PRESENTATION TO PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON POLICE

RHINO THREAT

9 SEPTEMBER 2015

DIRECTORATE FOR PRIORITY CRIME INVESTIGATION

Contents

Introduction

Strategic Direction

Statistics

Modus Operandi

Value Chain

Hot Spots Kruger National Park

Exports and Trafficking routes

Investigative strategy and the objectives of the ICC

Task team and investigative teams

Challenges

INTRODUCTION

• South Africa has a proud track record of rhino conservation. Figures show how the

numbers of rhinos have steadily been increasing. At the end of 2007 South Africa

conserved 35% of Africa’s Black rhino in the wild and 93% of the continent’s white

rhino.

• Over the last five years we have seen a dramatic rise in the incidents of rhino

poaching, notably in South Africa, custodian of the world’s largest remaining rhino

populations.

• Secure populations are now being targeted by increasingly sophisticated and

aggressive poaching operations, apparently backed by international organized crime

syndicates.

• Since 1997 the Convention for International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES)

has implemented an international trade ban on rhino horn. This anti-trade measure

has driven the market activity underground and not ended it. This resulted in covert

operations by the criminal organisations which made it increasingly difficult to

monitor.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

• NATJOINTS Priority Committee was established and activated

on 27 January 2011 to address the situation on a national and

international level with immediate effect.

• All PROVJOINTS were then instructed to establish and activate

a priority committee at provincial level to manage, implement

and coordinate all joint integrated actions, and efforts to curb

Rhino poaching and illegal hunting in their respective provinces,

with immediate effect.

• Dedicated investigative teams were established.

STATISTICS

• It needs to be highlighted that the figures provided here are those that have been

captured on the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) Crime Administration System

(CAS). Attached are the statistics of Rhino related cases reported on the SAPS CAS

system. It is referred to as Rhino related cases because it is not only where Rhinos

were shot and killed but include cases such as Murder, Trespassing and Illegal

possession of firearms.

• Latest figures obtained from SAPS CAS/SANParks regarding the statistics is that 827

Rhinos were killed inside Kruger National Park, 89 in Mpumalanga and 1224 killed

Nationally in 2014.

• As from January 2015 up to 30 June 2015, 379 rhinos were killed in Kruger National

Park and 18 in Mpumalanga outside the Kruger.

• Cases investigated within Kruger are done by a Head Office Task Team.

• Cases outside the park are currently investigated by Nelspruit Directorate for Priority

Crime Investigations (DPCI).

Main Heading Goes Here

YEAR

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL

2013 51 47 49 56 48 36 49 40 70 53 50 49 598

2014 74 38 49 67 59 54 59 69 66 92 89 113 827

2015 48 54 67 80 59 65 6 379

Rhino Poaching in KNP (South)

Source:

CAS system

SO3 OP

Control

51 47 49 56 48 36 49 40 70 53 50 49

74 38 49

67 59 54

59 69 66 92 89 113

48

54 67

80 59

56 7

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

0

50

100

150

200

250

RHINO POACHING

2013 2014 2015

STATISTICS SANPARKS

CASES REPORTED

RHINOS KILLED

OTHER CASES (ie Illegal possession of firearms, trespassing, inquest)

SUSPECTS FATALLY

WOUNDED DURING

OPERATION

ARRESTS FOR POACHING

OTHER CRIMES (ie Illegal possession of firearms, trespassing)

JAN 2015

161 48 6 2 9 6

FEB 2015

54 74 17 6 9 5

MAR 2015

67 67 6 4 12 11

APRIL 2015

15 80 1 5 22 3

MAY 2015

65 59 02 0 21 0

JUNE 2015

58 56 7 6 22 13

JULY 2015

7 6 2 0 03 0

MODUS OPERANDI

Large organised syndicates from Mozambique consist of up to eight members divided into two groups,

namely a reconnaissance group and an assault group, who operate almost in military formation. The

reconnaissance group identify the rhino while the second assault group kill the rhino and harvest the

horns. Groups enter from Mozambique through the Kruger National Park (KNP), the Crocodile River and

Lebombo Port of Entry (POE). Similar groups also enter from the KNP’s western border via private

reserves and the two provinces, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. Corrupt officials among parks personnel,

SAPS, South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and border agencies assist syndicates to locate

rhinos and provide forewarning of police operations and deployments. The latest trend is to enter through

the Western border with the assistance of South African Citizens who know the areas. These groups also

hunt in the Mpumalanga Parks and private reserves and farms.

More sophisticated poachers who operate in smaller groups (two or three) are transported from

Mozambique via Lebombo POE and enter the KNP at Crocodile Bridge Gate near Komatipoort, at

Malelane Gate and through Manyeleti on the western border. The poachers then stay with relatives or

accomplices before entering the Parks. This method is applied to avoid SAPS/SANDF personnel that

patrol the Republic of South Africa (SA)/Mozambican borderline.

THE VALUE CHAIN

HOTSPOTS SOUTH OF KRUGER NATIONAL PARK

HOTSPOTS…

Kruger National Park-

Houtboschrand

N'wanetsi

Kingfisherspruit

Maroela South

Pretoriuskop

Crocodile Bridge

Eastern Border Kruger National Park-

Manyeleti

Sabie Sands

Western Border Kruger National Park-

Mozambique

EXPORTS AND TRAFFICKING ROUTES

The methods of smuggling the rhino horn out of South Africa has to date not been

exposed sufficiently.

Most of the poaching incidents occurred in the Kruger National Park.

The rhino horn syndicates are using the following Air Services to transport goods

from Maputo:

Air Kenya Maputo to Kenya

Air Ethiopia Maputo to Ethiopia

Thailand

Air Qatar Maputo to Qatar Hong Kong

Vietnam

INFORMATION AND ASSISANCE NEEDED FROM

NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

• Assisting with personal information on suspects.

• Assisting with Cellular Phone information.

• Where arrests are made – information on fire arms and ammunition as well as DNA on Exhibits confiscated.

INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES AND THE ICC

OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVES

ANALYSIS

DISPRUTIVE

GATHERING

FAFI DATABASE

ENHANCEMENT

INVESTIGATIVES

COURT DRVEN

NPA PROCESSES

WHAT WHEN WHERE WHY WHO HOW

MEMBERS OF THE ICC

• South African Police Service

* Crime Intelligence (Chair Person)

* Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation

• State Security Agency (SSA)

• South African National Parks (SANParks) and Mpumalanga Parks and Tourism

Agency(MTPA)

• South African National Defense Force (SANDF)

MEMBERS OF THE ICC South African Police Service

* Crime Intelligence (Chair Person)

* Directorate for Priority Crime

Investigation

State Security Agency (SSA)

South African National Parks (SANParks) and Mpumalanga Parks and Tourism

Agency(MTPA)

South African National Defense Force (SANDF)

MEMBERS OF THE JOCOM

Representative of ICC

South African National Parks (SANParks) and Mpumalanga Parks and

Tourism (MTPA)

South African Police Service

* Crime Intelligence

* Directorate for Priority Crime

Investigation

* Skukuza SAPS (VISPOL and Detectives)

South African National Defense Force (SANDF)

MEMBERS OF THE ANALYST COMMITTEE

South African National Parks (SANParks) and Mpumalanga Parks and Tourism

Agency

South African Police Service

* Crime Intelligence

* Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation

* Disruptive Team Commander

South African National Defense Force (SANDF)

South African State Security

South African Revenue Services

MEMBERS OF THE DISRUPTIVE GROUP

South African Police Service

Investigators

Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Investigators)

* Disruptive Team

* Tactical Response Team

* Local Criminal Record Centre

* DPCI Digital Forensic Laboratory

* Crime Intelligence

FAFI

AFI

• Identify and investigate Properties.

• Verify and confirm collected

information.

• Ownership of property.

• Determine usage of property in

unlawful activities.

• Profile suspects and property

• Obtain orders (preservation,

restrained, confiscation, realization

order, forfeiture order).

• FIC Reports.

• Family tree report.

FI

• Identification of money laundering.

• Informing PP of money laundering

charges.

• Apply for financial documents in terms

of Sec 205.

• Analysis and capturing of Bank

statements.

• Conduct life style audit.

• How money was spend (money flow

chart)

• Affidavits with regards to analyse

documents. Investigate STR’s.

CRIME INTELLIGENCE

GATHERERS

• Gathering of information (proactive and reactive information).

• Identification of individuals, highflyers and syndicate groups

• Request of profiles of arrested suspects on rhino poaching from CIMO.

• Determining of vehicle .

• Recruitment of informers (infiltration and penetration).

• Identification of receivers/buyers/couriers/organiser.

• Interviewing of arrested suspects.

• Compiling of intelligence reports and information notes to the client.

• Sharing of information with all role players and feedback to clients

• Briefing and Debriefing of informers.

• Prioritization of suspects and stay focused on them.

• Referrals and tasking to stake holders.

• Application section 205 and Linkages on database.

CRIME INTELLIGENCE

ANALISTS

• Gathering of information reports from gatherers.

• Analysis of reports.

• Identify gaps in information.

• Tasking to gatherers to fill gaps.

• Analysis of reports .

• Liaise with different role players on different levels .

• Present information to client.

• Update Database on regular/daily basis.

PRIORITY CRIME MANAGEMENT CENTRE

ANALYSIS SECTION

• Profile known suspects on Experian and profiling system.

• Analyse section 205.

• Analyse information from downloading of cell phones of suspects.

• Give feedback of the analysis to investigating officer and give

taskings back.

• Sharing of information with other role players.

• Analyse and linkages of information reports

PCMC…

CO-ORDINATION

• Co-ordination and liaison between all role players.

• Distribution of tasking's to DPCI.

• Adhering to tasking's and feedback.

• Interprovincial liaison.

• Meeting convening

INVESTIGATION/DISRUPTIVE GROUP

• Conducting intelligence driven disruptive operations on all identified rhino poaching

suspects.

• Gathering of information and Seizure of exhibits.

• Arrest and interviewing of suspects. Opening and updating files on suspects.

• Downloading of cell phones and electronics devices.

• Interacting between ICC and TRT/Tracing unit/LCRC.

• Photos of suspects and properties.

• Compile factual report.

• Referrals and tasking to stakeholders and Feedback to clients.

• Further investigation.

• Monitoring of suspects on bail and sentenced.

• Reaction on available information.

TASK TEAM

• A Task Team was established to investigate all cases within Mpumalanga/Kruger National

Park , consisting of :

• SAPS Crime Intelligent with annalists

• SAPS Detective Services, SAPS DPCI Investigators (Projects) , Annalist and FAFI

• SAPS War room Annalists and Cellular Phone Downloads

• SAPS LCRC

• SAPS Skukuza

• SAPS TRT

• SSA Intelligent and Annalists

• SANParks Investigators and Annalists

• SANDF Operational, Intelligent and Annalists

• MTPA Investigators

• Dept. of Internal Affairs

• SARS

• NPA

ENHANCEMENT OF DATABASE

•Updating and keep of database

•Do linkages on database

•Sharing of database information with all stakeholders

•Compile prioritised list of suspect

•Tasking to investigators to obtain more information

•Updating database of arrested suspects on bail sentenced and parole.

•Prioritization of suspects and giving tasking to disruptive team.

HYPOTHESIS

FACTS:

Illegal hunters enter South Africa’s National and Provincial Parks to hunt and kill rhino for its horns.

There is a market for these horns in the Far Eastern countries like China and Vietnam.

There is a high probability that at the current trend, rhino’s are on the brink of extinction.

Illegal hunters does not care if there is a loss of life as long as they can kill a rhino, get the horns and sell it.

There are syndicates and people with money behind these killings.

VULNERABLE AREAS

• The following account is based on the research covering some different economic aspects and analyses of the rhino horn market. – It has become easy to access and illegally hunt, kill and dehorn rhinos in Kruger

National Park , Provincial Parks, Private reserves and Farms which is bordering Mozambique and Kruger National Park.

– It is not easy to trace whether a person or vehicle is still in the park once the latter has accessed it

– Access control at the gates leading into Kruger National Park is not strengthened

– The size of the Kruger national Park makes it difficult to police despite the deployment of the South African National Defence Force

– Lack of or limited tactical intelligence to prevent the poachers to enter Kruger national Park

– Limited utilization of technology

– Involvement of officials charged with the fight against rhino poaching

– The increased price of a rhino horn visa verse the risk of being killed by the rangers or wild animals

– The risk of loss of life by officials charged with rhino poaching

CHALLENGES

• Cumbersome court proceedings and slow conviction rate;

• Multiple armed incursions into State owned Reserves\Parks and private land

• Provincial (CITES\TOPS- Threatened and or Endangered Species ) permitting system and

implementation

• Different legislation in different Provinces together with National Endangered Management Act

(NEMA)

• The non-vetting of all involved in the operation/ line function

• The screening of applicants for hunting permits.

• Public awareness here and abroad

• Lack of proper records for accessing and leaving the parks including security

• Uncoordinated approach to foreign liaison

Thank you