in session following theday on which such question was reportedto the Senate.

6) No information in the pOS$ession ofthe Select Committee which the Committeehas determined should not be disclosed shallbe made available to any person except ina closed session of the Senate or, informationcan be made avallable by the Select Com­mittee· to another committee or anothermember of the Senate according to rules theSelect Committee lays down. No member ofthe Senate receiving such Information can .disclose such information to any other partiesexcept in a closed session of the Senate orwith the permission of the Select Committee.

7) The Select Committee on Standards andConduct shall investigate any alleged disclo­sure of intell1gence Information in Violationof these rules. The Select Committee onStandards and Conduct shall investigate anyalleged violation and report its findings andrecommendations to the Senate.

8) The head of any department or agencyof the United States engaged in intell1genceactiVities shall keep the Select Committeefully and currently Informed, including anysignificant anticipated activities which arethe responslbUlty of such department oragency. It is the mandate of the agency ordepartment to keep the committee informed.In no way is this requiring committee ap­proval before engaging in such activities. Inother words, there is a mandate to keep thecommittee fully and currently informed butthe committee does not have a veto powerover activities of such agency or department.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the dis­closures of the last few days have madethe need for oversight in the intelli­gence community painfully evident. Iventure to say there are few Members ofthis body who would wish to see repeatedthe violations of our civil liberties whichhave occurred. I believe that the pro­posed new committee represents the mosteffective possible check against repeatedactivities which are a threat to the veryfoundation of our democracy.

Mr. President, over 200 years of ourNation's history have shown we must beever alert to the dangers posed by those

13690 <::O:NGgaSSIONALRECORP.~.SENATE Jfqy·.. 12,,19'l6

agencies and evaluating their. perform­ance. Our findings. reported in morethan 600 pages of text on April.26, re­fiect beyond a doubt that new oversightis required. .

That report, together with otherswhich have been made public, demon­strates with clarity that the intelligenceagencies of our Government have attimes operated outside both the law andtheir charters and outside the bounds ofwisdom. The information which hasbeen released over the last few monthsregarding drug testing on unwittingAmericans. assassination plots and theinterception of millions of messages sentby private citizens refiect activitieswhich have simply gotten out of handand indicate a pressing need for ourintelligence agencies to return to ac­cepted practices.

These reports also indicate that theUnited states is involved in a muItitudeof so-called covert activities abroad­activities which by their nature cannotbe subjected to public scrutiny and de­bate as can, for example, the activitiesof the Department of Agriculture, or theDepartment of Commerce or most of theother activities of our Government.

Our Government has been involved insome 900 such major or sensitive projectssince 1961 and several thousand minorones, many of which, especially in theearlier years were undertaken withoutthe approval or review of a high levelbody outside the Central IntelligenceAgency. I, and the committee in general,concluded that we must maintain a ca­pability for such actions and that ourNation will be forced in a number of in­stances to continue to utilize covert ac­tivities. But, at the least, additionaloversight and accountability must be ap­plied to this area which has to operateunder a certain veil of secrecy.

Finally, our report indicates that de­spite the fact that our intelligence agen­cies have served well in many areas, thereare aspects of their operations whichcouId be improved. For example, moreattention should be given to producingthe so-called finished product of intelli­gence information; more coordinationand less waste and inefficiency might re­sult from strengthening the Director ofthe Central Intelligence-DCI. With thelarge increase in the number of Sovietsand other nationals whose interests maybe contrary to ours, in our country, addi­tional counterespionage efforts may needto be made.

These three situations-the unfortu­nate episodes which have occurred in thepast, the necessity of maintaining ourability to conduct covert actions and theneed for improvement in the effectlve­ness and efficiency of various aspectsof our intelligence community-arguestrongly for increased oversight, central­ized in a committee whose principal con­cern shall be intelligence.

If there is one thing that my />erviceon the Intelligence Investigating Com­mittee has done, it is to reinforce my be­llef in, and commitment to a strong andeffective intelligence system. In theworld in which we live, we couId notsurvive without the information whichthousands of dedicated men and women

who wish·us no well. The American peo­ple need a strong intelligencecommu­nity.

But, thousands of pages of testimony,hundreds of editorials and hundreds ofalleged abuses point out a need for betteroversight of the intelligence agencies.The American people need to be assuredthat these necessarily secret agencies op­erate within the law. The American peo­ple and the Senate need strong oversightof the intelligence community. The pro­posed new Committee on Intelligence Ac­tivities will do the job and do it well. Iurge my colleageus to offer their support.

Finally, I ask unanimous consent thatElliot Maxwell, Mike Madigan, and BobKellY, of the Select Committee on Intelli­gence, be granted access to the fioor, in­cluding votes, during the considerationof Senate Resolution 400, and that thesame privilege be granted to l\;Ir. JohnChilders, minority counsel for the Gov­ernment Operations Committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I.too, commend the distinguished chair­man of the Government OperationsCommittee, the chairman of the RuIesCommittee, and the others who haveparticipated in developing this SUbsti­tute amendment which has been intro­duced this afternoon.

It was just a week ago that the pressreports indicated that the prospects fordeveloping a strong oversight Commit­tee on Intelligence in the U.S. Senatewere rather bleak. I wouId say that thosereports were somewhat premature, eventhough perhaps it is a little early nowto predict that this body will accept thelegislation which is now before it, orwill accept it without substantialchange. But I think certainly we can saythat the prospects are greatly improved.In my own judgment we will have agood oversight committee established t.olook after the intelligence operations .ofthis Nation.

Mr. President. in the days ahead wewill be discussing what I view as one ofthe most important pieces of legislationwhich will come before this Congress.During those days of debate, we willtouch upon many issues-issues regard­ing Senate ruIes, the role of a new com.:.mlttee, the authorities for that commit­tee, the manner of selecting members.There are many differences of opinionwith regard to these issues--differenceswhich will have to be worked out in ourdeliberations and perhaps in Senaterollcall votes. Each of these matters isof impOrtance, and I do not believe thatany should be slighted in consideration.

But, in addressing. the various sub­sidiary issues. I hope that -we will notlose sight of what I consider to be theforemost one-the need for a strongcommittee for the intell1gencecom­munity with legislative and authorizingauthority.

As chairman of the Foreign and MiU­tary Intelligence Subcommittee of theselect Committee to Study Governmen­tal Operations with Respect to Intel­ligence Activities, I have spent manydays during the past 15 months review­ing the activities of our intelligence

provide us, often under the Jl10st tryingand dangerous circumstances. Withouttheir work, we couId not feel militarilysecure. We could not conduct foreign re­lations with assurance. We couId not en­ter treaties with confidence. Quite sim­ply, we couId not adequately protect our­selves.

Yet, perhaps the most insidous dangeris intelligence agencies which operateunder a cloud of suspicion and doubt.But, that is what the situation has been.That is what e1Jective oversight can helpprevent.

So, as consideration of this measurecontinues, I hope that we will all remem­ber that the heart of the matter is over­sight and accountability. Past wrongsargue to be righted as best they can;future effectiveness and legality de­mands to be secured. The most import­ant single move we eouId make towardaccomplishing that is to create a strong,responsible oversight committee whichcan exercise that eternal vigilance whichThomas Jefferson warned us is the priceof liberty.

I thank the Chair.Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, the

matter before the Senate today and thatwill be before the Senate for the nextfew days comes down to one very simplequestion: Will we ignore the past, orwill we learn from it?

We now have the reports of the SelectCommittee on Intelligence which care­fully document over 40 years of abuse by,and misuse of,the intelligence agenciesof the Federal Government.

For nearly 15 months, Mr. President, Isat as a member of that committee andlistened to the testimOny concerning theabuses and misuses of the Agency.

In the course of those 40 years, wehave had the rights and the privacy ofAmericans violated in countless episodes.Furthermore, we have seen that manyof these episodes were not the isolatedaberrations of agents out in the field, butrather were part of concerted programsapproved at the highest levels of theseagencies. I remind my colleagues of theFBI's program called COINTELPRO andthe CIA's program called CHAOS.

Despite the fact that these programsdid have high-level approval and resultedin widespread and systematic violationsof the rights of law-abiding citizens,Congress, until recently, had neversought to learn about them or controlthem. Indeed, on some occasions, I amafraid our actions in Congress actuallyencouraged them.

As the select committee put it in itsfinal report:

Congress has failed to define the scope ofdomestic intelllgenceactivities orlntelUgencecollection techniques, to uncover excesses.or to propose legislative solutions. Some ofits members have falled to object to Im­proper activities of which-they were awareand have prodded agenCies into questionableactivIties.

Then the report concludes:If congress had addressed the issues of

domestic intell1gence and passed regulatorylegislation, and if it had .probed into theactivities of lntell1gence .agencies and re­quired them to account for their deeds, manyof the excesses (of the past) might not haveoccurred.

May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 13691We have the opportunity to remedy

this situation by creating a committee'with the authority to propose legislativesolutions, and the power to make theseagencies accountable for their activities.

r..-rr. President, as I mentioned, I servedon the Church committee, and while Iinitially. approached that assignmentwith considerable skepticism, I came torealize that the abuses of the intelligenceagencies were real, and that people whohad done nothing wrong in the eyes ofthe law, had nonetheless suffered at thehands of the Government for the simplereason that they had dared to be differ­ent.

Most importantly, the Church commit­tee's work demonstrated to me that thereis no activity undertaken by the FederalGovernment which so jeopardizes therights guaranteed to us by the Constitu­tion. Intelligence activity, almost by def­inition, is directed at persons and orga­nizations who have committed no crimebut whose activities are thought to posea danger to our internal security or af­fect our foreign relations. By its verynature, therefore, intelligence activitytends to skirt the traditional notion thatgovernmental surveillance will be em­ployed only after a warrant has beenissued on the grounds that there is prob­able cause that a crime has been, or isabout to be, committed.

Again, I remind my colleagues thatthe record of the select committee showsus that intelligence activities of the pasthave reSUlted in the Government's open­ing mail and reading telegrams, in itstapping telephones, and its breaking intohomes--all without benefit of a searchwarrant or indication that a crime wasbeing committed.

In short, there is no activity carriedout by the Federal Government whichcan have so devastating an impact on theBill of Rights. While intelligence activ­ities cost us relatively little in terms ofmoney, they can cost us very dearly interms of our principles.

It is for this reason, then-the particu­lar sensitivity of intelligence activitieswith respect to the impact on the rightsof indivduals-that convinces me that weneed a strong oversight committee todeal exclusively with this area.

I realize that adoption of the approachsuggested here will result in the juris­diction of existing committees beingdiminished insofar as their oversight ofintelligence activity is concerned. But byconcentrating oversight in a new com­mittee with jurisdiction to treat intelli­gence activity exclusively, we should notonly get better oversight of intelligence,but existing committees should them­selves be able to devote greater time tonon-intelligence operations of the agen-cies they oversee. "

One of the problems of the past hasbeen that questionable intelligence activ­ities have not been brought to the atten­tion of existing oversight committees be­cause they have constituted a relativelysmall part of an agency's operations, andhave involved relatively small sums ofmoney. The possibility that certain prO­grams might intrude on the rights of in­dividuals has seldom motivated any in-

telligence agency to seek approval fromCongress.

I foresee this new committee, however,as being informed, in advance, of anyintelligence activity which could affectthe rights of Americans. I furthermoreforesee such a committee investigatingallegations that intelligence activitieshave violated constitutional guarantees.Finally, I foresee this new committee de­veloping-for the first time-the exper­tise necessary for Congress to formulateand enact legislative standards to governintelligence activity. .,'

I might also add that I think a strongoversight committee will result in morecooperation and better coordination be­tween Congress and the intelligence com­munity than heretofore. The Churchcommittee found, on the one hand, thatin the past there had been an attitUdeon the part of intelligence agencies thatCongress could not be trusted to keep itssecrets, and an attitude, on the otherhand, that Congress really could notunderstand all of the ramificationswhich the agency considered in decid­ing to undertake this or that action.So Congress was not informed, unless,on occasion, the plans of the agencywent awry, in which case Congress waspresented with a fait accompli.

I see a centralized oversight committeeas changing all this. First, I think theconcept of a single committee with in­telligence responsibility is appealing froma security point of view, the inte1l1gencecommunity would not be forced to spreadclassified information over a multitudeof congressional committees. Moreover,the committee itself would be in a betterposition than committees with other­than-intelligence jurisdiction to adoptstringent security procedures. I note inthe resolution currently pending thatcertain security restrictions are placedon both members and staff, and thatthere is a formal procedure to be fol­lowed prior to the public disclosure ofany classified information. Such meas­ures would go far, to insure that securityconsiderations do not, in the future, pre­vent the inte1l1gence community fromdealing frankly with the Congress.

Second, I think that Congress wouldbe in a position for the first time, to exer­cise its own independent judgment Withrespect to intelligence operations. Witha membership and a staff devoted solelyto intelligence needs and problems, thecommittee would be in a position tounderstand and evaluate the decisionsmade by the inte1l1gence community asno congressional committee has everdone before. My conversations with peo­ple in the intelligence .community leadme to believe that this change would bewelcomed by the intelligence community.They want to have the approval of theCongress, and they would like it toshoulder some of the responsibility forthe tough decisions which must be made.

And well it should. Too long have weabdicated our role in these matters, andtoo often has our neglect resulted inerosions of individual rights going un­checked and unrepaired.

Justice Douglas once wrote that theBill of Rights was written to keep gov-

ermnent off the backs of people. Oneway to insure that this is done, is forCongress to "get on the backs" of thoseagencies whose activities threaten ourrights. I do not mean to harass or em­barrass those agencies, but rather toexert a gentle, but unrelenting, pressure,which lets them know that we are thereand cannot be taken for granted.

And so, Mr. President, I urge my col­leagues to support the SUbstitutionoffered by Senator CANNON. In my opin­ion, this measure would create the strongoversight committee which I think theexperience of the past 40 years cries outfor. .

To do any less would be worse thandoing nothing. Effective oversight overany governmental activity is dependentupon the ease of access which a com­mittee has to records and personnel in­volved in that activity. It has been myexperience that unless a congressionalcommittee has legislative or monetaryclout, its inquiries are largely ignored. Itis politely strung along, but it is noteffective.

It is for this reason that I think itessential that any committee we createhave the authority to report legislationand the authority to authorize appro­priations. To establish an oversight com­mittee without the power needed to ob­tain access and cooperation from theintelligence community would be worsethan doing nothing at all-it would onlycamouflage the reality of the situation.

Mr. President, if we pass up this op­portunity to create such a committee, itvery well may be another 50 years beforethe abuses of such agencies again willbe disclosed to the public and the suppOrtfound that is necessary to enact suchlegislation.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the dis­cussion before us sharply raises the ques­tion of how the Senate should best exer­cise its oversight authority over govern~

mental intelligence programs.I have long been concerned with such,

intelligence activities having been deeplyinvolved in this area by virtue of mymembership on the Appropriations andJudiciary Committees.

Today I wish to address my remarkschiefly to that aspect of congressionaloversight pertaining to the Departmentof Justice.

In March, the JUdiciary Committeewas referred Senate Resolution 400which sought to create a new permanentcommittee with exclusive jurisdictionover all aspectsof the intelligence func­tion of the executive branch. Followinghearings and much deliberation amongstcommittee members, the Judiciary Com­mittee voted to delete from this resolu­tion the grant of jurisdiction to the pro­posed Committee on Intelligence Ac­tivities over the intelligence activities ofthe Department of Justice, including theFederal Bureau of Investigation.

The amendments would retain in theJudiciary Committee its historic juris­diction over the Department of Justiceand the FBI. The present exercise ofjurisdiction over these activities is inaccord with the purpose and spirit of theLegislative Reorganization Act of 1946.

'13692 CONGRESSIONAL·· RECORD-SENATE

Senate Report No. 1400, 79th Congress,2d session, Legislative ReorganizationAct of 1946-May 31, 1946-set forththe standards controlling committeejurisdiction, page 2:

(The bUl) would replace our jerry-buUtcommittee structure with a simplified systemof standing committees corresponding withthe major areas of pubUc poUcy and admin­istration . . . and the coordination of thecongressional committee system with thepattern of the administrative branch of theNational Government would improve theperformance by Congress of its legislativeand supervisory functions.

Following this continuing guideline,the Judiciary Committee possesses over­sight jurisdiction over the Departmentof Justice and its bureaus including theFederal Bureau of Investigation. Thefull committee and at least three sub­committees exercise jurisdiction over theBureau and its functions, the Subcom­mittee on Administrative Practice andProcedure, the Subcommittee on Con­stitutional Rights and the Subcommitteeon Criminal Laws.

The difficulty with Senate Resolution400, prior to its being amended, is thatit proposed to split the oversight juris­diction of the FBI between the JudiciaryCommittee and the proposed new Intelli­gence Committee, with the new commit­tee to have jurisdiction over intelligenceactivities of the Bureau and the Judi­ciary Committee to retain jurisdictionover nonintelligence aspects of thisagency.

Those who have studied the FBI's or­ganization and mode of operation arewell aware that its intelligence activitiesare intertwined with its law enforcementfunction. For the most part its intelli­gence activities are an investigatory toolused in detecting crime.

There is a real potential that a split­ting of the oversight jurisdiction of in­telligence and nonintelligence aspects ofthe FBI may create much confusion andresult in conflicting congressional guid­ance to that agency. It should be notedthat the FBI, unlike other intelligencecollecting agencies affected by SenateResolution 400, is a .law enforcementagency. The intelligence activity of theFBI is simply a means by which it detectsand investigates violations of Federalcriminal laws. Because this activity is sointegrally related to the criminal inves­tigatory function of the FBI and the De­partment of Justice, it is our belief thatoversight of the FBI should be continuedto be dealt with as a unit.

Mr. President, during the hearings be­fore the Judiciary Committee on SenateResolution 400, both Attorney GeneralLevi and FBI Director Kelley testified.Both stated that vigorous' oversight ofthe Department of Justice and the FBIwas healthy and productive in the better­ment of the system. Both urged that thisfunction could be best served by retain­ing oversight in a single committee.

Mr. Levi well pointed out-That intelllgence activities of the FBI

should be closely tied to the criminal law.

And that-Congressional oversight arrangements that

would split off the Intelllgence functions fromthe more ordinary law enforcement functionsof tlle Bureau would tend to diminish theforce of this perception.

Mr. President, we have heard much inrecent years that the FBI should be moreaccountable to the Department of Justicea.nd the AttorneY General. It should beviewed as an integral part of the Depart­ment of Justice--not as a separate lawenforcement or intelligence agency. Theeffect of splitting of the intelligence over­sight of the Bureau and vesting it with aseparate committee would tend to createthe impression that it is somehow di­vorced from the rest of the law enforce­ment branch of the Federal Government.

We should remember, Mr. President,that the Bureau Is under the supervisionof the Attorney General, the principallaw enforcement office in the FederalGovernment, a subject over which theJudiciary Committee has long exercisedjurisdiction.

As stated by Director Kelley:While the FBI has many duties concerning

the Internal security of our country, it Isnot alone In this responslblllty. The entirecriminal Justice system Is Involved. Obser­vance of the law and the preservation ofpubUc order are the foundations for thiscountry's domestic security. Without ade­quate and equitable enforcement of thelaw, whatever the source or circumstance otIts violation, a democratic society cannotenjoy the stab1llty it requires.

Stripping the Judiciary Committee ofjurisdiction over law enforcement in thearea of internal security while leM ingit with general jurisdiction over the re­mainder would be to create a hybridwherein necessary general oversightover law enforcement would be ann:llledand essential perspective destroyed.

The JUdiciary Committee is at thismoment considering the revision of title18 of the United States Code, the crimi­nal laws including the provisions onespionage. Should it report a bill withamended espionage provisions subject tofuture amendment by the IntelligenceCommittee? Should it report a bill withno change in the existing provisions onespionage with the expectation that thebill will be rereferred to the Intelliger.ceCommittee? Should the lengthy studythat has gone into the espionage provi­sions be put aside?

A further consideration which I be­lieve should be borne in mind is that aseparation of intelligence oversight fromthe traditional law enforcement aspectof the Department and the Bureauwould very likely result that no oneSenate committee would have a generaloverview and knowledge of all the activi­ties of the Department of Justice. Thiscould result In some information as toits operations to "fall between thecracks" and become known to no com­mittee.

The Senate Rules Committee, towhich Senate Resolution 400 was subse­quently referred, concurred with theJudiciary Committee position on thissubject, noting in part in its reportthat-

The Intelllgence actiVity ot the FBI is ameans by which It detects and investigatesviolations ot federal criminal laws. Becausethis actiVity Is so Integrally related to thecriminal investigatory function of the FBIand the Department of Justice. It is the be­Uet of the Committee that all legislative au­thority should be continued to be dealt withas a unit within the jurisdiction of the Com­mittee on the JudiCiary.

Mr. President, for these reasons lamopposed to the creation of a. permanentSenate Intelligence Committee withjurisdiction, whether exclusive or con­current, over the intelligence aspects ofthe Department of Justice.

It is my understanding that someMembers may attempt to revive such aversion of Senate Resolution 400 as wasreported by the Government OperationsCommittee. While I do oppose such anapproach, I am not wedded in oppositionto the version of Senate Resolution 400as it was reported by Chairman CANNONfrom the Rules Committee.

The Rules Committee version of Sen­ate Resolution 400 would in effect con­tinue the work of the present SelectCommittee. The temporary committeewhich is proposed would be granted gen­eral oversight of all intelligence activityrather than exclusive jurisdiction, leg­islative or authorization wise, which someare promoting. It would have an oppor­tunity to review this subject area withsome objectivity now that the emotioncharged revelations of the past year havebecome public.

In summary, Mr. President, it is myfirmest bellef that the granting of legis­lative oversight of FBI intelligence to anew committee will cause not only con­fusion as to congressional direction tothe Department of Justice in its lawenforcement investigatory function butwill also create much costly duplicationin request for materials and informationbeing sought by the various Senate com­mittees so authorized to oversee thisDepartment.

The most important reason againstsplitting jurisdiction, however, Mr. Pres­ident is that mentioned by Attorney Gen­eral Levi in testimony before both theJUdiciary and Government OperationsCommittees.

Mr. Levi strongly stressed the necessityof continuing and strengthening the con­cept that the intelligence activity of theFBI Is part and parcel of the law en­forcement mission of the Department ofJustice. I do not wish to aid those whowould, however inadvertently, separatethese two functions.

I wish to state again, Mr. President,that I fully oppose the creation of a per­manent Senate Intelligence Committeewith jurisdiction, concurrent or exclu­sive, over the intelligence activities ofthe FBI both in an oversight and legis­lative nature.

As I have indicated, such a move wouldgive strength to the concept that theintelligence activity of the FBI was sep­arate from the law enforcement functionof the Department of Justice where itnecessarily and properly rests. Such amove, fur~her could easily result in longrange confusion and confiict of congres­sional directives to the FBI not to men­tion the costly and duplicative requestsfor material and information beingsought by the various committees in­volved.

I believe also, that I would be remissin not adding that a sharing of accessto intelligence material provides agreater possibility of unauthorized dis­closure of matter which the Departmentof Justice understandably needs to safe­guard in order to protect its sources and

lJ,lay 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 13693techniques of investigating criminal vio­lations.

For these reasons, Mr. President, Iurge my colleagues to reject any meas­ures which grant any proposed standingcommittee the jurisdiction over the in­telligence activities of the Department ofJustice.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, TheU.S. Senate could play a major role Inimproving the image and the creditabil­ity of the American intell1gence com­munity if it adopts the proposed substi­tute to Senate Resoluton 400 to be offeredby Senators MANSFIELD, CANNON. RIBI­COFF, and others. I am pleased to join mycolleagues in cosponsoring this measure.

As the Members of the Senate know.this substitute would establish a SelectCommittee on Intelligence. Activitieswith both legislative and budgetary au­thority over the CIA and other intelli­gence agencies. If adopted, this measurewould centralize, for the first time, theSenate's oversight of the American in­telligence conununity. At the same time,it would permit other committees of theSenate the continued opportunity to re­view and oversee the work of the DIA,FBI, and the National Security Agency.

For over 15 months, the Church com­mittee has conducted a thorough and anexhaustive study and investigation ofthe practices and policies of the CIA,FBI, NSA, and the DIA. While none ofus are proud of the past abuses of powerwhich have taken place in these agencies,we all know of the important role theseorganizations play in the overall securityof our country. .

Mr. President, many of us believe andfeel that the· responsibility for theseabuses, as reported by the Church com­mittee, must not only be placed uponthe executive branch, but the legislativebranch as well. Had the Congress exer­cised the proper oversight of these agen­cies for the past 25 years, quite possiblymany of the abuses would never haveoccurred.

It is true that the political climate ofthe times did not require nor did it ex­pect the Congress to play an active over­sight role. But, the present times are suchthat the American people are demandingthat we, in the Congress, assume our re­sponsibility, and begin to exercise anactive interest in the affairs of the Amer­ican intelligence community.

The adoption of this measure will bea signal to the American people thatthe Congress is not only intent upondisclosing illegal practices, but is intentupon preventing similar practices fromtaking place in the future.

Mr. President,.I urge the early adop­tion of this substitute. To do otherwisewill be a message to the American peoplethat their elected represe~atives arenot interested in seeing to it that allaspects of intelligence work are done inaccordance with the Constitution andthe laws of this Nation.

WATERGATE REORGANIZATIONA!\'D REFORM ACT OF 1976

Mr. RlBICOFF. Mr. President, I askunanimous consent that the WatergateReorganization and Reform Act of 1976,S. 495, as amended, which I reported to­day, be referred, at the request of the

Committee on the JUdiciary, to the Com­mittee on the Judiciary, with instructionsto report not later than June 11, 1976.

The PRESIDING· OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I havea parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen­ator will state it.

Mr. RIDICOFF. My understanding isthat we have satisfied section 402 of theCongressional Budget Act of 1974 by re­porting S. 495 from the Committee onGovernment Operations by May 15, eventhough the bill, at the request of theCommittee on the Judiciary, will be re­ferred to the Committee on the JUdiciary.If one committee reports a bill by May 15and after the bill is reported, anothercommittee requests the bill to be referredto it for a limited period of time, whichwill result in that second committeecompleting work on the bill after May IS,have the requirements of section 402 ofthe· Congressional Budget Act of 1974been met?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Theyhave been met.

PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEEON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESThe Senate continued with the con­

sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)to establi£h a Standing Committee of theSenate on Intelligence Activities, andfor other purposes.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug­gest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerkwill call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerkproceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,I ask unanimous consent that the orderfor the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withou~

objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSIONMr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,

I understand that there are two nomina­tions at the desk which were reportedearlier today by the Committee on Laborand Public Welfare. I ask unanimousconsent that the Senate go into execu­tive session to consider those nomina­tions.

There being no objection, the Senateproceeded to the consideration of execu­tive business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nom­inations will be stated.

DEPARTMENT OF LABORThe assistant legislative clerk read

the nomination of Michael H. Moskow,of New Jersey, to be Under Secretary ofLabor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, the nomination is consideredand confirmed.

The assistant legislative clerk read thenomination of John Conyers Read, ofVirginia, to be an Assistant Secretaryof Labor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, the nomination is consideredand confirmed.

LEGISLATIVE SESSIONMr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,

I ask unanimous consent that the Sen­ate resume the consideration of legisla­tive business.

There being no objection, the Senateresumed the consideration of legislativebusiness.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN­ATOR PROXMIRE ON MONDAYNEXT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,I ask unanimous consent that on Mon­day next, after the two leaders or theirdesignees. have been recognized underthe standing order, Mr. PROXMIRE be rec­ognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

ORDERS FOR RECOGNITION OF MR.MONDALE AND· FOR ROUTINEMORNING BUSINESS ON TOMOR­ROW; ORDER FOR CONSIDERA­TION OF UNFINISHED BUSINESSMr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,

I ask unanimous consent that after Mr.PROXMIRE and Mr. GOLDWATER have beenrecognized on tomorrow, under the orderpreviously entered, Mr. MONDALE be rec­ognized for not to exceed 15 minutes,after which there be a period for thetransaction of routine morning business,with statements therein limited to 5 min­utes each, such period not to extendbeyond 1 p.m.; that at 1 p.m., the Senateresume consideration of the Unfinishedbusiness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEEON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESThe Senate continued with the con­

sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400)to establish a Standing Committee of theSenate on Intelligence Activities, and forother purposes.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,I suggest the absence of a quroum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerkwill call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk pro­ceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unani­mous consent that the order for thequorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

:M:r. PELL. Mr. President, I was verystruck with Senator MORGAN'S statementwhen he said that 50 years ago, we hada previous scandal that needed cleaningup and rectification. It seems odd thatin our country's history, every 50 yearssomething of this sort arises. We had theGrant scandals of the 1870's, the TeapotDome scandal of the 1920's, then we hadthe Watergate and CIA problems in the1970's. Let us hope that in the 2020's wedo not go through the same cycle again.

Mr. President, I commend the Mem­bers of this body who have C'.ooperatedso effectively and wisely In aevelopiilgthe compromise amendment on intelli­gence oversight which has been proposedby the distinguished Senator from

CONGREssiONAL RECORD-SENATENevada. A$trong thtellti~x;,6eovers1ghtcommittee Will be established if thisamendment to Senate Resolution 400 isadopted.

A strong and effective Senate Over­sight Committee with legislative author­ity is required in order to insure that theintelligence activities of the UnitedStates directly support· American secu­rity interests, are conducted under clearlegal authority, 'and do not violate thecivil rights of American citizens.· TheSelect Committee headed by the distin­guished Senator from Idaho has done anexcellent job in studying all facets of theactivities of the intelligence communityand in making recommendations for leg­islative action. But it is now essentialthat legislation be developed and actedupon. That is why I support the creationof the kind of intelligence committeeproposed in the amendment before us.

Although I support this amendment,I do have some questions relating to theeffect of the amendment on the jurisdic­tion and activities of other interestedcommittees, particularly the Foreign Re­lations Committee, of which I am a mem­ber. I would therefore appreciate it if thedistinguished Senator from Connecticutwho has done such a fine job in develop­ing this compromise as the fioor managerof Senate Resolution 400, would be sokind as to respond tc the followingquestions:

The Committee on Rules, in its report,raised the possibility that the Hughes­Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assist­ance Act, which provides for Presidentialreports to four standing committees ofthe Senate on covert actions, may besuperseded if an intelligence committeeis established. The report sretes that itis arguable that the Foreign RelationsCommittee could lose its statutory au­thority to receive Presidential reports oncovert activity. I understand that it is notthe intent of Senate Resolution 400 to af­fect the Hughes-Ryan amendment, but Ido believe that it would be useful toclarify the matter in light of what hasbeen said by the Rules Committee.

Mr. RIBICOFF. May.I respond thisway to the Senator frpm Rhode Island,who w"as deeply involved in the Commit­tee on Rules hearings on these proposals:Senate Resolution 400 does not repealthe Hughes-Ryan Act. As a resolution,it could not do so. Accordingly, crea­tion of a new committee will not repealthe requirement of the CIA to brief theCommittee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator.Does the granting of exclusive juris­

diction to the proposed. intelligencecommittee over the CIA mean thatparagraph 1(1) (l) of Senate rule XXV,which states that the Committee onForeign Relations has jurisdiction over"relations of the United States with for­eign nations generally," should be takento exclude jurisdiction over CIA activi­ties which have foreign relations impli­cations?

Mr. RIBICOFF. The jurisdiction ofthe Committee on Foreign Relationsover legislation affecting the CIA is notchanged by Senate Resolution 400. Leg-

fslatlon which.now. would. go to theCommittee on Foreign Relations be­cause of its predominant foreign policyimplications, rather than intelligenceimplications, would continue to go to theForeign Re1ations Committee, with theright of the new committee to ask for asequential referral.

Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague. Insection 3, paragraph (b) of the amend­ment it is stated that "any legislationreported by the select committee, exceptany legislation involving matters spe­cified in clause (1) "-that is, the CIA-or(4) (A) -CIA budget-"of subsection (a) ,containing any matter otherwise withinthe jurisdiction of any standing com­mittee shall, at the request of the chair­man of such standing committe, be re­ferred to such standing committee forits consideration."

Does that mean that any legislationdeveloped by the proposed intelligencecommittee relating to CIA actiVitieshaving foreign policy implications wouldbe referred upon request to the ForeignRelations Committee?

Mr. RIBICOFF. If the legislation re­ported by the Select Committee has sig­nificant foreign policy implications, theCommittee on Foreign Relations wouldbe able to ask for a sequential referralof the legislation.

Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator. Lateron in that same paragraph, it is statedthat-

Any proposed legislation reported by anycommittee, other than the select committee,which contains any matter within the juris­diction of the select committee shall, at therequest of the chairman of the select com­mittee, be referred to the select committeefor its consideration.

Does that mean that the Committee onForeign Relations could initiate legisla­tion of its own on CIA activities havingforeign policy implications as long assuch legislation is referred subsequentlyto the proposed Intelligence Committee?

Mr. RIBICOFF. That is correct. As Isaid in response to your second question,such legislation would be sequentially re­ferred to the Inte1l1gence Committee.

Mr. PELL, Finally, section 3, para­graphs (c) and (d), state that othercommittees may "study and review anyintelligence activity to the extent thatsuch activity directly affects a matterotherwise within the jurisdiction of suchcommittee" and that such committeeswould "obtain full and prompt access tothe product of the intelligence activitiesof any department or agency of the gov­ernment relevant to a matter otherwisewithin the jurisdiction of such commit­tee." Do these provisions mean that theadministration would be expected to pro­vide all of the information, which theCommittee on Foreign Relations re­quires, except of course raw data? I re­call in this regard that, when I was con­ducting hearings several years ago onweather modification activities in South­east Asia, I was denied information onthe grounds that the "appropriate" com-mittee inthis case, Armed Services-had been notified.

Mr. RIBICOFF. That is correct. Crea­tion of the new committee should not be

used by"the intelligence BgencieS'to denythe standing committee any informationon any matter with which'the committeeis concerned, such as an investigationdescribed by section 3(c) of the proposedsubstitute to Senate Resolution 400.

Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague verymuch for these answers, which will be animportant part of the recommended ac­tion on this amendment. I look forwardto supporting the Senator.

Mr. RIBICOFF. I thank the Senatorvery much.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence ofa quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerkwill call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk pro­ceeded to call the roll.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I askunanimous consent that the order forthe quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, first, Icongratulate the distinguished Senatorfrom Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) andthe distingUished Senator from minois(Mr. PERCY) on the remarkable jobthey have done in taking ideas contrib­uted by many Members of the Senate,melding them with their own very im­portant views, and then bringing themhere in the form of a legislative proposalthat I think is going to pass. I believe itshould pass. I take this time simply toexpress my views and my appreciationto them.

Mr. President, we are finally approach­ing the climax of a year anda half of anunprecedented investigation into theworld of intelligence. When the major­ity leader and I introduced the resolutionin October 1974 that led to the creationof the Select Committee on Intelligence,it was in the aftermath of Watergate,charges o'f domestic spying by the intel­ligence agencies and their misuse forpolitical purposes. The last long hardlook the Congress had taken at the Na­tion's intelligence arm occurred in the1940's-in the wake of the great intelli­gence fallure at Pearl Harbor.

The investigations and exposures ofthe past year have revealed another typeof intelligence fallure-.:.this time not afailure of military preparedness but ofadherence to the Constitution and tlielaw. The resolution before us. today-aproduct of a bipartisan effort to achieveagreement on essentials-is a significantbreakthrough .in the effort to remedythe intelligence failure we have recentlyexperienced. The resolution deserves ourmaximum support.

Today we see presidential hopefulsre­ceiving standing ovations for tellingaudiences "I promise I will never lie toyou.". In ll,'}democratic society, when aline like that brings people to their feetapplauding, you have really hit bottom.Government rests on the confidence ofthe people. Tills resolution1s designed torestore the confidence of the people inthe intelligence agencie$.. The. way tobring the intelligence community out ofits present disarray and the drumfire ofcriticism is to assure the Americanpeople that Congress is meeting its con-

May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD _. SENATE 13695stitutional responsibilities to oversee in­telligence operations. Only then willthe clamor of attack and attention re­cede.

In this, our Bicentennial Year, theSenate has a special opportunity to re­new the values of those who founded thiscountry. Seventeen months ago, on Jan­uary 21, 1975, the Senate established theselect committee to examine the opera­tions of the Government's intelligenceagencies. The results of that examina­tion are now before the Senate and theAmerican people. They are profoundlydisturbing to the cause of democraticgovernment. For they detail in unmis­takable terms the consequences of de­parting from the constitutional plandraVv'1l by the Founders.

Those who won our independence 200years ago recognized the necessity toplace governmental power under the ruleof law. They understood that powercarried with it the seed of abuse, andthat the exercise of unchecked power isthe path to tyranny. That is why wehave a government of checks and bal­ances and a written Bill of Rights.

As set out in over 1,000 pages ofthe select committee's final report, theintelligence operations of the Govern­ment have been the exclusive prerogativeof the executive branch. For nearly 40years, Congress has abdicated its consti­tutional responsibilities to oversee andC'heck the conduct of intelligenceoperations by the executive. In the re­sulting vacuum, great damage has beendone to our system of government andto the rights of the American people.

The record before us is clear, and itcannot now be ignored or covered· up.If we are to profit from history and ex­perience, we must do more than avertour eyes and return to business all usUal.In the face of the following facts, sure­ly it Is tinie to reorder our proceduresfor meeting our constitutional responsi­bilities:

First; Presidents and other high offi­cials in every administration fromFranklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixonhave used the intelligence agencies toserve their political and personal objec­tives. The Huston plan-a noxious laun­dry ·Ust of official criminality-was theUltimate fruit of unchecked bureaucraticand Presidential power.

Second. In the pursuit of "domestic in­telligence," large numbers of law-abid­ing Americans and lawful domesticgroups ranging across the political spec­trum from conservative to liberal havebeen subjected to extensive investigationand surveillance. Vicious tactics-violat­ing due process of law and fundamentalhuman decency-have been used to de­grade and discredit those marked out astargets for domestic intelligence investi-gation. .

Third. The law has been systematicallyignored in the conduct. of intellig~nceop­erations. In but one .example of manyuncovered by the select committee, morethan a quarter of a million first-.classletters were opened and Photographed inthe United States by the.. CIAanci Fl31between 1940 and 1973-in direct viola­tion of the fourth amendment, SupremeCourt decIsions, and statutory law.

Fourth. In foreign affairs, where theConstitution gives the Congress the ex­clusive power to determine whether theNation shall move from a state of peaceto a state of war, the Executive has usedthe intelligence agenciesto launch majormilitary actions, such as the abortive in­vasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, with­out so much as informing Congress.

In requiring that the new committeemust be informed about· "any signifi­cant anticipated activities," the resolu­tion makes clear that the committeemust be provided advance notice aboutsignificant intelligence activities. ThisWill avoid such incidents as occurred inApril 1961 when the Congress-possessedof the exclusive constitutional power todeCide if the Nation shall go to war-hadno advance knowledge that a military in­vasion of Cuba was to be carried out bythe executive branch as an "intelligencecovert action."

These are merely the surface points ofthe intelligence iceberg that has beencutting under and around the Constitu­tion over the past generation. Today webegin the historic task of restoring theFramers'. plan for a system of effectivechecks on governmental power. TheAmerican people expect the Congress todischarge its constitutional responsibili...ties. The time is over when Congress cancreak along, looking the other way whileintelligence operations go unexaminedand unchallenged.

The Senate can truly celebrate theBicentennial by renewing the values ofour forebears. The creation of a newintelligence oversight structure will re­affirm the principles that are at the cen-ter of our democracy. ,

The work of the select committee overthe past year and a half has opened theway. We need only have the courage tokeep to the course. By bringing the in­telligence arm of the Government withinour constitutional system, we will enablethe proper range of intelligence activityto go forward under law in the serviceof the country.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wishto respond to the distinguished Senatorfrom Maryland for his gracious com­ments about my colleague, SenatorPERCY, and myself.

It should be pointed out that through­out thIs matter, Senator MATHIAS madegreat contributions, and all of us whoworked on this legislation could not haveachieved the results without his magni­ficent contributions. .

Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the Senator.

PROGRAMMr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,

the Senate will convene at 12 noon to­morrow. After the two leaders or theirdesignees have been recognized underthe standing order, Mr. PROXMIRE willbe recognized for not to exceed 15 min­utes, Mr. GOLDWATER will be recognizedfor not to exceed 15 minutes, and Mr.MONDALE will be recognized for not toexceed 15 minutes. There will then be aperiod for the transaction .. of routinemorning business not to extend beyondthe hour of 1 o'clock p.m., with Senators

permitted to speak not in excess of 5minutes each.

At 1 o'clock p.m., the Senate will re­sume consideration of the unfinishedbusiness, Senate Resolution 400. Thepending question at that time will be onthe adoption of the Cannon substitute tothe ca'mmittee substitute to Senate Res­olution 400. Rollcall votes may occur to­morrow on amendments or motions inrelation to any of the foregoing. Othermatters may come before the Senate.Conference reports may be called up.Rollcall votes may occur thereon.

ADJOURNMENTMr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move

that the Senate stand in adjournmentuntil 12 noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to: and at 5:54p.m. the Senate adjourned until Thurs­day, May 13, 1976, at 12 noon.

NOMINATIONSExecutive nominations received by the

Senate May 12, 1976:DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PhUip C. Habib, of California, a ForeignService officer of the class of career minister,to be Under Secretary of State for PoliticalMairs.

William D. Rogers, of Virginia, to be un­der Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., of Maryland, aForeign service officer of the class of careerminister, to be an Assistant Secretary ofState.

Harry W. Shlaudeman, of california, a For­eign Service officer of class I, to be an as­sistant Secretary of State.

PhUlip V. Sanchez, of California, to be Am­bassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiaryof the United States of America to Colombia.

Viron P. Vaky, of Texas, a Foreign Serviceofficer of the class of career minister, to beAmbassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten­tiary of the United States of America toVenezUela.

Robert V. Keeley, of Florida, a ForeignService officer of class I, to be AmbassadorExtraordinary and Plenipotentiary of theUnited States of America to Mauritius.

IN THE NAVY

Rear Adm. William O. MUler, Judge Ad­vocate General's Corps, U.S.. Navy, to beJudge Advocate General of the Navy withthe rank of rear admiral, for a term of 4years.

CONFIRMATIONSExecutive nominations confirmed by

the Senate May 12, 1976:DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Bruce R •.Montgomery, of Tennessee, to beU.s. marshal for the eastern district of Ten­nessee for the term of 4 years.

James R. Cooper, of Georgia, t.o be a mem­ber of the Board of Parole for the rema.lnderof the term explr1ng September 30, 1978.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

MIchael H. MoskoWL of New Jersey, to beUnder Secretary of Labor.

John Conyers Read, of Virginia, to be anAssistant Secretary of Labor. .

The above nominations were approvedsubject to the nominees' commitment torespond to requests to appear and testifybefore any dUly constituted committee ofthe Senate.