positive–negative asymmetry in social discrimination

This article was downloaded by: [University of York]On: 03 September 2013, At: 08:28Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

European Review of SocialPsychologyPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pers20

Positive–Negative Asymmetryin Social DiscriminationAmélie Mummendey a & Sabine Otten aa University of JenaPublished online: 15 Apr 2011.

To cite this article: Amlie Mummendey & Sabine Otten (1998) Positive–NegativeAsymmetry in Social Discrimination, European Review of Social Psychology, 9:1,107-143, DOI: 10.1080/14792779843000063

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14792779843000063

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pers20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/14792779843000063

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14792779843000063

form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Chapter 4

Positive-Negative Asymmetry in Social Discrimination

AmClie Mummendey and Sabine Otten University of Jena

ABSTRACT Minimal group experiments showed that mere categorization of individuals into arbitrary social groups can be sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism. This effect has been qualified by demonstrating a positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination: categorization into minimal, laboratory groups was sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism in allocations of positive stimuli, but not in allocations of negative ones. Different explanatory perspectives for this valence-specific asymmetry in intergroup behaviour were tested. An integrative perspective link- ing normative, cognitive and motivational aspects is proposed. This perspective also implies a critical analysis and re-framing of traditional theorizing on categorization effects in minimal intergroup situations.

INTRODUCTION

Article 3 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany declares explicitly one right of man: all human beings are equal before the law. Men and women have equal rights. Nobody should be disadvantaged or advantaged because of hidher gender, origin, race, religious or political beliefs. Herewith, the constitution relies on the fundamental principle of human rights which presupposes the absolute acknowledgement of the individual as holder of equal liberty. About 50 years ago, on 10 December 1948, the General Assem-

European Review of Sociol Psychology. Volume 9. Edited by Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewsionr. 0 1998 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

108 A M ~ L I E MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OITEN

bly of the United Nations proclaimed the General Declaration of Human Rights which later (1976) resulted in two pacts, one concerning civil and political rights. the other concerning economic, social and cultural rights. By 1989 about 90 states had agreed to these pacts. Accordingly, many states provide as constitutional law the explicit prohibition of discrimination in favour of or against individuals because of their race, religion, political activity or gender.

G.W. Allport (1954) refers to an official memorandum of the United Nations from 1949 when he defines discrimination as “[Coming] about only when we deny to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish” (p. 5 1). He differentiated social discrimination from differential treatment of persons based on individual qualities by quoting the memorandum again: “Discrimination includes any conduct based on a distinction made on grounds of natural or social categories, which have no relation either to individual capacities or merits, or to the concrete behaviour of the individual person” (p. 52). Up to today. Allport’s definition of social discrimination is taken as the basis for theoretical and empirical research in social psychology about this phenomenon (e.g. Graumann & Wintermantel, 1989; Stroebe & Insko. 1989). Looking at the different laws, declarations, conventions and pacts on national or international levels, it seems justified to infer a broad social consensus which condemns social discrimination and which provides any target or victim with access to complaints at courts of justice.

The more strongly and widely this basic rejection is heard, the more interesting becomes the question of why social discrimination nevertheless still occurs. Both occurrence and rejection of discriminatory treatment look like two brothers fighting. The stronger one of them becomes, the more the other feels challenged to fight against him. The more severe and dreadful discriminatory treatments become, the more effort is put into endeavours to find explanations for the phenomenon, hoping that explanations might assist the search for control and reduction of these kinds of social problems. For decades social psychological theory and research has been a kind of fellow-soldier in this battle against social discrimination.

I t is not the place here to review the different lines of theoretical approaches which have been developed for this purpose (see Allport, 1954; Brown, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Stephan, 1985; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Moreover, we want to focus on those approaches which conceptualize social discrimination as a category of behaviour between social groups and which therefore analyse and systematize this kind of behaviour within the context of relations between social groups.

What leads people to maltreat others, to degrade or to disadvantage them, to prevent them from gaining access to important resources? In the early 1950s, Sherif and co-workers published their nowclassic summer camp experiments which provided the basis for Sherif‘s functional theory of realistic

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

POSITIVE-NEGATIVE ASYMMETRY IN SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION 109

intergroup conflict (Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955; Sherif et af., 1961). Accord- ing to this theory, behaviour directed toward members of one’s own or other groups is determined by the functional relation between the two groups with respect to their group interests or goals. Negative interdependence between two groups, or conflict of interests, leads to negative attitudes, hostilities and aggressive behaviour directed against the outgroup as well as particularly positive attitudes and evaluations towards the ingroup, in other words, to intergroup discrimination (Sherif, 1966).

From experiments following Sherif‘s realistic group conflict theory, increasing evidence emerged which also demonstrated ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination in situations where intergroup conflict was absent. Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) were the first to study individuals’ behaviour under the condition of mere belongingness to different groups without further qualifications of the relation between these groups. Horwitz and Rabbie (1982) conclude from their pioneering findings that the experience of common fate as members of a group is an important determinant for the instigation of ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination.

THE MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM

Tajfel et al. (1971) went one step further by developing their Minimal Group Paradigm. The idea was to establish a kind of baseline situation and then to enrich the intergroup situation step by step with additional variables in order to identify the critical condition or factor which would lead to social discrimination. For an intergroup situation to be minimal, the following criteria have to be met (see Brewer, 1979, p. 309):

(a) no face-to-face interaction among subjects within or between groups; (b) anonymity of group membership; (c) absence of any instrumental link between the basis for intergroup categorization and the response measure, and (d) a response measure involving real and significant choices but of no direct utilitar- ian value to the subject.

The results obtained in the first studies using this paradigm led to the claim that in the minimal group situation, mere categorization of people into ingroup and outgroup is a sufficient condition for ingroup favouritism, i.e. favouring one’s own group or category over an outgroup. When asked to allocate small amounts of money to members of one’s own and another group, participants in minimal group experiments preferred distributions which gave more to their own than to the other group. But the more important result in terms of the later developed Social Identity Theory was that they even preferred to maximize the difference between the two groups in favour of their own group, rather than simply maximizing the absolute gain for the ingroup.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

110 A M ~ L I E MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OITEN

As Turner put it, “[participants] seemed to want the ingroup to win rather than gain” (1978, p. 102).

Meanwhile a large body of empirical evidence supports this claim (for reviews see Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Messick & Mackie, 1989: Mummendey, 1995; Tajfel. 1982). Social discrimination as an effect of mere categorization in minimal group situations has been replicated again and again. It has been observed with variations of the original experimental setting, with different samples and with different kinds of dependent measures including evaluations, attributions, choices in prisoner’s dilemma games, allocations of resources, and use of different linguistic categories. The robustness and generalizability of the mere categorization effect (see Turner et af., 1987, p. 27). has hardly been challenged up to now. Brown (1995) concludes that:

[Social categorization] seems to provide the sufficient circumstances for people to begin to favour their own group over others, whether this favouritism be in the form of biased evaluative judgments or as some kind of concrete behavioural discrimination (p. 44).

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

With Social Identity Theory, Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) promoted the prevailing explanation of social discrimination in minimal group situations. By segmenting “an individual’s social environment into his own group and others” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 67), social categorization provides an individual with his/ her location within a network of interrelations between different groups. The knowledge of belonging to one group and not belonging to others, together with the emotional and evaluative meaning attached to this belongingness, creates an individual’s social identity. Individuals strive for a positive evaluation of their own identity. They obtain evaluative information by comparisons between their own and other groups on evaluative dimensions. A positive identity is achieved by a comparison outcome which creates positive distinctiveness for one’s own group compared to a relevant outgroup. A negative comparison outcome will create an unsatisfying identity and thus instigate activities in order to achieve or restore positive distinctiveness. It is obviously the comparative perspective which links social categorization with social identity.

From the social identity theory perspective. ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination in the situation of the Minimal Group Paradigm is seen as functional, fulfilling the need for differentiation or distinctiveness between groups. Subsequently. Self-categorization Theory (Turner et al., i987) proposed positive distinctiveness as equivalent to the “relative prototypicality of the ingroup on valued dimensions of intergroup comparison”

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


(p. 62). Positive self-evaluation is seen as a function of people’s relative prototypicality at any given level of self-other comparison. It is therefore assumed “that there is a general tendency to seek positive distinctiveness for oneself at any salient level of self categorization” (p. 62).

In both these theories, Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization Theory, favouritism of own group and discrimination against the outgroup is conceived as the result of individuals’ striving for positive social distinctiveness, in which they engage when they identify as members of a group in a context where the categorization into ingroup and outgroup is made salient.

POSITIVE DISTINCTIVENESS AND INTERGROUP DISCRIMINATION

In the social psychology literature, this theoretical proposition is very often condensed into the following kind of syllogism: first premise-the situation of the minimal group paradigm provides nothing but mere intergroup categorization; second premise-social discrimination in the minimal group paradigm is a robust replicable effect; conclusion-intergroup categorization is the sufficient condition for social discrimination. This, however, means a misleading short circuit, against which the founders of Social Identity Theory, even in their earliest writings, have argued. They stress, instead, that the co- occurrence between categorization and discrimination might be true only under certain conditions:

It would be premature to conclude theoretically that there is an automatic or inevitable connection between [intergroup categorization] and intergroup discrimination (Turner, 1978, p. 105, see also 1975).

What is postulated by Social Identity Theory is not an automatic connection between categorization and discrimination but, rather, the mediation between the two by the following three conditions:

1. In order to be identified with, social categorizations must be relevant for, an individual’s self-evaluation; they must contribute to an individual’s positive or negative social identity. Information about whether identity based on these categories is negative or positive must be provided by the presence or availability of intergroup comparisons on valued dimensions.

3. The only viable way in the particular situation for the ingroup to promote positive identity is to create positive distinctiveness on those valued dimensions.

Following these original assumptions of Social Identity Theory, the syllogism has to be modified: first premise-the minimal group paradigm creates an

2.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

112 A M ~ L I E MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OTTEN

intergroup categorization which implies these three particular conditions; second premise-social discrimination in the minimal group paradigm is a robust and replicable effect; conclusion-under minimal group conditions, intergroup categorization is connected with intergroup discrimination.

According to these assumptions, minimal social discrimination is the result of social competition between groups. i f a dimension permits individuals to make evaluative differentiations between ingroup and outgroup, and if both groups value this dimension similarly, comparison on this dimension can be utilized for social competition aiming at each group’s superiority on the same positively valued pole of this dimension (see Turner, 1975, 1978, for detailed discussion of this issue).

Ingroup Favouritism and Outgroup Derogation

The goal of winning is achieved by establishing a positive comparison outcome in favour of one’s own group. For such a comparison outcome to be positive, it is irrelevant whether this is achieved by being better than or less bad than the other group. The positive distinctiveness can be created independently of the valence quality of resources to be distributed or the valence connotation of attributes to be assigned. Social Identity Theory consequently does not take into account the valence of evaluative dimensions of resources in terms of a categorical differentiation as either positive or negative, neither does it suggest valence-specific predictions concerning conditions for discrimination.

Looking at the socially and politically problematic evaluation and treatment of others, at those cases of discrimination which originally formed the issue of concern, we see much more often the de-evaluation or derogation, the explicitly more negative treatment of the outgroup. Accordingly, there is a mismatch between social reality and the empirical studies on intergroup behaviour which-as already outlined by Brown (1986)Aemonstrate no evidence for outgroup hostility “but only mild derogation” (p. 557).

Social psychological research concerned with ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination has primarily focused on group members’ distribution of positive resources. There are many real-life examples, however, of people’s willingness to allocate aversive stimuli or negative resources like burdens to outgroup members. The question is whether the conditions sufficient to elicit discrimination in distributions of positive resources will function equivalently for intergroup discrimination in the negative area. However, empirical studies not designed explicitly to tackle the problem of valence in social discrimination have already cast some doubts on the adequacy of easy extrapolations from positive to negative valence. For example, Struch and Schwartz (1989) showed convincingly that ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination by positive distinctiveness on positive valence attributes did not

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


at all predict negative intentions to explicitly disadvantage the outgroup in an intergroup resource distribution task.

A Taxonomy of Social Discrimination

To approach this question in a more systematic way, Mummendey and Simon (1991) suggested a taxonomy of social discrimination which will be described below. In a first step, the distinction between positive and negative behaviour quality, i.e. the valence of behaviour involved in intergroup discrimination, should be clarified. For our purpose at the present stage, a preliminary opera- tional differentiation is considered sufficient (see Brendl & Higgins, 1996, for an elaborated motivational model of the judgement of valence). We define positive stimuli as those which an individual would like to approach and negative stimuli as those which an individual would like to avoid. Obviously, the decision whether a stimulus is perceived as negative or positive is not to be made a priori but depends on context information. Nevertheless, the decision can be made on the basis of empirical evidence or, in terms of an experimental procedure, on the basis of manipulation checks. The second step is to differen- tiate between two different modes of disadvantaging the outgroup in favour of the ingroup: the disadvantage might result from differential allocation or from differential removal of resources or stimuli. This analysis ends up with a two- dimensional taxonomy and four types of social discrimination presented in Figure 4.1.

If more positive or less negative stimuli are allocated to the ingroup relative to the outgroup, we call this direct discrimination in the positive or negative area; if less positive or more negative resources are taken away from the ingroup relative to the outgroup, we talk of indirect discrimination in the positive or negative area. The overwhelming empirical evidence so far refers to the type of discrimination depicted in cell (a) (the direct discrimination of

Valence

Behaviour Positive stimuli Negative stimuli

Allocation Direct discrimination IG > OG Direct discrimination IG c OG Positive type (a) (b) Negative type

Removal Indirect discrimination (c) (d) Indirect discrimination Positive Wpe IG < OG Nepative type IG > OG

Figure 4.1 Taxonomy of social discrimination. IG, OG denote ingroup, outgroup, respectively

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

114 AMELIE MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OTTEN

the positive type), where by the ingroup gets more positive evaluations or resource allocations than the outgroup. There is one example for cell (c) (the indirect discrimination of the positive type) provided in a study by Hewstone, Fincham, and Jaspars (1981) who, in a minimal group experiment, established differential removal of money-points, i.e. positive stimuli as the dependent variable. Results in this study showed ingroup favouritism scores which were somewhat lower than the results of the allocation study carried out by Tajfel et al. (1971).

Following this taxonomy we started a series of experimental studies which focused on the comparison of direct discrimination of either the positive or the negative type. The question to be dealt with was to investigate whether the findings from the classic minimal group experiments by Tajfel et al. (1971) can simply be replicated: will members of minimal groups, when distributing negative outcomes, show the same pattern of ingroup favouritism as group members in the typical minimal group experiments, who distributed primarily positive outcomes? Or, in other words, will the mere categorization effect on outgroup discrimination hold true irrespective of the valence.-specific type of social discrimination?

POSITIVE-NEGATIVE ASYMMETRY OF SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION

A first minimal group study (Mummendey et al., 1992, Study I ) focused on differential allocation of negative stimuli. By means of the usual matrices (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel et al., 1971), participants had to allocate varying duration of an unpleasant sound, supposedly to create the experimental conditions for an experiment to follow. Participants were told that the next experiment was about physiological correlates of mood induced by aversive noise. Results indicated that “fairness” was the dominant strategy used. Regardless of whether the experimental groups were formed at random or by a similarity criterion, participants did not show ingroup-favouritism or maximizing difference strategies at all.

In a second experiment (Mummendey et al., 1992, Study 11) we imple- mented two factors in order to vary the participants’ need for a positive social identity, namely relative group size and relative group status, the idea being that minorities and low-status groups should experience a greater need for positive social identity. The negative stimulus which had to be allocated to own and other group was now operationalized as the length of a list of meaningless syllables allegedly to be learned by the participants in an experiment to follow. Tajfel matrices were used again, and again groups with no particular need for positive social identity followed the “fairness” strategy in their allocation decisions. Only participants in a numerical minority or an inferior status

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

POSITIVE-NEGATIVE ASYMMETRY I N SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION 115

position, i.e., in the state of a threatened or even negative identity, showed significant ingroup bias.

The findings showed clearly that mere categorization into minimal groups was not sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism for negative outcome allocation. However, discriminatory allocation of negative stimuli will occur as well, provided group members are particularly motivated to achieve positive social identity. Only under specific and more compelling circumstances do people tend to discriminate by the allocation of negative stimuli. We suggested that these first results should be read as “a caveat against the silent generalization from the realm of positive to the realm of negative outcome allocations” (Mummendey et al., 1992, p. 142). We suggested, moreover, the explicit study of different types of discriminatory behaviour and formed the hypothesis of a “positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination“, which claims that ingroup favouritism by negative stimuli is less probable or less easily expressed than discrimination by positive stimuli.

The study reported above was concerned with negative intergroup allocations only; it took the comparison reference of positive intergroup allocations from similar minimal group studies with types of positive stimuli allocations. In order to investigate explicitly the effect of stimulus valence on social discrimination in intergroup situations, further studies were performed to create a systematic comparison of positive and negative outcome allocations in identical experimental settings. These experiments created a less minimal intergroup situation, still introducing an arbitrary social categorization, but with overt group assignment and face-to-face interaction. Blanz, Mummendey, and Otten (1995b) used evaluations of ingroup and outgroup on either positive or negative attributes; Otten, Mummendey, and Blanz (1996) compared allocation decisions of either money (German D-Mark currency units) or duration of an unpleasant noise (in minute units). Again, relative group status as well as relative group size were manipulated, but also the degree of salience of this categorization in different settings (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995a). In these studies, for the positive area of intergroup behaviour-namely the original version-the primary, very consistent and replicated finding was, in these still relatively minimal conditions, the old and well-known ingroup bias, where strategies maximizing ingroup profit or even maximizing intergroup difference were significant. In the negative area, however, ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination were absent.

To conclude from these studies: for ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination to occur in the negative area, there need to be additional conditions beyond the mere categorization into laboratory groups. We coined this our “aggravation hypothesis”: social discrimination in the negative area not only presupposes a salient social categorization, but additional conditions which “aggravate” the achievement or maintenance of positive distinctiveness are also necessary. In other words, conditions which are known to have an

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

116 A M ~ L I E MUMMENDEY AND SABINE O-ITEN

intensifying effect on ingroup bias in the positive area are necessary in the negative area in order to elicit ingroup bias. Such variables are, for example, the salience of categorization, inferior ingroup status and minority ingroup position. Conditions of this kind provide information that one’s own and another group differ on particular dimensions. These differences might then legitimize differential treatment of one’s own and other the group, potentially ending up with ingroup favouritism.

In order to obtain more solid evidence concerning our hypothesis referring to the positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination. we conducted a meta-analysis based upon all our studies about valence effects on intergroup discrimination. The sample included mere minimal group situations as well as “enriched” minimal group situations referring to artificial social categorizations, but introducing face-to-face interaction between participants as well as aggravating conditions. Participants were (non-psychology) students from the university or from high schools. Dependent measures included ratings on evaluative dimensions as well as allocations of resources, each representing either positive or negative valence-quality. Altogether, 26 experimental conditions in which valence was manipulated as independent variable were included in the analysis. The mean effect sizes of ingroup favouritism for positive and for negative valence conditions were significantly different (t = 2 . 1 8 ; ~ < 0.05: Rosenthal 1989, p. 84). Participants discriminated less on negative than on positive valence measures (see Figure 4.2). The mean effect sizes weighted by study size were Znegduve = 0.14 and Zpos,,,vc = 0.31. The reliability of our experimental tests is underlined by the fact that the mean favouritism measured in the positive conditions is very close to the results by Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992, p. 109), who report a mean score of i = 0.27 in their meta-analysis of ingroup biases (in studies referring to positive comparison dimensions). According to the conventions proposed by Cohen (1988), the favouritism effect size for negative valence can be considered “small”, while it is “medium” in the positive domain.

In order to test whether discrimination in the negative domain is simply discrimination to a lower degree than discrimination in the positive domain, we correlated the effect sizes from the positive and negative valence conditions for the 26 independent experimental tests. However, this Spearman correlation turns out to be negligible (I; = 0.08, k = 26). Hence, one can conclude that experimental variations, like the aggravating conditions, differ considerably in the strength of their impact on intergroup differentiation in either the positive or the negative domain.

To sum up, the empirical evidence so far shows that positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination is a fairly well established phenomenon. Apparently, the conditions established in the minimal group situation are sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism in the positive area, but not in the negative area. The mere categorization effect on ingroup favouritism does not

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


40T

-0.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9

negative valence n = 557 0 positive valence n = 579

Figure 4.2 Intergroup treatment in the domain of positive stimuli and in the domain of negative stimuli: meta analysis over 52 hypothesis tests. (According to Buhl, 19%)

appear when positive distinctiveness of one’s own group has to be established by comparison on negatively valued dimensions or by differential allocations of negative resources like costs and burdens. Positive comparisons, which result in the ingroup being “better than” the outgroup, seem to be different from those which mean being “less bad”.

How can this effect be explained? Neither Social Identity Theory nor Self- categorization Theory predict any impact of valence on intergroup behaviour. On the face of it, positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination seems to create difficulties for the postulate of “a general tendency to seek positive distinctiveness for oneself at any salient level of self-categorization” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 62). In our opinion, the search for explanations of the effect of valence on intergroup behaviour can be pursued from three different perspectives, which we define as the normative, the cognitive and the categorical. In the following sections we will present these perspectives together with recent research.

The Normative Perspective

One line of thinking could be that there are valence-specific differences in the normative appropriateness of ingroup favouritism (Mummendey et al., 1992).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

118 A M ~ L I E MUMMENDEY A N D SABINE OTTEN

Within the negative domain, positive comparison outcomes for the ingroup might be perceived as normatively less appropriate than in the positive area. While ingroup favouritism within the positive domain means that at least some amount of desirable stimuli is allocated also to the outgroup, direct discrimination in the negative domain implies an active infliction of aversive stimuli to outgroup members, and to a larger degree than to the ingroup. Social discrimination, although generally socially disapproved of, might be perceived as even more inappropriate if i t implied fewer burdens rather than more benefits for the ingroup at the expense of the outgroup.

The importance of valence in distributive justice has already been touched on by Tornblom (1988) and Tornblom, Miihlhausen, and Jonsson (1991). The question here is whether and under what conditions negative and positive allocations, and the justice evaluation of these allocations, follow the same justice principles. Research which contrasts the two kinds of allocations has only begun to emerge and, up to now, the available evidence is rather incon- sistent (Griffith, 1989; Tornblom, 1992). A number of studies recently conducted by Mikula and his co-workers focused explicitly on issues of justice in distributions of burdens and duties (Mikula et al.. 1997a, 1997b). Their results clearly suggest that it is inappropriate simply to extrapolate theories and evidence on allocations of positive resources to the domain of burdens and duties. The evidence thus far results in a present status of knowledge about valence effects in distributive justice which is far from conclusive.

So we started with a rather global, more plausible than sophisticated assumption: social discrimination will be less likely the more difficult it is to explain and to justify differential treatment of the ingroup and other group. I t seems plausible to assume that, in general, inflicting negative or aversive stimuli is less justifiable or demands more explanation than allocating positive stimuli.

Inappropriateness of Ingroup Favouritism on Positive and Negative Dimensions

Blanz, Mummendey, and Otten (1997a) investigated whether valence asymmetry in social discrimination has any correspondence to variations in normative evaluations of positive vs. negative outcome allocations in an intergroup setting. We were interested in the effect of valence on (a) outside observers’ expectations about the frequency of discriminatory behaviour (statistical norm) and (b) their judgements of social discrimination as more or less normatively appropriate or just (prescriptive norm). Participants from the perspective of an outside observer read a written description of the experimental procedure run in the study by Mummendey, Otten, and Blanz (1994): here individuals, categorized into two different groups, had to allocate either positive or negative stimuli to in- and outgroup members, using Tajfel matrices

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


in a minimal group setting. After the description of the experiment, participants had to evaluate the outcome decision of one target person. This outcome decision was presented as either fair (equal distribution) or in favour of the ingroup or in favour of the outgroup. Dependent measures in this study were participants’ expectations concerning the statistical frequency of this particular decision and evaluation of the respective target’s allocation as just, appropriate, cooperative and the like.

Not surprisingly, results showed that outside observers considered parity to be the most appropriate strategy of intergroup allocations in this minimal situation for both positive and negative stimuli. Favouritism or discrimination, whether at the cost of the other or of one’s own group, is evaluated as inappropriate. Interestingly, however, stimulus valence clearly moderates this pattern of judgements: for allocations of positive stimuli, participants expected group members to show predominantly ingroup favouritism (statistical norm) which simultaneousIy was mildly disregarded (prescriptive norm). For allocations of negative stimuli participants did not expect group members to show ingroup bias, which at the same time was condemned as the most inappropriate decision in a minimal group situation.

In a second study, Blanz et al. (199%) were interested in the motives exter- nal observers inferred to explain a target’s respective valence-specific outcome allocations to their own and the other group. Again, for a target’s ingroup favouritism on positive valence resources, participants inferred predominantly acceptable motives like “to strengthen the ingroup’s position” or “positive relations with ingroup”, whereas for ingroup favouritism on negative valence resources, less acceptable motives were inferred, like “egoism” or “self- interest”. This data pattern supports the assumption of a correspondence between the valence-specific asymmetry of social discrimination and its judgement as normatively appropriate in a minimal group setting.

Generally speaking, people refer to certain normative orientations when evaluating the appropriateness of a particular distribution of outcomes between different recipients. Dependent upon these normative orientations, a distribution might be judged as more or less appropriate or just. Valence of the resources to be allocated moderates the appropriateness rating of an allocation decision: if any justification for a differential treatment is missing, favouring one’s own group against an outgroup is less blameworthy if benefits are distributed than if the decision is about costs and burdens.

In sum, the evidence underlines a valence effect on the differential normative acceptability of social discrimination. At first sight, this could mean support for the normative perspective to explain the positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination. Unfortunately, “explaining” this effect in terms of different valence-specific norms does not at all provide a sufficient under- standing. As Billig and Tajfel (1973) put it, “statements of this nature can be made to explain almost everything, and therefore explain very little, if any-

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

120 A M ~ L I E MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OXEN

thing at all” (p. 50). What we have is the parallel or joint relation between valence effects on discrimination and valence effects on the normative evaluations of this discrimination. Yet, what we need is to focus on the processes or mechanisms responsible for this joint effect.

The Cognitive Perspective

Research on valence-specific differences in information processing suggests the second perspective for the search of explanations for positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination. Generalizing from studies on negativity effects in impression formation and person perception (Czapinski, 1986; Peeters & Czapinski 1990; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987) or mood effects on information processing (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1993) it may be assumed that different cognitive processes underlie decisions about positive and negative stimuli. Findings from these studies indicate a more careful and systematic processing of negative information. Accordingly, evaluative judgements on negative dimensions as well as decisions about negative stimuli allocations can be expected to be less susceptible to ingroup bias under conditions which do not provide any information about objective differences to justify any differentiation between both groups on the comparison dimensions in question.

In several research fields there is evidence for positive-negative asymmetries in the way knowledge is acquired, weighted, retrieved or organ- ized. Peeters (1993) summarizes studies showing that negative information is weighted more heavily in impression formation than is positive information. Pratto and John (1991) demonstrated in a series of experiments that negative stimuli per se receive more attention than positive ones. Clore, Schwarz, and Conway (1993) give many examples of a more systematic and correct (although not generally more efficient) information processing and cognitive retrieval under negative mood as compared with positive mood. Assuming that systematic information processing is positively correlated with unbiased behaviour, valence-specific lay-epistemic processes could account for the positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination. But why should the confrontation with negative stimuli instigate a more careful and thorough decision-making? Peeters and Czapinski (1990) argue that disregarding negative information is more risky and dangerous than disregarding positive information. Accordingly, negative stimuli get more attention and more weight. In the same vein, Fiske (1980) argues: “Attention to negative information is also literally adaptive in the sense that one survives better by avoiding negative contacts” (p. 904). However, Fiske (1980) adds a further argument, namely a chronic posifiviry bias in person perception (as, for example, referred to as the “Pollyanna principle” by Matlin & Stang, 1978), which in turn leads to the effect that negative information is “rare and hard to comprehend.. .”, but-

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


due to this rarity and novelty-at the same time “. . . highly informative” (p. 304). Fiske showed evidence for this assumption not only in impression ratings but also in latencies for processing valenced information.

Positive-Negative Asymmetry as an Accuracy Effect

In our own experiment testing a cognitive account of the positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination (Otten, Mummendey, & Buhl, in press), we chose a very similar approach. We tried to demonstrate corresponding valence-specific effects for intergroup evaluations as well as for the response latencies for these judgements, the latter being an indicator for the elaboration of the decision process underlying intergroup judgements. Also, it seemed necessary to measure the quality or accuracy of the evaluations themselves. While faults and deviations might be detected quite easily in memory tasks, it seemed problematic to define accuracy in intergroup judgements and allocations. Usually, experiments-especially in the minimal group paradigm- deliberately withhold differentiating information; intergroup differentiation, in spite of the absence of differences, is then interpreted as bias. Nevertheless, equality of groups in these experiments remains an untested premise. Addi- tionally, with equal groups as targets of evaluations or allocations, we cannot disentangle whether they are treated equally because they are really perceived as such, or whether group members prefer equitable treatment of both groups in spite of perceived differences. In order to deal with these problems, we did two things. First, data from a baseline experiment with uncategorized subjects were contrasted with those from the main experiment with participants being categorized in a classical minimal group setting. Second, ingroup and outgroup targets were utilised, whose quality was-according to a pretest-clearly unequal. Targets to be evaluated were identical in the baseline and the main experiment. Accordingly, biases could be defined in terms of deviations from the baseline evaluation. If even the baseline experiment showed evaluative differences between two sets of targets, the crucial question was whether this difference would be either exaggerated or attenuated, due to the fact that targets were assigned either to the ingroup or to the outgroup.

The design was based on two factors, stimulus valence (positive, negative) and instruction for decision making (spontaneous, accurate/thorough, control/ no manipulation). We hypothezised that the instruction to decide thoroughly about ingroup and outgroup evaluations should have effects analogous to those of the confrontation with negative evaluative dimensions per se. This analogy should result in a valence X instruction interaction, on both kinds of dependent measures, response latencies as well as baseline deviations in ingroup and outgroup treatment. We also included a third factor, target quality (ingroup targets superior to outgroup targets vs. ingroup targets inferior to outgroup targets). The experiment tested whether the probability of bias

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

122 A M I ~ L I E MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OTTEN

differs depending on whether the quality of targets assigned to the ingroup is either poor or good. Both a relative exaggeration of high ingroup target quality as well as a relative attenuation of low ingroup target quality would manifest in baseline differences in favour of the ingroup.

The experimental procedure of the main experiment was based on the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). The task was to evaluate the quality of six short advertisement texts, three of them supposedly a product of ingroup members, three of them a product of outgroup members. Before starting the evaluations, participants were encouraged to judge either spontaneously or thoroughly. In the control condition no special instructions concerning the decision style were given. The texts as well as the judgemental scales were displayed on a computer screen and subjects indicated their evaluations by pressing a key. In this way, judgements as well as the corresponding response latencies could be measured.

The single experimental sessions were run with five to eight participants. The only difference between the baseline experiment and main experiment was that in the former neither participants themselves nor the advertisement texts were categorized. As the only purpose of the baseline experiment was to provide the necessary data for constructing an appropriate indicator for ingroup favouritism in the main experiment, it will not be further discussed in this paper (for more details see Otten et al., in press).

Response latencies. The results for the response latencies were fully in line with the expectation. Analysis of variance indicated a significant main effect of the valence factor as well as of the instruction factor. In general, judgements on negative dimensions took more time than those on positive dimensions. In line with the manipulation, in the “spontaneous” condition response latencies were lowest, while in the “accurate” condition they were highest. However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect: the valence-specific difference in response latencies was significant in the “spontaneous” and control condition, but not in the “accurate” condition, in which positive response latencies were as high as negative ones. This pattern of data suggests that negative stimuli per se operated like an instruction to judge accurately and carefully (see Figure 4.3).

Intergroiip evaluations. Again a valence X instruction interaction was expected: in the “accurate” condition there should be no ingroup favouritism, while there should be the typical positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination effect in the control condition and especially in the “spontaneous” condition. However, the predicted two-way interaction was not significant. Instead, there was a highly significant three-way interaction with the additional factor, target quality: irrespective of valence as well as target-quality, in

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

POSITIVE-NEGATIVE ASYMMETRY IN SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION

- - - negative - positive

7.5 1

123

the “accurate” condition there were no significant deviations from the baseline data. In the “no manipulation” condition there was a positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination, with significant deviations from the baseline favouring the ingroup on positive comparison dimensions, but with a tendency towards outgroup favouritism on negative dimensions. This effect, however, was substantial only for participants who judged relatively poor ingroup targets and relatively good outgroup targets. Finally, in the “spontaneous” condition there were significant baseline deviations in the positive condition, exclusively. But here, judgements were not in line with a striving for positive ingroup differentiation, but rather with a general accentuation of inferiority as well as superiority of their own group (see Figure 4.4).

Correlational analyses with response latencies, on the one hand, and baseline deviations in favour of the ingroup, on the other hand, corroborate the results. There is a significant negative correlation. The longer the response latencies, the less absolute deviation from the baseline data. The elaboration of the decision process-as indicated by response latencies-predicted intergroup differentiation, but not outgroup discrimination.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

124 AMBLIE MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OITEN

High ingroup target quality

Low ingroup target quality

' t

.....

Spontaneous No manipulation Accurate

INSTRUCTION

positive . . . . . . . negative

Spontaneous No manipulation Accurate

INSTRUCTION

Figure 4.4 The valence X instruction interaction for high and low ingroup target quality on ingroupoutgroup baseline differences (OG-fav = outgroup favouritism; IG-fav = ingroup favouritism). From Otten, Mummendey, and Buhl, in press, with permission

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


In summary, results are encouraging with respect to the assumed valence- specific variation in information processing underlying intergroup judgements in the negative condition. We find a highly corresponding data pattern for response latencies and intergroup evaluations. On the one hand, response latencies are higher than in the positive condition; on the other hand, there are no significant ingroup-favouring deviations from the baseline evaluations. This indicates that-although ingroup identification was sufficiently high-the judgements of categorized targets were not influenced by the raters’ corresponding own group membership. In the positive condition, however, the assumption of a linear relationship between response latency and ingroup bias turned out to be too simple. This relation seems to be crucially influenced by further contextual variables like-in this experiment-the relative quality of targets assigned to the experimental ingroup. If group members are instructed to judge spontaneously, we do find a positive-negative asymmetry in intergroup accentuation rather than the typical positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination effect. Only in the positive domain, bad quality of targets as much as good quality of targets is exaggerated compared to the baseline, irrespective of whether the targets are assigned to the ingroup or the outgroup.

Positive-Negative Asymmetry as Differential Sensitization to Outgroup Discrimination

In the preceding section, we have dealt with valence effects on aspects of accuracy in quality judgements of one’s own vs. another group’s products. It was assumed that, unlike the condition of positive valence, the condition of negative valence would lead individuals to process information about the target more thoroughly and more deeply. This would make prevalent the “inherent” or objective quality of single targets and reduce accentuation and bias as effects of (irrelevant) categorical information. The main focus was on the impact of valence on the accuracy of the representation of the single target quality. We call this type of accuracy “descriptive accuracy”.

Another perspective on accuracy is suggested if the focus is directed to the relational aspect, i.e. the evaluation of targets as relatively equal or as inferior vs. superior to each other. This leads to the derivation of preference decisions on the basis of these relational or preferential judgements. Accuracy of a preferential judgement would again mean relying primarily on information about target qualities and not being influenced by additional information about category-membership, the relation between one’s own and another group or self-involvement by identification with one’s own group.

If preference decisions between one’s own and another group, the quality of their respective products, achievement, etc., are at stake, then accuracy re- ceives a moral or justice implication. Since judgements correspond to distribu-

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

126 AMELIE MUMMENDEY A N D SABINE OTTEN

tive qualities and functions, like distributions of higher or lower positions, higher or lower benefits and so on, they can now be characterized by what we call “normative accuracy”.

A preferential decision in favour of one target at the cost of another, which lacks justification by the target’s “objective” quality differences, is obviously- if performed deliberately-an unjust decision. If category-membership out- weighs individual quality information, the decision fits perfectly the criteria of social discrimination. As we have seen from our studies about perception of normative appropriateness, social discrimination is principally evaluated as unjust, morally inappropriate and negative. Normative accuracy of a relational judgement or a preferential decision would be given if, irrespective of category membership, the judgemental basis was restricted to the individual qualities of each exemplar to be evaluated or treated.

With respect to our goal of explaining the positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination, the notion of “normative accuracy” raises a modified assumption concerning the effect of valence on intergroup behaviour. Nega- tive stimuli. by instigating more thorough and careful information processing, might sensitize individuals to social discrimination, which might be implied by their preference judgements and decisions. Negative valence is assumed to function like a cue, indicating inappropriateness of preference and allocation decisions as biased.

A study by Wenzel and Mummendey (1996) provided initial support for this line of thinking. In an intergroup context, participants had to evaluate ingroup and outgroup products either separately on “pure” lists of only positive or only negative attributes, or on “mixed” lists of positive as well as negative attributes (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Mean differences of ingroup vs. outgroup evaluations (standard deviations in parentheses) for experiment l a (mixed lists) and Ib (pure lists)

Valence

Positive Negative

n = 24

(24.01) (1 5.60) n = 14 n = 15

( 13.40) (10.31)

Experiment l a (mixed lists) 3.84 2.96

Experiment l b (pure lists) 10.08* 2.93

Now: * p < 0.05 (cell mean is non-zero. one-tailed I test). From Wenzel and Mummendey, 1996, with permission.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


With the “pure” lists, the expected positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination was confirmed: participants showed ingroup favouritism on evaluations with positive attributes, but when evaluating ingroup and outgroup on negative attributes, ingroup bias did not occur. Interestingly, the latter was also true for “mixed” lists: here participants did not favour their own group irrespective of the valence of attributes; outgroup discrimination disappeared, also in the positive valence condition. Being confronted with the task of thinking in negative terms might have increased the vigilance towards possible injustice or inappropriateness of ingroup favouritism, which was then transferred to judgements of positive attributes as well.

Implicit and Explicit Social Discrimination

Otten and Mummendey (in press) approached the sensitization-assumption in a more direct way. Two studies varied stimulus valence (positive, negative) and the visibility of negative interdependence between groups (implicit, explicit). It was assumed that as long as it was not made explicit, but rather implied by the task, that one’s own group’s benefits could only be realized by raising the costs of the outgroup, the typical asymmetry effect would occur. However, as soon as this negative interdependence was made salient, ingroup favouritism should decrease or vanish in both valence conditions.

Method. Valence was manipulated by the quality of resources to be allocated between two groups. Social categorization referred to realistic groups, namely smokers vs. non-smokers. Allegedly, an issue workshop was planned to take place with members of these two groups. In the positive condition, participants decided on which group might enjoy certain leisure activities (e.g., visiting a concert; making a guided tour of a big city nearby). In the negative condition, participants allocated a number of duties (e.g., washing the dishes; cleaning the bedrooms) to be done by the workshop attendees. The visibility of negative interdependence (implicit, explicit) was manipulated as follows. In both conditions, participants were told that there was a total of eight possible leisure activitiedeight necessary duties and that four of these activitiedduties had to be allocated to either group. In the “implicit” condition the task was to choose which four out of the given eight resources should be given to the ingroup. However, from a logical point of view participants were well aware that those stimuli not allocated to the ingroup would be left over for the outgroup. In the “explicit” condition participants decided, for the complete list of eight activities, which four should be done by the ingroup and which four should be done by the outgroup. Ingroup favouritism in this experiment was indicated by participants allocating either relatively more attractive or fewer aversive stimuli to members of their ingroup. The fact that the lists of positive and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

128 AMELIE MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OTTEN

negative stimuli varied with respect to their attractiveness/aversiveness was ascertained in a pre-test. In the main experiment each participant subjectively rated the activities according to their degree of desirability or aversiveness. Ingroup treatment and outgroup treatment was defined as the average subjec- tive desirability or aversiveness of those resources assigned to the respective group (in the “implicit” condition “assigned to” meant “left over for” the outgroup).

Results. The results of this study corroborate our assumption that the visibility of negative interdependence between groups has an impact on the occurrence of social discrimination: If there are no legitimizing arguments for unequal treatment of groups, then explicit negative interdependence inhibits ingroup favouring responses in both valence conditions. However, in the “implicit” condition, which disguised the lack that the ingroup profit is realized at the outgroup’s cost, there was significant ingroup favouritism in positive as well as in negative outcome allocations. Here, the ingroupoutgroup difference scores were somewhat lower in the negative domain as compared with the positive domain (see Table 4.2), but statistically there was neither a main effect of valence, nor an interaction of valence X visibility, but only the highly significant main effect of visibility.

These results indicate that negative valence per se is not sufficient to elimi- nate biases in intergroup allocations, which are “minimal” in a broader sense than defined in the original minimal group paradigm, referring to the fact that

Table 4.2 Mean ingroupoutgroup difference scores (positive scores indicate ingroup favouritism) and standard deviations

Visibility of negative interdependence

Irnplici t Explicit Valence (ingroup allocation) (intergroup allocation)

Positive 1 .36***a (0.92) n = 42

Negative 1.15***a (1.05) n = 36

0.29h (1.16) n = 24 0.1Sh

(0.79) n = 29

Nore: *, **, ***scores are significantly different from zero with p < 0.05, p < 0.01. p < 0.001. Means with different superscripts differ from each other with p < 0.05, at least. According to Otten and Mummendey, in press.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


the experimental situation provided no obvious cues and information (e.g., status differences, differences in inputs, competitive relationships) which might justify unequal treatment of the two groups. If the outgroup only implic- itly suffered from favouring of the ingroup, then there was strong ingroup favouritism irrespective of stimulus valence. Probably, participants in the “implicit” condition took responsibility only for their active decisions for the ingroup and therefore felt to a lesser extent normative restrictions against ingroup biases. However, one might alternatively also argue that participants simply followed a heuristic when choosing four out of eight activities: they just chose the four activities they themselves liked best but did not bother about who would profit from their allocation decision. If this interpretation were right, then an “implicit” condition, requesting allocations for the outgroup only, should result in outgroup favouritism of similar size as the ingroup favouritism measured in the “implicit/ingroup” condition.

A follow-up study (Otten & Mummendey, in press) tested this possibility. This experiment replicated the preceding one, but additionally included an “implicit/outgroup” condition. Results again indicated a highly significant effect of the visibility factor. There was mild ingroup favouritism in both explicit conditions as well as in the negative/implicit/ingroup condition, no favouritism in the implicit/outgroup condition, and very high ingroup favouritism in the positive/implicit/ingroup condition. As hypothesized for Studies V and VI, this pattern of data was reflected in a valence X visibility interaction effect.

The significant difference between the explicit and the implicit/ingroup conditions corresponds to the results of the original study. Additionally, we found the typical asymmetry effect in the implicitlingroup condition, but not in the explicit condition (see Table 4.3). In line with the hypothesis that negative valence supports normative, cautious responses in negative resource allocations, ingroup favouritism in the implicit/ingroup condition was not significantly higher than in the explicit condition. Furthermore, the implicit/ outgroup condition did not result in symmetrical responses to the implicit/ ingroup condition. Participants did not simply judge on the basis of their own preferences. Obviously, they realized who would be profiting from their allocation decisions. However, why participants in the implicitloutgroup condition gave even less to their ingroup than in the explicit condition needs further clarification.

In sum, both studies on implicit and explicit social discrimination offer some preliminary evidence that negative valence might operate like a cue pointing to the inappropriateness of intergroup differentiation in minimal or almost minimal intergroup situations. The two experiments underline that the normative context is highly relevant in intergroup behaviour. At least in intergroup situations, which are based on a social categorization that offers no convincing legitimation for unequal treatment of the groups in question, people refrain

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

130 AMELIE MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OITEN

Table 4.3 Mean ingroup-outgroup difference scores (positive scores indicate ingroup favouritism) and standard deviations

Visibility of negative interdependence

Implicit Explicit lmplicit Valence (ingroup allocation) (intergroup allocation) (outgroup allocation)

~ ~ ~ ~~

Positive (1.83***" (0.94) n = 21

(0.92) n = 23

Negative 0.68**h

0.50*h (0.99) n = 20 0.53*h

(1.21) n = 20

-0.31' (1.41)

n = 21 0.06"

(1.23) n = 17

Nore: *, **. ***scores are significantly different from zero with p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001. Means with different superscripts differ from each other with p < 0.05, at least. According to Otten and Mumrnendey. in press.

from ingroup-favouring decisions as soon as the negative consequences for the respective outgroup become obvious.

The Cognitive-Normative Perspective

So far, our empirical evidence composes the following picture: minimal (or quasi-minimal) group situations are sufficient to elicit social discrimination in the positive but not in the negative area. Although social discrimination is generally judged as inappropriate (see above), it is even more disapproved of if it implies more duties and more burdens rather than fewer benefits for the outgroup in favour of the ingroup. Although morally not adequate, it seems understandable that people favour their own group with a larger share of benefits. To discharge one's own group from burdens at the expense of another group, however, is perceived as more blameworthy; such behaviour can only be explained by mean intentions and selfish motives.

Differences in response latencies clearly show that participants reflect more carefully when confronted with the task of allocating burdens, compared with the task of allocating benefits. They might inspect more thoroughly the information concerning criteria for comparing the two targets to which stimuli have to be allocated; and obviously, in the minimal intergroup situation, there is no information which gives any hint or justification for differential treatment of both groups.

The normative and the cognitive perspective can therefore be interrelated to form a meaningful interpretation: discrimination means withholding benefits or inflicting burdens in favour of the ingroup and to the disadvantage of an outgroup. It implies, apparently, an ingroup's advantage within a negative

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


interdependence between ingroup and outgroup. If this negative interdependence is obvious and individuals are aware of its consequences for the respective groups, they do not favour their own group; this would mean social discrimination of the outgroup which, as stated above, would be inappropriate and unjust. In the case of negative valence, individuals think more carefully about the allocation and the relation between the two targets, so they need less explicit hints to realize the negative interdependence. Consistently, in the case of a negative valence allocation task, they do not discriminate.

On the basis of our theoretical considerations and empirical evidence up to now, we have reached a somehow plausible interpretation of the positive- negative asymmetry of social discrimination. But with this cognitive- normative explanation we come into collision with the basic postulate of Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization Theory: favouritism of own group and discrimination against the outgroup is explained by the individual’s striving for positive social distinctiveness (Social Identity Theory) or the general tendency to seek positive distinctiveness at any given level of self-other comparison, at any salient level of self-categorization. Why should this striving be limited to the positive valence type of social discrimination?

THE CATEGORICAL PERSPECTIVE

There are two possibilities for solving the contradiction between Social Iden- tity Theory/Self-categorization Theory and positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination. Either the positive distinctiveness tendency has to be limited to a positive-valence type of social discrimination only, which would clearly demand a substantial modification of the basic assumptions of Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization Theory, or-and this alternative has far less severe consequences for the theory-the absence of discrimination, and therefore of striving for positive distinctiveness under negative valence conditions, has to be seen as a consequence of changed salience of self- categorization. Valence as a characteristic of intergroup behaviour would in this case acquire the status of an additional variable which moderates the impact of categorization on intergroup behaviour, the basic postulate concerning the functional relation between categorization and discrimination remain- ing untouched.

Being confronted with the task of distributing negative resources or evaluating on negatively connotated dimensions might have an impact on the level of self-categorization established in advance: it might elicit a feeling of “common fate” for both groups. Facing negative value dimensions or allocations of burdensome tasks might trigger a joint interest to cope with or to eradicate the problem. This would probably decrease the salience of the (experimentally) created categorization. The task of distributing burdens

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


might “switch on” the representation of a fixed or finite amount of work to be done, which turns any distribution into a zero-sum frame. For positive valence, allocation tasks might be handled quite differently. Benefits like money- especially against the background of our present competitive market society- are predominantly framed as an infinite resource, therefore negative interdependence between the respective “players” is not necessarily implied. Accordingly, benefits might elicit a striving to maximize one’s own gains. This is socially more approved because these gains are not won at the cost of direct disadvantages for competing others.

If distributing negative resources changes the salience of the group-level categorization, then a differential treatment of ingroup and outgroup, namely ingroup favouritism, must appear particularly inappropriate: why should they be treated differently if the rationale (the categorization into us and them) for differentiating has disappeared?

We conducted two experiments which were designed to test the explanation of positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination in terms of valence- specific differences in the salience of the social categorization on which intergroup evaluations are based (see Mummendey, Otten. & Berger, in preparation). We assumed that placing intergroup comparisons in the domain of negative stimuli decreases the salience of intergroup categorization. To test this, we expected to show that an active manipulation of the salience of intergroup categorization in a typical intergroup experiment shows similar effects on ingroup favouritism as the valence factor. In a situation with low or medium category salience the confrontation with negative stimuli should further decrease the importance of an intergroup distinction and hence the striving for positive ingroup distinctiveness on that level of categorization.

Accordingly, as in the previous studies on positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination, we expect significant ingroup favouritism only in the positive condition. If, however, category salience is high, then it should be sufficient to instigate ingroup bias irrespective of valence of comparison dimension. Additionally, the assumed valence-specific decrease in the salience of intergroup distinction should manifest itself not only on measures of ingroup bias but also on variables indicating category salience. According to our assumptions, we chose the same design for both experiments (see Figure

In the first study testing the categorical perspective, participants observed a video presentation of a discussion between members of two different university groups who tried to generate good reasons for the allocation (positive valence) or against the deduction (negative valence) of money in favour of their own respective faculty. Salience was manipulated in a procedure similar to that used by Oakes, Turner, and Haslam (1991): high normative fit of outgroup membership and line of arguing was held constant, while in order to establish the three levels of salience of categorization, the degree of structural

4.5).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


Salience Positive Negative

low I G > O G I G < O G high I G < O G I G > O G

Figure 4.5 Design and hypotheses for intergroup evaluations/allocations. From Mummendey, Otten, and Berger, in preparation

fit was varied. After the video presentation, participants were asked to suggest an allocation (positive valence) or deduction (negative valence) of money in reference to the two faculties by using distribution matrices. The mean scores of decisions on the whole set of matrices represented the overall i ng roup outgroup difference created by participants. Participants' causal attributions of their own allocations, either situation, person or group-attribution served as a dependent measure of salience of social categorization.

Results supported the main predictions (see Table 4.4). There was a positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination only under low salience conditions. Increasing the salience of social categories eliminated this asym- metrical effect and resulted in ingroup favouritism irrespective of valence of resources.

Increased intergroup favouritism was related to increased category-based attribution of their own behaviour. Within this data pattern, amount of ingroup identification showed an interesting picture: neither valence nor category salience had a significant impact on the ingroup identification measures,

Table 4.4 Means and standard deviations for the intergroup allocations, social category attributions and ingroup identification

~

Valence positive Valence negative

M (s.d.) n M (s.d.) n

Intergroup allocations Salience low 0.54" (0.48) 12 0.07b (0.37) 15 Salience high 0.51" (0.50) 10 0.57a (0.54) 10

Category attributions Salience low 5.00 (2.89) 12 4.38 (2.62) 8 Salience high 4.56 (3.00) 9 4.75 (2.71) 8

Salience high 3.78 (1.30) 9 4.87 (0.96) 10

Ingroup identification Salience low 4.53 (1.28) 12 4.60 (0.88) 15

Note: Positive ingroupoutgroup differences indicate ingroup favouritism. Due to missing data, cell counts vary for each dependent variable. Means with different superscripts differ significantly ( p < 0.05). by simple effects analysis. From Mummendey, Otten, & Berger, in preparation: Study 1 .

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


the absolute mean of each being relatively high. However, the correlation between ingroup identification and intergroup allocation was significantly positive for all experimental conditions except the negative valence/low salience condition, where it was zero.

PositivP-Negative Asymmetrv ns n Result of Recategorization

Thus, the results of the experiment were encouraging not only with respect to the assumed link between salience effects and variations in the salience of social categorizations, but also provide additional information qualifying the assumed decrease of category salience in the negative domain. There is some evidence that in the negative/low-salience condition participants did not change from the initial intergroup categorization to a lower, more interpersonal level of self-categorization, but to a social categorization at a higher level of inclusiveness.

I t is exactly that condition for which (because of a kind of collapsed ingroup-outgroup differentiation) no intergroup discrimination is expected (low saliencehegative valence); here ingroup identification varies independently of intergroup allocations. While identification is as high as in the high salience condition. intergroup differentiation decreased substantially. This data pattern does not fit with a process of decategorization but is fully in line with the “common ingroup identity model” as suggested by Gaertner er al. ( 1993). This model proposes, as one pathway to reduce intergroup discrimination, a change in social categorization towards a higher level of abstraction. This process should be accompanied by three different effects: (a) improved evaluation of the initial outgroup. which becomes now part of a common ingroup and therefore profits from a general “pro-ingroup bias”; (b) as a result. decreased ingroup bias; and (c) continuing high ingroup identification. Therefore. while maintaining the assumption that the lack of ingroup favour- itisrn under negative valence is due to a decrease in category salience, we could specify the process as an instance of recategorization.

This recategorization hypothesis concerning positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination was tested directly in the following study. If the positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination under low salience conditions can be explained by a recategorization process elicited by the negative- valence condition, we should expect the following data pattern: compared to the positive realm or high salience. ingroup bias is supposed to vanish due to a relative increase in the positivity of the treatment of the (former) outgroup: identification with the ingroup as well as its treatment should remain unaf- fected by the valence factor.

Participants were divided into two subgroups and had to put forward their respective group’s arguments for opposing positions in a discussion about how to decide in a resource allocation dilemma. Salience was manipulated by

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


varying normative and structural fit: in the high-salience condition it was claimed that due to their faculty membership they would be especially qualified to put forward arguments for a specific alternative. In the salience condition, participants, although invited as members of different faculties, were divided into two different dimension groups irrespective of this membership. After the exchange of arguments between the two groups, participants evaluated ingroup and outgroup on either positive or negative attributes concerning quality of arguments, discussion style or more general characteristics of the two groups. Additionally, measures of ingroup identification and salience of categorization (operationalized as perceived intergroup similarity and differences) were assessed.

Results corroborate the findings of the preceding study and are broadly in line with our main hypothesis (see Table 4.5). The negative valence/low salience condition was again the only one without significant ingroup favouritism. Data provide considerable evidence for the assumption that varying the valence of intergroup comparison dimensions actually operated like a manipulation of category salience. The data pattern for perceived intergroup similarities corresponds to the data pattern of intergroup discrimination: while in the condition with highest positive ingroup distinctiveness (positive valence/high salience), perceived intergroup similarity is lowest, it received its maximum value in the only condition where no significant ingroup favouritism was found (negative valence/low salience).

A very consistent picture arises concerning the re-categorization hypothesis: in the negative valence/low salience condition, findings were consistent with all three effects postulated by Gaertner et al. (1993) for the re-categorization

Table 4.5 Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the differences between ingroup and outgroup allocations, separate ingroup and outgroup allocations, ingroup identification, intergroup similarities and intergroup differences

Salience Low High

Valence

Difference IG-OG Ingroup evaluations Outgroup evaluations Ingroup identification Intergroup similarities Intergroup differences

Positive

0.97*a (1.55) 7.03” (1.20) 6.06” (1.62) 8.13 (1.79) 5.78“’ (2.45) 5.55” (2.30)

Negative

0.23” (1.40) 8.26” (1 S7) 8.04‘ (1 SO) 8.30 (1.18) 6.37” (2.20) 5.81” (2.32)

Positive

1 .37*’ (1.48) 6.44“ (1.67) 5.07’ (1.40) 8.27 (1.49) 4.96h (1.73) 6.87’ (1.52)

Negative

1 .05*a (1.65) 8.28” (1.35) 7.22d (1.75) 8.38 (1.84) 5.58”’ (2.43) 5.29a (2.33)

Note: Positive ingroupoutgroup differences (IG-OG) indicate ingroup favouritism. Cell counts vary from 23 to 27. Means with different superscripts differ significantly ( p < 0.05). Means with *differ significantly from zero ( p < 0.05). From Mummendey, Otten. & Berger. in preparation; Study 11.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


process to elicit: (a) significant decrease of ingroup bias; (b) relative increase in the positivity of outgroup evaluation; and (c) high ingroup identification. The valence effects on measures of category salience indicate that valence and salience manipulations do not simply result in parallel effects on discrimination, but that valence actually operates like a manipulation of salience.

In summary, the results from Studies VII and VIII are quite encouraging with respect to the categorical perspective for explaining the positive-negative asymmetry of discrimination. The evidence so far is in line with the assumption that in intergroup settings which do not provide objective information about evaluative differences between groups, the task of comparing two groups on negative dimensions reduces category salience and elicits recategorization on a higher level of abstraction. Additional support for this interpretation is provided by Blanz, Mummendey, and Otten (1997b): a re-analysis of data from two minimal group studies with a total of 280 participants tested whether the impact of stimulus valence on ingroup favouritism was attributable to varying degrees of ingroup identification. Here again, results clearly excluded identification as an explanatory concept for positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination. Variation of intergroup discrimination is not due to change of identification with the ingroup but due to change of the ingroup itself.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the empirical evidence presented above forms the following picture: different from the positive valence conditions typically realized in the minimal group paradigm, under negative valence conditions mere categorization is not sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation. In order to instigate social discrimination in the negative domain, what we call aggravating conditions are necessary. These conditions provide information beyond the mere categorization underlining the ingroupoutgroup distinction and, thus, potentially provide a rationale for discriminatory treatment between groups.

As indicated by studies from the cognitive perspective, ingroup and outgroup evaluations on negative dimensions elicit more careful information processing. Correspondingly, intergroup differentiation appears only if clear information about category based differences is provided. Consistently, as shown in the studies from the normative perspective, ingroup favouritism, which means positive ingroup distinctiveness without objective differentiating information, is perceived as more inappropriate in the negative area than in the positive one. Moreover, the results concerning implicit and explicit social discrimination show that, as long as the categorization does not provide any rationale for intergroup differentiation, group members refrain from favour-

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


ing their own group at the other group’s expense. As finally illustrated by the studies from the categorical perspective, a social categorization as introduced in the minimal group paradigm, which is usually sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism in social comparisons on positive dimensions, does not provide a sufficient rationale for treating ingroup and outgroup differently on negative dimensions. Accordingly, this particular categorization loses its function to organize and structure the social situation and to guide the respective evaluations and allocations.

If we accept the recategorization hypothesis to explain the positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination, the question is: why does negative valence instigate recategorization? To answer this question we could reach back to the normative as well as to the cognitive analyses offered above: the negative valence condition could make salient the inappropriateness of differentiation, especially discrimination on the basis of vague and insubstantial differences between ingroup and outgroup. Or more accurately, the deeper information processing might already make obvious that there are no differences between ingroup and outgroup relevant for their judgement or treatment. Both lines of thinking will in the end raise doubts in participants about whether the intergroup level established in minimal group type situations was actually the appropriate one of self-categorization.

In other words, if confronted with the task of distributing negative aversive stimuli, which means entering the socially more problematic area of social discrimination, mere social categorization is no longer a sufficient condition of ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination. This questions the relevance of positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination for Social Identity Theory or Self-categorization Theory and their respective explanations of social discrimination. If the striving for a positive social identity-based upon positive ingroup distinctiveness by a positive comparison outcome-is the central motive for ingroup bias, why should individuals pass up the opportu- nity to establish superiority on negatively framed evaluative dimensions? This question becomes even more interesting when considering the expected greater weight and attention assigned to negative as compared with positive information (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990).

Valence of resources or attributes seems to function as a moderator which is not taken into consideration in Social Identity Theory/Self-categorization Theory and which cannot simply be incorporated a posteriori into the theory. The zero-correlation of effect sizes for positive and negative valence conditions concerning intergroup discrimination, which was shown in the meta- analysis reported above, points to different processes being at work.

Positive distinctiveness created by relative superiority theoretically includes both the “better than . . .” type and the “less bad . . .” type as well. Positive and negative valence are interchangeable ingredients for the same cake. If one of them turns out to produce unexpected effects, this raises doubts in the original

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

138 A M ~ L I E MUMMENDEY AND SABINE OTTEN

expectations concerning the chemical characteristics of both. When we now return to the question of what the findings altogether mean for the basic assumptions of Social Identity Theory, then we propose to shift from our initial concern: the question is no longer why mere categorization is not sufficient to elicit social discrimination in the negative valence condition. Moreover, we are led back to the question posed 25 years ago, namely: what is it that makes mere categorization a sufficient condition for ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation in the positive valence condition? The striving for positive distinctiveness by creating a positive comparison outcome in order to establish or preserve a positive social identity no longer seems to be a satisfying answer in itself.

Forgas and Fiedler (1996) showed, for participants in a positive mood, that a minimal group situation with almost no relevance of induced categorization for participants’ self-concept might lead people to rely on simple categorical information, which then ends up in intergroup discrimination. In order to explain the consistent direction of intergroup differentiation towards ingroup favouritism, something beyond the mere categorical information must be taken into account. Ingroup favouritism under (broadly) minimal group conditions might, moreover, be something like an automatic reflection of positive image of the individual self by extrapolating it to the evaluation of the own group. Concepts like “pro-ingroup bias” (Gaertner ef a!., 1994), an “initial categorization-based ingroup bias” (Maass & Schaller, 1991) or a “self- anchoring process” for ingroup evaluation (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) underline this way of thinking. Continuing this line of thinking would lead to a quite interesting assumption: under positive valence conditions, individuals do not really discriminate against the outgroup. What is conceived as ingroup favouritism in the minimal group paradigm, might possibly be nothing else than a more or less mindless extension of positive evaluation of self to one’s own group as a whole. Then, the less positive evaluation of the outgroup would be a kind of unintended byproduct, rather than an explicitly established differentiation. In other words, in the positive area, mere categorization might create only “pseudo-discrimination”. Consequently. this pseudo-discrimination should vanish as soon as the task of differentiating on negative dimensions or distributing costs or burdens interrupts this mindless reliance on mere heuristic category information.

The findings concerning the cognitive perspective especially indicate that negative valence makes obvious that arbitrary categorizations lack a sufficient rationale for intergroup differentiation. Consequently, and in line with the results from the studies testing the categorical as well as the normative perspective, under negative valence conditions the salience of the initially induced categorization decreases and discrimination is perceived as more inappropriate.

Discrimination in Allport’s sense. namely denial of equality of treatment

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


because of a person’s membership of to a different category, is processed differently. The downgrading of an outgroup needs more than mere categorization. Moreover, it needs motivations like coping with identity threat or repairing aversive emotional states (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996), namely aggravating conditions (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995b; Mummendey el al., 1992; Otten, Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996) which underline or even enforce salience of categorization. They provide the legitimizing rationale, by which people would not hesitate to create positive ingroup distinctiveness, even at the expense of the outgroup, and by means of aversive stimuli.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The studies reported here were conducted within a research project supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DGF; MU-55111 1-314). We are grateful to Dirk Pisula, Nils Wandersleben, Iris Kohnen, Alexandra Rosol and Rahel Kruckels for their assistance during conceptualization of the experiments and data collection.

REFERENCES

Allport, G. W. (1954). Billig, M., & Tajfel. H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup

behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 3,27-52. Blanz, M., Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (1995a). Perceptions of relative group size

and group status: Effects on intergroup discrimination in negative evaluations. Euro- pean Journal of Social Psychology, 25. 231-47.

Blanz. M., Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (1995b). Positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination: The impact of stimulus-valence, size- and status-differentials in intergroup evaluations. British Journal of Social Psychology, 34(4), 409-19.

Blanz, M., Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (1995~). Wahrgenommene Motive fur soziale Diskriminierung: Einflusse von Stimulusvalenz und Beurteilerperspektive (Perceived Motives for Social Discrimination: The Influence of Stimulus Valence and Observer Perspective). Zeitschrift fur Sozialpsychologie. 26. 13547.

Normative evaluations and frequency expectations regarding positive and negative outcome allocations between groups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 165-76.

Blanz, M., Mummendey, A. & Otten, S. (1997b). lngroup identification as an explanatory concept for the positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination? Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale.

Affective states and the influence of activated general knowledge. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(7). 766-78.

Happiness and stereotypic thinking in social judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(4),

Principles of judging valence: What makes

The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Blanz, M., Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (1997a).

Bless, H., & Fiedler, K. (1995).

Bodenhausen, G. V., Kramer, G. P., & Siisser, K. (1994).

621 -32. Brendl, C. M., & Higgins. E. T. (1996).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

140 AMELIE MUMMENDEY AND SABINE O-ITEN

events positive or negative. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 28, pp. 95-160). San Diego. CA: Academic Press.

Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive- motivational analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86(2), 307-24.

Brewer, M. B.. & Kramer, R. M. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behavior. Annual Reviews of Psychology, 36, 219-43.

Brown, R. J. (1995). Brown, R. (1986). Buhl, T. (1996). Empirische Befiinde zur valenzspezifischen Eigen-

griippenbevorzugiing. Eine Meta-Analyse ziir Positiv-negariv Asymmetrie sozialer Diskriminierung. Berichte aus dem Psychologischen Institut IV, Marz 1996. Miin- ster: Westfalische Wilhelms-Universitat.

Cadinu. M. R.. & Rothbart, M. (1996). Self-anchoring and differentiation processes in the minimal group setting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(4), 661-77.

Affective causes and consequences of social information processing. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds), Handbook of Social Cognition (pp. 323-417). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioural Sciences (2nd edn). Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum.

Czapinski, J. (1986). Informativeness of evaluations in interpersonal communication: Effects of valence. extremity of evaluations and ego-involvement of evaluator. Polish Psychological Bulletin. 17, 155-64.

Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (Ed.) (1986). Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Fise. S. T. (1980). Attention and weight in person perception: The impact of negative and extreme behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38(6), 889-906.

Forgas. J. P., & Fiedler. K. (1996). Us and them: Mood effects on intergroup discrimination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70( 1). 2840.

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A.. & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. In W. Stroebe & M . Hewstone (Eds), European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 4. pp. 1-26). Chichester: Wiley.

Gaertner, S. L., Rust, M. C., Dovidio, J. F., Bachmann, B. A., & Anastasio, P. A. (1994). The contact hypothesis. The role of a common ingroup identity on reducing intergroup bias. Small Group Research, 25(2), 22449.

Discriminatory speech acts. A functional approach. In D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann. A. W. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (Eds), Stereotyping and Prejudice (pp. 183-204). New York: Springer.

Griffith, W. I. (1989). The allocation of negative outcomes. In E. J. Lawler & B. Markovsky (Eds), Advances in Group Processes (Vol. 6 , pp. 107-37). Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Hewstone. M., Fincham, F.. & Jaspars, J. (1981). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour: A replication with “penalties”. European Journal of Social

Individuality and membership in the intergroup system. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Social Identity and Intergroup relations (pp. 241-74). London: Academic Press.

Intergroup biases and the cognitive dynamics of stereotype formation. In: W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds), European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 2 , pp. 189-209). Chichester: Wiley.

Prejudice. Its Social Psychology. Oxford: Blackwell. Social Psychology (2nd edn). New York: Free Press.

Clore. G. L.. Schwarz, N., & Conway, M. (1993).

Graumann, C. F., & Wintermantel, M. (1989).

Psychology. 11, 101-7. Horwitz, M., & Rabbie, J. M. (1982).

Maass, A., & Schaller, M. (1991).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


Malin, M. W., & Stang, D. J. (1978). The Pollyanna Principle. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.

Messick, D. W., & Mackie, D. M. (1989). Intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 40,45-81.

Mikula, G., Freudenthaler, H. H., Brennacher-Kroll, S., & Brunschko, B. (1997a). Division of labor in student-households: Gender inequality, perceived justice and satisfaction. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 19(3).

Mikula, G., Freudenthaler, H. H., Brennacher-KroII, S., & Schiller-Brandl, R. (1997b). Arrangements and rules of distribution of burdens and duties: The case of household chores. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 189-208.

Mullen, B., Brown, R., & Smith, C. (1992). Ingroup bias as a function of salience, relevance and status: An integration. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 10s22.

Diskriminierung von Fremdgruppen: zur Asymmetrie im Umgang mit positiven und negativen Bewertungen und Ressourcen. In D. Frey (Ed.), Berichte uber den 37. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Psychologie in Kiel, 1990 (Vol. 2 , pp. 359-65). Gottingen: Hogrefe.

Mummendey, A. (1995). Positive distinctiveness and intergroup discrimination: An old couple living in divorce? European Journal of Social Psychology, 25,657-70.

Mummendey, A., Otten, S., & Berger, U. (in preparation). Positive-negative asymmetry in intergroup discrimination: Valence of evaluation and salience of categorization.

Mummendey, A., Otten, S., & Blanz, M. (1994). Social categorization and intergroup discrimination. The asymmetry in positive versus negative outcome allocations. Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 1, 15-30.

Mummendey, A,, Simon, B., Dietze, C., Grunert, M.. Haeger, G., Kessler, S., Lettgen, S., & Schaferhoff, S. (1992). Categorization is not enough: Intergroup discrimination in negative outcome allocation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 28. 125-44.

Oakes, P. J., Turner, J. C., & Haslam, S. A. (1991). Perceiving people as group members: The role of fit in the salience of social categorizations. British Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 1 2 5 4 .

Intergroup discrimination in positive and negative outcome allocations: The impact of stimulus valence, relative group status and relative group size. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(6), 568- 81.

Otten, S., Mummendey, A., & Buhl, T. (in press). Accuracy in information processing and the positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination. Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale.

Our benefits or at your expenses? Justice considerations in intergroup allocations of positive and negative resources. Social Justice Research.

Peeters, G. (1993). The positive-negative asymmetry: On cognitive consistency and positivity bias. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(4), 455-74.

Peeters, G., & Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive-negative asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction between affective and informational negativity effects. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds), European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 33-60). Chichester: Wiley.

Automatic vigilance: The attention-grabbing power of negative social information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(3), 380-91.

Mummendey, A., & Simon, B. (1991).

Otten, S., Mummendey, A., & Blanz, M. (1996).

Otten, S., & Mummendey. A. (in press).

Pratto, F., & John, 0. P. (1991).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

142 AMELIE MUMMENDEY A N D SABlNE OITEN

Rabbie, J. M.. & Horwitz. M. (1969). Arousal of ingrouputgroup bias by a chance

Rosenthal, R. ( 1 989). Meta-analytical Procedures for Social Research (Applied Social

Sherif, M. (1966). The Psychology of Social Norms. New York: Harper Torchbook. Sherif, M.. Harvey. 0. J . . White. B. J.. Hood, W. R., & Sherif. C . W. (1961).

Intergroicp Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman, OK: University Book Exchange.

Status in experimentally produced groups. American Journal of Sociology. 60. 370-79.

Social judgment and social memory: The role of cue diagnosticity in negativity, positivity, and extremity biases. Journal of Personality arid Social Psychology. 52(4), 689-99.

Intergroup relations. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds), Handbook of Social Psychology (Vol. 11, pp. 599458). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination: Chang- ing conceptions in theory and research. In D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, A. W. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (Eds). Stereotyping and Prejudice (pp. 3-34). New York: Springer.

Intergroup aggression: Its predictors and dis- tinctness from in-group bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56. 364- 73.

Tajfel, H . (1978). The Social Psychology of Minorities. London: Minority Rights Group (No. 7).

Tajfel. H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psy-

Tajfel, H.. & Turner. J. C . (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S . Worchel (Eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C . (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds). Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Tajfel, H., Billig. M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C . (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. Europeari Journal of Social Psychology, 1. 149-78.

Tornblom, K. Y. (1988). Positive and negative allocations: A typology and a model for conflicting justice principles. In E. J. Lawler & B. Markovsky (Eds), Advances in Group Processes (Vol. 5. pp. 141-68). Greenwich, CT: JAl.

Tornblom. K. Y . (1992). The social psychology of distributive justice. In K. R. Scherer (Ed.), Justice. Interdisciplinary Perspectives (pp. 177-236). Cambridge, MA: Cam- bridge University Press.

Tornblom. K. Y.. Miihlhausen. S. M.. & Jonsson. D. R. (1991). The allocation of positive and negative outcomes. When is the equality principle fair for both? In R. Vermunt & H. Steensma (Eds), Social Justice in Human Relations (Vol. 1: Societal and Psychological Origins of Justice, pp. 59-100). New York: Plenum.

Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour. Eiiropean Journal of Social Psychology. 5, 5-35.

Social categorization and social discrimination in the minimal group paradigm. In H. Tajfel (Ed.). Differentiation Between Social Groups (pp. 101- 40). London: Academic Press.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher. S. D.. & Wetherell, M. S . (1987). Re- discovering the Social Group. A Self-categorization Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

win or loss. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13. 269-77.

Research Methods Series, Vol. 6. 4th edn). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Sherif, M., White, B. J.. & Harvey, 0. J. (1955).

Skowronski. J. J.. & Carlston. D. E. (1987).

Stephan. W. G. (1985).

Stroebe, W.. & Insko, C . A. (1989).

Struch, N.. & Schwartz, S. H. (1989).

chology. 33, 1-39.

Turner, J. C. (1975).

Turner, J. C. (1978).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13


Wenzel, M., & Mummendey, A. (1996). Positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination: A normative analysis of differential evaluations of in-group and outgroup on positive and negative- attributes. British Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 493-507.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Y

ork]

at 0

8:28

03

Sept

embe

r 20

13

positive–negative asymmetry in social discrimination

Documents