OF AMERICAUNITED STATES

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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 92 CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

VOLUME 117-PART 20

JULY 19, 1971, TO JULY 24, 1971

(PAGES 25731 TO 27062)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, 1971

July 20, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 26139Grant's observations be printed in theRECORD.

There being no objection, the observa­tions were ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as follows:THE ANSWER TO THE MIDEAST CRISES-AUNITED EFFORT AGAINST A COMMON ENEMY

(By Max L. Grant)The situation in the Middle East must be

peacefUlly resolved If a world catastrophe Isto be avoided.

It can be! There is an answer!The question Is not who is right but what

Is the right thing to-do.For their own survival, as well as the peace

of the worid, the participants involved in theMideast must unitedly reallze that they havea common enemy-the guerrilla or saboteur.

The curse in the East and the cursethroughout the world is the guerrilla or sab­oteur who relegates unto himself and thatIs pious and righteous, but does not llve thatway himself, nor has he the ability to createsuch a society.

Destruction Is easy, but we can only livethrough construction.

Let the world face its common enemywhich, fortunately, Is such a small entity inour vast society.

When we ellminate this cancer, the bodypolitIc will be restored to healthful exIstence.

War does not solve problems. It createsmore hatreds, more misunderstandings, moreproblems, more wars and more guerrillas.

Even if victorious, what does any natIonwIn?

If Russia Is victorious, the Arab guerrillaswill sabotage all the assets of the Arab na­tIons, including oIl and cotton, and RussIawlll be faced wIth a VIetnam situation manytimes worse than ours-and is likely to losewhat it now has In Siberia because China IswaitIng to take it.

If the Arab nations should win, what havethey won?

The guerrlllas will arrogate to themselvesall the credit for the victory and take overthe governments to the detriment of theArab people.

If the Israells should win, what have theywon?

They wlll be faced by hostile neighbors onevery border.

Peace ellmlnates hatred, mIsunderstand­ings, problems and guerrlllas.

There is a new order: the youth of theworld. Whether Arabs, Israelis, Americans orRussians, they have a rIght to condemn theIrelders who try to solve the world's problemsby their old method, war, at the cost of theyouth and the wealth of the world.

If the nations Involved In the Mideastwould spend for construction what theyspend in preparation for destructIon, theycould solve the critical problems they nowface, and win back the youth of the worldfor constructive purposes and a constructIvesociety.

It Is wIthIn the power of either the UnitedStates or Russia to encourage the terms ofa just peace.

It is easier for both the United States andRussia to jointly accomplish this necessarysalvation of our Civilization.

Nasser's death makes a united effort im­perative!

There is eVidence that prior to his death,Nasser regarded as the real enemy of theArab countries the so-called guerrlllas orsaboteurs-and that they would be the vIc­tors temporarily in the event of a war.

The permanent vIctims would be the Arabnations.

There Is also undisputed e\'idenee that theguerrillas are beIng financed and encour­aged by Red ChIna, who llke the guerrlllas,has everything to gain by Involving theUnited States and Russia in the Mideastcrisis.

The responsible heads of the Arab govern­ments would become their prey and theirVictims.

In a peacefUl solution there is gloryenough for both the United States andRussia.

In war .there is destruction for either ofthe two nations that fails to live up to itsresponsIbility and opportunity.

"SAVE THE SNAKE"Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, ear­

lier this week I placed in the RECORDmany letters of support for S. 717 fromvarious conservation, fishing and otllerorganizations across the Nation.

Today I am pleased to ask unanimousconsent to have printed in the RECORD,copy of a resolution adopted by the In­ternational Longshorer,len's and Ware­housemen's UrIion Federated Auxiliarieson June 24, 1971, at that organization'sconvention.

There being no objection, the resolu­tion was ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as follows:RESOLUTION-SUPPORT SENATE BILL No. 717

Whereas, the prollferatlon of damsthroughout the country Without regard tofull and proper consideratIon of all theeconomic and environmental results hascaused and. can be the cause of further dam­age to our country, and

Whereas, the proposed MountaIn Sheepand Pleasant Valley sites, approved by theFederal Power Commission last Februaryshould be delayed five years to enable powerstUdy and consideration,

Therefore, be it resolved that we supportSenator Robert Packwood's bill, S 717 and beit

Further resolved: that copIes of this Res­oiution be sent to Interior Secretary RogersMorton and to Senator Packwood.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, Ihave also received copy of an editorial bySherrye Henry of WCBS-TV, channel 2.New York City, given on July 6, 1971, at6:55 p.m. I ask unanimous consent forthe text of that editorial to be printed atthis time in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorialwas ordered to be printed in the RECORD,as follows:

WCBS-TV EDITORIAL ON HELL's CANYONThis Is the Snake River. Far from New

York, it rushes In wild majesty between theborders of Oregon and Idaho, deep In HeU'sCanyon. The canyon Itself, a freak of geology,is deeper even than the Grand Canyon-theentire Teton MountaIn Range could bedropped into It With room to spare. The can­yon walls. carved with man's earliest mark­ings, are an archeological treasure. And theIndians who llved here, the explorers, furtraders, prospectors and visitors who passedthrough, have for centuries been stunned byits untamed beauty.

But Hell's Canyon, now, Is doomed. Man'sinsatiable appetite for power wants a damon the Snake River which wlll turn thecharging white waters into a plaCid 58-milelake. The Canyon walls will be submergedto a death of several hundred feet, and withthem will go the impressive pines and theWildflowers. All this In the name of prog­ress--and power.

The utility companies say the power Isneeded for further Industrial expansion inthe northwest. They say the lake. by openingup tourist recreation would enhance ratherthan impair the river, which should not beleft an idle resource.

Improve this natural wonderland? Impos-

sible. An Idle resource? Not for the salmonthat run its waters. or the wildllfe that roamits banks in the most amazing variety foundin North America.

The Department of the Interior could savethis canyon by designating the Snake a "wildand scenic riven." Or Congress could act onSena~Jr Robert Packwood's bill. The OregonRepubllcan wants to ban the dams and pre­serve the river as it is.

The Snake River in Hell's Canyon Is farfrom New York. Why should we care? Well,care we must. Just as a national outcry wasrequired to save the Florida Everglades, so,it seems now. oniy national support will saveHell's Canyon.

And the conflict between the Increasingneed for power plants and the increasing con­cern for the environment is one we have heretoo.

In order to mal~e decisions between the two,what we need Is a reasonable set of prior­ities. In the case of the Snake River, thehighest priority clearly belongs to theenvironment.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, it isvery gratifying to me, as I know it mustbe to the other cosponsors of the HellsCanyon-Snake National River bill, to seethis kind of support demonstrated tosave the Middle Snake River and HellsCanyon. I only wish I couId share withyou the stacks of letters I have receivedfrom around the Nation in support ofS.717.

THE PENTAGON PAPERSMr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the

Pentagon papers have already produceda growing body of analysis, interpreta­tion, and counterinterpretation.

They will be-and righUy so--the sub­ject of a national debate on the makingof our foreign policy for decades to come.

Charles Bailey. Washington Bureauchief for the Minneapolis Tribune hasmade a concise and lucid contribution tothis effort in a series of analytical articlesdescribing t.he secret stUdy and assessingits significance for the future.

As a correspondent who has coveredthe war with distinction both in Vietnamand in Washington, Mr. Bailey's articlesshould be standard reading for all of usconcerned with this disturbing chapter inAmerican history.

I recommend the articles to all my col­leagues and ask unanimous consent thatthey be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, th~ articleswere ordered to be printed in the RECORD,as follows:

VIETNAM: THE SECRET PAPERS-IWASHINGTON, D;C.-The publication of a

secret Defense Department study on theroots of U.S. Involvement in Vretnam-alongwith a mass of equally secret documents onthe subject-has stirred new controversy Inthe already-bitter national debate over thewar.

The report and documents, obtain~d sev­eral months ago by The New York Times.have been only partially reveaied to date.The federal government obtained a courtorder last week temporarily halting theirDublication after three installments had beenprinted by the TImes. Whether more of thematerIal will be published depends on theoutcome of continuing court actions, al­though some other portions of the secretPentagon study are now beginning toap­pear elsewhere and eventual disclosure ofthe entire stUdy seems llkely.

26140 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE July 20, 1971The material-In effect a 2.5-milllon-word

archive on American foreign and militarypolley relating to Indochina for the last twodecades-is far from complete. Prepared byDefense Department researchers under spe­cial instructions by former Defense SecretaryRobert McNamara in 1967 and 1968, it In­cludes almost no records of deliberations,arguments and decisions by President LyndonB. Johnson himself.

In addition, the Minneapolis Tribunelearneci. Saturday, then-Secretary of StateDean Rusk-perhaps the most important ofPresident Johnson's Vietnam policy advis­ers-refused in 1957 to give the authors of thesecret study access to a number of key StateDepartment files on the SUbject.

Nevertheless, what has been revealed pro­vides a wealth of new factual informationand new insights on the course of Americanpolicy-making during the critical period ofthe mid-1960's, when an already-existing U.S.com1l'timent to the defense of South Vietnamwas vastly expanded Into direct Americanparticipation in what has since become thenation's longest full-scale war.

Since the Times began pUblication of thematerial, the basic significance of the doou­ments themselves has been obscured by thefuror over their publloation, government ef­forts to find out who "leaked" the top-secretmaterial to the newspaper and the courtactions to stop further publication. Issuesof press freedom, censorship and the govern­ment's right to prevent pUbllcation of secretmaterial have monopolized the headlines.

But the real importanoe of the secretPentagon arohive lles in what it contalns­and in its Implications for future Americanpolicy and pOlicy-making.

The documents published by the Times re­veOlI, among other things, that:

There was secret U.S. Involvement earlier,and to a greater degree. in the war In Indo­china than has ever before been confirmed.This Is made clear even without the publica­tion of documents covering the administra­tions of presidents Harry S. Truman, DwightD. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, all ofwhom played a role In shaping the situationinherited by Johnson When he was suddenlythrust Into the presidency In November 1963.

There was broad acceptance at top levelsin the Johnson administration of the in­evitability of deep and direct U.S. involve­ment In Vietnam-long before this was dis­cussed with Congress, let alone with thepublic.

There was deliberate adoption, in secret,of a "provocation" strategy in 1964-a strat­egy that was consciously designed to give tIleUnited States an excuse to move in more di­rectly and deeply against North Vietnam.

There was an implicit, and sometimes ex­plicit, assumption by U.S. pollcymakers thatAmerican ground troops might have to besent In to salvage the U.S. commitment-ata time when Johnson was telling presidentialcampaign audiences that "Amerlcan bOYS"should not be sent to fight a war that "Asianboys" should fight.

There was repeated ignoring of sometimesdire warnings from a number of U.S. of­ficlals-Ir- both WaShington and Saigon,South Vietnam, and Including some all-out"hawks"-about the risks Involved, about thelimited chances of success, and about theIikellhood that what were then perceived aslimited steps could in fact turn into open­ended total commitments.

There Is evidence that the rationale for0111' Involvement In Vletna~ was not whatofficials prOClaimed It to be. The preservationof a "free" South Vietnam was not-despiterepeated public statements by the Presidentand others--the final determining factor. In­stead, the secret documents show that U.S.policy was rooted, In the end, on a "domino"theory of containing Communist China andon considerations of American power, pres­tige and credibility of which Vietnam was nomore than a symbol.

The secret record, even allowing for itssubstantial gaps, makes clear that theUnited States did not-as some opponentsof the war have charged-"blunder" intoits Vietnam involvement. On the contrary,the documents show that the highest offi­cials were constantly aware that steps theywere taking could lead to much greater In­volvement-and that some of them warnedwith considerable accuracy what it could alllead to.

The dccuments, for all the gaps they le~we

In the record, after compelling new evidencethat the nation's highest officials. includingthe President, deliberately kept Congress andthe public in the dark-and on occasionmisled them-about plans for greater U.S.Involvement In Vietnam.

Beyond these factual revelations, thesecret documents raise some broad basicquestions about the way the American gov­ernment operates-and about the distribu­tion of decision-making power in our s07ciety. Here are some of them:

Does a government ever have the right,under any circumstances, to lie to Its citi­zens?

What can a democratic government keepsecret? Indeed, can It properly keep anythingsecret from Its citizens?

How much control-If any-can beexerted by congress or the public over apresident's power to engage the nation insecret military ventures? And how muchcontrol can a preSident-any president­effectively exert over the military?

Is there any way to assure that a presi­dent will hear-and will listen to-dissent­ing views within his high councils?

And, finally, perhaps the most ominousquestion raised by the publication of thesecret Vietnam documents is this: canAmericans believe what their president andtheir government tell them?

VIErNAM: THE SEcaET PAPERS-II(By Charles W. Bailey)

WASHINGTON, D.C.-The secret dccuments011 U.S. Vietnam policy revealed last weekthat President Lyndoll B. Johnson, in hisfirst year In office, responded to continuingdeterioration inside South Vietnam by firstsecretfy planning .and then putting Into ef­fect-also secretly in some cases-a steadilyescalating series of military actions againstNorth Vietnam.

This Is the over-all pattern revealed In thedocuments cited in the New York Times ac­count of a Defense Department study ofVietnam-related events In Washington andSaigon, South Vietnam, during 19M-theyear Johnson won overwhelming election tothe presidency in a campaign in which hestressed his. determination not to get theUnited States into a major Asian war.

The United States was, of course, alreadydeeply Involved In Indochina when Johnsontook office <'11 Nov. 22, 1963. Three previousadministrations-those of Presidents HarryS. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower and JohnF. Kennedy-had each progressively steppedup the American commitment there.

JOHNSON REAFFIRMED COMMITMENT

Johnson lost no time In making clear hisdetermination to continue the U.S. effort inSouth Vietnam. In his first speech to Con­gress On Nov. 27, 1963, he said flatly: "Thisnation will keep Its commitments, fromSouth Vietnam to Berlin." And on Dec. 6 hesaid: "We are heavliy committed in SouthVietnam, with 18,000 of our fellow citizensthere, and 've should not go to bed any nightwithout asking whether we have done every­thing that we could do that day to win thestruggle there and bring victory to ourgroup."

But If Johnson had any illusions about thediffiCUlty of that task, they should qUicklyhaye been dispelled. On Dec. 21, he receiveda long report from Defense Secretary RobertMcNamara. The report, printed in full last

week by the Times, offered McNamara's as·sessment following a trip to Saigon. The pic·ture he painted was bleak:

"The situation is very disturbing. Currenttrends, unless reversed In the next 2-3months, will lead to neutralization at bestand more than likely to a Cnmmunist-con­trolled state.

"The new government is the greatest sonrceof concern. It Is Indecisive and drifting ...The (U.S.) country team Is the second majorwen.kn"2ss ...

"Viet Cong progress has been great sile' ~

the (anti-Diem) ooup, with my best gue5sbeing that the situation has In fact been de­teriorating in the countryside since July toa far greater extent than we realized ...

"Infiltration of men and equipment con­tinues 11sing (A) land corridors through Laosand Cambodia; (B) the Mekong River water­ways from Cambodia; (C) some possible en­try from the sea and the tip of the (MekongRiver) delta." McNamara added at anotherpoint: "The whole waterway system is sovest ... that el1'ective polIcing may be Im­possible."

1vIC NAMARA URGED DEEPER INVQLVE:MENT

McNamara capped his gloomy recital,however, by urging more rather than lessU.S. involvement. "My appraisal may be over­ly pessimistic," he wrote the new president."We should watch the situation very care­fully, running scared, hoping for tlle best,but preparing for more forceful moves If thesituation does not show early signs of im­provement:'

McNamara's report was typical of state­ments of U.S. polioy-makers throughout theensuing year, as revealed In the documentsprinted last week: continuing gloom aboutthe situation In South Vietnam-and con­tinuing proposalS for ever-Increasing U.S.military action to turn the situation around.

The defense secretary's Immediate pro­posals in his December report were: Beginaerial mapping of the Laos-Cambodia borderby U.S. U-2 aircraft; expand "OperationHardnose," described as a series of "limitedbut remarkably el1'ectlve operations" on theLaos side of the South Vietnamese border tomonitor Communist movements, and preparea program of "sabotage and psychological op­erations against North Vietnam."

These latter actions, code-named "Opera­tion 34A," began In February 1964. MarineMaj. Gen. Victor Knllak, who headed a spe­cial group on them within the Joint Chiefsof Staff. described them as "desLl'tlCtiveundertakings" to produce "substantial de­struction, economic loss and harassment" inNorth Vietnam. They were carried out bySouth Vietnamese and other Asian personnellanded or air-dropped Into North Vietnam.

This kind of thing had been going, on ac­cording to the Times account, since theEisenhower administration. But now therewas a significant change: instead of beingmanaged by the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA), the new 34A operations were directedby Gen. Paul Harkins, chief of the U.S. Mlll­tary Assistance Command In Saigon-andthus they came under control of the armedservices.

TONKIN GULF PATROLS STARTEDAnother new clandestine operation was

started in this period. Called "De Soto pa­trols," it consisted of sending U.S. Navy des­troyers Into the Gulf of Tonkin off NorthVietnam-primarily as a show of force, butalso to 'collect Intelllgence on North Viet­namese radar stations and coastal defenses,for use by' 34A raiders or possibly later bybombers. These missions began in February1964.

A third operation, already underway, wasbeefed up. This involved bombing raids inLaos by U.S.-furnished T28 planes pllotedby Laotian air force pilots or CIA fiiers work­ing covertly in Laos. These raids were sup­ported by reconnaissance flights by U.S. AirForce and U.S. Navy jet aircraft.

July 20, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 26141But even before all these operations could

be cranked up, the secret documents reveal,U.S. military chiefs in Washington werepushing for tougher and more far-reachingmilitary moves.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, then headed byGen. Maxwell D. Taylor, sounded 'no uncer­tain trumpet. In a Jan. 22, 1964, memo toMcNamara, they began by saying that pre­vious National Security Council "action"memoranda-not published by the Times­made clear "the resolve of the President toensure victory over the externally directedand supported Communist insurgency inSouth Vietnam." They went on to say that"the United States must be prepared to putaside many of the self-imposed restrictionswhich now limit our efforts, and to under­take bolder actions which may embody great­er risks."

JOINT CHIEFS HELD TO "nOMINO THEORY·'

The chiefs went on to argue that the lossof South Vietnam would mean the collapseof Laos, Thailand and Cambodia as well.Then, in an argument that the secret docu­ments show was eventually welded into highnational policy, the miUtary chiefs laid downa sweeping version of the "domino theory" ofCommunist expansionism:

"In broader sense, the failure of our pro­grams in South Vietnam would have heavyinfluence on the judgments of Burma, India,Indonesia, Malaysia. Japan, Taiwan, the Re­pUblic of Korea, and the Republic of thePhiUppines with respect to U.S. durability,resolution, and trustworthiness ... It is notunreasonable to conclude that there wouldbe a corresponding unfavorable effect uponour image in Africa and in Latin America."

South Vietnam, the generals said, is in "apivotal position in our world-wide confron­tation with the Communists," and the strug­gle there must be won-though they warned"it would be unrealistic to believe that acomplete suppression of the insurgency cantake place in one or even two years." Theynoted that it had taken the British "approx­imately ten years" to do a similar job inMalaya.

The generals argued that "self-imposed re­strictions" on U.S. activities in Vietnam­including "avoiding the direct use of U.S.combat forces"-not only were making thejob harder but "may well now be conveyingsignals of irresolution to our enemies." Theycalled for "a reversal of attitude and theadoption of a more aggressive program."

The key, they added, was to stop NorthVietnamese support of the South Vietnameseinsurgents. Speaking of the new program ofclandestine action, they said "it wouid beidle to conclude that these efforts will havea decisive effect on the Communist deter­mination to support the insurgency, and it isour view that we must therefore be preparedto undertake a much higher level of activity."

GENERALS SOUGHT MORE CONTROL

The generals proposed that the U.S. Mili­tary commander in Vietnam should be given"responsibilities for the total U.S. programin Vietnam"-a move that would presum­ably have displaced the American Ambassa­dor from bis traditional role as top Americanin any foreign country-and should also have"complete responsibillty for conduct of theprogram against North Vietnam"-a pro­posal that on its face would have lessenedpresidential and civilian control o"er suchopera tlons.

The chiefs also recommended pro\'idingU.S. arms, eqUipment and adYice for thebombing of North Vietnam by South Viet­namese. mining North Vietnam's sea ap­proaches; conducting "large-scale com­mando raids" against the nonh; and pro­viding "U.S. forces as necessary" for combatsupport in South Vietnam and also for "di­rect actions against North Vietnam."

Johnson wa.sn't ready for this kind of ac­tion yet, though he did on Feb. 20 order a

step-up in "contingency planning for pres­sures against North Vietnam," according tothe Times account.

One reason for the increasing focus onNorth Vietnam was a Widespread recogni­tion among top U.S. officials that the situa­tion in South Vietnam itself was gettingworse. McNamara went back to Saigon foranother look in March, and his report toJohnson on March Hl--another of the secretdocuments now published-said, "The situa­tion has unquestionably been growing worse."

He reported that "about 40 percent of theterritory" of the count.ry was under VietCong "control or predominant influence,"with the insurgents in control of up to 90percent of some key 'and popUlous proYincesaround Saigon.

McNamara also induced another catalogueof troubles:

"Large groups of the popUlation are nowshOWing signs of apathy and indifference... The ARVN (army) and paramllitarydesertion mtes, and partiCUlarly the latterare high and increasing . . . Draft-dodgingis high while the Viet Cong are recruitingenergetically and effectively ...

"In the last 90 days the weakening of thegovernment's position has been partiCUlarlynoticeable ... The political control struc­tm'e extending from Saigon downward intothe hamlets disappeared following the No­vember coup....

Again, however, such evidence did not sug­gest to McNamara that the United Statesshould pUll out. Indeed, he agreed with thejoint chiefs that more action should be takenagainst North Vietnam, although he opposed"an overt extension of operations into theNorth" for the time being because of theweakness of the "base" in the south.

But McNamara had no basic argumentwith the joint chiefs. In fact he incorporat;edinto his March 16 memo to the President the"domino" theory advanced to him by thechiefs on Jan. 22.

Without an "independent non-CommunistSouth Vietnam," he wrote, "almost all ofSoutheast Asia will pl'Obably fall under Com­munist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, andCambodia), accommodate to communism soas to remove effective U.S. and anti-Com­munist influence (Burma), or fall under thedomination of forces not now explicitly Com­munist but likely then to become so (Indo­nesia taking over Malaysia).

"Thailand might hold for a period withour help, but would be under grave pressure.Even the Philippines would become shaky,and the threat to India to the west, Aus­tralia and New Zealand to the south, andTaiwan, Korea and Japan to the north andeast would be greatly increased."

M'NAMARA URGED ESCALATION READINESS

McNamara proposed to tbe President that"we should start preparation" so as to benble "to mount new and significant pressuresagainst North Vietnam." The United Statesshould be ready. he said, to start on 72-hournotice a series of border-control and "retalia­tory" actions, including South Vietnameseair raids on the north, and on 30-day noticea program of "graduated oyert milita'ry pres­sure" to Include bombing by U.S. as well asSouth Vietnamese planes.

Thus. in the space of three months. 1\lc­Namara's December proposals had in largepart been overtaken and supplanted by thestronger steps urged by the joint chiefs.

On l\Iarch 17, Johnson himself approvedl\IcNamara's new proposals. A National Se­curlt,' Council action memorandum, theusual document for recording presidentialdecision. was issued that day, incorporatingnot only the substance but also a good dealof the wording of the defen.se secretary's pa­per-including McNamara's refinement ofthe joint chiefs' language setting out thedomino theory, which thus was welded intoU.S. foreign policy substantially as draftedby the mill tary.

As before, Johnson's approval of McNa­mara's proposals was a cautions one-in ef­fect saying. "go ahead and get ready butdon't do anythi'lg now." He cabled Ambassa­dor Lodge In Saigon that "judgment is re­sen'ed for the present on overt military ac­tions . . . Our planning for actions againstthe north is on a contingency basis at pres­ent, and immediate problem in this area isto develop the strongest possible military andpolitical base for possible later action."

BASIS FOn. ACTION PREPARED IN ADVANCE

Unknown to Congress or the public. workon developing such a "military and politicalbase" had already started in Washington.This is significant because it makes clear thatJohnson's later request for a congressionalresolution was not, as the administrationsaid at the time, the result of the NorthVietnamese attack on U.S. Navy destroyers inthe Tonkin Gulf, but that It had been inpreparation for some time and was simplyput forward at an opportune moment.

As early as February 1964, according to thesecret study, there was discussion in theState Department about seeking a congres­sional resolution to give the President au­thority for deeper U.S. milltary involvementagainst North Vietnam. The Times reportcites a Feb. 13 letter from Walt Rostow, thenchairman of the St,ate Department's policy­planning counCil, to secretary of State DeanRusk "on the desirability of the President'srequesting a congressional resolution draw­ing a line at the borders of South Vietnam."

Discussions of such a resolution continuer!into the spring. According to the study. itwas mentioned as a prereqUisite to a seriesof military and diplomatic actions proposedon May 23 in a detailed scenario for escala­tion of action against the north. Two dayslater, Assistant Secretary of State William P.Bundy drafted the proposed resolution. Thedraft--one of the documents now pUblish­ed-included this language:

" ... If the President determines the nec­essity thereof, the United States is prepared,upon the request of the government of SouthVietnam or the government of Laos, to useall measures, including the commitment ofarmed forces, to assist that government inthe defense of its independence or territorialintegrity against aggression or subversionsupported. controlled or directed from anyCommunist country."

RUSK URGED SEEKING CONGRESS RESOLUTION

The proposed resolution was further dis­eussed at a meeting in Honolulu. Hawaii, onJune 1 and 2. Participants included Rusk,McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, Lodge and Gen.William C. Westmoreland, who was then tak­ing over the Vietnam command fromHarkins.

According to a memo of record made byBundy after the meeting, Rusk and Mc­Namara both argued for seeking the resolu­tion. Rusk said events could force the callingup of reserves, always a touchy matter inCongress, and added that pUblic opinion inthe United States on Southeast Asia policywas "badly divided" and that McNamarasaid it might become necessary to commit"as many as seven divisions" of U.S. troops"as t:Je action unfolded."

For the time being, howe,er, the resolutionwas kept on the shelf. So were the ambitiousand detailed military plans which had beendeveloped for bombing Nortb Vietnam­plans de"elope,1 in response to Johnson'sMarch 17 decision to prepare for retaliatorystrikes on 72-11our notice and ful!-scaJe airraids on 30-day notice.

One of the gaps in the dcoumcntation asreported by the Times is the absence of allYrecord of Johnson's decisions when on June 3the Honolulu conferees met with him backin ·Washington. But the Defense Departmentstudy says that "noncommlttlng millt.aryactions" proposed by the Honolulu partlci­pants were approyed-includlng the ship­ment of supplies and eqUipment to forward

26142 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE July 20, 1971bases, one of them in Thailand, to supportthe possible subsequent move of army unitsto Vietnam.

JOHNSON SOUGHT CIA VIEW ON #cnOMINOS"

Th-ere are indications also, in the study,that Mr. Johnson had some doubts at thispoint about the validity of the "domino"theory. According to the publlshed account,he submitted a formal inquiry to the CIAwithin a few days after the June-3 WhiteHouse meeting.

The question he asked was this: "Wouldthe rest of Southeast Asia necessarily faU ifLaos and South Vietnam came under NorthVietnamese control?" The CIA's answer, ineffect, chaUenged the domino argument,which by then had been written into na­tional pollcy by the March 17 Security Coun­cll action memo. In the first of several in­stances in the newly revealed documents inwhich the intelligence community offereddissenting views on Vietnam-related issues,the CIA reply said:

"With the possible exception of Cambodia,it is llkely that no nation in the area wouldqUickly succumb to communism as a resultof the faJl of Laos and South Vietnam.Furthermore, a continuation of the spread ofcommunism in the area would not be in­exorable, and any spread which did occurwould take time-time in which the totalsituation might change in any number ofways unfavorable to the Communist cause:'

The CIA reply conceded, according to theTimes account, that the loss of South Viet­nam and Laos would be "profoundly damag­ing to the U.S. position in the Far East" andwould raise Chinese prestige at the expenseof the Soviet Union. But the CIA said thatas long as the United States could retain itsisland bases-Guam, Okinawa, the Phillp­pines and Japan-it would have enoughmllltary leverage to deter China and NorthVietnam from overt aggression against therest of Southeast Asia.

There were other restraining infiuencesfelt in Washington. Johnson was beginningto think about his own campaign for elec­tion to a fuJI term in the White House-acampaign pitting him against an archetypal"hawk," Barry Goldwater.

RESOLUTION'S PITFALLS WERE LISTEDThere was also concern about the possible

difficulties of winning congressional andpUblic approval of the proposed resolution.At an inter-agency meeting on June 10, thestudy says, "five basic 'disagreeable ques­tions' were identified for which the adminis­tration would have to provide convincinganswers to assure publlc support:' The ques­tions, according to the stUdy, were:

"(1) Does this imply a blank check for thePresident to go to war in Southeast Asia?(2) What kinds of force could he employunder this resolution? (3) What change inthe situation (if any) requires this now?(4) Can't our objectives be obtained bymeans other than U.S. mllltary force? (5)Does Southeast Asia mean enough to U.S.national interests?"

Despite these problems, some officials stiJlwanted to seek the congressional action. Buton June 15, the study says, Rusk and Mc­Namara were informed by McGeorge Bundy,White House national security assistant, thatMr. Johnson had decided to wait again be­fore moving.

Then, however, at midsummer, eventsagain began to overta'ke whatever restraintsthe President had felt against more overtmilitary action against North Vietnam.

During July, South V)etnamese navalcommandos raided two North Vietnameseislands in the Gulf of Tonkin as part of thegrowing "34A" program.

On Aug. 2, the U.S. destroyer Maddox-ona "De Soto patrol in the Tonkin Gulf-wasattacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.The next night, Aug. 3, there were two more"34A" raids by South Vietnamese PT boats

against the North Vietnamese coast. Andon the night of Aug. 4 the Maddox andanother U.S. destroyer sent to reinforce it­the Turner Joy-were again attacked byNorth Vietnamese PT boats.

STUDY LEAVES TONKIN INCIDENTS UNCLEARThe secret Pentagon stUdy does nothing to

settle the long-standing controversy Rroundthe Tonkin Gulf incidents. It remains un­clear, for example, whether the North Viet·namese attacks on the U.S. ships were pro­voked by the separate "34A" raids thatpreceded them.

But whatever their motivation, the NorthVietnamese attacks on U.S. ships led Presi­dent Johnson SUddenly to set in motion themUitary and political steps that he haddeferred for several months.

Within 24 hours after the second NorthVietnamese attack on the U.S. ships, John­son had ordered retaliatory U.S. bombingattacks against selected North Vietnamesemilltary targets. He announced them whilethey were still under way, just before mid­night on Aug. 4, Washington time, telling anationwide TV and radio audience that theywere "limited and fitting" response. "Westill seek no wider war ," he said.

The next day McNamara announced that aNavy attack carrier group had been orderedinto the Indochina area; that U.S. interceptorand fighter-bomber aircraft had been orderedinto South Vietnam; that other planes hadbeen moved to 'I'halHmd; that other U.S.­based squadrons had been moved into thePacific; and that "selected Army and Marineforces have been alerted and readied formovement."

At the same time, Johnson sent a specialmessage to Congress asking for passage of aresolution expressing the support of Congress"for aU necessary action to protect our armedforces and to assist nations covered by theSEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)treaty:' As finally drafted, the resolution wasworded differently from Bundy's springdraft-but it provided the same kind of au­thority. Two days later it passed 88 to 2 inthe Senate and 416 to 0 in the House.

The action was a watershed in the historyof U.S. involvement In Vietnam. Johnsonhad broad authority to attack North Viet­nam; almost none of the "disagreeable ques­tions" had been asked In the atmosphere ofcrisis; and the mllltary planners were movinghard and fast.

VIETNAM: THE SECRET PAPEas-IIIWASHINGTON, D.C...:.....The Johnson admin­

istration used the Tonkin Gulf incidents ofAugust 1964-when U.S. Navy ships wereattacked by North Vietnamese torpedoboats-as the lever to get from Congress abroadly worded resolution authorizing thepresident to take "aU necessary action:'

But the secret Pentagon stUdy and docu­ments revealed last week by the New YorkTimes show that Johnson didn't use that au­thority immediately. Instead, with the presi­dential campaign under way, he withheldapproval of further U.S. action against NorthVietnam-despite the continued urging ofmilitary and civilian advisers.

The secret documents accompanying thereports of the study, however, reveal thatpreparations for later escalation were beingmade at a rapid rate. The documents alsosuggest-but do not prove conclusively-thatthe President made up his mind relativelyearly in the faU to start bombing of NorthVietnam after Jan. 1, 1965.

The over-aU picture revealed by the secretpapers is one of continuing-and growing­military pressure on Johnson to take the nextstep and authorize direct U.S. air attacks onNorth Vietnam. At tile same time however,the president Is revealed as holding to thecautious, step-by-step course be had set ear­lier in the election year when he repeatedlydelayed asking Congress for war-makingpowers.

Atter the hard, fast air strikes againstNorth Vietnamese targets following the Ton­kin Incident, there was a lull in U.S. andU.S.-directed South Vietnamese actionagainst the North. The president was preach­ing restraint to campaign audiences.

PREPARATIONS FOR ACTION SPEED UPEven as he was speaking, however, some

U.S. troop units already had received "alert"o"rders and were hastlly preparing for pos­sible movement to Southeast Asia. And inWashington, Saigon and HonolulU, militaryleaders were urging stepped-up actions.

Gen. MaxweU D. Taylor, who had recentlybecome ambassador to South Vietnamafter serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, cabled Washington with his first"mission report" on Aug. 10.

Taylor said the U.S. objective in SouthVietnam must be to "do everything possibleto bolster" the Saigon government--and atthe same time "be prepared to implementcontingency plans against North Vietnamwith optimum readiness by Jan. I, 1965."

In Washington, two key administrationplanners-Assistant Secretary of State Wll­llam Bundy and Assistant Secretary of De­fense John MCNaughton-drew up anotherset of proposals. Their memo, also among thesecret Pentagon papers, proposed:

A two-week lull following the Tonkinreprisals.

Then a stepped-up resumption of the vari­ous covert operations which had been goingon during 1964-the "34A" commando raidsagainst the North by South Vietnamese: the"De Soto" patrols by U.S. Navy ships off theNorth Vietnamese coast; and some limitedcross-border air strikes from South Vietnaminto Laos.

Preparations for more specific "tit-for-tat"reprisals against Viet Cong or North Viet·namese actions that might occur.

A new phase of "more serious pressures" tobegin in January 1965. These would be"systematic mllitary action against the DRV(North Vietnam)" and "we should probablybe thinking of a contingency date, as sug­gested by Ambassador Taylor, of Jan. I, 1965:'

BOMBING TARGETS SUGGESTEDPossible types of actions suggested by

Bundy and McNaughton would begin withbombing of Communist infiltration routesand facill ties-a group of targets starting"with clear mllltary instaUations near theborders" whicll "can be extended almost atwill northward, to Inflict progressive damagethat would have a meaningful cumulativeeffect and would always be keyed to onerationale."

Next would come "action In tile DRVagainst selected military-related targets"­as opposed to wholly military ones. Thememo suggested the bombing of petroleumfacilities and the mining of Haiphong Har­bor as "spectaCUlar actions" in this category.

Their paper went to Taylor, among others,for comment. In his reply he again proposedbold action in the long run-but againsounded a cautious note for the immediatefuture. His cable, speaking for U.S. Com­mander Gen. Wllliam Westmoreland as well,said, "We should be slow to get too deeply in­volved" in larger actions "until we have abetter feel of the equality of our al1y ... Weshould not get involved militarlly with NorthVietnam and possibly Red China if our basein South Vietnam is insecure."

Taylor suggested a delay to give the SouthVietnamese government a chance to bulld upsufficient South Vietnamese ground forces tomeet possible North Vietnamese reaction toany stepped-Up U.S. military moves-"andthus avoid tile possible requirement for amajor U.S. ground force commitment:'

He suggested 'using the next five months"for developing a posture of maximum readi­ness for a dellberate escalation of pressureagainst North Vietnam, using Jan. I, 1965, asa target D-Day. We must always recognize,

July .~O, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 26143

however that events may force us to advanceD-Day ~ a considerably earlier date,"

He defined such a "deliberate escalation ofpressure" as "a carefully orchestrated bomb­ing attack on North Vietnam directe~.pri~marily at infiltration and other nulltarytargets."

COl\IMANDERS OPPOSE DELi\Y

U.S. mllltary commanders had some qUickand emphatiC comments on the Bundy­McNauahton and Taylor papers. Adm. U. S.Grant "Sharp. the Pacific commander-in­chief, opposed even the two-week lull sug­gested by Bundy and McNaughton: "Pres­sures against the other side once initiatedshould not be relaxed by any actions or lackof them which would destroy the benefits ofthe rewarding steps previously taken ... Theproposed two weeks suspension of operationsis not in consonance with desire to get themessage to Hanoi and Peiplng,"

Sharp also argued against the Bundy-Mc­Naughton argument that U.S. action shouldseek "maximum results" at "minimum risks."He said "Action to produce Improvements Inmorale in RVN (South Vietnam) must entailrisk. Temptation toward zero action and zerorisk must be avoided."

The Joint Chiefs, In an Aug. 26 memo toDefense secretary Robert McNamara whichis also among the secret documents, also pro­posed tougher action. They disagreed withtheir former boss, Taylor, on the need to "getbetter feel of our ally" before making morecommitments: "An accelerated program ofactions with respect to the DRV Is essentialto prevent a collapse of the U.S. position InSoutheast Asia."

The chiefs wanted stepped-up actionagainst Communist supply lines through Laosand Cambodia, "hot-pursuit" operations IntoCommunist Cambodian sanctuaries, and "In­creased pressure on North Vietnam throughmllltary action,"

CONTINUED PRESSURE URGEDThis, however, would not be enough, ac­

cording to the chiefs' secret memo--and theywent 011 to propose what became a central'and controversial theme of administrationplanning, the so-called "provocation strat­egy," Here is the way the Joint Chiefs put It:

"The Joint Chiefs beHeve that more directand forceful actions than these will, In allprobablllty, be necessary. In anticipation ofa pattern of further successful VC and Pa­thet Lao (PL) actions In RVN and Laos, andin order to Increase pressure on the DRV,the U.S. program should also provide forprompt and calculated responses to such VC­PL action in the form of air strikes and otheroperations against appropriate military tar­gets in the DRV."

Such "responses," they added, "must begreater than the provocation m degree, andnot necessarily limited to response In kind1I.gainst similar targets,"

The "provocation" idea was picked up In aSept. 3 "proposed plan of action" written byMcNaughton. He noted the coming elec­tion-"during the next two months, becauseof the lack of 'rebuttal time' before electionto justify particular actions which may bedistorted to the American public, we mustact with special care"-but he went on torestate the Joint Chiefs' theme more ex­pHcitly.

McNaughton proposed an "orchestration"of new moves designed to be "likely at somepoint to provoke a military DRV response.. .The provoked responall should be likely toprovide good grounds for liS to escalate If wewished. , , The timing and crescendo shouldbe under our control, with the scenario ca­pable of being turned off at any time,"

He thus in effect pr.oposed new militaryactions that would not only hurt North Viet­nam but could also provoke a North Viet­namese response that Itself would give theUnlt-ed States an excuse to escalate the warfurther.

SITU.o\TION \\rA5 HEADING "nOWN\VARD"

McNaughton's Sept. 3 memo Is significantfor this first explicit statement of the prov­ocation strategy. It Is also important in theVietnam chronology, however, because it isthe first of the recently revealed secret docu­ments to admit that the United States mightbe forced out of Vietnam without Victory.Noting, as had others, that the situation inSouth Vietnam was "deteriorating" andheading "downward." he said:

"The objective of the United States Is toreverse the present downward trend. Failingthat, the alternative objective is to emergefrom the situation with as good an imageas possible In U.S., allled and enemy eyes,"

He said the United States must keep"alert" so that If "worst comes to worst andSouth Vietnam disintegt'ates or their be­havior becomes abominable," It could" 'dis­own' South Vietnam hopefully leaving theImage of 'a patient who dIed despite theextraordinary efforts of a good doctor.' "

McNaughton's premonitions of possible fu­ture disaster were not, for the moment, a ma­jor consideration of top policymakers. Butthe provocation sclleme was, according to an­other of the secret papers-a formal memo­randum summarizing the recommendationsmade at a Sept. 7 White House meeting ofPresident Johnson and his principal ad­visers-Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Mc­Namara, Taylor and Gen. Earle Wheeler thenew chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The memo,written by William Bundy, put It in tllesewords:

"The main further question is the extentto which we should add elements ... thatwould tend deliberately to provoke a DRVreaction, and consequent ret.aliationby us ...

"We believe that such deliberately pro­vocative elements shOUld not be added in theimmediate future while the GVN Is stillstruggling to Its feet. By early October, how­ever, we may recommend such actions de­pending on GVN progress and Communistreaction In the meantime, especially to U.S.naval patrols,"

On Sept. 10, according to another of thesecret papers, Johnson formalized his accept­ance of this approach--one Involving cau­tion short-term actions but leaving the wayopen for much more later.

The final paragraph of this presidential"action memorandum," written by McGeorgeBundy, White House national security aideand brother of WlIliam Bundy, led the au­thors of the secret Pentagon stUdy on Viet­nam to the conclusion that President John­son decided on Sept. 7 to start bombing ofNorth Vietnam after the election.

After listing short-term act.lons to be takenand restating the need to Improve the situa·tion inside South Vietnam, the memo con·cludes:

"These decisions are governed by a prevail­ing Judgment that the first order of businessat present Is to take actions which will helpstrengthen the fabric of the government ofSouth Vietnam; to the extent that the situa­tion permits, such action should precedelarger decisions."

But, the memo added, "if such larger de­cisions llre reqUired at any time by a changeIn the situation, they wlll be taken."

This last sentence was taken by the authorsof the secret stUdy to mean t1lat Johnson hadagreed In effect that bombing of the northshould start after Jan. I, 1965. Others arguethat the language did not mean that much­that real "decisions" would still have to bemade by the president. The issue is left un­resolved by the secret documents. particu­larly In the absence of the full file of preSi­dential papers on the period.

What is clear, however, even from theincomplete document file, Is that althoughthe president delayed a bombing decision atthe September meeting, the bulk of his in­fluential policy-making machinery was now

moving steadily and with Increasing momen­tum toward precisely that act--and more.

Three months after that september WhiteHouse meeting, U.S. planes were bombingNorth Vietnam. And six months after John­son's promise of "larger decisions," Americanground troops were landing in South Viet­nam in force.

VIETNAM: THE SECRET PAPERS--IVWASHINGTON, D.C.-In late 1964, U.S. policy

on Vietnam began to shift decisively-froma limited, though growing, commitment tohelp the government of South Vietnam, to anall-out American war against North Viet·nam. with massive numbers of U.S. groundtroops committed to battle on the Asianmainland.

The secret Defense Department study anddocuments published last week by the NewYork Times show how this shift took shape­gradually but inexorably-over a period ofmonthS, and how it was completed long be­fore the American publlc fully realized whathad happened.

The secret documents make clear whatmany analysts have long suspected: '1'0 aconsiderable degree, President Lyndon B.Johnson sought to conceal the impact andsoft-pedal the Implications of his actions bywithl10ldlng announcement of some of hismost important decisions.

One key document in the massive arcl1ive­a National Security Council "action memo­randum" issued April 6, 1965, formallzing hisdecision to send more than 20,000 additionaltroops to Vietnam and to broaden their com­bat role-spells out tl1is policy expllcitly:

"The President desires that. , . prematurepUblicity be avoided by all possible precau­tions. The actions themselves should betaken as rapidly as practicable, but in waysthat should minimize any appearance ofsudden changes In policy ... The President'Sdesire Is that these movements and changesshould be understood as being gradual and\\"holly consistent with eXisting policy."

MAJOR WATERSHED IN u.s. POLICYThat April decision--ehanglng the mission

of U.S. troops in South Vietnam from a purelydefensive role to one a.llowing some offensiveaction-emerges in the secret Pentagonpapers as a major watershed in Americanpollcy.

But the elements that went Into that newpolley were several:

A rising crescendo of Communist terrorattacks against U.S. personnel e.nd bases InSouth Vietnam.

Months of successive government crises andchaos in South Vietnam, including a seriesof mllltary coups and near-coups that pro­duced near anarchy for weeks on end.

Continuing and grOWing pressure by U.S.mllitary leaders-and most ci\'llilln policy­makers as well-for eyer-tougher mnltary ac­tion against North Vietnam.

An underlying shift in the rationale ofAmerican pollcy-fronl a limited commit­ment to help preserve the Independence ofa small country to an effort to preserve U.S.power and prestige in a regional and world­wide struggle with Communist hations,

Tl1ese four strains are intermingled in thestory IIlmninated by the secret documents,and they are shown by the Pentarron studyto ha,-e Interacted more or less continually,with each feeding tlle others to produce inthe end a half-million-man American ex­peditionary force in Southeast Asia.

For example, the surprise Viet Cong attackon U.S. planes and facilltles at the Bien HORairbase near Saigon on Nov. 1, 1964, touchedoff a flurry of mllltary proposals for hea,'yAmerican reprisals against North Vietnam,The joint chiefs of staff, calling ~he BiCI?,Hoa strike u a change of the ground rules,proposed Immediate major U.S. air attackson North Vietnam-including strikes by B52bombers of the StrategiC Air COmmandagainst Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi.

26144 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE July 20, 1971STt.'DY CALLED FOR BOMBING THE NORTH

Johnson. with the presidential electiononlv two davs off, said no. But he did ordJrthe' preparation of yet another broad surveyof possible U.S. courses of actlon-and everyone of the options presented to him after amonth-long study called for bombing thenorth in greater or lesser degree.

According to the secret documents, thisprocess also produced the first signs of arealization by U.S. policymakers that theymigllt have to abandon their earlier aim ofstabilizing South Vietnam. There was in­creasing evidence of disintegration in theSaigon government. Ambassador MaxwellTaylor, for example, said that the UnitedStates should use promises to bomb thenorth as a lever to force reforms in Saigon­but he warned that it might not work. Thestudy says Defense Secretary Robert Mc­Namara replied that bombing "at least wouldbuy time-probably years."

President Johnson on Dec. 1 made whatthe Pentagon study caHs a "tentative de­cision" to bomb the north. but, the docu­ments say, he gave a final approval only tothe first and less ambitious part of a two­phase program proposed by his top advisers.

But before this first phase-dubbed "Bar­rel Roll" by military planners-could bestarted, things began to faH apart in Saigonas a succession of ambitious military leadersbegan efforts to overthrow the shaky civiliangovernment. The secret documents record astormy meeting at which Taylor told a num­ber of the generals, "You have made a realmess. We cannot carry you forever if you dotllings like this."

At this point new Viet Cong terror attacksadded to the sense of impending collapse inSaigon. On Christmas Eve of 1964 terroristsblew up a U.S. officers' billet in Saigon,kllling two and wounding 58 Americans. Ina siX-day battle near Binh Gia, Viet Congforces all but wiped out two South Vietna­mese marine battalions.

RUSK APPEARED TO HAVE DOUBTS

These fresh disasters were reflected almostat once In the eontinuing flow of policy pro­posals revealed in the secret archive. OnJan. 6, 1965, in a memo to Secretary of StateDean Rusk, Assistant Secretary WilliamBundy said that bombing North Vietnamheld only "some faint hope of really improv­ing the VIetnamese situation." However, hewent on to assert that it WOUld. "put us ina much stronger position to hold the nextline of defense, namely Thailand" and evenif negotiations resulted in an eventual Com­munist takeover in South Vietnam, "wewould still have appeared to Asians to havedone a lot more about it."

Rusk himself appears to have had somedoubts, In one of the few papers from histiles to be published in the Pentagon study,he cabied Taylor on Jan. 11 "to avoid ac­tions that would further commit the UnitedStates to any particular form of politicalsolution" in Saigon.

McNamara, according to the Pentagonstudy, agreed with his principal Vietnamassistant, John McNaughton, that the U.S.objective in South Vietnam was "not to helpa 'friend' but to contain China." Both aresaid to have favored air strikes against thenorth to pursue this aim.

Once again political turmoil in Saigon andterrorist strikes by the Viet Cong intervened.Gen. Nguyen Khanh, head of the govern­ment, ousted his civilian premier only to be­come himself the target ,Of plots by othergenerals. And the VIet Cong on Feb. 6 strucktwo more U.S. installations at Pleiku killing9 Americans and wounding 76.

The Pleiku attack provided a major turn­ing point in U.S. policy. Within 14 hoursJol1l1S0n had approved a direct Americanair attack against the north. The retaliatorystrike called "FlamIng Dart" was the flrst

since the one-time bombing that followedthe Tonkin Gulf incident the previous Au­gust. Three days after Pleiku, the Viet Congattacked another U.S. installation; again aretaliatory U.S. strike was ordered by John­sen.

ADVISER URGED SUSTAINED REPRISALS

But the effect of Pleiku extended far be­yond mere reprisal strikes. McGeorge Bundy,the preSident's national security adViser, wasin South Vietnam at the time. On his wayhome, he recommended-in a secret memo­randum published by the New York Times­"a policy of sustained reprisai" rather thancontinuation of isolated tit-for-tat strikes.Such action, he said, would be worthwhile"even if it falls to turn the tide, as it may"because "it will set a higher price for thefuture upon ail adventures of guerilla war­fare, and if should therefore somewhat in­crease our ability to deter such adventures."

Thus Bundy, like his brother William inthe State Department and like McNamaraand McNaughton at the Pentagon, was nowarguing that broader U.S. interests-andnot merely the security of South Vietnam­required strong American action againstNorth Vietnam.

Johnson approved a sustained bombingcampaign against the north, this one dubbed"Rolling Thunder" by the Pentagon, onFeb. 13. The raids began on March 2.

Almost as soon as they started, U.S. mili­tary leaders were warning that they were notenough and would not do the job unlessstepped up. On March 21, Adm. U. S. GrantSharp, Pacific commander-in-chief, proposeda "radar busting day" to cripple North Viet­namese air defenses and a sustained "LOCCut" campaign to knock out Communist linesof communication and supply to the south.Gen. John McConnell, chief of staff of theAir Force, went further, according to thesecret stUdy proposing a "short and vio­lent" 28-day bombing campaign to destroy94 major targets in North Vietnam.

JOHNSON GAVE GROUND SLOWLY

Johnson, still giving ground slowly, saidno to such proposals. But the secret docu­ments make clear that his policy adviserswere already further down the road: Theywere now talking about putting U.S. combattroops into South Vietnam.

McNaughton, in a March 24 memo to Mc­Namara, concluded that the situation inSouth Vietnam probablY could not be "bot­tomed out" withdUt "extreme measuresagalnst the DRV (North Vietnam) and/orwithout deployment of large numbers ofU.S. and other combat troops inside SVN(South Vietnam)."

In this paper, McNaughton also furtherrefined his own definition of U.S. aims. In ajudgment that was pemonal, but which ap­pears from the secret archive to have re­flected the growing conviction of manypolicymakers, he defined them as, "70 per­cent to avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat .•.20 percent to keep SVN (and the adjacent)territory from Chinese hands ... 10 percentto permit the people of South Vietnam toenjoy a better, freer way of life."

By late March, the major thrust of admin­istration debate was over ground troops.Gen. William Westmoreland, U.S. Vietnamcommander, asked on March 26 for theequivalent of two U.S. divisions, including17 infantry maneuver battalions, and pro­posed sending a division into the SouthVietnamese central highlands to "defeat" theViet Cong there. The joint chiefs discussedwith McNamara on March 29 a plan tosend three divisions to Sout·h Vietnam.

When Johnson convened another top-levelstrategy meeting at the White House onApril I, "the principal concern ... was theprospect of major deployment of U.S. andthird-country combat forces to SVN," thePentagon study says There was another ex-

acerbating factor, too: On March 29 VietCong terrorists had biown up the AmericanEmbassy in a daring Saigon daylight raid.

CRUCIAL CHANGE MADE IN u.s. ROLE

The April 1-2 meetings were perhaps themost critical of all Johnson's 1964-65 de­cision sessions, and the newly revealed doc­uments have made it int<) the most con­troversial as well. At this session, the secretpapers show, the President made a crucialchange in the mission of U.S. forces in Viet­nam, as well as deciding to commit majorground combat units to the war-but healso gave orders to keep the decisions andthe ensuing actions secret.

The evidence is contained in the NationalSecurity Council memo issued April 6, whichrecorded his decision to send two more Marinebattalions and 18,000 to 20,000 additional"support forces" into South Vietnam. (Someof the latter, as it turned out, were to pre­pare bases and otherwise pave the way foreven larger numbers of GIs who came later.)

The memo aiso recorded the President'sapproval of "a change of mission for allMarine battalions deployed to Vietnam topermit their more active use"-a shift thatfreed the Marines from purely defensive"security" duty and allowed U.S. command­ers to send them onto the offense for thefirst time.

None of this was to be revealed, however,as the last paragraph of the formal decisionmemo made clear. Johnson, it said, wanted"all possible precautions" to avoid "prema­ture pUblicity"; the "appearance of suddenchanges in policy" should be minimized; andthe changes and movements were to bedepicted as "Wholly consistent with existingp"iicy." It was not until June 8, when a StateDep.:ntment spolresman inadvertently brokethis embargo by saying that U.S. troops"would be available for combat support,"that the pUblic knew of the changes.

From April on, the Vietnam scenariomerely unfolded according to plans put for­ward by the military. Spurred by a series ofnew South Vietnamese defeats, .Westmore­land in June asked for 44 battalions of U.S.troops-upwards of 200,000 men.

AUTHORITY GIVEN TO COMMIT TROOPS

On June 26, Westmoreland received au­thority to commit those troops already inVietnam to battle when he thought it neces­sary-an even broader authority than thatgranted in April, and "as close to a freehand as (he) was llkely to get," the stUdysays.

On July 17, in another unpUblished orderreported by the Pentagon study, Johnson ap­proved the dispatch of 34 battalions of GIs toVietnam. He wasn't ready to talk about it,though; indeed, the White House continuedto show extreme sensitivity to any talk aboutmassive troop movements.

Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey wasone of those who felt the sting of WhiteHouse disapproval on this score. In the ad­vance text of a speech he was to dellver atthe National Governor's Conference in Min­neapolls on JUly 27, he said the President wasmakincr decisions that would "touch the llvesof hun"dreds of thousands of American fami­lies." The decisions, he added in his preparedtext, "could mean the' expenditure of greatresources--{)f money, material and, yes, ofhuman life."

Humphrey was stopped en route fromWaShington to Minneapolis to be informedby a telephone call from McGeorge Bundythat he had gone beyond the President'sground rules. When he delivered the speech,"hundreds of thousands" became merely"thousands"; the other reference to cost inmoney and "human life" disappeared com­pletely.

A day later, at a televised press conference,Johnson announced that he was sending 50,­000 more men to Vietnam, and said that"additional forces wiil be needed later andthey will be sent as requested," He told a

July 20, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 26145questioner that "it does not imply any changeof policy whatever."

strictly speaking, Johnson was telling thetruth. The "change of policy" had occurrednot that day but on many other days overa period of months, and the announcementmerely revealed what the secret documentsmake clear had in fact been decided earlier.

VIETNAM/THE SECRET PAPERS--VWASHINGTON. D.C.-It is difficult to assess

accurately the full significance of the secretDefense Department archive on U.S. Viet­nam policy which was revealed last week bypublication in several newspapers.

It provides only a documentary record­and an incomplete one at that-and it in­cludes virtually no information on the in­formal and oral exchanges between the presi­dent and his key advisers which played solarge a part in Lyndon Johnson's VIetnamdecision-making.

But even with these shortcomings, a care­ful stUdy of the documents themselves-­avoiding the SUbjective and purely personaljUdgments made by both the Pentagon ana­lysts and the journalists who reported ontheir study-provides the material for someover-all conclusions.

Four successive presidents and their ad­visers accepted two basic assumptlons aboutVietnam:

First, they believed that preventing a Com­munist takeover in South Vietnam was vitalto the worldwide position of the UnitedStates. The "domino theory"-that the fallof South Vietnam would ineVitably set inmotion a succession of Communist takeoversin the rest of Southeast Asia and would Infact have repercussions around the world­was taken ior granted by almost all U.S.policymakers, despite periodic and sometimeseloquent dissents.

Second, they assumed that the UnitedStates possessed enough power and influ­ence, and enough will to use It, to deal witha relatively minor Asian power like NorthVietnam.

CIA WARNINGS WERE IGNOREDIt Is easy now, In the light of bitter ex­

perience and with the aid of perfect hind­sight, to say that the presidents Involvedshould have paid more attention to the dis­sents. But the secret documents make plainthat the basic assumptions held by nearlyall public officials-and most editorialistsand scholars as well-simply blanked out dis­sent. They heard. but they weren't listen­11~~.

It was there to hear, but It was at best anInternllttent sound. One note came from thegovernment's "Intelligence community," es­pecially the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA)-whlch repeatedly warned that bomb­ing alone was unlikely to have a decisive ef­fect on either North Vietnam's will or thestrength of Insurgents in South Vietnam.

Perhaps the most searching dissent camefrom George W. Ball, undersecretary of state,just before President Johnson's final decisionto send thousands of U.S. combat troops toSouth Vietnam. In a memo to the preSidenton July 1, 1965, he said flatly:

"The South Vietnamese are losing the warto the Viet Congo No one can assure you thatwe can beat the Viet Cong or even forcethem to the conference table on our terms,no matter how many hundred thousandwhite, foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy. Noone lIas demonstrated that a white groundforce of whatever size can win a guerrillawar-which Is at the same time a civil warbetween Asians-in jungle terrain in themidst of a popUlation that refuses coopera­tion to the white forces ..." But Ball's wasalmost a lone voice. More typical was thatof Walt W. Rostow. then a State Departmentofficial, who wrote in a memo to Dean Ruskin May 1965 that "there Is no reason wecannot win as clear a Victory in South Vlet-

CXVII--1645-Part 20

nam as in Greece, Malaya and the Philip­pines." Victory, he said, "Is nearer our graspthan we may think."

Six months earlier Rostow had argued inanother memo to Rusk that "at this stagein history we are the greatest power in theworld-if we behave like it."

HINDSIGHT REVEALS FAULTY JUDGMENTSIn the narrower focus of South Vietnam

itself, the documentary record makes clearthat were other judgments that turned out­again In hindsight-to have been faulty:

First, it was assumed that the governmentof South Vietnam, first under Ngo DlnhDiem and then under a revolVing-door seriesof other leaders, had the inherent will andcapability to defend itself, with some help,against the Communist-supported Viet Conginsurgency.

Second, when successive South Vietnamesegovernments showed weakness, inefficiencyand corruption, it was assumed that thesefaults could be corrected with U.S. aid, ad­vice. exhortation and-if necessary-pres­sure.

Third, when South Vietnamese will andcapability was eventually perceived to befatally flawed, U.S. leaders sought to substi­tute major applications of American militarypower for South Vietnamese determination.And when the Saigon government began tocrumble openly, in 1964 and 1965, U.S. lead­ers fell back on other rationales for our in­volvement.

It Is quite clear, even given the gaps Inthe secret documentary record and the In­completeness of Its disclosure to date, thatLyndon Johnson didn't "get us Into Viet­nam." Like his predecessors, he merely walkedfarther into the quagn1lre; what he and hisadvisers did seemed to them simply a logicalextension of existing policy and commit­ment.

JOHNSON DID NOT EXPECT MAJOR WARIt Is also clear from the documents that

Johnson and his chief advisers hoped andbelieved throughout the crucial years ofdeepening U.S. Involvement that at somepoint-alter some one of the many eseala­tory American actions-Hanoi would decidethat Its objective was no longer worth itscast. Again, hindsight permits a verdict thatthis estimate was wrong; but the documentsmake clear that neither Johnson nor hispredecessors expected the process would re­sult in the major land war that eventuallyoccurred.

The documents-as opposed to the Inter­pretation put on them by both the Pentagonanalysts and the New York Times articles re­porting their study--<io not depict Johnsonas a man moving relentlessly toward ever­deeper military Involvement in South Viet­nam.

On the contrary, the documentary pictureshows the president as slow, cautious, skepti­cal of mmtary advice and pron1lses and re­luctant to get more deeply InVOlved. He isseen as having made his really big deci­sions-to start sustained bombing of thenorth, to Introduce major U.S. groundforces-only after repeated delays and usual­ly after several times rejecting the sugges­tions.

For example, the documents do not sup­port the suggestion of the Pentagon analystsand the New York Times accounts of theirstudy that Johnson decided as early as Sep­tember 1964 to start bombing North Vietnamin earlv 1965. On the contrary, the secretpapers 'demonstrate that on at least threeoccasions after September he delayed makingthat decision.

But the documents do prove that Johnsonsought-With considerable success-to muf­fle the Impact of his actions by concealingthem or being evasive about them in pUblic.

?REMATURE PUBLICITY WAS FEAREDThe most compelllng evidence of this. in

the secret papers thus far disclosed. lies in

the cold print of the final paragraph of thememorandum formaliZing the president's de­cision to broaden the mission of U.S. troopsalready in South Vietnam and to send 20,000more men there. In that paragraph. he or­dered "all possible precautions" against "pre­mature pUblicity" ahd said that the changesshould be portrayed as "gradual and whollyconsistent with existing pollcy"-whlch theywere not.

Publication of the documents, WltIl specificdates of presidential action, also makes clearthat on several occasions Johnson sought todismiss as "speculation" reports of actions hehad or was about to take.

The documents make plain-again con­trary to some published Interpretations­that many of the so-called recommendationsby high advisers were "contingency plans"­options prepared for and put before thepresident to guide him In reaching an actualdecision. Preparation of such plans is one ofthe principal duties of military and diplo­matic staffs; they would have .been derelictIn their duty if they had not prepared themthroughout the period.

But a study of these contingency plans alsomakes clear a larger truth about the work­Ings of government: That such plans tend tobe self-fuifilllng-that Is, what begins asmerely a set of options, no one of them neces­sarily recommended for adoption, tends toevolve .nto flrm proposals simply through themomentum of the bureacratic process. Thisin turn tends to prevent the fullest restudj'of basic polley tenets before major decisionsare made.

u.s. DIDN'T "BLUNDER" INTO THE WAR

Finally, for whatever it is worth in termsof lessons learned, the Pentagon archivedemonstrates clearly that the United Statesdid not "blunder" or "stumble blindly" intothe Vietnam War.

Again and again the secret dccuments re­veal U.S. leaders were aware that their step­by-step Involvement In Vietnam could leadto more--even though they hoped and be­lieved there would be an end to the progres­sion before it went as far as full-scale war.

In a 5eparate essay written some time ago,Leslie H. Gelb, the man who directed thesecret study In 1967 and 19G8, put It thisway:

"Our president.s and most of those who in­fluenced theIr decisions did not stumblestep by step into Vietnam ... Vietnam wasIndeed a quagmire, but most of our leadersknew it.

"Nevertheless, our presidents persevered.Given :nternational compUlsions to 'keep ourword' and 'save face; domestic prohibitionsagainst 'losing,' and their personal stakes,our leaders 'did what was necessary', did itabout the way they wanted, were prepared topay the costs, and plowed on wltll a mixtureof hope and doom. They 'saw' no acceptablealternative.'

Tills summation, by the man who directedthe compilation of the vast secret arcllive onthe war, may well stand as the bast assess­ment of its significance.

SOUTHERN LOUISIANA AREA RATEPROCEEDING

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, on July 16,1971, the Federal Power Commission is­sued its opinion and order in the south­ern Louisiana area rate proceeding.

Tllis was a landmark decision for threereasons.

First, the ceiling rates for natural gasproduced in this area were increased. ~Yover 30 percent. The southern LoUISI­ana area is one of our most pro~c ~asproducing areas. By setting these Signifi.cantly higher ceiling rates, the Commis­sion implicitly recognized th!'-t .their pre­vious rate had beenunrealistieally low.